Chapter 4

Profit Centers

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George G. Liddy, part owner of North Country Auto, Inc., was feeling pretty good about the new control systems recently put in place for his five department managers (new and used car sales, service, body, and parts depart ments). Exhibit 1 describes each department. Mr. Liddy strongly believed in the concept of evaluating each department individually as a profit center. But he also recognized the chal lenge of getting his managers to "buy in" to the system by working together for the good of the dealership. Background North Country Auto, Inc., was a franchised dealer and factory-authorized service center for Ford, Saab, and Volkswagen. Multiple fran chises Were becoming more common in the 1980s. But the value of-multiple franchises did not come without costs. Each of the three man ufacturers used a different computerized sys tem for tracking inventory and placing newor ders. They also required their dealerships to maintain an adequate service facility with a crew of trained technicians that, in turn, neces sitated carrying an inventory of parts to be used in repairs. Exhibit 2 gives balance sheet data with a breakout of investment for each product line. North Country also operated a body shop, and in mid-1989 opened a "while you-wait" oil change service for any make of vehicle. The dealership was situated in an upstate New York town with a population of about 20,000. It served two nearby towns of about 4,000 people as well as rural areas covering a
This case was written by Mark C. Rooney (T'90) under the lupervision of Professor Joseph Fisher. Copyright by The Amos Tuck School of Business Administration, Dartmouth College.

20-mile radius. North Country began opera tions in 1968, and in 1983 moved one mile down the road to its current 6-acre lot, 25,000 square foot facility. It was owned as a corporation by George Liddy and Andrew Jones, who were both equally active in day-to-day operations. Mr. Liddy purchased an interest in the dealer ship from a previous partner in 1988. Mr. Jones had been part owner since the start of the busi ness. Whereas Mr. Liddy focused his energies on new and used car sales, Mr. Jones concen trated on managing the parts, service, and body shop departments-commonly referred to as the "back end" of a dealership. The owners were determined to maintain a profitable back end as a hedge against de pressed sales and lower margins in vehicles sales. In an industry characterized by aggres sive discounting fueled by a combination of high inventories, a more educated consumer, and a proliferation of new entrants, alternative sources of cash flow were crucial. Industry ana lysts were estimating that fewer than 50 per cent of the dealers in the US would make a profit on new car sales in 1990. Overall net profit margins were expected to fall below 1 percent of sales (The Wall Street Journal, De cember 11, 1989). George Liddy's Challenge Before George Liddy bought into the dealership, all the departments operated as part of one busi ness. Department managers were paid salaries and a year-end bonus determined at the owners' discretion based on overall results for the year and a subjective appraisal of each manager. George Liddy believed this system did not pro vide proper motivation for the managers. He be lieved in decentralized profit centers and per formance-based compensation as superior models

182
EXHIBIT

Part I

The Management Control Environment

1 North Country Auto, Inc.-The Departmental Structure

New Car Sales and Used Car Sales

The new and used car departments each had a sales manager. They shared six salespersons. In addition, these departments shared an office manager a..'"1d clerks. The managers were paid a flat salary, plus a fixed sum per new or used vehicle sold, and a percentage of their department's gross profit (calculated as sales minus cost of vehicles sold). When the owners and the managers agreed on annual unit volume and margin goals, the dollar weights were set to make each portion approximately one-third of the manager's expected total compensation. The owners claimed that this type of dual incentive bonus structure allowed the managers flexibility in targeting margins and volume. George Liddy maintained, "If the margins are low, the sales manager can try to make it up in volume." The sales force was paid strictly a commission on gross profit. Many dealerships in the area were changing sales compensation to a flat salary plus a partial commission on gross profits generated. The new car sales manager was responsible for recommending to Liddy new model orders and inventory mix among the three product lines. He also had the authority to approve selling prices and trade-in allowances on customer transactions. Typically, the new car manager was allowed to transfer the trade-in at blue book. However, if the car was obviously of below average quality, the used car department was asked for their estimate ofvalue. The used car manager was responsible for controlling the mix of used car inventory through buying and selling used vehicles at wholesale auto auctions. Service The service department occupied over half of the building's usable square footage and was the most labor intensive operation. Service comprised 11 bays with hydraulic lifts, one of which was used for the oil change operation. The department employed a lIlJUlager, 10 technicians, 3 semiskilled mechanics, 2 counter clerks, and 3 office clerks. The manager was paid a flat salary plus a bonus on the department's gross profit on labor-bours billed (computed as labor dollars billed minus total wages of billable technicians and mechanics). Service revenue consisted oflabor only. No markup for parts was realized by service department. The bonus portion was planned to be approximately 50 percent ofhis salary. The technicians, mechanics, and clerks were all paid a flat salary, regardless of actual hours billed. The technicians required specialty training to perform factory-authorized work on each of the specific lines. Sending a technician to school cost about $4,000 over a two-year period. The owners estimated that a new hire could cost as much as $10,000 in nonbillable overruns on warranty jobs, where reimbursement was limited to standard allowable labor hours. Of the 10 techs, 4 were certified for Ford, 3 forSaab, and 3 for Volkswagen. George Liddy and Andrew Jones contemplated reducing the cost of idle time by cross-training, but were averse to risks ofturnover among highly skilled labor. Retraining costs could triple when one person quit. The primary sources of service department revenue were warranty maintenance and repair work, nonwarranty maintenance and repair work, used car reconditioning, and the oil change operation. Warranty work was reimbursed by

of control. He instructed each of his departmen tal managers (new, used, service, body, and parts) to run his/her department as if it were an independent business. He knew that the success of the profit center control system was dependent upon the support of his managers. They must understand the rationale for allocat ing costs to their departments and believe that they had reasonable control over profitability. The managers' bonuses in 1989 were calculated on the basis of departmental grass profits. Ex

penses below the gross profit line were not con sidered in the bonus calculation. They were only told. in a statement outlining their respon sibilities, to exercise "judicious control over dis cretionary expenses." Implementing a more comprehensive control system tied to actual de partmental net profits would require that Liddy break down costs traditionally regarded as gen eral overhead into separate activities associ ated with specific departments. His strategy with the managers involved a gradual phasing

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EmmIT 1 (continued)
the factories at their prescribed labor rates, which were typically as much as 20 percent lower than the rates charged directly for nonwarranty work. Lower margins on warranty work were a potential problem for the dealership ifthey diflsuaded the service manager from delivering prompt service to recent buyers. During times of near capacity utilization, the manager would be motivated to schedule higher margin non warranty jobs in the place of warranty work. Parts "ho parts department consisted of a manager, three stock keepers, and two 'clerks. The parts manager was paid a flat I.tary p!us a bonus on department gross profits (computed as total parts sold less cost of parts). The parts manager was responsible for tracking parts inventory for the three lines and minimizitlg both carrying costs and obsoleseence." The Owners defined obsolescence as a part in stock that was not sold in over a year. Mr. Liddy estimated that as many as 25 percent of the parts-on-hand fell into this category. Days supply of parts (inventory turnover) averaged 100 days for the Industry. The manager had to be an expert on the return policies, stock requirements, and secondary market of three di.tinct and unrelated lines of merchandise. It was the parts manager's job to use factory return credits most effectively and identify outside wholesale opportunities so as to minimize large write-downs. LOcal wholesalers would pay as much as I() percent of dealer cost for old parts. Demand for parts was derived almost completely from other departments. Dollar sales volume in parts broke down as lolJows: 50 percent through service, 30 percent through the body shop, 10 percent wholesale, and 10 percent over-the counter retaiL Similar to service work, parts needed in warranty work were reimbursed at rates as much as 20 percent less shin prices charged for nonwammty work.
Body Shop

Tho body shop consisted of a manager, three technicians, and a clerk. The manager, like the others, was paid a flat salary
plUI a bonus on departmental profitability. To keep the shop in business in the long run, North Country Auto needed to IrwMt an additional $50,000 in new spray-painting equipment. As it was, the body shop was showing a loss after allocation If' Axed overhead. Gross margins as high as 60 percent could be attained, but rework and hidden damage beyond estimates _dfld to drive them down to closer to 40 percent.
Oil Change Operation

Tho doalership's oil change business operated under the nationally franchised "Qwik Change" logo, using one bay in the
wrvtCIl
_ . . . .DLP.O

department and one of the semiskilled mechanics. Volume averaged 68 changes per week. The operation was not as an independent profit center but as a means of filling unused capacity in the service department. The oil franchise paid for all equipment, reducing the dealership's out-of-pocket investment to $500. After direct labor, parts, and the franchise fee, the dealership made about $10.00 on each oil change priced at $21.95. The owners were to devote an extra bay to this operation if volume warranted.

over the next few years of an "almost" fullallocation system, where each department. would eventually have responsibility controllable costs incurred in the depart Fixed expenses, such as interest expense, be allocated by Liddy for his own deci but would not be used in the managers' calculations. gradual changeover would allow Liddy, was new to the dealership, time to become knowledgeable about the intricacies of

.n

North Country Auto's accounting records. He did not want to lose credibility because of per ceived arbitrary cost allocations. Exhibit 3 gives a breakdown of department profitability on an "almost" full-cost basis. In addition to finding a way to effectively track departmental perfonnance, George Liddy had to devise a sensible system for transfer pricing. Though Mr. Liddy believed that each department at North Country theoretically could operate as an independent business, he

184

Part I

The Management Control Environment

monthly, was, at best, a near estimate of liqui dation value. Actual values varied daily with the supply-demand balance at auto auctions. NORTH COUNTRY AUTO, INC.
These variances could be as much as 25 percent Balance Sheet
of the book value. October 31, 1989
(in thousands)
Ms. Robbins believed that she could sell the trade-in quickly at $5,000 and earn a good mar Liabilities and Equity Assets gin, so she chose to.carry it in inventory instead Cash ............ $ 32 Accounts payable .. $ 73
of wholesaling it for a value estimated to be Accounts ........ . Notes payable-
$3,500. Mr. Walker, in turn, used the $3,500 receivable ...... . 228 vehicles. . . . . . . . . 1,294 value in calculating his actual profit on the new Saab inventory. .. 253 Long-term debt. . . . . 344 car sale. VW inventory . . . . . 243 In performing the routine maintenance check Ford inventory. . . . . 773 Total liabilities. . . . . 1,711 on the trade-in, the service department re Used cars. . . . . . . . . 231 ported that the front wheels would need new Saab parts ....... 75 brake pads and rotors and that the rear door VWparts......... 75 lock assembly was jammed. The retail esti Ford parts. . . . . . . . 226 mates for repair would be $300 for the brakes Body shop materials 6 Stockholders' equity ($125 in parts, $175 jn labor) and $75 to fix the Other current assets 89 Common stock. . . .. $ 400 lock assembly ($30 in parts, $45 in labor). Retained earnings. . . 205 Cleaning and touch-up (performed by service Property & department as a part of the service order for equipment-Net*. . 85 lock and brake) would cost $75. The service de ($377M gross) partment also recommended that a full tune-up Total. ............ !2,316 Total............. $ 2,316 he performed for a retail price of $255 ($80 in parts, $175 in labor). 'North Country leases both the land and the building. The repair and tune-up work was completed and capitalized at retail cost into used car in ventory at $705. These mechanical repairs acknowledged that a complex interrelationship would not necessarily increase wholesale value existed among the profit centers in the course if the car subsequently were sold at the auction. of normal business transactions. A recent new The transfer price for internal work recently vehicle purchase illustrates the potential prob had changed from cost to full retail equivalent. The retail markup for labor was 3.5 times the lems that could arise. Alex Walker, manager of the new car sales direct hourly rate and about 1.4 times for parts. George Liddy was concerned that the retail department, sold a new car for $14,150. This purchase was financed by a cash down payment transfer price of the repairs in conjunction with of $2,000, a trade-in allowance of $4,800, and a his plan to eventually allocate full costs to each bank loan of $7,350. The dealer's cost was department (as illustrated in Exhibit 3) might $11,420, which included factory price plus sales encourage the used car sales manager to avoid commission. the possibility of losses in her department by The manager of the used car sales depart wholesaling trade-in cars that could be resold ment, Amy Robbins, examined the trade-in ve at a profit for the dealership. This might also hicle. The trade-in had a wholesale guidebook hurt the dealership by making its deals less at value of $3,500. The guidebook, published tractive for new car customers . EmmIT 2 Balance Sheet

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185

Financial Statement
NORTH COUNTRY AUTO, INC.
October 31, 1989 (10 months) (Dollar figures in thousands)
New Used Service
Body

Parts

Sales ......., ..................................... . Gross profit ....................................... . Number of units (vehicles, repairs, or parts) ............. . Direct selling (commission & delivery) .................. . Indirect labor ...................................... . Department advertising ............................. . Policy work-parts & service (giveaways & rework) ....... . Supplies & utilities ................................. . Depreciation ....................................... . Rent ............................................. . Profit before common expenses ........................ . Other expenses: Interest (on new inventory) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . Other interest .................................... . Owners' salary ................................... . Insurance ....................................... . Net operating profit ................................. .

$ 6,558 502 474 $ 96 162 91 29 22 3 89 $ 10 $ 110 21 65 35 35

$1,557 189 390 $ 25 74 30 12 18 1 22 $ 7

$ 672 421 9,795

Dla

$231 145 406

Dla
64

237 19 14 19 15 67 $ 50

2 12 28
5

13 $ 21

$ 1,417 361 40,139 Dla 156 3 1 12 2 9 $ 178

Notes to Financial Statement

1. New car sales and gross margins (Ooos) break down as: Sales Ford Saab VW Financing fees Gross profit
# Units

$3,114 1,502 1,794

~

$193
90

$6.558 2. Used car sales and margins break down as:

Sales Retail Wholesale Financing fees

117 102 $502

243 73 158
Dla

474

Gross profit

# Units

$1,045 423 89 $1,557

$212 (59) 36 $189

177 213
Dla

390
ContinlU!d

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ExHIBIT

Part I

The Management Control Enuironl1U'nt

(continued)

3. Notes payable for vehicles is a revolving line of credit secured by new car inventory. Payments to the bank are due
upon sale of each vehicle financed in inventory. This liability has been reduced over the past 10 months by
approximately $1.5 million.
4. Indirect labor consists of department managers, clerks, bookkeepers, and work involving tasks directly related to the activities in a specific department. It does not include sales commissions or billable employees in the back end. 5. Departmental advertising is assigned to departments based on actual ads placed. 6. Policy work consists of dealer concessions made to customers arising from disputes over dealer-installed options on new vehicles, warranty coverage, or cost of repairs. These costs are allocated to the departments in which they occur. 7. Depreciation is allocated by historical cost of leasehold improvements or equipment in each department. S. Rent is allocated by square footage used by each department, adjusted for the value of the space. 9. Interest expense is treated as a common expense for the purpose of keeping investing and financing costs separate. 10. Insurance consists of both umbrella liability and property damage for the dealership as a whole. Because of the multiple types of coverages included and the bundled pricing, it is not feasible to break out coverage costs by department. 11. Approximately 75 percent of the fixed costs in the used car department related closely to retail vehicle sales and approximately 25 percent to wholesale sales. 12. Total number of parts sold during the year = 40,139 parts; total number of service orders undertaken during the year = 9,795 orders. 13. Using Exhibit 3, North Country determined the following allocations for overhead expenses: New: $S351vehicle =$396,000/474 vehicles Used: $665/vehicle =$157,000 * 0.75/177 vehicles Parts: $32 $183,000/40,139 parts =4.55/part * 7 parts
(2 brake kits, 1 lock assembly, 4 tune-up parts)
Service: $114 $371,000/9,795 orders * 3 orders
(lock, brakes, tune-up)

*Finance fees consist of income that the dealer earns on dealer-sourced auto loans. It also includes the dealer's commission on service contracts and extended warranties sold through the dealership.

Knowing how important it was to maintain credibility with each of the departments, Liddy called a meeting with the three department managers. He decided to pse the recently com pleted new car sale to illustrate the effect that transaction would have on departments' profits. In his presentation, Mr. Liddy laid out the transaction and allocation of profits and costs. After this presentation, Mr. Liddy asked for the reactions of his department managers. Alex Walker was the first to chime in, "I un derstand that the allowance above book value on the trade-in cannot be accounted for as profit. However, the real issue is how to set the price between me and Amy when we transfer

the trade-in. I refuse to be responsible for any loss that might arise if the trade-in vehicle is liquidated at auction for an amount less than the wholesale guidebook value. Her department should be accountable for its valuation errors." Amy Robbins vehemently disagreed. "My de partment should not have to subsidize the prof its of the new car sales division." Liddy quickly jumped into this deteriorating argument, "Obviously, we need to carefully con sider how to set the price between the new and used car departments and who should be re sponsible for unexpected losses." "Another item that concerns me," Robbins went on, "is using full retail price for parts and

.":hapter 4

Profit Centers

187 of departmental success is our inventory turnover [average industry inventory turnover was 75 days for new cars and 45 days for used cars]. In conclusion, while I think the profit cen ter concept makes good sense for this business, I am concerned about the frictions that are taking place between the departments."

labor used in the repairs of trade-ins. Given un derutilized capacity in service, I do not under stand why I am charged full price. It doesn't make sense for the service department to mark up on projects undertaken for new and used car departments within our own dealership. I can't see how we can make profits when one part of our company sells to a.."1other." Robbins added, "When I am unsure of the ac tual retail value, I tend to wholesale rather than take a risk of a negative margin at retail. However, when I do this, we may be losing as an organization as a whole." "I agree with Amy on this," stated Walker, "and I have the same problem with dealer installed options. When I am charged full price for options, I have no incentive to try to sell these items." "Hold on," said the service department man ager. "I make my profit by selling service, and these are the prices I would charge for outside work. To sell service for a lower price insifte de feats the purpose of this profit center idea. But I do have a problem with getting full price for parts. The demand for parts is derived almost completely from service, and we are dependent on parts for quick delivery for repairs." Liddy jumped back in. "Obviously, we are de pendent on each other for quality and prompt service. We need to make sure that, as each of you maximizes profits in your departments, you do not negatively affect other departments." Liddy continued, "I am also concerned about the impact of capit.alizing trade-in repairs rather than expensing immediately. We all know that wholesale values drop with each pub lication of the new guidebook. I am afraid that, when a car is slow to sell, we might be reluctant to sell the car at a loss, even though we should. Car inventory ties up cash, and key measure

Questions
1. Using the data in the transaction,

compute the profitability of this one transaction to the new, used, parts, and service departments. Assume a sales commission of $250 for the trade-in on a selling price of $5,000. (Note: Use the following allocations [new, $835; used, $665; parts, $32; service, $114] for overhead expenses while computing the profitability of this one transaction. These overhead allocations are also shown as Note 13 in Exhibit 3.) 2. How should the transfer-pricing system operate for each department (market price, full retail, full cost, variable cost)? 3. If it were found one week later that the trade-in could be wholesaled for only $3,000, which manager should take the loss? 4. North Country incurred a year-to-date loss of about $59,000 before allocation of fixed costs on the wholesaling of used cars (see Note 2 in Exhibit 3). Wholesaling of used cars is theoretically supposed to be a break-even operation. Where do you think the problem lies? 5. Should profit centers be evaluated on
gross profit or "full cost" profit?
6. What advice do you have for the owners?

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