-INEEP

Chapter 2: Thermal Design Principles

Problem Solution

Problem 2-1 Relations among fuel element thermal parameters in various

power reactors

Solution:

According to Eq. 2-5 (page 23):

〈 〉 〈 〉 〈 〉

Where:

N = the number of cylindrical fuel pins.

L = active fuel length of the pin.

Dco = outside clad diameter.

Rfo = fuel pellet radius.

We can obtain 〈 〉 and 〈 〉 as below:

〈 〉 〈 〉
〈 〉 〈 〉

From Table 2-3 (page 31) and Table 1-3 (page 13):

For BWR:

〈 〉

We obtain:

〈 〉
 〈 〉

Similarly, for PWR:

〈 〉

We obtain:

〈 〉

〈 〉

Similarly, for PHWR:

〈 〉

We obtain:

〈 〉

〈 〉

Problem 2-3 Minimum critical power ratio in a BWR

Solution:

MCPR can be derived by this ratio:

Where:

Critical bundle power = number of pins in an assembly x operating pin power.

The operating pin power can be obtained by integrating the axial linear power
equation over the active fuel height.

From Table 2-3 (page 23):

Active fuel height of BWR = 3.81 m; q’max = 44kW/m

∫ ( )

Note:

Primitive function of the integral:

Is derived as below:

From Table 1-3 (page 13), for BWR, the number of pins in an assembly is 62.

Therefore, operating bundle power = 62 x 43.8211 = 2716.91 kW

And
Problem 2-5 Relations among thermal design conditions in a PWR

〈 〉 =17.8 kW/m.

The failure limit = 70 kW/m.

Multiplication factors:

Radial flux (RF) = 1.55

Axial and local flux factor (ALF factor) = 1.70

Engineering uncertainty factor (EU factor) = 1.05

Overpower factor (O factor) = 1.15

Solution:

As defined in Figure 2-5 (page 29), we obtain:

Limit for design transient = 〈 〉 x RF x ALF factor x EU factor x O factor

= 17.8 x 1.55 x 1.70 x 1.05 x 1.15 = 56.63 kW/m.

Attempt to so solve the problem 2-4 Pumping power for a PWR reactor coolant
system

Core power = 3817 MWt

ΔTcore = 31oC

Reactor coolant system pressure drop = 778 kPa

Solution:

According to Eq. 2-8

Where:

= Pressure drop through the circuit.

Af = Cross-sectional area of the coolant passage.

v = Average coolant velocity.

We observe that Af x v is equal to V - the volume of water passing through the

core per second. Therefore:

The amount of heat that water receives from the core per second = Q = Core
power

∫ ∫ (1)

Where:

G(t) = mass of water passing through the core per second.

V = Volume of water passing through the core per second.

= Absolute density of water at ToC.

C(T) = Specific heat capacity at ToC.

 (Ref> http://cbs.grundfos.com/au-nz/lexica/HEA_Specific_heat_capacity.html)

For a rough estimation, we can suppose that:

Tin = 286oC, Tout = 317oC.
From T = 286oC to 300oC: C1 = 5.296 kJ/KgoK; 1 = 750.5 kg/m3
From T = 300oC to 317oC: C2 = 5.773 kJ/KgoK; 2 = 712.2 kg/m3
And specific heat capacity and density of water don’t change much in these
ranges of temperature.
Therefore, Eq. 1 can be simplified as below:

We can derive V as:

And

Study the LOCA of the Three Mile Island accident.

The accident to unit 2 happened at 4 am on 28 March 1979 when the reactor was
operating at 97% power. It involved a relatively minor malfunction in the
secondary cooling circuit which caused the temperature in the primary coolant to
rise. This in turn caused the reactor to shut down automatically. Shut down took
about one second. At this point a relief valve failed to close, but instrumentation
did not reveal the fact, and so much of the primary coolant drained away that the
residual decay heat in the reactor core was not removed. The core suffered
severe damage as a result.
The operators were unable to diagnose or respond properly to the unplanned
automatic shutdown of the reactor. Deficient control room instrumentation and
inadequate emergency response training proved to be root causes of the accident
The chain of events during the Three Mile Island Accident
Within seconds of the shutdown, the pilot-operated relief valve (PORV) on the
reactor cooling system opened, as it was supposed to. About 10 seconds later it
should have closed. But it remained open, leaking vital reactor coolant water to
the reactor coolant drain tank. The operators believed the relief valve had shut
because instruments showed them that a "close" signal was sent to the valve.
However, they did not have an instrument indicating the valve's actual position.
Responding to the loss of cooling water, high-pressure injection pumps
automatically pushed replacement water into the reactor system. As water and
steam escaped through the relief valve, cooling water surged into the pressurizer,
raising the water level in it. (The pressurizer is a tank which is part of the primary
reactor cooling system, maintaining proper pressure in the system. The relief
valve is located on the pressurizer. In a PWR like TMI-2, water in the primary
cooling system around the core is kept under very high pressure to keep it from
boiling.)
Operators responded by reducing the flow of replacement water. Their training
told them that the pressurizer water level was the only dependable indication of
the amount of cooling water in the system. Because the pressurizer level was
increasing, they thought the reactor system was too full of water. Their training
told them to do all they could to keep the pressurizer from filling with water. If it
filled, they could not control pressure in the cooling system and it might rupture.
Steam then formed in the reactor primary cooling system. Pumping a mixture of
steam and water caused the reactor cooling pumps to vibrate. Because the severe
vibrations could have damaged the pumps and made them unusable, operators
shut down the pumps. This ended forced cooling of the reactor core. (The
operators still believed the system was nearly full of water because the
pressurizer level remained high.) However, as reactor coolant water boiled away,
the reactor’s fuel core was uncovered and became even hotter. The fuel rods
were damaged and released radioactive material into the cooling water.
(Ref> http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf36.html)