Ms.

Mary Amerson 1203 Forest Avenue

Des Moines, Iowa 50314

January 25,2011

Judicial Nominating Commission 1111 E. Court Avenue

Des Moines, Iowa 50319

RECEIVED

Dear Judicial Nominating Commission:

JAN 2 6 2011

STATE COURT ADMINISTRATOR

Re: Robert Blink, Judge of the Iowa District Court for Polk County

I do not believe that Robert Blink should be nominated to be a Justice of the Iowa Supreme Court because he is unfit for the position; has engaged in criminal activity; or has violated his cannon of ethics.

Judge Robert Blink issued the enclosed recent ruling, dated December 22,2010 in a case involving me, as the plaintiff. In the case you will see that Judge Robert Blink falsified facts of the case, failed to uphold the Iowa law, Iowa Common law, the Iowa Constitution and the United States Constitution, as briefly described below:

THE CASE:

I purchased the property in question ill this depicted litigation from Polk County (hereinafter the County) on August 5, 1998 (see contract and receipt attached). On August 21,2000 the County told me it had "foreclosed" the property (a statement which is false).

The fact that I was told I was "foreclosed" and that I believed the false statement is evidenced by an affidavit which I filed before the United States Supreme Court on January 9, 2007 in which I stated on page 6 "the City had convinced the County to "foreclose" my interest in the 9th Street property", I believed the false statement that I was "foreclosed" until City employee's came to my home and made statements that indicated that the property had been stolen from me.

I investigated and found the allegations of real estate fraud were true. I sued the County in the Iowa District Court for Polk County to recover the property alleging fraud and violation of my constitutional due process rights to notice on June 22,2009.

At a three day trial I presented my contract, a copy of my purchase receipt for the property, and proof that I was attending school and at work during the fall and winter of2000. The

1

County produced its recorded documents and the testimony of witnesses who alleged that I was allegedly at work evading service in 2000; or at school evading service of process in 2000; or at home evading service of process.

The U.S. Constitution Amendments Article 14.1 and the Iowa Constitution Article 1 § 9 state that the government shall not take property from citizens without due process. Due process means notice and an opportunity to be heard. At trial the evidence supported that I was not given notice of the taking of my property, and that my right to due process has been violated.

In the December 22, 2010 ruling Judge Blink:

1. Calls the payment in full that I made for the property on August 5, 1998 an "earnest money deposit". (This false fact is a fact Robert Blink knew was False and not supported by the record) (See the contract attached at subsection 1 indicating the property was paid for in full and the receipt for the payment).

2. States that the contract required Amerson to rehabilitate the property. (This fact is knowingly false. See the Buyers obligations under the contract at subsection 4 of the contract and Exhibit A to the contract).

3. States that there was no evidence that the City of Des Moines owned the monitoring well in the back yard of the property (See the July 26, 2000 letter from the City of Des Moines admitting to ownership of the monitoring well).

4. States that he does not believe that the contract was extended to December 31, 2000. (Polk County admitted that the contract was extended to December 31,2000).

5. States that he doesn't believe I was told I was "foreclosed".

I have asserted before the Iowa Supreme Court that the facts are false in their entirety. As you can clearly see, Robert Blink falsified facts of the decision. While a district court judge has discretion, discretion does not extend to misapprehending the terms of a contract, disputing facts admitted in answer to a complaint, claiming that evidences does not exist which does exist, or claiming that terms are in the contract which it does not contain.

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Further, the Iowa Constitution, the United States Constitution, Iowa Law, and Iowa Common Law states that it is a constitutional violation for a government to fail to notify the property owner before taking their property.

In the depicted case, every document indicates that no notice was ever served on me. If it were true that I was evading service in 2000 the county should have filed an action in the Iowa District COUlt stating so in 2000, not in answer to a complaint in 2009.

Robert Blink has abandoned the Iowa Law, the Iowa Constitution, the United States Constitution, and the common law in issuing the luling which he entered which is based upon false facts.

I am not writing this out of any animosity toward Robert Blink. I believe that he is in violation of his cannon or ethics, aiding and abetting Polk County in defrauding me out of my house, or he is unfit to hold the position of Supreme Court Justice based upon incompetence demonstrated by his inability to interpret and apply the terms of a written agreement as demonstrated in the December 22, 2010 ruling.

The case depicted here is on appeal to the Iowa Supreme Court. I am not using this letter as a forum to air my grievance. I am genuinely concerned that the Justices of our Supreme Courts are chosen from among persons who are competent and persons of stellar character.

3

IN THE IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR POLK COUNTY

Defendant.

CE62427

MARY AMERSON,

Plaintiff,

. v.

RULING

POLK COUNTY, IOWA,

This matter. was tried to the bench in a reported contested proceeding on

October 25, 26, and 28, 2010. Plaintiff represented herself.' Defendant was

represented by Assistant Polk County Attorney David W. Hibbard.

Ms. Amerson's lawsuit arises from a contract sale to her of real estate by Polk

County, That contract was later forfeited.

The petition has been amended several times, and as best the Court can

discern, she asserts the following claims: interference with real estate contract (this

~.--- '-'--~-'- --- . --~.-~.-~-~.--

~~- '~'--'~--~~"----~-'~------~--

might be characterized as assertions of fraud or fraudulent misrepresentation), violation

of Iowa Code Chapter 656 (concerning forfeiture of real estate contracts), violation of

due process rights under the State and Federal Constitution because of the Chapter

656 violation, negligence, and to quiet title.

1 Ms. Amerson does not have formal legal training. However, she is intelligent and well-schooled in litigation. She has represented herself numerous times in actions in State and Federal court over many years. She was respectful and timely in the presentations of her positions in pretrial hearings and at trial. While she had a propensity to object more than necessary, the Court attributes this to her lack of training in procedure and evidence in combination with her appreciation that the record made is subject to appellate review. In this Court's experience, Ms. Amerson was the most well-prepared self-represented litigant to advocate before it. That being said, it was sometimes difficult to appreciate what evidence she offered on any given cause of action. And the Court was also left with the impression that her misunderstanding or ignorance of the law was sometimes convenient and disingenuous.

I

Whether any or all of these' claims were properly pleaded, or properly supported

by adequate evidence at trial, the heart of this case is whether or not Polk County properly forfeited its real estate contract with Ms. Amerson. If so, all of her claims fail.

The County's position is simply that Ms. Amerson did not perform her obligations

under the contract and/or abandoned the contract.

Ms. Amerson asserts that she performed all that was required of her under the

contract and that governmental agents of the City and County lied to her and conspired

to create an environment that was intended to prevent her from fulfilling her contract

obligations.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

In the late summer of 19~8, Ms. Amerson met with the Polk County Board of

Supervisors. She wanted to buy a dilapidated house located at 1224 Ninth Street in

Des Moines that was owned by the County. The County sought to sell such property for

a nominal sum on the condition that the buyer would either raze or""!!lJ'(j\latethe building. The sale of the property to Ms. Amerson was to be accomplished through a

, ' .. - --~-~ -,-~,-~ ._-_. . ,_,-.,---,.,-~~, .-~, ,'._-

contract that required her tc:r'paY"earlie~t;;;mQlili¥iikBfld, among other conditions, either

level the house or restore it within a time certain.

These conditions were thoroughly discussed with her by the Board, the County Manager, Assistant County Attorney, and Frank Mauro, a County employee who worked with this program to sell rundown properties, on August 28, 1998. She had made

similar real estate purchases from the County and was, or should have been,

knowledgeable of the terms. Ms. Amerson expressly told the Board she understood the

consequence of forfeiture if she failed to obtain the necessary permits and restore the

2

house to code within one year. She knew the City of Des Moines would require permits

to be "pulled" for all the work to be performed.

Ms. Amerson and County representatives signed the contract that day. It is in

evidence. In substance, she would receive a deed only if she performed certain acts

within a specified period to rehabilitate and occupy the property. She paid the earnest

money. The terms of the contract that are most relevant to this suit required

Ms. Amerson to:

Immediately assume responsibility for all maintenance of the lot.

Remove all trash and secure the structure either by replacing the glass in all windows and doors or by boarding doors and windows to restrict access to the property by November 25, 1998.

Obtain the necessary permits to complete the needed repairs and show evidence that local codes have been met on or before August 25, 1999, or alternatively completely remove the structure and grade the lot to City/County specifications.

Ms. Amerson did not maintain the lot or remove all trash. In June of 2000 she

did mow the lawn. After receiving a nuisance citation from the City, she mowed it again

in late July. She mowed it once more, in late August, shortly before the City inspected

the property to see if the nuisance had been abated. The City had to mow part of the.

property again in August because Ms. Amerson's efforts were inadequate.

Old automobile parts piled up on the property, animal manure was dumped in the

3

backyard, and tree limbs and branches were strewn on the property in 2000. There is

no direct evidence that Ms. Amerson put these items there. However, the fact that she

made no effort to prevent the parcel from being used as a dump site or to timely f§l 1)1 oY§l

this refuse resulted in a nuisance citation from the City. Thls is evidence that Ms. Amerson was not attentive to her obligation to maintain the lot.

One of the more significant infirmities to the house was a hole in the roof. It was extant when the contract was signed and required repair. By her own admission, this was a concern to Ms. Amerson. She never took steps to repair this structural deformity. More than a year after signing the contract she apparently put a tarp over the hole.

Ms. Amerson did nothing to bring the property into compliance with building codes; She did not even apply for the necessary permits. She argues' this contract, term was waived because she had not been forced to do so when she bought property from the County under similar terms in 1993. There is, however, a significant difference between the two situations. The prior property was used and occupied as her primary residence. The parcel at issue is rental property. She concedes knowing code requirements for rental property are different from a single-family dwelling. Yet she made no effort whatsoever to determine the particular code requirement for the extant property. The record reflects that Ms. Amerson, armed with limited knowledge from

prior experience, made the error of assuming that similar but different circumstances would have identical requirements and consequences.

Ms. Amerson's inaction regarding the property led her to request two extensions of the deadline for compliance with her contract obligations. It defies logic to argue that contract terms-were "waived" if one requests more time to comply with those very terms.

There is no evidence in th is record to support the argument that the County waived any of the compliance obligations of Ms. Amerson. In fact, the County sent her a warning letter noting that she was not making substantial progress to meetcode

4

requirements. The Court concludes the terms were not waived and that Ms. Amerson

knew it. Ms. Amerson has failed to meet her burden of proving any of her contract

obligations were waived.2

During the two years this property was in Ms. Amerson's possession, she did not

have the utilities put in her name. Power was never run to the house. One can only

speculate how a structure could be renovated without light and power tools. The hole in

the roof and collapsed foundation wall were ignored. Siding fell off the house.

Ms: .Amersen-made-nc credible efforts tosecure flnancrnqto-cover-the-cost-ot-.

"i:i~!tl~pilitatingJh~····property - ~J:lesecured,no,mortgqgJLandapplied,.Jo[.no ... grants. While

she "investigated" possible grant providers, she took no action beyond that. Her

explanations as to why she did not are simply not credible.

Ms. Amerson takes the' position that her securing a deed under the contract was

simply a matter of passage of time - thaL.she':"hat;t"vrt()'~'fealduty to rehabilitate-the'

property - and if she did, her nominal efforts were sufficient.

She also contends that the presence of a monitoring well on the property

required removal, and her inability to do so impeded her contract performance. The

evidence shows otherwise.

Ms. Amerson was unaware of the well at the time she signed the contract.

(Indeed, the record shows that Ms. Amerson really did not exercise due diligence

regarding any aspect of this property prior to signing the contract.) The County did not

require the well's removal as a condition precedent to execution of a deed.

, The presence of the well, however, became a focus of Ms. Amerson's frustration.

She demanded the City remove it, although the record shows it was placed there by a

2 Continental Casually Companyv. G. R. KinneyCo.,140 N.W.2d 129 (Iowa 1966).

5

private entity. There is no indication the City placed or owned the monitoring well. It is

simply not pertinent to the contract terms at issue.

On August 9, 2000, Ms. Morningstar, on behalf of the County, wrote Ms.

Amerson telling her the contract would be forfeited if she did not contact her immediately." She did not. Instead, Ms. Amerson called Mr. Mauro. She claims he told

her she would be given more time. The Court does not believe that. On August 21,

2000, Ms. Amerson claims Mr. Mauro said the property was "foreclosed." She contends that because he used the word "foreclosed" she thought there was nothing more she

could do. (At the very least she could have read her contract to determine her rights.) The record reflects that the County routinely uses the remedy of forfeiture, not

foreclosure, in similar circumstances. Given all the facts of this case, the Court

concludes Mr. Mauro actually told her the contract would be forfeited.

Finally, Polk County lost patience with. Ms. Amerson's failure to comply with the

contract and rehabilitate the property. Ms. Amerson concedes that after August 21,

2000, she took absolutely no action regarding the property. The County began

proceedings to forfeit the contract

On four separate occasions in the fall of 2000, Larry Cramer, an employee of the

Polk County Attorney's Office, attempted personal service upon her at her residence on

Ninth Street in Des Moines. He knocked on the door. There was no answer. There

was a-hasp onthe.door.with a padlock, but it was not lockedthree of the four visits. He

knocked loudly. A car. on the street near the home was registered to Ms. Amerson. He

knocked on every door to the house that he could get to. There was never a response.

He left his business card every time, which included his name, title, and phone number.

33 This was well beyond the extension "grace" periods accorded her by the County.

6

On his last attempt he either taped the forfeiture notice to the door or slipped it under

the door. These four attempts at personal service occurred in a seven-to-ten-day period

in October/November of 2000.

Mr. Cramer is an experienced law enforcement officer with more than a quarter

of a century experience as a Des Moines police officer before joining the County

Attorney's staff. He is patently credible. It was his opinion that on three of the

occasions Ms. Amerson was at home but did not answer the door in an effort to avoid

service. This conclusion is supported not only by the physical facts he observed, but by

Ms. Amerson's habit of attempting to avoid as demonstrated in the record.

Ms. Amerson's many years of experience with the legal system and her native

intellect have taught her the basic concept of service of process and jurisdiction over the

parties. In other instances where process servers have attempted to serve her, she has

evaded them by walking away and entering her home and refusing to answer the door.

She has fled from her work desk when she observed a deputy approaching to serve her

at work.

~.~---'--~---'--- .--~~-- ----- .. - .. ---

The Court listened to and watched Ms. Amerson carefully when she testified

about these events. Based on the record taken as a whole, the Court concludes Ms.

Amerson has a pattern or habit of attempting to avoid personal service in general and

attempted to evade service in particular in this case, The Court agrees with the

conclusion of riAL Cramer that on at least three of the four occasions he attempted

personal service she was in the house and refused to come to the door.

After these reasonable efforts at personal service, the County, in compliance with

Iowa Rule of Ci\(iJ Procedure 1.311, had the notice of forfeiture published three times in

7

consecutive weeks, and a copy was mailed to her address. It is patently incredible to

conclude that given all these efforts at giving her notice of the forfeiture that she did not,

in fact, have knowledge as to what legal action was taking place. Indeed, she testified

at trial that she read the notice in the newspaper.

I.

Abandonment of a real estate contract occurs where the -buyer indicates by

action or inaction an intent and purpose to surrender the rights and duties conferred in

the contract. Whether abandonment has occurred is largely a question of fact, not law."

Failure to perform one of the requirements of the contract may not be sufficient by itself to show abandonment." But when that failure to act is coupled with the expiration of the

time to act, and when. the contract states the time is of the essence, those circumstances show an intent to abandon the contract." If those circumstances lead the

seller to convey the property to others, the buyer's failure to act destroys all of the contractual rights?

In Lake v. Bernstein, 246 N.W. 790 (1933), the Iowa Supreme Court held that

.... _ ... _------------

abandonment of a real estate contract could be proven by the buyer's failure to perform

his duties to make payments, plus his failure to ask for the return of his down payment

or to lay claim to the property for two years after he quit paying, especially when

coupled with evidence at trial that he could not or would not perform the terms of the

contract.

4 Ray Coal Mining Co. v. Ross, et al_. 151 N.W. 63,65 (1915)_ sId.

61d.

71d.

8

In Lake, the buyer paid money down and agreed to pay the balance a month

later. The payment date was extended by three months. The buyer did not pay the

balance when the extension expired. The seller served a notice of forfeiture. The buyer

made no claim to the property after that and never asked for return of the down

payment. The seller then sold the property to someone else.

The Lake Court held:

A distinction, of course, must be made between the forfeiture of a vendee's rights under a contract by notice in the way

··-provided by statute, and the forfeiture of those rights by abandonment. In the one case the vendee loses his property through the contract and the statute, and in the other he loses it through his own voluntary action in abandoning the property. Of course, the mere failure to pay the purchase price, as provided by a real estate contract, does not in itself work a forfelture or an abandonment. If there is no forfeiture, as contemplated by the contract and the statute, and also there is no abandonment, then the vendor's remedy aqainst the vendee is to foreclose his contract as if it were a mortgage, or sue for the purchase price."

When a buyer abandons the contract, the seller has a right to rely on that

.. -----abancienmer-rt·-afll.:l-feseH-t-he--JW0!3eft-y-. ~ReselHn§---{he--pft}perty-is-f1ot---a-tefmifla-ti0fl-of'--------

rescinding of the contract because the buyer's refusal to proceed further with the contract waives further performance by the seller."

The same actions that constitute abandonment of a contract also support a

forfeiture of the .. contract. Abandonment can be asserted by a seller whether or not the

seller initiates forfeiture proceedlnqs.'?

8 Lake v. Bernstein, 246 N.W., at 794.

9 Lake v. Bernstein, 246 N.W., at 790 {citing Dimon v. Wright, 214 N.W. 673, 675 (1927». 10 Westercamp v. Smith, 31 N.W.2d 347,350-351 (Iowa 1948).

9

Abandonment usually arises in equitable actions. The Court applies both the clean hands doctrine and the fairness doclrine.!' The application of these doctrines can lead to disparate results in abandonment cases, depending on the facts."

A contract is considered abandoned when the buyer consistently fails to perform the terms of the contract, is consistently inattentive to the property and to the contract,

provides no good reason for ignoring the duty, and will not be unjustly deprived of

payments made or improvements done to the property. Measured against this

standard, Ms. Amerson abandoned the contract and the property no later than August

21.2000.

II.

While the Plaintiffs abandonment 'of the contract is dispositive in this case, the

exhaustive debate between the parties concerning propriety of service of process

warrants comment by the Court. It bears reiteration that the Court concludes the

County made reasonable attempts to effectuate personal service and Ms. Amerson

knowingly evaded that service. It also is significant that Ms. Amerson conceded actual

notice of the forfeiture proceedinq in light of her reading the notice published in the

newspaper.

A.

The procedure for serving notice of forfeiture is found in Iowa Code §656.3:

Said notice may be served personally or by publication, on the same conditions, and in the same manner as is provided for the service of original notices, except that when the notice is served by publication no affidavit therefore shall be

11 Spangler v Misner, 28 N.W.2d 5,9 (1947); Dimon v, Wright, 214 N.W. 673, 675 (1927).

12 See Lutz v. Cunningham, 38 N.W.2d 638 (Iowa 1949); Westercamp v, Smith, supra; Dimon v. Wright, supra.

10

required before publication. Service by publication shall be deemed complete on the day of the last publication.

Serving notice of forfeiture by publication is-appropriate when repeated attempts

to make personal service are unsuccessful, especially if the person may be avoiding service by hiding or refusing to answer the door."

The attempts to make personal service must be diligent in order to justify serving

notice of forfeiture by publication. This is especially true when the person attempting to forfeit the contract claims to be unable to locate the person to be served."

In the instant case, the problem was making face-to-face contact with

Ms. Amerson to serve her. Her whereabouts were known. i.e., where she lived. She

simply appeared to be evading service. Whether all reasonable means have been exhausted has to be determined by the circumstances of each particular case."

It is axiomatic that equity-abhors a forfeiture;" "In adherence to that rule.

forfeiture statutes are to be construed strictly against a forfeiture with the burden to

show full and strict compliance with the statutory procedures upon the party seeking

.-- -----feFfeitu reo ,,17 SeFViee--of--a-f1eHee-e-f-fet=feitUfe--ret:ttHFeS strict e0mpltaAee-wttft--the--lowa~-

Rules of Civil Procedure governing service personally or by publication in order to properly enforce the general rule."

The historical derivation of the principles enunciated in Fairfax v. Oaks

Development Compenv demonstrate that the need to strictly construe foreclosure

statutes against a forfeiture rests entirely upon the equitable principles that a party

13 Reinecke v. Hinman, 422, 210 N.W. 442, 443 (1926); In re Marriage of Thraifkill, 438 N.W.2d 845, 848, 849 (Iowa 1989).

14 See Qualley v. state Federal Savings and Loan, 487 N.W.2d 353 (Iowa App. 1991). 151d.

16 Jamison v. Knosby, 423 N.W.2d 2,4 (Iowa 1988). 17 Jamison v. Knosby, 423 N. W_2d, at 5.

18 Fairfax v. Oaks Development Company, 713 N.W.2d 704,708 (Iowa 2006).

11

should not profit from the use of equity, should not deprive another of fair treatment, and

will not warrant unjust enrichment. Merely because forfeitures are not favored does not mean they will never be enforced."

The Plaintiff knew what was required of her under the terms of the contract.

These terms were explained to her at the Board of Supervisors' meeting. They are

clearly stated in the contract. Despite her claims of waiver, she was granted extensions

of time to complete those terms.

Ms. Amerson did not maintain the property and keep it free of trash and debris.

Ms. Amerson did not make substantial progress towards repairing and rehabilitating the

property in compliance with local codes. Ms. Amerson was told by Mr. Mauro that her

contract would be terminated. A reasonable person in Ms. Amerson's position would

have expected to receive a notice_of forfeiture of the contract. The situation was ripe for a person inclined to evade service to do so. The Plaintiff was no stranger to evading

service of process.

The County made every reasonable effort to effectuate personal service. Unlike

._---- ._-------_- -------~-~~--~-------------~--

the commencement of other legal proceedings, a petition is not on file with the clerk in a

forfeiture proceeding. Publication of notice was fair and reasonable under these

circumstances. There is no credible evidence that Ms. Amerson did not get the copy of

the notice that was mailed to her.

Serving the notice of forfeiture by publication was justified, reasonable, and appropriate in this case."

19 Miller V. American Wonderlands, Inc., 275 N_W_2d, at 402-403.

_2o Reinecke v. Hinman, 210 N.W. at 443; In re Marriage of Thrailkill, 438 N.W.2d at 849.

12

The attempts at personal service along with the published and mailed notice

show that Ms. Amerson was provided legally adequate notice reasonably calculated to

inform her that the County was forfeiting the real estate contract and what her remedies

were, as required by the Rules of Civil Procedure. These efforts exceed the

requirements of Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Company, 70 S.Ct. 652,

339 U,S. 306, 94 L.Ed. 685 (1950). All of these efforts took place after Ms. Amerson

was warned verbally and in writing that termination of the contract was an imminent

possibility.

B.

Ms. Amerson claims that she did not receive the mailed notice. The Court does

not find this credible.

Under the facts of this case, the Court can presume receipt because the

envelope was properly addressed, postage was affixed, it was placed in the U.S. Mail with a return address provided, and it was not returned."

c.

Forfeiture is complete upon the expiration of 30 days after the third publication and mailing of the notice to the buyer.22 The only purpose of recording the affidavit in

support of forfeiture of real estate contract, accompanied by the notice and proof of

service, is to give constructive notice to third parties. The recorded affidavit is not notice to the buyer.23

21 Reserve Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 150 N.W.2d 632 (1967).

22 Abodeefy v. Cavras, 221 N.W.2d 494 (Iowa 1974); Gottschalk v. Simpson, 122 N.W.2d 181 (Iowa 1988).

23 Iowa Code §656.5, Abodeefy, 221 N.W.2d at 499-500; Gottschalk, 422 N.W.2d, at 183-184. See a/so Vol. 1, Iowa Practice, Methods of Practice, §10.33, pp. 304-5.

13

The recording of proof of service of notice is simply not a condition precedent to

the forfeiture of her contract. Once the 30-day period passed and she had not performed, the forfeiture was complete as to her.24

Even assuming Ms. Amerson did not abandon the contract, she was fairly

notified of the forfeiture proceeding through the County's justifiable use of service by

publication and mailing.

III.

A review of the record as a whole could lead one to the conclusion that

Ms. Amerson believes everyone with whom she dealt in this matter was attempting to

deceive her, independently, or secretly in concert with others. One might also conclude

that she fails to see that her 'own inactions or unwillingness to accept her own mistakes

might have contributed to problems concerning this real estate contract.

Her most pointed claim of deception is leveled at Mr. Frank Mauro.

The elements of fraud are:

1, A representation that a fact is true.

------------------------

2. Falsity of that representation.

3_ That the false representation is material, meaning that it is important enough to make a difference in the response of a person reasonably relying upon it.

4. That the person malcinq the representation knew that it was not true.

5. An intention to deceive by making the false statement.

6. Justifiable reliance on the false statement by the person being defrauded.

7. Injury and damage resulting from the first six elements."

24 Abodee/y v. Cavras, 221 N,W_2d at 500.

25 McGough v. Gabas, 526 N.W.2d 328, 331 (Iowa 1995)_

14

Fraud must be established by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence." In

an equitable proceeding, fraud may be constructed from circumstances, whereas in a

proceeding at law, the proof must be established by bare fact. In equity, it is

permissible for the Court to grant relief without a showing that the person making the statement knew it to be false or a showing of pecuniary darnaqe."

Ms. Amerson claims that Frank Mauro told her on August 21, 2000, "Your

contract is foreclosed." He was the manager of the Real Estate Division of the County.

Mr. Mauro has no independent memory of talking to her on that date. He has been

retired for ten years.

Mr. Mauro testified that foreclosure was never used to terminate a contract for

rehabilitation and occupancy of property. To terminate a contract due to extended

nonperformance, the contract was turned over to the County Attorney's Office- for

forfeiture.

The first three elements of a fraud claim are often treated as one and referred to

as fraudulent misrepresentation." They must be proven by clear and convincing

evidence_29 The Court does not believe Mr. Mauro told Ms. Amerson the contract

was foreclosed. This is inconsistent with the historical practice of the County under

similar circumstances. Ms. Amerson has failed to meet her burden of proof as to these

elements.

15

26 (d.

27 Manson State Bank v, R. C. Tripi»; 248 N.W.2d 105, 108 (Iowa 1976). 28 Sedgwick v. Bowers, 681 N.W.2d 607, 611 (Iowa 2004).

29 rd.

Even if she did, she would then have to show, by clear and convincing evidence, that Me Mauro intended to deceive her by stating, "Your contract is foreclosed.'?" There

is no evidence of this"although Ms. Amerson alludes to a vague conspiracy between

Mr. Mauro and the City to deprive her of this property. In fact, he advocated for the

extensions on her behalf before the Board.

Ms. Amerson must have justifiably relied on the statement." She didn't. She did no further work on the property after the 21s1 of August. She conceded that she had no

time to work on the rehabilitation of the house after that date. She also became

disabled within a few months thereafter and has been unable to work since then.

The more logical explanation is not that Ms. Amerson "relied" on the alleged

statement, but, rather, by late August 2000, she had simply given up on the contract

and abandoned it because she knew she could not perform.

Ms. Amerson has proven no damages. She claims she had hoped to rent the

property as a four-plex apartment building. She invested $1,100.00 earnest money plus

a $31.00 fee for recording and filing the contract and resolution. There is no evidence

of any other damages proven. She claims that nothing needed to be done to the inside

of the building. Even though this defies logic, neither time nor money were expended to

repair or rehabilitate the outside of the structure. She never asked for a refund of the

earnest money.

Any claims for lost profits are soeculatlve."

16

30 Lloyd v. Drake University, 686 N.W.2d 225, 233 (Iowa 2004).

31 Gibson v. ITT Hartford Insurance Company, 621 N.W.2d 388, 400 (Iowa 2001).

32 See Twin-State Engineering and Chemical Company v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 197 N.W.2d 575,578 (Iowa 1972).

IV.

In a letter of August 9, 2000, Ms. Amerson was told to contact the Real Estate

Division immediately or the County would proceed with forfeiture of her contract. On

August 21, 2000, the Real Estate Division Manager told her the contract would be

forfeited.

Based on discussions at the Board of Supervisors' meeting, the warning by

Frank Mauro on August 21, the letter of August 9, and her experience with real estate

contracts, one would have reasonably expected her to ask what her options, rights, and

remedies were or simply re-read the real estate contract to determine her rights. She

did neither. She had no further contact with the County.

Paragraphs 9 and 10 of the real estate contract outline the foreclosure process,

including the 30-day period to cure a default and the notice requirement. The Iowa

Code chapter regarding forfeiture is included in paragraph 9. In light of this information

readily available to her, the belief that immediate foreclosure occurred is completely

untenable .

. --- .. - .. ~~---

By August 21 Ms. Amerson was on inquiry notice of all facts that would have

been disclosed by a reasonably diligent investigation. Because she was on inquiry

. notice when the statement was allegedly made, the five-year statute of limitation began

to run at that time.

The fraud claim, filed more than five years after August 2000, is time barred as a

matter of law.33

33 Hallett Construction Company v, Meister, 713 N.W.2d 225,231 (Iowa 2006).

17

IV.

Ms. Amerson's attempt to quiet title in her favor fails in several respects. Such a

claim requires proof:

t. That Plaintiff has a specific interest in the real estate.

2. That the Defendant makes, or may make, some claim adverse to Petitioner's interest in the real estate.

3. A description of the property."

A petitioner must also prove the elements of the specific cause of action upon

which title is claimed: adverse possession, mistake. equitable estoppel. or specific

performance compelling the issuance of adeed.

Ms. Amerson did not plead or prove any of these elements except the description

of the property. She claims to be the fee simple owner of the property. This is not

supported by the record. At best, Ms. Amerson had an equitable interest in the property

that could have ripened into fee simple title if she had performed the terms of the contract. She did not perform them, and the County did not waive them.

~------~--Polk-GeUflty,---the--8efef1cl-aftt;~clees-lWt-ewrt--the---pri:)f:Wfty:--Polk Courrl:y--has-~--

disclaimed any interest in the property beginning with its October 2009 answer to the

amended petition.

Ms. Amerson knows who the titleholder is and has not joined that person as a

party. Defendant long ago conveyed the property, by quit claim deed. to other persons who are not parties to this action." The County has no interest in the property which it

34 Code of Iowa §§649.1 et seq.

35 The record shows that the present title holders have done substantial renovation and restoration to the structure. Indeed, they have done everything, and more, than what the County had hoped Ms. Amerson would have done.

18

could convey to Ms. Amerson. So long as the titleholder is not in court, the Court cannot give to the Plaintiff the relief the Plaintiff has requested."

Ms. Amerson is not entitled to a decree ordering the County to issue her a deed because she never complied with the terms of the contract."

CONCLUSION

Ms. Amerson abandoned the contract and the property. She was fairly served

with notice of forfeiture proceedings and the contract was properly forfeited. She has

failed to meet her burden of proof as to any of the claims she has made. For all of these

reasons judgment is entered in favor of Defendant and against the Plaintiff. The petition

is dismissed 'with costs assessed to Plaintiff.

Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Defendant's Post-Trial Brief and Emergency Motion for

Judgment are denied.

SO ORDERED this ;i;<.~day of December, 2010.

~--L~e--_C ~

Fifth Judicial District of Iowa

Original filed. Copies to:

Mary Amerson

1203 Forest Avenue Des Moines, IA 50314

"

David W. Hibbard

Assistant County Attorney 111 Court Avenue, Room 340 Des Moines, IA 50309

36 Fay v. Smiley, 207 N.W. 369,372 (1926); Ross v. Gordon, 109 N.W.2d 208,212 (1961). 31 See Wemerv. Long, 185 N.W.2d 243, 247 (Iowa 1971).

19

~i'age.1 of 6)

e-.

01.931.~ WE~:OffiG FEE :;;jj?O:

I\UO\l1lR FEE ---REAL ESTATE CONTRACT

FILED rea RECORD POLK COUNTY. IOWA

98 AUG 28 A 10: 35.9 TIM.iilfl J. SRIEH

RECORDER

This iIgftenlenl made and entered blo this ~ day of ~ 199....1. by and belwc<:n Polk County. Iowa. it goVetnm<tltai entity olgll1li2ed and e.'Ostillg under the lav;s of the Slate of iowa {which logtdler with any successor public body or offi~ hadnafter desiS":u.cd by or pursuaot 10 law} hereinafter n:fart:d 10 as ~Counly". sdlcr. and MARY AMERSON. bereinal1ef' ref~ 10 as "Buyer". buycr(s):

WHEREAS. tbe Buyer and COUnty specifically aclm!l\'lled!.~ that any a£,lttmm! «'I>ling to the prop..-ty described below r:xecuted by the parties poo~ 10 the dale of this agreement is nult and wid.

WHEREAS. the Coon!), hereby a~ 10 sell and cOnditionally :Ollwy and Ihe bl.l)'o:r agrees to btr, and receive for the purpos<:. cf rehabilitalion and ()((:Upancy. ihe following real estate I~gally deseribed as:

I..OT 11 £NOS B HUNT ADOl'flON

(NQW KoolVn As)

-EX E 31'· LOT 11 &~OS B HUNT ADDITION

and locally i;ooYl'll as: 1224 '1lH STREET.

Street Address

tosetll1:( with My easemenl5 and servient estates ~ppurtemnt thel'eto (all above-described interests herdnafter Icl'etted to as "property") subjecl to the temlS. conditions. covenants. obligations. reservations and exception following:

The County shall sell and conditionally ool1vey the property te the Buyer and the Buyer . wilt purchase the ptoperty nom the (;QUilt)' for $1.100.00 payable in rtl\1 on AUGUST S 1998.

'2. Po~ion Date

Buy= sball be entitled 10 possession of said premises on the :UTH day of AUGUST 1993. and th«eaft ... so 10llg as they shall perform the nbligatioM ormis contract,

1. Conditional Conveyance of P£9Perlv.

{a} Condjtional C.o!!yeyam:e.. The executlon of this contract constitutes a conditional conveyance and equil.1ble conversion of the property 10 m~ Buycr. The BUJa' shail bold the interest in _It,. The County shall hold the pelWnai inlecesl in legal tille as 5eo.1lil)' IQ insull: the terms, cooditions and obliga.tiOllS of this oonuact ace fulfilled. The Buy« shall be entitled 10 possession of ihe property so long as it p<tfomu !he terms. coodirions and abligatiolU of !his tontca;;t. Time is of the essence of this eontraet,

(b) Rerordalion. lhe Counly'shall pUJrnpdy file this cootraCl. on btha.lf of the Buy¢!' for r«ocd<uion among the land records or Polk Coonty. Iowa. Buyer is responsible for the recording ree..

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le) OeW. Upon full compliance willi aU terms, condilions and obligalions set forth ;n !Irls comma, the Coonty shall execute and deliver 10 the Buyer a Quit CI';m ~ o;Ql\'Ieying the propeny in ronformity with this eoouact, Such execution and delivay ~tl under ao ~CI;IJ~laIIces ~ before the Bu)'er has fulfilled and completed the.obligat~ S¢t forth In S¢<;itOO 4 of mlS.contract. (ri

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~ The Coo_nty. OIl irs diS<;relion. may reqnire the Buyer III keep insurance in force ~1lSt loss by fire. tornado. OIhcr hazards, a.suaIIies and oonLingencies as the County may reasonsbly require 011 all buildings and impmvements, DOW 00 Of hereafrcr placed on said premises, with premiums Iheodore to be prepaid by the Buyec.

6_ CoIllPJi"ng: and fnmr:gion,

Promptly after completion of'all work referred 10 in section 4. !he County shall be notified ilfld an employee of the Polk County ~ Estale Dilrision. G~neral Services Depmm0l11 may il'lSJU!Cllhe property 10 derermlne compliance with semon- 4.

7. Liens aoo Ellcumbrancss_

The BuyCf sMll make prompt paymenrs and sblll not default on its obUgaliOl1S 10 3lly financing agrwnen!s SCCIlI"ed by the proPmJ- A defaull by the Buycc on any rlJl;lncing obtained

. to rd\abilitate the property shall constilUle a dcfWll under this cont~ entitling .he County 10 enforce "",y and all legal and equitable remedies avail able for a material breach or defwll under tbis contract. including forfdturc Or foreclowre of the Buyer's interest In the properly pursuant 10 scct\on 9 or- 10_ Specifically the Buyer shall have Qo rigbllO a deed pursuant 10 =lion l{e) 1Il11_ all paymo:ols on loans of theB~, ifany, arecurretil The Buyer shall nOtify tile County of any judgments, liens or similar =brances !hat have been created on or altached to tP4 p<opl'ft}', wbeiher by VOIUDtaIy.act of the Buyer- or 0[h0:005"-

Prior 10 thll issuance or it DcOO p4lmJalll 10 Section J(eJ. any pnlposcd financing 10 be secured by mortgage or other simil.,- litn instrument shall be subject 10 Couaty ~PI)!1)vi!l_ Unlil the issuaeee of a deed. the Buyer shall not ~ge in any financin!,! ""d shall not mgagc in any oilier trallS;J.ction c.-eating any mortgage, cncumbtilJtct: or tio:o upon the propel1Y, wbdber by express aw't:CID.cnl or oper.tlioo orlm, oc SIIffer ~ny encumbrance or fiest be made on or attachaj to the propetty, ~~t for the purpose of obfajning nu.ds necessary 10 complete the ~ set out in section 4 of this contract,

8. Taxa and Assessments.

The Buyer shall promptly pay all real estate iaxes, assessments, sp«iai assessmeets, liens. cb~es and dalm:s agairu[ the plOp<:fty that become due ancr the dale of "-~CCUlion of tbis contract, The Buyer shall allo\v no m~' IiCO$ 10 be imposed upon or foredo$ed against [he p("O~. The Buyer shall have the right al il$ expense, in good faith., (0 conlest the validity of any liel! filed or established. or aD,! tax, assessment, specUl assessment. clt;uye or claim against the Propcrt)', and in such event I1II.Y pennit the items so contested 10 remain IiIld&:barged and unsaJ.lsficd during the ~od of such cootest and any appeal therefrom. In case ~ny such contest shall be adjudicated adversely to lhe Duyer, then die Buyer shall promptly.pay and 5a!isfy the lien. 11"'. assessmer«, dlat}J:e or claim,

9. FQrfcirure..

In additicn 10 any and all oihec legal and equitable remedies u may have. the C(lUnty, at its option. rnay proceed io forfell and cancet ihis contract as provided by law {Chapter 656, Iowa Code} in !he event !he Buyer breaches this rontl'ad as follows:

(a} fail~ of Bu)'et" to comply milt any of the conditions of this contract;

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(b) defauh !;Iy !he Buyer Oil ill; obligations 10 any loan that is secured by tbe property

in violalio<l of seeden 7 of this ronlcact: or

(c) failure by the Buyer to pay real estate taxes, assessments, special assesseaeots,

liens. cbuges or claims against the prol'tt1Y ill violarion of section S of III is cunlnCl.

Upon (QUlpfeliall of such forfeiture, Buyer shall bave lID right of reelamarlon or coropensaslon foc impmvCIllents made; but sud! lmprovemenrs, if any. shall be reuioed and k~pI by the CQUIIIy as rompellS2tion fur the usc Qf the property. audlor as liquidaled damages for breach of this contract. In addition, upon compledon of SJJCh forfeiture, !he Buyennd any Glhe.pmy in po~ oithe propttty sIlall ill once peacefully ranoyc lhercfrom. or failing fo do so. such parties may be created as rcnaolS ho1dingo'icr unlawfullyafte( the etpil'llion ofa lease and ~ch parties ""'y accQrdiogly 1M: ousted and removed as such as provided by law. fW1nCl".up<JR complttioo of sud\. fwfeiture, the Buyer shall remain liable for Rpaymenl of all firuncing it has r=:\ved.

10. Foreclosure.

In the event the Buyet" breach this contract in aIlY one or more or lite ways specified in (a). (b). or (e} of section 9 above, tile CllWIty may upon thirty PO) days written notice of its Intent to fbreelose, during which thirty DO) days tlre deCwll{s) are nol removed, declare this contract in defaull;. and. werea!ier. u the option of me Counly thls contract may then be foredo$ed in eq1.Iily aM a. receiver may be appointed to take tluQ;c of the property and <:011= the ren!S and profits to=fll) be applied as may be directed by the CQurt_ Uport CDmpleiiaR of sudt foreclosure. me 8uyenbaU c=ain liable for repaymenl of all rcl>abilitation finaJlcing it has received,

II. Delay by Coonlv shalT nol opeEte "" waiv"," gf rights.

Any delay by theCounl), in instilu!ing forfeiturcorfon,elosure procedures orin exercising othu lesat or equitabte remedies upon breach afthis contract shall not operare as a _iva of the COIiQly's ri&hts to iostiUrte forfeiture or fORclosure proceedings or 10 exercise olhcr I~ or ~uita.bh! remcmes [II being the intent of Ihi5 provision that the County shall be wnnraincd so as to avoid the risk of being deprived of or (imilro in the exercise of any remedy ptOyi&ed by Ihis COIllrael because of concepts of waiver, taches. or othlUWise (0 exercise $lid! remedy at a time wilen it may still othetWise hop" to resolve the prob(elll.S created b)' the default involved) •

Nothing contained in this conrract not' any action uadertakee by the County or ils offi~.

CIfIp(oyees or agents pursuant 10 the contract shall be deemed to be a warraruy to the Suyer, titha- express or implicl, as to the safely of the property or as to the qwlity of ecnt ... cted consln1t:fi()n work..

13. Hold. Harmlw.

The Buyer shall protect, save and hold harmless the ('.QUIlty from ~nd against any and aU Mbifity.losses and damages 10 property orbodily injury happenin!lOr do~ in or on the property. or arising OUt of Of in any way connected with the performance of Ihh contract.

14. Assil!nmen!S_

The Buyer shall ~ transfer (IT assign this contract or any of the B.ty~·s imerest Iherein. and no transfer or assisnm""! shall be made by the Buyer withOUlthe p~ wrlllen consent of the Coumy_ Any such assisnmenl or transfer. without such pre-,.ious ",-nllen COIlSCilI. shall tIOt vest in the transferee or ;\Mi~e:l any rlghl tltle or lnterest herein or btRUnde.- or in said property. bUI shall render this 1;OfI1:t3C1 null and void, at the election of the Counly_

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1 ("age 4 of 6)

4

IS. Construction.

Words and phra5es Il.m:in. including ao;lu\Owtcdgmenl$ hereof, Wll be ceosuued as in !he sinh"Ilar or plural number. and iI$ maw.tlinc. feminine or nwt..- gwd er; =rding.1O the contex],

IN WiTNESS THEREOF. the County has caused thn contract 10 be duly execnted in its (WIle and behalf by its BoattI of Supervison and its seal to be bCfCUUto duly fixed and attested. by the Polk County Auditor. rod the Buy"" 1= exeeuted lhe same dn or as of the d.a.y 3.IId the year above written.

Ailes!:

Polk County, Iowa

~n

ard of Supervis«s

Buyet{s):

STATE OF IOWA

}

) $S-

COUNTY OF ('OI.K ) .

~.--'.-.-------~--- .. '\

00 ,hl.ZsTH day of AUGUST, 1m Wore me, a Nolary Public. in and for the jurisdiction ~d .. ~p~ra:~hop on behalf of Ihe Polk CQU'UY Board of Supervisors. to me pe1"SOnaRy !(nown [0 be the Chai'llefson of said Board of Supervisors and ad.-nowk<iSed 10 me !ha1 he C)CeQlled the foregoing instrument on bdWf of the County of Polk and the Board of SupetvlsolS pursuaru to resolution of Ihe Board duly adopled at it «gUlar

m~n~ /

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CONDITION OF SALE

I.

IMMIIDIATEL Y ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALL MAlNTENA..'ICE OF LOT. REMOVE ALL TRASH AND SECURE STRUCTIJRE EITHER BY REPLACING GLASS IN ALL WiNDOWS AND DOORS OR BY BOARDING DOORS AND WlNDOWS TO RESTRICT ACCESS TO THE PROPERTY BY NOVEMBER ~~ 1998.

2.

3.

COMPLETELY REMOVE THE STRUCTURE AND GRADE ras LOT TO OTYICOUNTY SPECIFICATIONS, OR OBTAIN THE NECESSARY PBRMITS TO COMPLETE THE NEEDED REPAlRS AND SHOW EVIDENCE THAT LOCAL CODES RAVE BEEN MET ON OR BEFORE AUQ!JST 25, 1999.

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BK799 5PG23 3

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108-l0). it 11; S 0 r. U T 1: 0 11'

!-loved by __ ::1'O __ L-i: .. -'"o. ..... , ... ..o,V,"'..J .... :.- Seconded by

~. a.fc!I!.r t'rop~-r nntice and public/hea-.:-L:og pursuaQt t-o se.ct:.LOIl llL.J61, <:ooe of ;:"""" 1'o1l< CO\In1;y received [rOOt IQRY :.MERSO!! (~ .. r .. inafter "pad\.io.ur(s)" a pn:.posal to purcl...s" .. County ""ned l~ legal.ly deeeefbea as,

-6X E 3F- LOt' 1:1 ENOS B IUINT' AnnlnON ILocal.ly ~ 1'>1 1214 nh Streetl

and

ot 'i~ doll .. ",,, "nd aU of the e .. ne and c<lndlt:ious cb e " e in. and

VHERE.J\S. Ptlrcha.se-r(s) desire t;Q- pucchase: 1:ha above aeece lbed pcope.rty f~ lUl~ CQu.1&ty, and trol'k County desires xo ~e11 t:h,= :Iii-me t:o. I:lIO purcha:!lel: Is) pursuant 1:0 t-he eeres .a:.nd: condi't.iOU$ sec out hi the att:ache.d -U;:A!, E.S't'i\~

NOw. nt£AEFO:;m iJ-E.rr ~r.-'fGO by tho' 80,;II;d o~ Su_p",nis;:ol;;s of \lolk Count.y. lQi.l& t:hat said Pl:<lpOS'al of 1;Iu.:t'cba:l.'le ba and is aceeplted.

BE IT l'IJP:rlIEIt lIESOLvro th .. lO I;be Chair of 1:;11" ~Qlk OOUnty 00acl of

said p~apQgl ot purdLl.se: ~ I:.Q execuce and .t.cknowl.edge r;he: all:-ltacb.ed • .P.EAL =....., eo«ntACl"'.

11£ rr fUltnlSll'ltJ!SOLVED that: the Polk CouQty JlUdhor and tlIlt ~oll< CCWlty

:l"rea.surer eze 4ut:hoI:ized. pu:rsuant. tQ Section 5".9. Code of !-r,:r"ta. to SCt:ike: frOiD: the tiUdng books ot t.be O)unry all previ~:rly l.evied. or .set:; eexea on ehe 41bov'lit d8sc~lbed Prr~op~~~r~~~'~~7- __ _'

ROlLCiIU.

FOR ALlOWANCe:

POt.X COUlln" 8QARD OF SUPERVISORS

I her;oby certify that ~e above and foregoing re=latlan was du1y and legany adopl:l><i by th" 8oa~d of SuperViso"" o( ~Qlk COUnty... XO"'""a". as p:z;ovided by 1&'\1", and propecly journalized .i!l. !the m1nuee..s of ebe _e~i.ng th""eoa th.. ~ day of ~, 1991.

?:1~J'l'4~

Polk C<>unl;y Auditor and SecreU><y 1:0 ~h" Board of SUp~rvisors of ~lk county

OAn: .... en ilEQlJESt'it):"OO1I51" 25, U98

F.tSC1\L li(Yt'£.: Revem.Jj!: co the. Count.y Sl,lO(LQO

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DMACC

DESMOINf.S AR£Ac-::==

COMMUNITY COLLEGE

April 19. 2010

VERIFICATION OF ENROLLMENT FOR MARY AMERSON:

This will verify that Mazy Amerson was enrolled at Des Moines Area Community College for the fall semeste~~_2.<QQ.Q~~~,(lfuJl:tirn~sf.1JdentwithJ2 credits in the qberaL~~ program. The dates for the term

~~28'_2~ to December ~~,2000.)

Kims::~'

Records Specialist (515-964-6565)

A.nkeny Campus _ 2006 S_ Ankeny Blvd. Ankeny. IA 50023-3993 515-964-6200

B90ne Campus

11g5 Hancock Qr. B29ne, IA 50036-5399 515432·7203

carroll CamPII$

906 N. Grant Rd. Carroll, IA 51401·2525 712-792·1755

Newfon PoTYrechnlc Campus

600 N. 2"" Ave. W. Newton. IA 50208-3049 641·791-3622

UrbanIDSM Campus 11 QO-~ Street

Des M::mes. IA 50314-3049 515-244-4226

west CamplJS 5959,G1anctAve. WOM. 1/1;,50266.530; 515-633.2407

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CITY O~ Dff momss

LeGAL OEPARTMENT CfTYHALL

400 £Asl" FIRST STRi'CEr ' DEs NOINES.1OW1t. 503()9-168t (51S) 283-0130 ............... _

(51 S) 2iI3-45I>< lJIigaIIoo •

FAX(5t5)237·'B4:"1~

(515)237'1748~

AU..lt.MERlCAcnY 1949.1976.1981

, CORPORATION COUNSEL.'

caY SQUCfTORS _GODWIN LAWR£I'IC1;; R.. MoDoWaL

SCOTTBEAYnE

ROGER K. BAOWH

MARY It..lJIUGI<UN SUSANA. lOW

STEVEN C, UOSS'ER

DoI..IGLAS P. PHI1.JPH

RICW\RI> SClESZlNSKI

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. Thank you for speakin~ with me again on July 261h• As we discussed, we

reviewed your fetter of July 24 in which you requested 'the monitoring w~1i be removed from your property at 1224 glh Street. As I told you in the past, Jim Humiston of the state Department of Natural Resources has given permission to remove this well and the City of Des Moines would be happy to do so.

July 26, 2000

Ms. Mary Amerson' 1203 Fgrest Avenue Des Mpjoes, IA 50314

RE:

1224 9th Street

Dear Ms. Amerson:

As we also discussed on July 26th, from the info'rmation provided by you and the Engineering Department otthe City. we see no correlation betwepn the monitoring well and the damage to your property whi~h apparently consists of a

, sinkhole and a, deteriorating foundation wall and therefore must respectfully decline your claim for damages. Furthermore, we find your request for' compensation for lost rent to be without merit and must respectfully decline that

claim as well. '

If we do not hear from you within 15 days of the date of this letter, we will proceed with removal of the well as your permission is explicitly granted in your letter of July 24th. If you do not want the well removed, please call me at283- 4565 within the 15-day time nmit "

Thank you for your patience and concern.

, "

','(.outstruly,

~~~

Dan SCies~ns~ Claims AdjOster

DJS:ct .. '

CC~ ,.David McGuffin. Engineering Thomas- Vlassls, City Council', '

DWIGHT W. JAMES

THE ]AIVIES LAW FIRl'l'1 P.C.

ATTORNEYS AT LAW 604 LOCUST STREET 630 EQUITABLE BUILDING DES I'vIOINES, IOWA 50309 TELEPHONE: (515) 246·8484 FACSIMILE: (515) 246·8767 www.jamcslawf rrn.com

FREDERICK W. JAMES

dv,james@_'-mc('oon.com

fv..james@raccoon.('om

RE.ef-NED

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s,AA\OR January 10, 2011 -I:': caUR1 ~DM\N\

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Dear Commission Members

It has been my privilege to know Rob Blink for over twenty-five years. I first became

acquainted with Rob Blink when I was a student at Drake University where he was my trial

advocacy professor. Following graduation from Drake we maintained our friendship. I can think

of no better qualified individual to serve Iowans on the Supreme C0U11 than Rob. His breadth of

experience from representing the State ofIowa as an Assistant Attorney General, to practicing in

the civil arena and then serving the citizens of the Fifth Judicial District on the Bench have

groomed him well for this position. In addition, Rob Blink is a scholar of the law and

understands the importance of judicial independence and has the demeanor to serve Iowa as a

Justice on our Supreme COUl1 ..

It is my sincere hope that Rob Blink is one ofthe finalists that you recommend to

Govemor Branstad for service to all Iowans.

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