.

Structure and Insight rn

Problem Solving

Long before the Camhridge'and Wood s Hole Con fe rence� nrtieufntcd the need
r":""r t e ne h ing m:tthematic:�l �tructure� in mcani,ittful way� . :uu .. ;·,cr grour of r�Y·
eholorim in Europe w as de ve lop i ng a theo ry that also point ed to th e imponancc
nf under stand in g st ructu re fo r prob l em solving and thin k in g in g c ncr nl . These
were the gc!I!Rh psychologists. Although duri n g the .ONit hnlf of thi� c ent ury a few ·

p!lycholop.im such as Brownell were concerned w ith meaningful conceptual

lcnming; most American psychnlottis l s oi the rime were !ltillla,.ge1y in '"'vcd in
t�ccour.tl.1r; fo r th"' formation of �i mp lc associations. Thorndike acknowledged
the nccc � !iity for more complex nrganitation!i of bond!! to account for proble m
solving and understanding. but his c�periments remained focused upon the ba�ic
connections of which. he thoug ht , all knowledge consisted. lmpo:1cd from
Europe in the 1920s, gestalt p11yc h olog y set forth a fund:t mtn t a l ly d i ff e re nt
a ppro ach tn teaming, citing ex pe rimen t al data that the os�oc i a t lo ni�t thcoric.�
c ould not re ad il y explain. Ge st al t theory lnOuenced .,onions of American p�y­
chology ror years afterward and today Is receiving renewed nttcntion in nMiy�cs
or problem sol ving .
In thl l' �hnpter we pre11cnt 1 brir.r !ntroduetlnn t<l �c..�tolt p� yc hnlng y . We
con !ilder the work nr Mnx Wertheimer, a ge11talt pl')'chnlogi�t who wn� pnnku·
lnrly eunccmcd with mnthematlc� lenmlng 11nd tenchlng nnd whn clnimed tn
demonstrate in drarnatlc fa!lhinn the different re�ullll that could he exrected from
rote learning and learning with meaning. We t hen look nt geMnlt c:tplonntion5 of
rt rn hle m �ulvlng, focudn�t r nrt lc ul n rly on the rhcnomenon nf ln�IRhl nne! lhr
proceues by which it might be achieved. A gestnlt view of l enml ri g ill pre�ented
and related to more recent !itudles on "di!lcovery"lcaming. Finnlly, we explnre

128
 Gestalt Principles and Some Mathematical Examples 129

·.� �
implkiillou., )fa gcstnlluppmm:h for the teaching of mulhctnlllics and prob -

/1\ sulvinll. :1•

Gt:ST,ALT PRINCIPLES AND SOME MATHEMATICAL

t EXAMPLES
I
' 1
it.:stalt theor.y gr·cw ou t of a European tradition of psychology that accepted
hcnomcnologic!11 repo rts (individuals' descriptions of their mental experience
uring soml! tusk) as basic data and sources of hypotheses. Gestalt
sychnlogist:;-�ot:�bly KOhler, Koffka, and Ncrthe imer- w er e distinguished
'

y their insbtd'i.ce that the human mi nd illt('rprm all incoming sensations and
xpcricnn•l' ���·�.·i•rdin!l to c�rtnjn or� nni7.lntt principle�t �
. t h nt , rather than
nc rc ly tnkin11 i n t hc i n formnt ion , som.: sun of understanding is nchievc d They
· .

nu�ht th� il\slliitccs in c v cry d uy life thut would �tuppurt the existence l)f the
·

1 ypo thcmcd g
or an i zin g principles. Central to their style was the arranging of
Jenwnstrations In w hi ch they be licved the o�eration of the theory w a s dramati·
.

:ally and i nd ispu t ably revealed .

The earliest 1 g es c alt work was conccm�d with the organiz.alion of human
rcrcc plual prm:.c5SCli. Accord in� to 1h1: theory. human �rcepti\m co u ld not be
m.:countl'tl f(n merely n10 n l\Umm ation of nil the stimuli that imp in � e upon the
senses. This p rc �cntc d ;, clcur contrast with the extreme red u ctio n is m of Amcri·
cnn psycholugy 'i,r the t i m c � el d that the perceiver brought some·.
thin� uniltUc hi the experi enc e of perceiving, �umcthing thnt made I h e experience
m nrc than just the sum of its constituent stimuli. There was a natural tendency for
the pe rc ci vc.r to' sce structure in his or her perceptions. There was a pressure to
·

seck whole forms or ..gestalts" in the environment, and this was affected by
s pecific rules (} f: perception .
g
Some of th� estalt notions are exemplified n Fig. 6.1
tion of dots labeled (a) (see Luchins & Luchins,.·- 1970};·
)
\
)
· ....-. typical reaction to this
pattern is that it forms a diamond shape. But if one adds two more dots as we
Notice the configura­

.
hnve done in (b ), the pattern forms a trinngte, with the topmost dot functioning as
. s the three bottom dots and adds two above as in (c),
its vertex. No\v, if one erasc
the result is il r�ct an gle , in which our pinpointed dot marks the center. In (d), the
dot is pcrccivcd:ns merely peripheral to another visual pattern, the hexagon: This
simple exum pli: demonstrates how the identity and function of a p erceptua l
cnmpnncnt. in ttli5 cn5c n dot, changes with Its 5urroundina context. One actually
sec � the dot di rrercntly d e pe nding on its relation to olher dots n rou l'd it. Thus,
contc-<t dch:rmincll the wuy things urc ('Crcclvr:cJ.
Furthcrmurc : •we do not think of what we see in Fig. 6. 1 as merely a colleclluu
of dots. Acct�rd ing to g estalt theory. \)Ur pereepJion of the dots is dominated by
our tcntknt:y In ·sec them M �tmuri n �s lh;tl we .recognize M shnpcs--d i nmu nd ,
 130 6. STRUCTURE AND INSIGHT IN PROBLEM SOLVING

t ~,/.j,fl' J!lt,,,·.•·

J( 1t/ J(.( vJ·,

_/ .
1
~ ~
,\ I

./1-·)1v~
,, i
• • .;~/.}

0 0 0 0 • •
• • • • • • • •
• •
• • • •
Ia) (b) (c) (d)

FIG .. 6.1Dominance or perer::--tual or,anlt.alion. A dot Uhc: empty circle:) 15

ui·.dcnctd di""ertntly ,ecordin' In chc soundin1 eoniUL
#

triangle, squnrc. and hexngon. Agnin, the perceiver doc~ not merely rcgi~ter
individual dot~: he or she brings to the experience an orgnni1.ing princirle that
make!l the whole perception add up to more th:1n the !lum or it~ pnrt~.
Ge:o;talt p!lychologist!l cited numerous demou!ltratlon!l or thi~ phenomenon in
everyday experience. Mu!ilc wa!l a good exnmplc, br::nu~c mclnc.fy wn~ cnm·
posed of many Individual notes, but when those Individual note~ were trnnl'po~ed
ton new key, lhcy rctnincclthclr chnrncter n~ n mclncly. It wn~ their intcrrr.lation~,
or the pattern or the note!l, that the li!ltencr perceived and nnt the intlivitlunltonc~.
The !ltrwturc contributed by the !1Uhjccllve ellJ'Ierlcncc nr I~Cti.'Cptlon wn~ furlhl•f
demon:o;trated in the phenomenon of applHtnt motion (Wertheimer, 1923, trnn~­
lated and reprinted in 1938). A movie film wu mAde Uf" nf thou!lnnd!l or !'itill
frames, but when these were pre!lented In ra.~t succession. one perceived the !lum
or th~ Individual frames as a moving picture. As a fin:~l example, notice the
shapes in Fig. 6.2. These are broken or Incomplete shape~. but, rnthcr thnn
seeing them as a collection of connected lines and curves, we perceive them as
whole forms with ga.ps and additional piece!. Perception tends to :o;c'ck "clo~urc"
in such figures. The tens1on created by the vl~ual incongruity is re!lolved into the
perception of a unified whole.
Although concerned Initially with perceptual phenomena ~uch n~ we hnve
demonstrated, the attention of gestult psychC'Ioglsts eventually fO<:u~ed on a more
V general problem, the nature of thinking and problem solving. The gcstnlti!il$
came to believe that thinking and perceptual proceues were governed by the
same ba!lic principles. They sugge!lted that the way paltcm!l in vilmnl nnd nudi·
tory arrays were registered by the perceiver might be very much like the way
thoughts were organized by the thinker. In other words, the ps)•chological field
(the "inner !ipace ·• in which cognition o~eurrcd) might be !iubjcct tn the !'nmc
 Gutalt Principles and Some Mathematical Examples 131

tendency In ~cc tstrucl\trc. lf so. the,., thinking too would be affcctctl hy context.
1111d illc1mgruitic11 umun~ ldc.:n!l would liC.:ck "cquilibriu111" in pun.: stntctmul
fnrll\!1 (llll 11111\)llJ! nr cln!~Urc in perception).

lll.l'iNirl 111111 ',,,.,/tll'ttl St/'111'/111'1', One f111.'\lll 11f )lC~Inll ~111di~·" 111 fll'\lhklll
solving wns the :phenomenon of insight. The role of insi~ht in problem solving
ViliS lttttlldllccd .to tlu.: gc.~lllllbtl\ lurgcly thr11111::h the: effml~ 11f \VIlll'~tll\~ l(llhkr
(I IJ25). who had worked clo!icly with Wcnhcimer on the cnrly experiment~ in
perception. Ki\hlcr had occ:~sion to observe closely the behavior of n captive
colony of chinip.anz.ccs over a number of years. He especially noted their cffom
tu. ~olvc cvcryd;ly prohlcms, such all trying '<, obtain food that was jur.t out of
rcnch. Whcrea~. !earning theorists like Thorndike tried to expl:~in :~nimal problem
sqlving in tcnns of coal-oriented trials and errors, Kohler's observations con-
vinced him that· more global organizing processes were at work. Behavior w:~~
not always directed strictly toward the goal object; solutions sometimes involved
temporarily tuming away from the blocked goal and searching for a detour that
would ulli.l\ntely lead to the same end. For eumplc, finding that a b:~n:~na was
high up on a shetf, .111 ape would tum away from the food and move to tne other
side of the cage to procure a box to stand on, demonstrating a hutllolll-:~~c
·'reasoned •• response to a problematic situ:uion .
. Such in~tances seemed to follow moments of apparent insight into some
important Ulipccl uf, the problem. Recognition or the nature of the problem and of
the solutitln oft~n 'happened suddenly and simultaneously after a long period of

~} ll/J
~'),

FIG. 6.2 Shapes seen u unified ftp.urcs wi1h "c~lru" and "saps."
 .li.

132 6. STRUCTURE A"'O INSIGHT IN PROBLEM SOLVING

seemingly random activity. To cite nnother example, an o~ wns given two sti<.:k.\
tr, play with, one of which could be fit into the other to make a l\inglc longer
stick. A banann lny on the Ooor jul'it out of reach outside the t:nf.!c. A ft~r n period
of play with the sticks, the ape suddenly ,;eemcd to unden:tand how they might he
11~c:d lu 11olvc the rtohlcm, Then, wllh !lc:llhc:rnllctn, lht' npc rittcd lhl· ~tkb
together and Ul'ied the clon)lntcd l'itick to bring the bnnnnn within ~ru~pinf.! rnn~c.
Ul"en sudt b<hnvlur, K6hler rcnsuncc.J, thinking nnd rrohlc111 solving could nut
be the mere sum of constituent stimulus-response as!iociatlons but mu!it involve
perceiving problems as functional wholes. This under!itanding or insight, inter·
preted as recognition of the problem structure, seemed to result from n rcorgnni·
zation of problem clements so that they were ~een Inn new context. The rdntion
of th"! box or sticks to the configuration or elements that constituted the ''banana
problem" su.:fdenly became clear to the ape, and solution be~avior followed
almost immediately.
Extrapolating to human behavior, Koh!l:r viewed problem situations ali crcnt·
ing tensions in a psychological field. much ns the blocked gonl initintcd solution
activity in apes. Where a solution was nc.t immediately apparent. where there
wa!i inhcrcl'lt connict in the problem ~itu:Uion. the dynamic mental fmces would
seek equilibrium In the form of some reorganization. This reorgnnizntion would
re5olve the tension (I.e., reveal the true structure of the problem nnd thu~ the path
to 5olution). According to K6hler, the re!'ioluti<m or this Inner conOict could only
corr.e abou.t when the components of the problem were perceived in the'ir pmpcr
function with regard to the whole. Insight occurred at the point of thill rcorgnni1.n·
linn. The l'itntcture of the prohlcm thul'i rcvcnlcd wnuld dcOnc the functions nnd
interrelationships of problem elem<:nts and conl'iec.tuently determine which skills
cuulcJ be applied tuwurd 5olutlon. Until the ba!ilc l'itructurc nf the pwhlcrn was
npprehcnded durin~ thl5 moment nf inl'ii~tht. the prohlem 5ituntinn Wll!'i not mcnn-
ingfulto the would-be problem !lolver and the problem wus, therefore, 1101 solv-
ahlc.

Wertheimer's Parallelogram Problem

Whnt the gc!itnlt nut inn of Mructun: in humnn cognition might mcun with rcspcl.'t
to education wu perhaps best exemplified in the work of Wertheimer. Although
Wertheimer began by studying perceptual phenomena in the Inborn tory, he bc-
cnme increa~ingly interested h\ humnn thinking. Evcntunlly he m<wcd nut of the
lahorntory and into the clusroom to study thought proccssc5 in children. Wert·
hcimcr wn!i pnrticulnrly interested in demon~trntln~ whnt he c:ntled "prolluctivc
thinking" or thinking based on an appreciation of structure. In a favorite dcmon-
l'itrntion, the parallelogram problem, Wertheimer claimed to revenl the opcrntion
or productive thinking and sugge~ted what such thinking entailed.
Wertheimer ( 1945/1959) tells or going lntn a 5ehoolroum where young chil-
dren were being taught to nnd the IU'Ca of a parallelogram. Their tenchcr hod
 Gestalt Principles and Some Mathematical Examples 133
shown them h11w 111 l'Onl>truct u line (drop n pcrpcndlculnr) from the upper
lclt-hund ~uiiu!r llliCh 111111 It funned u 'JO-degree ungle with the buscL l'hcy were
then to mcnl>urc the new line and multiply it by the length of the bnse to find the
unswcr (sec Pig. 6.3. top). Using this standard algorithm, the children were
SIICl'CMllrully l'lltiiJUitlng the ltrCIIll ur IIUII\Y f'rnctlcc rlgurc:l' when Wenhclmcr
~;t~ppcd tu thl' front nf the room and posed 11 disturbing problem. He sh\>wed them
the 11urullclo~rum tlcplc:tellnl lhc buthllll ur Fig. 6.3 (un "upcndl!d" vcrslon or
the nne nt l.hl· 'top of the fi[lurc), and 11.~kcci them In find illi nrcn.
The childrcti.'s rcnclions were mixed. Some declared "no fair," saying they
hud not bcdn t'aught how to do that kind of problem; others said their altitude-
! imcs-busc ntgi,rithm liimply would nol WNk on that kind of figure; still others
liimply gave up and refused to consider the problem at all. The difliculty was that
when lhc diildrcn dropped a perpendicular from the top left-hand comer, as they

,I

St~tul~r.d ,Jigurithm

:t.
~.LJ..lT!__.....
7
I
b"e

•' ·,
·r.,

Wtrthtimttf'.l,
. ~J~r•lltlogfl~ probl1m

FIG; 6.3 · Findin& the area or a rarattcloaram usin& the standard alcorithm.
Children were conru~ed when •rrlyinJ il to' Wcnhcimcr's rroblcm n,urt.
(Adartcd rrom Wenhcimcr. 194~/1959.1
134 6. STRUCTURE AND INSIGHT IN J'ROBLEM SOLVING

hnd been taught, the line ended up somewhere to the left or the bn!le, !i() thnl the
standard fommln did not seem to apply (!tee Fig. 6.;\., bottom).
Let us analyze the parallelogram problem (rom the point of view nf mnthemat i-
cal structure. What do the children actually do when they drop n perpendicular.
m~asurc.: it, 1111tl rnultlrly by th~ h:tsc'! ·n,~y nrply n gcncrnlulgorilhlll for culc.:ululiul!
the nren nf n four·sidcd fi~ture; thnt is, multlrlyln~t bnsc times nhitudc i~ n shm1n11
method for dividing the figure into n number of uniform ~quurcs nnc.J ~ounting them
to determine the number or "square" incheli. Understanding the nature of thi~
algorithm. one should have no trouble figuring out how to apply it to squnrcs or
other rectangles. But the algorithm's rclation~hip to the parallelogram i$ not ~o
obvious, at least not from the standpoint of Its perceptunl Impact. The human
tendency hi perceive thing!! 11!1 nrgnnit.c:d Wh<,le!!-thc J'RrniJclo~r'llin 11!'1 II 1111ifk•tl
figure-may In this cMe ob~cure the true structure of the ('lnlhlc:tn. Look ngnin at
the drawings In Fig. 6.2. Each drnwlng tends to be ~c~n us u rcct:tngle with a
"gnp" nnd an "extra" piece that could fill the gnp. Now. ~UJ'IJ'IO!'Ie one were. to
view the parallelogram in te~s of the gap-extra relationship. It could he pcr-
ceivea as another shape, a rectangle. with a piece sticking outthnt fit~ perfectly
into a gap on the other end. Next notice that if a parallelogram is transformed by
dividing it along :a perpendicular and refittint the piece~ ~uch thnt they form a
rectangle. the altitude-time!O-base formula applies quite directly. Thil' explnin~
why one ~rops a perpendicular in executing the area algorithm.·
The point Wertheimer wished to make with his demon~tratinn was this: Chil-
dren who learned the nl~oritttm for finding nten wlthnut \tndcrr.tandin[!. thl' !'trm··
tural principles upon which It wa~ halted were limited to following blindly the
rule~~~ forth by their teacher. They had nbvlou~ly been taught the nltwrlthm l'n 11
role fashion: they had not learned with meaning. This wns of grcnt cor.ccm to
W-:rthcimcr, hccau!le he felt thttt the Rdmols nf his time were inl'tilling the hahi1
of '"!'Plying algorithm~ in a ~nsele~4i fa~hlon and thus ~tumplng 'mu c.:hildren 's
nuturnl humnn tendency to see thlng5 'all structured whulc!l. Ullntl all(urilhlllk
~olution~ he called "ugly" and "fooli~h." Solutions derived frnm n true under·
standing of the problem structure, on the other hand, he variously called · 'ele-
gant, beautiful, true, and clean" and saw as examples of productive thinking.
In Wertheimer's "problem" parallelogram, the difficulty ~n!i thnt "rulc-
t'<lund" children made their lines perpendicular to the buttont of th( page rnthcr
tt.<tn to the ba10e of the figure. They would not have mndc such n mi~tnkc. ~nid
Werthdmer, If they had understood the (ur.ctlona1 equivalence between the pnrnl-
lc:logrnm nnd the rectangle. The equivalence wu the true underlying ~tructurc or
the problem. Concelvln~ the problem In that light wa~ n wny of orgnni1.in~
"sen!ilbly" with respect to both the goal nf the to!lk (finding nrcn) nnd the ha~ic:
perceptual and mathematical festure~ or the parallelogram. It took into ,.. count
both the conteltt oi the prohlem u11d the relntlon of the parts to the whole. One
could, ol cou~e. argue thnt the children had learned n wrong nlgorithm or hncl nt
ka~t heen taught nn incorrect definition (or the altitude of n figure. Hnd the

...
 ..
*jt
~

:5

.,

: ..... --·-Gestalt Principles and. Some ·M·a·thematlcal Examples 135

children been given correct rules tv follow, their strict adherence to an algorithm
~light have yicided performances indistir.guishable from those of children who
. I

4n~erstnod·th(underlying mathematic:ll structure.

Further. in the foregoing example it Is not clear that the gestalt tendency to
perceive things as mgnnited wholes necessarily facilitated problem solving. In
fuct, we saw that the perceptual wholeness of the parallelogram might interfere
\Vith notidn~ i~e gap-extra relationship that transformed the figure into a rec-
tnngle io whic" the standard fonnula for area applied. In this and other gestalt
demon~tration~~ the perceptual structures and the true structures of the problems
C!ften seem to ~ie for the mind's attention. ':'his presents a persistent difficulty in
interpreting gc~talt theory with respect to problem solving. Nevertheless, Wert-
heimer finds. 'i\inplc cvi~cnce f<lr the dislin(tlon between proouctive and non-
productive .~hinkin(!.. and he cites these differences as the differential results to be
cxrcck!d fn,111\
., 'h1te ns oppt)llctl tu flleuningful learning.
'

.
·•
.
The Carpenter's Apprentice and the Sum of a Series
~ I :

~n illustrntion: p( the two supposed approaches to a problem-one based on an

or
undcrlltandihl!, structure, the other n blindly algorithmic solution-is found in
Wertheimer '!i demonstration ur the derivation of Gauss's formula for the sum of
a, series. Ac~or'~ing to mathematical lore (Uc\1, 1977). young Gauss, a boy of I 0.
discovered 'the·: principle behind his famous formula one day when a sadistic
teacher set his Class the problem of finding the sum of a series of large numbers
nrd sat do,i.•n to read the newspaper while they worked. Within minutes, the story
ghcs. ymmg Ghuss had the answer-and 1 very astonished teacher! Gauss hadn't
~anted to was~~ a lot of time adding each successive number, he said, so he had
found a shortcut.
On first thought the task of summing a series of numbers, say from I to 100,
indeed appcars:to require a. long process of computation: I + 2 + 3 + ... + I00.
But, as Onuss. found out·, there is a simpler and more elegant way to find
the sum. Altli9Utth the exact thinking behind his discovery is not known.
Wertheimer· uses a variant story as a point of depanurc for his own inductive
· expositiun of 'he properties of the series. We follow the steps of Wertheimer's
reasoning in (l~dcr to give a flavor of the structure·based insights he thought
OaUlili mi~ht .have had in examining this task (Wertheimer, 194511959, pp.
108-116): .,

A llt:tir~·nsc i~ hcin(: huih nlun~ the \\'llllln the hnll uf 11 new hou~c. It hn~ 19 ~tc:p~.
The 11itle IIWII)' frum the wallis to be f11ccd whh ~uarc panel' uf the site of the ends
11f lht• lll~·p:~. The ~·nrpcnlcr tdb hi~ npprcntke ttl fetch tl•~n1 rwn1 the xhup. Th\·
1l('prentkc n~ks. "Hnw m:tny pnndll ~hall I brins? .. "fin() uut for Y\lUrsclf ...
rcjnln!lth~: l'llrpcntcr. The nrprcntkc Mnn~ l'O\intin~: I + 2 • ~; + ~ • 6; + 4 •
10; + ~ =....
 I

136 6. STRUCTURE AND INSIGHT IN PROBLEM SOLVING

The carpenter laur.n~. •'\Vhy don't you think? Must you count them out. one hy
nne?''
Oenr reader. if Yt'U were the apprentice. wh:ll would ynu tlu'!
If Y<lU tln not ~uccced In finding a hcllcr way, I will a.~k: "\Vhnt If the ~lain:n~c
were n()l along the wnll and required the ~quare wooden panel~ un hoth ~ic.Jc~?
Would it help if I sug~c~lctl thinkinJ ur the pnllcrn5 or the IWII side~ CUI IIlii of
raJ'ICr?"JWcnhclmcr, J<)4~/I'J~'J, p. IORJ. ·

Wertheimer is suggesting thut the reader visuali7.e the shupe of the st;lirL·a~l:
panels as half of~ larger figure. Fitting the _side of the staircase together with
another piece exactly the same shape nnd llilc yicldll a rc:clanglc. Thits conccivctl.
the problem can be represented u in Fig. 6.4. Viewing the lltnircnse M h:M of a
rectangle and filling in the gap temporarily with an imagined complcm.cntnry
~tulrC:a!IC shape, WC have: lransfurrnc:cl the ptuhJCh1J Jnslcfttf Uf Junking like II

n + 1 • 20

n • 19

FIG. 6.4 Vlsuali7.in~ the ~tllii'(GM' rrnt-lcm n~ tW\1 hni\'C~ nr n ~in)!l~ ligmc'
(Adaptrd rrnm WrnhC'in1cr. IIJ.t~/III~Q.I
 Gestalt Principles and Scme Mathematical Examples 137

lctlious cumputation of successive ndtlilior.s, the problem now appears to yield to

a simple t wo-st~p multiplication and dlvision prc.cess-Cinding the number of the
squares in the ;whoh: rc.:tangle and then dividing by 2 to find the number of
outsidl~ pnnl!ls .in the staircase.
How due !I this intuition relate to the problem of summing the numbers from I to
100'! lnsteuu or computing I + 2 + 3. etc., as the carpenter's apprentice might
hnve done, Wertheimer suggests we bring the. problem into the visual domain to
try to understa.nd its structural properties.

I 2 ) 4 91 98 99 100

L~ J :LJ J
I
Note thut th~ numhcr!l cnn he puircd iu!luch 11 \I!UY thut e111:h pnir !lUIIIllttt the llnmc
numhcr. Nnl4• .nlsu the number of pnirs th;s procedure wuuld yield nnd the
relation lll' the.numbcr of pairs to the total number of elements In the series. Fifty
pairs, c11ch summing to 101. gives us the answer, SOSO.
Another diagrammatic approach \1. cnhcimer points out also invol vcs pairing
hut is strul·turnlly different from the approach above. It is directly analogous to
the strntq~y s\•gltcstcd for snlvinlt the !ltnircnsc prnhlcm. We imn~inc n com·
plcmcntnry series uf idcnticaf numhcrs in l'rder to ~implify the computation.
I f 3 4 97 98 99 100
100 99: 98 97
. j.
4 3 2 I
Now we have ,~vo complete series of I to 100. They are arranged in pairs, each of
~hich sum~ lt.l 101. Orte·hundred pairs or 101 equal 10,100: then since we began
by doubling th~! series, we divide the product in half to find the desired sum,
5050. . . . .
Of course ~;c need not write out all the pairs in the manner shown above. The
point of these' demonstrations is simply to capture the problem structure intui-
tively. Once ~'{c \lrlderstand the principle or pairing. and the invariability of the
pair sums,· we:c:an even invent shortcut formulas to describe the operations we
have perfor,mcd on the series. The results arc two versions or Gauss's formula for
the !'Urn or :u\' even-numbered series, either 1<"
+ I) as ln the first example or
11 ~ tt!i ~n tl'c sec:nud. According to Wertt.clmer. the two versions'"' the
fornlltht arc ~mdthcmatically equivalent but structurally and psychologically dif~
fcrcnt. As it 'tu.~~ out, the formula applies equally well to odd-numbered series.
such as th~ l\crl~s 1-1 Y In the stalrcuse problem. When we pairthe numbers 1-19
as in the fir.:;t .c~nmplc we huvc one numhcr left over. Thb numhcr, 10, we mny
simply view a{ "half a pair." snys Wertheimer(~)
Whut Wl·rt'lidmcr hoped to uchicvi.• by this ucnwn~tration was the intuitilln
he hind GnUsli ·~ (tcncrnl fnrmuln. The :~tructu.rnl properties of the :~cries were
apparent wl,en'it wns visually reprc~cntcd. nnd this :~hould have led quite n.:ndily
to rcco~nltio11 M !'horll'uts to solutinn. We do not know tlont this is how Gnuss
 ~

138 6. STRUCTURE AND INSIGHT IN PROBLEM SOLVING

saw the series problem. only that the lntuitle: behind h:s fc~nula was nwn:
eu~ily gru~rctlwhen the prohlcm wn~ rccu!Ct in vl~twl nr dinJ!rnmnwtk tc1111s.
Wertheimer·~ demnn~trntion~ hnve ~rent intuitive "~"~"cnl. Vel nne quc~tion~
whether all or even most mathcmatknl problems cnn he set up ln visuall1.1ihk
furrta. Mnthemntlcnl llttlll'lllrt' l11 nut nlwn)'!l, r':trnllt'lrtl hy !IJl:tlhti !lttm·tmc. It
mny be no accident, thererore, that mnny t'f Wertheimer's pcd:tr.nsknl exnmpks
arc drawn from geometry. whkh deuls with !<patlnl rather than algchr:1k l'Oil·
cepts.
One might also ask. why shouldn't the carpenter's :1pprcntice have merely
counted ( l + 2 + 3 + ... +. 19) the number of p:tncls he w(lUid need to cover
the side of the staircase? ~nd why not do the same with the ~cries of I to 100?
The answers would have been ju:c;t as valid as those arrived at by more structural
eonctptu:tli7..ations. But such solutions would hnvc been "ugly" nccording to
Wertheimer's scheme of things. We can sec that they .vould not hnve been b:t~cd
on an understanding of the structure (i.e., the mnthcmntical structure) nf the
problems. They are also clumsy and inelcgnnt by any mnthematician 's definition.
The solutions that are presumed to revc:al productive thinking nrc elegant hcl·ausc
they organir.e the components of pmhlcm~ nlnng !ilnll·tural lines nnd deal with
them in a parsimonious way. In the~e cnsc~ nn undcrstnntlinp. of mnthcmatic:ll
relationshi"s leads to simplification of the prohlcms. It nlso saves hoth time and
computational steps. This. after all, was Gauss's intention in the first place nnd
remains a prime motive for many mathematical disco•1crie~. An added benefit or
the reduction in steps, of course, i~ the lessened chnncc for cornputat ion aI errors.
Note, hnwcver, thnt once the fonnuln ft!r the surn uf nscrk·s is tk•rivcd, itl·an
be applied In an lliJOrithmlc fashion ju~t ru a simple ndditlon nlltnrithm might
.have been applied by the atpprcntlcc. ihc ac.!dltiun procedure l!sclr ha!'i un umkr·
lying mathemAtical ~tructure-the additive pmpcrty of the renl-numhcr system.
Perhaps we should nut conclude from Wertheimer·~ exnmpks that nlgorithrm
themselves Are at fault In htelegant thinking: rather, the impnrtnnt point is that
algorithms should be teamed in t~c context of the structures underlying them.
According to this interpretation, teaching should attempt first to build nn intui.tivc
understanding of the 'mathematical substrate for any computational procedure and
only then intmduce the algorithm as a "shortcut" for the more elabornte thinking
upon which the a.lgorithm Is based. The suggestion i~ thnt when the rcnsons
behind algorithms Ate clearly understood, then the thinker or prohlcm snlver is in
a better position to t:hoo!:e the partic-ular al~_:orithm thnt b mo!\t nprroprintc to th~
problem at hand.

THE PROCESS OF PRODUCTIVE THINKING

The ge~talt notion that the ~trurturc nf the whole defines the funl·tions nnd
inten-elations of ils parts seem~ p::.rticularly relevant 10 the development of rro~,.
lr.m solving and gencrali7.cd thinking ~kills. We have ~ccn cxnmplcs of ~o-callcd
 ~

The Process of Productive Thinking 139

prbductivc thinki.ng in Wertheimer's demonstrations In connection with the pnrnl-

lclogrum und ~o·;arpcnh:r'll upprenticc problems. But we arc left wondering how
11u~h thlnkin~t pri,ceell5, b there n 11tep-hy·11tcp procc1111 we t'Rn follow In the mind
ol' the prohl'-'111~ ·solver'/ If problem structure .is as Important as Wertheimer
!eliVoH<'lltll jt i~, \"illl wr tlc,,c:rlhc the l'lli~'CIIIA hy which tho prublem suh,or liP·
prchcnds structur.e. by which he or she achieves insights? And since our concern
ill willa illllll"lll'tii\11 1 Cllll 1111 UIHJC:rlltUJiding or the proceSS or productiVe thinking
help us make ~o·hildren better problem solvers?
:With rcsp~.:l.'l.lo thesr. points, the gestalt writings arc not very speciOc. Con-
sider Wcrthcinll~r's ( 1945/1959) comments on a well-conceived solution to the
parnllclogram problem:
. .
.(There wasj re~rouping with rey.ard to the whole, reorganization, Otting; (acton of
interrelatcdncss;and or inner requirements (wercj discovered, realized •nd followed
·up. The steps \vere taken, the opcratiuns were clearly done in view of the whole:
·figure a~1d ,)(the whole situation. They arose by virtue of their pan-function, not by
blind recall or ~iind trial; their content, their direction, their application grew out of
the requirement~ of the problem. Such a process Is not just a sum of several steps,
not un nurcgat.~ of several upperations, but the growth of one line of thinking out
uf the gal"~ in the situation, out of the structural troubles and the desire to remedy
them, tu :~triti!,!h(cn out what was bad, to get 111 the good Inner relatedness. lt is not a
process thni mtives from pieces to an anrcgatc, from below to above. but from
nbovc tu bci(IW~ from the n11turc of the Jtructurol trouble to the concrete steps (pp.
49-SOJ.
... , ., . :1

Sortlntt (\lit jqst how classroom pupils may l-e encouraged 111ld helped to
cn~n~;c In 11uuh thinking .b ~ut un ciiiiY mntter. The Idea or problem structure,
nlthou[th It inspires eloquence In Wertheimer's writlnJ, is not alwny11 11lmple to
dcOnc In pructlc~~l terms. It Is easier to \lemonstratc the operation or structural
nntiunA In the c(~'l)tcxt of ApceiOc prnblcmA thnn it Is to state in the nbstract exactly
what these structures are. And it Is harder still to give a complete theor"tical
pr~~cntation concemil'lg structure as a general phenomenon in mathematical
problem solving;•. To a great extent, the gestalt psychologists have left their
explanations at the level of concrete example. We can see that they arc getting at
something important, but we are not shown how to generalize the findings Into
principles for instruction that can.be applied to verieties of specific mathematical
content and pro~\cms.
Wertheimer's quotation, effusive and vague, is nevertheless interesting be-
cause it sets up a dichotomy that has been taken up again in recent studies of
problem solving.,The dichotomy is between processing that moves "from below
to above, from pieces to an aggregate," anc! proce.~sing that moves "from nbovc
to below, from ihe nature of the structural trouble to the concrete steps." In
mathematical pro.blcm solvlnt. going from pieces to an aggregate Implies letting
various problem features suggest specific known proceclures and strategic~~ going
from the ll!;!;reg'n.tc to the specifics implies examining variou5 chnroctcritntions
''' .
140 6. STRUCTURE AND INSIGHT IN PROBLI:M ~OLVING

of the problem through ~uch ~trategic~ as lWnl unaly~is und problem rcformula·
tion.
In current cognitive r~ychnlogy, nr. irnportnnt dllltlnl·tinn ill drnwn hctwccn
processing thnt i!l ''bottom-up" and "top-down." ClnriOcntlon nf thlll di~tin~tion
IICCfl1,. In urtll'f hrc:niiiiC the twn IYf'<'~ ur rrm.·t'~~ina lllliU~I"~Icllrrrt~nl ''l'fltlllh;hr~
to instruction. If processing proceed5 from the bottom up, thut i!i, from !ipc:clfic
chnracteristlc!i ur the mutcrlub. then cmphn!lls.in tc:tchlng !ihould he placed nn
basic number facts and simple calculntiotis before moving "up~· to nbstrnct
mathematical concepts. tn contrast, top-down rrocessin~t suggcm an appronch to
mathematics instruction thnt initially emphasizes the logic nnd !itructure of mnth·
ematics and only later insists on the details of computational algorithms nnd other
such components of specific problems. tn practice, it is often difficult to sortout
bottom-up from top-down processes; in matllematlcal performnh.ccs the pro·
cesses appear to interact c:onstantly. Nevertheless. the di!itinction is interesting
pedagogically because it sugge.~ts alternative instructionnl foci.

Duncker on Problem Solving

Among gestalt psychologists, Karl D11ncker ( 1945) mo!it explicitly pur!;ucd the
di!ilinctions between bnttom-up nnd tnp-dnwn prncc:ssin~ nn<.lattcmptcd to illu~­
trate them in the context of specific problems. In so doing. he ~ccmcd to advocate
precisely the kind of process analysc5 of rroblem-solving hchavior that many
cognitive psychtlloglsts are devch,ping today.
Wherea5 Wertheimer wa~ concc:mc<.l with the mnthemutknl slrUL'Iurc~ umkr·
lying spc:ciOc problem~. Duncker, ·li student uf Wertheimer's, cunccntrutcd on
general strnlc:gies of pmhlc:m ~olving. He: ~ou~~t In uplnln prnhlcm snlvinl! in
terms of the sequence of events thnt ncc:urred between recugni1.ing a pruhlcm nnd
nndlng ~~~ sulutlun. Ill~ uhject itf !ltudy WU!lthc hchi'VIur ttl' 11111111 liUhjccl~ (II\ II
variety of mathc:matlcnl nnd prnctic:nl problem!i (~uch n~ pnwing thc:~c: i~ nn
infinite number of prime numbers, finding a way to Irradiate u tumor without
destroying healthy tissue, and building 3 door that opens from both side~). In
problems such as these, where complex reasoning was required nnd n lengthy
search was neces~ary to Ond a workable solution, problems appc:nred to undergo
a series of reformulations in order to bring to mind solution~ thnt hnd n functionnl
rclntionship tn the prohlcm ~tn1c:tur~. Ounckcr ( 1945) hyputhclli7.ed th:ll the
process was all follow~·

The Onnl f1\rm uf nn individu:~l solution ill, in tcneral, nt't ren~hcd ~)' :1 llinl!k ~tep
fron\ the C\rigin31 $etlin~ elf tht' probJ.:m: on the Cnntrnry, the principle, the
functional value of the ~olutiM. typkally arises firllt, nnd the finnl fnrm nf •.he
M'JUtlon ltl que~tion deveJnr~ nnJy U thl~ f'tinclrJe become~ ~IIC'C:C~~ivdy mnre nnd
more concrete. In other words. the f!cneral or "e~~entlal" prorx•r1ic~ of a ~olution
(tenetlcally rrecede the ~pccific rrnpcr1ic~: the l:~ucr nn: dr.vclorcd tlllt of the
fnrmer IPP· 7-RI.
 t
..<

Th~ Proc:c:;a of Produc.lve 7hlnklng 141

He noted that a problem could be solved "from above" by refonnulating the

problem 11u thut u particular .clan of solutions would be sought. This type of
~oluliun dt'l"l\'r\tll'd un whnt Ounckcr cnlled an "nnnlyld5 of the CMnicl, .. lhnt i~.
ligu;in!! uut.whnt wu!l wrong, what needed to be changed. "Analvsls of f"nls,"
~,!,Ill he• ·r"'"i ,ur 11uh~lluu rrum ubuv~. lnvulvt~ rocudull un whllt the pt'Oblcm
rcully dcmondi:d. so as to overcome the nonnal tendency to become fixed on
punkulur 1111~:~ uf solution uuempt:~. Solutions could ulso come "from below"
through notking features of the task and allowing those features to suggest
possible sulutiuns. This type of solution depended upon an "analysis of mate-
rials," that is. noting what was present and what could be used.
Dunckc·r 's .hypotheses arc llliwratcd in "talking aloud 1 ' protocols of adults
trying In find ·~n answer to the question, "Why are all six-place numbers of the
form 267,267.: 591.591; 112~112 divisible by 137" The protocol of one indi-
viduaf was as follows: ·
'!.

I. Arc th~ triplet$ t~~emselves ~rhups divisible by 13?

2. b_thcr~ pcrh:~ps some soti of rule here about the sumo( the digits, as there is
with djvisibility by 97
J. The t~ing must roll'ow rrom a hidden common principle: of structure-the
fir:r;i lrtplet is 10 times the 5econd, 591,59lls 591 multiplied by 11, no: by
li>l·. (·c: So7) No: by 1001. Is 1001 divisible by 137 (Total duration 14
minute~) .
. [Duncker, 1945, p. 31J.
.,
According tu. Dunckcr I the third solution strategy, looking for a hidden common
principle, ~ru~11 nut of nn unuly11111 or the ttoal. Whnt the subject has to discover is
all
the {tl'ncrn_l.pri.hciple that numbers of the rorin.abcabc have the number 1001
os n f111.:tur •. ltKH bcl.ng· divisible by 13. The rcfonnulation of the problem by this
Auhjcc:t t'rt'ilt<-~ n Jtnnl uf findlna n hidden cnmmon principle, 11cttlng up "con·
nlct" that scr~ell lo direct ind motivate activity to find that common principle.
Thllt CUll he cliuructcriY.t:tl llll an lllh!IUJll At Aolullun rrom ubovc. Dut we see lhlll
the clue thot leads to solution is actually a suggestion from below: The factor
I00 I is disco·~~red by noticing something about the nature of the six-digit num-
bers, namely, 'the consistent relationship of the first triplet to the second. The
divisibility of ..iOOI by 13 is the only remaining discovery needed for problem
solution, and this is quickly verifJed.
Jn an experiment devised to test the efficacy of suggestions from "above I' and
"below,". Duncker gave different groups of subjects different hints while they
worked on th~ "13" problem. The hint~ that markedly improved the likelihood
or solution (producing n SO% sollllion r:1te) were: "The numbers nre divisible by
1001" and "1001 is divisible by 13." Both arc suggestions from below in the
sense that they set the subject on the track of the number 100 I what it is divisible
1

by, and what is divisible by it. A suggestion· to analyze the goal ("Look for a
more fundamental character from which the divisibility by 13 becomes evident'')
did not help and neither did general statements about ~he properties of division
142 6. STRUCTURE AND INSIGHT IN PROBLEM SOLVING

(c .g., "If a common divisor of numbers is divisible by 13. then they arc nil
divisible by 13"). Although bringing attention to the number 1001 was what
worked In thi~ problem, Dunl·kcr found thnt the number need nnt hnvc hccn
mentioned explicitly. hnd the experi111en1 hcen "el up In such o wny as to fndlitalc
it\ tlilll.'ovcry. When the prnhlc111 wa~ prc~crtlcll tilling Mllt't·cs~ivc ntllllhcr.~ ns
cxnmplcs-"\Vhy 11re six-di~dt numbers of the form 276.276; 277 .277; 27R.27R
ulways divisible! by 13'!"-rno~t subject~ suhtrnctcll suc~.·csslvc numbers from
each other (11gain, an attempt to find the hidden underlyin(!. principle). thu~
arriving at the number 1001.
Although Duncker expressed a preference for solutions from above bnscd on
analysis of goals ar:d analysis of connlct-hc called such solutionr. ''orb.~.-::···· n~
<~pposed to "mcchnnlc:ul"-thc del nih uf hb ~tudics fall to Clltuhlish the ~:upcrior·
ity of one strategy over the other. Jt seems more tueful to acknowledge the
effects of both goal analysis and analysis of materials and to appreciute their
complex interactions. ln·JJ·.apter 8, we examine these same processes from the
perspective of modem cognitive psychology. We de~cribe experiments spcc:ifi·
cally designed to tease out the differential effects or task materials and general
solution strategies. and we relate these effects to modch or human information
processing.

A Gestalt View of Learning

The principles set forth by Wertheimer and Duncker. among other ge~tnlti~t~.
~hcd light on some complex tt!lpects uf human thinkinJt~lhc orgnnii".ntion of
perception and problem solving. But although both were interc.~ted in fmtering
elegant thinking. and ulthuugh their demom;trntlun!C nppcored rdevant to tt•itch·
ing. their work did not extend very far into the renlm nf instruction. Kntnnn
( 1940/1967) cn~l the gcstah concern wit~ structure nnd menning Into n more
traditional experimental fonn by S)'lltemnticafly comparing gestult prindplc!l nnd
traditional learning theory a~ they explain how people learn to r~rf'orm tn.<k.~.
Like Wertheimer, Kntona l:~beled v:~rious types oflenrning either "senseless" or
"meaningful." By 'cnllelcss lean-.ing, he mennt role memori1.ntion. Mcantngful
lrarnirje, N leamir g by •Jnderst:!nding, was b:~sed upon organi1.ing a set of
structur:~lly related Idea~ or components.
To test the differential effects o( the~e two types of lcnmlng, Kntona dc!iigncd
a series of studies to be conducted in several st3$C!i, The {!.enerul idea wn~• to look
fortaskll that could be taught by two or more methods bn~cd on different thcorcti·
en! urientntion!;. Ench method brought about lcnmlng In the short run us men·
sured by pretests and postt~sts. First, experimental suhjccts were prete~t~<.l to be
sure they were not already competent at the task 10 be t~tughL Different groups of
experimental subjects were then given ehher instnlction based on rotc mcmorl7.n·
tion or instruction that stressed the prin:iples underlying the task!'. In the instruc·
tionnl conditions thnt str~ssed meaning. some group~ hnd tu detect the principle~
thcm~elvcs nnd some groups were given explicit dc~criptions of the prinl'iplcs.
--------------- ---- a

' '

Tho Procou of Productlvo Thinking 143

At the end of lhe period of instruction, all subjects could usually do the task,
because the various teaching procedures were carefully chosen and applied to
ensure learning, The crucial comparison of teaming types came at a subsequent
stage. At this· comparison stage, Katona tested sutjects to see how well they
could to the task a month Inter (retention), He also examined how learning one
tMk contrihuted'to executing other ta~k~ that shared some characteristics with the
one taught (transfer).
In one experiment, for example, Katona (1940/1967) asked people to learn a
lengthy scric:; of numbers, such as I 4 9 1 6 2 5 3 6 4 9 6 4. Three different
groups were gi~en three different sets of instructions a.s follo~s:
Oruup I, 'Recite these numbers 5lowly three times, for example, "one hundred
'·furty·nine or une hundred sixty-two. , , .• "
<lrnup ~. lh:t~llthl11 llluwly ll" yuu may lr.nuw II cumrlctcly and rrc:clacly: "The
; ~m~~ national produ~t of the \Jnitc:d States last year wa~
.\ 14,1J 16,l.Sl,MIJ.64."
Omup :\. Try to team the following series (i.e., no special instructions were
given ihis group, just tht. printed list or numbcn).

Group 3 subjects pondered the series briefly and then appeared to notice, or
"di~cov~.:r." a ~ertnin pattern in the numners: I 4? 16 25 36 49 64. The other two
groups followed the specific instructions biven.
Directly following the c~mpletion of this given task, all groups could recite
the list of digits virtually without err\lr. But during the comparison stage, dif-
ferences emerged among the groups. Asked a week later whether they still
remembered the series, Group I suid the question was "unfair"~ Group 2 re·
membered n partial answer, such as "the GNP was about Sl4 billion"; but
Group 3 was ·_qble to rem~mber the list perfectly and could in fact extend the
series cven'further (e.g., 81 100 121. ••• ), Thus. Katona reasoned, there was a
qualitative ~li .well as ·:tuantltative difference between the kinds of learning en·
gaged in by the three groups.
Notice t.hat ~orne type of grouping was induced by each of the three forms of
instruction. Tht kind used by Oroup I was clearly irrelevant and even interfered
with noticing t~e pattern or the series. Oroup l's partial answer wu a sensible
response to the: memory question, given the context established by the original
instructlun11. tn:ract, thl:; may be int.:rprctcd as a structure-based response; olbeit
a response .to structure of a different kind than that or a number series. Oroup 3,
the "mcnningf~l" lenming group, WM the mo:>t ~uccessful in the memory tt!.llk.
Having dis.Go.y~red the principle underlying the series, or In some cases having
been tuld thc principle, they grouped the numbers along structural lines, consis·
tent with the u~derlylng mathematical organization of the series. This group also
dem,·mstratcd t'tansfer in their ability to extend the series.
Katona's experiments were an attempt to -prove that learning did not constst
merely of memorizing a set or associations or a procedure. Learning could also
mcnn r<;orgnni~:ing infonnotion so nli to fonn a structure that had the power to
 I

144 6. STRUCTURE AND INSIGHT IN PROBLEM SOLVING

explain other similarly structured problems. In Katona's view. this accounted for
the trnnl'fcr of knowleege to new siruations. Finding the "problem l'trueturc ··-the
principle underlying the problem-not only made It easier to do 5imilar problem~
but al!io enable~ one to rrcmt.rtrttct the 5olution long nfler the initinl expmure tn
the problem tusk. Thi~ wn~ becnu~e the rcorgnni1.ution thut lll.'l'lllllpanlctl mean-
ingful learning rrovidcd la5ting principle~ to guide rceon5tructinn. In mcmori 7-
ing lists of digits, for exomplc, J)Cr~ons who le:•mctlthe princ.:lplcs for gcncr:1tin!!
the sedes were able to reconstruct and extend them indennitcly. The innuence of
gestalt thinking is clear in Katona's cxpl3nation!i for such_phenomcna: Fncts that
nrc organized into a structured whole are retained as part of thnt whole. ench
being remembered because or its plnce within thnt structure.
Unllcd Cln n ~eric~ ur lllmllor experiment~ using c:nrd tricks lind mah:h·st id
pwhlcms,.KIItonn (1940/1967) rcoc:hcd scvcrnl cnndu~lnn~ rel!nrclinJt the nature
of meaningful learning:

h) Lcarninr by memorizing is • different l"roccss from learning hy untlcr~tnntJing:

(b) learning by understanding involves substantially the ~:~me pwces~ :1~ due~
prohlcm solving-the discovery o( 1 principle: (c) both prol>lcm stllving anti mcnn-
in3fullcarning consist l"rimarily in chang'nt:. or or!!anizing. the matcrinl. Thl· role
of organization is to establish. discover. or understand an Intrinsic rclatinn~hip I pp.
5J.S4J,

Note that Katona. in his time. w:ts reacting again~! n very doctr'nnirc S- :-'-theory .
.u wcr· Wcr1heirTcr nnd the oth:-r g~r.talt p~ychologi~t~. hcnc~: hi!i condcmnatiiH1
of lenrning by memorizing, which he apparently equnted with r(ltc teaming. Thi~
argument has softened with time. and most psychologists today recognize that H
sharp dichotomy between rote and meaningful teaming is not warranted, thnt
memorl;dng I~ not necessarily an altrrnativr to undcrlitnnding. Indecd. rurrc nt
work on memory make~ it clear th'nt mcmori1.ing i~ an active pnK·c~~. dependent
on organizing principles very much like those Katonr· propolic~. Research shows
that a tendency to organize information as a means to more efficient rncrnory
increases with age, and this Increase C'.>rrelates with better performnnce on mem-
ory tasks (Kreutzer, Leonard, & Flavell, 1975). In t!tls connection, it is interest-
ing to note that people In Oroup 3 or Katona '11 number ~eric~ tnlik nctunlly hnd
less to remember than th~ other groups, becau~c they on Jy had t<i remember the
prinl'lplr for generating the ~eric~. Thu~. nrgttnl7.lng nne',; lenrning mny lend to
more efficient remembering partly bccau~e It decrea5es the number of ~epnrnte
pier:c~ of informutiun lhnt mu!it be retained. And organl1.ing ulong ~tructur;ll
line~. dictated in rar1 by the !itructure or the !iUbject mntter mny he whnt lcnd!i to
I

better retention in memory.

A Comment on Discovery Learning

Katona's couclu~ions twice mention the tenn t!i.fc•m•rry. indicnting n !ihnred
concern with many later cognitive p!iychologisls and educntor!i. It is therefore of

-
 i
"

r
The Procllss of Productive Thinking 145

interest to note the parallels between Katona's conclusions and those arising from
the extensive rc!lcarch on "discovery learning." Discovery has often been pro·
posed as the be~t way to teach new concepts in mathematics and other subject
:~rcas. The strategy is to make available to children all the relevant mat<'rials for a
prohlcm nr ·~:<m.~ept and let them "hmwse" and test idl!as until they discover
relationships an~ rules on their own. A ~ligh\ly different way of fostering discov·
cry lcnrning--cillled by· some "f.uidcd discovery"-is to guide the children
through all the· s'teps or conditions leading up to a conclusion but let them come
up with the actJat rule themselves. Advocates of discovery learning claim that
these methods .s~mchow ''fix'· the newly learned concept In memory so that it is
held longer ~nd ·generalizes better to new situations. Children taught by discovery
n~ctiH)ds !ihit,uld! 'In <It her w<trds, pcrfumt better at Katona's cumpnrison 11tngc
thnn children who were simply told the same principles. Tied to this is the notion
that if children pre encouraged to formulate the discovered rules for themselves.
the rules. arc infcrnnli7.ed to a grentcr degree than if they nrc simply accepted in
the form handeq' down by the teacher. This should make the rules more readily
available for problem solving and for understanding related mathematical topics.
A conference held in 1965 (Shulman & Keislar, 1966} brought together a
number of cmi~cnt scholars to review the psychological literature on discovery
lcarnin~ nnd discuss it~ pro11 o~d cons. In o !len!lc, thi11 meeting oemonstrntcd thnt
discovery lcam.ing was a poorly understood tenn. for though it had intuitive
appcal--<.:ertain~y we all have a notion of what discovery is, based on our own
experiences-it was extremely difficult to define for the purpose of rigorous
scientific exp~r'iinentation. As a result, the studies that had been done could not
confidently be used to back up instructional practice, even though disco:-'ery was
being a~vocated:bY some as tilt best way to learn. The suggestion emerging r..... m
the conference .was that the concept of discovery should be broken down into a
number of more specific and experimentally m~tnageable subtopics. It was also
proposed that :analysis o( results should .center around a whole set of
interactions-l'subject ma~ter. with type of Instruction, with timing of ins~ruc­
tion, with type pf pupil. with outcome (Cronbach. 1966, p. 92]"-rather than
simply cor.lpari~g a discovery method with a nondiscovery method.
Of interest·ft;r the present discussion is that in a number of studies on discov-
ery learning peo'ple In the nondiscovcry conditions were given no chanct to find
the !ltructurol h:~scs of the problems they were to solve. They were shown fixed
ways of ~olving the problems without explanations for why these rules worked.
Then they were encouraged to npply the rules to many examples In exactly the
way shown thcrr. They thus hod no reason to look for structure or meaning in the
problems: they were simply "following orders." ,Or sometimes, as in Group I of
the Kntonn experiment ju11t described. nondiscovery groups were given rules that
act11aliy interfered with noticing the structure or the problem. The exp.:rimental
discovery lttuups, on the other hnnd, were glvc·n materials to help point up t),c
structural ba!les; of problems and were glveu opportunities to try out different
wnys of putting things together in u way that mode sense. These people were
 I

146 6. STnUCTURE AND INSIGHT IN PROBLEM SOLVING

being encouraged to notice the underlying mathcmntlcnl muctures thnt mnde

probler.u meaningful. In 5ome nf Katona·~ cx~riments the mcnningfullcnming
RriHIJl.dld not hnvc to (li\Covcr lhc \lndc:rlyin~t rrinclrlc: nr ~tnr<.·turc: fur tht"lll•
selves. ln~tead they were shown the principle di:-ectly nnu then given a charH.'l' to
~tutly It urtd upply it 111 new prohlcrll'l, Thcllc: lltutlcnlll !lid not pcrforru rttlll'lt
differently from ~tudcnts who discovered the principle for thernselvc~.
A ~tudy by Gagn~ and Brown' 19fll 1 nlso sugg.ests thnt the content rather thnn
the meth::1d of instruction m:\y account for the apparent superiority of discovery
teaching. In this study teeMge boys were taught to obtain formulns for the ~Uil1!'
of specific number series. A "rule-and-example" group was ~hown the formulas
and .then led through a number of examples In which they identified terms arid
practiced finding the numerical values of the series using the formuln. "Discov-
ery" and "guided-discovery" groups, on the other hand, were nsked to ckrivc
the formula for the sum of each series and were given increasingly. explicit hints
to help them achieve th.: solution. Both the rule-and-example nnd the guided-
discovery programs proceeded in small. carefully liequenced steps bn5ed on
general principles of programmed learning. In the test 5ituations. the group:~ were
presented with n number serie5 that they had not seen before nnd were rcquir~d to
derive the formula for its sum. The guided-discovery group wali most succc~liful
in the novel problem-solving tasi<, followed by the discovery group and the
rule-and-example group in that order. Looking for the crucial differences be-
tween the guided-discovery and the rule-and-example le~rnin(! prugrnmll, one
notes that the guided-discovery progrnm directed students' attention tn wnys of
finding rclation~hip5 between numheu In the 5eric5, whcrcn:~ 'the nrle·nnd·
example group simply practiced applying a formula In which the relntionships
were nlreutly given. The two progmna thull tuught different cm1tcnt unc.l ;on~
(guided discovery) wu more useful when I'O formula wa:~ avaltnhle, ns In the test
situation. Like Katona's, this linding suggests that It Is not the rli.,covr.ry itself
but the principle that is important for meaningful learning. Where the l\im of
teaching is retention and transfer, it may be es effective-and is usually more
efficient-to demonstrate the principle di.-~-:tly rather thnn requiring students h1
discover it. ·

IMPLICATIONS OF GESTALT THINKING FOR

INSTRUCTION

Having reviewed briefly the background of gestnlt psychology and the demon·
stratlons and experiments of some of Its major theori5ts, our ta~k is Ill evnluittc
the relevance of gestalt principles for mathematics instruction:
We saw, fll'st, that in the case cf the carpenter's apprentice and parallelogram
problems, the explanations or demonmations that provided Insight into their
solutions were couched In terms of the underlying mathematicnl or geometric
structures. This suggests that a task for instruction Is to ~resent problems in way~
 ;

Implications of Gestalt Thinking for Instruction 147

that highlight tlu!ir vnrious interrelntcd components and promote insight into their
underlying ~iru~turcll. Although Wertheimer c.Jid not SI'\CII lc out In so many
wnttl!l, w(' t•n•) !lnr<'r fn1111 hl11 dcmon/ltrntionll thnt the 11lnlcturc11 thnt undcrlny
productive thln~ing C\lUid often be dcnncd os the structures of mathematics. II
WitH uppu•·~ill t~t the ue111111t J\Kychulngilltll 111111 llrlll llf'('IMin~·hcll tn lcnrnln~
~tnmpcd nut 'the· nnturnl tendencies to or!tnnlze thinking in structure-based ways.
In u l~C:IISC:; . the human tendency to Impose structure in thinking nnu
pcrception--~to look for "good gestalts "-provides a theoretical rationale for the
kind of structur~·oricr.tcd teaching methods spawned during the era of the Cnm·
bridge and Woo<Js Hole Conferences. Gestalt psychology, like the psychology ol
Pioget, views the Ieamer as an organiler of perceptions and experiences. This
being the case,: it is not unreasonable to want to teach portions of larger
mathematical structures in a spiral curriculum. To the extent that teaching high·
lights the st.ruct¥ral properties of concepts and procedures, the ~arger organiza.
tion may be provided in time by the Ieamer. Because gestalt psychology credits
learners with more global organizing processes than simple stimulus-response
learning theories would suggest they have, It gives credence to the possibili•y th11t
children may be able to discover mathematical principles. for themselves In the
proce$S of working with specially de$i{!ned math materials.
Perhaps a fruitful way to consider the theory and experiments presented in this
chapter is to think of them as point in!! out the importance of building good men·
tnl rc:presentutiims, both of the subject matter of mt~thematics and of specific
problem-solving tasks. In the preceding chapter, we discussed Eruner's
hyputhcsi;1.c.•d t•ruu:tive:, lenni<.•, nnd llymbolic mode~ for reprc:sentinll the 5truc-
tu:re5 nf ronthcnu&tkll In memory. We have ~xps1.ded the dc1inhion of a mental
rcprc:~enuition hfre h\ Include the wny the structure of a mathemntlcnl problem is
con·cclvctl. Hmv the suhjc:ct mnttcr nnd rroblem stnrcture nrc mcntnlly reprc·
sc"tcd is not x(>l.:llcd out in gestalt writings, except for the suggestion that those
structure!! might activate certain ncurulogical patterns that nrc isomorphic to
pattt>ms previously per~eived, in the envirc,nment (Kohler, 1929\, We r·~·tme
•nAt the f'H•rtkulnr rerrcsentation an individual has of a subject matter, including
relevant procedural knowledge, determines how he or she enters into problem
solution. We nl.so assume that the mode of instruction has an impact on the form
of people '!i mental representations. In Chapter 8, we report studies that ~eek to
map out the exact organization of subject-matter and procedural knowledge for
the purp.>sc of developing a:theor; of mental rerresentation.
If problem representations are superficial, as a ges•alt psychologist might
expect In cases: where rote instruction has dominated mathematical learning, then
the thinker muy be limited in the problem-solving resources he or she can bring to
bear. Such :ti person will tend to make the same mistake as the apprentice in
Wertheimer's ~taircasc story and will lind the sum of a series by a long and
tedious coniputntion. If the r~presentation Is bn~ed on the underlying mathemati·
cal structure u( the problem. on the other hand, the pr.,blem solver is capable of
experimenting with different ways of ~cuing up the problem nnd is more apt to
1118 6. STRUCTURE AND INSIGHT IN PIWBLEM SOLVING

find <: simple and elegant upproach to ~olution. In this c.:onct•ptualizatinn. :1

previously t:111ght rule or algorithmic 11olution need not he considcrctllcss dcsira·
hie thnn 11 pcr~on11lly con~tnJctcd ori~inal 11olution 10 n prohlem-indccd. tP
require original solutions would be to ne~wtc the cu111ulntivc clfons of n:nturics
o( mnthcmntknl thinking. Prrhnp~. then, the criterion or produt·tivr: thinkin~-t
should be whether or not the rcprel'cntation underlying a prohkm solycr'!' net ion~
is rich enough to make conl:lct with til': knowledge he or she hns huil! up
concerning the structure of the !illbjcct mntter.
Besides the rather general notion of strJcture-oricnted tc:~ching. what can we
offer in the way of suggestions for increasing the probability of insight into any
given problem situation? Al!hough the ge!italtists attached great importance to
insight in their writings, they largely failed to analyze the processes in insight and
provided little concrete guidance for would-be problem solvers. The vague
suggestion that insight depends 011 gettin& I'll the ''good inner relatcdnes~' • of a
problem {Wertheimer) or understanding the inherent "connict" in a situation
(Duncker) h less than adequate when our concern is to imp_rove individual:;·
ability~to solve problems.
We interpret Wertheimer a~ sayi11g that in!iight come~ about in part a!i n rc~adt
of understanding the structures of mathematic~. The studie~ on meaningful nntl
discovery learning highlight the ncctl (or adequtllc rcprcscnt:llions of prohlcrm
and their underlying mathematical structure!i. But beyond the undcrstnnding nntl
representation of structure, there nrc fcnture~ inherent in any problem that tlrnw
upon another aspect of mental proces~ing: solution strategy. By definition. ntrue
prohlem require~ 11 ~carch for po~sihle 1\olutiort!i hccnu!ie nn 11o!"tion i11 rcndily
apparent. This implies some sort of strategy for determining wh<tt the goal of the
problem Is, whut infurntatloA the lcnrncr!l hnve nt their dilcpmnl, And whnt the
missin~ inform(uion i~ that would allow either a known ~nlutlon .,;trnte~tY tn he
applied or a n"Qw solution to be In vented. This o~pccl of problem solving is
largely ambiguous in gc!itnlt writings. although Ounckcr went I"H111 way in trying
to analyze the processes. Today the roles of understanding undlnsight in proble"m
solving still loom large us topics for rc~earch, and studies arc underway that mny
shed more light on these complex Intellectual processes that problem solving
brings into play. We explore these concepts further in Chapter 8. as we present
information-proceuing theories of problem llnlving. Meanwhile. we arc offered
some concrete suggt~~lions for increasing the tlkelihood of Insight and cnh~nd"g
general problem solving ability In the work of Polya, n ntnthemntkinn innuencetl
by gest~tlt theory and directly concerned with Instruction.

Facilitating :Insight
George Polya spent years showing teachers how to teach mathematics, focusing
~pecifically on those kind5 of helpll nnd hints that guide people tnwnrd in!iight
into problem solutions. His suggestions can be viewed n!i way~ of fncilitnting
('
Implications of Gestalt Thinking for Instruction 149

di~~covery of the: underlying structures, in the gestalt sense, of the problems to be

Mi:vcd. Jtoly:e pruvldcll a ~ct of llpcdfic qucstlunll ur steps to follow in working on
n :rrnhlem. cnl·~ of which could be charn.:tcrlzed all lr«uristic, a word of Greek
o~lgin mcunin~· .u;,.;,,~ to d/~·<'O\'c·r. The value of heuristics Is tunt they aliow n
wuulcl-hr pn•hl~··h ~olvcr In rtun•t"d ~y~tcmntlcnlly tnwnrcf imijlht, inMcnll 11f
lc'aving · 'prudu"·tive thinking" to chance or to the gifted few who nre quick to sec
pwhlc111 ~tru,:turc on their ,·,wn .
. Accmding l\l Polya (1945/1957). problem solving may be divided into four
stages. nnmcly, understanding the problem, devising a plnn for finding the solu-
tiun, earryintt tlUt the plan, and looking back tJ verify the procedure and check
the rcllult. These four lltngc-s, with detailed questions t.nd hints relevant to each.
nrc listed in' fig. 6.5. Let us examine them in the context of a specific problem:

A stunt nwtorcyclist plans to rid~ his t•ike the length of a tightrope stretched from
. the up;>er' ldt-hand ctrner or the back or an auditorium to the lower right-hand
c.'umer ur thc'front or the auditorium. The dimension~ or the audilorium arc 100 by
60 hy 30 fc:cL He nccd5 to know how long a ti~htrope he should bring to span the
distance he plans to ride. How would you help him find out7

Now, inwttinc 11 lib.th grader. Drian. trying to follow Polya 's steps. ll'har i.r tire·
1111J.:nm•·"? ':'The len~th o( the tightrope." IVhat arr th« data? "A room I00 by
60 feet nml .10 ,rcct hig~." IVIrat is tlw emu/don.' Here Brian would probably
want In dr:ew n: figure and label the knowns and unknowns nppropritucly, ns in
l~i~. hA ':'l'hl~ c:onditl<m ill thnt 1 llpnn!i the dbtnncc rmm point A to fl of n
thrce-uimensinilnl rcctnngulur figure. with dimensions II', It, anu I ... uwk atlhc
llllkllllll'll. /111 ; ,\'1111 ktltlll' II Jlrtlfl/t•lll \1'/tfl tltr .ftlllll' 111' tl .f/1111/tll' 1111-
ktloll'll? ... · "Y~ll. 1indin~t the hyj,otcnullc of a rittht trianttle .... " So there is n
n::atcd pruhlcia,. C:wr you tf.fc• It? ..• H(Jpcfully by this time Urian hns enouth
hintll' tu Jlll un'\tu liCI(Utlun nf the Jlrt~hlcn\ hut, lr n<lt, J'lnlyn ~uggeAIA giving
incrcnllilll!ly' cxplkit hints, helping him bring to mind other problems he has
solved In th<! pa~t· and procedures he already knows ror finding the length or a line
segment. . · ~~
What we arc searching for in this example is the moment of insight. It is what
occurs bctwcen:the time Brian says "Gee, I have a problem here. l wonder how I
can solve il!' and "Oh yes, this Is basically a case or finding the hypotenuse of
nne: triangle' and substituting irlnto another find-the-hypotenuse problem." It is
this crucial step that seems to be affected by the kinds or principles gestalt
psychologists 11pcak or. It involves looking ror structure, rcronnulating the prob·
lem. and perhaps trying to loosen up a preconceived structure so that new ways
of looking at t~c problem present themselves. Once lhe structure (hypotenuse of
a right triangle) Is apprehended and the nature or the parts or the problem (e.g.,
the data) In relation to the whole (the conjunction or line segments that makes this
ntrinngle problem) is rec:ognized, Brian is ready to ronnulate a systematic plnn to

-
I'
~

liN I) f. nST 1\NOING THE PROn l.EM

Flr•t. ~It ir 111e un•nowrt) ~It " ' the d1r1.> H-1•11 /r tit~ conrlitlonl
Yuu fte,..• tu ''"tl•,tt•~trl
h II r•nHihl" In urhly th• r.nntlltlnn1 11 th• r.nntlilitln '"""''""'
'"' l'•oblrm. to dflttmine tne unkl'lown? Or h II lniUIIici~nt? Or r~dund~nt'
Or contradictoty1
OttW • figure. Introduce rultthlft rHHtlinn. s~, •• , •• , ,,~ Y~tlnvl
" ' ' " of the condition, CM you write them down I

S..cond.
Find tnt connection bet wren
lht !1111 and lht lll'lknown.
Vov may be ob 1iged
to con,lc1tr a•ailiary problems
if tn lmmel'i• tte connection
tannot be lovnd,
You should obuin eventually
1 p/1 .., of the solution.
DEVISING A PLAN
H1v~ vnu l~'en it ho!lott7 Ot luv~ vou ,,.~n '"" '~'"" ntnlol""' "'
a stiqt\tly different lorm1
Do yov •now a "''tt•d prohf11n) Do vnu ktlow a tk-.nrem thAt
could b~ uwluP
L ()I)#; at rht unknown/ And try to think of a llmiliar prohlem
having the ume or a slmil11 unknown.
Htrt Is 1 problem rtllttd to youn and solved b~lort. Co:~ld vou
use It'! Could you utt Its result1 Could vou ute Its method'
Should you Introduce some au~eillary elemrnt in order 10 1\'uke
iu utt pouiblt 1
Could you restate the problerr.? ..:ould you restate it still
differently~ Go back to definitions.

If you cannot solve the proposed problem try to solve lir11 some
related problem, Could vou Imagine 1 more •cet~'ihle related
problem? A more oeneral problem? A more specltl problem1 An
tntl('?ovs prcblem? Could \'l'\1 solve 1 part of the problfm? Keep
only 1 put ol th~ condition, drop the othftr pArt: how fat Is th,.
unknown then determined, how can It vary? Coul:f you derive
tome thing uttlul frt>m tl., data? Coul~ you think of othtr, dltft
approprlart to determine tht vnl:nooA•:\? Could 'you change the
unknown or tht da1a, or both If nec:P.sury, se that tke new •m·
known and tilt new dtll art nearer to tach other? Old you u\~
all tilt data? Did you utt th• whole condition? Htve you tAken
Into Iecount all eutntlal notl~nt ln\'ulvfltl In thll prcltlf!m1

CAFIAVING OUT THE PLM'

Thld, f~•rrylnS' ..,,,, vo•Jr plan of the solution, chtck tlch ltl!p. C•n vou
C~rry out your plan. tee clearly tkat ihe ttep it cotreet~ Can vou prove thai it
is correct?

LOOKING BACK
Fourth. Can you ch«k thl rtlult? Can you check the argvment1
Ex1min~ tht ,,lutlon obtained.
Can you derive the rttuft differently? Can you tee It af a glance?
Can you use the result, or the method, for some other problem?

FIG. 6.5 Poly a's sta~es of rrohlern !tnlvln,. (From Polya, 19~7. Cnryri,ht 19~7
by rnnceton Unlveuity Pn:H. Rerrlnte\1 by (lem11sslon.)

15,)
 q
..&,

Implications of Gestalt Thinking for Instruction 151

., ,.

I • 100
I c w • GO
Tightrope • t
h • 30
Length of auditorium • I t • 7
Width of auditorium • w
Height ol auditorium • h

FIG. 6.6. 'Labeling unknowns and drawing a figure facilitates visualizing a solu-
tion procel.!urc ror the tigl.t:opc problem.

so!v.e the pr~blem. Then, provided he chooses appropriate algorithms or proce·

dures, all that temains is for him to compute and check the resu Its.
Notice h<?W n~uch murc clearly Brian could "see'' the tightrope problem when
he dn:w 11 dingram uf it. In n prcvi~,~~~ chnptc:r we noted, too. that drawing a
picture of nil ·:impossible" word problem led quickly to the recognition that a
direct algebrai~ translation would hnve yielded an erroneous solution. Wer-
theimer :;ho~ed us how to simplify the staircase problem by visualizing it as
complementn~ ,'parts of a rectangle. Drawing diagrnms and pictures seems to aid
in both rmblcm rcrormulation and soal analysis, processes that are heavily
implicated in in~ight. As is true of Wertheimer's examples, many of the sample
problem~ ln.' Pt)lya ·~ books for mathematics teachers arc geometry problems or
prohlems thnt ilend thcmllelves ea~ily to visual representation. Although
seemingly firnit'~d In their gencralit)', these types of problems seem to demon-
litrn.te pnrticulnrly wc:ll the :~tructuml prineiplell upon which problem solving
(and, more ~en~·rally, mathematics) il' based. ·Spatial representation i3 in fact an
in!c:grnl nnd nccC:l\lH\ry lllipect of higher mnthc:mnticnl thinking. Even Ill liiC
eleinentary .ievcl,
,.,
we value the manipulation of concrete materials bcca~se our
·'i
. 1
 I
.ii.

152 6. STRUCTURE AND INSIGHT IN PROBLEM SOLVING

intuition~ tell u~ the vi~ual and lipntinl n~pectli of l'imple mnthemntic~ :~re impor·
tant.
With relipcctto the proce~~ of human problem ~;olving, Poly a ( 1962) hns s:dd:

Solving prohlrnH ,, lhr ~!'<'•:Irk n\·hlrvrmrnl ur intrllip,rrwr, nncllrllrlllr,rtH'f' h lhr

5flecific gift of man. The ability to gn round nn ob~t:u:lc, to undcrt:tke nn indifl'l't
l'our~e wht•rc 1111 direct l'nurse prr.,cnt5 lt~clf. rnlsc~ the clever nnlmnlnhovc the dull
one. raises mnn far above the most clever animal~. and men of talent above their
fellow men fVol. I, p. IIRI.

·'The anility tel go round nn ob~tncle, to undertnke nn indirc<.'' t.•omote where no

din~c: cour!ic presents lt!iel("-this brin~s to mind Ki~hler'!; npcs who hnd to
mnke a mental detour from their gt,ul u( ~ettlug A hnnnn11 In order tu notice thnt
other uhjecl~ ROHUI them cuuld he emrlnyed In !lntvinJt their rruhlem. It '" thnt
detour.cnat Polya encourages by a5klng "Do you knnw a problem with n ~itnilnr
unknnwnr· or .. What el~e do you know thntmlght work here?'' It Is that detour
that facilitates insight into the probkm solution. Gcstaltists would explnin this
ins•ght in IW11S of npp . ..:hendi11g strutlures of problems. Thus Polya. concerned
with general principles of discovery and deriving his methods from n mnthcmflli·
cian 's background. operates within a framework that we can understand in term~
of the ~tructural thinking of gestalt psychology. At the snme time, he provides
specific hi11ts that appear to cncourarc a kind of bottom-up processing growing
out of coMtituent problem features. Thus. we may view Polyn as highlighting n
ne<.·es5ary intcrnction between the whole and its p~rt~. bl!twcr.n the integrative
nnd annlytic aspccu of problem solving.

SUMMARY

In this chapter we have looked at a theoretical position that contrasts with early
learning theory and its nnalysb o( beh:wior in !emu of !ilimulu!i-res()on~e aswci·
at ions. The centralthc!ils of gestalt psychology is that thinking nnd ,.,erccption nrc
dominated by 11n innnle tendency to apprehend structure. Thi~ being the cMe, the
cxpcrlen~e n( perceiving or thinking achieve~ un nrgnnh~ntinn thnt I~ more thttn
the sum of objectively identiriable individual elements or stimuli. The or!!nni7.a·
lion()( experience is controlkd by the tendency tu !leek good gestalts. <.'losurc. or
r~ycholo~ic'nl equilibrium. In dcmon~tr:uinn~ or the dnmln:~nce or the whole over
the rart~ In mathematical problems. Wcnhcimcr tried 1<1 llhow thnt npprchcndin~
the underlying ~tructure~. interpretable as mnthemnticalstructure~. led to produc·
tive thinkin~ nnd Clegnnt problem ~~living. This was becau~e. hy E_!nining in1iight
into problem stnJctures, the problem solvr.r under~tood the relevance nntl
functions of problem components and of known solution procedures. suggesting
f'l:Hh~ lo ~olut inn.
 References 153

The procrss of achieving insight, although largely unexplored by gestalt

syr.hologists. was analyzed in part by Duncker. Duncker drew a distinction
ctwccn processing from above, Starting with anaJy1iiS of goals and problem
cformulation, and processing from below, starting with the analysis of problem
naterials. The ~nr,ne distinction is made in current anr.lyses of cognitive perfor-
nance, although in practice the interaction between ,the two types of processes,
ather than their differences, may be more amenable tQ :;tudy.
Attempting to;develop a gestalt theory of lea:niog, Katona suggested that
neaningfullcarning. like problem solving, depended on a presentation that either
nadc explicit or. allowed the Ieamer to discover the underlying mathematical
;tructure. If the principles underlying the content of learning and problem solving
.vcre undcr~tuud, '~olutions could be rt~conmucted, extended, nnd remembered.
:n contrast, rote learning appeared to limit the Ieamer's ability to remember and
I
r
e
'
~cncrullze ocw lcarnins. These contentions were similar to those found in the
:nore recent litcra'rure on discovery learning. A review of that literature suggested
:hat discovery is· i1ot a unitary concept and is hard to cxpHcate experimentally.
Studies purportini to lest the efficacy of the method confounded discovery with
l
r: the opportunity fu npprehend underlying $lructures of material to be learned.
The ge:;t~!t view of problem solving is thilt insight grows out of an understand·
,
)

ing of th~· prohl~'in us u whok· nnu pf the rclntion of th\! part~ lo the whole.
lnnuencr.d by. gestalt theory, Poly a has developed hints that encourage the prob·
lem solver h>: rcct>nsider the goal~; of the problem, search memory (or similar
problems solved, before. and analyze the materials or givens of the proble~.
These hints may, be helpful in promoting the problem reformulation and goal
analysis that appear to facilitate the emergence of insight.
Gestalt psychqlogists have given ·us intuitively appealing demonstrations of
the organization of thinking and perception, and they foreshadowed many of the
concerns of t~day's cognitive psychologists. Of themselves, however, the dem·
onstrations arc not clear with respect to many of the processes we hope to
influence thrQugl\~instruction. The nature of mental representations and the pro-
cesses by whkh·1problems wre formulated and solution strategies chosen are
issues that rci.1uh'(; clarification. The:;e topics arc receiving further treatment in
current annly~cs ~t' problem-solving behavior, and we return to them in Chap-
ter 8. ;
. ~.
/~

• I '• '! REFERENCES

:
11~11. 1\. T. Mr11 11/mrrtlirmnlit•j, Ntw Yurk: ~in111n nnd ~khu~ltr. tY17.
Cmnhach, L. J. i'hc ioglc or cJ.pcrimcnu on di5covcry. In L. S. Shulman & E. R. Keislar (Ells.).
/.rllnt/11/l, /1.\' '"·"·,;trr,l': A l'fitlntlllf'l'"''·'"'· C:hkn~u: Rnnll M~·Nally, IYMi.
Duncker. K. On rrohlem-5olvlng. Psydwloxiral MIIIIIIRTfl{'hJ, 194S. JR(270). 1-tl2.
(il!J(h~ R. M.••~ llrliwn. L. T. Sumc rn~:tnr5 in the flrtlj!rnmmlnll or Cflnt'CfiiUnllcllminj:.
I lflltrllll/ "/
l:'.rpt•ri·~r,tal f's.\·;·JtoloN)', 1961 ; 62 (4). 3D· 321.