Pascual v. Pascual-Bautista Case No. 198 G.R. No.

84240 (March 25, 1992) Chapter IV, Page 127, Footnote No.16 FACTS: Petitioners are the acknowledged natural children of the late EligioPascual, the latter being the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual, who died intestate without any issue, legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children. ISSUE: W/N Art. 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which states that An illegitimate child has no right to inherit abintestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child, interpreted to exclude recognized can be

People v. Amigo Case No. 201 G.R. No. 116719 (January 18, 1996) Chapter IV, Page 127, Footnote No.16 FACTS: The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision finding the Accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, and sentenced to the penalty of reclusionperpetua. Accused-Appellant argues that error was committed by the trial court in imposing or meting out the penalty of reclusion perpetua against him despite the fact that Sec. 19 (1), Art. 3 of the 1987 Constitution was already in effect when the offense was committed. Accused-Appellant contends that under the 1987 Constitution and prior to the promulgation of RA 7659, the death penalty had been abolished and hence, the penalty that should have been imposed for the crime of murder committed by Accused-Appellant should be reclusion temporal in its medium period to 20 years of reclusion temporal. ISSUE: W/N Sec. 19 (1), Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution means to require a corresponding modification in the other periods as a result of the prohibition against the death penalty.

natural children from the inheritance of deceased. HELD:

the

In Diaz v. IAC, this Court ruled that Art. 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestate between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Art. 992.

HELD: EligioPascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children. Petitioners herein cannot represent their father in the succession of the latter to the intestate estate of the decedent Andres Pascual, full blood brother of their father. In People vs. Muoz, the Court held that A reading of Section 19 (1) of Article III will readily show that there is really nothing therein which expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty.

Globe-Mackay v. NLRC and Salazar Case No. 112 G.R. No. 82511 (March 3, 1992) Chapter IV, Page 124, Footnote No.3 FACTS: Petitioner placed Respondent preventive suspension because it Salazar under

merely insinuated that since Respondent Salazar had a special relationship with Saldivar, she might have had direct knowledge of Saldivars questionable activities. Basbacio v. Office of the Secretary, Dept. of Justice Case No. G.R. No. 109445 (November 7, 1994) FACTS:

appeared that she had full knowledge of the loss and whereabouts of an air conditioner that DelfinSaldivar had stolen from the company but failed to inform her employer. Respondent Salazar filed a complaint for illegal suspension and for other damages. On appeal, the Respondent Court affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter with respect to the reinstatement of Private Respondent but limited back wages to 2 years and deleted award for moral damages. ISSUE: 1. W/N the Labor Tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the reinstatement of Respondent Salazar. 2. W/N there existed independent legal grounds to hold Respondent Salazar answerable as well and, thereby, justify her dismissal. HELD: The Labor Code clearly provides that an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement and to his full back wages. An exception to this is when the reinstatement inadmissible due to strained relations may be

RA 7309, among other things, provides for compensation of persons unjustly accused, convicted, and imprisoned. Petitioner and his son-in-law Balderrama were charged with murder and frustrated murder for killing Boyon and wounding his wife and son, due to a land dispute and thus imprisoned. However, on appeal to the CA, Petitioner was acquitted on the ground that conspiracy between him and his son-inlaw was not proven. What was proven was that he was at the scene of the crime with Petitioner when the shooting happened and left the place with his son-in-law. Petitioner claims he was unjustly accused and is entitled to compensation. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is entitled to compensation pursuant to RA 7309. HELD: No, he is not. For one to be unjustly accused one must be wrongly accused from the very beginning, unjustly convicted (when a judge knowingly and deliberately rendered an unjust judgment, whimsical and capricious devoid of any basis for judgment) and imprisoned. In the case at bar, Petitioner was acquitted because the prosecution was unable to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Petitioner was guilty. Thus, he does not fall under RA 7309.

between the employer and the employee. The position of Private Respondent as systems analyst is not one that may characterized as such. Moreover, Petitioner be

JMM Promotions v. NLRC Case No. 136

Radiola-Toshiba Appellate Case No. 249

Phils.

Inc.

v.

Intermediate

G.R. No. 109835 (November 22, 1993) G.R. No. 75222 (July 18, 1991) Chapter VI, Page 251, Footnote No. 21 Chapter VI, Page 252, Footnote No. 20 FACTS: FACTS: JMM Promotions paid license fee amounting to P30, 000 and posted a cash bond of P100, 000 and a surety bond of P50,000, as required by the POEA Rules. When JMM Promotions appealed to regarding a decision rendered by POEA, NLRC Pasig. However, the insolvency proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Angeles City was commenced more than four months after the issuance of the said attachment. Under the circumstances, Petitioner Radiola-Toshiba Phils.contended that its lien on the subject properties overrode the insolvency proceeding and was not dissolved thereby. ISSUE: surety bond, as required by the POEA? HELD: Yes. The POEA Rules regarding monetary appeals are clear. A reading of the POEA Rules shows that, in addition to the cash and surety bonds and the escrow money, an appeal bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary award is required to perfect an appeal from a decision of the POEA W/N the levy on attachment insolvency proceedings against dissolved the The levy on attachment against the subject properties of spouses Carlos and TeresitaGatmaytan was issued on March 4, 1980 by the Court of First Instance of

the NLRC dismissed the petition for failure to post the required appeal bond as required by Art. 223 of the Labor Code. ISSUE: Is JMM Promotions still required to post the required appeal bond, as required by Art. 223 of the Labor Code, considering it has already posted a cash bond and

Respondent spouses even though it commenced four months after said attachment. HELD: No. Sec. 32 of the Insolvency Law is clear that there is a cut off period one month in attachment cases and thirty days in judgments entered in actions commenced prior to the insolvency proceedings. Also, there is no conflict between Sec. 32 and Sec. 79. Where a statute is susceptible to more than one interpretation, the court should adopt such reasonable and beneficial construction as will render the provision thereof operative and effective and harmonious with each other

De Guia v. COMELEC Case No. 30 G.R. No. 104712 (May 6, 1992) FACTS: Petitioner contends that under Par (d) of Sec. 3 of RA 7166, members of the SangguniangPanlulungsod and Bayan shall be elected at large. ISSUE: W/N par (d) Sec. 3 of RA 7166 should be interpreted to mean that elective officials of the SangguniangPanlulungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected at large. HELD: No. Par (d) Sec.3 of the RA refers only to elective officials of the Sangguniang Panlulungsod of single district cities and elective officials of the Sangguniang Bayan for municipalities outside Metro Manila. The law specifically stated that provinces with only one legislative district should be divided into two and therefore should necessarily be elected by districts. Par (d) should be interpreted in line with the rest of the statute and to follow the interpretation of the petitioner there would have been no reason for the RA to single out the single district provinces. The court realized that the language of the law in this case seems abstruse and the key to determine what legislature intended is the purpose or reason which induced it to enact the statute. The explanatory note in the proposed bill provided that the reason for the division into two legislative districts is to reduce the number of candidates to be voted for in the 1992 elections. Sangguniang

Salenillas v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 78687 (January 31, 1989) Chapter IV, Page 135, Footnote No.47 FACTS: On December 4, 1973, the property of Petitioners was mortgaged to Philippine National Bank as security for a loan of P2,500. For failure to pay their loan, the property was foreclosed by PNB and was bought at a public auction by Private Respondent. Petitioner maintains that they have a right to repurchase the property under Sec.119 of the Public Land Act. Respondent states that the sale of the property disqualified Petitioners from being legal heirs vis-vis the said property. Respondent also maintains that the period for repurchase has already prescribed based on Monge et al. vs. Angeles. ISSUE: 1. W/N petitioners have the right to repurchase the property under the said Act. 2. W/N the prescription period had already prescribed. Held: The provision makes no distinction between the legal heirs. The distinction made by Respondent contravenes the very purpose of the Act. Petitioners contention would be more in keeping with the spirit of the law. With regard to prescription, the Monge case involved a pacto de retro sale and not a foreclosure sale and so the rules under the transaction would be different. For foreclosure sales, the prescription period starts on the day after the expiration of the period of redemption when the deed of absolute sale was executed.

Chua v. Civil Service Commission Case No. 60 G.R. No. 88979 (February 7, 1992) Chapter IV, Page 164, Footnote No.146 FACTS: RA 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation as well as for involuntary separation due reorganization. Section 2 covers those who are qualified: to

government employees who are similarly situated as those covered by the said law. The court applied the doctrine of necessary implication in deciding this case.

City of Manila v. Philippines Case No. 23

Judge Gomez and Esso

G. R. No. L-37251 (August 31, 1981) FACTS: Sec. 2. Coverage. This Act shall cover all appointive officials and employees of the National Government. authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary, emergency employees, regardless The benefits realty tax at one and one-half percent. The Special Education Fund Law (RA 5447), casual and which took effect on Jan. 1, 1969, imposed an annual additional one percent tax and fixes the total realty tax at three percent. With the three percent maximum limit set by RA 5447, the municipal board of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7125, effective beginning the third quarter of 1972, imposing an additional one-half percent realty tax. Respondent Corporation paid the tax, but protested the Ordinance; the Court of First Instance of Manila ruled that the tax ordinance is void as it is not authorized by the city charter or by any law, and that the city of Manila should reimburse Respondent Corporation said tax. ISSUE: W/N the tax ordinance is valid. HELD: The Court holds that the doctrine of implications in Statutory Construction sustains the City of Manilas contention that the additional one-half percent realty tax is sanctioned by the provision of the Special Education Fund Law that the total real The Revised Charter of Manila took effect on June 18, 1949. It fixes the annual

of age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years of government service as of the date of separation Petitioner Lydia Chua, believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the program, filed an application on January 30, 1989 with Respondent Administration, which, however, denied the same. Recourse by the petitioner to Respondent Commission yielded the same result. ISSUE: W/N Petitioners status as a co-terminus employee is excluded from the benefits of RA 6683 (Early Retirement Law). HELD: The petition is granted. The Early Retirement Law would violate the equal protection clause of the constitution if the Supreme Court were to sustain Respondents submission that the benefits of said law are to be denied a class of

property tax shall not exceed a maximum of three per centum. While the 1949 Revised Charter of Manila fixed the realty tax at one and one-half percent, the 1969 Special Education Fund Law fixed three percent as the maximum real property tax. The obvious implication is that an additiona onel half percent tax could be imposed by municipal corporations. Inferentially, that law fixed at two percent the realty tax that would accrue to the city or municipality. The fact that the 1974 Real Property Tax Code specially fixes the real property tax at two percent confirms the prior intention of the lawmaker to impose two percent as the realty tax proper. That was also the avowed intent of the questioned ordinance.

J.M. Tuason& Co. v. Mariano &Aquial& Cordova Case No. 64 G.R. No. L-33140 (October 23, 1978) FACTS: Plaintiffs Aquial (herein Respondents) claimed ownership of a parcel of land located in QC having an area of 383 hectares. They alleged that it had been fraudulently or erroneously included in OCT No. 735 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal and that it was registered in the names of Defendants Tuason (herein Petitioners) pursuant to a decree issued on July 6, 1914 in Case No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration. Plaintiffs Aquial prayed that OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom be declared void due to certain irregularities in the land registration proceeding. The Tuasons prayed that the petition be dismissed on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction over the case, improper prescription, laches and prior judgment. venue,

Respondents Cordova spouses were allowed to intervene in the case since they were able to purchase 11 hectares from the Aquials. ISSUE: W/N OCT No. 735 is valid. HELD: OCT No. 735 is valid. The validity of OCT No. 735 was already decided upon by the Supreme Court in the cases of Benin vs. Tuason, Alcantara vs. Tuason and Pili vs. Tuason. The ruling in these cases was also applied in other cases involving the validity of OCT No. 735.

Philippine British Appelate Court Case No. 234

Assurance

v.

Intermediate

attachment shall be charged with the payment of any judgment that is returned unsatisfied. It covers not only a final and executory judgment but also the execution of a judgment of pending appeal.

G.R. No. L-72005 (May 29, 1987) Chapter 5, Page 200, Footnote No.99 FACTS: Sycwin Coating& Wires Inc, filed a complaint for a collection of money against Varian Industrial Corporation. During the pendency, Respondent attached some of the properties of Varian Industrial Corp upon the posting of a supersedes bond. The latter in turn posted a counter bond through Petitioner so the attached properties were released. Sycwin filed a petition for execution pending appeal against the properties of Varian, which was granted. However, the writ of execution was returned unsatisfied as Varian failed to deliver the previously attached personal properties upon demand. Sycwin prayed that Petitioner Corporation be ordered to pay the value of its bond which was granted. ISSUE: W/N the counter bond issued was valid. HELD: ISSUE: The counter bond was issued in accordance with Sec. 5, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court. Neither the rules nor provisions of the counter bond limited its application to a final and executory judgment. It appllies to the payment of any judgment that may be recovered by Plaintiff. The only conclusion is that an execution of any logical W/N Petitioner can be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and expenditures since he was a non-candidate, having withdrawn his certificate of candidacy three days after its filing. HELD: Yes. Sec. 14 of RA 7166 states that every candidate has the obligation to file his statement of contributions and expenditures. As the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the Pilar v. Commission on Elections Case No. 242 G. R. No. 115245 (July 11, 1995) Chapter 5, Page 201, Footnote No.100 FACTS: On March 22, 1992, Petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of member of the SangguniangPanlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. Three days later, he withdrew his certificate of candidacy. As a result, Respondent Commission imposed a fine of P10,000 pesos for failure to file his statement of contributions and expenditures. Petitioner contends that it is clear from the law that the candidate must have entered the political contest, and should have either won or lost.

judgment including one pending appeal if returned unsatisfied may be charged against such counter bond. The rule therefore, is that the counter bond to life

same, the term every candidate must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy. Sec. 13 of Resolution No. 2348 categorically refers to all candidates who filed their certificate of candidacy

De Villa v. CA Case No. 88 G.R. No. 87416 (April 8, 1991) Chapter III, Page 96, Footnote No.110 FACTS: Petitioner was charged with a violation of BP 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) for issuing a worthless check. However, he contends that the check was drawn against a dollar account with a foreign bank, and is therefore, not covered by the said law. ISSUE: W/N the Makati Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case in question. HELD: The Makati Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction. The determinative factor (in determining venue) is the place of the issuance of the check. The offense was committed in Makati and therefore, the same is controlling and sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the Makati Regional Trial Court. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the accused upon the filing of a complaint or information in court which initiates a criminal action. With regard to Petitioners allegation that the check is not covered by BP 22, it will be noted that the law does not distinguish the currency involved in the case. Thus, the Court revealed that the records of Batasan, Vol. III unmistakably show that the intention of the lawmakers is to apply the law to whatever currency may be the subject thereof.

Colgate-Palmolive Phil, Inc v. Gimenez Case No. 67

products. Because such items will be used for toothpaste, it is not a food product and therefore not subject to exemption

G.R. No. L-14787 (January 28, 1961) Chapter V, Page 199, Footnote No.95 FACTS: Petitioner Corporation engages in manufacturing toilet preparations and household remedies. Importation including stabilizers and flavors is of materials Petitioners arguments effected the grant of the refund: RA 601 does not categorize the exceptions as stated above. Though stabilizers and flavors are preceded by items that might fall under food products, the following which were included are hardly such: fertilizer, poultry feed, vitamin concentrate, cattle, and industrial starch. Therefore, the law must be seen in its entire context, not the parts and categorizations posited by the respondent.

among those Petitioner imports. For importation, Petitioner pays the Central

every

Bank of the Philippines 17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost, transportation and other charges pursuant to RA 601, the Exchange Tax Law. Under such law, it was also provided that: Foreign exchanged used for the payment of cost, transportation and/or other charges incident to the importation into the Philippines of stabilizer and flavors shall be refunded to application therefore. any importer making

The petitioner therefore seeks a refund of the 17% special excise tax ISSUE: W/N the imports of dental cream stabilizers and flavors are subject to a 17% transportation tax exemption under the Exchange Tax Law. HELD: No. The refusal to deny refund was based on the following argument: All the items enumerated for the tax exemption fall under one specific class, namely: food products, books supplies/ materials and medical supplies. The stabilizers and flavors the petitions refer to are items which must fall under the category of food

Rep. of the Philippines vs. Hon. Migrinio and Tecson Case No. 257

Buenaseda v. Secretary Flavier Case No. 40 G.R. No. 106719 (September 21, 1993)

FACTS: Chapter III, Page 104, Footnote No.141 Acting on information received, which indicated the acquisition of wealth beyond his lawful income, the Philippine Anti-Graft Board required Private Respondent to submit his explanation or comment, together with his supporting evidence. Private Respondent, a retired lt. colonel, was unable to produce his supporting evidence, despite several postponements, because they were allegedly in the custody of his bookkeeper who had gone abroad. The anti-graft Board was created by the PCGG to investigate unexplained wealth and corrupt practices the FACTS: The Private Respondents filed an administrative complaint with the Ombudsman against the Petitioner for the violation of the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act. In response, the Ombudsman filed an order directing the preventive suspension of the Petitioners, who were employees of the national center for mental health. The Respondent argue that the preventive suspension laid by the Ombudsman under Sec. 24 of RA 6770 is contemplated in by Sec. 13(8) of Art. 9 of the 1987 Constitution, while the Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman can only recommend to the Heads of Departments and other agencies the preventive suspension of officials and employees facing administrative investigation conducted by his office. ISSUE: W/N the Ombudsman has the power to preventively suspend government officials working in other offices other than that of the Ombudsman pending the investigation of administrative complaints. HELD: Yes. The Ombudsman has the power to suspend the employees of the said institution may it be in punitive or preventive suspension. Sec. 13(3) of the Constitution refers to suspension in its punitive sense, as the same speaks of penalties in administrative cases, while Sec. 24 of RA 6770 grants the Ombudsman the power to

of AFP personnel, both retired and in active service. ISSUE: W/N Private Respondent may be investigated and prosecuted by the Board, an agency of the PCGG, for violation of RA 3019 and 1379. HELD: No. Applying the rule in statutory construction, the term subordinate as used in EO 1 and 2 would refer to one who enjoys a close association or relation with former President Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative, and close associate in EO 1 and the close relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in EO 2.

preventively suspend public officials and employees facing administrative charges. This statute is procedural and may arise in order to facilitate a speedy and efficient investigation on cases filed against the officers. A preventive measure is not in itself a punishment but a preliminary administrative investigation. step in an

Fule v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. L-79094 (June 22, 1988) Chapter VIII, Page 337, Footnote No. 37 FACTS: Petitioner, an agent of the Towers Assurance Corporation, issued and made out check No. 26741 in favor of Roy Nadera. Said check was dishonored for the reason that the said checking account was already closed, thus in violation of BP 22, the Bouncing Checks Law. Upon the hearing, prosecution presented its evidence and the Petitioner waived his right. Instead, he submitted a memorandum confirming the Stipulation of Facts. He was convicted by the trial court, and on appeal, the Appellate Court. ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC based on the Stipulation of Facts that was not signed by the Petitioner nor his counsel. HELD: The CA erred. Case is re-opened to receive evidence of Petitioner. Sec. 4 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides, No agreement or admission made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing and signed by him and his counsel. Because of the word shall, in its language, the rule is mandatory. Negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory. Therefore, the signature of the Petitioner and the counsel is mandatory. Also, penal statues are to be liberally construed in favor of the accused.

Bersabal v. Salvador G.R. No. L-35910 (July 21, 1978)

Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 117188 (August 7, 1997)

(South)

Chapter VIII, Page 335, Footnote No. 25 FACTS: FACTS: Private Respondents filed an ejectment suit against the Petitioner. The subsequent decision was appealed by the Petitioner and during its pendency, the court issued an order stating that counsels for both parties are given 30 days from receipt of this order within which to file their memoranda in order for this case to be submitted for decision by the court. After receipt, Petitioner filed a motion ex parte to submit memorandum within 30 days from receipt of notice of submission of the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the hearing of the case which was granted by the court. But the Respondent judge issued an order dismissing the case for failure to prosecute Petitioner filed a motion for Petitioners appeal. The Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association Inc. (LGVHAI) was registered with Respondent Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC) as the sole homeowners organization in the said subdivision but it did not file its corporate bylaws. Later, it was discovered that there were two other organizations within the subdivision: the North and South Associations. Respondent HIGC then informed the president of LGVHAI that the latter has been automatically dissolved because of non-submission of its by-laws as required by the Corporation Code. This resulted in the registration of Petitioner association. LGVHAI complained and got a favorable result from Respondent HIGC declaring registration of Petitioner association cancelled and Respondent CA affirmed the said decision. Hence, the

subsequently

reconsideration citing the submitted ex parte motion but the court denied it. ISSUE: W/N the mere failure of an Appellant to submit the mentioned memorandum would empower the CFI to dismiss the appeal on the ground of failure to prosecute. HELD: The court is not empowered by law to dismiss the appeal on the mere failure of an Appellant to submit his memorandum. The law provides that Courts shall decide cases on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted from the city courts: Provided parties may submit memoranda if so requested It cannot be interpreted otherwise than that the submission of memoranda is optional.

Petitioner association filed a petition for certiorari. ISSUE: W/N the failure of a corporation to file its by-laws within one month from the date of its incorporation results in its automatic dissolution. HELD: No. The legislatures intent is not to automatically dissolve a corporation for its failure to pass its by-laws. The word must in a statute is not always imperative but it may be consistent with an exercise of discretion. The language of the statute should be considered as a whole while ascertaining the intent of the legislature in using the word must or shall.

ALU-TUCP v. NLRC G.R. No. 109328 (August 16, 1994)

Acting Commissioner of Customs v. Manila Electric Company Case No. 3

FACTS: G.R. No. L-23623 (June 30, 1977) Petitioners were employed by the National Steel Corporation for their five year expansion program. The workers contend that they should be considered regular workers as opposed to project workers, as the NSC and NLRC ruled. ALU-TUCP claims that they have been working in NSC for more than 6 years and that their work is necessary for the business, and that would have been more than enough to consider them as regular employees. Petitioners contentions stemmed from Art. 280 of the Labor Code. ISSUE: W/N Petitioners should be considered regular employees. HELD: No. The provision calls for casual employees. Since Petitioners were considered project employees, this provision does not apply to them. Moreover, the fact that they have been working in NSC for more than a year does not mean they are automatically converted into regular employees. (They were hired as project employees for the 5-year expansion program. Once that project is done, their services will no longer be needed.) In Mercado, Sr. vs. NLRC, the proviso in par. 2 of Art.280 relates only to casual employees and is not applicable to those who do not qualify under the definition of such workers in par. 1. The proviso is to be construed with reference to the immediately preceding part of the provision to which it is attached, and not to other sections thereof. Chapter VII, Page 301, Footnote No. 85 FACTS: RA 1394 exempted payment of special import tax for spare parts used for industries and also insulators from all taxes of whatever nature. Respondent contends that their insulating oils are exempt from taxes. ISSUE: W/N insulating oil is an insulator Respondent exempt from paying its taxes. HELD: No, insulating oil is different from insulators. The Supreme Court looked into the definition of insulating oils under Materials Handbook by George J. Brady, 8 th Edition. The court found out that insulating oils are used for cooling as well as insulating. And there is no question that the insulating oil that Respondent is importing is used for cooling instead of insulating. The law frowns on exemption from taxation; hence an exempting provision must be construed stictissimijuris. making

Paras v. COMELEC Case No. 196 G.R. No. 123169 (November 4, 1996) Chapter VI, Page 259, Footnote No. 50 FACTS: A petition for recall was filed against Paras, who is the incumbent Punong Barangay. The recall election was deferred due to Petitioners opposition that under Sec. 74 of RA No. 7160, no recall shall take place within one year from the date of the officials assumption to office or immediately preceding a regular local one year

election. Since the SangguniangKabataan (SK) election was set on the first Monday of May 2006, no recall may be instituted. ISSUE: W/N the SK election is a local election. HELD: No. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to its context, and it must be considered together and kept subservient to its general intent. The evident intent of Sec. 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall once during his term, as provided in par. (a) and par. (b). The spirit, rather than the letter of a law, determines its construction. Thus, interpreting the phrase regular local election to include SK election will unduly circumscribe the Code for there will never be a recall election rendering inutile the provision. interpreting a statute, the Court assumed In

that the legislature intended to enact an effective law. An interpretation should be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.