Dr Hadori Yunus Ak:

Akuntan Harus Independen,

Profesional,
dan Menjunjung Tinggi Kode Etik

JAKARTA – Hadori & Rekan merupakan Kantor

Akuntan Publik dan Konsultan Manajemen yang berdiri
sejak tahun 1973 dengan
kantor pusat di Jakarta.

Kantor itu sekarang memiliki tiga cabang, yakni di

Yogyakarta, Semarang, dan Surabaya, dengan jumlah
karyawan lebih dari 200 orang. Jasa yang diberikan
meliputi berbagai jenis konsultasi dan jasa bisnis
lainnya, selain jasa utama di bidang audit.
Sejak tahun 1988, KAP Hadori & Rekan bergabung
dengan HLB International, sebuah organisasi kantor
akuntan publik internasional. Konsekuensi dari
keanggotaan tersebut, Hadori & Rekan diharuskan
menggunakan nama HLB sebelum nama anggota di
dalam setiap dokumen formal.
Maka sejak tahun 1988, nama Hadori & Rekan berubah
menjadi HLB Hadori & Rekan. Sebagaimana diketahui,
HLB International, dengan kantor pusat di London,
Inggris, kini memiliki anggota tersebar di 100 negara.
Partner dan staf yang bergabung di HLB International
lebih dari 13.000 orang, tersebar di 430 kantor cabang,
dengan total pendapatan lebih dari US$ 910 juta per
tahun.
Sejak berdiri tahun 1973, hingga kini, menurut Dr Hadori
Yunus Ak, kantornya telah memberikan layanan
terhadap puluhan ribu klien yang sebagian besar
merupakan perusahaan besar, baik swasta maupun
BUMN, antara lain, PT Indosat Tbk, Pelindo II dan III,
Wijaya Karya, Pupuk Iskandar Muda.
”Agar tetap dipercaya masyarakat, kami selalu
konsisten, profesional, dan menggunakan standar tinggi
dalam memberikan layanan jasa. Intinya, seorang
akuntan harus profesional, independen, dan menjunjung
tinggi kode etik profesi dalam menjalankan tugasnya,”
kata Hadori Yunus dalam perbincangan dengan SH, di
kantornya, akhir pekan lalu.
Menurut Hadori, kantor ini bukan saja memberikan
pelayanan jasa profesional pada bidang dan sektor
bisnis komersial, tapi juga di lembaga pemerintahan,
khususnya pemerintah daerah dalam rangka otonomi
daerah. Bukan hanya itu, sejak bergabung dengan HLB
International, Hadori & Rekan juga dipercaya oleh dunia
bisnis di tingkat internasional.
Sejumlah perusahaan internasional, dan lembaga
internasional pernah tercatat sebagai kliennya, antara
lain World Bank. HLB Hadori & Rekan juga pernah
bekerjas ama dalam bentuk pendidikan/ pelatihan untuk
tenaga-tenaga profesional dalam praktik audit BUMN
dan BUMD, khususnya di kantor BPK wilayah
Yogyakarta.
Sebagaimana diketahui, jasa-jasa yang ditawarkan HLB
Hadori & Rekan, selain jasa audit, juga konsultasi
manajemen, corporate finance, tax services, human
resource development dan teknologi informasi. ”Jasa–
jasa yang kami tawarkan memang cukup banyak. Tapi,
kami ini masih masuk kategori perusahaan menengah,
dengan total pendapatan di bawah Rp 15 miliar per
tahun,” ungkap dosen Pascasarjana, UGM, Yogyakarta
ini merendah.
Tentang tantangan dunia akuntansi di Indonesia,
menurut Hadori, cukup banyak. Jika tahun 1950-an,
tantangan itu karena masih langkanya tenaga ahli, kini
di tengah era globalisasi, tantangan telah bergeser,
yakni ketertinggalan dengan negara lain dan hantaman
globalisasi ekonomi. Pembenahan pendidikan akuntansi
memang telah dilakukan di Indonesia, tapi hingga
sekarang pembenahan itu masih belum memuaskan.
Lalu, menghadapi globalisasi ekonomi, menurut Hadori,
mau tidak mau, akuntan publik Indonesia, harus
menyesuaikan diri dengan standar internasional.
Hadori memberi contoh, sistem akuntansi Indonesia
yang dibangun, bisa saja mengacu kepada standar
Amerika Serikat. Namun, karena budaya di Indonesia
tidak sama dengan Amerika Serikat, sebagai salah satu
alat dalam ekonomi, akuntansi Indonesia dengan
standar internasional tersebut harus disesuaikan
dengan kultur Indonesia. ”Langkah demikian harus
dilakukan, agar ke depan kita memiliki identitas diri
dalam bidang akuntansi,” paparnya.
Dalam Apa & Siapa Sejumlah Akuntan Indonesia,
Hadori memaparkan upaya membangun identitas diri,
kini justri mendapat waktu dan ruang yang tepat di
tengah keinginan masyarakat untuk keluar dari krisis.
Banyak orang tak menyadari, Indonesia sekarang
mengalami krisis identitas yang memprihatinkan,
menyerah kepada keinginan dunia internasional yang
banyak mengambil keuntungan dari buruknya situasi.
Indonesia, tambahnya, tidak akan pernah mendapat
manfaat yang lebih besar karena dipaksa menuruti apa
saja yang datang dari luar tanpa upaya penyesuaian.
Agenda besar ini belum tentu dapat diselesaikan
dengan cepat.
Kecenderungan kompromistis dalam banyak hal
ternyata dijadikan alasan oleh para akuntan untuk
melecehkan etika profesi. Lebih lanjut Hadori
menjelaskan, seorang profesional jelas tidak sekadar
melaksanakan sesuatu sesuai dengan standar acuan
tertentu, tapi juga mampu ”mengadilinya”.
Sebuah pedoman tertentu mungkin akan diterapkan lain
pada situasi tertentu. Oleh karenanya, perlu kecakapan
dan ada keharusan menjunjung tinggi etika profesi.
”Kemandirian dalam persaingan profesi yang
merupakan kenyataan riil bisa dibuat aturan mainnya di
dalam naungan Ikatan Akuntan Indonesia, para pelaku
masih bisa bebas bermain sejauh tidak melanggar kode
etik yang telah disepakati bersama,” katanya.
Dijelaskan, dalam HLB Hadori & Rekan selalu
meletakkan penekanan yang besar pada konsistensi
dan peningkatan dari kualitas jasa serta standar yang
tinggi dan keahlian profesional. Hal ini, tambahnya,
didukung dengan komunikasi yang dekat antara
perusahaan referensi dan penerima, termasuk prosedur
yang efektif untuk memonitor secara konstan standar
pekerjaan yang dijalankan.
Selain itu, HLB Hadori & Rekan juga menetapkan
standar untuk pembangunan sistem dan prosedur di
setiap kantor cabang untuk memastikan bahwa klien
memperoleh kualitas standar yang tinggi di antara
jaringan HLB. Pengawasan kualitas ini, tambah Hadori
lagi, juga digunakan sebagai dasar program per review
HLB.
”Semua calon perusahaan di-review sebelum
bergabung dan perusahaan yang sudah ada ikut
terkena review periodik,” kata Hadori seraya
menambahkan, prosedur review meliputi pelaporan
secara formal, termasuk laporan mendetail kepada
perusahaan tersebut sebagai hasil review dan
rekomendasi tindakan sebagai penyelesaian.
Untuk bisa melakukan audit sesuai standar
internasional, HLB Hadori & Rekan diperkuat SDM
profesional di bidangnya. Dia mencontohkan, dalam
jasa corporate restructuring, misalnya, HLB Hadori &
Rekan menawarkan restrukturisasi dan rekapitalisasi
bisnis.
”Karena berdasarkan interdisipliner staf kami, maka bisa
memberikan bantuan dalam berbagai macam advis,
seperti penjualan aset, divestasi perusahaan, dan
restrukturisasi modal serta neraca. Tanpa didukung
SDM yang berpengalaman dan profesional, klien tidak
akan percaya,” tandasnya.
Demikian pula di bidang konsultasi untuk merger, HLB
Hadori & Rekan bisa membantu klien mengembangkan
rencana strategik yang menggabungkan potensi
keuangan sejalan dengan sasaran dan tujuan
perusahaan yang melakukan akuisisi.
”Pengalaman kami yang bertahun-tahun, serta didukung
SDM profesional, memungkinkan kami memberikan
nasihat untuk merencanakan dan mengindentifikasi
kandidat potensi merger,” cetus Hadori tanpa mau
memerinci soal pendapatan perusahaan jasa yang
dipimpinnya.
(SH/ignatius gunarto)

Copyright © Sinar
Harapan 2003

http://www.sinarharapan.co.id/ceo/2004/0412/ceo1.html

Posted by Dini | on Thursday, October 09, 2003 - 01:42 AM

The US Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 is a major reform package mandating the most far-reaching
changes US Congress has imposed on the business world . It seeks to thwart future scandals
and restore investor confidence by, among other things, creating a public-company-accounting-
oversight board, revising auditor independence rules, revising corporate governance standards
and significantly increasing the criminal penalties for violations of securities laws. This article highlights the
provisions most important to accounting professionals engaged in public company audits.

THE PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BOARDSarbanes-Oxley establishes the Public

Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) to regulate accounting professionals who audit the
financial statements of public companies. The board’s operations are subject to direct and substantial SEC
oversight. It, according to the act, is not a government agency and will be made up of five full-time
“prominent individuals of integrity and reputation.” Two members must be or must have been CPAs. The
SEC, in consultation with the chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the
secretary of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, is responsible for identifying the initial board members.
The critical task of finding the right individuals for this job is complicated by the requirement that members
of the PCAOB refrain from engaging in any other professional or business activity while serving. The SEC
must appoint the chairperson and other initial members by October 28, 2002. The board is responsible for,
among other things, Timing Is EverythingThe Sarbanes-Oxley Act says the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board must be organized and SEC-authorized to function on or before April 26, 2003. As soon
as the SEC sees that the new board has the capacity to carry out its responsibilities (which could occur
prior to April 26), public accounting firms have 180 days to register with the board or cease all participation
in public company audits. Accounting firms should not attempt to wait until the 179th day to register
because the board has 45 days to act on an application and is permitted to request additional information
from an applicant. It would be prudent for accounting firms to allow a sufficient time cushion for the
registration process and submit applications no later than the 135th day after the SEC’s determination.
Click here more detail

JofA: Regulations Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act | Login/Create an account | 0

WORTH REPEATING

A New Accounting
Culture
BY BARRY C. MELANCON

The following is adapted from a speech made by AICPA

President and CEO Barry C. Melancon at the invitation of
the Yale School of Management. Mr. Melancon spoke
before a group of business professionals and
representatives of the media at the Yale Club in New York
City on September 4, 2002.

his is my first chance to speak to an audience outside the accounting

profession since President Bush signed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. That
law contains some of the most far-reaching changes that Congress has
ever introduced to the business world. Its scope is large. It contains
fundamental reforms forms. Many of its standards are high. And its
penalties are stiff. It included many elements the profession supported—
and yes, some that we opposed.

Now that it has been signed into law, our position is unequivocal: We will work to
implement it and to rebuild the faith of investors who depend on us for
information critical to the capital markets.

But let’s recognize the challenge ahead: Reestablishing the perception of the
audited financial statement as a clear picture window into a publicly traded
company will not be achieved purely by legislation or regulation.

No, the lead role must be played by all members of the profession. We must reach
back to our core roots which earned us enormous respect as trusted advisers. We
must reassert the heritage that made the accountant the professional in whom
Americans confide their most confidential financial information and to whom
they turn for honest advice.

WE MUST RESTORE OUR MOST PRICELESS ASSET:

OUR REPUTATION
All of us who are privileged to be leaders of our profession have the responsibility
of preserving a legacy of honor and integrity for future generations of CPAs. We
owe it to all who preceded us and all who will follow us. We can afford no
tolerance for those who strayed from the commitment to put the public interest
first. We must do better and we will.

What is needed is not just reform of the accounting laws, it is a rejuvenated

accounting culture, both internally in corporate finance offices and externally in
audit firms. The culture must build upon the profession’s traditional values, such
as rigorous commitment to integrity, a passion for getting it right, a commitment
to rules—not just to their letter, but their spirit, and zero tolerance for those who
break them.

These values are the commitment of all of the 350,000 CPAs who are members of
the AICPA across this country. We are determined to restore the image of the
accounting profession and rebuild the legacy we will pass on to the next
generation of accountants. We’re committed to the same goals that Congress
envisioned when it passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and that the president
articulated when he signed it.

We are committed to rebuilding confidence in the financial markets and their

institutions. We’re committed to dramatically reducing the risk that future
investors will fall prey to the kind of financial malfeasance that characterized
Enron and WorldCom. And we are committed to something else as well: restoring
pride in our profession. For us, it’s personal.

The revelations of financial abuse were a traumatic blow to everyone in the

accounting profession. It has been painful to the nearly half of our members who
are corporate employees, who serve as the financial conscience for thousands of
corporations in America. It has been painful to the vast body of CPAs in public
practice, CPAs who are not by and large involved in auditing publicly traded
companies, but who concentrate on providing good advice and quality services to
individuals and small businesses. Let’s not forget that small businesses make up
roughly half of our economy. They are America’s engine of economic growth and
job creation and they depend upon their CPAs for expertise and trusted advice. In
a business world that seems to grow more complex every day, small business
people need to turn to a trusted adviser to put complicated issues in context. CPAs
fulfill that role.

The corporate scandals have also been painful to auditors who provide
independent, objective judgments to public companies and insist on full
disclosure to investors; that includes nearly a thousand audit firms.

The business scandals have been painful to members of our profession because it
is made up of honest people. But hundreds of thousands of good apples do not
excuse the behavior of a few bad ones. Make no mistake about it, our profession
was part of the problem. And it came to embody the public’s perception of the
problem.

THE PROFESSION IS INVOLVED

But no matter how small a minority caused the problems, all of us in the
accounting profession are working to solve them. To begin with, we were
“present at the creation” of many of the reform ideas that were recently embraced
by law. We helped develop the proposal for a board to oversee auditors of public
companies, an idea that evolved into the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board. We called for a requirement that auditors be hired by the board’s audit
committee, not management. We agreed with a prohibition on those who audit
public companies from consulting in two key areas: financial systems design and
implementation, and internal audit outsourcing. And we created a public-interest
test against which all reforms could be measured:

Will it help investors make informed investment decisions?

Will it enhance audit quality and the quality of financial reporting?

Will it help restore confidence in the capital markets, our nation’s financial
reporting system and the accounting profession?

Will it be good for America’s financial markets and economic growth?

But we’ve looked beyond legislation. We’ve engaged in a long and serious
process of introspection at the AICPA over what went wrong and what must be
done to make it right.

WHAT WENT WRONG?

For executives of Enron, WorldCom and yes, for some auditors, part of the
problem was simple greed or arrogance. Part of the problem was the pressure of a
market in which the difference of a penny or two in earnings per share could lead
to the difference of a billion or two in market cap. Part of the problem was a
failure of some auditors to step up to their own responsibility. And part of it is the
financial reporting model itself: The proper treatment of many issues is not clear,
such as off-balance-sheet activity. Financial statements are not written in plain
English and disclosure is periodic, even though the Internet allows it to be
provided in real time.

Part of the problem is a GAAP model with too many rules that leaves too little
room for principle-based judgment. And even where GAAP does allow for such
judgment, far too many preparers don’t exercise it, opting for a form of “connect
the dots” accounting that doesn’t necessarily draw a full and complete picture of a
company.

Part of the problem is the fact that institutional investors and other market
professionals have not traditionally provided feedback to the AICPA’s standard-
setting process. In retrospect, we could and should have done more to solicit it.
Now, we must demand it.

Clearly, part of the problem was some inherent weaknesses in disciplinary and
monitoring processes for the profession. And part of it is the threat—real or
perceived—of auditor dependency on fees from major clients.

Part of the problem is an inclination among many auditors to assume good intent.
Most of those who make up the leadership of corporate America are honest, with
the interests of their shareholders foremost in mind. But an auditor must carry a
standard of professional skepticism into each and every audit. As President
Reagan said of arms negotiations with the Soviets: “Trust, but verify.” That’s our
obligation to shareholders.

These are explanations, but they are not excuses. They remind us that there is no
one simple answer to the question of what went wrong. And there will be no one
simple answer to the question of what must we do to make it right. The
accounting profession must start with a basic commitment—a commitment that
has governed the AICPA and its members since the organization was founded
over a century ago.

Let me illustrate that commitment with a story about an auditor named Al Bows,
who this summer was the subject of a profile in The Wall Street Journal. He went
to work for an audit firm in the depths of the Depression. Public companies had
just been mandated to have their financial statements certified. There were no
nationally recognized standards in place, no history to draw upon. Bows took
pride in helping to reform capitalism. He took pride in something else, too: his
integrity. One day he discovered that the CEO of one of his client companies was
secretly running a competing business on the side to siphon off profits. The client
controlled a major account for Bows. But Bows told him to cut out the con game
or he’d turn him in. The client was angry, but he stopped cheating his
shareholders. Al Bows possessed a characteristic crucial to the profession: He had
the guts to say no, even when he had a lot to lose.

WHAT INVESTORS DESERVE—AUDITORS WHO SAY “NO”

Let there be no doubt: Hundreds of thousands of members of the CPA profession
say “no” every day. “No” means protecting the public interest by rejecting
unsound corporate accounting practices. “No” means reducing the risk of deceit
and fraud. “No” means ensuring that audited statements are not just accurate, but
illuminating. “No” means questioning and challenging management. When
justified, it means rejecting management’s accounting decisions. Saying “no”
means saying “yes” to protecting the public interest. Only if auditors are fully
prepared to say “no” will investors be fully prepared to say “yes.”

“No” is not always easy to say. But obscured by the recent focus on our
profession is the fact that auditors say it every day. These stories rarely come to
light because an auditor prevails on clients to do the right thing. Every day, an
auditor is telling a corporate executive what must be disclosed, why an item can’t
be treated in a certain manner or why a certain activity must be shown on the
balance sheet.

Every year, members of the AICPA collectively conduct almost 17,000 audits of
public companies that are unblemished by restatements or allegations of
impropriety. That doesn’t even include hundreds of thousands of audits of
privately held companies and government and not-for-profit institutions that
exemplify the highest standards of integrity.

That’s the true spirit of the accounting profession, a spirit we must marshal in
pursuit of a fair investment climate. We must strive for zero audit defects,
knowing full well that a combination of factors will prevent us from ever
achieving perfection. But when a failure occurs, we must be unrelenting in
ensuring that its weaknesses are not repeated.

The president and Congress have taken a significant step. The accounting
profession is determined to carry the cause forward. We realize that no single
initiative will rebuild investor confidence, that no single magic bullet will put
fraud or malfeasance to rest.

Months of introspection at the AICPA have brought us to the conclusion that we

have six leadership roles to fulfill. All of them require cooperation with other
important players, who have jurisdiction in many vital areas.

First, the AICPA has a role as a standard setter. While the new Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board has broad responsibilities, CPAs have a
responsibility to set standards for their own profession, just as professionals do in
medicine, engineering and architecture.

To ensure that our standard-setting capacity is as robust as possible, the AICPA

will make it a priority to obtain greater involvement of the users of financial
statements in setting auditing standards.

We are developing new guidance regarding an auditor’s potential dependency on

fees from large clients, including discussion with audit committees about potential
dependency and expanded rotation requirements for key personnel. The guidance
would also consider compensation policies that reward partners primarily based
on auditing proficiencies and policies that prevent a firm from penalizing a
partner who says “no” at the risk of losing a client.

Second, the AICPA has a role as a liaison between market institutions and
corporations, jointly shaping programs and policies to guard the interests of
investors. Reducing the incidence of financial fraud will require a partnership
among auditors, corporate management and all financial professionals, with the
goal of achieving an environment of fraud-free financial reporting.

We will design antifraud criteria and controls intended for public corporations,
targeted for introduction next June. We invite corporate America to work with us.
We are calling on the Auditing Standards Board to enhance our existing
attestation standard for CPAs to test and report on client antifraud controls and
programs and to develop ways to communicate the results to the public.

We will be sponsoring a summit, before the end of this year, of financial

executives, corporate directors, audit committees, stock exchanges, analysts and
regulators to identify new antifraud initiatives and collaborate in implementing
them.

Third, the AICPA has a research role. Academic research can provide new
insights into the who, what, when, where and why of corporate fraud. These
insights will improve corporate-fraud-prevention controls, strengthen
undergraduate education and enhance audit procedures to detect fraud.
 Today, I am pleased to announce that the AICPA, the University of Texas at
Austin and the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners are jointly establishing
an Institute for Fraud Studies. We call upon leaders in corporate America and
CPA firms to participate in this initiative. We are committed to incorporating the
research results into the task of standard setting. One of the outcomes must be
improved investor education. For that reason, one of the first research projects
will be to study how investors can help protect themselves against fraud.

Fourth, the AICPA has an educational role. We are developing training

programs aimed at combating fraud.

We will initiate discussions with the American Accounting Association, the

Federation of Schools of Accountancy, chairpersons of university accounting
programs and college textbook publishers aimed at promptly incorporating fraud
prevention materials into the accounting curriculum and university textbooks.
This will give students the knowledge and skills to understand the fundamental
characteristics of fraud, identify factors that may indicate it exists and acquire
enhanced interviewing techniques. The AICPA will work with academic
institutions to develop appropriate materials, targeted for inclusion in college
courses in the fall of next year.

We further believe all members of the AICPA should commit more time to
continuing education in the area of fraud detection. While considerable ongoing
professional education is required to maintain professional standards, we are
calling on audit and finance professionals dealing with public companies to
commit at least 10 percent of their continuing education to the area of fraud
detection.

We are urging stock exchanges to mandate effective antifraud training for all
members of management, boards of directors and audit committees. As a public
service, by the end of this year, we will develop and make available, free of
charge, training programs focusing on the roles and responsibilities of
management and those in corporate governance.

Fifth, the AICPA has a role to play in advancing the level of financial
reporting. Achieving more transparent financial reporting is central to ensuring
fair markets and restoring investor confidence. We are eager to pursue this goal in
concert with FASB and with leading corporate organizations. We seek to work
with all interested parties, but we are prepared to move forward on our own if
necessary.

One of our first steps is to initiate a debate within the accounting community on
how to differentiate between the needs of widely held and privately held
businesses, and how to reform GAAP to reflect this reality. Given the media focus
on public companies, it’s easy to lose sight of both the importance of small
business and its unique reporting needs. As a first step in addressing this, the
AICPA is asking all of our committees and those of state societies that deal with
small-company issues to put this high on their agendas. Feedback is due by the
first quarter of next year.

We will work with FASB to ensure an improved reporting model is built that
will provide investors with higher-quality information—addressing such issues as
off-balance-sheet activity, liquidity, financial performance indicators and
unreported intangibles.

In addition, we’re working with the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants

to lead the way in updating the reporting model. We’ve jointly developed the
Value Measurement and Reporting Collaborative, which brings together
stakeholders in the financial reporting process from around the world to determine
the best methodologies for value measurements and reporting. This will enable
investors to see more information about what makes a company successful. It will
also help boards of directors and senior management to make better strategic
decisions.

We fully support the SEC’s current proposal to expand and enhance the
disclosure of estimates and accounting policies. When the new rules are finalized,
we will provide our members with tools to implement it. The additional
disclosures should be included either as part of the financial statement disclosures
or as part of management’s discussion and analysis (MD&A). And we fully
support the auditor’s examination of MD&A. As well, the Auditing Standards
Board is seeking input from users of financial information as to other types of
information that should be communicated by the auditor.

Sixth, the AICPA has a role in promoting strong corporate governance and
internal control systems. A public company’s ability to withstand pressures to
provide false information to the public depends largely on those factors.

For that reason, we are calling on the Auditing Standards Board to revise
existing internal controls and reporting standards so that the public will be put on
notice when the auditor communicates internal control weaknesses to the audit
committee. Situations that will be considered as constituting reportable conditions
will include one individual holding the dual positions of chairman of the board
and CEO or an audit committee that is not fulfilling its mission. It may include
lack of mandatory antifraud education or lack of a code of conduct.

In fulfilling all of these roles, the AICPA has an overriding mission: to shape an
accounting culture for the future that surpasses the legacy of our past.
 Over the past few months, certainly one good thing has occurred: The importance
of the audit has been reaffirmed loud and clear. Now, we must build on its core
value.

The AICPA will be both a watchdog and a source of leadership. We pledge to be

a force for raising new issues and examining issues that are raised by others. We
will serve as common ground for all in the profession and those involved in the
financial reporting process to bring their concerns and proposals.

To be certain, none of us—auditors, corporations or investors—will look back

fondly on this year. But the 350,000 members of the AICPA are concentrating on
looking forward. We’re looking forward to implementing the fundamental
reforms enacted by Congress. We’re looking forward to working with lawmakers,
corporations and the public to implement new reforms as necessary and to
rebuilding the faith of investors in the audited financial statement as an open
window into publicly traded companies. We’re looking forward to reclaiming our
profession’s heritage as a bedrock of business integrity and continuing our
historic role as trusted advisers to businesses of all sizes and protectors of the
public interest.

It will not be easy. But we are committed to it. We are committed to moving
forward. We will rebuild trust in our profession brick by brick.

http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/jofa/oct2002/melancon.htm2002 AICPA

Posted by Dini | on Wednesday, October 08, 2003 - 04:57 AM

U.S. companies victimized by fraud in the past two years reported that whistleblowers, audits and
investigations were responsible for detecting 86 percent of crimes, suggesting U.S. companies
have provided a high degree of access to audit committees and auditors, as well as a regulatory
structure that encourages and rewards tip-offs.

According to the just released PricewaterhouseCoopers' Global Economic Crime Survey 2003, 50 percent
of all economic crime detection came from internal or external investigations and audits. Another 36
percent of economic crime detection came from whistleblowers. Produced by the law firm of Wilmer, Cutler
& Pickering, the survey is based on more than 90 interviews with chief executive officers, chief financial
officers, and those responsible for detecting and preventing economic crime in the largest U.S. companies.
It is the first survey of its kind since the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.Overall, the survey revealed
that economic crime in the U.S. is prevalent -- more than one third of U.S. respondents to the survey
reported significant economic crimes during the previous two years -- and is viewed as likely to increase
over the next five years. Most worrisome to survey participants is financial misrepresentation, which
respondents believed to be prevalent in half of all companies. However, the survey sponsors point out that
the actual instances of this crime was reported by only two percent of respondents, suggesting that the
media attention surrounding some of the high-profile cases of financial misrepresentation in the U.S. has
exaggerated the perceptions of the instance of financial misrepresentation.Asset misappropriation,
according to respondents, is prevalent at an incidence of 25 percent, followed by cybercrime at an
incidence of eight percent. Other findings:Economic crime is consistently harmful to a company's
intangible assets. More than 75 percent of the incidences of economic crime had a negative impact on the
company's reputation and on staff morale and motivation, in addition to damaging business relationships.
Confidence in controls appears to be misplaced in comparison with how economic crimes are actually
discovered. Ninety-five percent of respondents believe they have adequate risk management systems. Yet
respondents reported that risk management systems detected only about one-third of the instances of
economic crime, suggesting that internal systems are co-opted, circumvented or overridden in a majority of
instances of economic crime. Seventy-six percent of U.S. respondents have some form of insurance but o-
nly 37 percent report recovering damages through insurance, and these recoveries are small.Copies of the
U.S. and Global Economic Crime Surveys are available to view and download online at: www.wilmer.com.

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Posted by Budi | on Friday, May 30, 2003 - 10:36 PM
Organisasi bisnis merupakan sebuah pertemuan dari berbagai macam kontrak kepentingan
(nexus of contract), sehingga di dalam proses akuntansi, ada dimensi politis yang terlibat
didalamnya. Dimensi politis tersebut adalah sebuah kenyataan bahwa ada pihak-pihak yang
berkepentingan dan cukup mempunyai kekuatan untuk menggunakan pengaruhnya ke dalam
organisasi tersebut. Sehingga dalam pemahaman mengenai ‘creative accounting’ ini bukan berarti
akuntan ‘an sich’ yang memanfaatkan pemahaman akuntansi tersebut, tetapi pihak-pihak yang
mempunyai kepentingan dan kekuatan untuk menggunakan ‘creative accounting’ tersebut, seperti
manajer, akuntan, pemerintah, asosiasi industri dan sebagainya.

Teori Akuntansi Positif berkembang seiring kebutuhan untuk menjelaskan dan memprediksi realitas
praktek-praktek akuntansi yang ada di dalam masyarakat seperti yang dikatakan oleh Watts dan
Zimmerman [1986] dibandingkan dengan akuntansi normatif yang lebih menjelaskan praktek-praktek
akuntansi yang seharusnya (should be) berlaku. Dalam pemilihan kebijakan akuntansi misalnya akan
membawa dampak ekonomi terhadap pemilihan kebijakan akuntansi tersebut kepada penggunanya yang
sering disebut oleh Zeff [1978] sebagai economic consequences. Dalam mengisi ruang teori akuntansi
positif maka ‘creative accounting’ sebagai salah satu tema menarik yang juga perlu diperhatikan oleh
akuntan (dan juga penyusun standar akuntansi).
‘Creative accounting’ menurut Amat, Blake dan Dowd [1999] adalah sebuah proses dimana beberapa
pihak menggunakan kemampuan pemahaman pengetahuan akuntansi (termasuk didalamnya standar,
teknik dsb.) dan menggunakannya untuk memanipulasi pelaporan keuangan.
Naser [1993] dalam Amat et.al. [1999] medefinisikan ‘creative accounting’ sebagai berikut:
The process of manipulating accounting figures by taking advantage of loopholes in accounting rules and
the choice of measurement and disclosure practices in them to transform financial statements from what
they should be, to what prepares would prefer to see reported, …..and The process by which transactions
are structured so as to produce the required accounting results rather than reporing transaction in neutral
and consistent way.

Stolowy dan Breton [2000] menyebut ‘creative accounting’ merupakan bagian dari ‘accounting
manipulation’ yang terdiri dari ‘earning management’ , ‘income smoothing’ dan ‘creative accounting’ itu
sendiri.
Dalam pemahaman mengenai ‘creative accounting’ ini bukan berarti akuntan ‘an sich’ yang
memanfaatkan pemahaman akuntansi tersebut, tetapi pihak-pihak yang mempunyai kepentingan dan
kekuatan untuk menggunakan ‘creative accounting’ tersebut, seperti manajer, akuntan, pemerintah,
asosiasi industri dan sebagainya.
Manajer dalam bereaksi terhadap pelaporan keuangan menurut Watt dan Zimmerman [1986]
digolongkan menjadi tiga buah hipotesis, yaitu bonus-plan hyphotesis, debt-covenant hyphotesis dan
political cost hyphotesis.

Bonus plan hyphotesis

Healy [1985] dalam Scott [1997] menyatakan bahwa manajer seringkali berperilaku seiring dengan bonus
yang akan diberikan. Jika bonus yang diberikan tergantung pada laba yang akan dihasilkan, maka
manajer akan melakukan ‘creative accounting’ dengan menaikkan laba atau mengurangi laba yang akan
dilaporkan. Pemilik biasanya menetapkan batas bawah laba yang paling minim agar mendapatkan
bonus. Dari pola bonus ini manajer akan menaikkan labanya hingga ke atas batas minimal tadi. Tetapi
jika pemilik perusahaan membuat batas atas untuk mendapatkan bonus, maka manajer akan berusaha
mengurangkan laba sampai batas atas tadi dan mentransfer laba saat ini ke periode yang akan datang.
Hal ini dia lakukan karena jika laba melewati batas atas tersebut manajer sudah tidak mendapatkan
insentif tambahan atas upayanya memperoleh laba di atas batas yang ditetapkan oleh pemilik
perusahaan. Formula bonus yang digunakan Healy didasarkan pada asumsi bahwa perusahaan terdiri
atas manajer yang menghindari resiko (risk averse) sehingga manajer akan memilih discretionary accrual
untuk (1) menurunkan earning ketika earning sebelum keputusan accrual lebih kecil dari bogey (batas
bawah) atau melebihi cap (batas atas) (2) menaikkan earning ketika earning sebelum keputusan accrual
melebihi bogey tetapi tidak melebihi cap. Implikasi yang dikemukakan oleh Healy adalah bahwa manajer
akan berperilaku oportunistik menghadapi intertemporal choice.

Debt-covenant hyphotesis
Penelitian dalam bidang teori akuntansi positif juga menjelaskan praktek akuntansi mengenai bagaimana
manajer menyikapi perjanjian hutang. Manajer dalam menyikapi adanya pelanggaran atas perjanjian
hutang yang telah jatuh tempo, akan berupaya menghindarinya dengan memilih kebijakan-kebijakan
akuntansi yang menguntungkan dirinya. Fields, Lys dan Vincent [2001] mengemukakan ada dua kejadian
dalam pemilihan kebijakan akuntansi, yaitu pada saat diadakannya perjanjian hutang dan pada saat jatuh
temponya hutang. Kontrak hutang jangka panjang (debt covenant) merupakan perjanjian untuk
melindungi pemberi pinjaman dari tindakan-tindakan manajer terhadap kepentingan kreditur, seperti
pembagian deviden yang berlebihan, atau membiarkan ekuitas berada di bawah tingkat yang telah
ditentukan. Semakin cenderung suatu perusahaan untuk melanggar perjanjian hutang maka manajer
akan cenderung memilih prosedur akuntansi yang dapat mentransfer laba periode mendatang ke periode
berjalan karena hal tersebut dapat mengurangi resiko ‘default’. Sweeney [1994] dalam Scott [1997]
menyatakan perilaku ‘memindahkan’ laba tersebut dilakukan oleh perusahaan bermasalah yang
terancam kebangkrutan dan ini merupakan strategi untuk bertahan hidup.

Political-cost hyphotesis.
Dalam pandangan teori agensi (agency theory), perusahaan besar akan mengungkapkan informasi lebih
banyak daripada perusahaan kecil. Perusahaan besar melakukannya sebagai upaya untuk mengurangi
biaya keagenan tersebut. Perusahaan besar menghadapi biaya politis yang lebih besar karena
merupakan entitas yang banyak disorot oleh publik secara umum. Para karyawan berkepentingan
melihat kenaikan laba sebagai acuan untuk meningkatkan kesejahteraannya melalui kenaikan gaji.
Pemerintah melihat kenaikan laba perusahaan sebagai obyek pajak yang akan ditagihkan. Sehingga
pilihan yang dihadapi oleh organisasi adalah dengan cara bagaimana lewat proses akuntansi agar laba
dapat ditampilkan lebih rendah. Hal ini yang seringkali disebut dengan political cost hyphoyesis [Watts
dan Zimmerman: 1986].

Berbagai macam pola yang dilakukan dalam rangka ‘creative accounting’ menurut Scott [1997] sebagai
berikut:
1. Taking Bath, atau disebut juga ‘big bath’. Pola ini dapat terjadi selama ada tekanan organisasional
pada saat pergantian manajemen baru yaitu dengan mengakui adanya kegagalan atau defisit
dikarenakan manajemen lama dan manajemen baru ingin menghindari kegagalan tersebut. Teknik ini
juga dapat mengakui adanya biaya-biaya pada periode mendatang dan kerugian periode berjalan ketika
keadaan buruk yang tidak menguntungkan yang tidak bisa dihindari pada periode berjalan.
Konsekuensinya, manajemen melakukan ‘pembersihan diri’ dengan membebankan perkiraan-perkiraan
biaya mendatang dan melakukan ‘clear the decks’. Akibatnya laba periode berikutnya akan lebih tinggi
dari seharusnya.
2. Income minimization. Cara ini mirip dengan ‘taking bath’ tetapi kurang ekstrem. Pola ini dilakukan pada
saat profitabilitas perusahaan sangat tinggi dengan maksud agar tidak mendapatkan perhatian oleh
pihak-pihak yang berkepentingan (aspek political-cost). Kebijakan yang diambil dapat berupa write-off
atas barang modal dan aktiva tak berwujud, pembebanan biaya iklan, biaya riset dan pengembangan,
metode successfull-efforts untuk perusahaan minyak bumi dan sebagainya. Penghapusan tersebut
dilakukan bila dengan teknik yang lain masih menunjukkan hasil operasi yang kelihatan masih menarik
minat pihak-pihak yang berkepentingan. Tujuan dari penghapusan ini adalah untuk mencapai suatu
tingkat return on assets yang dikehendaki.
3. Income maximization. Maksimalisasi laba dimaksudkan untuk memperoleh bonus yang lebih besar,
dimana laba yang dilaporkan tetap dibawah batas atas yang ditetapkan.
4. Income smoothing. Perataan laba merupakan cara yang paling populer dan sering dilakukan.
Perusahaan-perusahaan melakukannya untuk mengurangi volatilitas laba bersih. Perusahaan mungkin
juga meratakan laba bersihnya untuk pelaporan eksternal dengan maksud sebagai penyampaian
informasi internal perusahaan kepada pasar dalam meramalkan pertumbuhan laba jangka panjang
perusahaan.
5. Timing revenue and expense recognition. Teknik ini dapat dilakukan dengan membuat kebijakan
tertentu berkenaan dengan saat atau timing suatu transaksi seperti adanya pengakuan yang prematus
atas penjualan.
‘Creative accounting’ dapat dikatakan sebagai sebuah praktek akuntansi yang buruk, karena cenderung
mereduksi reliabilitas informasi keuangan. Karena manajer memiliki asimetri informasi, yang bagi pihak di
luar perusahaan sangat sulit diketahui, maka memaksimalkan keuntungan dengan ‘creative accounting’
akan selalu ada. Masalah sebenarnya adalah tidak diberikannya pengungkapan yang transparan secara
menyeluruh tentang proses pertimbangan-pertimbangan dalam penentuan kebijakan akuntansi
(accounting policy). Akibatnya, laporan keuangan dianggap masih memiliki keterbatasan mendasar
sehingga belum memadai untuk digunbakan dalam proses pengambilan keputusan.
Merujuk agency theory, laporan keuangan dipersiapkan oleh manajemen sebagai pertanggungjawaban
mereka kepada principal. Karena manajemen terlibat secara langsung dalam kegiatan usaha perusahaan
maka manajemen memilikiasimetri informasi dengan melaporkan segala sesuatu yang memaksimumkan
utilitasnya. ‘Creative accounting’ sangat mungkin dilakukan oleh manajemen, karena manajemen dengan
asimetri informasi yang dimilikinya akan leluasa untuk memilih alternatif metode akuntansi. Manajemen
akan memilih metode akuntansi tertentu jika terdapat insentif dan motivasi untuk melakukannya. Cara
yang paling sering digunakan adalah dengan merekayasa laba (earning management), karena laba
seringkali menjadi fokus perhatian para pihak eksternal yang berkepentingan.
‘Creative accounting’ dan etika
‘Creative accounting’ mempunyai banyak konsekuensi. Dalam perspektif ekonomi, ‘creative accounting’
dipengaruhi oleh kerangka ekonomi yang bertujuan untuk self-interset. Hal ini mungkin sah-sah saja
dilakukan sepanjang tidak bertentangan dengan prinsip-prinsip akuntansi berterima umum. Namun
pertanyaan yang harus dijawab adalah apakah ‘creative accounting’ memang sesuatu yang benar untuk
dilakukan? Apakah maksud dan tujuan ‘creative accounting’ sehingga moral judgment-nya tergantung
kepada tujuan ‘creative accounting’ itu sendiri. Persepsi ini harus diluruskan agar tidak menjadikan
bahwa ‘creative accounting’ menjadi hal yang pro dan kontra.
Dalam pandangan orang awam ‘creative accounting’ dianggap tidak etis, bahkan merupakan bentuk dari
manipulasi informasi sehingga menyesatkan perhatiannya. Tetapi dalam pandangan teori akuntansi
positif, sepanjang ‘creative accounting’ tidak bertentangan dengan prinsip-prinsip akuntansi yang
berterima umum, tidak ada masalah yang harus dipersoalkan. Asalkan tidak ada asimetri informasi
antara pelaku ‘creative accounting’ dan pengguna informasi keuangan.
Perilaku yang tidak semestinya (disfunctional behaviour) para manajer terjadi akibat adanya asimetri
informasi dalam penyajian laporan keuangan tidak terlepas dari pertimbangan konsekuensi ekonomi.
Perhatian kita mungkin diarahkan bagaimana mendorong keterbukaan informasi secara lebih luas
sehingga inside information bukanlah sesuatu yang ‘tabu’ untuk diumumkan kepada khalayak. Karena
dalam kerangka keterbukaan yang menyeluruh sebenarnya ‘creative accounting’ atau apapun namanya,
tidak akan berpengaruh kepada semua pihak yang berkepentingan terhadap organisasi. Karena semua
pihak akan mempunyai informasi yang sama dan tidak ada asimetri informasi lagi. Sekali lagi, pentingnya
mendorong keterbukaan dalam rangka good governance akan membawa dampak kepada
ketersediaannya informasi sehingga akan mengeliminasi dan mengurangi dampak ‘creative accounting’.

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