Consti 1-A Legislative Dept

LECTURE PRESENTATION FOR LAW STUDENTS
ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
BASED ON PHIL. POLITICAL LAW 2002 EDITION BY ISAGANI A. CRUZ RETIRED ASSOCIATE JUSTICE SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINES
CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.
1. WHAT COMPOSES THE CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES?
2. SHOULD MANNY PACQUIAO DECIDES TO RUN FOR THE SENATE AS SUGGESTED BY SOME PEOPLE, WHAT QUALIFICATIONS MUST HE POSSESS?
3. SHOULD MANNY PACQUIAO DECIDES TO RUN FOR THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO REPRESENT THE PROVINCE OF SARANGANI, WHAT QUALIFICATIONS MUST HE POSSESS?
4.
WHO ARE CONSIDERED NATURAL-BORN CITIZENS?
5.
ARE PERSONS BORN OF FOREIGN MOTHERS WHO ELECTED PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONSTITUTION AND LAW, CONSIDERED NATURAL-BORN CITIZENS?
6. WHAT DO YOU UNDERSTAND BY THE TERM RESIDENCE? o ANIMUS MANENDI o ANIMUS REVERTENDI o ANIMUS NON-REVERTENDI
NOTA BENE: MUST READ CASES: 1. LIM v. PELAEZ, ELECTORAL CASE NO. 36, HET. 2. BRILLANTE v. REYES, ELECTORAL CASE NO. 31, HET (1988)
7. WHAT DO YOU UNDERSTAND BY THE TERM THE DAY OF THE ELECTION? NOTA BENE: MUST READ CASE: ESPINOSA v. AQUINO, ELECTORAL CASE NO. 9, SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUTANL.
8. WHAT IS GERRYMANDERING?
9. WHAT IS THE HISTORICAL BASIS OF THIS TERM?
10. WHAT ARE THE TERMS OF OFFICE OF:
A. B.
MEMBERS OF THE SENATE? MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES?
CHAPETER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.
11. CAN A MEMBER OF CONGRESS BE ARRESTED FOR THE COMMISSION OF A CRIME WHILE CONGRESS IS IN SEESION? 12. WHAT ARE THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AVAILMENT OF THE PRIVILEGE FROM ARREST?
13. CAN A MEMBER OF CONGRESS BE QUESTIONED OR HELD LIABLE IN ANY OTHER PLACE FOR ANY SPEECH OR DEBATE IN CONGRESS OR IN ANY COMMITTEE HEARING THEREOF?
14. WHAT ARE THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AVAILMENT OF THE PRIVILEGE OF SPEECH AND DEBATE? MUST READ CASE: OSMENA v. PENDATUN, GR L-17144, OCTOBER 28, 1960.
CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT. 15. WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY LEGISLATURE OR LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE IS FUNCTIONING OR IN SESSION? 16. WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY FINAL ADJOURNMENT?
NOTA BENE: MUST READ CASE: A. LOPEZ v. DELOS REYES, 55 PHIL. 205 B. JIMENEZ v. CABANGBANG, 17 SCRA 876
17. CAN A MEMBER OF CONGRESS HOLD OTHER OFFICE OR EMPLOYMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT OR ANY OF ITS AGENCY DURING HIS TERM OF OFFICE?
18. CONGRESS CREATED AN OFFICE NAMED NATIONAL ARTISTS DEVELOPMENT AGENCY. CAN A MEMBER OF SUCH CONGRESS WHO CREATED THIS OFFICE QUALIFY TO HEAD IT AFTER THE TERM OF HIS OFFICE?
19. CAN A MEMBER OF CONGRESS APPEAR PERSONALLY AS COUNSEL BEFORE ANY COURT, ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, QUASIJUDICIAL OR ANY OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES?
MUST READ CASE: PUYAT v. DE GUZMAN, 113 SCRA 23
20. MANNY POQUIAO WAS ELECTED CONGRESSMAN FOR THE IST DISTRICT OF KIG. BEFORE HIS ELECTION HE TRANSFERRED HIS SHARES IN THE FAMILY CORPORATION TO HIS SON.
QUESTION: CAN HIS SON ENTER INTO A GOVT CONTRACT DURING HIS TERM OF OFFICE?
21. WHAT IS ELECTORAL
THE COMPOSITION OF THE TRIBUNAL? WHAT IS ITS
FUNCTION?
22. WHAT IS THE COMPOSITION OF COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS? WHAT IS ITS FUNCTION? GOOD LUCK
THE
CHAPTER 9 POWERS OF CONGRESS

CLASSIFICATION OF POWERS OF CONGRESS. (*****) 1. LEGISLATIVE POWER. - IS THE AUTHORITY TO MAKE LAWS AND TO ALTER AND REPEAL THEM. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION: THE LEGISLATIVE POWER SHALL BE VESTED IN THE CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES WHICH WILL CONSIST OF A SENATE AND A HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE, EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT RESERVED TO THE PEOPLE BY THE PROVISION ON INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM (Section 1, Article VI, Constitution). a. NATURE OF LEGISLATIVE POWER: (*****)
POWERS OF CONGRESS
a.1) DERIVATIVE AND DELEGATED POWER: (*****)
AS VESTED BY THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS, IT IS DERIVATIVE AND DELEGATED POWER. THE CONSTITUTION IS THE WORK OR WILL OF THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, IN THEIR ORIGINAL, SOVEREIGN, AND UNLIMITED CAPACITY. LAW IS THE WORK OR WILL OF THE LEGISLATURE IN THEIR DERIVATIVE AND SUBORDINATE CAPACITY. THE ONE IS THE WORK OF THE CREATOR, AND THE OTHER OF THE CREATURE. THE CONSTITUTION FIXES LIMITS TO THE EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY, AND PRESCRIBES THE ORBIT WITHIN WHICH IT MUST MOVE (Vanhornes Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 Dall, 304, 308 [U.S.1795]).
SIMPLY PUT, LEGISLATIVE POWER IS ONE DERIVED FROM, AND DELEGATED BY, THE SOVEREIGN PEOPLE TO CONGRESS THROUGH THE CONSTITUTION.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
a.2) PLENARY LEGISLATIVE POWER: (*****) UNLIKE THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES WHICH CONTAINS ONLY A GRANT OF ENUMERATED LEGISLATIVE POWERS TO THE FEDERAL CONGRESS (ALL LEGISLATIVE POWERS HEREIN GRANTED . . . Sec. 1, Art. 1, US Constitution), THE 1987, LIKE THE 1973 AND 1935 CONSTITUTIONS, EMBODIES A GRANT OF PLENARY LEGISLATIVE POWER TO THE PHIL. LEGISLATURE. THUS, ANY POWER, DEEMED TO BE LEGISLATIVE BY USAGE AND TRADITION, IS NECESSARILY POSSESSED BY CONGRESS, UNLESS THE ORGANIC ACT HAS LODGED IT ELSEWHERE (Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192 [1946]). AND IN FACT, SEC. 1, ART. VI OF THE 1987 ORGANIC LAW HAS ALSO GIVEN LEGISLATIVE POWER TO THE ELECTORATE THROUGH THE EXERCISE OF INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AS SET DOWN IN SEC. 32, ART. VI.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
AS COROLLARY TO THIS PLENARY GRANT OF LEGISLATIVE POWER, IT FOLLOWS: a. THAT THE CONGRESS ALONE CAN MAKE LAWS AND CONGRESS MAY NOT DELEGATE ITS LAW MAKING POWER. THIS IS THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER. THAT CONGRESS CANNOT PASS IRREPEALABLE LAWS.
b.
SIMPLY PUT, A PLENARY LEGISLATIVE POWER IS THE POWER TO ENACT LAWS COVERING ANY MATTER SUBJECT ONLY TO THE PROHIBITIONS AND LIMITATIONS EMBODIED IN THE CONSTITUTION.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
b. LIMITATIONS ON LEGISLATIVE POWER: (*****) SPEAKING OF THE POWERS OF THE LEGISLATIVE DEPT. OF GOVERNMENT UNDER THE AMERICAN FLAG, AN EARLY CASE DECIDED BY THE PHIL. SUPREME COURT SAID: SOMEONE HAS SAID THAT THE POWERS OF THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT, LIKE THE BOUNDARIES OF THE OCEAN, ARE UNLIMITED. IN CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT, HOWEVER, AS WELL AS GOVERNMENTS ACTING UNDER DELEGATED AUTHORITY, THE POWERS OF EACH OF THE DEPARTMENTS OF THE SAME ARE LIMITED AND CONFINED WITHIN THE FOUR WALLS OF THE CONSTITUTION OR THE CHARTER, AND EACH DEPT. CAN ONLY EXERCISE SUCH POWERS AS ARE EXPRESSLY GIVEN AND SUCH OTHER POWERS AS ARE NECESSARILY
POWERS OF CONGRESS
IMPLIED FROM THE GIVEN POWERS. THE CONSTITUTION IS THE SHORE OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AGAINST WHICH THE WAVES OF LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT MAY DASH, BUT OVER WHICH IT CANNOT LEAP (Govt. v. Springer, 50Phil. 529, 309 [1927]). ALTHOUGH THE ORIGINAL 1973 CONSTITUTION ADOPTED A PARLIAMENTARY FORM OF GOVERRNMENT, IT DID NOT ADOPT THE ENGLISH PRINCIPLE OF PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY UNDER WHICH PARLIAMENT CAN DO EVERTHING BUT MAKE A WOMAN A MAN, AND A MAN A WOMAN (De Lolme, The Constitution of England 102 [1853]. NEITHER DID THE REVISSION OF 1981 NOR THE 1987 CONSTITUTION. THUS, LEGISLATIVE POWER REMAINS A LIMITED POWER AFTER THE MANNER OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM EMBODIED IN THE 1935 CONSTITUTION. IT IS SUBJECT TO:
POWERS OF CONGRESS
b.1) SUBSTANTIVE LIMITATIONS WHICH CIRCUMSCRIBE BOTH THE EXERCISE OF THE POWER ITSELF AND THE ALLOWABLE SUBJECTS OF LEGISLATION.
THE SUBSTANTIVE LIMITATIONS ARE FOUND IN: b.1.a) ARTICLE III, THE BILL OF RIGHTS; b.1.b) ARTICLE VI, THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT;
b.1.c) OTHER PORTIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
b.2) FORMAL AND PROCEDURAL LIMITATIONS PRESCRIBING THE MANNER OF PASSING BILLS AND THE FORM THEY SHOULD TAKE. THESE ARE FOUND, AMONG OTHERS, IN: b.2a) SEC. 24, ART. VII, THE PASSAGE OF APPROPRIATION, REVENUE, AND TARIFF AND OTHER BILLS; b.2.b) SEC. 26(1), ART. VII, SINGULARITY OF SUBJECT OF BILLS; b.2.c) SEC. 26(2), ART. VII, LEGISLATIVE PROCESS; b.2.d) SEC. 27(1), ART. VII, APPROVAL OF BILLS INTO LAW.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
c. CLASSIFICATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER: (*****) c.1) GENERAL LEGISLATIVE POWER CONSISTS IN THE ENACTMENT OF LAWS INTENDED AS RULES OF CONDUCT TO GOVERN THE RELATIONS AMONG INDIVIDUALS OR BETWEEN THE INDIVIDUALS AND THE STATE. c.2)SPECIFIC LEGISLATIVE POWER - CONSISTS IN THE ENACTMENT OF LAWS EXPRESSLY MANDATED IN THE CONSTITUTION, SUCH AS TO PASS A GENERAL APPROPRIATION LAW.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
CLASSIFICATION OF POWERS OF CONGRESS: 2. NON-LEGILATIVE POWER, SUCH AS: 2.a) POWER TO IMPEACH 2.b) POWER TO CONFIRM TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT EXECUTED BY THE PRESIDENT 2.c) POWER TO DECLARE THE EXISTENCE OF WAR 2.d) POWER TO ACT AS CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY 2.e) POWER TO CONCUR WITH AMNESTY GRANTED BY THE PRESIDENT 2.f) POWER TO ACT AS BOARD OF CANVASSER FOR PRESIDENTIAL AND VICE-PRESIDENTIAL VOTES.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
CLASSIFICATION OF POWERS OF CONGRESS: 3. IMPLIED POWERS THOSE THAT ARE ESSENTIAL TO THE EFFECTIVE EXECUTION OF OTHER POWERS EXPRESSLY GRANTED. EXAMPLE POWER OF LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATION. 4. INHERENT POWERS THESE ARE POWERS WHICH THOUGH NOT EXPRESSLY GIVEN ARE NEVERTHELESS EXERCISED BY CONGRESS AS THEY ARE NECESSARY FOR ITS EXISTENCE. EXAMPLES (EXAMPLES GIVEN ARE ALSO EXPRESS POWERS): a. TO DETERMINE THE RULES OF ITS PROCEEDINGS (Sec. 16 [3] & 21, Art. VII); b. TO DISCIPLINE ITS MEMBERS (Sec. 16[3], Art. VII); c. TO KEEP JOURNALS OF ITS PROCEEDINGS (Sec. 16[4], Art. VII).
POWERS OF CONGRESS
AUTHORITIES: 1) THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, A COMMENTARY, VOLUME II, FIRST EDITION, 1988, JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J.
2)
PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW, REVISED EDITION, 1970, RUPERTO G. MARTIN. PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW, ISAGANI A. CRUZ. 2002 EDITION,
3)
QUESTIONAIRES (*****)
1.
HOW DOES A BILL BECOMES A LAW? WHERE SHOULD APPROPRIATION, REVENUE OR TARIFF BILLS, BILLS OF LOCAL APPLICATION, AND PRIVATE BILLS ORIGINATE? WHAT IS AN TARIFF BILL? BILL? APPROPRIATION BILL? REVENUE BILL? BILL OF LOCAL APPLICATION? PRIVATE
2.
3.
4.
IN THE ENACTMENT OF A TAX LAW, WOULD IT BE POSSIBLE THAT THE SENATE VERSION OF THE TAX BILL BE ADOPTED AND APPROVED AS THE TAX LAW?
QUESTIONAIRES
5.
IF THE PRESIDENT DOES NOT WANT A BILL TO BE PASSED INTO LAW, WHAT SHALL HE DO? IF CONGRESS WANTS IT PASSED INTO LAW, WHAT SHALL IT DO? (Bar Flunkers Act of 1953; In re Cunanan, et al., 94 Phil. 534). CONGRESS PASSED A LAW, RA 4790, ENTITLED AN ACT CREATING THE MUNICAPLITY OF DIANATON IN THE PROVINCE OF LANAO DEL SUR WHEN IN FACT THE SAID MUNICIPALITY COMPRISED NOT ONLY BARRIOS IN LANAO DEL SUR BUT ALSO TWO MUNICIPALITIES TO BE DISMEMBERED IN THE ADJACENT PROVINCE OF COTABATO (Lidasan v. Comelec, 21 SCRA 496) . AS A STUDENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, WHAT IS YOUR OBSERVATION OF THIS LAW?
6.
QUESTIONAIRES
7.
THE PRESENT 14TH CONGRESS OF THE 5TH PHIL. REPUBLIC HAS A LIFE OF 3 YEARS EFFECTIVE JUNE 30, 2007 UP TO JUNE 30, 2010. IT HOLDS REGULAR SESSION STARTING 4TH MONDAY OF EVERY JULY AND ADJOURNS FOR RECESS 30 DAYS PRIOR TO THE OPENING OF THE NEXT REGULAR SESSION. IN MAY, 2008, THE HOUSE OF REP HELD A LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY IN RELATIONS WITH ITS PROPOSED BILL REGULATING THE CTPL INSURANCE INDUSTRY. MR. CONFESSOR, CEO OF ABC INSURANCE CO., WAS SUMMONED TO APPEAR BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE TO SHED LIGHT ON CERTAIN ANOMALOUS PRACTICES IN THE CONDUCT OF THE CTPL BUSINESS. DURING THE HEARING HE REFUSED TO ANSWER IMPORTANT RELEVANT QUESTION ON THE GROUND THAT HE MAY INCRIMINATE CERTAIN GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL. THEREAFTER, HE WAS CITED IN DIRECT CONTEMPT AND WAS DETAINED AT THE HOUSE EVEN BEYOND ITS ADJOURNMENT FOR RECESS ON JUNE 13, 2008 UNTIL TODAY, AUG. 1, 2008 DUE TO HIS CONTINUED REFUSAL TO ANSWER. QUESTION: IS HIS CONTINUED DETENTION AT THE HOUSE LEGAL? EXPLAIN. (Lopez v. De Los Reyes, 55 Phil.170; Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29).
PROPOSED ANSWER TO QUESTION NO. 7

YES, THE CONTINUED DETENTION OF MR. CONFESSOR IS LEGAL. IT IS WITHIN THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF THE HOUSE TO CONDUCT INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION WHICH INCLUDES THE POWER TO PUNISH CONTUMACIOUS WITNESS WITH DETENTION FOR CONTINUED REFUSAL TO ANSWER RELEVANT QUESTION. IN THE CASE AT BAR, MR. CONFESSOR CONTINUOUS LY REFUSED TO ANSWER QUESTION WHICH IS RELEVANT TO THE SUBJECT OF LEGISLATION UNDER CONSIDERATION. AS SETLLED IN THE CASE OF ARNAULT V. NAZARENO, HIS DETENTION COULD LAST NOT ONLY DURING THE 2007-2008 SESSION, WHEN THE OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED, BUT COULD LAST UNTIL THE FINAL ADJOURNMENT OF THE 14TH CONGRESS IN THE YEAR 2010. THIS IS NECESSARY TO PRESERVE THE LEGISLATURE AS AN INSTITUTION.
QUESTIONAIRES
8.
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF MANILA HAS VARIOUS REAL PROPERTIES AMONG WHICH IS A PARKING LOT NEAR ONE OF ITS CHURCHES. THE PARKING LOT COLLECTS P20.00 PER VEHICLE PER 3-HOUR USAGE AS RENTAL AND HAS A TOTAL OF P60,000.00 RENTAL COLLECTION A MONTH. UPON A THIRD PARTY INFORMATION, BIR DISCOVERED THIS AND ASSESSED THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF MANILA THE PRESUMPTIVE VAT LIABILITY FOR THE YEAR 2007 AMOUNTING TO P86,400.00. THE CHURCH QUESTIONED THE VALIDITY OF THE ASSESSMENT AND INVOKE ITS EXEMPTION FROM TAXATION UNDER SECTION 28(3), ARTICLE VI OF THE CONSTITUTION. QUESTION: IS THE CHURCHS ARGUMENT CORRECT? (Lladoc v. Commisioner of Internal Revenue, 14 SCRA 292)

CONSIDER THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION: CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS, CHURCHES AND PARSONAGES OR CONVENTS APPURTENANT THERETO, MOSQUES, NONPROFIT CEMETERIES, AND ALL LANDS, BUILDINGS, AND IMPROVEMENTS, ACTUALLY , DIRECTLY, AND EXCLUSIVELY USED FOR RELIGIOUS, CHARITABLE, OR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM TAXATION (Sec. 28 [3], Art. VI).

ANSWER: NO, THE ARGUMENT OF THE CHURCH IS NOT CORRECT. UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, WHAT ARE EXEMPTED FROM TAXATION, AMONG OTHERS, ARE ALL LANDS, BUILDINGS, AND IMPROVEMENTS ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY, AND EXCLUSIVELY USED FOR RELIGIOUS, CHARITABLE, OR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES. IN THE CASE AT BAR, THE PARKING LOT IS NOT SO USED AS IT IS AVAILABLE TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC REGARDLESS OF REASON FOR USING IT. ASSUMING, ARGUENDO , THAT IT IS SO USED, STILL THE ASSESSMENT FOR VAT IS CORRECT BECAUSE WHAT IT IS EXEMPTED, AS SETTLED IN THE LLADOC V. CIR CASE, IS FROM THE PAYMENT OF REAL ESTATE TAXES AND NOT FROM THE PAYMENT OF EXCISE TAXES, LIKE THE VAT.
CHAPTER 10 THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

1.
THE EXECUTIVE POWER CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION: EXECUTIVE POWER SHALL BE OF THE PHILIPPINES. SEC. 1, ART. VII, THE VESTED IN THE PRESIDENT
THE SEAT OF EXECUTIVE POWER IN PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW HAS UNDERGONE A SERIES OF RELOCATIONS. THE 1935 CONSTITUTION VESTED EXECUTIVE POWER IN THE PRESIDENT. UNDER THE ORIGINAL 1973 CONSTITUTION EXECUTIVE POWER WAS FOR THE PRIME MINISTER TO EXERCISE AND THE PRESIDENT WAS REDUCED TO A MERE SYMBOLIC HEAD OF STATE. THE IDEA OF A MERELY CEREMONIAL
PRESIDENT,
HOWEVER,
DIED EVEN
BEFORE IT
THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

1.
THE EXECUTIVE POWER. COULD BE TESTED. WHEN THE ORIGINAL 1973 CONSTITUTION TOOK EFFECT, PRESDENT MARCOS, WHO WAS PRESIDENT UNDER THE 1935 CONSTITUTION, WAS ALLOWED TO RETAIN HIS 1935 CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS AND AT THE SAME TIME BECAME CEREMONIAL PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER. AND HE NEVER WAS MERELY CEREMONIAL HEAD. IN 1981, THE 1973 CONSTITUTION WAS REVISED AND THE PRESIDENT WAS ONCE MORE MADE HEAD OF STATE AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE, WHILE THE PRIME MINISTER WAS REDUCED TO BEING A CEREMONIAL FIGURE. WITH THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM RETURNS TO THE PRESIDENTIAL MODEL OF THE 1935 CONSTITUTION EXECUTIVE POWER IS VESTED IN THE PRESIDENT.

1.
THE EXECUTIVE POWER. IN THE PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM, MOREOVER, THE PRESIDENCY INCLUDES MANY OTHER FUNCTIONS THAN JUST BEING CHIEF EXECUTIVE. WRITING ABOUT THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT, CLINTON ROSSITER SAID (The American Presidency 14-5[1962]):
HE REMAINS TODAY, AS HE HAS ALWAYS BEEN, THE CEREMONIAL HEAD OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES, AND HE MUST TAKE PART WITH REAL OR APPARENT ENTHUSIASM IN A RANGE OF ACTIVITES THAT WOULD KEEP HIM RUNNING AND POSING FROM SUNRISE TO BEDTIME IF HE WERE NOT PROTECTED BY A COLD-BLOODED STAFF. SOME OF THESE ACTIVITIES ARE SOLEMN OR EVEN PRIESTLY IN NATURE; OTHERS, THROUGH NO FAULT OF HIS OWN, ARE FLIRTATIONS WITH VULGARITY. THE LONG CATALOGUE OF

1.
THE EXECUTIVE POWER. PUBLIC DUTIES THAT THE QUEEN DISCHARGES IN ENGLAND, THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF FRANCE, AND THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF CANADA IS THE PRESDIENTS RESPONSIBILITY IN THIS COUNTRY, AND THE CATALOGUE IS EVEN LONGER BECAUSE HE IS NOT A KING, OR EVEN THE AGENT OF ONE, AND IS THEREFORE EXPECTED TO GO THROUGH SOME RATHER UNDIGNIFIED PACES BY A PEOPLE WHO THINK OF HIM AS A COMBINATION OF SCOUTMASTER, DELPHIC ORACLE, HERO OF THE SILVER SCREEN, AND FATHER OF MULTITUDE.
WHAT ROSSITER SAID OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT CAN BE SAID WITH EQUAL TRUTH OF THE PHILIPPINE PRESIDENT.

2.
THE CABINET. ALTHOUGH THE CONSTITUTION MENTIONS THE CABINET A NUMBER OF TIMES (Sec. 3, 11, & 13, Art. VII), THE CABINET ITSELF AS AN INSTITUTION IS EXTRA-CONSTITUTIONALLY CREATED. IT ESSENTIALLY CONSISTS OF THE HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS WHO THROUGH USAGE HAVE FORMED A BODY OF PRESIDENTIAL ADVISERS WHO MEET REGULARLY WITH THE PRESIDENT. ALTHOUGH THEY ARE THE PRINCIPAL OFFICERS THROUGH WHOM THE PRESIDENT EXECUTE THE LAW, THE PRESDIENT, THROUGH HIS POWER OF CONTROL OVER THEM AND HIS POWER TO REMOVE THEM AT WILL, REMAINS THE CHIEF OF ADMINISTRATION.

3.
QUALIFICATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT. (*****) SEC. 2, ART. VII, PROVIDES THAT: NO PERSON MAY BE ELECTED PRESIDENT UNLESS HE IS:
a. b. c. d.
A NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES; A REGISTERED VOTER; ABLE TO READ AND WRITE; AT LEAST FORTY YEARS OF AGE ON THE DAY OF THE ELECTION; AND e. A RESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FOR AT LEAST TEN YEARS IMMEDIATELY PRECEEDING SUCH ELECTION.

3.
QUALIFICATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT. (*****) QUESTIONS: 1) CAN CONGRESS INCREASE ABOVE QUALIFICATIONS? OR REDUCE THE
2) WHAT IS EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS 3) WHO IS CONSIDERED A NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN? 4) DEFINE RESIDENCE?

4. MEANING OF RESIDENCE. (*****) WHO IS CONSIDERED RESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES? ONE IS A RESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES IF HE IS DOMICILED THERE, THAT IS, THERE MUST CONCUR: (1) BODILY PRESENCE IN THE LOCALITY; (2) AN INTENTION TO REMAIN THERE ANIMUS MANENDI; AND (3) AN INTENTION TO ABANDON THE OLD DOMICILE, IF HE HAD ONE, OR ANIMUS NON REVERTENDI.

4. MEANING OF RESIDENCE. (*****) WHILE, HOWEVER, BODILY PRESENCE IN THE LOCALITY IS REQUIRED, THE RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT ALLOWS FOR TEMPORARY PHYSICAL ABSENCES PROVIDED THAT THE ANIMUS REVERTENDI TO THE DOMICILE IS NEVER ABANDONED. (Gallego v. Vera, 73 Phil. 453 [1941]); Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 [1954]).

6.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION - TERM OF OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE VICE-PRESIDENT. (*****) THE PRESIDENT AND THE VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL BE ELECTED BY DIRECT VOTE OF THE PEOPLE FOR A TERM OF SIX YEARS WHICH SHALL BEGIN AT NOON ON THE 30TH DAY OF JUNE NEXT FOLLOWING THE DAY OF THE ELECTION AND SHALL END AT NOON OF THE SAME DATE SIX YEARS THEREAFTER. THE PRESIDENT SHALL NOT BE ELIGIBLE FOR ANY REELECTION. NO PERSON WHO HAS SUCCEEDED AS PRESIDENT AND HAS SERVED AS SUCH FOR MORE THAN FOUR YEARS SHALL BE QUALIFIED FOR ELECTION TO THE SAME OFFICE AT ANY TIME. (Sec. 4, Art. VII, par. 1). NOTA BENE: LONZANIDA V. COMELEC (311 SCRA 602) RE THREE-TERM LIMIT IN THE CONSTITUTION.

6.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION - TERM OF OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE VICE-PRESIDENT. (*****) NOTE LONZANIDA V. COMELEC CASE (311 SCRA 602) REGARDING THE 3-TERM LIMIT IN THE CONSTITUTION. IN THIS CASE, THE PETITIONER WAS ELECTED 3 TIMES AS MAYOR BUT LOST IN AN ELECTION PROTEST AND WAS OUSTED DURING HIS 3RD TERM. INTERPRETING THE 3-TERM LIMIT IN THE CONSITUTION AND LGC FOR LOCAL OFFICIALS, THE SC HELD THAT HE WAS NOT DISQUALIFIED FROM RUNNING FOR THE SAME POSITION AGAIN BECAUSE HIS 3RD ELECTION WAS NULLIFIED AND HE DID NOT FULLY SERVE THE 3RD TERM. HOWEVER, THIS RULING IS NOT NECESSARILY DECISIVE OF THE QUESTION AS IT APPLIES TO THE TERM LIMITS OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE VICE-PRESIDENT.

6.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION-TERM OF OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE VICE-PRESIDENT. (*****) NO VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL SERVE FOR MORE THAN TWO SUCCESSIVE TERMS. VOLUNTARY RENUNCIATION OF THE OFFICE FOR ANY LENGTH OF TIME SHALL NOT BE CONSIDERED AS AN INTERRUPTION IN THE CONTINUITY OF THE SERVICE FOR THE FULL TERM FOR WHICH HE WAS ELECTED. (Sec. 4, Art. VII, par. 2). THE SUPREME COURT, SITTING EN BANC, SHALL BE THE SOLE JUDGE OF ALL CONTESTS RELATING TO THE ELECTION, RETURNS, AND QUALIFICATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT OR VICEPRESIDENT, . . . . (Sec. 4, Art. VII, par. 7).

7.
DISCUSSION ON THE TERM OF THE PRESIDENT. (***) IT WAS ARGUED THAT SIX YEARS WAS LONG ENOUGH FOR A GOOD PRESIDENT TO IMPLEMENT HIS PROGRAMS AND, RATHER OPTIMISTICALLY, THAT WITH THE CONSTRAINTS BUILT AROUND THE PRESIDENCY, A BAD ONE WOULD NOT SUCCEED IN ACCOMPLISHING HIS EVIL DESIGNS.

7.
DISCUSSION ON THE TERM OF THE PRESIDENT. (***) THE FIXING OF THE EXACT TIME AND DATE FOR THE START AND ENDING OF THE TERM EXCLUDES THE RIGHT TO HOLD-OVER. AT NOON ON JUNE 30 SIX YEARS AFTER THE START OF THE TERM, EITHER THE NEWLY ELECTED PRESIDENT TAKES OVER OR THE RULE ON FILLING OF VACANCIES FOUND IN SECTION 7, ARTICLE VII BECOMES OPERATIVE.

7.
DISCUSSION ON THE TERM OF THE PRESIDENT. AN INNOVATION INTRODUCED BY THE 1986 CONCOM IS THE LIMIT ON THE NUMBER OF TERM A PRESIDENT MAY SERVE. A PRESIDENT IS NOT ELIGIBLE FOR ANY REELECTION FOR THAT OFFICE, THAT IS, EITHER IMMEDIATELY AFTER HIS TERM OR EVEN AFTER AN INTERVAL OF ONE OR MORE TERMS.

7.
DISCUSSION ON THE TERM OF THE PRESIDENT. IT WAS THOUGHT THAT THE ELIMINATION OF THE PROSPECT OF REELECTION WOULD MAKE FOR A MORE INDEPENDENT PRESIDENT CAPABLE OF MAKING CORRECT, EVEN IF UNPOPULAR, DECISIONS. THE PROHIBITION OF REELECTION APPLIES TO ANY PERSON WHO HAS SERVED* AS PRESIDENT FOR MORE THAN FOUR YEARS. (The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, First Edition, 1988, Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J.). *EITHER BY ELECTION OR SUCCESSION

5.
CASE EXAMPLE - TERM OF OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT: IN AN ELECTION FOR THE PRESIDENCY FOR A TERM OF 6 YEARS STARTING JUNE 30, 200A TO JUNE 30, 200G, MR. MEROLCO WAS PROCLAIMED AS THE ELECTED PRESIDENT FOR A FIXED TERM OF 6 YEARS STARTING JUNE 30, 200A. HOWEVER, MR. GSAS, HIS RIVAL, FILED AN ELECTION PROTEST WITH THE PET. AFTER 4-1/2 YEARS IN OFFICE, THE ELECTION PROTEST WAS DECIDED IN FAVOR OF MR. GSAS;THEREAFTER, MR . GSAS TOOK HIS OATH OF OFFICE AS THE DULY ELECTED PRESIDENT TO GOVERN THE COUNTRY FOR THE BALANCE OF THE TERM WHICH IS 1-1/2 YEARS. QUESTIONS: CAN MR. MEROLCO RUN FOR PRESIDENT IN THE NEXT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION? HOW ABOUT MR. GSAS? (Note Lonzanida v. Comelec, case 311 SCRA 602)

THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (MACALINTAL SEEKS ABOLITION OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL PETITION WITH SC DATED APRIL 5, 2010: PGMA ELECTION LAWYER, R. MACALINTAL, SOUGHT THE ABOLITION OF THE PET, WHICH HE ARGUED WAS ILLEGALLY CREATED AND COULD BE UNNECESSARILY EATING UP GOVERNMENT FUNDS.
IN A 7-PAGE PETITION, MACALINTAL ASKED THE SC TO DECLARE THE CREATION OF THE PET IN VIOLATION OF TWO PROVISIONS IN THE CONSTITUTION: PAR. 7, SEC. 4,

ART. VII, AND SEC. 12, ART. VIII. MACALINTAL ARGUED THAT THE SC SITTING EN BANC SHOULD RESOLVE ELECTORAL PROTESTS IN THE PRESIDENTIAL AND VICE-PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, AND NOT THE PET. THE FIRST PROVISION STATES: THE SC, SITTING EN BANC, SHALL BE THE SOLE JUDGE OF ALL CONTESTS RELATING TO THE ELECTION, RETURNS, AND QUALIFICATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT OR VICE-PRESIDENT, AND MAY PROMULGATE ITS RULES FOR THE PURPOSE.

THE SECOND PROVISION STATES: THE MEMBERS OF THE SC AND OTHER COURTS ESTABLISHED BY LAW SHALL NOT BE DESIGNATED TO ANY AGENCY PERFORMING QUASIJUDICIAL OR ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS. MACALINTAL ALSO SAID THE HIGH COURT WAS MISTAKEN IN CREATING THE PET BECAUSE THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT AUTHORIZE THE CREATION OF ANOTHER TRIBUNAL OPERATING ON ITS OWN BUDGET. MACALINTAL ARGUED THAT THE PET GIVES MAGISTRATES DUAL POSITIONS IN GOVERNMENT. SC

TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE THAT THIS PETITION BE RESOLVED WITH DISPATCH IN VIEW OF THE FORTHCOMING PRESIDENDTIAL ELECTIONS IN MAY, 2010 WHERE CASES MAY BE FILED INVOLVING THE ELECTION, RETURNS OR QUALIFICATIONS OF CANDIDATES FOR PRESIDENT OR VICE-PRESIDENT, HE SAID IN THE PETITION.

THE SC HELD THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PET IS AUTHORIZED BY THE LAST PAR. OF SEC. 24, ART. VII OF THE CONSTITUTION AND SUPPORTED BY THE DISCUSSIONS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE CONCOM. THE PROVISION WHICH STATES THAT THE SC SITTING EN BANC, SHALL BE THE SOLE JUDGE OF ALL CONTESTS RELATING TO ELECTIONS, RETURNS, AND QUALIFICATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT OR VICE PRESIDENT, AND MAY PROMULGATE ITS RULES FOR THE PURPOSE4, MANDATES THE SC TO CREATE THE PET, THE COURT HELD.

THE COURT STRESSED THE PLENARY GRANT TO IT BY THE CONSTITUTION OF JUDICIAL POWER AND THAT UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSARY IMPLICATION, THE ADDITIONAL JURISDICTION BESTOWED BY THE LAST PAR. OF SEC. 4, ART. VII OF THE CONSTITUTION TO DECIDE PRESIDENTIAL AND VICE PRESDIENTIAL CONTESTS INCLUDES THE MEANS NECESSARY TO CARRY IT. THE SC RULED THAT ITS METHOD OF DECIDING PRESDIENTIAL AND VICE PRESDIENTIAL ELECTION CONTESTS THROUGH PET, IS ACTUALLY A DERIVATIVE OF THE EXERCISE OF THE PREROGATIVE CONFERRED BY THE SAID CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION.

THE SC HELD THE POWER OF PET IS A DERIVATIVE OF THE PLENARY JUDICIAL POWER ALLOCATED TO COURTS OF LAW, EXPRESSLY PROVIDED FOR IN THE CONSITUTION. (MAKALINTAL V. PET, GR NO. 191618, JUNE 7, 2011)

8.
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION. A. THERE ARE TWO SETS OF RULES ON PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION:
SECTION 7 ON VACANCIES OCCURING BEFORE THE PRESIDENT ASSUMED HIS TERM OF OFFICE;
SECTION 8 ON VACANCIES OCCURING PRESIDENT ASSUMED HIS TERM OF OFFICE. AFTER THE

8.
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION: SECTION 7, ARTICLE VII: THE PRESIDENT-ELECT AND THE VICE-PRESIDENT-ELECT SHALL ASSUME OFFICE AT THE BEGINNING OF THEIR TERMS. IF THE PRESIDENT-ELECT FAILS TO QUALIFY, THE VICEPRESIDENTELECT SHALL ACT AS PRESIDENT UNTIL THE PRESIDENT-ELECT SHALL HAVE QUALIFIED.
IF THE PRESIDENT SHALL NOT HAVE BEEN CHOSEN, THE VICE-PRESIDENT-ELECT SHALL ACT AS PRESIDENT UNTIL A PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE BEEN CHOSEN AND QUALIFIED.

8.
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION. IF AT THE BEGINNING OF THE TERM OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT-ELECT SHALL HAVE DIED OR SHALL HAVE BECOME PERMANENTLY DISABLED, THE VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL BECOME PRESIDENT. WHERE NO PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE BEEN CHOSEN OR SHALL HAVE QUALIFIED, OR WHERE BOTH SHALL HAVE DIED OR BECOME PERMANENTLY DISABLED, THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE OR, IN CASE OF HIS INABILITY, THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SHALL ACT AS PRESIDENT UNTIL A PRESIDENT OR A VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE BEEN CHOSEN AND QUALIFIED.

8.
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION. THE CONGRESS SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR THE MANNER IN WHICH ONE WHO IS TO ACT AS PRESIDENT SHALL BE SELECTED UNTIL A PRESIDENT OR A VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE QUALIFIED, IN CASE OF DEATH, PERMANENT DISABILITY, OR INABILITY OF THE OFFICIALS MENTIONED IN THE NEXT PRECEEDING PAPRAGRAPH. SECTION 8, ARTICLE VII: IN CASE OF DEATH, PERMANENT DISABILITY, REMOVAL FROM OFFICE, OR RESIGNATION OF THE PRESIDENT, THE VICEPRESIDENT SHALL BECOME THE PRESIDENT TO SERVE THE

8.
THEPRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION. UNEXPIRED TERM. IN CASE OF DEATH, PERMANENT DISABILITY, REMOVAL FROM OFFICE, OR RESIGNATION OF BOTH THE PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE OR, IN CASE OF HIS INABILITY, THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE SHALL THEN ACT AS PRESIDENT UNTIL THE PRESIDENT OR VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE BEEN ELECTED AND QUALIFIED. THE CONGRESS SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE, WHO SHALL SERVE AS PRESIDENT IN CASE OF DEATH, PERMANENT DISABILITY, OR RESIGNATION OF THE ACTING PRESIDENT. HE SHALL SERVE UNTIL THE PRESIDENT OR THE VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE BEEN ELECTED AND QUALIFIED, AND BE SUBJECT TO THE SAME RESTRICTIONS OF POWERS AND DISQUALIFICATION AS THE ACTING PRESIDENT.

8.
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION. THE CASES CONTEMPLATED IN SECTION 7 ARE: a. FAILURE OF THE PRESIDENT-ELECT TO QUALIFY, THAT IS, TO ASSUME HIS OFFICE BY TAKING THE OATH AND ENTERING INTO THE DISCHARGE OF HIS DUTIES; b. FAILUE TO ELECT THE PRESIDENT, AS WHERE THE CANVASS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS HAS NOT YET BEEN COMPLETED, OR WHERE FOR ONE REASON OR ANOTHER THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION HAS NOT BEEN HELD; c. DEATH OR PERMANENT DISABILITY OF THE PRESDIENTELECT. IN (a) AND (b), THE VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL MERELY ACTS AS PRESIDENT; WHILE, IN (c), HE BECOMES THE PRESIDENT.

8.
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION. SECTION 8 DEALS WITH VACANCIES OCCURING IN THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT DURING HIS INCUMBENCY AND IS LIMITED TO FOUR INSTANCES: a. b. c. d. DEATH; REMOVAL; RESIGNATION; OR PERMANENT DISABILITY, LIKE INCURABLE INSANITY.

8.
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION. B. JOSEPH ESTRADA V. GMA (G.R. NO. L-146738, MARCH 2, 2001). ESTRADA QUESTIONED GMAS RIGHT TO SUCCEED HIM AS PRESDIENT, CLAIMING THAT HE HAD LEFT MALACANANG ON JAN. 20, 2001 ONLY TO DIFFUSE THE TENSION BUILDING UP AMONG THE DEMONSTRATORS AT EDSA WHO WERE DEMANDING HIS RESIGNATION. HE DENIED HE HAD RESIGNED AND SAID HE HAD EVERY INTENTION TO RETURN AFTER THE DISTURBANCES SHALL HAVE ENDED BUT WAS PREVENTED FROM DOING DOING SO.
JUSTICE REYNATO S. PUNO DECLARED IN PART FOR THE COURT:

8.
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION. B. ESTRADA V. GMA: IN SUM, WE HOLD THAT THE RESIGNATION OF THE PETITIONER CANNOT BE DOUBTED. IT WAS CONFIRMED BY HIS LEAVING MALACANANG. IN THE PRESS RELEASE CONTAINING HIS FINAL STATEMENT, (1) HE ACKNOWLEDGED THE OATHTAKING OF THE RESPONDENT AS PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC ALBEIT WITH RESERVATION ABOUT ITS LEGALITY; (2) HE EMPHASIZED HE WAS LEAVING THE PALACE, THE SEAT OF THE PRESIDENCY, FOR THE SAKE OF PEACE AND IN ORDER TO BEGIN TH HEALING PROCESS OF OUR NATION. HE DID NOT SAY HE WAS LEAVING THE PALACE DUE TO ANY KIND OF INABILITY AND THAT HE WAS GOING TO RE-ASSUME THE PRESIDENCY AS SOON AS THE DISABILITY APPEARS (DIS?); (3) HE EXPRESSED HIS GRATITUDE TO THE PEOPLE FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO SERVE THEM. WITHOUT DOUBT HE WAS REFERRING TO THE PAST

8.
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION. B. ESTRADA V. GMA: OPPORTUNITY GIVEN HIM TO SERVE THE PEOPLE AS THEIR PRESIDENT; (4) HE ASSURED THAT HE WILL NOT SHIRK FROM ANY FUTURE CHALLENGE THAT MAY COME AHEAD IN THE SAME SERVICE OF OUR COUNTRY. PETITIONERS REFERENCE IS TO A FUTURE CHALLENGE AFTER OCCUPYING THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT WHICH HE HAS GIVEN UP, AND (5) HE CALLED ON HIS SUPPORTERS TO JOIN HIM IN THE PROMOTION OF A NATIONAL SPIRIT OF RECONCILIATION AND SOLIDARITY. CERTAINLY, THE NATIONAL SPIRIT OF RECONCILIATION AND SOLIDARITY COULD NOT BE ATTAINED IF HE DID NOT GIVE UP THE PRESIDENCY. THE PRESS RELEASE WAS PETITIONERS VALEDICTORY, HIS FINAL ACT OF FAREWELL. HIS PRESIDENCY IS NOW IN THE PAST TENSE.

8.
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION. B. ESTRADA V. GMA: ESTRADA ALSO AGRUED THAT GMA COULD NOT HAVE REPLACED HIM EITHER IN AN ACTING CAPACITY BECAUSE THE DETERMINATION OF THE PRESIDENTS INABILITY TO DISCHARGE THE POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF HIS OFFICE SHOULD BE MADE BY THE CONGRESS PURSUANT TO THE PROCEDURE LAID DOWN IN SECTION 11, ARTICLE VII. THE COURT HELD THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN REPLACED ON THAT GROUND; AND ANYWAY, THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE HAD, BY RESOLUTION, FORMALLY RECOGNIZED GMA AS THE CONSTITUTIONAL SUCCESSOR OF ESTRADA BY REASON OF HIS RESIGNATION AS PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES.

8.
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION. C. INABILITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO DISCHARGE HIS POWERS AND DUTIES. SECTION 11, ARTICLE VII. WHENEVER THE PRESIDENT TRANSMIT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE AND THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES HIS WRITTEN DECLARATION THAT HE IS UNABLE TO DISCHARGE THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF HIS OFFICE, AND UNTIL HE TRANSMITS TO THEM A WRITTEN DECLARATION TO THE CONTRARY, SUCH POWERS AND DUTIES SHALL BE DISCHARGED BY THE VICE-PRESIDENT AS ACTING PRESIDENT.

8.
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION. C. INABILITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO DISCHARGE HIS POWERS AND DUTIES. WHENEVER A MAJORITY OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE CABINET TRANSMIT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE AND TO THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THEIR WRITTEN DECLARATION THAT THE PRESIDENT IS UNABLE TO DISCHARGE THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF HIS OFFICE, THE VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL DISCHARGE THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE OFFICE AS ACTING PRESIDENT. THEREAFTER, WHEN THE PRESIDENT TRANSMIT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE AND TO THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES HIS WRITTEN DECLARATION

8.
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION. THAT NO INABILITY EXISTS, HE SHALL REASSUME THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF HIS OFFICE. MEANWHILE, SHOULD A MAJORITY OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE CABINET TRANSMIT WITHIN FIVE DAYS TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE AND TO THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THEIR WRITTEN DECLARATION THAT THE PRESIDENT IS UNABLE TO DISCHARGE THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF HIS OFFICE, THE CONGRESS SHALL DECIDE THE ISSUE. FOR THAT PURPOSE, THE CONGRESS SHALL CONVENE, IF IT IS NOT IN SESSION, WITHIN FORTY-EIGHT HOURS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS RULES AND WITHOUT NEED OF CALL.

8.
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION. IF THE CONGRESS WITHIN TEN DAYS AFTER RECEIPT OF THE LAST WRITTEN DECLARATION, OR, IF NOT IN SESSION, WITHIN TWELVE DAYS AFTER IT IS REQUIRED TO ASSEMBLE, DETERMINES BY A TWO-THIRDS VOTE OF BOTH HOUSES, VOTING SEPARATELY, THAT THE PRESIDENTV IS UNABLE TO DISCHARGE THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF HIS OFFICE, THE VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL ACT AS PRESIDENT ; OTHERWISE, THE PRESIDENT SHALL CONTINUE EXERCISING THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF HIS OFFICE.

8.
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION. C. INABILITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO DISCHARGE HIS POWERS AND DUTIES. 1. ESTRADA V. GMA (G.R. L - 146738, March 2, 2001) JAN. 20, 2001 SIR, BY VIRTUE OF PROVISION SEC. 11, ART. VII OF THE CONSTITUTION, I AM HEREBY TRANSMITTING THIS DECLARATION THAT I AM UNABLE TO EXERCISE THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF MY OFFICE. BY OPERATION OF LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION, THE VICEPRESIDENT SHALL BE THE ACTING PRESIDENT. PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA

8.
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION. C. INABILITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO DISCHARGE HIS POWERS AND DUTIES. 1. ESTRADA V. GMA (G.R. L 146738, March 2, 2001).
ESTRADA TRIED TO TEST THIS PROVISION BY HIS MYSTERIOUS LETTER BUT THE COURT HELD THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN REPLACED ON THAT GROUND; AND ANYWAY, THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE HAD, BY RESOLUTION, FORMALLY RECOGNIZED GMA AS THE CONSTITUTIONAL SUCCESSOR BY REASON OF HIS RESIGNATION AS PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. HENCE, THIS ISSUE BECAME A POLITICAL QUESTION WHICH THE COURT, UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS, HAS NO POWER TO REVIEW.

8.
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION. (***) D. VACANCY IN THE OFFICE OF THE VICE-PRESIDENT DURING THE TERM FOR WHICH HE WAS ELECTED.
QUESTION: WHAT IS THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS REQUIRED TO REPLACE AND INSTALL A NEW VICE-PRESDIDENT IN CASE A VACANCY OCCURS IN HIS OFFICE DURING THE TERM FOR WHICH HE WAS ELECTED, LIKE FOR INSTANCE, WHEN THE INCUMBENT VICE-PRESIDENT SUCCEDED AS PRESIDENT?

8.
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION. D. VACANCY IN THE OFFICE OF THE VICE-PRESIDENT DURING THE TERM FOR WHICH HE WAS ELECTED. SECTION 9, ARTICLE VII: WHENEVER THERE IS A VACANCY IN THE OFFICE OF THE VICE-PRESIDENT DURING THE TERM FOR WHICH HE WAS ELECTED, THE PRESDIENT SHALL NOMINATE A VICE-PRESIDENT FROM AMONG THE MEMBERS OF SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES WHO SHALL ASSUME OFFICE UPON CONFIRMATION BY A MAJORITY VOTE OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF BOTH HOUSES OF CONGRESS VOTING SEPARATELY. (GMA & GUINGONA CASE)

8.
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION. E. FILLING OF THE VACANCY IN THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT AND VICE-RESIDENT. SECTION 10, ARTICLE VII: THE CONGRESS SHALL, AT TEN OCLOCK IN THE MORNING OF THE THIRD DAY AFTER VACANCY IN THE OFFICES OF THE PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT OCCURS, CONVENE IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS RULES WITHOUT NEED OF A CALL AND WITHIN SEVEN DAYS ENACT A LAW CALLING FOR A SPECIAL ELECTION TO ELECT A PRESIDENT AND A VICE-PRESIDENT TO BE HELD NOT EARLIER THAN 45 DAYS NOR LATER THAN 60 DAYS FROM THE TIME OF SUCH CALL. THE BILL CALLING SUCH SPECIAL ELECTION SHAL BE DEEMED CERTIFIED UNDER PARAGRAPH 2, SECTION 26, ARTICLE VI OF THIS

8.
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION. E. FILLING OF THE VACANCY IN THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT. CONSTITUTION AND SHALL BECOME LAW UPON ITS APPROVAL ON THIRD READING BY THE CONGRESS. APPROPRIATION FOR THE SPECIAL ELECTION SHALL BE CHARGED AGAINST ANY CURRENT APPROPRIATIONS AND SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM THE REQUIRE MENTS OF PARAGRAPH 4, SECTION 25, ARTICLE VI OF THIS CONSTITUTION. THE CONVENING OF THE CONGRESS CANNOT BE SUSPENDED NOR THE SPECIAL ELECTION POSTPONED. NO SPECIAL ELECTION SHALL BE CALLED IF THE VACANCY OCCURS WITHIN I8 MONTHS BEFORE THE DATE OF THE NEXT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.

9.
EXECUTIVE INHIBITIONS (***) QUESTION: CAN AN ENERGY SECRETARY BE QUALIFIED TO THE APPOINTMENT AS MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES? a) b) c) d) e) SECTION 13, ARTICLE VII SECTION 7, PAR. 2, ARTICLE IX-B SECTION I, ARTICLE XI EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 284 CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION V. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, 194 SCRA 317.

SEC. 13, ARTICLE VII: THE PRESIDENT, VICE-PRESIDENT, THE MEMBERS OF THE CABINET, AND THEIR DEPUTIES OR ASSISTANTS SHALL NOT, UNLESS OTHERWISE PROVIDED IN THIS CONSTITUTION, HOLD ANY OTHER OFFICE OR EMPLOYMENT DURING THEIR TENURE. THEY SHALL NOT, DURING SAID TENURE, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY PRACTICE ANY OTHER PROFESSION, PARTICIPATE IN ANY BUSINESS, OR BE FINANCIALLY INTERESTED IN ANY CONTRACT WITH, OR IN ANY FRANCHISE, OR SPECIAL PRIVILEGE GRANTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OR ANY SUBDIVISION, AGENCY, OR INSTRUMENTALITY THEREOF, INCLUDING GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS OR THEIR SUBSIDIARIES.

SEC. 7, 2ND PAR, ARTICLE IX-B: UNLESS OTHERWISE ALLOWED BY LAW OR BY THE PRIMARY FUNCTIONS OF HIS POSITION, NO APPOINTIVE OFFICIAL SHALL HOLD ANY OTHER OFFICE OR EMPLOYMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT OR ANY SUBDIVISION, AGENCY OR INSTRUMENTALITY THEREOF, INCLUDING GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS OR THEIR SUBSIDIARIES.

SEC. 1, ARTICLE XI: PUBLIC OFFICE IS A PUBLIC TRUST. PUBLIC OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES MUST AT ALL TIMES BE ACCOUNTABLE TO THE PEOPLE, SERVE THEM WITH UTMOST RESPONSIBILITY, INTEGRITY, LOYALTY, AND EFFICIENCY, ACT WITH PATRIOTISM AND JUSTICE, AND LEAD MODEST LIVES.

10.
PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY. (*****) QUESTION: IS THE PRESIDENT IMMUNE FROM SUIT?

10.
PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY. A. LEGAL BASIS: 1) THE 1935 CONSTITUTION 2) ORIGINAL 1973 CONSTITUION SECTION 7, ARTICLE VII: THE PRESIDENT SHALL BE IMMUNE FROM SUIT DURING HIS TENURE. 3) 1973 CONSTITUTION, AS AMENDED IN 1981: SECTION 17, ARTICLE VII: THE PRESIDENT SHALL BE IMMUNE FROM SUIT DURING HIS TENURE. THEREAFTER, NO SUIT WHATSOEVER SHALL LIE FOR THE OFFICIAL ACTS DONE BY HIM OR BY OTHERS PURSUANT TO HIS SPECIFIC ORDERS DURING HIS TENURE. 4) 1987 CONSTITUTION 5) FORBES, ETC. V. CHUOCO TIACO AND CROSSFIELD (16 PHIL. 534 [1910]).

10.
PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY. B. 1987 CONSTITUTION. WHEN THE 1987 CONSTITUTION WAS CRAFTED, ITS FRAMERS DID NOT REENACT THE EXECUTIVE UMMUNITY PROVISION OF THE 1973 CONSTITUTION. THE FOLLOWING EXPLANATION WAS GIVEN BY DELEGATE J. BERNAS, VIZ: MR. SUAREZ. THANK YOU. THE LAST QUESTION IS WITH REFERENCE TO THE COMMITTEES OMITTING IN THE DRAFT PROPOSAL THE IMMUNITY PROVISION FOR THE PRESIDENT. I AGREE WITH COM. NOLLEDO THAT THE COMMITTEE DID VERY WELL IN STRIKING OUT THIS SECOND SENTENCE, AT THE VERY LEAST, OF THE ORIGINAL PROVISION ON IMMUNITY FROM SUIT UNDER THE 1973 CONSTITUTION. BUT WOULD THE

10.
PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY. COMMITTEE MEMBERS NOT AGREE TO A RESTORATION OF AT LEAST THE FIRST SENTENCE THAT THE PRESIDENT SHALL BE IMMUNE FROM SUIT DURING HIS TENURE, CONSIDERING THAT IF WE DO NOT PROVIDE HIM THAT KIND OF IMMUNITY, HE MIGHT BE SPENDING ALL HIS TIME FACING LITIGATIONS, AS THE PRESIDENT-IN-EXILE IN HAWAII IS NOW FACING LITIGATIONS ALMOST DAILY? FR. BERNAS. THE REASON FOR THE OMISSION IS THAT WE CONSIDER IT UNDERSTOOD IN PRESENT JURISPRUDENCE THAT DURING HIS TENURE HE IS IMMUNE FROM SUIT. MR. SUAREZ. SO THERE IS NO NEED TO EXPRESS IT HERE.

10.
PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY. FR. BERNAS. THERE IS NO NEED. IT WAS THAT WAY BEFORE. THE ONLY INNOVATION MADE BY THE 1973 CONSTITUTION WAS TO MAKE THAT EXPLICIT AND TO ADD OTHER THINGS. MR. SUAREZ. ON THAT UNDERSTANDING, I WILL NOT PRESS FOR ANY MORE QUERY, MADAM PRESIDENT. I THANK THE COMMISSIONER FOR THE CLARIFICATION. (CITED BY THE SC IN ESTRADA V. GMA & ESTRADA V. DESIERTO CASES).

10.
PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY. (*****) C. FORBES,ETC., V. CHUOCO TIACO AND CROSSFIELD (16 Phil. 534 [1910]). THE COURT SAID ON THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-LIABILITY: THE THING WHICH THE JUDICIARY CAN NOT DO IS MULCT THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL PERSONALLY IN DAMAGES WHICH RESULT FROM THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS OFFICIAL DUTY PUBLIC POLICY FORBIDS IT. WHAT IS HELD HERE IS THAT HE WILL BE PROTECTED FROM PERSONAL LIABITY FOR DAMAGES NOT ONLY WHEN HE ACTS WITHIN HIS AUTHORITY, BUT ALSO WHEN HE IS WITHOUT AUTHORITY, PROVIDED HE ACTUALLY USED DISCRETION AND JUDGMENT, THAT IS JUDICIAL FACULTY, IN

10.
PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY. DETERMINING WHETHER HE HAD AUTHORITY TO ACT OR NOT. IN OTHER WORDS, HE IS ENTITLED TO PROTECTION IN DETERMINING THE QUESTION OF HIS AUTHORITY. IF HE DECIDE WRONGLY, HE IS STILL PROTECTED PROVIDED THE QUESTION OF HIS AUTHORITY WAS ONE OVER WHICH TWO MEN, REASONABLY QUALIFIED FOR THAT POSITION, MIGHT HONESTLY DIFFER; BUT HE IS NOT PROTECTED IF THE LACK OF AUTHORITY TO ACT IS SO PLAIN THAT TWO SUCH MEN COULD NOT HONESTLY DIFFER OVER ITS DETERMINATION. IN SUCH CASE, HE ACTS, NOT A GOVERNOR-GENERAL BUT AS A PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL, AND, AS SUCH, MUST ANSWER FOR THE CONSEQUENCES OF HIS ACT.

10.
PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY. THE COURT UNDERSCORED THE CONSEQUENCES IF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE WAS NOT GRANTED IMMUNITY FROM SUIT, VIZ: XXX. ACTION UPON IMPORTANT MATTERS OF STATE DELAYED; THE TIME AND SUBSTANCE OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE SPENT IN WRANGLING LITIGATION; DISRESPECT ENGENDERED FOR THE PERSON OF ONE OF THE HIGHEST OFFICIALS OF THE STATE AND FOR THE OFFICE HE OCCUPIES; A TENDENCY TO UNREST AND DISORDER; RESULTING IN A WAY, IN A DISTRUST AS TO THE INTEGRITY OF GOVERNMENT ITSELF. (CITED BY THE SC IN ESTRADA V. GMA & ESTRADA V. DESIERTO CASES).
THE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT

A.
DOES THE PRESIDENT ENJOY THE TOTALITY OF EXCUTIVE POWER? IS HE AUTHORIZED TO EXERCISE ANY POWER SO LONG AS IT IS BY NATURE EXECUTIVE? (***) 1. VILLENA V. SEC. OF THE INTERIOR (67 Phil. 451); 2. PLANAS V. GIL (67 Phil. 62); 3. MYERS V. UNITED STATES (272 U.S. 52); 4. LACSON V. ROQUE (92 Phil. 456); 5. MONDANO V. SILVOSA (97 Phil. 143); 6. YOUNGSTOWN TUBE AND SHEET CO. V. SAWYER (343 U.S. 579 [6-3 Vote]), THE FAMOUS STEEL SEIZURE BY US PRES. TRUMAN CASE; 7. MARCOS V. MANGLAPUS (177 SCRA 668 [8-7 Vote]); 8. LAUREL V. GARCIA (187 SCRA 797 [9-6 Vote]) ROPPONGI PROPERTY CASE.

B.
THE APPOINTING POWER. (*****) 1. APPOINTMENT 2. DISTINGUISH APPOINTMENT FROM COMMISSION 3. DISTINGUISH APPOINTMENT FROM DESIGNATION 4. DISTINGUISH PERMANENT FROM TEMPORARY APPOINTMENT 5. DISTINGUISH REGULAR FROM AD INTERIM APPOINTMENT 6. IF THE POWER TO APPOINT BELONGS TO THE PRESIDENT, CAN CONGRESS INTERFERS WITH IT BY PRESCRIBING THE QUALIFICATIONS FOR THE PUBLIC OFFICE? IF THE PRESIDENT APPOINTS ONE WHO LACKS QUALIFICATION, IS THIS ISSUE A POLITICAL QUESTION THAT CANNOT BE A SUBJECT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW?

ANSWER TO NO. 6: SINCE THE APPOINMENT TO OFFICE IS AN EXECUTIVE FUNCTION, THE CLEAR IMPLICATION IS THAT THE LEGISLATURE MAY NOT USURP SUCH FUNCTION. THE LEGISLATURE MAY CREATE AN OFFICE AND PRESCRIBE THE QUALIFICATIONS OF THE PERSON WHO MAY HOLD THE OFFICE, BUT IT MAY NEITHER SPECIFIY WHO SHALL BE APPOINTED TO SUCH NOR ACTUALLY APPOINT HIM. IF THE PRESIDENT APPOINTS ONE WHO LACKS THE QUALIFICATIONS, IT IS NOT A POLITICAL QUESTION; HENCE, IT CAN BE THE SUBJECT OF A JUDICIAL REVIEW.

B.
THE APPOINTING POWER. 7. THE PRESIDENT IN A PHONE CALL APPOINTED MEROLCO AS SECRETARY OF DECS. AFTER THE CALL, MEROLCO THROW OUT A LAVISH PARTY AND SPEND P200,000.00. BEFORE FORMALLY ACCEPTING THE APPOINTMENT, THE PRESIDENT APPOINTED AND ISSUED A COMMISION INSTEAD TO GSAS AS SECRETARY OF DECS. QUESTIONS: a) CAN MEROLCO SUE THE PRESIDENT FOR DAMAGES? b) IS THE APPOINTMENT OF GSAS LEGAL? 8. WHAT ARE THE CATEGORIES OF OFFICIALS WHO ARE SUBJECT TO THE APPOINTING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT?

C.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION ON THE APPOINTING POWER (SEC. 16, ART. VII): (*****) THE PRESIDENT SHALL NOMINATE AND, WITH THE CONSENT OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINMENTS, APPOINT THE HEADS OF THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS, AMBASSADORS, OTHER PUBLIC MINISTERS AND CONSULS, OR OFFICERS OF THE ARMED FORCES FROM THE RANK OF COLONEL OR NAVAL CAPTAIN, AND OTHER OFFICERS WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE VESTED IN HIM IN THIS CONSTITUTION. HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT ALL OTHER OFFICERS OF THE GOVERNMENT WHOSE APPOINMENTS ARE NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR BY LAW, AND THOSE WHOM HE MAY BE AUTHORIZED BY LAW TO APPOINT. THE CONGRESS MAY, BY LAW, VEST THE APPOINTMENT OF OTHER OFFICERS LOWER IN RANK IN THE PRESIDENT ALONE, IN THE COURTS, OR IN THE HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES, COMMISSIONS, OR BOARDS.

THE PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE THE POWER TO MAKE APPOINTMENTS DURING RECESS OF THE CONGRESS, WHETHER VOLUNTARY OR COMPULSORY, BUT SUCH APPOINTMENTS SHALL BE EFFECTIVE ONLY UNTIL DISAPPROVED BY THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS OR UNTIL THE NEXT ADJOURNMENT OF THE CONGRESS. ======================================= CATEGORIES OF OFFICIALS WHO ARE SUBJECT TO THE APPOINTING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT: 1. 2. THE HEADS OF THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS; AMBASSADORS, OTHER PUBLIC MINISTERS AND CONSULS;

3. 4. 5. 6. 7. OFFICERS OF THE ARMED FORCES FROM THE RANK OF COLONEL OR NAVAL CAPTAIN; THOSE OTHER OFFICERS WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE VESTED IN HIM BY THE CONSITUTION; ALL OTHER OFFICERS OF THE GOVERNMENT WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE NOT PROVIDED FOR BY LAW; AND THOSE WHOM HE MAY BE AUTHORIZED BY LAW TO APPOINT; OFFICERS LOWER IN RANK WHOSE APPOINTMENTS THE CONGRESS MAY BY LAW VEST IN THE PRESIDENT ALONE.
QUESTION: IS THE APPOINTMENT OF A COMMISIONER OF THE BIR SUBJECT TO CONFIRMATION?

D.
SARMIENTO III V. MISON (156 SCRA 549 [Dec. 17, 1987]). PETITION FOR PROHIBITION (12-2 Vote) (*****) 1. PETITIONERS SARMIENTO III & ARCILLA, TAXPAYERS AND MEMBERS OF IBP, CLAIMED THAT THE APPOINTMENT OF MISON AS COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS REQUIRES THE CONFIRMATION OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONSTITUTION. 2. RESPONDENTS MISON & CARAGUE MAINTAINED THAT SUCH APPOINTMENT DOES NOT NEED THE CONFIRMATION OF THE CA SINCE CONFIRMATION IS REQUIRED ONLY FOR THE OFFICERS MENTIONED IN THE FIRST SENTENCE OF SECTION 16, ARTICLE VII, TO WIT:

a. b. c. d. THE HEADS OF THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS; AMBASSADORS, OTHER PUBLIC MINISTERS AND CONSULS; OFFICERS OF THE ARMED FORCES FROM THE RANK OF COLONEL OR NAVAL CAPTAIN; OTHER OFFICERS WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE VESTED IN THE PRESIDENT IN THE CONSTITUION.
NO CONFIRMATION IS REQUIRED FOR: a. ALL OTHER OFFICERS WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED BY LAW (Second Sentence); b. THOSE WHOM THE PRESIDENT MAY BE AUTHORIZED BY LAW TO APPOINT (Second Sentence); AND c. THOSE OTHER OFFICERS LOWER IN RANK WHOSE APPOINTMENT IS VESTED IN THE PRESDIENT ALONE (Third Sentence).

3. AMICUS CURIAE SENATOR NEPTALI GONZALES ARGUED THAT THE PHRASE IN THE SECOND SENTENCE HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT IMPLIES THAT THE PRESIDENT SHALL IN LIKE MANNER APPOINT THE OFFICERS MENTIONED IN THE SECOND SENTENCE. IN OTHER WORDS, THE PRESIDENT SHALL APPOINT THE OFFICERS MENTIONED IN SAID SECOND SENTENCE IN THE SAME MANNER AS HE APPOINTS OFFICERS MENTIONED IN THE FIRST SENTENCE, THAT IS, BY NOMINATION AND WITH THE CONSENT (CONFIRMATION) OF THE CA. 4. MAJORITY OF THE COURT HELD THAT THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS IS NOT SUBJECT TO CONFIRMATION, BEING OF THE RANK OF THE BUREAU DIRECTOR, WHO WAS PURPOSELY DELETED FROM THE LISTING OF THOSE WHOSE APPOINTMENTS HAD TO BE APPROVED BY THE CA. AS POINTED OUT BY THE

COURT IN THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, HOWEVER, AS ALREADY POINTED OUT, THE CLEAR AND EXPRESSED INTENT OF ITS FRAMERS WAS TO EXCLUDE PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS FROM CONFIRMATION BY THE CA, EXCEPT APPOINTMENTS TO OFFICES EXPRESSLY MENTIONED IN THE FIRST SENTENCE OF SECTION 16, ARTICLE VII. 5. JUSTICE CRUZ DISSENTED: THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT BUREAU DIRECTORS ARE NOT REQUIRED TO BE CONFIRMED UNDER THE FIRST SENTENCE OF SECTION 16, BUT THAT IS NOT THE PROVISION WE OUGHT TO INTERPRET. IT IS THE SECOND SENTENCE WE MUST UNDERSTAND FOR A PROPER RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE NOW BEFORE US. SIGNIFICANTLY, ALTHOUGH THERE WAS A LONG DISCUSSION OF THE FIRST SENTENCE IN THE CONCOM, THERE WAS NONE ON THE SECOND SENTENCE WE CAN THEREFORE SPECULATE ON THE CORRECT

INTERPRETATION OF THIS PROVISION IN THE LIGHT OF THE FIRST AND THIRD SENTENCES OF SECTION 16 OR BY BY READING THIS SECTION IN ITS TOTALITY. THE MAJORITY OPINION SAYS THAT THE SECOND SENTENCE IS THE EXCEPTION TO THE FIRST SENTENCE AND HOLDS THAT THE SETS OF OFFICERS SPECIFIED THEREIN MAY BE APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT THE CONCURRENCE OF THE CA. THIS INTERPRETATION IS PREGNANT WITH MISCHIEVOUS IF NOT ALSO RIDICULOUS RESULTS THAT PRESUMABLY WERE NOT ENVISIONED BY THE FRAMERS.
ONE MAY WONDER WHY IT WAS FELT NECESSARY TO INCLUDE THE SECOND SENTENCE AT ALL, CONSIDERING THE MAJORITY OPINION THAT THE ENUMERATION IN THE FIRST SENTENCE OF THE OFFICERS SUBJECT TO CONFIRMATION IS EXCLUSIVE ON

THE BASIS OF EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS. IF THAT BE SO, THE FIRST SENTENCE WOULD HAVE BEEN SUFFICIENT BY ITSELF TO CONVEY THE IDEA THAT ALL OTHER APPOINTEES OF THE PRESIDENT WOULD NOT NEED CONFIRMATION. MY OWN READING IS THAT THE SECOND SENTENCE IS BUT A CONTINUATION OF THE IDEA EXPRESSED IN THE FIRST SENTENCE AND SIMPLY MENTIONS THE OTHER OFFICERS APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT WHO ARE ALSO SUBJECT TO CONFIRMATION.

IN MY VIEW, THE ONLY OFFICERS APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT WHO ARE NOT SUBJECT TO CONFIRMATION BY THE CA ARE: (1) THE MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY AND THE OMBUDSMAN AND HIS DEPUTIES, WHO ARE NOMINATED BY THE JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL; (2) THE VICE-PRESIDENT WHEN HE IS APPOINTED TO THE CABINET; AND (3) OTHER OFFICERS LOWER IN RANK, BUT ONLY WHEN THEIR APPOINTMENT IS VESTED BY LAW IN THE PRESDENT ALONE.
E.
MAY CONGRESS PASS A LAW ADDING TO THE CONSITUTIONAL LIST OFFICERS WHOSE APPOINTMENTS REQUIRE THE APPROVAL OR CONFIRMATION BY THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS?

F.
WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE FUNCTION OF THE CA: (***) ALTHOUGH THE CA IS ASSEMBLED BY CONGRESS AND CAN MEET ONLY WHEN CONGRESS IS IN SESSION AND, THEREFORE, CAN, TO THAT EXTENT, BE IMMOBILIZED WHEN CONGRESS DECIDES TO ADJOURN (Guevara v. Inocentes, 16 SCRA 379), THE CA IS A CREATURE OF THE CONSTITUTION AND NOT OF CONGRESS, AND IS NOT LEGISLATIVE BUT EXECUTIVE IN NATURE. AS THE SC SAID ALTHOUGH ITS MEMBERSHIP IS CONFINED TO MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, SAID COMMISSION IS INDEPENDENT OF CONGRESS IN FACT, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMISSION ARE PURELY EXECUTIVE IN NATURE (Cunanan v. Tan, Jr., 5 SCRA 1). SO WHEN THE CA CHECKS THE APPOINTMENTS MADE BY THE PRESIDENT, IT IS NOT STRICTLY A CASE OF THE LEGISLATIVE INTERFERRING WITH THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT.

G. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATION OF THE APPOINTING POWER: SECTION 14, ART. VII: APPOINTMENTS EXTENDED BY AN ACTING PRESIDENT SHALL REMAIN EFFECTIVE UNLESS REVOKED BY THE ELECTED PRESIDENT WITHIN NINETY DAYS FROM HIS ASSUMPTION OF OFFICE. SECTION 15, ART. VII: TWO MONTHS IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE NEXT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AND UP TO THE END OF HIS TERM, A PRESIDENT OR ACTING PRESIDENT SHALL NOT MAKE APPOINTMENTS EXCEPT TEMPORARY APPOINTMENTS TO EXECUTIVE POSITIONS WHEN CONTINUED VACANCIES THEREIN WILL PREJUDICE PUBLIC SERVICE OR ENDANGER PUBLIC SAFETY.

H.
THE REMOVAL POWER. QUESTIONS: 1. THE POWER TO APPOINT CARRIES WITH IT THE IMPLIED POWER TO REMOVE. IS THIS POWER TO REMOVE ABSOLUTE?
2. CAN AN OFFICER APPOINTED TO A 3-YEAR TERM BE LEGALLY REMOVED BY THE PRESIDENT EVEN BEFORE THE EXPIRY OF THE SAID TERM?
3. CAN AN OFFICER APPOINTED TO A POSITION WITHOUT A FIXED TERM BE REMOVED BY THE PRESDENT ANYTIME? 4. CAN AN OFFICER WHOSE OFFICE WAS GIVEN A P1.00 BUDGET COMPLAIN OF CONSTRUCTIVE TERMINATION?

H.
THE REMOVAL POWER. (*****) 1. ALAJAR V. ALBA (100 Phil. 683) (VICE-MAYOR OF ROXAS CITY) 2. APARRI V. CA (127 SCRA 231) (GENERAL MANAGER OF NARRA) WHEN AN OFFICER WHOSE OFFICE IS NOT FIXED BY LAW, HOLDS THE SAME AT THE PLEASURE OF THE APPOINTING POWER. WHEN HE IS REPLACED BY THE APPOINTING POWER OR HIS OFFICE ABOLISHED BY LAW, HE IS NOT CONSIDERED TERMINATED BUT THAT HIS TERM OF OFFICE HAS MERELY EXPIRED.

I.
THE CONTROL POWER. (*****) CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION, SECTION 17, ARTICLE VII: THE PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE CONTROL OF ALL THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS, BUREAUS AND OFFICES. HE SHALL ENSURE THAT THE LAWS BE FAITHFULLY EXECUTED. 1. THE POWER OF CONTROL
2. THE POWER OF GENERAL SUPERVISION

3. THE TAKE CARE CLAUSE

4. CONTROL IS DEFINED AS THE POWER OF AN OFFICER TO ALTER OR MODIFY OR NULLIFY OR SET ASIDE WHAT A SUBORDINATE OFFICER HAD DONE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTIES AND TO SUBSTITUTE THE JUDGMENT OF THE FORMER FOR THAT OF THE LATTER (Montano v. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143). SUPERVISION MEANS OVERSEEING OR THE POWER OR AUTHORITY OF AN OFFICER TO SEE THAT SUBORDINATE OFFICERS PERFORM THEIR DUTIES (Ibid). DISTINCTION BETWEEN CONTROL AND SUPERVISION (DRILON V. LIM, 235 SCRA 135) TAKE CARE CLAUSE THE POWER TO ENSURE THAT ALL LAWS ARE FAITHFULLY EXECUTED.
5.
6.
7.

5.1 POWER OF SUPERVISION SEC. 4, ART. X (LOCAL GOVT) THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHIL. SHAL L EXERCISE GENERAL SUPERVISION OVER LOCAL GOVT. PROVINCES WITH RESPECT TO COMPONENT CITIES AND MUNICIPALITIES, AND CITIES AND MUNICIPALITIES WITH RESPECT TO COMPONENT BARANGAYS SHALL ENSURE THAT THE ACTS OF THEIR COMPONENT UNITS ARE WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THEIR PRESCRIBED POWERS AND FUNCTIONS.

7.1 THE TAKE CARE CLAUSE THE LAW THE PRESIDENT IS SUPPOSED TO ENFORCE INCLUDES THE CONSTITUTION ITSELF, STATUTES, JUDICIAL DECISIONS, ADMINISTRATIVE RULES AND REGULATIONS, MUNICIPAL ORDINANCIES, WAS WELL AS TREATIES ENTERED INTO BY OUR GOVERNMENT. QUESTION:
IS THE PRESIDENT EMPOWERED NOT TO ENFORCE A LAW WHICH IN HIS BELIEF IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL?

J.
THE MILITARY POWER (SECTION 18, ARTICLE VII). (*****) THIS SECTION BOLSTER THE PRINCIPLE ANNOUNCED IN ARTICLE II, SECTION 3, THAT: CIVILIAN AUTHORITY IS, AT ALL TIMES, SUPREME OVER THE MILITARY. BY MAKING THE PRESIDENT THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF ALL THE ARMED FORCES, THE CONSTITUTION LESSENS THE DANGER OF A MILITARY TAKE-OVER OF THE GOVERNMENT IN VIOLATION OF ITS REPUBLICAN NATURE. THE MILITARY POWER ENABLES THE PRESIDENT TO: (*****) 1. COMMAND ALL THE ARMED FORCES; 2. SUSPEND THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; AND 3. DECLARE MARTIAL LAW.

1. COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES: THE POWER OF THE SWORD MAKES THE PRESIDENT THE MOST IMPORTANT FIGURE IN THE COUNTRY IN TIMES OF WAR OR OTHER SIMILAR EMRGENCY. HE CAN: a. ORGANIZE COURT MARTIAL FOR THE DISCIPLINE OF THE MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES VIOLATING MILITARY LAW; RUFFY V. CHIEF OF STAFF (75 Phil. 875) COURT MARTIAL IS AN AGENCY OF EXECUTIVE IN CHARACTER WHICH MAY BE CONVENED BY THE PRESIDENT INDEPENDENTLY OF LEGISLATION AND BY VIRTUE OF HIS CONSTITUIONAL FUNCTION AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF. THESE ARE NOT JUDICIARY COURTS.

b. CREATE MILITARY COMMISSION FOR THE PUNISHMENT OF WAR CRIMMINALS. KURODA V. JALANDONI (42 O.G. 4282) THE SUPREME COURT, CITING THE EARLIER CASE OF YAMASHITA V. STYER (75 Phil. 563), WHICH UPHELD THE JURISDICTION OF MILITARY COMMISSION OVER WAR CRIMMINALS, DECLARED THAT THE PROMULGATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 68 ESTABLISHING WAR CRIMES OFFICE WAS AN EXERCISE BY THE PRESIDENT OF HIS POWERS AS COMMANDIER-IN-CHIEF OF ALL OUR ARMED FORCES. AQUINO V. MILITARY COMMISSION NO. 2 (63 SCRA 546, [1975]) THE SUPREME COURT UPHELD THE POWER OF THE PRES. TO CREATE MILITARY TRIBUNALS AUTHORIZED TO TRY NOT ONLY MILITARY PERSONNEL BUT ALSO CIVILIANS EVEN IF AT THAT TIME CIVIL COURTS WERE OPEN AND FUNCTIONING, THUS, REJECTING THE OPEN COURT THEORY OBSERVED IN THE UNITED STATES.

OLAQUER V. MILITARY COMMISSION NO. 34 (150 SCRA 144, [MAY 22, 1987]). - IN THIS CASE, HOWEVER, THE AQUINO DECISION WAS REVERSED AND IT WAS HELD IN PART: DUE PROCESS OF LAW DEMANDS THAT IN ALL CRIMMINAL PROSECUTIONS (WHERE THE ACCUSED STANDS TO LOSE EITHER HIS LIFE OR HIS LIBERTY), THE ACCUSED SHALL BE ENTITLED TO, AMONG OTHERS, A TRIAL. THE TRIAL CONTEMPLATED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION, IN RELATION TO THE CHARTER AS A WHOLE, IS A TRIAL BY JUDICIAL PROCESS, NOT BY EXECUTIVE OR MILITARY PROCESS. A MILITARY COMMISSION OR TRIBUNAL, BY WHATEVER NAME THEY ARE CALLED, ARE NOT COURTS WITHIN THE PHILIPPINE JUDICIAL SYSTEM.

c. CALL OUT THE ARMED FORCES TO PREVENT OR SUPRESS LAWLESS VIOLENCE, INVASION, OR REBELLION. IBP V. ZAMORA (338 SCRA 81) - IBP QUESTIONED THE COMMAND OF PRES. ESTRADA DEPLOYING THE PHIL. MARINES TO JOIN THE PNP IN VISIBILITY PATROLS AROUND METRO MANILA FOR THE PURPOSE OF CRIME PREVENTION. THE ORDER WAS OBVIOUSLY BASED ON THE DETERIORATING PEACE AND ORDER IN THE METROPOLIS. THE IBP CONTENDED THAT THERE WAS NO EMERGENCY OR A STATE OF LAWLESS VIOLENCE TO WARRANT THE CALLING OF THE ARMED FORCES, WHICH WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF MILITARIZING THE GOVERNMENT TO THE PREJUDICE OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES AND THE SUPREMACY OF CIVILIAN AUTHORITY.

IBP V. ZAMORA (CONTINUATION) THE SUPREME COURT DISMISSED THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION, HOLDING THAT INASMUCH AS THE IBP HAD NOT SHOWN THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING HIS COMMAND, IT WAS NOT INCLINED TO OVERRULE THE PRESIDENTS DETERMINATION OF THE FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE CALLING OF THE MARINES.

2. SUSPEND THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS. 1935 CONSTITUTION BILL OF RIGHTS (SEC. 14, ART. III): THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS SHALL NOT BE SUSPENDED EXCEPT IN CASES OF INVASION, INSURRECTION, OR REBELLION, WHEN THE PUBLIC SAFETY REQUIRES IT, IN ANY OF WHICH EVENTS THE SAME MAY BE SUSPENDED WHENEVER DURING SUCH PERIOD THE NECESSITY FOR SUCH SUSPENSION SHALL EXIST. 1973 CONSTITUTION BILL OF RIGHTS (SEC. 15, ART.1V): THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS SHALL NOT BE SUSPENDED EXCEPT IN CASES OF INVASION, INSURRECTION, REBELLION, OR IMMINENT DANGER THEREOF, WHEN PUBLIC SAFETY REQUIRES IT .

1935 CONSTITUION, SEC. 10 (2), ART. VII: IN CASE OF INVASION, INSURRECTION, OR REBELLION, OR IMMINENT DANGER THEREOF, WHEN PUBLIC SAFETY REQUIRES IT, HE MAY SUSPEND THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 1973 CONSTITUTION, SEC. 11, ART. VII: IN CASE OF INVASION, INSURRECTION, OR REBELLION, OR IMMINENT DANGER THEREOF, WHEN PUBLIC SAFETY REQUIRES IT, HE MAY SUSPEND THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 1987 CONSTITUTION, SEC. 18, ART. VII: IN CASE OF INVASION, OR REBELLION, WHEN THE PUBLIC SAFETY REQUIRES IT, HE MAY, FOR A PERIOD OF NOT EXCEEDING 60 DAYS, SUSPEND THE PRIVILEGE OF HABEAS CORPUS

1987 CONSTITUTION BILL OF RIGHTS (SEC. 15, ART. III): THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS SHALL NOT BE SUSPENDED EXCEPT IN CASES OF INVASION OR REBELLION, WHEN PUBLIC SAFETY REQUIRES IT. (SEC. 13, ART. III) THE RIGHT TO BAIL SHALL NOT BE IMPAIRED EVEN WHEN THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IS SUSPENDED MONTENEGRO V. CASTANEDA (91 Phil. 882) IN 1951, PRES. QUIRINO BASED HIS SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS ON SEDITION AND IMMINENT DANGER OF INSURRECTION OR REBELLION. IF HE HAD NOT ADDED THE LATTER GROUND, WHICH WAS LISTED IN THE 1935 CHARTER, THE SC WOULD HAVE INVALIDATED HIS PROCLAMATION.

BARCELON V. BAKER (5 Phil. 87) and MONTNENGRO V. CASTANEDA (91 Phil. 882) CASES, THE SUPREME COURT HELD THAT THE DETERMINATION BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES OF THE EXISTENCE OF ANY OF THE GROUNDS PRESCRIBED BY THE CONSTITUTION FOR THE SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS SHOULD BE CONCLUSIVE UPON THE COURTS. THE JUSTIFICATION WAS THAT THE PRESIDENT, WITH ALL THE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AVAILABLE TO HIM AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, WAS IN A BETTER POSTION THAN THE SUPREME COURT TO ASCERTAIN THE REAL STATE OF PEACE AND ORDER IN THE COUNTRY. IN SHORT, IN THESE TWO CASES, THE DETERMINATION BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE FACTUAL BASIS, WAS CONSIDERED A POLITICAL QUESTION AND BEYOND THE POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE JUDICIARY.

LANSANG V. GARCIA (42 SCRA 448) THE DOCTRINE IN THE BARCELON AND MONTENEGRO CASES WAS ABANDONED IN THE LANSANG CASE WHERE THE SUPREME COURT DECLARED THAT IT HAD THE POWER TO INQUIRE INTO THE FACTUAL BASIS OF THE SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS BY PRES. MARCOS IN AUG. 1971 AND TO ANNUL THE SAME IF NO LEGAL GROUND COULD BE ESTABLISHED. AFTER HEARINGS, HOWEVER, A UNANIMOUS COURT, AFTER SATISFYING ITSELF THAT THERE WAS ACTUALLY A MASSIVE AND SYTEMATIC COMMUNIST-OIRIENTED CAMPAIGN TO OVERTHROW THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILS. BY FORCE, AS CLAIMED BY THE PRESIDENT, DECIDED TO UPHOLD THE SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.

GARCIA-PADILLA V. ENRILE (121 SCRA 472) IN THIS CASE, HOWEVER, THE SUPREME COURSE REVERSED THE LANSANG DECISION AND REVIVED THE BAKER AND MONTENEGRO DOCTRINES, REITERATING THAT THE SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS WAS A POLITICAL QUESTION TO BE RESOLVED SOLELY BY THE PRESIDENT. 1987 CONSTITUTION (PAR. 3, SEC. 18, ART. VII) THIS PROVISION, HOWEVER, HAS ABROGATED THE GARCIA-PADILLA DOCTRINE AND EXPRESSLY CONSITUTIONLIZED THE LANSANG DOCTRINE, THUS NOW, THE SUPREME COURT MAY REVIEW THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE FACTUAL BASIS OF THE SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT... NOTE BENE: PAR. 2, SECTION 1, ARTICLE VIII JUDICIAL POWER ON GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION.

3. DECLARE MARTIAL LAW. 1935 CONSTITUTION (SEC. 10[2], ART. VII) . . . IN CASE OF INVASION, INSURRECTION, OR REBELLION, OR IMMINENT DANGER THEREOF, WHEN PUBLIC SAFETY REQUIRES IT, HE MAY . . . PLACE THE PHILIPPINES OR ANY PART THEREOF UNDER MARTIAL LAW. 1973 CONSTITUTION (SEC. 11, ART. VII) SAME PROVISION.
1987 CONSTITUION (SEC. 18, ART. VII) IN CAS OF INVASION, REBELLION, WHEN THE PUBLIC SAFETY REQUIRES IT, HE MAY, FOR A PERIOD NOT EXCEEDING 60 DAYS, PLACE THE PHILIPPINES OR ANY PART THEREOF UNDER MARTIAL LAW. MORE THAN THIS, CONGRESSIONAL INTERVENTION AND APPROVAL IS ALREADY NECESSARY.

AQUINO V. ENRILE (59 SCRA 183). IN THIS CASE, THE SUPREME COURT, BY UNANIMOUS VOTE OF ITS MEMBERS THEN, SUSTAINED THE PROCLAMATION OF MARTIAL LAW BY PRES. MARCOS ON SEPT. 23, 1973, BUT NO CLEAR CONSENSUS WAS REACHED ON THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE COMMON CONCLUSION. FOR THIS REASON, EACH OF THE JUSTICES SUBMITTED HIS OWN OPINION OF THE RATIONALE FOR SUCH PROCLAMATION. MARTIAL LAW UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUION CONFORMS WITH WILLOUGHBY THAT MARTIAL LAW IN ITS STRICT SENSE REFERS TO THAT LAW WHICH HAS APPLICATION WHEN THE MILITARY ARM DOES NOT SUPERSEDED CIVIL AUTHORITY BUT IS CALLED UPON TO AID IT IN THE EXECUTION OF ITS CIVIL FUNCTION.

4.
LIMITATIONS OF THE MILITARY POWERS. (*****) THE 1987 CONSTITUTION HAS PROVIDED FOR THE FOLLOWING SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN THE ORIGINAL AUTHORITY OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF: a. HE MAY CALL OUT THE ARMED FORCES WHEN IT BECOMES NECESSARY TO PREVENT OR SUPRESS LAWLESS VIOLENCE, INVASION, OR REBELLION ONLY.
b. THE GROUNDS FOR THE SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND THE PROCLMATION OF MARTIAL LAW ARE NOW LIMITED ONLY TO INVASION OR REBELLION, WHEN PUBLIC SAFETY REQUIRES IT.

4.
LIMITATIONS OF THE MILITARY POWERS: (*****) c. THE DURATION OF SUCH SUSPENSION OR PROCLAMATION SHALL NOT EXCEED SIXTY (60) DAYS, FOLLOWING WHICH IT SHALL BE AUTOMATICALLY LIFTED. d. WITHIN FORTY EIGHT HOURS AFTER SUCH SUSPENSION OR PROCLAMATION, THE PRESIDENT SHALL PERSONALLY OR IN WRITING REPORT HIS ACTION TO THE CONGRESS. IF NOT IN SESSION, CONGRESS MUST CONVENE WITHIN 24 HOURS WITHOUT NEED OF A CALL. e. CONGRESS MAY THEN, BY A MAJORITY VOTE OF ALL ITS MEMBERS VOTING JOINTLY, REVOKE HIS ACTION.

4.
LIMITATIONS OF THE MILITARY POWERS: (*****) f. THE REVOCATION MAY NOT BE SET ASIDE BY THE PRESIDENT.
g. BY THE SAME VOTE AND IN THE SAME MANNER, THE CONGRESS MAY, UPON INITIATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT, EXTEND HIS SUSPENSION OR PROCLAMATION FOR A PERIOD TO BE DETERMINED BY THE CONGRESS IF THE INVASION OR REBELLION SHALL CONTINUE AND THE PUBLIC SAFETY REQUIRES THE EXTENSION.

4.
LIMITATIONS OF THE MILITARY POWERS: (*****) h. THE ACTION OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS SHALL BE SUBJECT TO REVIEW BY THE SUPREME COURT WHICH SHALL HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE FACTUAL BASIS OF SUCH ACTION. THIS MATTER IS NO LONGER CONSIDERED A POLITICAL QUESTION AND MAY BE RAISED IN AN APPROPRIATE PROCEEDING BY ANY CITIZEN. MOREVER, THE SUPREME COURT MUST DECIDE THE CHALLENGE WITHIN 30 DAYS FROM THE TIME IT IS FILED. i. MARTIAL LAW DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY SUSPEND THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OR THE OPERATION OF THE CONSITUTION. THE CIVIL COURTS AND THE LEGISLATIVE BODIES SHALL REMAIN OPEN. MILITARY COURTS AND AGENCIES ARE NOT CONFERRED JURISDICTION OVER CIVILIANS WHERE THE CIVIL COURTS ARE OPEN.

4.
LIMITATIONS OF THE MILITARY POWERS: (*****) j. THE SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS SHALL APPLY ONLY TO PERSONS FACING CHARGES OF REBELLION OR OFFENSES INHERENT IN OR DIRECTLY CONNECTED WITH INVASION. k. ANY PERSON ARRESTED FOR SUCH OFFENSES MUST BE JUDICIALLY CHARGED THEREWITH WITHIN THREE (3) DAYS. OTHERWISE, HE SHALL BE RELEASED.

5. JURISPRUDENTIAL LEGACY OF MARTIAL LAW WITH THE DECISION IN SANIDAD V. COMELEC (73 SCRA 333 (OCT. 12, 1976), THE MAIN LINEAMENTS OF PHIL. MARTIAL LAW JURISPRUDENCE HAD BEEN DRAWN:
a) THE MARTIAL LAW PROCLAMATION OF 1972 WAS VALIDLY MADE ON THE BASIS OF AN EXISTING REBELLION;
b) THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW CARRIED WITH IT THE SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS;

5. JURISPRUDENTIAL LEGACY OF MARTIAL LAW c) THE MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR COULD LEGISLATE ON ANY MATTER RELATED TO THE WELFARE OF THE NATION; d) HE COULD CREATE MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND CONFER ON THEM JURISDICTION TO TRY CIVILIANS FOR CRIMES RELATED TO THE PURPOSE OF MARTIAL RULE; e) IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY OTHER OPERATIVE CONSTITUENT BODY HE COULD EVEN PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION.

ALL OF THE ABOVE, MOREOVER, ARE CONFIRMED BY THE BROAD GRANT OF POWER FOUND IN ARTICLE XVII, SEC 3(2), OF THE 1973 CONSTITUTION WHICH WAS ITSELF RATIFIED IN A MOST UNIQUE MANNER. THE SUPREME COURT WAS TO ADD LATER THAT, UNDER MARTIAL LAW, CLAIMS OF DENIAL OF SPEEDY TRIAL ARE UNAVAILING (OCAMPO V. MILITARY COMMISSION NO. 25, 109 SCRA 22, Nov. 6, 1981), AND THAT THE SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS ALSO SUSPENDS THE RIGHT TO BAIL (BUSCAYNO V. MILITARY COMMISSION NOS. 1, 2, 6, and 25, 109 SCRA 273, Nov. 19, 1981).

ON JAN. 17, 1981, ON THE EVE OF THE VISIT OF POPE JOHN PAUL II TO THE PHILS, MARTIAL LAW WAS LIFTED BY PROC. NO. 2045. BUT NOT REALLY. IF THE HEART OF MARTIAL LAW IS THE CONCENTRATION OF GOVERNMENTAL POWERS IN THE HANDS OF THE EXECUTIVE, THE EQUIVALENT OF MARTIAL LAW REMAINED AS PART OF NORMAL DAY TO DAY GOVERNMENT. THIS WAS THE EFFECT OF AMENDMENT NO. 6 OF 1976 WHICH GRANTED FULL LEGISLATIVE POWER TO THE PRESIDENT (THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, A COMMENTARY, VOLUME II, FIRST EDITION, 1988, JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J.).

6. THE NEW MARTIAL LAW DOCTRINE IT WAS UNDER THE SHADOW OF THIS JURISPRUDENTIAL LEGACY OF THE MARCOS REGIME THAT THE 1986 CONCOM WENT ABOUT FORMULATING THE MARTIAL LAW DOCTRINE OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION. IN SUM, THE 1987 CONSTITUTION: 1) NARROWED THE GROUNDS FOR THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW AND SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, 2) LIMITED THE DISCRETION OF THE PRESIDENT AND PUT IT UNDER REVIEW POWERS OF CONGRESS AND OF THE SUPREME COURT, AND 3) REJECTED THE BULK OF MARTIAL LAW JURISPRUDENCE THAT HAD DEVELOPED UNDER PRESIDENT MARCOS.

UNDER BOTH THE 1935 AND 1973 CONSTITUTIONS, THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS COULD BE SUSPENDED AND MARTIAL LAW COULD BE IMPOSED IN CASE OF INVASION, INSURRECTION, OR REBELLION, OR IMMINENT DANGER THEREOF, WHEN THE PUBLIC SAFETY REQUIRES IT. THE 1987 CONSTITUTION HAS NARROWED THE GROUNDS TO [ACTUAL] INVASION OR REBELLION, WHEN THE PUBLIC SAFETY REQUIRES IT.

UNDER THE 1935 AND 1973 CONSTITUTION THE PRESIDENT COULD SUSPEND THE PRIVILEGE AND IMPOSE MARTIAL LAW FOR AN INDEFINITE DURATION AND CONGRESS HAD NO POWER TO CURTAIL HIM OR REVIEW HIS DECISION. UNDER THE 1987 CONSITUTION, THE INITIAL SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE AND THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW IS STILL FOR THE PRESIDENT TO DECIDE BUT THEY CAN ONLY BE FOR A PERIOD NOT EXCEEDING SIXTY DAYS. (THE CONSITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, A COMMENTARY, VOLUME II, FIRST EDITION, 1988, JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J.

K.
THE PARDONING POWER: (*****) 1. DEFINITION OF TERMS: a. b. c. d. e. f. PARDON COMMUNTATION REPRIEVE PARDON VS. PAROLE PARDON VS. PAROLE VS. PROBATION PARDON VS. AMNESTY
2. KINDS OF PARDON: a. ABSOLUTE VS. CONDITIONAL b. PLENARY VS. PARTIAL

K.
THE PARDONING POWER. (*****) 3. LIMITATIONS ON THE PARDONING POWER: a. CAN PARDON BE GRANTED IN CASES OF IMPEACHMENT? b. CAN PARDON BE GRANTED FOR THE VIOLATION OF ANY ELECTION LAW? c. CAN PARDON BE GRANTED EVEN BEFORE CONVICTION BY FINAL JUDGMENT? d. CAN PARDON BE EXTENDED TO A PERSON CONVICTED OF LEGISLATIVE CONTEMPT. e. CAN PARDON BE EFFECTIVE EVEN IF THE PARDONEE (CONVICTED PERSON) DOES NOT ACCEPT IT?

K.
THE PARDONING POWER. 4. NATURE OF PARDON. UNITED STATES V. WILSON, (7 Pet 150 [1833]) C.J. MARSHALL SAID: A PARDON IS AN ACT OF GRACE, PROCEEDING FROM THE POWER ENTRUSTED WITH THE EXECUTION OF THE LAWS, WHICH EXEMPTS THE INDIVIDUAL ON WHOM IT IS BESTOWED, FROM THE PUNISHMENT THE LAW INFLICTS FOR A CRIME HE HAS COMMITTED. IT IS THE PRIVATE, THOUGH OFFICIAL ACT OF THE EXECUTIVE MAGISTRATE, DELIVERED TO THE INDIVIDUAL FOR WHOSE BENEFIT IT IS INTENDED, AND NOT COMMUNICATED OFFICALLY TO THE COURT A PARDON IS A DEED, TO THE VALIDITY OF WHICH DELIVERY IS ESSENTIAL, AND DELIVERY IS NOT COMPLETE WITHOUT ACCEPTANCE. IT MAY THEN BE REJECTED BY THE PERSON TO WHOM IT IS TENDERED; AND IF IT BE REJECTED, WE HAVE DISCOVERED NO POWER IN A COURT TO FORCE IT ON HIM.

K.
THE PARDONING POWER. (*****) 5. EFFECTS OF PARDON. EX PARTE GARLAND (71 U.S. 333) FACTS: IN 1865, THE US CONGRESS PASSED A LAW THAT EFFECTIVELY BEBARRED FORMER MEMBERS OF THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT BY REQUIRING A LOYALTY OATH BE RECITED BY ANY FEDERAL COURT OFFICER AFFIRMING THAT THE OFFICER HAD NEVER SERVED IN THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT. AUGUSTUS HILL GARLAND, AN ATTORNEY AND FORMER CONFEDERATE SENATOR FROM ARKANSAS, HAD PREVIUSLY RECEIVED A PARDON FROM PRES. ANDREW JOHNSON. GARLAND PETITIONED THE US SUPREME COURT TO DECLARE THE ACTT OF CONGRESS AS A BILL OF ATTAINDER AND AN

K.
THE PARDONING POWER. 5. EFFECTS OF PARDON. EX RE GARLAND: EX POST FACTO LAW WHICH UNFAIRLY PUNISHED HIM FOR THE CRIME HE HAD BEEN PARDONED FOR AND WAS THEREFORE UNCONSTITUTIONAL. DECISION: IN A 5-4 VOTE, THE SUPREME COURT RULED THAT THE LAW WAS INDEED A BILL OF ATTAINDER AND AN EX-POST FACTO LAW. THE COURT RULED THAT GARLAND WAS BEYOND THE REACH OF PUNISHMENT OF ANY KIND DUE TO HIS PRIOR PRESIDENTIAL PARDON. THE COURT ALSO STATED THAT COUNSELORS ARE OFFICERS OF THE COURT AND NOT OFFICERS OF THE UNITED STATES, AND THAT THEIR REMOVAL WAS AN EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL POWER AND NOT LEGISLATIVE POWER. THE LAW WAS STRUCK DOWN, OPENING THE WAY FOR FORMER CONFEDERATE GOVERNEMNT OFFICIALS TO RETURN TO THE POSITIONS WITHIN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY.

K.
THE PARDONING POWER. 5. EFFECTS OF PARDON. EX RE GARLAND: JUSTICE FILED SAID A PARDON REACHES BOTH THE PUNISHMENT PRESCRIBED FOR THE OFFENSE AND THE GUILT OF THE OFFENDER; AND WHEN THE PARDON IS FULL, IT RELEASES THE PUNISHMENT AND BLOTS OUT THE EXISTENCE OF GUILT, SO THAT IN THE EYE OF THE LAW THE OFFENDER IS AS INNOCENT AS IF HE HAD NEVER COMMITTED THE OFFENSE . . . IT MAKES HIM, AS IT WERE, A NEW MAN, AND GIVES HIM A NEW CREDIT AND CAPACITY. GARLAND WAS THEREAFTER RE-ADMITTED AND RE-INSTATED TO HIS FORMER POSITION AS ATTORNEY AND COUSELOR OF THE COURT.

K.
THE PARDONING POWER. 5. EFFECTS OF PARDON. PELOBELLO V. PALATINO (72 Phil. 441 [1941]). THE LEGAL EFFECT OF A PARDON IS TO RESTORE NOT ONLY THE OFFENDERS LIBERTY BUT ALSO HIS CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS. IN THIS CASE, A MAYORS ELECTION WAS CONTESTED ON THE GROUND THAT HE WAS DISQUALIFIED FROM PUBLIC OFFICE BECAUSE OF A PRIOR CONVICTION AND IMPRISONMENT. IT WAS SHOWN, HOWEVER, THAT BEFORE ASSUMING OFFICE FOLLOWING HIS ELECTION HE WAS GRANTED AN ABSOLUTE PARDON BY PRES. QUEZON. AS A RESULT, THE SUPREME COURT HELD, HIS FORMER DISABILITIES HAD BEEN REMOVED, AND HE WAS THEREFORE ELIGIBLE FOR THE PUBLIC OFFICE IN QUESTION.

K.
THE PARDONING POWER. 5. EFFECTS OF PARDON. NOTA BENE: THE EX RE GARLAND DOCTRINE WAS APPLIED IN PELOBELLO V. PALATINO CASE, CRISTOBAL V. LABRADOR CASE (71 PHIL. 34 [1940]), AND SEVERAL OTHER CASES. MONSANTO V. FACTORAN (170 SCRA 190) THE EX RE GARLAND DOCTRINE, AS APPLIED IN THE PELOBELLO AND CRISTOBAL CASES, HOWEVER, WAS MODIFIED IN THIS CASE WHERE A WOMAN CONVICTED OF ESTAFA THROUGH FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS WAS GRANTED AN ABSOLUTE PARDON AND THEREAFTER CLAIMED SHE WAS ENTITLED AS A CONSEQUENCE TO REINSTATEMENT AS ASSISTANT CITY TREASURER WHICH THE COURT DID NOT AGREE.

K.
THE PARDONING POWER. 5. EFFECTS OF PARDON. MONSANTO V. FACTORAN: C.J. FERNAN SAID: PARDON CANNOT MASK THE ACTS CONSTITUTING THE CRIME. THESE ARE HISTORICAL FACTS WHICH, DESPITE A PUBLIC MANIFESTATION OF MERCY AND FORGIVENESS IMPLICIT IN PARDON, ORDINARY PRUDENT MEN WILL TAKE INTO ACCOUNT IN THEIR SUBSEQUENT DEALINGS WITH THE ACTOR. PARDON GRANTED AFTER CONVICTION FREES THE INDIVIDUAL FROM ALL THE PENALTIES AND LEGAL DISABILITIES AND RESTORES HIM TO ALL HIS CIVIL RIGHTS. BUT UNLESS EXPRESSLY GROUNDED ON THE

K.
THE PARDONING POWER. 5. EFFECTS OF PARDON. MONSANTO V. FACTORAN: PERSONS INNOCENCE (WHICH IS RARE), IT CANNOT BRING BACK LOST REPUTATION FOR HONESTY, INTEGRITY AND FAIR DEALING. THIS MUST BE CONSTANTLY KEPT IN MIND LEST WE LOSE TRACK OF THE TRUE CHARACTER AND PURPOSE OF THE PRIVILEGE. THUS, NOTWITHSTANDING THE EXPANSIVE AND EFFUSIVE LANGUAGE OF THE GARLAND CASE, WE ARE IN FULL AGREEMENT WITH THE COMMONLY-HELD OPINION THAT PARDON DOES NOT IPSO FACTO RESTORE A CONVICTED FELON TO PUBLIC OFFICE NECESSARILY RELINQUISHED OR FORFEITED BY REASON OF THE CONVICTION ALTHOUGH SUCH PARDON UNDOUBTEDLY RESTORES HIS ELIGIBILITY FOR APPOINTMENT TO THAT OFFICE.
AUTHORITIES
1.
PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW, 2002 EDITION, ISAGANI A. CRUZ, RETIRED ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, VOLUME II, FIRST EDITION, 1988, JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J.
2.

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LECTURE PRESENTATION FOR LAW STUDENTS

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

1. WHAT COMPOSES THE CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES?

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

WHO ARE CONSIDERED NATURAL-BORN CITIZENS?

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

9. WHAT IS THE HISTORICAL BASIS OF THIS TERM?

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

10. WHAT ARE THE TERMS OF OFFICE OF:

MEMBERS OF THE SENATE? MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES?

CHAPETER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

21. WHAT IS ELECTORAL

THE COMPOSITION OF THE TRIBUNAL? WHAT IS ITS

CHAPTER 8 LEGISLATIVE DEPT.

CHAPTER 9 POWERS OF CONGRESS

b.1.c) OTHER PORTIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION.

PROPOSED ANSWER TO QUESTION NO. 7

PROPOSED ANSWER TO QUESTION NO. 8

PROPOSED ANSWER TO QUESTION NO. 8

CHAPTER 10 THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

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PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION. A. THERE ARE TWO SETS OF RULES ON PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION:

THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

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THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

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THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

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THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

JUSTICE REYNATO S. PUNO DECLARED IN PART FOR THE COURT:

THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT