VENUE/JURISDICTION with the other allegations therein are sufficient to vest jurisdiction
Case 1
Agustin v. Pamintuan
Facts:
Petitioner Victor Agustin was charged with 4 separate
Informations of libel by the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Baguio. He was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty to all the
charges. On September 10, 2001, he then filed a Motion to Quash
the Informations on the sole ground that the court had no
jurisdiction over the offenses charged. He pointed out that the said
Informations did not contain any allegation that the offended party
was actually residing in Baguio City or that the alleged libelous
articles were printed and first published in a newspaper of general
circulation in Baguio City. Private complainant opposed the
motion alleging that he was a bona fide resident and acting
general manager of Baguio Country Club.  jurisdiction of the court. Article 360 of the RPC provides that the
                The RTC issued an order denying the MTQ and the
motion for reconsideration of the Order. Petitioner then brought
the case to the CA. The CA rendered a decision dismissing the
petition and the motion for reconsideration of the decision for lack
of merit. Thus, petitioner filed a motion for certiorari and
prohibition before the Supreme Court.
The petitioner contented that in the absence of any allegations in
the Informations that the private respondent was actually residing
in Baguio City, or that the alleged libelous articles were printed
and first published in Baguio as mandated by Article 360 of the
RPC, the trial court had no jurisdiction over the offenses charged.
He asserted that the amendments of the Informations would be
improper, considering that the defects of the Informations were
not of form but of substance.
The OSG maintained that the failure of the Informations to allege
that the private respondent is a resident of Baguio City is not a
jurisdictional defect. It asserted that the averment in the
Informations that the crimes charged were committed within the
jurisdiction of the trial court in Baguio City, taken in conjunction
1
over the subject cases in the RTC of Baguio City.
Issue:
Whether the RTC of Baguio City has jurisdiction over the
offenses charged in the four Informations.
Ruling:
                The SC granted the petition, holding that the RTC of
Baguio has no jurisdiction.
                The SC held that venue in criminal cases is an essential
element of jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of a court over the
criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or
Information, and the offense must have been committed or any of
its essential ingredients took place within the territorial
criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written
defamations, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the
Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous
article is printed and first published or where any of the offended
parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the
offense.
                In the case at bar, the Informations did not allege that
the offended party was actually residing in Baguio City at the time
of the commission of the offenses, or that the alleged libelous
articles were printed and first published in Baguio City. It cannot
even be inferred from the allegation 'the offended party was the
Acting General Manager of the Baguio Country Club and of good
standing and reputation in the community that the private
complainant was actually residing in Baguio City.
 
Case 2
Macasaet v. People
Facts:
Petitioners were charged with the crime of libel before the RTC of
Quezon City. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the libel case
on the ground that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the
offense charged. According to petitioners, as the information
discloses that the residence of private respondent was in Marikina,
the RTC of Quezon City did not have jurisdiction over the case
pursuant to Article 360 of the RPC. The public prosecutor argued
that the RTC of QC had jurisdiction over the case. He maintained
that during the time material to this case, the complainant was a
resident of both QC and Marikina as shown in his Reply-Affidavit
filed during his preliminary investigation of the case. The
petitioners contended that the complaint-affidavit executed by
complainant and the information filed before the court state that
complainant’s residence is in Marikina, thus the dismissal of the
case is warranted for the rule is that jurisdiction is determined
solely by the allegations contained in the complaint or
information. The trial court rendered an Order dismissing the case
due to lack of jurisdiction and it held that the editorial box of
Abante is in Manila and that the address of complainant is in
Marikina as provided in the information.
The complainant then filed a motion for reconsideration insisting
that at the time the alleged libelous article was published, he was
actually residing in QC. According to him, he mistakenly stated
that he was a resident of Marikina at the time of publication but he
rectified the error by his supplemental affidavit which indicated
QC as his actual residence at the time of publication of the
defamatory article. However, the motion for reconsideration was
denied.
Respondents file a notice of appeal to the Court of appeals. The
CA reversed and set aside the ruling of the RTC. Petitioners filed
a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the CA, hence
this petition before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the RTC of QC had jurisdiction.
2
Ruling:
The RTC of QC had no jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that
for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the
offense should have been committed or any one of its essential
ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court. 
                In libel cases, the criminal action and civil action for
damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in this
chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the Court
of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article
is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties
actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense.
                In the case at bar, private respondent was a private
citizen at the time of the publication of the alleged libelous article,
hence, he could only file his libel suit in the City of Manila
where Abante was first published or in the province or city where
he actually resided at the time the purported libelous article was
printed.
A perusal, however, of the information involved in this case easily
reveals that the allegations contained therein are utterly
insufficient to vest jurisdiction on the RTC of Quezon City.  Other
than perfunctorily stating “Quezon City” at the beginning of the
information, the assistant city prosecutor who prepared the
information did not bother to indicate whether the jurisdiction of
RTC Quezon City was invoked either because Abante was printed
in that place or private respondent was a resident of said city at the
time the claimed libelous article came out.  As these matters deal
with the fundamental issue of the court’s jurisdiction, Article 360
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, mandates that either one
of these statements must be alleged in the information itself and
the absence of both from the very face of the information renders
the latter fatally defective.  Sadly for private respondent, the
information filed before the trial court falls way short of this
requirement.  The assistant city prosecutor’s failure to properly
lay the basis for invoking the jurisdiction of the RTC, Quezon
City, effectively denied said court of the power to take cognizance
of this case.
Case 3
 Campamano vs Datuin
 Facts:
  Seishin International Corporation, represented by its
president-herein petitioner David B. Campanano, Jr. filed against
respondent. An Information for violation ofB.P. Blg. 22.
respondent was convicted of Estafa by the Regional Trial Court,
of Pasig City by Decision of May 3, 1999. Meanwhile, sometime
in July 15, 2003when he vacated his office,  found the cash
voucher evidencing his cash payment of the two (2)  road rollers,
Sakai brand, which he purchased from Mr. Yasonobu Hirota,
representing Seishin International Corporation, in the amount of
Two Hundred Thousand (P200,000.00) Pesos.  The cash voucher
was dated June 28, 1993, and it was signed by respondent and Mr.
Hirota.   The Court of Appeals' conclusion-basis of its reversal of the DOJ
 Claiming that the complaint of Seishin International Corporation
against him was false, unfounded and malicious respondent filed a
complaint for Incriminating Against Innocent Persons, before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon city against petitioner and
a certain Yasunobu Hirota.
In filing the complaint for Estafa - fully knowing that it was
baseless and without factual or legal basis, according to
respondent   Mr. Campanano, Jr. and Mr. Hirota should be
criminally liable for the crime of Incriminating Innocent Persons
punishable under Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code.
By Resolution of January 20, 2004, the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City dismissed respondent's complaint for
incriminating innocent person It appearing that the case of estafa
was filed in Pasig City , and the testimony given by respondent
David Campano, Jr. was also made in Pasig City , this office
has no jurisdiction on the above-entitled complainant.
3
 
  Issue:
whether  the City prosecutor of Quezon City has jurisdiction over
the complaint filed by the respondent
 Held:
It is doctrinal that in criminal cases, venue is an essential element
of jurisdiction; and that the jurisdiction of a court over a criminal
case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or
information.
The complaint-affidavit for incriminating innocent person filed by
respondent with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City
on August 28, 2003 does not allege that the crime charged or any
of its essential ingredients was committed in Quezon City . The
only reference to Quezon City in the complaint-affidavit is that it
is where respondent resides. Respondent's complaint-affidavit was
thus properly dismissed by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City for
lack of jurisdiction
Resolutions that since petitioner's November 20, 2003 Counter-
Affidavit to respondent's complaint for incriminating innocent
person was executed in Quezon City, the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City had acquired jurisdiction to conduct
preliminary investigation of the case is thus erroneous.
 In any event, the allegations in the complaint-affidavit do not
make out a clear probable cause of incriminating innocent person
under Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code.
 the petition is  Granted.  The Court of Appeals Decision of
December 9, 2005 is Reversed and set aside.  The complaint of
respondent for Incriminating Innocent Person filed against
petitioner David Campamano, Jr. is Dismissed
Complaint/Information
Case 4
LUIS MARCOS P. LAURELvs. HON. ZEUS C. ABROGAR,
Facts:
Petitioner is one of the accused in Criminal action filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 150. The
Amended Information charged the accused with theft under
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner filed a Motion
to Quash with Motion to Defer Arraignment, on the ground that
the factual allegations in the Amended Information do not
constitute the felony of theft. The trial court denied the Motion to
Quash the Amended Information, as well petitioners subsequent
Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner then went to the Court of
Appeals which reversed and set aside the ruling of the RTC. The
CA then, directed the RTC to issue an order grating the motion of
the petitioner to quash the Amended Information, holding that
Amended Information does not contain material allegations
charging petitioner with theft of personal property since
international long distance calls and the business of providing
telecommunication or telephone services are not personal
properties under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.  The SC resolved to grant the Motion for Reconsideration
Respondent Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company (PLDT) filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion
to Refer the Case to the Supreme Court En Banc. It maintains that
the Amended Information charging petitioner with theft is valid
and sufficient; that it states the names of all the accused who were
specifically charged with the crime of theft of PLDTs
international calls and business of providing telecommunication or
telephone service in Makati City by conducting ISR or
International Simple Resale; that it identifies the international
calls and business of providing telecommunication or telephone
service of PLDT as the personal properties which were unlawfully
taken by the accused; and that it satisfies the test of sufficiency as
it enabled a person of common understanding to know the charge
against him and the court to render judgment properly.  only later mentions stealing the business from PLDT as the
4
According to the OSG, prosecution under Republic Act
(RA) No. 8484 or the Access Device Regulations Act of 1998and
RA 8792 or the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 does not
preclude prosecution under the Revised Penal Code for the crime
of theft. The latter embraces unauthorized appropriation or use of
PLDTs international calls, service and business, for personal
profit or gain, to the prejudice of PLDT as owner thereof. On the
other hand, the special laws punish the surreptitious and advanced
technical means employed to illegally obtain the subject service
and business. Even assuming that the correct indictment should
have been under RA 8484, the quashal of the information would
still not be proper. The charge of theft as alleged in the
Information should be taken in relation to RA 8484 because it is
the elements, and not the designation of the crime, that control. 
Issue:
whether the information should be quashed for being insufficient.
Ruling
but remanded the case to the trial court for proper clarification of
the Amended Information. 
Petitioner’s acts constitute theft of respondent PLDTs
business and service, committed by means of the unlawful use of
the latter’s facilities. In this regard, the Amended Information
inaccurately describes the offense by making it appear that what
petitioner took were the international long distance telephone
calls, rather than respondent PLDTs business. Therefore, the
business of providing telecommunication and the telephone
service are personal property under Article 308 of the Revised
Penal Code, and the act of engaging in ISR is an act of subtraction
penalized under said article. However, the Amended Information
describes the thing taken as, international long distance calls, and
manner by which the gain was derived by the accused. In order to
correct this inaccuracy of description, this case must be remanded
to the trial court and the prosecution is directed to amend the
Amended Information, to clearly state that the property subject of
the theft are the services and business of respondent
PLDT. Parenthetically, this amendment is not necessitated by a
mistake in charging the proper offense, which would have called
for the dismissal of the information under Rule 110, Section 14
and Rule 119, Section 19 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure. To be sure, the crime is properly designated as one of
theft. The purpose of the amendment is simply to ensure that the
accused is fully and sufficiently appraised of the nature and cause
of the charge against him, and thus guaranteed of his rights under
the Constitution.  judicial service and disbarment.
case 5
NOTAN LUMBOS, complainant, vs.JUDGE MARIE
ELLENGRID S.L.BALIGUAT, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Branch 1, General Santos City, respondent.
 Facts
 Administrative complaint was filed against Judge Marie Ellengrid
S.L. Baliguat , MTCC, Branch 1, General Santos City.
 Complainant alleges that:  instead of dismissing the case for
patent lack of jurisdiction, respondent judge conducted the
Preliminary Investigation without prior application for the
issuance of warrant of arrest; with the object of issuing a warrant
of arrest against all accused, respondent propounded a series of
suggestive rather than searching questions and  merely tried to
confirm her preconceived presumption of guilt of all accused via
suggestive questions; respondent issued an Order for the issuance
of a warrant of arrest against complainant and his co-accused
without giving them a fair chance to file their respective counter-
affidavits.   without waiting for the conclusion of the investigation, the judge
Respondent claims that: the conduct of the Preliminary
Investigation and the subsequent issuance of the warrant of arrest
are well within the authority given in the Sections 84 and 86, R.
5
A. No. 5412 (City Charter of General Santos City); there was no
usurpation of authority of an RTC Judge when she issued the
assailed warrant of arrest as she has authority to do so under the
City Charter; there was no grave abuse of discretion when she
held in abeyance the resolution of the prayer for the lifting of the
warrant of arrest because the primary reason why it was withheld
was the complainant's failure to submit a counter-affidavit.
 
Issue
 Whether or not the acts committed by the respondent judge
constitute gross ignorance of the law, abuse of authority,
dereliction of duty, and oppression warranting dismissal from
 Ruling:
 Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to determine
whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is
probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.9 And prior to
the issuance of A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC10 which took effect on
October 3, 2005, among the officers authorized by Sec. 2, Rule
11211 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure to conduct
preliminary investigation are the city prosecutors and judges of
the MTC and MCTC.
 The Charter of General Santos City, specifically Sec.
84,12 authorizes the city court to conduct preliminary
investigations for any offense without regard to the limits of
punishment and may release or commit and bind over any person
charged with such offense to secure his appearance before the
proper court.
Under Sec. 6(b), Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure,
may issue a warrant of arrest if he finds after an examination in
writing and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in the
form of searching questions and answers, that a probable cause
exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under
immediate custody not to frustrate the ends of justice.
 Wherefore, Administrative case against Judge Baliguat is
DISMISSED. In line with A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC, withdrawing the
power to conduct preliminary investigation from judges of the
first level courts, she is ADVISED to refer criminal cases for
preliminary investigation to the Office of City Prosecutor for
appropriate action.
SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT
Case 6
Catiis vs. CA anent to SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT
G.R. NO. 153979
February 6, 2006
 Facts: Petitioner filed a letter-complaint dated May 28, 2001
against private respondents Reynaldo A. Patacsil, Enrico D.
Lopez, Luzviminda A. Portuguez and a certain Margielyn Tafalla
before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, for
violation of Art. 315, No. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code in
relation to Presidential Decree No. 1689 (syndicated estafa) and
other related offenses. Private respondents, except for Tafalla,
filed their joint counter-affidavits denying the charges against
them.
 On October 10, 2001, Assistant City Prosecutor Alessandro D.
Jurado issued a Resolution finding the existence of a probable
cause for syndicated Estafa against private respondents and
Tafalla with no bail recommended. The Resolution was approved
by City Prosecutor Claro A. Arellano.
 An Information was filed on the same day by Prosecutor Jurado
against private respondents and Tafalla before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City and raffled off to the sala of Honorable
Judge Lucas Bersamin.
 That on or about the 3rd week of January 2000 or subsequent
thereto in Quezon City and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
6
confederating together and all of them mutually helping and
aiding one another in a syndicated manner consisting of five (5) or
more persons through corporations registered with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) and/or unregistered foreign
entities with intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act,
transaction, enterprise or scheme, with intent to gain and by
means of fraud and deceit, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously defraud REGINO SY CATIIS and several other
persons in the following manner, to wit: by falsely or fraudulently
pretending or representing, in a transaction or series of
transactions, which they made with the Complainant and the
public in general to the effect that they were in a legitimate
business of foreign exchange trading successively or
simultaneously operating under the following name and style of
Asia Profits Philippines, Incorporation, Winggold Management
Philippines Incorporated, Belkin Management Consultancy, Inc.
and/or Belkin Profits Limited or other unregistered foreign entities
induced and succeeded in inducing complainant and several other
persons to give and deliver and in fact, the latter and said persons
gave and delivered to said accused the amount of at least US$
123,461.14 or its equivalent in Philippine Pesos on the strength of
said manifestations and representations, the accused knowing
fully well that the above-named corporations registered with the
SEC and/or those unregistered foreign entities are not licensed nor
authorized to engage in foreign exchange trading corporations and
that such manifestations and representations to transact in foreign
exchange were false and fraudulent that resulted to the damage
and prejudice of the complainant and other persons and that the
defraudation pertains to funds solicited from the public in general
by such corporations/associations.
 On November 7, 2001, Judge Lucas P. Bersamin issued an Order
finding probable cause against all the accused and approved the
recommendation of the City Prosecutor that the charge be non-
bailable. The corresponding warrants of arrest were issued.
 A return on the warrant of arrest was made by PO3 Joselito M.
Coronel, PNP Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, Camp
Crame, Quezon City, with the information that except for
Margielyn Tafalla, who remained at large, all other accused were
already detained at the Makati City Jail.
On November 12, 2001, a notice of hearing was issued by Judge
Bersamin setting the case for arraignment on November 20, 2001.
Private respondents on the same day filed an urgent motion to fix
bail.
On November 20, 2001, private respondents, when arraigned,
entered pleas of not guilty. The Prosecution was required to file
their comment/opposition on private respondents’ motion to fix
bail which they did through the Private Prosecutor with the
conformity of Assistant City Prosecutor Arthur O. Malabaguio.
On December 18, 2001, Judge Bersamin issued an Order
reconsidering his earlier Order of November 7, 2001 by declaring
that the offense charged is bailable. In finding that the accused are
entitled to bail.
 Issue:
Whether Judge Bersamin is correct in finding that the crime
charged is bailable despite that the imposable penalty ranges from
reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua?
Held:
The Court held that since the crime charged was not committed by
a syndicate as defined under the law, the penalty of life
imprisonment to death cannot be imposed on private respondents.
Judge Bersamin is correct when he ruled that private respondents
could only be punished with reclusion temporal to reclusion
perpetua in case of conviction since the amount of the fraud
exceeds P100,000.00.  Operations, respectively, of Marcopper Mining Corporation
 The Court further held that Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on
December 1, 2000, provide:
7
 Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. — The complaint or
information shall state the designation of the offense given by the
statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and
specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no
designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section
or subsection of the statute punishing it.
 Sec. 9. Cause of the accusations. — The acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise
language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute
but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its
qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to
pronounce judgment.
 Clearly, it is now a requirement that the aggravating as well as
the qualifying circumstances be expressly and specifically alleged
in the complaint or information. Otherwise, they cannot be
considered by the trial court in their judgment, even, if they are
subsequently proved during trial. A reading of the Information
shows that there was no allegation of any aggravating
circumstance, thus Judge Bersamin is correct when he found that
the lesser penalty, i.e., reclusion temporal, is imposable in case of
conviction.
Case 7
JOHN ERIC LONEY VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES 
G.R. No. 152644             February 10, 2006
 Facts:
                 Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and
Pedro B. Hernandez are the President and Chief Executive
Officer, Senior Manager, and Resident Manager for Mining
("Marcopper"), a corporation engaged in mining in the province of
Marinduque. Marcopper had been storing tailings from its
operations in a pit in Mt. Tapian, at the base of the pit ran a
drainage tunnel leading to the Boac and Makalupnit rivers. On 24
March 1994, tailings gushed out of or near the tunnel’s end. In a
few days, the Mt. Tapian pit had discharged millions of tons of
tailings into the rivers.
 
                On August 1996, the Department of Justice separately
charged petitioners in the Municipal Trial Court of Boac,
Marinduque with violation of Article 91(B), sub-paragraphs 5 and
6 of the Water Code of the Philippines (P.D. 1067), Section 8 of
the National Pollution Control Decree of 1976 (P.D. 984), Section
108 of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (R.A. 7942), and Article
365 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting to Damage to Property.
 Petitioners moved to quash the Informations on the ground that
the Informations were "duplicitous" as the Department of Justice
charged more than one offense for a single act.
 Issue:
                Whether or not there is duplicity of charges made
against petitioner?
 Ruling:
             There is no duplicity of charges in the present case.
Duplicity of charges simply means a single complaint or
information charges more than one offense, as Section 13 of Rule
110 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. In short, there is
duplicity of charges when a single Information charges more than
one offense. Petitioner’s contention that they should be charged
with one offense only for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Damage to Property because all the charges filed against them
"proceed from and are based on a single act or incident of
polluting the Boac and Makalupnit rivers thru dumping of mine
tailings" has no merit because this Court had ruled that a single act
or incident might offend against two or more entirely distinct and
unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of the
8
accused for more than one offense. The only limit to this rule is
the Constitutional prohibition that no person shall be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for "the same offense.” Here, double
jeopardy is not at issue because not all of its elements are present.
 On petitioners’ claim that the charge for violation of Article 365
of the RPC "absorbs" the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD
984, and RA 7942, suffice it to say that a mala in se felony (such
as Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property) cannot
absorb mala prohibita crimes (such as those violating PD 1067,
PD 984, and RA 7942). What makes the former a felony is
criminal intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa); what makes the latter
crimes are the special laws enacting them.
 
Case 8
Title: Andaya vs. People of the Philippines
Facts: Complainant Armed Forces and Police Savings and Loan
Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) is a non-stock and non-profit
association authorized to engage in savings and loan transactions.
In 1986, petitioner Noe S. Andaya was elected as president and
general manager of AFPSLAI. During his term, he sought to
increase the capitalization of AFPSLAI to boost its lending
capacity to its members. Consequently, on June 1, 1988, the
Board of Trustees of AFPSLAI passed and approved Resolution
No. RS-88-006-048 setting up a Finder’s Fee Program whereby
any officer, member or employee, except investment counselors,
of AFPSLAI who could solicit an investment of not less than
P100,000.00 would be entitled to a finder’s fee equivalent to one
percent of the amount solicited.
In a letter dated September 1991, the Central Bank wrote Gen.
Lisandro C. Abadia, then Chairman of the Board of Trustees,
regarding the precarious financial position of AFPSLAI due to its
alleged flawed management. As a result, Gen. Abadia requested
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to conduct an
investigation on alleged irregularities in the operations of
AFPSLAI which led to the filing of several criminal cases against
petitioner, one of which is the instant case based on the alleged
fraudulent implementation of the Finder’s Fee Program.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner should be acquitted due to
insufficiency of evidence?
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioner by
granting the petition and acquit the petitioner based on reasonable
doubt. The facts alleged in the information are sufficient to
constitute the crime of falsification of private document.
Specifically, the allegations in the information can be broken
down into the three aforestated essential elements of this offense
as follows: (1) petitioner caused it to appear in Disbursement
Voucher No. 58380 that Diosdado Guillas was entitled to a
finder’s fee from AFPSLAI in the amount of P21,000.00 when in
truth and in fact no finder’s fee was due to him; (2) the
falsification was committed on Disbursement Voucher No. 58380;
and (3) the falsification caused damage to AFPSLAI in the
amount of P21,000.00.
The first element of the offense charged in the information was
proven by the prosecution. The testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, namely, Diosdado Guilas and Judy Balangue, as well
as the presentation of Disbursement Voucher No. 58380
established that petitioner caused the preparation of the voucher in
the name of Guilas despite knowledge that Guilas was not entitled
to the finder’s fee. Significantly, petitioner admitted his
participation in falsifying the voucher when he testified that he
authorized the release of the voucher in the name of Guilas upon
the request of Ernesto Hernandez. While petitioner did not
personally prepare the voucher, he could be considered a principal
by induction, had his conviction been proper, since he was the
president and general manager of AFPSLAI at the time so that his
9
employees merely followed his instructions in preparing the
falsified voucher.
The second element of the offense charged in the information, i.e.,
the falsification was committed in Disbursement Voucher No.
58380, a private document, is likewise present. It appears that the
public prosecutor erroneously characterized the disbursement
voucher as a commercial document so that he designated the
offense as estafa through falsification of commercial document in
the preamble of the information. However, as correctly ruled by
the trial court, the subject voucher is a private document only; it is
not a commercial document because it is not a document used by
merchants or businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or credit
transactions nor is it defined and regulated by the Code of
Commerce or other commercial law.
While the first and second elements of the offense charged in the
information were satisfactorily established by the prosecution, it is
the third element which is decisive in the instant case. In the
information, it was alleged that petitioner caused damage in the
amount of P21,000.00 to AFPSLAI because he caused it to appear
in the disbursement voucher that Diosdado Guilas was entitled to
a P21,000.00 finder’s fee when in truth and in fact AFPSLAI
owed no such sum to him. However, contrary to these allegations
in the information, petitioner was able to prove that AFPSLAI
owed a finder’s fee in the amount of P21,000.00 although not to
Guilas but to Ernesto Hernandez.
It was positively shown that Hernandez was able to solicit a
P2,100,000.00 worth of investment for AFPSLAI from Rosario
Mercader which entitled him to a finder’s fee equivalent to one
percent of the amount solicited (i.e., P21,000.00) under the
Finder’s Fee Program. The documentary evidence consisting of
the Certificate of Capital Contribution Monthly No. 52178 which
was presented by the prosecution categorically stated that Rosario
Mercader deposited P2,100,000.00 worth of investment in
AFPSLAI. In fact, Rosario Mercader was no longer presented as a
defense witness in view of the stipulation by the prosecution on
the fact that Mercader was a depositor of AFPSLAI and that
Hernandez was the one who convinced her to make such deposit.
Moreover, the defense showed that the disbursement voucher was
merely placed in the name of Guilas upon the request of
Hernandez so that he would have a lower tax base. Thus, after
Guilas received the P21,000.00 from AFPSLAI, he gave the
money to petitioner who in turn surrendered the amount to
Hernandez.
In all criminal prosecutions, the burden of proof is on the
prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. It has the duty to prove each and every element of the
crime charged in the information to warrant a finding of guilt for
the said crime or for any other crime necessarily included therein.
However, in the case at bar, the prosecution failed to prove the
third essential element of the crime charged in the information.
Thus, petitioner should be acquitted due to insufficiency of
evidence.
Case 9
People vs. Malngan
 Facts:   Facts:
On January 2, 2001, Edna, one hired as a housemaid by Roberto
Separa Sr. was accused of setting fire the house of his employer
resulted in the destruction of his employer’s house and the death
of six persons including his employer Roberto Separa Sr., some
seven adjoining residential houses,were also razed by fire.  and feloniously threaten the minor, a 13 year old boy, and that on
On January 9, 2001, an information was filed before the RTC of
Manila, charging the accused-appellant with the crime of Arson
with multiple homicide. The RTC as well as the Court of Appeals
finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
10
Arson with multiple homicide. The accused-appellant asserts that
the prosecution’s evidence was insufficient to prove her guilt, that
she is charged with crime not defined and penalized by law.
Issue: 
Whether or not the accused-appelant is liable of the crime of arson
with multiple homicide and whether or not the crime charged is
not defined and penalized by law.
Held: 
What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the
designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part
thereof allegedly violated, but the description of the crime charged
and the particular facts therein recited. As stated in the body of
information, accused-appellant was charged with having
intentionally burned the house. Consequently, if proved at the
trial, she may be convicted, and sentenced accordingly, of the
crime of simple arson. Such is the case not withstanding the error
in the designation of the offense in the information, the
information remains effective insofar as it states the facts
constituting the crime alleged therein.
Case 10
 Jumaquio vs. Villarosa
 
The undersigned Prosecutor II accuses Resty Jumaquio, with the
crime of grave threats in relation to RA 7610 and also accuses
with the crime of physical injuries. That on or about August 2,
2003, the said accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
the same date the said accused, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, box and hit the minors, 13
years old and 17 years old, thereby causing physical injuries to the
latter, which required medical treatment for a period of three to
five days, to their damage and prejudice.
That the above acts of the accused debases, degrades and demeans
the dignity of the complaint and impairs their normal growth and
development.
Issue:
Whether or not the several crimes charged with the accused-
appellant should be dismissed on the grounds of could not be
considered a crime and could not even be complexed.
Held:
As correctly argued by the City Prosecutor, the questioned
information separately charged two distinct offense of child abuse
committed through the use of threatening words and child abuse
through the infliction of physical injuries.
Petitioner is not in jeopardy of being convicted of grave threats
and child abuse in the first case and slight physical injuries and
child abuse in the second. In the first information, petitioner
charged with child abuse uttering debasing, demeaning and
degrading words to the minor. In the second, he is charged with
child abuse by inflicting physical injuries. What controls is not the
title of the information or the designation of the offense but the
actual facts recited therein. Moreover, an information is not
duplicitous if it charges several related acts, all of which constitute
a single offense, although the acts may in themselves be distinct
offenses.
 
Amendment  Not all defects in an information can be cured by amendment. In
Case 11
 Rafael Gonzales vs. Hon. Tranquil P. Salvador, Glen Dale, Et al.
G.R. No. 168340, December 5, 2006
 Facts:
11
Rafael Gonzales filed a complaint of libel against Glen Dale a.k.a.
Rene Martel arising from the latter’s column “Bizz ‘N’ Fizz” in
Today newspaper. Finding that there is probable cause, the
Prosecutor filed information before the said court. Petition for
Review the prosecutor’s resolution was raised before the DOJ but
was denied. Thus, Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition were
raised before the CA but was denied. Hence, respondent was
arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the libel charges.
Respondent filed a Motion to Quash on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the offense charged because there is no allegation
in the information that petitioner resides in Makati or that the
libelous article was first published in Makati, hence, the court has
no jurisdiction to try the case.
The Motion to Quash was granted. Upon petitioner’s motion, the
trial court granted and directed the public prosecutor with 10 days
within which to file amended information. It was opposed by
respondent on the ground that defective information may only be
amended before a motion to quash is granted, and that once
quashed, the information can no longer be amended. Respondent
was favored by the trial court. On appeal with the CA, the same
was denied. Hence, this recourse was filed before the highest
court.
 Issue: 
Whether or not amendment to information can be allowed
subsequent to a grant of a Motion to Quash.
 
Holding:
this case, the amendment of the information to vest jurisdiction
upon a court is not permissible. Sec. 4 of Rule 117 applies if the
trial court finds that there is a defect in the information and the
defect can be cured by amendment, in which case the court shall
order the prosecution to amend the information. Once the court
has granted the motion to quash the information and such order
became final and executory, then, there is nothing more to amend. Whether or not an information can be amended even after the
The trial court has the discretion to order the filing of another accused had been arraigned and entered his plea.
information and if warranted, must be contained in the same order
granting the motion to quash.  Holding: 
In this case, the petitioner failed to assert the propriety of The Supreme Court held that the amendment in the name of the
amending the information within the reglementary period, thus, complainant is of form. The test as to whether a defendant is
the order quashing the information became final and executory. prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense under the
Furthermore, the petition of Gonzales is denied.  information as it originally stood would be available after the
  amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might
Case 12 have would be equally applicable to the information in one form
 Eduardo G. Ricarze vs. CA, Caltex Phils. Inc., PCIBank as in the other. In this case, the amendment made which does not
G.R. No. 160451, February 9, 2007 change the nature of the crime alleged does not affect the essence
  of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an
Facts: opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held to be
Eduardo Ricarze (employed as a collector-messenger of City one of form and not of substance. As provided by the Rules of
Service Corporation) is assigned to collect checks payable to Court, after the entry of the plea, only a formal amendment may
Caltex. He opened a bank account in the name of Dante Gutierrez, be made but with leave of court and if it does not prejudice the
a regular customer of Caltex, forged the signatures on the dorsal rights of the accused. In the case at bar, the amendment is allowed
portions of the stolen check and deposited it in that same bank because it is settled that the same does not prejudice the rights of
account. He was charged by the officers of Caltex with estafa Ricarze. In addition, it was held that in case of offenses against
through falsification of commercial documents. In the original property, the designation of the name of the offended party is not
information filed by the prosecutor, Caltex appeared to be the absolutely indispensable for as long as the criminal act charged in
offended party because the prosecutor was not informed that the complaint or information can be properly identified.
PCIBank credited certain amount to Caltex. After arraignment and
plea, PCIBank appeared as the complainant. Ricarze averred that Case 13
the information can no longer be amended because he had already PACOY VS. CAJIGAL
been arraigned under the original information, and that doing so G.R. NO. 157472
would place him in double jeopardy. On one hand, PCIBank September 28, 2007
contended that PCIBank had re-credited the amount to Caltex to  
the extent of the indemnity, hence, the PCIBank had been FACTS: On July 4, 2002, an Information for Homicide was filed
subrogated to the rights and interests of Caltex as private in the RTC against Petitioner Jose M. Pacoy. Upon arraignment,
complainant.  petitioner, duly assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to
the charge of Homicide. However, on the same day and after the
 Issue:  arraignment, the respondent judge issued another Order directing
the trial prosecutor to correct and amend the Information to
12
Murder in view of the aggravating circumstance of disregard of
rank alleged in the Information which public respondent
registered as having qualified the crime to Murder.  Acting upon
such Order, the prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing out
the word “Homicide” and instead wrote the word “Murder” in the
caption and in the opening paragraph of the Information. The
accusatory portion remained exactly the same as that of the
original Information for Homicide.
 
Petitioner filed a Motion to Inhibit with attached Motion for
Reconsideration. In his Motion to Inhibit, he alleged that the
respondent judge exercised jurisdiction in an arbitrary, capricious
and partial manner in mandating the amendment of the charge
from Homicide to Murder in disregard of the provisions of the law
and existing jurisprudence. The respondent judge denied the
Motion to Inhibit and granted the Motion for Reconsideration.
 
In granting the Motion for Reconsideration, respondent judge
found that a close scrutiny of Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code shows that “disregard of rank” is merely a generic
mitigating circumstance which should not elevate the
classification of the crime of homicide to murder.
 
ISSUE:  have would be inapplicable to the complaint or information. Since
Whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion
and exceeds his jurisdiction in ordering the amendment of the
information from homicide to murder.
 
HELD:  to the rights or defense of petitioner.
 The petition is not meritorious. The change of the offense
charged from Homicide to Murder is merely a formal amendment
and not a substantial amendment or a substitution.
 
Under Section 14, Rule 110 - Amendment or substitution. — A
complaint or information may be amended, in form or in
13
substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused
enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal
amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can
be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
 
While the amended Information was for Murder, a reading of the
Information shows that the only change made was in the caption
of the case; and in the opening paragraph or preamble of the
Information, with the crossing out of word “Homicide” and its
replacement by the word “Murder.” There was no change in the
recital of facts constituting the offense charged or in the
determination of the jurisdiction of the court. Thus, we find that
the amendment made in the caption and preamble from
“Homicide” to “Murder” as purely formal.
 
Section 14, Rule 110 also provides that in allowing formal
amendments in cases in which the accused has already pleaded, it
is necessary that the amendments do not prejudice the rights of the
accused. The test of whether the rights of an accused are
prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or information is
whether a defense under the complaint or information, as it
originally stood, would no longer be available after the
amendment is made; and when any evidence the accused might
the facts alleged in the accusatory portion of the amended
Information are identical with those of the original Information for
Homicide, there could not be any effect on the prosecution's
theory of the case; neither would there be any possible prejudice
 
While the respondent judge erroneously thought that “disrespect
on account of rank” qualified the crime to murder, as the same
was only a generic aggravating circumstance, we do not find that
he committed any grave abuse of discretion in ordering the
amendment of the Information after petitioner had already pleaded
not guilty to the charge of Homicide, since the amendment made
was only formal and did not adversely affect any substantial right
of petitioner.
 
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, there being no grave
abuse of discretion committed by respondent Judge.
Prosecution of Offenses
Case 14
CHUA VS. PADILLO
G.R. 163797
April 24. 2007
 
FACTS: Rodrigo Padillo and Marietta Padillo, respondents, are
the owners of Padillo Lending Investor engaged in the money
lending business. Their niece, Marissa Padillo-Chua, served as the
firm’s manager. Marissa is married to Wilson Chua, brother of
Renita Chua, herein petitioners.
 
Sometime in September 1999, a post-audit was conducted. It was
found that Marissa was engaged in illegal activities. Some of the
borrowers whose loan applications she recommended for approval
were fictitious and their signatures on the checks were spurious,
the cash amounts received were turned over to Marissa or her
husband Wilson for deposit in their personal accounts. To
facilitate encashment, Marissa would sign the check to signify to
the bank that she personally knew the alternative payee. The total
amount embezzled reached P7 million.
 
Respondents filed complaints against petitioners with the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Forthwith, the City Prosecutor
filed an Information for estafa against Marissa, Wilson, and
Renita Chua.
14
Believing that a more serious offense should have been charged
against petitioners, respondents interposed an appeal to the
Secretary of Justice. The Secretary of Justice found that the
participation of Wilson Chua in the commission of the crime was
not clearly established by the evidence. As to Renita Chua, the
Secretary of Justice found no proof of conspiracy between her and
Marissa. Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, but it
was denied with finality by the Secretary of Justice.
 
Respondents then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of
Appeals. They alleged that the Secretary of Justice committed
grave abuse of discretion. They prayed that the Court of Appeals
order the Prosecutor to withdraw the Information and instead, file
several Informations against petitioners. The Court of Appeals
rendered  its Decision dismissing the petition, holding that there
was no conspiracy among the petitioners.
 
Respondents seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration and
then the Court of Appeals reverses itself. The Court of Appeals
found that it overlooked certain facts and circumstances which, if
considered, would establish probable cause against Wilson and
Renita. The Court of Appeals identified these facts to be: (1)
Marissa’s consistent practice of depositing checks with altered
names of payees to the respective accounts of Wilson Chua and
Renita Chua; (2) considering that Wilson and Marissa are husband
and wife, it can be inferred that one knows the transactions of the
other; and (3) Wilson had full knowledge of the unlawful
activities of Marissa. . This is supported by the affidavit of
Ernesto Alcantara.
 
ISSUE: Whether or not Court of Appeals erred in compelling the
Secretary of Justice to include in the Information Wilson and
Renita.
HELD: The Court of Appeals did not err in directing the City
Prosecutor to include Wilson and Renita Chua in the Information
for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of
commercial documents.
 
Section 5, Rule 110 of the 200 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
amended, partly provides that "All criminal actions either
commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted
under the direction and control of a public prosecutor." The
rationale for this rule is that since a criminal offense is an outrage
to the sovereignty of the State, it necessarily follows that a
representative of the State shall direct and control the prosecution
thereof.. However, that the public prosecutor’s exercise of his
discretionary powers is not absolute. One of the exceptions is that
the Court of Appeals may review the resolution of the Secretary of
Justice on a petition for certiorari on the ground that he committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction.
 
As found by the Court of Appeals, the Secretary of Justice either
overlooked or patently ignored the following circumstances: (1)
Marissa’s practice of depositing checks, with altered names of
payees, in the respective accounts of Wilson and Renita Chua; (2)
the fact that Wilson and Marissa are husband and wife makes it
difficult to believe that one has no idea of the transactions entered
into by the other; and (3) the affidavit of Ernesto Alcantara
confirming that Wilson had knowledge of Marissa’s illegal
activities. WHEREFORE, the petition is denied and the Amended
Decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Prosecution of Civil Action Arising from crimes
Case 15
Quinto Vs. Andres
453 SCRA 511
Facts:
15
The son of the petitioner died by drowning as the former
assented to the invitation of the respondents to go fishing inside a
concrete culvert.
The NBI filed information for homicide and prosecution
had presented its witnesses.
The trail court had acquitted the respondents on the ground
of insufficiency of evidence and held the respondents not liable
for damages because of the absence of preponderant evidence.
The CA affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not the extinction of respondent’s criminal
liability carries with it the extinction of their civil liability.
Held:
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the
extinction of the civil action. However, the civil action based on
delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final
judgment in the civil action that the act or omission from where
the civil liability may arise does not exist.
In the present case, we rule that, as held by the trial court
and the CA, the prosecution failed to adduce preponderant
evidence to prove the facts on which the civil liability of the
respondents rest, i.e. that the petitioner has a cause of action
against the respondents for damages.
Case 16
Tupaz IV Vs. Court of Appeals
475 SCRA
Facts:
Petitioners signed trust receipts in favor of respondent BPI
for the letters of credit issued by the latter to the former. When
petitioners did not comply with their undertaking under the trust
receipts after the respondents several demands, the latter charged
the former with estafa under trust Receipt Law.
The trial court acquitted the petitioners for the crime of
estafa based on reasonable doubt. However, it found petitioners
civilly liable under the trust receipt. The CA affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not the acquittal of the petitioners operates to
extinguished their civil liability.
Held:
The rule is that where the civil action is impliedly instituted
with the criminal action, the civil liability is not extinguished by
acquittal- where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
preponderance of evidence is requires in civil cases; where the
court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not
criminal but only civil in nature xxx and where the civil liability
does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which
the accused was acquitted.
Case 17
SAMSON CHING, Petitioner, vs. CLARITA NICDAO and HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents
 
I. Facts of the Case
                                Clarita Nicdao was accused of BP22 by
Samson Ching. Eleven (11) Informations were filed with the First
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Dinalupihan-Hermosa,
Province of Bataan, which, except as to the amounts and check
numbers. At about the same time, fourteen (14) other criminal
complaints, also for violation of BP 22, were filed against
respondent Nicdao by Emma Nuguid, said to be the common law
spouse of petitioner Ching. Another witness presented by the
prosecution was Imelda Yandoc, an employee of HSLB. On
direct-examination,15 she testified that she worked as a checking
16
account bookkeeper/teller of the bank. stated anew that respondent
Nicdao’s checks bounced on October 7, 1997 for being "DAIF"
and her account was closed the following day, on October 8,
1997.
                        The defense proffered the testimonies of
respondent Nicdao, Melanie Tolentino and Jocelyn Nicdao. On
direct-examination,17 respondent Nicdao stated that she only
dealt with Nuguid. She vehemently denied the allegation that she
had borrowed money from both petitioner Ching and Nuguid in
the total amount of P22,950,000.00.
                        On December 8, 1998, the MCTC rendered
judgment in Criminal Cases Nos. 9433-9443 convicting
respondent Nicdao of eleven (11) counts of violation of BP 22.
The MCTC gave credence to petitioner Ching’s testimony that
respondent Nicdao borrowed money from him in the total amount
of P20,950,000.00.
                        On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Dinalupihan, Bataan, Branch 5, in separate Decisions both dated
May 10, 1999, affirmed in toto the decisions of the MCTC
convicting respondent Nicdao of eleven (11) and fourteen (14)
counts of violation of BP 22 in Criminal Cases Nos. 9433-9443
and 9458-9471, respectively.
                        On November 22, 1999, the CA (13th Division)
rendered the assailed Decision in CA-G.R. CR No.
23055 acquitting respondent Nicdao of the eleven (11) counts of
violation of BP 22 filed against her by petitioner Ching.The
Decision of the CA became final and executor.
 
III-Issue
           Repondent Nicdao’s acquittal by the CA,does the Supreme
Court has the jurisdiction and authority to resolve and rule on her
civil liability, under  Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of
Court which, prior to its amendment
 
III-Held by SC
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
Notwithstanding respondent Nicdao’s acquittal, petitioner Ching
is entitled to appeal the civil aspect of the case within the
reglementary period
It is axiomatic that "every person criminally liable for a felony is
also civilly liable."34 Under the pertinent provision of the Revised
Rules of Court, the civil action is generally impliedly instituted
with the criminal action. At the time of petitioner Ching’s filing of
the Informations against respondent Nicdao, Section 1,35 Rule
111 of the Revised Rules of Court, quoted earlier, provided in
part:
SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of
civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action,
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right
to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action.
A painstaking review of the case leads to the conclusion that
respondent Nicdao’s acquittal likewise carried with it the
extinction of the action to enforce her civil liability. There is
simply no basis to hold respondent Nicdao civilly liable to
petitioner Ching.
First, the CA’s acquittal of respondent Nicdao is not merely based
on reasonable doubt. Rather, it is based on the finding that she did
not commit the act penalized under BP 22. In particular, the CA
found that the P20,000,000.00 check was a stolen check which
was never issued nor delivered by respondent Nicdao to petitioner
Ching. As such, according to the CA, petitioner Ching "did not
acquire any right or interest over Check No. 002524 and cannot
assert any cause of action founded on said check,"41 and that
respondent Nicdao "has no obligation to make good the stolen
check and cannot, therefore, be held liable for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22."42
With respect to the ten (10) other checks, the CA established that
the loans secured by these checks had already been extinguished
17
after full payment had been made by respondent Nicdao. In this
connection, the second element for the crime under BP 22, i.e.,
"that the check is made or drawn and issued to apply on account
or for value," is not present.
Second, in acquitting respondent Nicdao, the CA did not adjudge
her to be civilly liable to petitioner Ching. In fact, the CA
explicitly stated that she had already fully paid her obligations.
The CA computed the payments made by respondent Nicdao vis-
à-vis her loan obligations in this manner:
Clearly, adding the payments recorded at the back of the cigarette
cartons by Emma Nuguid in her own handwriting totaling
P5,780,000.00 and the P1,200,000.00 demand draft received by
Emma Nuguid, it would appear that petitioner [respondent herein]
had already made payments in the total amount of P6,980,000.00
for her loan obligation of only P2,100,000.00 (P950,000.00 in the
case at bar and P1,150,000.00 in CA-G.R. CR No. 23054).43
On the other hand, its finding relative to the P20,000,000.00 check
that it was a stolen check necessarily absolved respondent Nicdao
of any civil liability thereon as well.
Third, while petitioner Ching attempts to show that respondent
Nicdao’s liability did not arise from or was not based upon the
criminal act of which she was acquitted (ex delicto) but from her
loan obligations to him (ex contractu), however, petitioner Ching
miserably failed to prove by preponderant evidence the existence
of these unpaid loan obligations. Significantly, it can be inferred
from the following findings of the CA in its decision acquitting
respondent Nicdao that the act or omission from which her civil
liability may arise did not exist. On the P20,000,000.00 check, the
CA found as follows:
True, indeed, the missing pre-signed and undated check no.
002524 surfaced in the possession of complainant Ching who, in
cahoots with his paramour Emma Nuguid, filled up the blank
check with his name as payee and in the fantastic amount of
P20,000,000.00, dated it October 6, 1997, and presented it to the
bank on October 7, 1997, along with the other checks, for
payment. Therefore, the inference that the check was stolen is
anchored on competent circumstantial evidence. The fact already
established is that Emma Nuguid , previous owner of the store,
had access to said store. Moreover, the possession of a thing that
was stolen , absent a credible reason, as in this case, gives rise to
the presumption that the person in possession of the stolen article
is presumed to be guilty of taking the stolen article (People v.
Zafra, 237 SCRA 664).
 
Therefore. CA decision is affirmed and petitioners appeal is deny
for lack of merit.
Case 18
CRUZ v. MINA
G.R. No. 154207, 27 April 2007
 Case Summary:
 
On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz, filed before the
Metropolitan Trial Court a formal entry of Appearance as private
prosecutor, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 for Grave Threats,
where his father, Mariano Cruz is the complaining witness.
 
On May 9, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC, a Motion for
Reconsideration. The petitioner argues that nowhere does the law
provide that the crime of Grave Threats has no civil aspect. On
June 5, 2002 however, the RTC issued its Order denying the
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence this petition.
 
Issue:
 Whether or not the crime of Grave Threats carries with it civil
liability
 
18
Decision of the case:
 
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code provides that every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable except in
instances when no actual damage results from the offense, such as
espionage, violation o neutrality, flight t an enemy country, and
crimes against popular representation. The basic rule applies in
the instant case, such that when a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal
action, unless the offended party waves the civil action, reserves
the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior
to the criminal action.
The petitioner is correct in stating that there being no reservation,
waiver, nor prior institution of the civil aspect in Criminal Case
No. 00-1705, it follows that the civil aspect arising from grave
Threats is deemed instituted with the criminal action, and hence,
the private prosecutor may rightfully intervene to prosecute the
civil aspect.
 
WHEREFORE the petition is GRANTED. The assailed resolution
and order of the RTC, branch 116, Pasay City are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
 
SO ORDERED.
Preliminary Investigation
Case 19
CELSA P. ACUÑA, Petitioner, versus DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN
FOR LUZON, PEDRO PASCUA and RONNIE TURLA,
(Angeles City National Trade School), Respondents.
2005 Jan 31
G.R. No. 144692
CARPIO
 
The Case
 
This is a petition for certiorari of the Resolution dated 4 April
2000  and the Order dated 19 June 2000 of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon.  The 4 April 2000 Resolution dismissed
for lack of probable cause the complaint for perjury of petitioner
Celsa P. Acuña against respondents Pedro Pascua and Ronnie
Turla.  The 19 June 2000 Order denied the motion for
reconsideration.
 
FACTS:
 
Petitioner Celsa P. Acuña  (“petitioner”) is a former teacher of the
Angeles City National Trade School (“ACNTS”) in Angeles City,
Pampanga.   Respondent Pedro Pascua (“respondent Pascua”) was
ACNTS’ Officer-In-Charge while respondent Ronnie Turla
(“respondent Turla”) was a member of its faculty.
 
On 13 July 1998, a certain Erlinda Yabut (“Yabut”), another
ACNTS teacher, together with other school personnel, requested a
dialogue with respondent Pascua on some unspecified matter. 
Respondent Pascua agreed to the request and the meeting took
place on 16 July 1998.  Respondent Turla attended the meeting
upon respondent Pascua’s directive. Petitioner, whom Yabut
apparently invited, also attended the meeting.
 
As an offshoot to an incident during the 16 July 1998 meeting,
petitioner charged respondent Pascua with misconduct (“OMB-
ADM-1-99-0387”) and with violation of Article 131 (perjury) of
the Revised Penal Code (“OMB 1-99-903”) before the Office of
the Ombudsman (“Ombudsman”).
 
19
Contending that private respondents perjured themselves in their
sworn statements in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387, petitioner charged
private respondents with perjury (“OMB 1-99-2467”) before the
office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon (“public
respondent”). Petitioner alleged that private respondents were
liable for perjury because: (1) the complaint she and Yabut filed
against respondent Pascua before the Civil Service Commission,
later endorsed to the DECS, was not “the same” as her complaint
in OMB-ADM-1-99-0387 and (2) it was Yabut and not
respondent Pascua who called the 16 July 1998 meeting.
 
Private respondents denied the charge against them and sought the
dismissal of the complaint.  Public respondent found no evidence
to indict respondents for perjury, hence, dismissed the complaint. 
Petitioner sought reconsideration but public respondent denied her
motion in the 19 June 2000 Order. 
 
Hence, petitioner filed the petition before the Supreme Court
contending that public respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing her complaint for lack of probable cause.
 
ISSUE:
 
Whether public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the complaint in OMB 1-99-2467 for lack of probable
cause.
  
HELD:
 
The Public Respondent did not Gravely Abuse His Discretion in
Dismissing OMB 1-99-2467 for lack of probable cause
 
It is the Court’s policy of non-interference with the Ombudsman’s
exercise of his constitutionally mandated prosecutory powers. 
The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and
prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of
the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the
functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by
innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory
proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with
regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the
courts would be extremely swamped if they could be compelled to
review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or
prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information
in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.  The
Court, in the present case, found no reason to deviate from this
long-standing policy.
 
Probable cause, as used in preliminary investigations, is defined as
the “existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the
belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the
knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of
the crime for which he was prosecuted.”
 
 Case 20
 
JIMMY ANG, Petitioner,  versus ELEANOR R. LUCERO, THE
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, and THE CITY
PROSECUTOR OF MAKATI CITY, Respondents.
2005 Jan 21
G.R. No. 143169
CARPIO
 
The Case
 
This petition for review assails the 29 October 1999 Decision[2]
and 25 April 2000 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 44778.  The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for
certiorari filed by petitioner Jimmy Ang and affirmed the
20
Resolutions issued by former Secretary of Justice Teofisto T.
Guingona, Jr.
 
FACTS:
 The record shows that complainant [Lucero], an American
citizen, is a businesswoman and a native of Pangasinan.  On
August 8, 1989, she entered into a memorandum of agreement
with E. Ganzon, Inc. for the purchase of Condominium Unit 1512,
Makati Cinema Square Tower located along Pasong Tamo,
Makati for P2,417,655.00.  As she is a resident of Guam, she
appointed by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney,[3] Graciano
P. Catenza, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact on November 20, 1990 to
manage and administer all her businesses and properties in the
Philippines, including the condominium unit.  Catenza, however,
delegated his authority to the respondent.
 Respondent/complainant filed against petitioner a criminal
complaint for estafa through failsification of public documents for
falsifying a letter of authorization dated 6 July 1992 and to make
it  appear that she authorized petitioner to register the
condominium unit in his name and the Deed of Assignment dated
June 22, 1992 to make it appear that she transferred the ownership
of the condominium unit. 
 Through the use of the aforementioned fictitious documents, her
title was cancelled and in lieu thereof, condominium Certificate of
Title No. 23578 was issued in the name of respondent by the
Registry of Deeds of Makati City which title he used as a
collateral to secure a loan in the amount of P2,000,000.00 from
the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC).  When she
learned of the fraudulent transfer, she executed an affidavit of
adverse claim and annotated it on the title on March 21, 1994. 
The day after the thirty-day effectivity period of the adverse claim
lapsed, respondent, to add insult to injury, immediately secured an
additional loan in the amount of P700,000.00 with the same bank
(RCBC) using the same property as collateral even after the
transport business he was managing for the complainant had
ceased operation already.  Respondent failed to act on
complainant’s demands for accounting and for the reconveyance
to her of Condominium Unit No. 1512.
 
The NBI found the signature on the Deed of Assignment and
Lucero’s sample signatures to have been written by “one and the
same person.” However, the NBI found the signature on the
Authorization Letter a “traced forgery.”
 
A preliminary investigation was conducted finding probable cause
against Ang.  Prosecutor Bautista recommended the filing of two
(2) informations, (1) for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (c)
of the Revised Penal Code[7] and (2) for estafa through
falsification of public document.    Ang moved for a
reinvestigation.  Prosecutor Wilfredo Ong of the CPO Makati
reconsidered Prosecutor Bautista’s resolution of 17 April 1995
and dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. 
Lucero appealed the dismissal of the complaint to the Department
of Justice and the resolution was reversed.  Petition for certiorari
with prayer for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and
TRO was filed.  The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision
dismissing the petition for certiorari and affirming the resolutions
of the Secretary of Justice.  Hence, petitioner before the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not the findings of the Secretary of Justice of
probable cause for estafa valid?
 
HELD:
 Ang’s contentions are untenable.
 
           In a preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor merely
determines whether there is probable cause or sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed
21
and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be
held for trial. It does not call for the application of rules and
standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after
trial on the merits.  As implied by the words themselves,
“probable cause” is concerned with probability, not absolute or
moral certainty. The complainant need not present at this stage
proof beyond reasonable doubt.  A preliminary investigation does
not require a full and exhaustive presentation of the parties’
evidence.
 
In this case, Ang calls on this Court to assume the function of a
public prosecutor.  Ang’s arguments are essentially evidentiary
matters that must be presented and heard during the trial. Whether
Lucero granted Ang the authority to sell and mortgage the
Property is a question which requires an examination of the
parties’ evidence.
 
In this case, Ang admitted typing the Deed of Assignment over
Lucero’s signature in blank. Thereafter, Ang used the Deed of
Assignment to transfer the ownership of the Property from Lucero
to him.  Lucero claims that she was prejudiced by virtue of the
Deed of Assignment.  However, whether Ang took advantage of
Lucero’s signature is a question that should be presented and
resolved during the trial. 
 There is also probable cause that Ang committed estafa by
falsification of public document. The Deed of Assignment is a
public document since it is notarized.  Lucero claims that the
Deed of Assignment was falsified because she was out of the
country when it was executed.  Moreover, though the signature in
the Deed of Assignment appears to be her signature, it was not
Lucero’s intention to transfer the Property to Ang.
 
Case 21.
TORRES VS AGUINALDO
Facts:
Torres, the petitioner, was charged for the falsification of public
documents by forging the Deed of Absolute Sale of property of
the Spouses Edgardo and Nelia Aguinaldo. They alleged that the
title to their properties covered by TCT No. T-93596,T-87764-65
were transferred without their knowledge and consent in the name
of Torres.
Office of the City Prosecutor found probable cause and
recommended the filing of an information against Torres. Torres
moved for reconsideration but was denied. On appeal DOJ
reversed the findings and ordered withdrawal of the information.
Information was withdrawn and petitioner has not been arraigned.
Aguinaldo filed petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeal
which was granted.
Issue:
Whether or not evidence of a respondent in a criminal case should
be considered during the preliminary investigation in determining
if probable cause exists to indict him for the crime charged.
Held:
Preliminary investigation is executive in character. It does not
contemplate a judicial function. It is essentially an inquisitorial
proceeding, and often, the only means of ascertaining who may be
reasonably charged with a crime. It is not a trial on the merits and
has no purpose except to determine whether a crime has been
committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the
22
accused is guilty thereof. 'It does not place the person against
whom it is taken in jeopardy.
Generally, preliminary investigation falls under the authority of
the prosecutor. It is well to note that Section 3, Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure not only requires the
submission of the complaint and the affidavits of the complainant
and his witnesses, as well as other supporting documents, but also
directs the respondent to submit his counter-affidavit and that of
his witnesses and other supporting documents relied upon for his
defense. Section 4 thereof also mandates the investigating
prosecutor to certify under oath in the information that the
accused was informed of the complaint and the evidence against
him, and that he was given an opportunity to submit controverting
evidence.
 
Case 22
Romualdez vs Marcelo
470 SCRA 763
Facts : 
A warrant of arrest was issued on February 28, 1989, but
this was not served because of petitioner’s exile from the country. 
On October 21, 1991, he filed through counsel a Motion to Recall
Warrants of Arrest, alleging that the preliminary investigation
conducted by Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) was invalid for lack of jurisdiction.Due to his non-
compliance with these terms, the Sandiganbayan denied on
January 24, 1992 petitioner’s motion to recall the warrant of
arrest.  Petitioner moved for reconsideration which the
Sandiganbayan denied on April 24, 1992In a Decision dated May
16, 1995, this Court declared invalid the preliminary investigation
conducted by the PCGG for lack of jurisdiction.  However, it held
that the invalidity or absence of a preliminary investigation did
not affect the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan or impair the
validity of the informations.
Issue:
Whether or not the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss the
preliminary investigation?
Ruling:
 No.  The Supreme Court ruled, that the Ombudsman is the
proper authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of the
alleged offenses committed by petitioner.  Pursuant thereto, there
is no need for a new complaint to be filed by PCGG because the
Ombudsman, on its own, may conduct a preliminary investigation
of offenses committed by public officers.  Moreover, the denial of
his motion to dismiss was concomitant with Section 4 of the
Revised Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman
disallowing a motion to dismiss except on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.  admitting the Amended Information charging a new offense
Case 23
Matalam vs Sandiganbayan
455 SCRA 737
Facts :
An information 15 November 2004 was filed before the
Sandiganbayan charging petitioner Datu Guimid Matalam, Habib
23
A. Bajunaid, Ansari M. Lawi, Muslimin Unga and Naimah Unte
with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, for their alleged illegal and unjustifiable refusal to pay
the monetary claims of Kasan I. Ayunan, Abdul E. Zailon, Esmael
A. Ebrahim, Annabelle Zailon, Pendatun Mambatawan, Hyria
Mastura and Faizal I. Hadil. After the reinvestigation, the public
prosecutor filed a “Manifestation and Motion to Admit Amended
Information Deleting the Names of Other Accused Except Datu
Guimid Matalam to which petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss
and Opposition to the Motion to Admit the Alleged Amended
Information Against the Accused Guimid P. Matalam Thereafter,
the public prosecutor filed his Reply to which petitioner filed a
Rejoinder.In his Motion to Dismiss, petitioner alleged that the
amended information charges an entirely new cause of action. 
The corpus delicti of the amended information is no longer his
alleged refusal to pay the backwages ordered by the Civil Service
Commission, but the alleged willful, unlawful and illegal
dismissal from the service of the complaining witnesses.  He
insists that the amended information charging a separate and
entirely different offense cannot be admitted because there would
be a serious violation of due process of law.  He claims he is
entitled to a preliminary investigation since he was not informed
that he is being charged for the alleged dismissal of the
complaining witnesses and that he was not given the opportunity
to explain.Petitioner argues that the resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan dated 12 January 2004 and 03 November 2004
without conducting a preliminary investigation were issued
without jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of jurisdiction
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Issue :
 whether or not petitioner was deprived of due process of
law when the Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended Information
without conducting another or new preliminary investigation?
Ruling :
The amendment was indeed substantial. The recital of
facts constituting the offense charged was definitely altered.  In
the original information, the prohibited act allegedly committed
by petitioner was the illegal and unjustifiable refusal to pay the
monetary claims of the private complainants, while in the
amended information, it is the illegal dismissal from the service of
the private complainants.  However, it cannot be denied that the
alleged illegal and unjustifiable refusal to pay monetary claims is
related to, and arose from, the alleged illegal dismissal from the
service of the private complainants.Thus, before or after a plea, a
substantial amendment in an information entitles an accused to
another preliminary investigation.However, if the amended
information contains a charge related to or is included in the
original information, a new preliminary investigation is not
required.
Case 24
DR. BENITA F. OSORIO, petitioner,
Versus
HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, G.R. No. 156652
 Promulgated October 13, 2005
Facts:
          This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the 13
December 2002 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 67511 dated December 13, 2002 which affirmed
in toto the 12 January 2001 Resolution of the Office of the
Ombudsman-Visayas in, as well as the order dated 17 July 2001
denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, suspending the
24
petitioner from her position as principal of Dr. Cecilio Putong
National High School (formerly Bohol National High School).
         The petition originated from a letter complaint from Beatriz
L. Tenorio to the Ombudsman alleging that the petitioner
committed the following acts:
1.      Failure to  account for the rentals of the school facilities;
 
2.      Non-remittance to the school trust funds of money from the
sale of old newspapers to the school and appropriation of the said
amount to herself;
 
3.      Ready-made bidding with supplier of school-needed
materials;
 
4.      Double mandatory collection supposedly for the  Boy and
Girl Scouts of the Philippines, from all students of Bohol National
High School and non-remittance of all the contributions to BSP
and GSP;
 
5.      Treatment of money from the school canteen as her personal
money;
6.      Conspiracy with treasure hunters in digging under the main
ground of the school building for Yamashita treasures;
 
7.      Falsification of travel document to claim bigger
representation allowances; and
8.      Other improper acts.
 
           Acting on the complaint, the Office of the Ombudsman-
Manila, on 29 January 1998, requested the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) to conduct an investigation to verify the
alleged anomalies at the Dr. Cecilio Putong National High School.
In the course of that investigation, the NBI found:

a) that petitioner Osorio authorized the sale of newspapers, but did
not remit the proceeds thereof to the school; and
b) that she issued a memorandum through which students were
charged more than the allowable fees for their membership with
Boy and Girl Scouts of the Philippines. 
 
          On 17 February 1998, the Office of the Ombudsman-Manila
requested audit specialists from the COA to conduct a thorough
investigation on the alleged anomalies at the Dr. Cecilio Putong
National High School.
 
          After evaluating the report of the COA auditors, the Office
of the Ombudsman-Visayas was convinced that allegations no. 1
to no. 4 were duly substantiated while the rest of the allegations
were not.  It found prima facie case of five (5) counts of
Malversation of Public Funds against petitioner on the proceeds of
the sale of the school’s old newspapers on five occasions.
 
 
          On 17 December 1998, the investigating auditors submitted
a sworn affidavit. In an order dated 27 January 1999, the Office of
the Ombudsman-Visayas issued an order placing petitioner and
Mr. Nestor Robles under preventive suspension. On 05 February
1999, the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas ordered petitioner
and Mr. Nestor Robles to file their respective counter-affidavits to
the complaint. Later, on 15 March 1999, petitioner and co-
respondent Robles submitted their respective counter-affidavits,
denying participation in the alleged irregularities.
 
          In a resolution dated 12 January 2001, the Office of the
Ombudsman-Visayas found probable cause against petitioner for
five (5) counts of Malversation of Public Funds and five (5)
counts of violations of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, as
amended.   Subsection (e) of Section 3 and of the same rule provides:
25
          The Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas denied petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration in its order dated 17 July 2001.
 
 Issues:
 
1.      Whether the Court of Appeals is correct in ruling that the
Honorable Office of the Ombudsman did not commit any grave
abuse of discretion when it opted not to conduct a clarificatory
hearing in the case of the petitioner.
 
2.      Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the other
issues raised by the petitioner on certiorari are purely questions of
evidence and not of law.
  
Decision:
           On the first issue raised by petitioner, she bewails
respondent court’s ruling decreeing that a clarificatory hearing in
the instant criminal case is optional on the part of the investigating
prosecutor. Petitioner believes that without a clarificatory hearing,
it is impossible for the investigating prosecutor to resolve
numerous irreconcilable issues and arrive at a lawful indictment.   
          Section 1 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides:
             Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to
determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and the
respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.
   
           The foregoing provision sets forth the purpose of
preliminary investigation which is to determine whether there is a
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty
thereof.      
           (e) The investigating officer may set a hearing if there are
facts and issues to be clarified from a party or a witness.  The
parties can be present at the hearing but without the right to
examine or cross-examine.  They may, however, submit to the
investigating officer questions which may be asked to the party or
witness concerned.
  
It is the call of the investigating prosecutor, in the exercise of his
sound discretion, whether to conduct a clarificatory hearing or
not.  If he believes that the evidence before him is sufficient to
support a finding of probable cause, he may not hold a
clarificatory hearing.  Ronald’s teacher, banged his head against that of his classmate
As held in Webb v. De Leon:
  . . . The decision to call witnesses for clarificatory questions is
addressed to the sound discretion of the investigator and the
investigator alone.  If the evidence on hand already yields a
probable cause, the investigator need not hold a clarificatory
hearing.  an x-ray. The attending physician informed Magdalena that
  
          The consistent and general policy of the Court is not to
interfere with the Office of the Ombudsman’s exercise of its
investigatory and prosecutory powers. The rule is based not only
upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted
by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon
practicality as well.   Evidence warrants the release of the respondent for further
 
          The instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67511 dated
13 December 2002 affirming in toto the resolution dated 12
January 2001 and the order dated 17 July 2001 issued by the
Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas is AFFIRMED.
 
Case 25
G.R. No. 147932             January 25, 2006
26
LAILA G. DE OCAMPO, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, MAGDALENA B. DACARRA, and
ERLINDA P. ORAYAN, Respondents.
The Facts
The present case arose from a sworn statement of respondent
Magdalena B. Dacarra ("Magdalena") executed before the
Women’s Desk of the CPD Police Station in Batasan Hills,
Quezon City on 10 December 1999 stating that on 4 December
1999, her nine-year-old son Ronald complained of dizziness upon
arriving home at about six in the evening and then vomited. When
asked what happened, Ronald replied that petitioner, who was
Lorendo Orayan ("Lorendo"). Magdalena inspected Ronald’s head
and saw a woundless contusion. Due to Ronald’s continued
vomiting, Magdalena brought him to a quack doctor (arbularyo)
on 5 December 1999. The following morning, Magdalena brought
Ronald to the East Avenue Medical Center where he underwent
Ronald’s head had a fracture. Blood oozed out of Ronald’s nose
before he died on 9 December 1999.
Lorendo also executed a sworn statement narrating how petitioner
banged his head against Ronald’s.
The Inquest Proceedings which will be the primary defence
citation of the petitioner stated that:
investigation of the charges against her. The case is not proper for
inquest as the incident complained of. Further, the evidence
insufficient to support the charge for homicide against the
respondent. There is no concrete evidence to show proof that the
alleged banging of the heads of the two minor victims could be
the actual and proximate cause of the death of the minor. There is
no certainty, therefore, that respondent’s alleged wrongdoing
contributed or caused the death of said victim.
Subsequently, the case was referred for preliminary investigation.
During the said preliminary investigation, Lorendo’s mom alleged
that she was bribed by the petitioner and presented said bribe
money. Also 2 other witnesses swore they saw petitioner banging
the heads of the minors as well as physically abusing them.
Her counter argument contained:
-          The findings of the inquest proceedings
-          Petitioner assailed the omission in Magdalena’s sworn
statement about Ronald’s head injury due to a vehicular accident
in November 1997.
-          Petitioner also alleged that the witnesses have immature
perception.
-          Petitioner further asserted that the causes of death stated in
Ronald’s Death Certificate are hearsay and inadmissible in the
preliminary investigation.
The investigating prosecutor issued a Resolution finding probable
cause against petitioner for the offenses charged. Petitioner filed a
petition for review with the DOJ.
The DOJ Secretary denied the petition for review. The DOJ
Secretary held that there was no bias in complainants’ favor when
the investigating prosecutor did not conduct a clarificatory hearing
and unilaterally procured the autopsy report as nothing precluded
her from doing so.
The DOJ Secretary rejected petitioner’s claim that she is innocent
as held by the inquest prosecutor. The inquest prosecutor did not
dismiss the case. She merely recommended petitioner’s release for
further investigation since the case was not proper for inquest and
the evidence was then insufficient.
Issues:
1. Whether petitioner was denied due process during the
preliminary investigation; and
2. Whether there is probable cause against petitioner for homicide
under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section
10(a), Article VI of RA 7610 and for violation of Section 10(a),
Article VI of RA 7610.
27
Ruling:
Absence of a clarificatory hearing
The Court rejects petitioner’s contention that she was denied due
process when the investigating prosecutor did not conduct a
clarificatory hearing. A clarificatory hearing is not indispensable
during preliminary investigation. Rather than being mandatory, a
clarificatory hearing is optional on the part of the investigating
officer as evidenced by the use of the term "may" in Section 3(e)
of Rule 112:
(e) If the investigating officer believes that there are matters to be
clarified, he may set a hearing to propound clarificatory questions
to the parties or their witnesses, during which the parties shall be
afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to
examine or cross-examine. xxx15 (emphasis supplied)
In this case, the investigating prosecutor no longer conducted
hearings after petitioner submitted her counter-affidavit. This
simply means that at that point the investigating prosecutor
believed that there were no more matters for clarification. It is
only in petitioner’s mind that some "crucial points" still exist and
need clarification. In any event, petitioner can raise these
"important" matters during the trial proper.
Petitioner was not deprived of due process since both parties were
accorded equal rights in arguing their case and presenting their
respective evidence during the preliminary investigation. Due
process is merely an opportunity to be heard.
Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial. It is not a trial of
the case on the merits. Its sole purpose is to determine whether a
crime has been committed and whether the respondent isprobably
guilty of the crime. It is not the occasion for the full and
exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence.
There is probable cause for the offenses charged against
petitioner. Probable cause is the existence of such facts and
circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind that
a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty
of the crime. In effect, petitioner admits the occurrence of the
head-banging incident but denies committing it.
Petition is denied and the Resolutions affirmed.
Arrest
Case 26
People of the Philippines Vs German Agojo
 
As alleged in the complaint, accused appellant German Luna was
apprehended on August 24, 1999 in Poblacion, Tanauan,  has proven beyond reasonable doubt that the accused appellant
Batangas for violation of PD 1866 and RA 6425.
Concomitantly, the police team headed by Major Ablang secured
an entrapment operation against the accused appellant through a
buy-bust. A civilian informant, under the name of Rodolfo Alonzo
was able to purchase 206.32 grams of shabu which was positively
identified by a chemist from the PNP crime laboratory in camp
Vicente Lim.
In light of the foregoing decision of the RTC, the accused was
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the charge of RA 6425,
however, he was acquitted for the charge of violation of PD 1866
for lack of sufficient evidence.
Issues:
1. Whether or not appellant’s guilt was proven beyond  In due course, a decision was rendered and the three were
reasonable doubt
2. Whether or not appellant was framed up by the buy first
team violation of
Held
                In the case at bench, violation of RA 6425 was evidently
proven by the prosecution through the testimony of Alonzo on the
sale of illegal drugs and the identification of appellant as the seller
is clear and
28
straightforward.                                                                                  
                    More so, the buy bust team witnessed the sale of
shabu and it was duly accorded the immediacy between the time
of commission of the offense and the time of the arrest.
                Further review of the record reveals that the second
instance of lawful warrantless arrest covered by paragraph (B) 
were met in this case in which the offense has just been
committed and the person marking the arrest  has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it.
                As regards to the issue of framed up, the buy bust team
accepted payment for the contraband. It was also proven that the
VHS tape containing drugs were examined in PNP crime
laboratory and positively tested for shabu. Thus, there was no
evidence that such an attempt to frame him up was made in this
case.   
 
 Case 27
People of the Phil. Vs Cesar Givera
 
On May 2, 1993 Cesar Givera together with Epifanio Geralde and
Arturo Geralde were charged with the same offense at the RTC of
Q.C. Branch 104 and were sentenced to the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua for the death of Eusebio Gardon.
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the
accessory penalties prescribed by law, to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased the sum of P100, 000 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs of the
suit. Although said defendants filed appealed the judgement but
the decision of the court was affirmed with modification.
Prescinding to prove the fact and cause of death of Eusebio
Gardon, the prosecution presented in evidence the testimony
medico legal office P/ Maj Florante Baltazar wherein the
testimony shows that the victim sustained one fatal stab wound
possibly caused by a single bladed weapon.
Collorarily the daughter of the victim, Milagroso Gardon and
another witness Melinda Delfin testified against the accused and it
is noteworthy that they knew accused appellant and the other
assailants and that in fact some of them are related to witnesses.
Issue:
Whether or not the presence of reasonable doubt the court a quo
has committed an error in convicting the accused appellant of the
crime charged.
Held:
                The court finds the petition devoid of merit
First and foremost:
                It is clearly apparent that the prosecution presented
evidence and testimonies of witnesses were quoted as
spontaneous, detailed and arid consistent. Markworthy to note that
the accused – appellant are even related by affinity to the deceased
and residing within the vicinity where the crime was committed ,
and therefore, no reason to doubt their identification by the
prosecution witness.
                Secondly, forthwith with the allegations of conspiracy,
the evidence convincingly and unequivocally shows a coordinated
action by the group in the execution of the crime.  Nonetheless
evident premeditation and treachery cannot be appreciated in this
case for the very reason that the victim is not totally oblivious of
the impending attack by all the group of the accused appellant.
Suffice to say that the victim had very opportunity to escape from
the attack because he had been forewarned by his daughter of the
danger posed by the group of the accused appellant.      before the Supreme Court. Accused-appellant contended that his
                Thirdly, his arrest by virtue of a warrant of arrest was
deemed waived because he failed to move for the question of the
information before the trial court when he entered a plea of not
guilty and participated in the trial. The law provides that a warrant
of arrest remains enforceable until it is executed, recalled, or
quashed.
29
                Lastly the testimony of the medico legal officer was
inadmissible for failure of the adverse party to cross examine the
officer.
 
Case 28
G.R. No. 117952-53      February 14, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
DANILO DE GUZMAN y PEREZ, accused-appellant.
Facts:
Appellant in this case was under surveillance for illegal
possession of dangerous drugs by the police. The policemen
however did not arrest him immediately but waited for him to be
caught in flagrante delicto for selling shabu and possessing
unlicensed gun and a magazine. The offenders were brought to the
police station for questioning and detention. The police officers
were without warrants of arrest or search warrants at the time of
the arrests and seizure of evidence. As the operation was
conducted largely during night-time, the police officers were
unable to secure the necessary warrants for fear of leaving the
place of surveillance.
Accused-appellant was arraigned on February 22, 1993 with the
assistance of his counsel de officio. He pleaded "not guilty" to
both charges. The RTC of Cavite convicted Danilo de Guzman for
violation of RA 6425, Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and
Unlawful possession of firearms and ammunition.
Accused-appellant assails his conviction and raised the issue that
the trial court committed a patent reversible error in not finding
that the evidence so far presented was obtained in an illegal search
arrest and the search conducted incidental to his arrest were illegal
as the surrounding circumstances of the arrest were not within the
purview of the allowable warrantless arrests under Rule 113,
Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Issue:
Whether the arrest was illegal
Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court
and found that the contention of the accused untenable.
A close scrutiny of the records reveals that the police officers'
manner of conducting the accused-appellant's arrest was not
tainted with any constitutional infirmity. Despite word from their
fellow officer, SPO1 Cuevas, that he saw accused-appellant sniff
"shabu", they resisted the first impulse to storm the rented cottage
which could have caused them to seriously disregard
constitutional safeguards. Instead, the police officers waited for
the needed opening to validly arrest the accused.
Rule 113, Section 5 (a) of the Rules of Court provides that:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or
a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense; x x x
In the case at bar, accused-appellant was caught by the police
officers in flagrante delicto while carrying a firearm without the
necessary permit or license. Clearly, it was in violation of P.D.
No. 1866, Section 1, at the time of the arrest.
Furthermore, accused-appellant in this case is estopped from
questioning the legality of his arrest upon his failure to move for
quashal of the information against him prior to his arraignment
and entry of plea. Any irregularity .was therefore cured upon their
voluntary submission to the trial court's jurisdiction.
Case 29
People of the Philippines versus Molina
 
FACTS: Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Paguidopon received an
information regarding the presence of an allegedmarijuana pusher
in Davao City. His informer pointed to the motorcycle driver,
30
accused-appellant Mula, as the pusher. As toaccused-appellant
Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon had no occasion to see him before the
arrest.Moreover, the names and addressesof the accused-
appellants came to the knowledge of SPO1 Paguidopon only after
they were arrested. In the morning of August 8,1996, SPO1
Paguidopon received an information that the alleged pusher will
be passing at NHA, Ma-a, Davao City. He called forassistance at
the PNP proceed to the house of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon where
they would wait for the alleged pusher to pass by.At around 9:30
in the morning of August 8, 1996, a “trisikad” carrying the
accused-appellants passed by.At that instance, SPO1Paguidopon
pointed to the accused-appellants as the pushers. The police
officers then ordered the “trisikad” to stop. SPO1Pamplona
introduced himself as a police officer and asked accused-appellant
Molina to open the bag. Molina replied, “Boss, if 
possible we will settle this.” SPO1 Pamplona insisted on opening
the bag, which revealed dried marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter,
accused-appellants Mula and Molina were handcuffed by the
police officers. Accused-appellants contended that the marijuana
allegedly seized from them is inadmissible as evidence for having
been obtained in violation of their constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
 
ISSUE: Whether or not the marijuana is in admissible evidence
for having been seized in violation of appellants constitutional
rights against unreasonable searches and seizures?
 
HELD: The fundamental law of the land mandates that searches
and seizures be carried out in a reasonable fashion.
The Constitution provides: SEC. 2. The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
againstunreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant
orwarrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under
oathor affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
andthe persons or things to be seized. Search and seizure may be
made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may
be admissible in thefollowing instances: (1) search incident to a
lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in
violation ofcustoms laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view;
(5) when the accused himself waives his right against
unreasonablesearches and seizures;ii[24] and (6) stop and frisk
situations.
As a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid
warrant of arrest.The Rules of Court, however,recognizes
permissible warrantless arrests.Thus, a peace officer or a private
person may, without warrant, arrest a person: (a)when, in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense(arrest in
flagrante delicto); (b) when an offense has just been committed
and he has probable cause to believe based onpersonal knowledge
of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it (arrest effected in hot pursuit);and (c) when the
person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or a place where he is servingfinal judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from oneconfinement to another (arrest of
escaped prisoners). In the case at bar, accused-appellants
manifested no outward indicationthat would justify their arrest.In
holding a bag on board atrisikad, accused-appellants could not be
said to be committing,attempting to commit or have committed a
crime. The response of Molina that “Boss, if possible we will
settle this” is anequivocal statement which standing alone will not
constitute probable cause to effect an inflagrante delicto
arrest.Note thatwere it not for SPO1 Marino Paguidopon (who did
not participate in the arrest but merely pointed accused-appellants
to thearresting officers), accused-appellants could not be the
subject of any suspicion, reasonable or otherwise. SPO1
31
Paguidopon onlylearned Mula’s name and address after the arrest.
It is doubtful if SPO1 Paguidopon indeed recognized accused-
appellant Mula.It is worthy to note that, before the arrest, he was
able to see Mula in person only once, pinpointed to him by his
informer whilethey were on the side of the road.These
circumstances could not have afforded SPO1 Paguidopon a closer
look at accused-appellant Mula, considering that the latter was
then driving a motorcycle when SPO1 Paguidopon caught a
glimpse of him.Withrespect to accused-appellant Molina, SPO1
Paguidopon admitted that he had never seen him before the arrest.
The Court holds that the arrest of accused-appellants does not fall
under the exceptions allowed by the rules.Hence, thesearch
conducted on their person was likewise illegal.Consequently, the
marijuana seized by the peace officers could not beadmitted as
evidence.WHERE FORE accused are ACQUITTED
Case  30
People of the philippines versus Galvez
FACTS: At around 11:30 in the evening of May 9, 1998 the
accused Manuel Galvez together with unidentified companions
attack, assault, and stab with a bladed weapon Romen Castro,
which injuries eventually caused the latter’s death at a local fair
inside the DM Compound in Heroes del 98, Caloocan City.
Several witnesses identified Manuel Galvez as the assailant, SPO1
Alberto Lizarondo then went to Manuel Galvez  invite him to the
victim’s house for clarification however the relatives denied
Manuel Galvez as the assailant therefore the SPO1 Alberto
Lizarondo release him, Although allegedly released, he was later
forced by a barangay tanod Arturo Saligumba  to board a taxi and
go to the police headquarters in Sangandaan, Caloocan City where
SPO2 Vivencio Gamboa, investigator of the Station Investigation
Division of the Caloocan City police told him that he was a
suspect in the killing of Romen Castro and he pleaded not guilty.
He was not shown a warrant when he was arrested nor was he
interviewed by the policemen at the headquarters. Later that same
day, SPO1 Alberto Lizarondo said he saw Galvez in the police
station and SPO1 Lizarondo asked why Galvez was there, but the
relatives of the victim and the other witnesses told him that the
reason they said nothing when he asked them to identify Galvez
was because of fear.
 
ISSUE: Whether or Not the arrest executed on Manuel Galvez
was illegal arrest
HELD:  Accused-appellants arrest was illegal. Arturo Saligumba
admitted that he arrested Galvez on the basis solely of what
Reynaldo Castro had told him and not because he saw accused-
appellant commit the crime charged against him. Indeed, the
prosecution admitted that there was no warrant of arrest issued
against accused-appellant when the latter was taken into custody.
Considering that accused-appellant was not committing a crime at
the time he was arrested nor did the arresting officer have any
personal knowledge of facts indicating that accused-appellant
committed a crime, his arrest without a warrant cannot be
justified. By entering a plea of not guilty and participating actively
in the trial, however, accused-appellant Galvez waived his right to
raise the issue of the illegality of his arrest. It is now settled that
objection to a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which a court
acquires jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made
before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed
waived. The fact that the arrest was illegal does not render the
subsequent proceedings void and deprive the State of its right to
convict the guilty when all the facts point to the culpability of the
accused. The decision of the RTC of Caloocan City was affirmed
with modification, finding accused-appellant Manuel Galvez
guilty of murder and sentencing him to the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
Case 31
G.R. No. 121877 September 12, 2001
32
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
ERLINDA GONZALES Y EVANGELISTA, accused-appellant.
QUISUMBING, J.:
Facts of the Case:
Appellant Erlinda Gonzales y Evangelista was convicted violating
Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act (R.A. No. 6425)
and sentenced her to life imprisonment.
The prosecution presented two witnesses, namely, PO1 Reggie
Pedroso and Angela Baldevieso, forensic chemist of the PNP. In
addition, the prosecution presented the following object and
documentary evidence: (1) ten bundles of dried marijuana leaves
or fruiting tops, weighing 9.560 kilograms. (2) Physical Sciences
Report No. D-087-93 issued by Angela Baldevieso, PNP forensic
chemist and (3) black traveling bag. On the other hand, the
defense presented appellant herself and Isaac Lamera, the trisikad
driver.
 
PO1 Reggie Pedroso narrated that the Chief of Police of Dueñas,
Iloilo received information that a woman with long hair, wearing
maong pants and jacket, and Ray Ban sunglasses would be
transporting marijuana along the national highway. According to
the tipped information, the woman would bring a black traveling
bag and would ride a trisikad. A mobile patrol in the poblacion of
Dueñas and along the national highway was conducted and they
passed by a woman who fitted the informer’s description. She was
standing along the national highway holding a black traveling bag
in a trisikad. They alighted from their car and asked her who owns
the traveling bag. The woman denied ownership of the bag but
trisikaddriver, later identified as Isaac Lamera, the latter pointed
to the woman as the owner of the said bag. Hence both were
arrested.
 
Appellant denied her involvement in the drug transport. Lamera,
the trisikad driver, also testified that he had no involvement too.
 
The court found for the prosecution, disbelieved the defense, and
convicted appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation
of Sec. 4, Art. II of R.A. 6425 as amended, and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a
fine of P20,000.00 and the costs.  circumstances:
 
Issues of the Case:
(1) WON the testimonies of prosecution witnesses credible and
sufficient to prove appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
(2) WON appellant’s warrantless arrest legal, thereby making the
bricks of marijuana leaves allegedly seized from her admissible in
evidence.
 
Ruling of the Court:
On the first issue, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, the
positive testimony of the apprehending policeman outweighs
appellant’s negative testimony.  In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person
Furthermore the testimony of Lamera, the trisikad driver on the
witness stand materially contradicts his sworn statements . A
witness who makes two sworn statements which are contradictory
to his testimony in court impeaches his own credibility. 
 
On the second issue,basic is the rule that no arrest, search or
seizure can be made without a valid warrant issued by a
competent judicial authority. The Constitution guarantees the right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Any evidence
obtained in violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding. 
Nevertheless, the constitutional proscription against warrantless
searches and seizures admits of certain legal and judicial
exceptions, as follows: (1) warrantless search incidental to a
33
lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules
of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence
in plain view; (3) search of a moving vehicle; (4) consented
warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk; and (7)
exigent and emergency circumstances.
Moreover, a lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a
peace officer or a private person under the following
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the
nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112.
 
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo
City, Branch 39, finding appellant ERLINDA GONZALES Y
EVANGELISTA, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal
transport of marijuana is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION
that appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to pay the fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) and the costs.