BASIC AND APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 1997,19(4),401--410 Copyright © 1997, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

Effects of Situational Variables on Judgments About Deception and Detection Accuracy

Murray G. Millar Department of Psychology University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Karen Millar Las Vegas, Nevada

In this study we investigated the effects of situational variables on judgments about deception. It was hypothesized that more deceptive judgments would be made in situations where there was high gain for the communicator, low probability that the deception would be detected, and a low cost for deception. Two hundred and forty-two participants viewed videotapes of persons describing their work history truthfully or deceitfully. Prior to the videotape, a short description of the situation was read to the participants in which the amount of gain, probability of detection, and cost of detection were manipulated. Following the videotapes, the participants were required to evaluate the applicant's performance on a number of scales and to indicate whether the applicant had held the job. The results supported the hypothesis.

A large body of research has examined the extent to which naive observers can accurately detect a deceptive communication (see DePaulo, Stone, & Lassiter, 1985, for a review). In the course of exploring detection accuracy, a number of variables that influence perceptions and judgments about deceptiveness have been identified. At the present time, almost all of the variables associated with veracity judgments are elements of the deceiver's nonverbal and verbal behavior that are present during the communication. For example, nonverbal behaviors such as postural shifts, shrugs, eye contact, and adapters that occur during the communication have been related to veracity judgments (e.g., Gordon, Baxter, Rozelle, &

Requests for reprints should be sent to Murray G. Millar, Department of Psychology, University of Nevada Las Vegas, Las Vegas, NV 89154-1021. E-mail: miIIar@nevada.edu

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Druckman, 1987; Hocking & Leathers, 1980; Kraut, 1978; Zuckerman, Koestner, & Driver, 1981). Similarly, paralinguistic behaviors during the communication, such as voice pitch, response latency, speech rate, and speech errors seem to influence veracity judgments (e.g., Apple, Streeter, & Krauss, 1979; DePaulo et al., 1985; Kraut & Poe, 1980). More recently, McCornack and his colleagues, in their investigation of information manipulation theory, found that elements of the message (message clarity, message relevance, quality, and quantity) affect the perceived deceptiveness of the message (McCornack, 1992; McCornack, Levine, Solowczuk, Torres, & Campbell, 1992).

Beyond immediate verbal and nonverbal elements of the communication, however, little attention has been given the role of more general situational factors in veracity judgments; that is, the context of the communication. A notable exception to this lack of attention to other factors has been the research on situation ally aroused suspicion (state suspicion). This research repeatedly has demonstrated that manipulating the communication situation to increase suspicion leads to more perceptions of deception (e.g., McCornack & Levine, 1990; Stiff, Kim, & Ramesh, 1992; Toris & DePaulo, 1985). Unfortunately, in almost all of this research, the level of suspicion was manipulated with a straightforward prime. That is, participants in one condition are informed that the communicator may be lying. For example, Burgoon, Buller, Ebesu, and Rockwell (1994) manipulated suspicion by telling half of the participants that "in our research so far, we have discovered some people are far less than candid and truthful when answering these questions" (p. 312). Consequently, such research does not address what elements of the communication situation would make a person more suspicious and more likely to perceive that they are being deceived.

What elements of the communication situation affect veracity judgments?

Although there are a great variety of situational factors that can affect perceptions of communication, in this study we focused on three that should affect suspicion. First, communication situations vary in the degree to which the communicator has the opportunity to obtain a personal gain. There is a considerable amount of evidence from the attitude-change literature suggesting that as opportunity for the communicator to achieve personal gain increases, the communicator's trustworthiness decreases (e.g., Walster, Aronson, & Abrahams, 1966; Wiener & Mowen, 1986). Presumably, as the communicator's trustworthiness decreases, the recipient will become more suspicious and make more judgments of deception. Second, communication situations vary in the degree to which there is an opportunity for deceptions to be detected. Research examining consumer behavior suggests that the verifiability of a statement is often used to assess the statement's truthfulness (Calfee & Ford, 1988). Presumably, as it becomes easier to detect a communicator's deception, the recipient will become less suspicious and make fewer judgments of deception. Third, communication situations vary in how large the cost will be to the communicator if a deception is detected. When behaviors are associated with a large cost, observers infer that there is less motivation to perform the behavior (Bem,

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1972). Presumably, as the cost to the communicator becomes larger, the recipient will perceive less motivation to deceive and will become less suspicious and make fewer judgments of deception.

In our study, participants were required to view videotapes of job interviews in which the job applicant claimed to have held a particular job. A short description read to the participants, prior to the videotape, manipulated each of the situational variables presented earlier here: amount of gain, probability of detection, and the cost associated with the detection of deception. After viewing the videotapes, the participants were required to evaluate the applicant's performance on a number of scales. Embedded in these items was one question that asked the participants to indicate whether the applicant had held the job; that is, the participants were asked to judge the veracity of the applicant. It was expected that each situational variable would produce a main effect: (a) Large amounts of gain would lead to more judgments indicating deception than small amounts of gain, (b) low probability of detection would lead to more judgments indicating deception than high probability of detection, and (c) small costs associated with a detected deception would lead to more judgments indicating deception than large costs.

METHOD

Participants

Two hundred and forty-two (148 female and 93 male) participants recruited both from a large urban community and from undergraduates at a large southwestern university participated in the study. 1 Participants were recruited on a voluntary bases, with no monetary compensation and with class credit offered for undergraduates. The ages of the participants ranged from 17 to 58 years of age, with the average age of the sample being 26 years. The subjects participated in the experimental conditions in groups of three to four persons, and the sessions were conducted by male and female experimenters. Subjects were randomly assigned to each of the eight experimental conditions.

Materials

Each participant viewed a videotape that consisted of eight different communicators describing their most recent job. On each tape presented to the participants, four of the communicators were truthful, and the other four were deceitful. The order of the truthful and deceitful communications was randomized on each tape. Also, the

'One participant failed to indicate his or her gender.

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tapes presented an equal number of male and female communicators who told an equal number of lies and truths.

The videotapes were constructed by choosing truthful and deceitful communications from 24 (14 women and 10 men) undergraduates who were recruited from a large southwestern university. At the beginning of the session, to enhance motivation to lie successfully, the communicators were advised that the researchers were interested in deceptive ability because the ability to lie successfully is related to a number of important skills and traits such as intelligence (see DePaulo, Kirkendol, Tang, & O'Brien, 1988). Then the communicators were informed they would be videotaped twice=-once while they were being truthful and once while they were being deceitful. In the truth session, the communicators were asked to state truthfully what their most recent job was and to respond to a series of questions about this job. For example, applicants were asked, "What was the best part of your last job?"; "What did you think of your boss?"; and to "Describe your coworkers" (see Bond, Kahler, & PaoliceIli, 1985, for a similar procedure). In the deceitful session, the communicators were instructed to lie about what their most recent job was (communicators were restricted to jobs that were plausible) and make up answers to the questions about the job. The order of the truthful and deceitful video recording sessions was randomized. After completing the videotaping sessions, the communicators were required to complete the Self-Monitoring scale (Snyder, 1974) and to be debriefed and released.

Procedure

Participants were recruited to a study that was ostensibly investigating job-interview skills. They were informed that they would be viewing videotapes made during a job interview of a number of job applicants describing their most recent job. Participants were asked to watch each videotape very closely because they would be required to make a number of judgments about the applicant's performance.

Situation manipulation. Before beginning the videotape, the experimenter provided the participants with some background information about the eight interviews being presented. All participants were informed that the job experience being described by the applicants on the videotape was critical for obtaining the new position; that is, applicants who had not held the position would not be considered for the new position. Then directions were given to manipulate three elements of the situation: the amount the applicant had to gain in the situation, the cost to the applicant if he or she was caught in a deception, and the probability that a deception by the applicant would be detected. To manipulate the amount of gain in the situations, approximately half the participants were informed that the position being applied for was very desirable because it paid over $20 an hour, and the other half of the participants were informed that the position was not very desirable because it paid under $4 an hour. To manipulate the probability that a deception

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would be detected, half the participants were informed that the interviewee knew that there was a 90% chance that the interviewer would verify the applicants employment history. The other half of the participants were informed that there was only a 10% chance that the employment history would be verified. To manipulate the cost to the applicant if he or she was caught in a deception, half the participants were informed that the interviewee knew that if a discrepancy was found the applicant would forfeit his or her $50 application fee and the other half of the participants were informed that the applicant would forfeit only a $5 application fee.

Measures. Immediately following the background information, participants were seated 4 to 5 ft from a television monitor that displayed the videotapes of the eight interviews. After each interview, the tape was stopped, and the participants were asked to evaluate the performance of the job applicant on a number of scales. For example, the participants were asked to indicate by checking yes or no whether the applicant had adequate social skills. After each yes or no response, the participants were asked to indicate how confident they were about this judgment on a scale with endpoints of 0% to 100%. Embedded in these items was one question that asked the participants to indicate whether the applicant had held the job he or she was describing in the interview; that is, the participants were asked to indicate whether they believed the applicant was lying.

After judging the eight interviews, the participants were asked to complete three general questions to assess the effectiveness of the manipulations. Participants were asked to indicate on a scale ranging from 1 (much) to 9 (little) how much the applicants had to gain in the situation. The likelihood that applicants would be caught if they lied about the job was rated on a scale ranging from 1 (very likely) to 9 (not very likely). The severity of the consequences if the applicants were caught lying about their last job was rated on a scale ranging from 1 (very severe) to 9 (very mild). When the three manipulation check questions had been completed, the participants were required to complete a number of personality scales (e.g., SelfMonitoring scale; Snyder, 1974). Finally, the participants were questioned concerning their understanding of the experimental hypotheses and were debriefed and released.

RESULTS

Manipulation Check

To assess the effectiveness of the situational manipulation, the participants were asked to indicate how much the applicants had to gain, how likely the applicants would be caught in a lie, and how severe the consequences were if the applicants were caught lying. Scores from these items were analyzed in separate 2 (high vs. low gain) x 2 (high vs.low probability of detection) x 2 (high vs.low cost) analyses of variance (ANOVAs). As expected, a significant main effect for the manipulated

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variable was obtained in each analyses. Participants who listened to the high-gain description indicated that applicants had more to gain (M = 5.58) than participants who listened to the low-gain situations (M = 4.04), F(l, 231) = 24.88, p < .001.2 Participants who listened to the high-probability description indicated that applicants were more likely to be caught (M = 5.18) than participants who listened to the low-probability directions (M = 4.33), F(l, 231) = 10.45, p = .001. Finally, participants who listened to the high-cost description indicated that consequences for lying were more severe (M = 4.50) than participants who listened to the low-cost description (M = 3.84), F(l, 231) =4.73,p = .03. When the gender ofthe participant was added as a factor to each of the manipulation check analyses, it was not involved in any significant effects involving the manipulated variables.'

Veracity Judgments

A measure of veracity judgments was constructed by averaging the number of times each participant indicated that an applicant had not held the job, that is, the number of times he or she indicated that the applicant was being deceptive. Overall, participants perceived the applicants as truthful (M == 0.30). As expected, a significant main effect was obtained for each independent variable when these averages were analyzed in a 2 (high vs. low gain) x 2 (high vs. low probability of detection) x 2 (high vs. low cost) ANOV A.4 More judgments indicating deception were made by participants when gain was high (M = 0.33) than when gain was low (M = 0.27), F(l, 234) == 7.74, P == .006. More judgments indicating deception were made by participants when the probability of detection was low (M :::: 0.34) than when the probability of detection was high (M:::: 0.26), F(1, 234) == 11.71, p = .001. More judgments indicating deception were made when cost was low (M = 0.33) than when cost was high (M == 0.26), F(!, 234) == 8.35, p == .004.

2Scores for the manipulation checks have been converted so that higher numbers indicated more gain, higher probability, and more cost. Also, three participants failed to complete the manipulation checks.

3 Also, a set of analyses was done to examine whether aspects of the participants' personality influenced their perceptions of the situation. When the personality measures were correlated with each of the manipulation checks, none of these correlations were significant.

4The veracity judgment measure was constructed by counting the number of times that a participant believed the applicant was being deceptive. Because count data are usually not normally distributed, the appropriateness ofthis ANOV A procedure may be questioned. Numerous Monte Carlo studies have, however, indicated that analysis of variance is typically unaffected by violations of normality (Boneau, 1960; David & lohnson, 1951; Horsnell, 1953). In addition, Box and colleagues have offered a mathematical explanation for why the ANOV A procedure is usually unaffected by violations of normality (Box, 1954; Box & Andersen, 1955). Norton (1952), reported in Lindquist (1953), found that with analysis of variance, even with extremely small sample sizes, markedly nonnormal distributions would inflate Type 1 errors by only 2%. In this study, a relatively large sample size was used, and the analysis of the veracity judgments produced p values that were distant from the critical alpha.

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Detection Accu racy

For each participant, the number of times he or she correctly judged whether the applicant was being truthful or deceitful (about holding the job) was averaged. When these averages were analyzed in the standard ANOV A, no significant effects were obtained. Overall, participants detected deceptions at levels expected by chance (M = 0.49).

Confidence

For each participant, his or her confidence ratings of the deceptive judgments were averaged. The mean overall confidence score was 73.97%. When the confidence averages were analyzed in the standard ANOV A, no significant effects were obtained, Fs < I. Confidence on true and deceptive statements was also explored by computing separate averages for true statements and deceptive statements. These averages were analyzed in a 2 (high vs. low gain) x 2 (high vs. low probability) x 2 (high vs. low cost) x 2 (true vs. deceptive statement) ANOV A with repeated measures assumed on the last factor. This analysis failed to produce any significant effects.

The relation between confidence in the judgment and the accuracy of the judgment was explored by computing separate averages for accurate and inaccurate judgments. These averages were analyzed in a 2 (high vs. low gain) x 2 (high vs. low probability) x 2 (high vs. low cost) x 2 (correct vs. incorrect) ANOVA with repeated measures assumed on the last factor. The only effect to reach significance was a two-factor interaction of Gain x Accuracy, F(I, 234) = 4.48, p = .03. When there was high gain, participants were more confident in inaccurate judgments (M = 75.70) than accurate judgments (M = 73.54), F(I, 234) = 4.61, p = .03. When there was low gain, there was a nonsignificant tendency for this effect to reverse. Participants were more confident in accurate judgments (M = 76.50) than in inaccurate judgments (M = 75.33).

Gender Differences

The effects of both the gender of the participant and the gender of the videotaped applicant were examined. Each of the outcome measures was analyzed in separate 2 (high vs. low gain) x 2 (high vs.low probability) x 2 (high vs.low cost) x 2 (male vs. female participant) x 2 (male vs. female applicant) ANOV As with repeated measures assumed on the last factor. When veracity judgments were examined, the only effect involving gender to reach significance was a main effect for the gender of the applicants, F(I, 225) = 7.0, p = 0.09. More judgments of deception were made by the participants when the applicant was female (M = 0.33) than when the applicant was a male (M = 0.28). When the accuracy of the judgments was examined again, a main effect for gender of the applicants was found, F(l, 225) = 34.69, p <

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.001, with participants being more accurate with female applicants (M = 56.2) than male applicants (M = 43.6). In addition, there was a nonsignificant tendency for male participants to be more accurate (M = 50.53) than female participants (M = 47.72), F(l, 255)= 3.22,p= .07. Finally, when confidence was examined, no effects involving gender were significant.

Also, the effects of a couple of other variables on the outcome measures (veracity judgments, accuracy, and confidence) were explored. The age of the participant was correlated to each of the outcome measures. Two modest correlations were found, indicating that increasing age was associated with more judgments of deception (r = .14, p = .03) and with less confidence (r = -.14, p = .03). Further, the effect of the status of the participant was investigated by adding status (student vs. nonstudent) as a factor to each of the main analyses. The status of the participant was not involved in any significant effects.

DISCUSSION

The results provided support for the hypothesis. All of the situational variables increased the number of deception judgments. The largest number of deception judgments occurred when there was high gain, low probability of detection, and low cost of deception. Alternatively, the smallest number of deception judgments occurred when there was low gain, high probability of detection, and high cost of deception. In addition, consistent with past research, these results indicated that the detectors had a strong tendency to judge the applicants as truthful (DePaulo et al., 1985). In each of the experimental conditions, the truth judgments were in the majority.

When the accuracy of the judgments was examined, no significant main effects were found for the situational variables. The failure to find an effect for situation variables seems consistent with past research that examined the effects of suspicion. That is, in most studies that manipulate suspicion with a direct prime, detection accuracy has not been improved (e.g., Buller, Strzyzewski, & Comstock, 1991; McCornack & Levine, 1990; Toris & DePaulo, 1985; Zuckerman, Spiegel, DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 1982).

Although the results are consistent with our hypothesis, a couple of important issues remain. First, in our study, only the detectors were aware of the situational variables (gain, probability of detection, and cost of detection); that is, these variables were not manipulated when the communicators were videotaped. In most real-life circumstances, however, both the detector and communicator are aware of and influenced by situational variables. In this study, the communicators were not exposed to the situational manipulations in order to isolate changes in detector's perceptions about the situation from actual behavioral changes in the communicators. Although both detector and communicator may have access to the situation, it is the perceptions of the detector that determines the detector's judgments. Thus,

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an understanding of how the detector's perceptions of the situation influence veracity judgments is important when attempting to predict when persons will infer deception. Also, programs designed to teach effective lie detection need to alert students to how the situation may influencing their judgments. Nonetheless, future research needs to explore how the communicator's behavior is influenced by situational variables and how the detector's perception of the situation and the communicator's behavioral changes interact.

Second, many models of person perception and a considerable body of research have emphasized the automatic nature of the perception process (e.g., Gilbert, 1989; Langer, Blank, & Chanowitz, 1978; Quattrone, 1982). In these models, persons limit the amount of cognitive effort by considering a very small amount of information when making dispositional judgments. This theme has been echoed in the research on deception, where a variety of researchers have proposed that persons employ heuristics to make judgments about deceptions to limit the amount of cognitive effort needed (e.g., Buller, Strzyzewski, & Hunsaker, 1991; Fiedler & Walka, 1993; McCornack & Parks, 1986). The data from this study, however, suggested that persons expend cognitive effort in weighing several elements of the situational context when making judgments about the deceptiveness of other persons. Perhaps variables in the situational context can act as cues to increase the cognitive effort used to make judgments about deception. This is another question for future research.

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