Victor David Hanson, in his book Carnage and Culture, examines battles from Salamis to Tet offensive and

explains why the armies of the West have been the most deadly and effective fighting forces in the world. He looks beyond popular explanations and states that it is Western culture and values that produced better-quality arms and soldiers. Hanson is a military historian and a professor of classics at California State University, Fresno. In Carnage and Culture, Hanson makes a logical, well-supported, but somewhat flawed argument for his claim. The reason for this is that not all parts of his claim fit exactly the way Hanson seems to want it to fit. There appear to be many exceptions to his theory, and his critiques often point to those exceptions to disprove his whole theory. In Carnage and Culture, Hanson claims that the West always wins because of their culture and the way they fight. Hanson calls this culture of the West the Western Way of Warwith some of the characteristics being freedom, individualism, civic militarism, superior weapons, organization, discipline, morale, initiative, flexibility, and command.1 Hanson seems to think this way because it is the same way that the Romans and the Greeks fought since they existed. In Hansons mind, the term Western means the culture of classical antiquity that arose in Greece and Rome; spread to western and northern Europe; then.expanded to the Americas, Australia, and areas of Asia and Africa2 He uses nine landmark battles to support his claim. The battles he uses are the battle of Salamis, Gaugamela, Cannae, Poitiers, Tenochtitln, Lepanto, Rorkes Drift, Midway, and Tet. In all of the aforementioned battles, Western nations used shock warfare to demolish their enemies and subject these enemy nations to their will.

Victor Davis Hanson, Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power (New York: Anchor Books, 2001), 21. 2 Hanson, Preface to Carnage and Culture, XV.

In his book Carnage and Culture, Victor Davis Hanson seems to be trying to answer the following question, what is the relationship between the culture of a nation and the outcome? The reason for this question is that he seems to feel that the most prominent writers of war, such as Thucydides, relate tactics with blood and strategy with corpse. He uses a number of battles to answer his question gathering the information from primary sources, secondary books, articles, and correspondences with other scholars. There are a few assumptions that Hanson makes while proving answer to his driving question. One thing Hanson assumes is that all Western nations are driven by the idea of freedom. In his chapter on the battle of Salamis, after comparing the Greeks freedom to the Persians being under the control of a king, Hanson says, These were not alternative approaches to state rule, but fundamental differences in the idea of personal freedom that would help determine who would live and who would die at Salamis.3 This idea ignores the fact that not all Western nations were free men and seems to point to the fact that under a kings rule you are not free, which idea is not completely true. Hanson also seems to assume that the West always wins when it is the West verses the Non-West. This assumption is clearly false since there were many instances were Non-Western nations beat Western nations, one being the battle of Poitiers where the Muslims beat the Franks. Hanson overcomes this weakness by saying it still show continuity to the Western Way. In addition, Hanson seems to be biased towards that fact that the culture of the nation determines the outcome of a battle. This idea creates the problem of completely ignoring the fact that there may be other reasons for victory besides the culture. When Hanson runs into a battle that the West lost he completely ignores why they lost and instead makes the battle work with his thesis.

Victor Davis Hanson, Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power (New York: Anchor Books, 2001), 34-35.

Victor Davis Hanson presents a number of concepts in order to answer his question. Some of these concepts include the ideas of decisive battle, freedom, discipline, and capitalism. These ideas he presents to help to clarify his answer to the question, but assumes that all Western battles have them--which assumption is not necessarily true. He makes the conclusion that culture causes the west to win. Another conclusion that he makes is that the primary driving force for Western nations is freedom. Both the conclusions are based off his assumption that the Western Way of War fits perfectly with all western battles and makes the West win. This assumption clearly if flawed. Because Hanson makes this assumption, when he encounters a battle where the West does not win, he seems to sweep it under the rug with no explanation as to why the west lost. Hanson clearly states his meaning including his meaning of the word Western And he supports his claim with relevant material. He is accurate to a point, but there are many flaws in his claim as mentioned earlier. Hanson takes the reader into great depths when answering his question and tackles many views from opposing sides and clearly says what is wrong with there views. Overall, Hansons argument is consistent, but there are a few points when he seems to just sweep a contradiction under the rug without really trying to explain it. His view seems to be a more one-sided approach to the subject with the idea that the Western Way of War causes the west to win and does not bring up any other ideas. Over all Carnage and Culture is a significant book in that it takes the reader to a completely new level of understanding, but due to its onesidedness, it is not a book to rely upon without referencing other books dealing with the same topic. John Lynn, in his book Battle, analyzes and compares Carnage and Culture to his own theories. Lynn gives credit to Hanson for his renowned work, and he recognizes that Hansons

work spurs thought about how to re-examine what is distinct about Western warfare.4 None-theless, Lynn questions and criticizes many of Hansons assumptions calling his work highly controversialbeginning with Hansons assertion that the Greeks were compelled by a sense of liberty rather than the protection of their agricultural livelihood.5 Lynn only points out this disagreement, citing that Hanson believes that grape vines and olive trees required little protection, and the armies would be at home during the harvest rather than attacking anothers crops.6 Lynns main argument stems from Hansons theory on what actually did drive the Hoptic warriors. Hanson argues that the Greek sense of liberty compelled them fight and fight valiantly. Rights to own land, freedom of speech, freedom to act, the right to vote, and freedom of religion all create a culture of battling bravely. Lynn claims this more fantasy than fact.7 Lynns primary objection to Hansons theory is that there are many gaps in the Western domination of war over the last 2500 years.8 Lynn also seems to object to the assertion that shock warfare is natural result of the aforementioned liberties, and that the Wests economic system has contributed to advancing and supporting imperialistic domination of the world.9 Lynn cites Edward Rothsteins argument that the world celebrates west for its democratic vision of human liberty and condemns it for militarism and imperialism.10 Lynn feels that Hansons claim that these two qualities are inseparable is questionable at best. The cause and effect evidence that Hanson presents may be wrong, but the evidence does seem powerful. Regarding the gaps in the Wests dominance, Lynn feels that Carnage and Culture admits there are gapsyet still claims
4

John A. Lynn, Written in Blood: The Classical Greek Drama of Battle and the Western Way of War, in Battle: A History of Combat and Culture (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2003), 3 and 13. 5 John A. Lynn, Written in Blood: The Classical Greek Drama of Battle and the Western Way of War, in Battle: A History of Combat and Culture (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2003), 4. 6 Lynn, Written in Blood, in Battle, 3-4. 7 Ibid., 25. 8 Lynn, Written in Blood, in Battle, 13. 9 Ibid., 13-14, and 20. 10 Ibid., 16.

continuity.11 This implication is true, and clearly, Hanson recognizes that gaps occur, but he rationalizes that gaps are mainly due to the erosions of the freedoms cited. Expecting no gaps at allon Lynns partseems somewhat unreasonable. In the sum total of western history, Hansons claim is true, and Hanson admits that theory does not always prove out during some periods. Next, Lynn criticizes Hansons declaration that seeking out the enemy and engaging in shock action without deception is a continued Western war culture. He seems to have a point here. Even Hanson points out how many armies, such as Cortezs, used every tactic available to conquer the enemy. There is no question that Western armies use every trick possible to hide true battle plans in modern warfare. The element of surprise is surely a weapon that must be used. When your enemys greatest defense weapons are swords and pikes, there is little need to hide attack plans, but as warfare advanced technologically, the element of surprise became more critical. However, decimating the enemy in open shock battle is most often required to conquer another nation. Even this concept of the continuous use of shock tactics is dismissed by Lynn he cites several quotations in-the-which Western military leaders express the opposite. Again, here Lynns argument is partly unreasonablethere will always be exceptions to the rule. If possible and advantageous, in modern western warfare, strategy is used to surprise the enemy followed by shock attack. Lynn also feels that discipline and drill of troops is not only Western attribute of military training.12 Of course, other non-Western nations drill discipline into their troops. Hansons claim centers on the fact that Western armies better maintain that discipline on the battlefield. The reason for the Wests better battlefield discipline relates back to their culture. If you know that
11 12

Ibid., 17. John A. Lynn, Written in Blood: The Classical Greek Drama of Battle and the Western Way of War, in Battle: A History of Combat and Culture (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2003), 19.

your leaders are scrutinized, if you feel you are fighting for your own liberties, if you know there was broad input into the battle planof course you are going to do your part with unwavering loyalty. So, yes, other nations drill discipline into there ranks, but the West does a much better job of maintaining it on the battlefieldeven when they fight each other. Finally, Lynn claims that western tactics have worked flawlessly in some parts of the world, such as the Americas. However, they have not fared quite so well in southern Asia. This may appear to be true, but Western sentiment against imperialism has changed how wars are foughtrather than any special case in Asia. Russia might be a better example of the failure of Western military might than southern Asia. In all, reading Lynns critique is thought provoking, but does nothing to discredit Hansons basic assumptions. Another battle that holds ground to at Hansons claim is the battle of Antioch during the First Crusade, which lasted from October 20, 1097 to Jun 2, 1098.13 The battle was between the Crusaders, who wanted to spread Christianity, and the Turks who had taken over much of the former Christian cities, one being the city of Antioch. Obviously, in this case, the Crusaders had religious freedom as motivator--why else would they leave their far away homelands to free a city whose only tie to them is their religion. On the other hand, democracy, homeland protection, and family had no part in their motivation. The Crusaders began the siege by camping right in front of Antioch as the fearful Turks stayed in the city fearing to come out. Gesta says this about the beginning of the siege In marvelous fashion we besieged three gates of the city, since on the other side there was no place from which to besiege (them), for a very steep mountain

13

Robert the Monk, Robert the Monks History of the First Crusade: Historia Iherosolimitana, Translated by Carol Sweetenham (Burlington VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2005), 121 and147. Thomas Asbridge says that the siege began on October 20. Thomas Asbridge, Before the Walls of Antioch, in The First Crusade: A New History, The Roots and Conflict Between Christianity and Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 162.

constrained us.14 The Turks used the Armenians and the Syrians who were within the city as spies. The Armenians and Syrians came out by night, leaving there wives and children within the walls of the city, and then came back into the city by day and told the Turks what they saw. Gesta made this conclusion about the strategy of the Turks Indeed, they craftily investigated our condition and strength and reported everything to those excommunicate who were shut up in the city.15 The Turks would open there gates at night and shoot arrows at the Crusaders, while staying within their well-fortified city. Robert the Monk shows the feelings the Crusaders had towards the Turks when he says [Antioch] was full of defenders who could have fought alongside our men on the battlefield if they had not been enemies of the name of Christ. 16 This driving force to purge the city of all non-believers was the ultimate cause for their victories during the Crusades. Before the battle, both sides waited to attack waiting for reinforcements. The Crusaders feared the cities defenses, despite some who believed that God would protect them, while Yanghi-Siyan of the Turks feared he had not enough men to protect the city. Turks who were in the castle of Harim, which castle the Crusaders eventually took over, ambushed the Crusaders. Then Bohemond of the Crusaders struck a deal with a jealous captain of the Turks named Firouz who sold Antioch to Bohemond and his men, which deal Bohemond kept secret from his men.17 The Crusaders fought the Turks by making it so that they could neither flight nor flee. There were times when the Turks seemed to push back the Crusaders but Bohemond waved the banner of the Crusaders giving them courage and causing the Turks to flee. Finally, through
14

Augustus C. Krey, From Nicaea to Antioch, The First Crusade: The Accounts of Eye-Witnesses and Participants (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1921), 125. 15 Augustus C. Krey, From Nicaea to Antioch, The First Crusade: The Accounts of Eye-Witnesses and Participants (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1921), 126. Robert the Monk agrees with Gesta the strategy a cunning strategem on their part Robert the Monk, Robert the Monks History of the First Crusade: Historia Iherosolimitana, Translated by Carol Sweetenham (Burlington VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2005), 121. 16 Robert the Monk, Robert the Monks History of the First Crusade: Historia Iherosolimitana, Translated by Carol Sweetenham (Burlington VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2005), 121. 17 Steven Runciman, Before the Walls of Antioch, in A History of the First Crusades: Volume 1, The First Crusade and the Foundation of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, 231 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

the treachery of Pyrrus the Turks and Firouz a captain of the Turks, the Crusaders were able to seize Antioch slaying all who were within. Part of the reason for their victory is summed up by the words of Robert the Monk when he said, Those who know something about war are well aware that foot soldiers kill more effectively than cavalry.18 The siege of Antioch clearly proves that Hansons claim is not far from the truth. Indeed the siege of Antioch shows that the freedom and religion along with superior weaponry are the forces that drive the West to win the battles they fight. The cause of freedom is often a great motivator to be victorious. With the correct motivation, nations and their military will create technology, develop skills, and fight for the cause they cherish. The Crusaders Franks made swords and their foot soldiers were no match against the cavalry of the Turks and their poisoned arrows. The Crusaders slaughtered the Turks with there swords like the harvester with his scythe in the meadow grass or corn.19 It shows that western weaponry is more superior to nonwestern weaponry. In speaking of the Franks and their swords, Robert the Monk says, What should the Franks do other than engage hand to hand with the sword?20 Even though the Turks captured Antioch again, the Crusaders, driven by their religion, defeated the Turks and took back Antioch. However, the Crusaders were not freemen because the government they lived under (they were under a king), but they were, in a way, freemen in terms of there religion since it was ultimately their faith in their religion that made them free. That sense of freedom along with western weaponry is what caused the Crusaders to defeat the Turks and, later on, the Turks to defeat the Crusaders. Liberty, freedom of religion, homeland protection and democracies are the ultimate motivation to fight valiantly. Those same qualities, by Hansons argument, also create
18

Robert the Monk, Robert the Monks History of the First Crusade: Historia Iherosolimitana, Translated by Carol Sweetenham (Burlington VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2005), 125. 19 Robert the Monk, Robert the Monks History of the First Crusade: Historia Iherosolimitana, Translated by Carol Sweetenham (Burlington VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2005), 132. 20 Ibid., 130

the very best war machine. A natural result is the subjection of other nations, and imperialism, and this is where many factions of society have he biggest problem. In general, Hansons theory holds true, and there are examples of exceptions. [2543]

Bibliography
Asbridge, Thomas Before the Walls of Antioch. In The First Crusade: A New History, The Roots and Conflict Between Christianity and Islam, 153-187. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. Hanson, Victor Davis. Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power. New York: Anchor Books, 2001. Krey, Augustus C. From Nicaea to Antioch. The First Crusade: The Accounts of EyeWitnesses and Participants, 112-162. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1921. Lynn, John A. Written in Blood: The Classical Greek Drama of Battle and the Western Way of War. In Battle: A History of Combat and Culture, 1-27. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2003. Peters, Edward, ed. The Siege of Antioch. The First Crusade: The Chronicles of Fulcher of Charters and Other Source Materials, 152-194. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971. Robert, the Monk. Robert the Monks History of the First Crusade: Historia Iherosolimitana. Translated by Carol Sweetenham. Burlington VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2005. Runciman, Steven. Before the Walls of Antioch. In A History of the First Crusades: Volume 1, The First Crusade and the Foundation of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, 213-235. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

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