BENJAMIN PANGAN vs. HON. LOURDES F.

GATBALITE
G.R. No. 141718           
January 21, 2005

Facts:
On September 16, 1987, the petitioner was convicted of the offense charged and was sentenced to serve a
penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, on October 24, 1988,
affirmed in toto the decision of the Municipal Trial Court. Petitioner never got to serve his sentence and hid for
about nine years.

Pursuant to the order of arrest, on January 20, 2000, the petitioner was apprehended and detained at the
Mabalacat Detention Cell. On January 24, 2000, petitioner filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at the
Regional Trial Court of Angeles City. He impleaded as respondent the Acting Chief of Police of Mabalacat,
Pampanga. Petitioner contended that his arrest was illegal and unjustified on the grounds that:

(a) the straight penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor prescribes in five years under No. 3,
Article 93 [of the] Revised Penal Code, and
(b) having been able to continuously evade service of sentence for almost nine years, his criminal
liability has long been totally extinguished under No. 6, Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code.

The petition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied as there was no evasion of the service of the sentence in this
case, because such evasion presupposes escaping during the service of the sentence consisting in deprivation of
liberty.

Issue:
When does the prescription of penalties begin to run?

Ruling:
Petitioner is ordered released effective immediately for having fully served his sentence unless he is detained
for another offense or charge.

The period of prescription of penalties — the succeeding Article 93 provides — "shall commence to run from
the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence". In Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code
discussed on how the evasion of service of sentence was perfected and thus it was stated there as such that; The
penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any convict who
shall evade service of his sentence by escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final
judgment. To consider properly the meaning of evasion service of sentence, its elements must be present the
are: (1) the offender is a convict by final judgment; (2) he "is serving his sentence which consists in deprivation
of liberty"; and (3) he evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence. For, by the
express terms of the statute, a convict evades "service of his sentence" by "escaping during the term of his
imprisonment by reason of final judgment." That escape should take place while serving sentence, is
emphasized by the provisions of the second sentence of Article 157 which provides for a higher penalty if such
"evasion or escape shall have taken place by means of unlawful entry, by breaking doors, windows, gates,
walls, roofs, or floors, or by using picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation, or through
connivance with other convicts or employees of the penal institution, . . ." Indeed, evasion of sentence is but
another expression of the term "jail breaking."

As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General "escape" in legal parlance and for purposes of Articles 93 and
157 of the RPC means unlawful departure of prisoner from the limits of his custody. Clearly, one who has not
been committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped therefrom.
In the instant case, petitioner was never brought to prison. In fact, even before the execution of the judgment for
his conviction, he was already in hiding. Now petitioner begs for the compassion of the Court because he has
ceased to live a life of peace and tranquility after he failed to appear in court for the execution of his sentence.
But it was petitioner who chose to become a fugitive. The Court accords compassion only to those who are
deserving. Petitioner's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt but he refused to answer for the wrong he
committed. He is therefore not to be rewarded therefor.

People of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand Baluntong

G.R. No.  182061       
March 15, 2010

Facts:
Ferdinand Baluntong set on fire, the house of Celerina Solangon, causing the complete destruction of the said
house and the death of Celerina Solangon and Alvin Savarez, and inflicting serious physical injuries on Joshua
Savarez, thereby performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of murder as a
consequence but which, nevertheless do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator.

The Trial Court found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of double murder and
frustrated murder. He is sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court but in light of the passage of R.A. 9346, it reduced
the sentence from death to reclusion perpetua.

Issue:
Were the courts correct in charging the accused the complex crime of double murder and frustrated murder?

Ruling:
The Court of Appeals Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a NEW one is rendered finding
appellant, Ferdinand T. Baluntong, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Simple Arson under Sec. 3(2) of P.D.
No. 1613 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with no eligibility for parole and other
civil damages modified.

In determining the offense committed by appellant, People v. Malngan teaches:

In cases where both burning and death occur, in order to determine what crime/crimes was/were perpetrated –
whether arson, murder or arson and homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to ascertain the main objective of the
malefactor:

(a) if the main objective is the burning of the building or edifice, but death results by reason or on the
occasion of arson, the crime is simply arson, and the resulting homicide is absorbed;
(b) if, on the other hand, the main objective is to kill a particular person who may be in a building or edifice,
when fire is resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal the crime committed is murder only; lastly,
(c) if the objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person, and in fact the offender has already done so, but
fire is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, then there are two separate and distinct crimes
committed – homicide/murder and arson.

Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1613, “Amending the Law on Arson,” reads:

 
Section 3.  Other Cases of Arson. ─ The penalty of Reclusion Temporal to Reclusion Perpetua shall be imposed
if the property burned is any of the following: (2)  Any inhabited house or dwelling;
 
The Court finds that there is no showing that appellant’s main objective was to kill Celerina and her housemates
and that the fire was resorted to as the means to accomplish the goal.

Absent any concrete basis then to hold that the house was set on fire to kill the occupants, appellant cannot be
held liable for double murder with frustrated murder.  Celerina was outside  the house at the time it was set on
fire.  She merely entered the burning house to save her grandsons.
 
While the above-quoted Information charged appellant with “Double Murder with Frustrated Murder,”
appellant may be convicted of Arson.   For the only difference between a charge for Murder under Article 248
(3) of the Revised Penal Code and one for Arson under the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 3 (2) of
P.D. No. 1613, lies in the intent in pursuing the act. 
 
As reflected above, as it was not shown that the main motive was to kill the occupants of the house, the crime
would only be arson, the homicide being a mere consequence thereof, hence, absorbed by arson.
 
When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the
offense charged is included or necessarily includes the offense proved, conviction shall be for the offense
proved which is included in the offense charged, or the offense charged which is included in the offense
proved. 
 
          Under Section 5 of P.D. 1613, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death is imposed when death results. 
In the light of the passage of Republic Act No. 9346, the penalty should be reclusion perpetua.

People of the Philippines vs. Roberto Abay

G.R. No. 177752
February 24, 2009

Facts:
Appellant Roberto Abay was charged with the rape of AAA, a minor, 13 years of age. According to Dr.
Guerrero-Manalo, AAA confided to her that appellant had been sexually abusing her for six years. This was
confirmed by AAA’s physical examination indicating prior and recent penetration injuries.

BBB corroborated AAA’s testimony. She testified that she knew about appellant’s dastardly acts. However,
because he would beat her up and accuse AAA of lying whenever she confronted him, she kept her silence.
Thus, when she caught appellant in the act of molesting her daughter on December 25, 1999, she immediately
proceeded to the police station and reported the incident.

The Trial Court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the crime of rape under Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5 Article III of RA 7610 and sentenced him to death.

The appellate court on the other hand affirmed the findings of the trial court but modified the penalty and award
of damages. In view of the enactment of RA 8353 and RA 9346, the CA found appellant guilty only of simple
rape and reduced the penalty imposed to reclusion perpetua.

Issue:
Is the accused correctly charged with simple rape?

Ruling:
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed with modification. He is found guilty of simple rape and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and pay damages.
Under Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 in relation to RA 8353, if the victim of sexual abuse is below 12
years of age, the offender should not be prosecuted for sexual abuse but for statutory rape under Article 266-
A(1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code and penalized with reclusion perpetua. On the other hand, if the victim is 12
years or older, the offender should be charged with either sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of RA 7610 or rape
under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1[d]) of the Revised Penal Code. However, the offender cannot be
accused of both crimes for the same act because his right against double jeopardy will be prejudiced. A person
cannot be subjected twice to criminal liability for a single criminal act. Likewise, rape cannot be complexed
with a violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610. Under Section 48 of the Revised Penal Code (on complex crimes),
a felony under the Revised Penal Code (such as rape) cannot be complexed with an offense penalized by a
special law.
 
In this case, the victim was more than 12 years old when the crime was committed against her. The Information
against appellant stated that AAA was 13 years old at the time of the incident. Therefore, appellant may be
prosecuted either for violation  of  Section 5(b) of  RA 7610  or  rape  under  Article 266-A (except paragraph
1[d]) of the Revised Penal Code. While the Information may have alleged the elements of both crimes, the
prosecution’s evidence only established that appellant sexually violated the person of AAA through force and
intimidation by threatening her with a bladed instrument and forcing her to submit to his bestial designs. Thus,
rape was established.

People of the Philippines vs. SPO1 Ernesto Ulep

G.R. No. 132547
September 20, 2000

Facts:
Buenaventura Wapili went berserk Mundog Subdivision, Poblacion Kidapawan, Cotabato and in order to stop
the former from going further, SPO1 Ulep’s assistance was sought. Accused with two other policemen, armed
with rifles, arrived at the scene, alighted from the jeep when they saw the victim approaching them. The
accused fired a warning shot in the air and told Wapili to put down his weapons or they would shoot him. But
Wapili retorted "pusila!" ("fire!") and continued advancing towards the police officers. When Wapili was only
about two (2) to three (3) meters away from them, SPO1 Ulep shot the victim with his M-16 rifle, hitting him in
various parts of his body. As the victim slumped to the ground, SPO1 Ulep came closer and pumped another
bullet into his head and literally blew his brains out.

The trial court rendered judgment convicting the accused with murder and sentenced to death.

Accused-appellant prays for his acquittal mainly on the basis of his claim that the killing of the victim was in
the course of the performance of his official duty as a police officer, and in self-defense.

Issue:
Is the accused really guilty of murder and by such, is he liable to suffer the sentence of death penalty?

Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant SPO1 ERNESTO ULEP is found
guilty of HOMICIDE, instead of Murder, and is sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of four (4) years, two
(2) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional medium as minimum, to six (6) years, four (4) months and
twenty (20) days of prision mayor minimum as maximum. He is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of
Buenaventura Wapili in the amount of P50,000.00, and to pay the costs.

Preliminarily, having admitted the killing of Wapili, accused-appellant assumed the burden of proving legal
justification therefor. He must establish clearly and convincingly how he acted in fulfillment of his official duty
and/or in complete self-defense, as claimed by him; otherwise, he must suffer all the consequences of his
malefaction.

Before the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty under Art. 11, par. 5, of The Revised Penal Code may
be successfully invoked, the accused must prove the presence of two (2) requisites, namely, that he acted in the
performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or an office, and that the injury caused or the offense
committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of such right or
office. The second requisite is lacking in the instant case.

Once he saw the victim he fired a warning shot then shot the victim hitting him on the different parts of the
body causing him to fall to the ground and in that position the accused shot the victim again hitting the back
portion of the victim's head causing the brain to scatter on the ground x x x x the victim, Buenaventura Wapili,
was already on the ground. Therefore, there was no necessity for the accused to pump another shot on the back
portion of the victim's head.

We find in favor of accused-appellant the incomplete justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty or lawful
exercise of a right. Under Art. 69 of The Revised Penal Code, "a penalty lower by one or two degrees than that
prescribed by law shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the
conditions required to justify the same or to exempt from criminal liability in the several cases mentioned in
Arts. 11 and 12, provided that the majority of such conditions be present. The courts shall impose the penalty in
the period which may be deemed proper, in view of the number and nature of the conditions of exemption
present or lacking."

Incomplete justification is a special or privileged mitigating circumstance, which, not only cannot be offset by
aggravating circumstances but also reduces the penalty by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law.
Undoubtedly, the instant case would have fallen under Art. 11, par. 5 of The Revised Penal Code had the two
(2) conditions therefor concurred.

We likewise credit in favor of accused-appellant the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The police
blotter of Kidapawan Municipal Police Station shows that immediately after killing Wapili, accused-appellant
reported to the police headquarters and voluntarily surrendered himself.

Article 249 of The Revised Penal Code prescribes for the crime of homicide the penalty of reclusion temporal,
the range of which is twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. There being an incomplete
justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty, the penalty should be one (1) degree lower, i.e., from reclusion
temporal to prision mayor, pursuant to Art. 69, in relation to Art. 61, par. 2, and Art. 71, of the Code, to be
imposed in its minimum period since accused-appellant voluntarily surrendered to the authorities and there was
no aggravating circumstance to offset this mitigating circumstance. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the maximum of the penalty shall be taken from the minimum period of prision mayor, the range of which is six
(6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in
degree which is prision correccional, in any of its periods, the range of which is six (6) months and one (1) day
to six (6) years.

Rosalinda Serrano vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 123896 
June 25, 2003

Facts:
Three cases are filed against the petitioner for committing the crime of estafa through falsification of
commercial documents. A certain Ramon Mojica wanted to buy some dollars to be used for purchasing
machinery spare parts for his blanket factory issued checks from his bank in exchange for checks issued from
Centerre Bank, St. Louis, Missouri, U.S.A and Citizens National Bank of San Francisco, California. These
checks were eventually found out to be fraudulent.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Rosalinda Serrano GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for estafa
thru falsification of [commercial] documents defined and penalized under paragraph 2(a) of Article 315 and
paragraph 1 of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code on three (3) counts and sentences her as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 85-8237-P, to an indeterminate penalty ranging from SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1)
DAY of prision mayor as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS of prision mayor as maximum; to indemnify Ramon
C. Mojica the amount of P102,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay 1/3 of
the proportionate costs.

2. In Criminal Case No. 85-8238-P, to an indeterminate penalty ranging from TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1)
DAY of prision mayor as minimum to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS and EIGHT (8) MONTHS of reclusion
temporal as maximum; to indemnify Ramon C. Mojica the amount of P160,000.00, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay 1/3 of the proportionate costs.

3. In Criminal Case No. 85-8239-P, to an indeterminate penalty ranging from TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1)
DAY of prision mayor as minimum to FOURTEEN (14) and EIGHT (8) MONTHS of reclusion temporal as
maximum; to indemnify Ramon C. Mojica the amount of P246,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency and to pay 1/3 of the proportionate costs.

Petitioner interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals which, by Decision of December 18, 1992, affirmed
the judgment of conviction but modified the penalties as follows:

1.) In Criminal Case No. 85-8237-P, six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor  as minimum to twelve (12)
years and one (1) day of Reclusion Temporal as maximum; to indemnify private complainant Ramon C. Mojica
the amount of P102,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay 1/3 of the
proportionate costs.

2.) In Criminal Case No. 85-8238-P, ten (10) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as minimum to seventeen
(17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of Reclusion Temporal as maximum; to indemnify the private
complainant Ramon C. Mojica the amount of P160,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency; and to pay 1/3 proportionate costs.

3.) In Criminal Case No. 85-8239-P, ten (10) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as minimum to seventeen
(17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of Reclusion Temporal as maximum; to indemnify the private
complainant Ramon C. Mojica the amount of P246,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency; and to pay 1/3 of the proportionate costs.

Issue:
What should be correct penalty to be imposed on the accused?

Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the challenged Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

1. In Criminal Case No. 85-8239-P, petitioner is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of Four (4) Years
and Two (2) Months of prision correccional, as minimum, to Twenty (20) Years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.
2. In Criminal Case No. 85-8238-P, petitioner is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of Four (4) Years
and Two (2) Months of prision correccional, as minimum, to Nineteen (19) Years and One (1) Day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.

3. In Criminal Case No. 85-8237-P, petitioner is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of Four (4) Years
and Two (2) Months of prision correccional, as minimum, to Fourteen (14) Years and One (1) Day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.

The indeterminate penalty imposed by the appellate court on petitioner needs modification, however.  Estafa is
punished as follows:

ART. 315. Swindling (estafa) – Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow shall be punished by:

1st  The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the
amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; and if such amount exceeds the
latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for
each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years.  In
such case, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the
other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may
be;

In complex crimes, under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the more serious crime shall be
applied in its maximum period. 

In imposing a prison sentence under the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the Indeterminate Sentence
Law provides that the maximum term of the penalty shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances,
could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense.

The penalty next lower should be based on the penalty prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense,
without first considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime.  The minimum
of the indeterminate penalty is left to the sound discretion of the court, to be fixed from within the range of the
penalty next lower without reference to the periods into which it may be subdivided.  The modifying
circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.