PELAEZ vs.

AUDITOR GENERAL
Facts: In 1964, the president, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Order Nos. 93 to 121,124 and 126 to 129 for the creation of 33 municipalities. Vice president Pelaez instituted a special civil action for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction to restraint the auditor general as well as his representatives and agents from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of the executive order and for any disbursement by said municipality by alleging that the executive order is null and void for it was impliedly repealed by RA 2370 and constitute undue delegation of power. The third paragraph of Section 3 of RA 2370, reads: Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except under the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress. Pursuant to the first two (2) paragraphs of the same Section 3: All barrios existing at the time of the passage of this Act shall come under the provisions hereof. Upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected, a new barrio may be created or the name of an existing one may be changed by the provincial board of the province, upon recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is stipulated. The recommendation of the municipal council shall be embodied in a resolution approved by at least two-thirds of the entire membership of the said council: Provided, however, That no new barrio may be created if its population is less than five hundred persons. The petitioner argues that if the president cannot create a barrio, how can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipality. Respondent on the other hand argue that a municipality can be created without creating a new barrios by placing old barrios under the jurisdiction of municipality. Issue (1): Whether or not the President has the power to create municipalities. NO Held: Respondent alleges that the power of the President to create municipalities under this section does not amount to an undue delegation of legislative power. Such claim is untenable. When RA 2370 became effective, barrios may "not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected" and the "recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated." This statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to create municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios. The power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. In the language of other courts, it is "strictly a legislative function" or "solely and exclusively the exercise of legislative power". Issue (2): Whether or not the executive orders are valid. NO Held: According to the SC, under RA 2370, barrios may not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names be changed except by act of congress or of the corresponding provincial

board upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected and the recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated. The SC further said that the authority to create municipal corporation is legislative in nature. WHEREFORE, the EOs in question are declared null and void ab initio and the respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities above referred to.

MUNICIPALITY OF MALABANG vs. BENITO

Facts: The petitioner Amer Macaorao Balindong is the mayor of Malabang, Lanao del Sur, while the respondent Pangandapun Bonito is the mayor, and the rest of the respondents are the councilors, of the municipality of Balabagan of the same province. The municipality of Balabagan was created by EO 386 of President Garcia out of barrios and sitios of Malabang. The petitioners seek to nullify the EO. Petitioners relied on the Pelaez ruling that the Presidents power to create municipalities under Sec. 68 of the Administrative Code is unconstitutional. Respondents argued that the Pelaez ruling is inapplicable because Balabagan is a de facto corporation, having been organized under color of a statute before this was declared unconstitutional, its officers having been either elected or appointed, and the municipality itself having discharged its corporate functions for the past five years preceding the institution of this action. It is contended that as a de facto corporation, its existence cannot be collaterally attacked, although it may be inquired into directly in an action for quo warranto at the instance of the State and not of an individual like the petitioner. Issue: Whether the municipality of Balabagan is a de facto corporation, as it was organized before the promulgation of the SC's decision in Pelaez. NO Held: The following principles may be deduced. (1) The color of authority requisite to a de facto municipal corporation may be an unconstitutional law, valid on its face, which has either: (a) Been upheld for a time by the courts; or (b) Not yet been declared void; provided that a warrant for its creation can be found in some other valid law or in the recognition of its potential existence in the general constitution of the state; (2) there can be no de facto municipal corporation unless either directly or potentially, such a de jure corporation is authorized by some legislative fiat; (3) there can be no color of authority in an unconstitutional statute alone, the invalidity of which is apparent on its face; (4) there can be no de facto corporation created to take the place of an existing de jure corporation, as such organization would clearly be a usurper. In the cases where a de facto municipal corporation was recognized as such despite the fact that the statute creating it was later invalidated, the decisions could fairly be made to rest on the consideration that there was some other valid law giving corporate vitality to the organization. Hence, in the case at bar, the mere fact that Balabagan was organized at a time when the statute had not been invalidated cannot conceivably make it a de facto corporation, as, independently of the Administrative Code provision in question, there is no other valid statute to give color of authority to its creation. Executive Order 386 "created no office." This is not to say, however, that the acts done by the municipality of Balabagan in the exercise of its corporate powers are a nullity because the

executive order "is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed." The Act of Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. It is quite clear, however, that the actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. There is then no basis for the respondents' apprehension that the invalidation of the executive order creating Balabagan would have the effect of unsettling many an act done in reliance upon the validity of the creation of that municipality. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted, Executive Order 386 is declared void, and the respondents are hereby permanently restrained from performing the duties and functions of their respective offices. MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO vs. MENDEZ Facts: President C. Garcia, issued E.O. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres, Quezon. By virtue of E.O. 174, issued by President D. Macapagal, the municipal district of San Andres was later officially recognized to have gained the status of a fifth class municipality by operation of Sec. 2 of RA 1515. It was then attacked of its validity. The Municipality of San Narciso filed a petition for quo warranto against the officials of the Municipality of San Andres. The petition sought the declaration of nullity of Executive Order No. 353 and prayed that the respondent local officials of the Municipality of San Andres be permanently ordered to refrain from performing the duties and functions of their respective offices. While petitioners would grant that the enactment of RA 7160 may have converted the Municipality of San Andres into a de facto municipality, they contend that since the petition for quo warranto had been filed prior to the passage of said law, petitioner had acquired a vested right to seek the nullification of E.O. 353, and any attempt to apply Sec. 442 of RA 7160 to the petition would perforce be violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Issue: Whether or not the Municpality of San Andres legally exists. YES Held: The de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in the province of Quezon must be conceded. Granting the Executive Order No. 353 was a complete nullity for being the result of an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case hardly could offer a choice other than to consider the Municipality of San Andres to have at least attained a status uniquely of its own closely approximating, if not in fact attaining, that of a de facto municipal corporation. Created in 1959 by virtue of Executive Order No. 353, the Municipality of San Andres had been in existence for more than six years. On the contrary, certain governmental acts all pointed to the State's recognition of the continued existence of the Municipality of San Andres. Thus, after more than five years as a municipal district, Executive Order No. 174 classified the Municipality of San Andres as a fifth class municipality after having surpassed the income requirement laid out in Republic Act No. 1515. Sec. 442(d) of the LGC of 1991, which provides that municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executives orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of the code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities, is also curative statute, as it validates the creation of

municipalities by executive orders which had been held to be an invalid usurpation of legislative power.

TORRALBA vs. MUNICIPALITY OF SIBAGAT

Facts: BP 56, creating the Municipality of Sibagat, Province of Agusan del Sur, is being challenged as violative of Section 3 Article XI of the 1973 Constitution. Petitioners are residents and taxpayers of Butuan City, with petitioner, Clementino Torralba, being a member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of the same City. Respondent municipal officers are the local public officials of the new Municipality. According to the petitioners, the Local Government Code must first be enacted to determine the criteria for the creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of the boundary of any province, city, municipality, or barrio; and that since no Local Government Code had as yet been enacted as of the date BP 56 was passed, that statute could not have possibly complied with any criteria when respondent Municipality was created, hence, it is null and void. Issue: Whether or not BP 56 is invalid. NO Held: The absence of the Local Government Code at the time of its enactment did not curtail nor was it intended to cripple legislative competence to create municipal corporations. Section 3, Article XI of the 1973 Constitution does not proscribe nor prohibit the modification of territorial and political subdivisions before the enactment of the LGC. It contains no requirement that the LGC a condition sine qua non for the creation of a municipality, in much the same way that the creation of a new municipality does not preclude the enactment of a LGC. What the Constitutional provision means is that once said Code is enacted, the creation, modification or dissolution of local government units should conform with the criteria thus laid down. In the interregnum, before the enactment of such Code, the legislative power remains plenary except that the creation of the new local government unit should be approved by the people concerned in a plebiscite called for the purpose. The creation of the new Municipality of Sibagat conformed to said requisite. A plebiscite was conducted and the people of the unit/units affected endorsed and approved the creation of the new local government unit. The officials of the new Municipality have effectively taken their oaths of office and are performing their functions. A de jure entity has thus been created. It is a long-recognized principle that the power to create a municipal corporation is essentially legislative in nature. In the absence of any constitutional limitations, a legislative body may create any corporation it deems essential for the more efficient administration of government. The creation of the new Municipality of Sibagat was a valid exercise of legislative power then vested by the 1973 Constitution in the Interim Batasang Pambansa. There are significant differences, however, in Tan vs Comelec and in this case: in the Tan case, the LGC already existed at the time that the challenged statute was enacted on 3 December 1985; not so in the case at bar. Secondly, BP 885 in the Tan case confined the plebiscite to the "proposed new province" to the exclusion of the voters in the remaining areas, in contravention of the Constitutional mandate and of the LGC that the plebiscite should be held "in the unit or units affected." In contrast, BP 56 specifically provides for a plebiscite "in the area or areas

affected." Thirdly, in the Tan case, even the requisite area for the creation of a new province was not complied with in BP Blg. 885. No such issue in the creation of the new municipality has been raised here. And lastly, "indecent haste" attended the enactment of BP Blg. 885 and the holding of the plebiscite thereafter in the Tan case; on the other hand, BP 56 creating the Municipality of Sibagat, was enacted in the normal course of legislation, and the plebiscite was held within the period specified in that law.

MUNICIPALITY OF JIMENEZ vs. BAZ

Facts: The Municipality of Sinacaban was created by EO 258 of then Pres. Quirino pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Revised Admin. Code. Sinacaban laid claim to several barrios based on the technical description in EO 258. The Municipality of Jimenez asserted jurisdiction based on an agreement with Sinacaban which was approved by the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental which fixed the common boundary of Sinacaban and Jimenez. The Provincial Board declared the disputed area to be part of Sinacaban. It held that the earlier resolution approving the agreement between the municipalities was void since the Board had no power to alter the boundaries of Sinacaban as fixed in EO 258. Jimenez argued that the power to create municipalities is essentially legislative (as held in Pelaez v Auditor General), then Sinacaban, which was created thru and EO, had no legal personality and no right to assert a territorial claim. Issue: Whether or not Sinacaban has juridical personality. YES Held: Where a municipality created as such by EO is later impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded legal validity, its creation can no longer be questioned. In the case of Municipality of San Narciso v Mendez, the SC laid the factors to consider in validating the creation of a municipal corporation: 1. The fact that for 30 years, the validity of the corporation has not been challenged; 2. The fact that no quo warranto suit was filed to question the validity of the EO creating the municipality; and 3. The fact that the municipality was later classified as a 5th class municipality, organized as part of a municipal circuit court and considered part of a legislative district in the Constitution apportioning the seats in the House. In this case, the following factors are present: 1. Sinacaban has been in existence for 16 years when Pelaez was decided in 1965 and yet the validity of EO 258 creating it had never been questioned. 2. It was only 40 years later that its existence was questioned. 3. Rule 66, Sec. 16 of the Rules of COurt provides that a quo warranto suit against a corporation for forfeiture of its charter must be commenced within 5 years from the time the act complaned of was done or committed. 4. The State and even Jimenez recognized Sinacabans corporate existence by entering into an agreement with it regarding the boundary. Ex.: AO 33, Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, etc. 5. Sinacaban is constituted as part of a municipal circuit for purposes of the establishment of MTCs in the country.

Moreover, the LGC of 1991, Sec. 442(d) provides that municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities. Sinacaban has attained de jure status by virtue of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, apportioning legislative districts throughout the country, which considered Sinacaban as part of the 2nd District of Misamis Occidental. II. Sinacaban had attained de facto status at the time the 1987 Constitution took effect. It is not subject to the plebiscite requirement. It applies only to new municipalities created for the first time under the Constitution. The requirement of plebiscite was originally contained in Art. XI, Section 3 of the previous Constitution. It cannot be applied to municipal corporations created before, such as Sinacaban. MIRANDA vs. AGUIRRE Facts: On May 5, 1994, RA 7720 converted the municipality of Santiago, Isabela, into an independent component city. On Feb 1998, RA 8528 was enacted, amending RA 7720. It changed the status of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city. Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of this RA since it lacked a provision submitting the law for ratification by the people of Santiago City in a plebiscite. The respondents raised the defense of standing and the political question doctrine. The Sol Gen argued that the RA merely reclassified Santiago City from an independent component city to a component city. It allegedly did not involve any creation, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units. Issue: Whether or not a reclassification of a city from an independent component city to a component city requires a plebiscite. Held: Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides: No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, or divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. This constitutional requirement is reiterrated in Section 10, Chapter 2 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160), thus: Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. The wording of the constitution has a common denominator: the material change in the political and economic rights of the LGU directly affected. The consent of the people is required to serve as a checking mechanism to any exercise of legislative power. The changes are substantial. The city mayor will be placed under the administrative supervision of the provincial governor. The resolutions and ordinances of the city council will have to be reviewed by the Provincial Board of Isabela. Taxes that will be collected by the city will have to be shared with the province. There would be a reduction in their IRA. When RA 7720 upgraded the status of Santiago City from a municipality to an independent component city, it required the approval of its people thru a plebiscite called for that purpose. There is no reason why the same should not be done when RA 8528 downgrades the status of

their city. The rules cover all conversions, whether upward or downward so long as they result in a material change in the LGU directly affected. Thus, R.A. No. 8528, which fails to provide that the conversion of the city of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city should be submitted to its people in a proper plebiscite, is unconstitutional.

by the people, but appointed by the President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member. In fact, part of his function is to perform such other duties as may be assigned to him by the President, whereas in local government units, the President merely exercises supervisory authority. This emphasizes the administrative character of the MMDA. Clearly then, the MMC under P. D. No. 824 is not the same entity as the MMDA under R. A. No. 7924. Unlike the MMC, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the local government units, acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal.

MMDA vs. BEL-AIR

Facts: Bel Air Village Assn. (BAVA) is the registered owner of Neptune St. in Makati. Oreta (MMDA Chair) Wrote the BAVA president to ask for the voluntary opening of Neptune St. to public vehicular traffic. MMDA claims to have authority to open Neptune St. to traffic since it is an agent of the state endowed with police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. One of these is traffic management which involves the regulation of the use of thoroughfares to insure the safety, convenience and welfare of the general public. Respondent instituted against petitioner praying for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall. Issue: Whether or not the MMDA can order the opening of a subdivision road to public traffic absent an ordinance from the concerned LGU. Held: NO. With the passage of RA No. 7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special development and administrative region" and the Administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the region placed under "a development authority" referred to as the MMDA. "Metro-wide services" are those "services which have metro-wide impact and transcend local political boundaries or entail huge expenditures such that it would not be viable for said services to be provided by the individual local government units comprising Metro Manila." There are seven (7) basic metro-wide services and the scope of these services cover the following: (1) development planning; (2) transport and traffic management; (3) solid waste disposal and management; (4) flood control and sewerage management; (5) urban renewal, zoning and land use planning, and shelter services; (6) health and sanitation, urban protection and pollution control; and (7) public safety. The MMDA has the power and function to set the policies concerning traffic in Metro Manila, and shall coordinate and regulate the implementation of all programs and projects concerning traffic management, specifically pertaining to enforcement, engineering and education. Upon request, it shall be extended assistance and cooperation, including but not limited to, assignment of personnel, by all other government agencies and offices concerned. (Sec. 5 (e) of RA No. 7924) There is no syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. MMDA is not an LGU or a public corporation endowed with legislative power. The creation of a "special metropolitan political subdivision" requires the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. R. A. No. 7924 was not submitted to the inhabitants of Metro Manila in a plebiscite. The Chairman of the MMDA is not an official elected

MUNICIPALITY OF CANDIJAY vs. CA

Facts: The Municipality of Candijay claimed that the barrio of Pagahat is within its territorial jurisdiction and that it is not a part of the Municipality of Alicia. The trial court ruled for Candijay but this was reversed by the CA. The CA found that the plans submitted by the two municipalities are inadequate insofar as identifying the monuments of the boundary line between the petitioner and the Muncipality of Mabini. The CA ruled that in cases of equiponderance of evidence, the courts must find for the defendant. The petitioner argues that the CA improperly applied the rule on equiponderance of evidence, and that respondent municipality does not have a juridical personality since it was created under a void executive order. Petitioner contended that Exec. Order No. 265 issued by President Quirino creating respondent municipality is null and void ab initio, inasmuch as Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, on which said Executive Order was based, constituted an undue delegation of legislative powers to the President of the Philippines, and was therefore declared unconstitutional. Issue: Whether or not a municipality, created under a void executive order, can be considered as not having a juridical personality in light of the passage of the Local Government Code of 1991. NO Held: The petitioner commenced its collateral attack on the juridical personality of the respondent on 19 January 1984 (35 yrs after its creation in 1949) during the proceedings in this case. After presentation of evidence, Candijay asked the trial court to bar the respondent from presenting evidence on the ground that it had no juridical personality. Candijay argued that EO 265 issued by Pres. Quirino is null and void ab initio since Sec. 68 of the RAC constituted an undue delegation of legislative power to the President. Respondent municipality's situation in the instant case is strikingly similar to that of the municipality of San Andres. In that case, Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres was issued on 20 August 1959 but it was only after almost 30 years that the municipality of San Narciso finally decided to challenge the legality of the executive order. In the meantime, the Municipal district, and later the Municipality of San Andres, began and continued to exercise the powers and authority of a duly created local government unit. Created in 1959 by virtue of Executive Order No. 353, the Municipality of San Andres had been in existence for more than six years when, on 24 December 1965, Pelaez vs. Auditor General was promulgated. The

ruling could have sounded the call for a similar declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 353 but it was not to be the case. On the contrary, certain governmental acts all pointed to the State's recognition of the continued existence of the Municipality of San Andres. Thus, after more than five years as a municipal district, Executive Order No. 174 classified the Municipality of San Andres as a fifth class municipality after having surpassed the income requirement laid out in Republic Act No. 1515. The Municipality of Alicia was created by EO 265, or ten years ahead of the Municipality of San Andres, and had been in existence for 16 years when Pelaez was promulgated. Various governmental acts through the years all indicate the States recognition and acknowledgement of its existence. Alicia must benefit from the effects of Sec. 422 (d) of the LGC and should be considered a regular, de jure municipality. According to Sec. 442 (d) of the LGC, municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of the Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities. Curative laws, which in essence are retrospective, and aimed at giving validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with, are validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification against impairment of vested rights. WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED, with costs against petitioner.

pursuant to the Constitution, the power to create a province is with Congress and may not be validly delegated. Section 19 is, therefore, unconstitutional. MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly and creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void. The creation of Shariff Kabunsuan is invalid. In this case, the creation of a province by the Regional Assembly is contrary to the Constitution. There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create LGUs. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create LGUs, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. When it comes to the creation of municipalities and barangays, there is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional legislative bodies (like the ARMM Regional Assembly) of the power to create such LGUs. The creation of provinces and cities is another matter. The power to create a province or city inherently involves the power to create a legislative district. This is clear under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution (Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative in the House of Representatives) and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to theConstitution (Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than twohundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member) In other words, for Congress to delegate validly the power to create a province or city, it must also validly delegate at the same time the power to create a legislative district. However, Congress CANNOT validly delegate the power to create legislative districts. The power to increase the allowable membership in the House of Representatives, and to reapportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress. Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to increase, through a law, the allowable membership in the House of Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion legislative districts. The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress exercises these powers through a law that Congress itself enacts, and not through a law that regional or local legislative bodies enact. The allowable membership of the House of Representatives can be increased, and new legislative districts of Congress can be created, only through a national law passed by Congress. The exclusive power to create or reapportion legislative districts is logical. Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its allowable membership or in its incumbent membership through the creation of legislative districts must be embodied in a national law. Only Congress can enact such a law. It would be anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to create or reapportion legislative districts for a national legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change the membership of the superior legislative body. Indeed, the office of a legislative district representative to Congress is a national office, and its occupant, a Member of the House of Representatives, is a national official. It would be

SEMA vs. COMELEC

Facts: The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was created underRepublic Act (R.A.) No. 6734, as amended by Republic Act No. 9054. The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City, on the other hand, voted against inclusion in the ARMM during the plebiscite in November 1989. There are two legislative districts for the Province of Maguindanao. The first legislative district of Maguindanao consists of Cotabato City and eight municipalities. However, for the reason noted above, Cotabato City is not part of the ARMM but of Region XII. On 28 August 2006, the ARMMs legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao. The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuans creation in a plebiscite held on 29 October 2006. On May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these petitions, renaming the first legislative district in question as Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City). Sema, who was a candidate in the 2007 elections for Representative of Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City, prayed for the nullification of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from canvassing of the votes cast in Cotabato City for that office. Sema contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in Congress. Issue: Whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, is constitutional. NO Held: The power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays was delegated by Congress to the ARMM Regional Assembly under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054. However,

incongruous for a regional legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office when its legislative powers extend only to its regional territory. The office of a district representative is maintained by national funds and the salary of its occupant is paid out of national funds. It is a self- evident inherent limitation on the legislative powers of every local or regional legislative body that it can only create local or regional offices, respectively, and it can never create a national office. To allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office is to allow its legislative powers to operate outside the ARMMs territorial jurisdiction. This violates Section 20, Article X of the Constitution which expressly limits the coverage of the Regional Assemblys legislative powers within its territorial jurisdiction.

Government Code. The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws. Likewise, Section 450 of the Local Government Code provides: Section 450. Requisites for Creation - (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has a locally generated average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least One hundred million pesos (P100,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites: (i) a contiguous territory of at least 100 square kilometers, as certified bythe Land Management Bureau; or (ii) a population of not less than 150,000 inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office. The creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein. (b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands. (c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. Thus, RA 9009 increased the income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million toP100 million. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not provide any exemption from the increased income requirement. The equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification under the following conditions: 1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions; 2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law; 3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and 4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class. Limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as worded the exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.

LEAGUE OF CITIES vs. COMELEC

Facts: During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law RA 9009 amending Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million to restrain the mad rush of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence. Prior to its enactment, a total of 57 municipalities had cityhood bills pending in Congress. Congress did not act on 24 cityhood bills during the 11th Congress. During the 12th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29. This Resolution reached the Senate. However, the 12thCongress adjourned without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29. During the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities mentioned in the unapproved Joint Resolution No. 29 filed between November and December of 2006, through their respective sponsors in Congress, individual cityhood bills containing a common provision, as follows: Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009: The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009.These cityhood bills lapsed into law on various dates from March to July 2007 after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo failed to sign them. Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code. Issue: Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and the equal protection clause. YES Held: The Cityhood Laws violate both the Constitution and the equal protection clause. Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides: No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local

CAMID vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

Facts: This is a petition for Certiorari arguing the existence of Municipalityof Andong in Lanao Del Sur. This decision have noted the earlier decision of Pelaez where the Executive orders of

Former President Macapagal creating 33 Municipalities of Lanao Del Sur was considered null and void due to undue delegation of legislative powers. Among the annulled executive orders is EO 107 creating Andong. The petitioner herein represents himself as resident of Andong (as aprivate citizen and taxpayer). Camid contends/argues the following: (1) Municipality of Andong evolved into a full blown municipality (since there is a complete set of officials appointed to handle essential tasks and services, it has its own high school, Bureau of Post, DECS office, etc. (2) 17 baranggays with chairman; (3) he noted agencies and private groups recognizing Andong and also the CENRO and DENR Certification of land area and population of Andong. In the Certification of DILG, there is an enumeration of existing municipalities including 18 0f the 33 Municipalities invalidated in Pelaez Case. Camid finds this as an abuse of discretion and unequal treatment for Andong. Likewise, Camid insists the continuing of EO 107, arguing that in Municipality of San Narciso v. Hon. Mendez, the Court affirmed in making San Andres a de facto municipal corporation. San Andres was created through an executive order. Thus, this petition. Issue: Whether or not the Municipality of Andong be recognized as a de facto municipal corporation. NO Held: Municipal corporations may exist by prescription where it is shown that the community has claimed and exercised corporate functions, with the knowledge and acquiescence of the legislature, and without interruption or objection for period long enough to afford title by prescription. Camid does not have shown factual demonstration of the continuous exercise by the municipal corporation of its corporation of its corporate powers as well as acquiescence by the other instrumentalities of the state like charters or the legislatures action. May any action on the Certification be an appropriate solution to Camids prayer? NO. The Certification has no power or it does not bear any authority to create or revalidate a municipality. Should the case of Andong be treated same as the case of San Andres? No, for the following reasons: (1) There are facts found in the San Andres case that are not present in the case at bar: (1) The Executive Order creating San Andres was not invalidated in Pelaez Case, (2) The municipality existed for 30 years before it was questioned and (3) The municipality was classified as a fifth class municipality and was included in the legislative district in the House of Representatives apportionment. (2) Andong did not meet the requisites set by LGC of 1991 Sec.442 (d) regarding municipalities created by executive orders. It says: Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities. (3) The failure to appropriate funds for Andong and the absence of elections in the municipality are eloquent indicia (indicators) that the State does not recognize the existence of the municipality.

(4) The Ordinance appended in the 1987 Constitution (which apportioned seats for the House of Reps to the different legislative districts in the Philippines, enumerates the various municipalities encompassed in the various districts) did not include Andong. Is there an unequal treatment since 18 of the 33 invalidated municipalities are now considered existing? NONE. The DILG Certification and the Ordinance in the1987 Constitution validates them. The fact that there existing organic statutes passed by the legislation recreating these municipalities is enough to accord a different treatment as that of the municipality of Andong. SC DISMISSED petition for lack of Merit. Note the following Sections with regards to juridical personality of corporations in relation to the reasons why San Andres have a different treatment with Andong: Batas Pambansa Blg. 8: Section 2. Corporation defined. - A corporation is an artificial being created by operation of law, having the right of succession and the powers, attributes and properties expressly authorized by law or incident to its existence; Section 4. Corporations created by special laws or charters. Corporations created by special laws or charters shall be governed primarily by the provisions of the special law or charter creating them or applicable to them, supplemented by the provisions of this Code, insofar as they are applicable. Moreover, under Art.44 of the New Civil Code with relation to Art. 45 of the New Civil Code, those considered as juridical person includes the State and its political subdivisions and Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by law; their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law. These two are governed by the law creating them. Since Andong has no law recreating it and that it is not a recognized olitical subdivision, it is not also considered a juridical person. What happened with the people from Andong?-The constituent barrios of the voided town returns to its original municipalities (Lumbatan, Tubig and Tubaran) which are recognized and still existing. The solution to have Andong recognized is through legislation and not judicial confirmation of void title

CITY OF MANILA vs IAC

Facts: Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. died and was buried in North Cemetery which lot was leased by the city to Irene Sto. Domingo for the period from June 6, 1971 to June 6, 2021. The wife paid the full amount of the lease. Apart, however from the receipt, no other document embodied such lease over the lot. Believing that the lease was only for five years, the city certified the lot as ready for exhumation. On the basis of the certification, Joseph Helmuth authorized the exhumation and removal of the remains of Vicencio. His bones were placed in a bag and kept in the bodega of the cemetery. The lot was also leased to another lessee. During the next all souls day, the private respondents were shocked to find out that Vicencios remains were removed. The cemetery told Irene to look for the bones of the husband in the bodega. Aggrieved, the widow and the children brought an action for damages against the City of Manila; Evangeline Suva of the City Health Office; Sergio Mallari, officer-in-charge of the North Cemetery; and Joseph Helmuth, the latter's predecessor as officer-in-charge of the said burial grounds owned and operated by the City Government of Manila. The court ordered defendants to

give plaintiffs the right to make use of another lot. The CA affirmed and included the award of damages in favor of the private respondents. Issue (1): Whether or not the operations and functions of a public cemetery are a governmental, or a corporate or proprietary function of the City of Manila. PROPRIETARY Held: Petitioners alleged in their petition that the North Cemetery is exclusively devoted for public use or purpose as stated in Sec. 316 of the Compilation of the Ordinances of the City of Manila. They conclude that since the City is a political subdivision in the performance of its governmental function, it is immune from tort liability which may be caused by its public officers and subordinate employees. Private respondents maintain that the City of Manila entered into a contract of lease which involve the exercise of proprietary functions with Irene Sto. Domingo. The city and its officers therefore can be sued for any-violation of the contract of lease. Petitioners alleged in their petition that the North Cemetery is exclusively devoted for public use or purpose as stated in Sec. 316 of the Compilation of the Ordinances of the City of Manila. They conclude that since the City is a political subdivision in the performance of its governmental function, it is immune from tort liability which may be caused by its public officers and subordinate employees. Private respondents maintain that the City of Manila entered into a contract of lease which involves the exercise of proprietary functions with Irene Sto. Domingo. The city and its officers therefore can be sued for any-violation of the contract of lease. Under the foregoing considerations and in the absence of a special law, the North Cemetery is a patrimonial property of the City of Manila. The administration and government of the cemetery are under the City Health Officer, the order and police of the cemetery, the opening of graves, niches, or tombs, the exhuming of remains, and the purification of the same are under the charge and responsibility of the superintendent of the cemetery. With the acts of dominion, there is no doubt that the North Cemetery is within the class of property which the City of Manila owns in its proprietary or private character. Furthermore, there is no dispute that the burial lot was leased in favor of the private respondents. Hence, obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties. Thus a lease contract executed by the lessor and lessee remains as the law between them. Therefore, a breach of contractual provision entitles the other party to damages even if no penalty for such breach is prescribed in the contract. Issue (2): Whether or not the city is liable for damages. YES Held: All things considered, even as the Court commiserates with plaintiffs for the unfortunate happening complained of and untimely desecration of the resting place and remains of their deceased dearly beloved, it finds the reliefs prayed for by them lacking in legal and factual basis. Under the aforementioned facts and circumstances, the most that plaintiffs ran ask for is the replacement of subject lot with another lot of equal size and similar location in the North Cemetery which substitute lot plaintiffs can make use of without paying any rental to the city government for a period of forty-three (43) years, four (4) months and eleven (11) days corresponding to the unexpired portion of the term of the lease sued upon as of January 25, 1978 when the remains of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. were prematurely removed from the disputed lot; and to require the defendants to look in earnest for the bones and skull of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo Sr. and to bury the same in the substitute lot adjudged in favor of plaintiffs hereunder.

As regards the issue of the validity of the contract of lease of grave lot No. 159, Block No. 195 of the North Cemetery for 50 years beginning from June 6, 1971 to June 6, 2021 as clearly stated in the receipt duly signed by the deputy treasurer of the City of Manila and sealed by the city government, there is nothing in the record that justifies the reversal of the conclusion of both the trial court and the IAC to the effect that the receipt is in itself a contract of lease. Under the doctrine of respondent superior, (Torio v. Fontanilla), petitioner City of Manila is liable for the tortious act committed by its agents who failed toverify and check the duration of the contract of lease. The contention of the petitioner-city that the lease is covered by Administrative Order No. 5, series of 1975 dated March 6, 1975 of the City of Manila for five (5) years only beginning from June 6, 1971 is not meritorious for the said administrative order covers new leases. When subject lot was certified on January 25, 1978 as ready for exhumation, the lease contract for fifty (50) years was still in full force and effect.

SURIGAO ELECTRIC, CO. vs. MUNICIPALITY OF SURIGAO

Facts: On June 18, 1960, Congress further amended the Public Service Act, one of the changes introduced doing away with the requirement of a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the Public Service Commission for "public services owned or operated by government entities or GOCCs," but at the same time affirming its power of regulation, more specifically as set forth in the next section of the law, which while exempting public services owned or operated by any instrumentality of the government or any GOCCs from its supervision, jurisdiction and control stops short of including "the fixing of rates." Petitioner Surigao Electric, a legislative franchise holder, and Arturo Lumanlan to whom the rights and privileges of the former as well as its plant and facilities were transferred, challenge the validity of the order of respondent Public Service Commission wherein it held that it had "no other alternative but to approve as [it did approve] the tentative schedule of rates submitted by the applicant," the other respondent herein, Municipality of Surigao. Respondent Commission contends that a municipal government or a municipal corporation such as the Municipality of Surigao is a government entity recognized, supported and utilized by the National Government as a part of its government machinery and functions; a municipal government actually functions as an extension of the national government and, therefore, it is an instrumentality of the latter; and by express provisions of Section 14(e) of RA 2677, an instrumentality of the national government is exempted from the jurisdiction of the PSC except with respect to the fixing of rates. This exemption is even clearer in Section 13(a). Issue: Whether or not a municipal government can directly maintain and operate an electric plant without obtaining a specific franchise for the purpose and without a certificate of public convenience and necessity duly issued by the Public Service Commission. YES Held: Here, the Municipality of Surigao is not a GOCC. It cannot be said, however, that it is not a government entity. In Mendoza v. de Leon, there has been recognition by the Court of the dual character of a municipal corporation, one as governmental, being a branch of the general administration of the state, and the other as quasi-private and corporate. Legislative and

governmental powers are "conferred upon a municipality, the better to enable it to aid a state in properly governing that portion of its people residing within its municipality, such powers being in their nature public. An alleged error imputed to respondent Commission, however, needs further discussion. Petitioners seek refuge in the legislative franchise granted them. Whatever privilege may be claimed by petitioners cannot override the specific constitutional restriction that no franchise or right shall be granted to any individual or corporation except under a condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress. Such amendment or alteration need not be express; it may be implied from a latter act of general applicability, such as the one now under consideration. Reference by petitioners to the statute providing the procedure for the taking over and operation by the government of public utilities, in their view "to further strengthen their contention", as to the commission of this alleged error is unavailing, even if such statute were applicable, which it is not. In the language of their own brief: "This Act provides for the procedure to be followed whenever the Government or any political subdivision thereof decides to acquire and operate a public utility owned and operated by any individual or private corporation." That is to be regulated, therefore, by this enactment is the exercise of eminent domain, which is a taking of private property for public use upon the payment of just compensation. There is here no taking. There is here no appropriation. What was owned before by petitioners continue to remain theirs. There is to be no transfer of ownership. Rather, a municipal corporation, by virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 2677, may further promote community welfare by itself engaging in supplying public services, without the need of a certificate of public convenience. If at all then, the exercise of this governmental prerogative comes within the broad, undefined scope of the police power. It is not here, of course, the ordinary case of restraint on property or liberty, by the imposition of a regulation. What the amendatory act in effect accomplishes is to lend encouragement and support for the municipal corporation itself undertaking an activity as a result of which, profits of a competing private firm would be adversely affected. Clearly, then, the relevancy of the statute providing for the taking or operation of the government of public utilities, appears, to put it at its mildest, far from clear. Petitioners' contention as to this alleged error being committed, therefore, far from being strengthened by such a reference, suffers from a fate less auspicious. WHEREFORE, the orders of respondent Public Service Commission denying the motion for reconsideration are affirmed.

Lanao del Sur. [Remarkably, even the Congressman of Cotabato voted in favor of RA 4790.] Pursuant to this law, COMELEC proceeded to establish precints forvoter registration in the said territories of Dianaton. Lidasan then filed that RA 4790 be nullified forbeing unconstitutional because it did not clearly indicate in its title that it in creating Dianaton, it would be including in the territory thereof barrios from Cotabato. Issue: Is RA 4790, which created Dianaton but which includes barrios located in another province - Cotabato -to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that "No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill. Held: The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive. Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill that even a Congressman from Cotabato voted for it only to find out later on that it is to the prejudice of his own province. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of RA 4790.

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO vs. FIRME

Facts: Petitioner is a municipal corporation existing under and in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines. At about 7 am of December 16, 1965, a collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney driven by Bernardo Balagot and owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras, a gravel and sand truck driven by Jose Manandeg and owned by Tanquilino Velasquez and a dump truck of the petitioner and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Several passengers of the jeepney including Laureano Bania Sr. died as a result of the injuries they sustained and 4 others suffered physical injuries. Private respondents instituted an action against Nieveras and Balagot before the CFI. The defendants filed a third party complaint against petitioner and Bislig. The complaint was then amended to implead petitioner and Bislig. Petitioner raised as defense lack of cause of action, non suability of the State, prescription and negligence of the owner and driver of the jeepney. Issue: Whether or not the court committed grave abuse of discretion when it deferred and failed to resolve the defense of non-suability of the State amounting to lack of jurisdiction in a motion to dismiss. YES Held: In the case at bar, the judge deferred the resolution of the defense of non-suability of the State until trial. However, the judge failed to resolve such defense, proceeded with the trial and then rendered a decision against the municipality and its driver. The judge did not commit GAD when it arbitrarily failed to resolve the issue ofnon-suability of the State in the guise of the municipality. However, the judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction when in his decision he held the municipality liable for the quasi-delict committed by its regular employee. The doctrine of non-suability of the State is expressly provided for in Article XVI, Section 3 of the Consti, to wit: "the State may not be sued without its consent." Express consent may be

LINDASAN vs. COMELEC

Facts: Lidasan is a resident of Parang, Cotabato. Later, RA 4790, which is entitled "An Act Creating theMunicipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur," was passed. Lidasan came to know later onthat barrios Togaig and Madalum just mentioned are within the municipality of Buldon, Provinceof Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Katbo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko,Colodan, and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality, the municipality of Parang,also in the Province of Cotabato and not of

embodied in a general law or a special law. The standing consent of the State to be sued in case of money claims involving liability arising from contracts is found in Act No. 3083. A special law may be passed to enable a person to sue the government for an alleged quasi-delict. Consent is implied when the government enters into business contracts, thereby descending to the level of the other contracting party, and also when the State files a complaint, thus opening itself to a counterclaim. Municipal corporations are agencies of the State when they are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the performance of such functions because their charter provided that they can sue and be sued. A distinction should first be made between suability and liability. "Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable." Anent the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable for the torts committed by its employee, the test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver, acting in behalf of the municipality, is performing governmental or proprietary functions (Torio vs. Fontanilla). According to City of Kokomo vs Loy (Indiana SC), municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity, and their functions are twofold. In one they exercise the right springing from sovereignty, and while in the performance of the duties pertaining thereto, their acts are political and governmental. Their officers and agents in such capacity, though elected or appointed by them, are nevertheless public functionaries performing a public service, and as such they are officers, agents, and servants of the state. In the other capacity the municipalities exercise a private, proprietary or corporate right, arising from their existence as legal persons and not as public agencies. Their officers and agents in the performance of such functions act in behalf of the municipalities in their corporate or individual capacity, and not for the state or sovereign power." It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them inthe discharge of governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they wereacting in a proprietary capacity. In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that "he was on his way to the Naguilian River to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando's municipal streets." In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of official duty is presumed pursuant to Section 3(m) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court. Hence, We rule that the driver of the dump truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office.We already stressed in the case of Palafox, et. al. vs. Province of Ilocos Norte, the District Engineer, and the Provincial Treasurer that "the construction or maintenance of roads in which the truck and the driver worked at the time of the accident are admittedly governmental activities."

After a careful examination of existing laws and jurisprudence, We arrive at the conclusion that the municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee, who was then engaged in the discharge of governmental functions. Hence, the death of the passenger tragic and deplorable though it may be imposed on the municipality no duty to pay monetary compensation.

TORIO vs. FONTANILLA

Facts: On October 21, 1958, the Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan, passed Resolution No. 159 whereby "it resolved to manage the 1959 Malasiqui town fiesta celebration on January 21, 22, and 23, 1959." Resolution No. 182 was also passed creating the "1959 Malasiqui 'Town Fiesta Executive Committee" which in turn organized a sub-committee on entertainment and stage, with Jose Macaraeg as Chairman. The "zarzuela" entitled "Midas Extravaganza" was donated by an association of Malasiqui employees of the Manila Railroad Company in Caloocan, Rizal. The troupe arrived in the evening of January 22 for the performance and one of the members of the group was Vicente Fontanilla. The program started at about 10:15 o'clock that evening with some speeches, and many persons went up the stage. The "zarzuela" then began but before the dramatic part of the play was reached, the stage collapsed and Vicente Fontanilla who was at the rear of the stage was pinned underneath. Fontanilia was taken to tile San Carlos General Hospital where he died in the afternoon of the following day. The heirs of Vicente Fontanilia filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 11, 1959 to recover damages. Named party-defendants were the Municipality of Malasiqui, the Municipal Council of Malasiqui and all the individual members of the Municipal Council in 1959. Answering the complaint defendant municipality invoked inter alia the principal defense that as a legally and duly organized public corporation it performs sovereign functions and the holding of a town fiesta was an exercise of its governmental functions from which no liability can arise to answer for the negligence of any of its agents. The defendant councilors in turn maintained that they merely acted as agents of the municipality in carrying out the municipal ordinance providing for the management of the town fiesta celebration and as such they are likewise not liable for damages as the undertaking was not one for profit; furthermore, they had exercised due care and diligence in implementing the municipal ordinance. Issue: Whether or not the celebration of a town fiesta authorized by a municipal council under Sec. 2282 of the Municipal Law was a proprietary function of the municipality. YES Held: Under Philippine laws municipalities are political bodies corporate and as such are endowed with the faculties of municipal corporations to be exercised by and through their respective municipal governments in conformity with law, and in their proper corporate name, they may inter alia sue and be sued, and contract and be contracted with. The powers of a municipality are two fold in character public, governmental or political on the one hand, and corporate, private, or proprietary on the other. Governmental powers are those exercised by the corporation in administering the powers of the state and promoting the public

welfare and they include the legislative, judicial public, and political Municipal powers on the other hand are exercised for the special benefit and advantage of the community and include those which are ministerial private and corporate. This distinction of powers becomes important for purposes of determining the liability of the municipality for the acts of its agents which result in an injury to third persons. If the injury is caused in the course of the performance of a governmental function or duty, no recovery, as a rule, can be had from the municipality unless there is an existing statute on the matter, nor from its officers, so long as they performed their duties honestly and in good faith or that they did not act wantonly and maliciously. With respect to proprietary functions, the settled rule is that a municipal corporation can be held liable to third persons ex contract or ex delicto. The court held that the town fiesta in 1959 by the municipality of Malsiqui Pangasinan was an exercise of a private or proprietary function of the municipality. Section 2282 of the Chatter on Municipal Law of the Revised Administrative Code provides: Section 2282. Celebration of fiesta. fiesta may be held in each municipality not oftener than once a year upon a date fixed by the municipal council A fiesta s not be held upon any other date than that lawfully fixed therefor, except when, for weighty reasons, such as typhoons, foundations, earthquakes, epidemics, or other public ties, the fiesta cannot be hold in the date fixed in which case it may be held at a later date in the same year, by resolution of the council. This provision simply gives authority to the municipality to celebrate a yearly fiesta but it does not impose upon it a duty to observe one. Holding a fiesta even if the purpose is to commemorate a religious or historical event of the town is in essence an act for the special benefit of the community and not for the general welfare of the public performed in pursuance of a policy of the state. The mere fact that the celebration, as claimed was not to secure profit or gain but merely to provide entertainment to the town inhabitants is not a conclusive test. For instance, the maintenance of parks is not a source of income for the nonetheless it is private undertaking as distinguished from the maintenance of public schools, jails, and the like which are for public service. It follows that under the doctrine of respondent superior, petitioner-municipality is to be held liable for damages for the death of Vicente Fontanilia if that was at- attributable to the negligence of the municipality's officers, employees, or agents. Art. 2176, Civil Code: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. . . Art. 2180, Civil Code: The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omission, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. . . The holding of the town fiesta was an exercise of a propriety function. It is an act for the special benefit of the community and not for the general welfare of the public performed in pursuance of a policy of the state. Hence, the municipality is liable for damages. However, the councilors should be absolved from liability. The liability of public officers for damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code applies to nonfeasance and not to negligence or misfeasance. The councilors are similar to the board of directors of a corporation, since the celebration of the town fiesta is not governmental function. As such, they are not liable for damages for negligence of the agents

and employees of the municipality unless there is a showing of bad faith or gross negligence on their part.

MUNICIPALITY OF HAGONOY vs. DUMDUM

Facts: Private respondent Emily Rose Go Ko Lim Chao, entered into an agreement with petitioner municipality of Hagonoy through Ople for the delivery of motor vehicles. Because of Oples earnest representation that the funds had already been allocated for the project agreed to deliver 21 motor vehicles. Despite respondents several demands petitioner did not pay its obligation. RTC issued and order directing the sheriff to attach the estate of petitioner real or personal properties. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that, their agreement with the respondent is unenforceable under the statute of fraud as it was not reduce into writing. Petitioner also filed a motion to dissolved and discharge the writ of preliminary attachment invoking immunity of state from suit. Issue (1): Whether or not the agreement between the respondent and petitioner is unenforceable. Held: While it is true that the agreement between the respondent and petitioner was not reduce into writing however it was evidenced by receipt which was acknowledge by petitioner. Moreover, there was already partial performance when the respondent effected the delivery of the motor vehicle. Thus, it is now removed from statute of fraud. Issue (2): Whether or not the states property is discharged in attachment in invoking state immunity from suit. Held: The universal rule that where the state gives it consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimants action only up to the completion of the proceedings anterior to the stage of execution and the power of the courts end when the judgment is rendered since the government funds and properties are may not be seized under writ of executions or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on the on the obvious consideration of public policy. Disbursing of public funds must be covered by corresponding appropriations as required by law. The functions and public service rendered by the state cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects. Thus, the writ of preliminary execution must be dissolved.

CALOOCAN CITY vs. ALLARDE

Facts: In 1972, Mayor Marcial Samson of Caloocan abolished the position of Assistant City Administrator Delfina Hernandez Santiago and 17 other positions via Ordinance No. 1749. The affected employees assailed the legality of the abolition. The CFI in 1973 declared abolition illegal and ordered the reinstatement of all the dismissed employees and the payment of their back-wages and other emoluments. The City Government appealed the decision but such was dismissed. In 1986, the City paid Santiago P75,083.37 as partial payment of her back-wages. The others were paid in full. In 1987, the City appropriated funds for her unpaid back salaries (supplemental budget #3) but the City refused to release the money to Santiago. The City of Caloocan argued that Santiago was not entitled to back wages. On July 27, 1992, Sheriff Castillo levied and sold at

public auction one of the motor vehicles of the City Government for P100,000. The amount was given to Santiago. The City Government questioned the validity of the motor vehicle; properties of the municipality were exempt from execution. Judge Allarde denied the motion and directed the sheriff to levy and schedule at public auction 3 more vehicles. On October 5, 1993 the City Council of Caloocan passed Ordinance No. 0134 which included the amount of P439,377.14 claimed by Santiago as back-wages, plus interest. Judge Allarde issued an order to the City Treasurer to release the check but the City Treasurer can't do so because the Mayor refuses to sign the check. On May 7, 1993, Judge Allarde ordered the Sheriff to immediately garnish the funds of the City Government of Caloocan corresponding to the claim of Santiago. Notice of garnishment was forwarded to the PNB but the City Treasurer sent an advice letter to PNB that the garnishment was illegal and that it would hold PNB liable for any damages which may be caused by the withholding the funds of the city. Issue: Whether the funds of City of Caloocan, in PNB, may be garnished (i.e. exempt from execution), to satisfy Santiagos claim. Held: Garnishment is considered a specie of attachment by means of which the plaintiff seeks to subject to his claim property of the defendant in the hands of a third person, or money owed by such third person or garnishee to the defendant. The rule is and has always been that all government funds deposited in the PNB or any other official depositary of the Philippine Government by any of its agencies or instrumentalities, whether by general or special deposit, remain government funds and may not be subject to garnishment or levy, in the absence of a corresponding appropriation as required by law. Even though the rule as to immunity of a state from suit is relaxed, the power of the courts ends when the judgment is rendered. Although the liability of the state has been judicially ascertained, the state is at liberty to determine for itself whether to pay the judgment or not, and execution cannot issue on a judgment against the state. Such statutes do not authorize a seizure of state property to satisfy judgments recovered, and only convey an implication that the legislature will recognize such judgment as final and make provision for the satisfaction thereof. The rule is based on obvious considerations of public policy. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law. However, the rule is not absolute and admits of a well-defined exception, that is, when there is a corresponding appropriation as required by law. Otherwise stated, the rule on the immunity of public funds from seizure or garnishment does not apply where the funds sought to be levied under execution are already allocated by law specifically for the satisfaction of the money judgment against the government. In such a case, the monetary judgment may be legally enforced by judicial processes. Herein, the City Council of Caloocan already approved and passed Ordinance 0134, Series of 1992, allocating the amount of P439,377.14 for Santiagos back salaries plus interest. This case, thus, fell squarely within the exception. For all intents and purposes, Ordinance 0134, Series of 1992, was the "corresponding appropriation as required by law." The sum indicated in the ordinance for Santiago were deemed automatically segregated from the other budgetary allocations of the City of Caloocan and earmarked solely for the Citys monetary obligation to her. The judgment of the trial court could then be validly enforced against such funds.

MUNICIPALITY of SAN MIGUEL vs. FERNANDEZ

Facts: In Civil Case No. 604-B, entitled "Margarita D. Vda. de Imperio, et al. vs. Municipal Government of San Miguel, Bulacan, et al.", the then CFI rendered judgment holding herein petitioner municipality liable to private respondents. The court ordered the partial revocation of the Deed of Donation signed by the deceased Carlos Imperio in favor of the Municipality of San Miguel Bulacan insofar as Lots Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, Block 11 of Subdivision Plan Psd-20831 are concerned. It also ordered to execute the corresponding Deed of Reconveyance over the aforementioned five lots in favor of the private respondents, and to pay them rentals it has collected from the occupants for their use and occupation of the premises from 1970 up to and including 1975 plus interest. Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the writ of execution on the ground that the municipality's property or funds are all public funds exempt from execution. he said motion to quash was, however, denied by the respondent judge and the alias writ of execution stands in full force and effect. Respondent judge ordered petitioners to comply with the money judgment. When the treasurers (provincial and municipal) failed to comply with the order, respondent judge issued an order for their arrest and that they will be release only upon compliance thereof. Hence, the present petition. Issue: Whether the funds of the Municipality of San Miguel, Bulacan, in the hands of the provincial and municipal treasurers of Bulacan and San Miguel, respectively, are public funds which are exempt from execution for the satisfaction of the money judgment in Civil Case No. 604-B. Held: Well settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution. The reason for this was explained in the case of Municipality of Paoay vs. Manaois, "that they are held in trust for the people, intended and used for the accomplishment of the purposes for which municipal corporations are created, and that to subject said properties and public funds to execution would materially impede, even defeat and in some instances destroy said purpose." Likeise, in Tantoco vs. Municipal Council of Iloilo, it was held that "it is the settled doctrine of the law that not only the public property but also the taxes and public revenues of such corporations Cannot be seized under execution against them, either in the treasury or when in transit to it. Judgments rendered for taxes, and the proceeds of such judgments in the hands of officers of the law, are not subject to execution unless so declared by statute." Thus, it is clear that all the funds of petitioner municipality in the possession of the Municipal Treasurer of San Miguel, as well as those in the possession of the Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan, are also public funds and as such they are exempt from execution. Besides, PD No. 477, known as "The Decree on Local Fiscal Administration", Section 2 (a), provides: Fundamental Principles. Local government financial affairs, transactions, and operations shall be governed by the fundamental principles set forth hereunder: (a) No money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of a lawful appropriation or other specific statutory authority. Otherwise stated, there must be a corresponding appropriation in the form of an ordinance duly passed by the Sangguniang Bayan before any money of the municipality may be paid out. In the case at bar, it has not been shown that the SB has passed an ordinance to this effect.

Furthermore, Section 15, Rule 39 of the New Rules of Court, outlines the procedure for the enforcement of money judgment: (a) By levying on all the property of the debtor, whether real or personal, not otherwise exempt from execution, or only on such part of the property as is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and accruing cost, if he has more than sufficient property for the purpose; (b) By selling the property levied upon; (c) By paying the judgment-creditor so much of the proceeds as will satisfy the judgment and accruing costs; and (d) By delivering to the judgment-debtor the excess, if any, unless otherwise, directed by judgment or order of the court. The foregoing has not been followed in the case at bar. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted and the orders of respondent judge are SET ASIDE; and respondents are hereby enjoined from implementing the writ of execution.

Where a municipality fails or refuses, without justifiable reason, to effect payment of a final money judgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail of the remedy of mandamus in order to compel the enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation ordinance, and the corresponding disbursement of municipal funds therefor. This Court will not condone petitioner's blatant refusal to settle its legal obligation arising from expropriation proceedings it had in fact initiated. It cannot be over-emphasized that, within the context of the State's inherent power of eminent domain, just compensation means not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. The State's power of eminent domain should be exercised within the bounds of fair play and justice. In the case at bar, considering that valuable property has been taken, the compensation to be paid fixed and the municipality is in full possession and utilizing the property for public purpose, for 3 years, the Court finds that the municipality has had more than reasonable time to pay full compensation. The Court Resolved to ORDER petitioner Municipality of Makati to immediately pay Philippine Savings Bank, Inc. and private respondent. The order of respondent RTC is SET ASIDE and the TRO issued by the Court is MADE PERMANENT.

MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI vs. CA

Facts: Petitioner Municipality of Makati initiated an expropriation proceeding against private respondent Admiral Finance Creditors Consortium, Home Building System & Realty Corporation and one Arceli P. Jo, involving a parcel of land and improvements located in Makati City. It appears that the action for eminent domain was filed. Attached to petitioner's complaint was a certification that a bank account (Account No. S/A 265-537154-3) had been opened with the PNB under petitioner's name containing the sum of P417,510 made pursuant to the provisions of PD No. 42. After due hearing, respondent RTC judge rendered a decision fixing the appraised value of the property at P5,291,666, and ordering petitioner to pay this amount minus the advanced payment of P338,160 which was earlier released to private respondent. Petitioner contended that its funds at the PNB Buendia Branch could neither be garnished nor levied upon execution, for to do so would result in the disbursement of public funds without the proper appropriation required under the law. Upon appeal, it was disclosed for the first time that petitioner has two bank accounts with PNB. Issue: Whether or not public funds may be garnished or levied upon execution. NO Held: The funds deposited in the second PNB Account are public funds of the municipal government. In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution, unless otherwise provided for by statute. The properties of a municipality, whether real or personal, which are necessary for public use cannot be attached and sold at execution sale to satisfy a money judgment against the municipality. Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and which are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental activities and functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution. Absent a showing that the municipal council of Makati has passed an ordinance appropriating from its public funds an amount corresponding to the balance due, no levy under execution may be validly effected on the public funds of petitioner deposited in the second bank account. Nevertheless, this is not to say that private respondent and PSB are left with no legal recourse.

CIRIACO vs. CITY OF CEBU

Facts: On May 23, 1994, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cebu City enacted City Ordinance No. 1519, giving authority to the City Mayor to expropriate one-half (1/2) portion of the spouses Ortegas land which is occupied by the squatters. Pursuant to said ordinance, Cebu City filed a Complaint for Eminent Domain before the RTC against spouses Ortega. RTC issued an order declaring that Cebu City "has the lawful right to take the property subject of the instant case, for public use or purpose described in the complaint upon payment of just compensation." Based on the recommendation of the appointed Commissioners, one of whom was the City Assessor of Cebu City, the RTC issued another Order fixing the value of the land subject to expropriation as just compensation. Issue: Whether or not the deposit of Cebu City with the Philippine Postal Bank, appropriated for a different purpose by its Sangguniang Panglungsod, can be subject to garnishment as payment for the expropriated lot. NO Held: It is a settled rule that government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy judgments, based on obvious consideration of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law. While the Sangguniang Panglungsod of petitioner enacted Ordinance No. 1519, appropriating the sum of P3,284,400 for payment of just compensation for the expropriated land, such ordinance cannot be considered as a source of authority for the RTC to garnish Cebu Citys bank account with Philippine Postal Bank, which was already appropriated for another purpose. Cebu Citys account with Philippine Postal Bank was not specifically opened for the payment of just

compensation nor was it specifically appropriated by Ordinance No. 1519 for such purpose. Said account, therefore, is exempt from garnishment. Since the RTC has no authority to garnish Cebu Citys other bank accounts in order to satisfy its judgment, consequently, it has no authority to order the release of Cebu Citys other deposits with Philippine Postal Bank. Even assuming that Cebu City Ordinance No. 1519 actually appropriated the amount for payment of just compensation thus, within the reach of a writ of garnishment issued by the RTC there remains the inescapable fact that the PPB account referred to in the ordinance does not actually exist, as certified to by the Bank. Accordingly, no writ of garnishment may be validly issued against such non-existent account with Philippine Postal Bank. This circumstance translates to a situation where there is no valid appropriation ordinance. The petitions are DENIED. The Decision of the CA is affirmed.

insists that the donation is perfectly valid, stating that there is nothing in the LGC which expressly states that the lack of an appraised valuation renders the subject transfer void. Further, it contends that at best, an appraised valuation is merely a formal and procedural requisite, the lack of which cannot overturn substantive and vested rights. Petitioner also contends that considering that the assailed donation is clearly onerous, the rules on contracts will apply. Pertinently, the Civil Code expressly defines the different kinds of void and inexistent contracts under Art. 1409. A transfer of real property by a local government unit to an instrumentality of government without first securing an appraised valuation from the local committee on awards does not appear to be one of the void contracts enumerated in the aforequoted Article 1409. Neither does Section 381 of the LGC expressly prohibit or declare void such transfers if an appraised valuation from the local committee on awards is not first obtained. The freedom of contract is both a constitutional and statutory right and to uphold this right, courts should move with all the necessary caution and prudence in holding contracts void. Furthermore, a duly executed contract carries with it the presumption of validity. There being a perfected contract, the Province of Tarlac, through Gov. Yap, cannot revoke or renounce the same without the consent of the other party. From the moment of perfection, the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all the consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage, and law. The contract has the force of law between the parties and they are expected to abide in good faith by their respective contractual commitments. Just as nobody can be forced to enter into a contract, in the same manner, once a contract is entered into, no party can renounce it unilaterally or without the consent of the other. It is a general principle of law that no one may be permitted to change his mind or disavow and go back upon his own acts, or to proceed contrary thereto, to the prejudice of the other party.

GSIS vs. PROVINCE OF TARLAC

Facts: On March 26, 1996, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Tarlac passed Resolution No. 06896, which authorized and approved the conversion of Urquico Memorial Athletic Field into a Government Center, as well as the segregation and donation of portions of said land to different government agencies for the purpose of constructing or relocating their office buildings. After receiving two letters of invitation regarding the project, the GSIS decided to put up an office at the site. Thus, Tarlac Governor Margarita Cojuangco issued a Notice of Construction for the building of the GSIS office on the designated lot. The Province of Tarlac and the GSIS then executed a MoA whereby the Province of Tarlac donated the said lot to the GSIS subject to the conditions stipulated therein. The Province executed a Deed of Donation over the subject lot in favor of the GSIS, which was duly accepted by the latter. As stipulated in the MOA, the GSIS donated P2M as financial assistance. Subsequently, Gov. Jose Yap was elected as the new chief executive of Tarlac. Gov. Yap was of the opinion that the provisions of the Deed of Donation were unfair to the Province. Later, the Provincial Administrator wrote the GSIS, demanding the payment of P33.59M representing the balance of the value of the lot donated, which the GSIS refused to pay. The Province of Tarlac then filed a Complaint against the GSIS for declaration of nullity of donation and memorandum of agreement. RTC rendered its decision in favor of the validity of the donation to the GSIS. CA declared it NULL and VOID. Issue: Whether or not the deed of donation and MOA are null and void. VALID Held: The CA relied on Sec. 381 of RA No. 7160 (LGC) which provides: Transfer Without Cost. Property which has become unserviceable or is no longer needed may be transferred without cost to another office, agency, subdivision or instrumentality of the national government or another local government unit at an appraised valuation determined by the local committee on awards. Such transfer shall be subject to the approval of the sanggunian concerned making the transfer and by the head of the office, agency, subdivision, instrumentality or local government unit receiving the property. In effect, the appellate court ruled that the donation of the subject property by the Province of Tarlac to the GSIS was void, because it was executed without first securing an appraised valuation of the property from the local committee on awards. On the other hand, petitioner

LINA vs. PALO

Facts: On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the PCSO to install Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for a mayor's permit to open the lotto outlet. This was denied by Mayor Cataquiz in a letter dated February 19, 1996. The ground for said denial was an ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508 which declared its policy against the operation of lotto within the province. As a result of this resolution of denial, respondent Calvento filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. On February 10, 1997, the respondent judge, Francisco Dizon Pao, promulgated his decision enjoining the petitioners from implementing or enforcing resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508. Petitioners contend that the assailed resolution is a valid policy declaration of the Provincial Government of Laguna of its vehement objection to the operation of lotto and all forms of gambling. It is likewise a valid exercise of the provincial government's police power under the General Welfare Clause of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991. They also maintain that respondent's lotto operation is illegal because no prior consultations and approval by the local government were sought before it was implemented contrary to the express provisions of Sections 2 (c) and 27 of R.A. 7160.

Issue (1): Whether or not Kapasiyahan Blg. 508 and the denial of a mayor's permit based thereon is valid. Held: YES. The entire controversy stemmed from the refusal of Mayor Cataquiz to issue a mayor's permit for the operation of a lotto outlet in favor of private respondent. According to the mayor, he based his decision on an existing ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto in the province of Laguna. The ordinance, however, merely states the "objection" of the council to the said game. It is but a mere policy statement on the part of the local council, which is not selfexecuting. As a policy statement expressing the local government's objection to the lotto, such resolution is valid. This is part of the local government's autonomy to air its views which may be contrary to that of the national government's. However, this freedom to exercise contrary views does not mean that local governments may actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress. Given this premise, the assailed resolution in this case could not and should not be interpreted as a measure or ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto. The game of lotto is a game of chance duly authorized by the national government through an Act of Congress. Republic Act 1169, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 42, is the law which grants a franchise to the PCSO and allows it to operate the lotteries. Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred upon them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute. Issue (2): Whether or not prior consultations and approval by the concerned Sanggunian are needed before a lotto system can be operated in a given local government unit. Held: NO. The SC held that petitioners erred in declaring that Sections 2 (c) and 27 of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, apply mandatorily in the setting up of lotto outlets around the country. From a careful reading of said provisions, these apply only to national programs and/or projects which are to be implemented in a particular local community. Lotto is neither a program nor a project of the national government, but of a charitable institution, the PCSO. Though sanctioned by the national government, it is farfetched to say that lotto falls within the contemplation of Sections 2 (c) and 27 of the LGC.

Ordinance 3375-93 (An Ordinance prohibiting the operation of Casino and providing penalty for violation therefore). The contention of the petitioners is that it is violative of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. On the other hand, the respondents invoke P.D. 1869 which created PAGCOR to help centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. Issue: Whether or not the Ordinance No. 3353 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 are valid. Held: NO. Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. It is expressly vested with the police power under what is known as the General Welfare Clause now embodied in Section 16 as follows: Sec. 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants. There is a requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute. Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the LGUs can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute. Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. The morality of gambling is not justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Further, there are two kinds of gambling, to wit, the illegal and those authorized by law. Legalized gambling is not a modern concept; it is probably as old as illegal gambling, if not indeed more so. The suggestion that the LGC authorize LGUs to prohibit all kinds of gambling would erase the distinction between these two forms of gambling without a clear indication that this is the will of legislature.

MAGTAJAS vs. PRYCE

Facts: PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. To this end, it leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation Inc., renovated and equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino there during the Christmas season. The reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. On 7 December 1992, it enacted Ordinance 3353 (An Ordinance Prohibiting the issuance of business permit and canceling existing business permit to any establishment for the using and allowing to be used its premises or portion thereof for the operation of Casino). On 4 January 1993, it adopted a sterner

CITY OF MANILA vs. LAGUIO

Facts: Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses.5 It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as a hotel.6 On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order7 (RTC Petition) with the lower court impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the City Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional. The Ordinance, hereunder: SECTION 1. Any provision of existing laws and ordinances to the contrary notwithstanding, no person, partnership, corporation or entity shall, in the Ermita-Malate area bounded by Teodoro M. Kalaw Sr. Street in the North, Taft Avenue in the East, Vito Cruz Street in the South and Roxas Boulevard in the West, pursuant to P.D. 499 be allowed or authorized to contract and engage in, any business providing certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where women are used as tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community, such as but not limited to: 1. Sauna Parlors; 2. Massage Parlors; 3. Karaoke Bars; 4. Beerhouses; 5. Night Clubs; 6. Day Clubs; 7. Super Clubs; 8. Discotheques; 9. Cabarets; 10. Dance Halls; 11. Motels; 12. Inns. MTDC argued that the Ordinance erroneously and improperly included in its enumeration of prohibited establishments, motels and inns such as MTDC's Victoria Court considering that these were not establishments for "amusement" or "entertainment" and they were not "services or facilities for entertainment," nor did they use women as "tools for entertainment," and neither did they "disturb the community," "annoy the inhabitants" or "adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community." MTDC further advanced that the Ordinance was invalid and unconstitutional for the following reasons: (1) The City Council has no power to prohibit the operation of motels as Section 458 (a) 4 (iv)12 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (the Code) grants to the City Council only the power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments; (2) The Ordinance is void as it is violative of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 49913 which specifically declared portions of the Ermita-Malate area as a commercial zone with certain restrictions; (3) The Ordinance does not constitute a proper exercise of police power as the compulsory closure of the motel business has no reasonable relation to the legitimate municipal interests sought to be protected; (4) The Ordinance constitutes an ex post facto law by punishing the operation of Victoria Court which was a legitimate business prior to its enactment; (5) The Ordinance violates MTDC's constitutional rights in that: (a) it is confiscatory and constitutes an invasion of plaintiff's property rights; (b) the City Council has no power to find as a fact that a particular thing is a nuisance per se nor does it have the power to extrajudicially destroy it; and (6) The Ordinance constitutes a denial of equal protection under the law as no reasonable basis exists for prohibiting the operation of motels and inns, but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments, and for prohibiting said business in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area. Issue: Whether or not the city ordinance is unconstitutional. YES

Held: Ordinance contravenes the Constitution. The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public good.43 In the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws. A. The Ordinance infringes the Due Process Clause Requisites for the valid exercise of Police Power are not met. To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.60 It must be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. Means employed areconstitutionally infirm. It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement of its purposes, the governmental interference itself, infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a person's fundamental right to liberty and property. Modality employed is unlawful takin. In addition, the Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it substantially divests the respondent of the beneficial use of its property.77 The Ordinance in Section 1 thereof forbids the running of the enumerated businesses in the Ermita-Malate area and in Section 3 instructs its owners/ operators to wind up business operations or to transfer outside the area or convert said businesses into allowed businesses. An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without just compensation.78 It is intrusive and violative of the private property rights of individuals. B. The Ordinance violates Equal Protection Clause. Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others.98 The guarantee means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like circumstances.99 The "equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws."100 It limits governmental discrimination. The equal protection clause extends to artificial persons but only insofar as their property is concerned. The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area. A noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if located outside the area.

The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area. A noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if located outside the area. Conclusion All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs personal privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City Council under the Code had no power to enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and void. Concededly, the challenged Ordinance was enacted with the best of motives and shares the concern of the public for the cleansing of the Ermita-Malate area of its social sins. Police power legislation of such we reiterate ourcharacter deserves the full endorsement of the judiciary support for it. But inspite of its virtuous aims, the enactment of the Ordinance has no statutory or constitutional authority to stand on. Local legislative bodies, in this case, the City Council, cannot prohibit the operation of the enumerated establishments under Section 1 thereof or order their transfer or conversion without infringing the constitutional guarantees of not even under the guise of policedue process and equal protection of laws power. WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Regional Trial Court declaring the Ordinance void is AFFIRMED.

Held: The ordinance is valid. Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of its police power. It is a settled principle of law that municipal corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of local selfgovernment and as such are endowed with the police powers in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. 3 Its authority emanates from the general welfare clause under the Administrative Code, which reads: The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein. For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, and must be in consonance with certain well established and basic principles of a substantive nature. These principles require that a municipal ordinance (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute (2) must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must not be partial or discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and (6) must not be unreasonable. 5 Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1952, meets these criteria. The objections interposed by the petitioner to the validity of the ordinance have not been substantiated. Its purpose is well within the objectives of sound government. No undue restraint is placed upon the petitioner or for anybody to engage in trade but merely a prohibition from storing inflammable products in the warehouse because of the danger of fire to the lives and properties of the people residing in the vicinity. As far as public policy is concerned, there can be no better policy than what has been conceived by the municipal government. WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

TATEL vs. MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC

Facts: It appears from the records that on the basis of complaints received from the residents of barrio Sta. Elena on March 18, 1966 against the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside the warehouse of petitioner which affected the peace and tranquility of the neighborhood due to the smoke, obnoxious odor and dust emitted by the machine, a committee was appointed by the municipal council of Virac to investigate the matter. The committee noted the crowded nature of the neighborhood with narrow roads and the surrounding residential houses, so much so that an accidental fire within the warehouse of the petitioner occasioned by the continuance of the activity inside the warehouse and the storing of inflammable materials created a danger to the lives and properties of the people within the neighborhood. Resultantly, Resolution No. 29 was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac on April 22, 1966 declaring the warehouse owned and operated by petitioner a public nuisance within the purview of Article 694 of the New Civil Code. Respondent municipal officials contend that petitioner's warehouse was constructed in violation of Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire. On the other hand, petitioner contends that said ordinance is unconstitutional, contrary to the due process and equal protection clause of the Constitution and null and void for not having been passed in accordance with law. Issue: Whether or not Ordinance No. 13, S. 1952 of the Municipality of Virac is unconstitutional and void. NO

BATANGAS CATV vs. CA

Facts: On July 28, 1986, respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Resolution No. 2107 granting petitioner a permit to construct, install, and operate a CATV system in Batangas City. Section 8 of the Resolution provides that petitioner is authorized to charge its subscribers the maximum rates specified therein, "provided, however, that any increase of rates shall be subject to the approval of the Sangguniang Panlungsod." On July 28, 1986, respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Resolution No. 2107 granting petitioner a permit to construct, install, and operate a CATV system in Batangas City. Section 8 of the Resolution provides that petitioner is authorized to charge its subscribers the maximum rates specified therein, "provided, however, that any increase of rates shall be subject to the approval of the Sangguniang Panlungsod." Petitioner then filed with the RTC, Branch 7, Batangas City, a petition for injunction docketed as Civil Case No. 4254. It alleged that respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod has no authority to regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators because under Executive Order No. 205, the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) has the sole authority to regulate the CATV operation in the Philippines.

Issue: Whether or not the resolution no. 210 section 8 of BATANGAS CITY which provides that any increase of rates shall be subject to the approval of the Sangguniang Panlungsod is valid. Held: Section 8 of the Resolution is invalid. The right of plaintiff in fixing its service rates needs no prior approval of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Batangas City. While Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, extends to the LGUs the general power to perform any act that will benefit their constituents, nonetheless, it does not authorize them to regulate the CATV operation. Pursuant to E.O. No. 205, only the NTC has the authority to regulate the CATV operation, including the fixing of subscriber rates. Resolution No. 210 is an enactment of an LGU acting only as agent of the national legislature. Necessarily, its act must reflect and conform to the will of its principal. To test its validity, we must apply the particular requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by the accepted principles governing municipal corporations. Speaking for the Court in the leading case of United States vs. Abendan,37 Justice Moreland said: "An ordinance enacted by virtue of the general welfare clause is valid, unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the Philippine Islands, or an Act of the Philippine Legislature, or unless it is against public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in derogation of common right." In De la Cruz vs. Paraz,38 we laid the general rule "that ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power found in the general welfare clause must be reasonable, consonant with the general powers and purposes of the corporation, and not inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State." The apparent defect in Resolution No. 210 is that it contravenes E.O. No. 205 and E.O. No. 436 insofar as it permits respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod to usurp a power exclusively vested in the NTC, i.e., the power to fix the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators. As earlier discussed, the fixing of subscriber rates is definitely one of the matters within the NTCs exclusive domain. In this regard, it is appropriate to stress that where the state legislature has made provision for the regulation of conduct, it has manifested its intention that the subject matter shall be fully covered by the statute, and that a municipality, under its general powers, cannot regulate the same conduct. In Keller vs. State, it was held that: "Where there is no express power in the charter of a municipality authorizing it to adopt ordinances regulating certain matters which are specifically covered by a general statute, a municipal ordinance, insofar as it attempts to regulate the subject which is completely covered by a general statute of the legislature, may be rendered invalid. x x x Where the subject is of statewide concern, and the legislature has appropriated the field and declared the rule, its declaration is binding throughout the State." A reason advanced for this view is that such ordinances are in excess of the powers granted to the municipal corporation. Since E.O. No. 205, a general law, mandates that the regulation of CATV operations shall be exercised by the NTC, an LGU cannot enact an ordinance or approve a resolution in violation of the said law. It is a fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state. An ordinance in conflict with a state law of general character and statewide application is universally held to be invalid.42 The principle is frequently expressed in the

declaration that municipal authorities, under a general grant of power, cannot adopt ordinances which infringe the spirit of a state law or repugnant to the general policy of the state.43 In every power to pass ordinances given to a municipality, there is an implied restriction that the ordinances shall be consistent with the general law. Resolution No. 210 violated the States deregulation policy. Deregulation is the reduction of government regulation of business to permit freer markets and competition.50 Oftentimes, the State, through its regulatory agencies, carries out a policy of deregulation to attain certain objectives or to address certain problems. In the field of telecommunications, it is recognized that many areas in the Philippines are still "unserved" or "underserved." Thus, to encourage private sectors to venture in this field and be partners of the government in stimulating the growth and development of telecommunications, the State promoted the policy of deregulation. There is no law specifically authorizing the LGUs to grant franchises to operate CATV system. Whatever authority the LGUs had before, the same had been withdrawn when President Marcos issued P.D. No. 1512 "terminating all franchises, permits or certificates for the operation of CATV system previously granted by local governments." Today, pursuant to Section 3 of E.O. No. 436, "only persons, associations, partnerships, corporations or cooperatives granted a Provisional Authority or Certificate of Authority by the NTC may install, operate and maintain a cable television system or render cable television service within a service area." It is clear that in the absence of constitutional or legislative authorization, municipalities have no power to grant franchises. Consequently, the protection of the constitutional provision as to impairment of the obligation of a contract does not extend to privileges, franchises and grants given by a municipality in excess of its powers, or ultra vires. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The RTC Decision in Civil Case No. 4254 is AFFIRMED.

MMDA vs. GARIN

Facts: The issue arose from an incident involving the respondent Dante O. Garin, a lawyer, who was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) and his driver's license confiscated for parking illegally along Gandara Street, Binondo, Manila, on 05 August 1995. The following statements were printed on the TVR: You are hereby directed to report to the MMDA Traffic Operations Center Port Area Manila after 48 hours from date of apprehension for disposition/appropriate action thereon. Criminal case shall be filed for failure to redeem license after 30 days. Valid as temporary DRIVER'S license for seven days from date of apprehension. Shortly before the expiration of the TVR's validity, the respondent addressed a letter2 to then MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting the return of his driver's license, and expressing his preference for his case to be filed in court. Issue: Whether or not the MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001, authorizing confiscation of driver's licenses upon issuance of a TVR, is void ab initio. Held: Meanwhile, on 12 August 2004, the MMDA, through its Chairman Bayani Fernando, implemented Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series of 2004, outlining the procedures for the use of the Metropolitan Traffic Ticket (MTT) scheme. Under the circular, erring motorists are issued an MTT, which can be paid at any Metrobank branch. Traffic enforcers may no longer confiscate drivers' licenses as a matter of course in cases of traffic violations. All motorists with

unredeemed TVRs were given seven days from the date of implementation of the new system to pay their fines and redeem their license or vehicle plates. It would seem, therefore, that insofar as the petitioner from confiscating drivers' licenses is Court's need to decide this case, which has implementation of Memorandum Circular No. 04, absence of a prima facie case to enjoin the concerned, recent events have overtaken the been rendered moot and academic by the Series of 2004.

for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, people's organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the charter itself. Thus, where there is a traffic law or regulation validly enacted by the legislature or those agencies to whom legislative powers have been delegated (the City of Manila in this case), the petitioner is not precluded and in fact is duty-bound to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers' licenses in the exercise of its mandate of transport and traffic management, as well as the administration and implementation of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education programs. WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed.

The petitioner, however, is not precluded from re-implementing Memorandum Circular No. TT95-001, or any other scheme, for that matter, that would entail confiscating drivers' licenses. For the proper implementation, therefore, of the petitioner's future programs, this Court deems it appropriate to make the following observations: 1. A license to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege that the state may withhold in the exercise of its police power. The petitioner correctly points out that a license to operate a motor vehicle is not a property right, but a privilege granted by the state, which may be suspended or revoked by the state in the exercise of its police power, in the interest of the public safety and welfare, subject to the procedural due process requirements. This is consistent with our rulings in Pedro v. Provincial Board of Rizal8 on the license to operate a cockpit, Tan v. Director of Forestry9 and Oposa v. Factoran10 on timber licensing agreements, and Surigao Electric Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Surigao11 on a legislative franchise to operate an electric plant. 2. The MMDA is not vested with police power. In Metro Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.,14 we categorically stated that Rep. Act No. 7924 does not grant the MMDA with police power, let alone legislative power, and that all its functions are administrative in nature. We restate here the doctrine in the said decision as it applies to the case at bar: police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. Having been lodged primarily in the National Legislature, it cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the president and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units (LGUs). Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body. [T]he powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. There is no syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development authority." It is an agency created