12-50377
In the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF AUSTIN FAMILY PLANNING, INC.,
PLANNED PARENTHOOD ASSOCIATION OF HIDALGO COUNTY TEXAS,
INC., PLANNED PARENTHOOD ASSOCIATION OF LUBBOCK, INC.,
PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF CAMERON AND WILLACY COUNTIES,
FAMILY PLANNING ASSOCIATES OF SAN ANTONIO, PLANNED
PARENTHOOD OF CENTRAL TEXAS, PLANNED PARENTHOOD GULF
COAST, INC., PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF NORTH TEXAS, INC., and
PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF WEST TEXAS, INC.
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
THOMAS M. SUEHS, Executive Commissioner, Texas Health and Human Services
Commission, in his official capacity,
Defendant-Appellant.
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Western District of Texas, Austin Division
Case No. 1:12-cv-322-LY
EMERGENCY MOTION TO STAY
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION PENDING APPEAL
NATURE OF THE EMERGENCY
At 11:50 AM Central Time today, Judge Yeakel preliminarily enjoined the State
of Texas, acting through the Executive Commissioner of its Health and Human Ser-
vices Commission, from enforcing state regulations governing the Texas Womens
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ii
Health Program (WHP). See Preliminary Injunction Order, April 30, 2012 (Doc.
25) (the Order) (attached). In particular, the district court held that Texas cannot
continue to operate the Texas Womens Health Program unless it provides taxpayer
subsidies to entities that promote elective abortionseven though the Texas Wom-
ens Health Program is designed to reduce abortion by subsidizing nonabortion meth-
ods of family planning. Although the State respects the district court, we believe its
analysis of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is flawed in many respects and
is likely to be overturned on appeal. Absent a stay pending appeal, the State of Tex-
asand the women of Texas who depend on the Womens Health Programwill be
irreparably harmed because state law prohibits Texas from continuing to operate the
Texas Womens Program if taxpayer money must be provided to entities that affiliate
with abortion-promoting entities . Consequently, the district courts preliminary in-
junction effectively forces Texas to choose between contravening state law and shut-
ting down the program. The administrative provisions at issue are scheduled to go
into effect (and Texas will be irreparably injured if they do not) at midnight tonight.
This emergency situation is of Planned Parenthoods own making. Planned
Parenthood has been on notice of the state law at the heart of this suit for months.
Yet Planned Parenthood filed this lawsuit a mere 19 days ago, forcing the district
court and the litigants into an abbreviated briefing schedule, and causing the district
court to rule one day before the law was scheduled to go into effect.
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iii
Given the time pressure caused by Planned Parenthoods litigation strategy, it
was impracticable for Texas to file this motion first in the district court. See FED. R.
APP. P. 8(a)(2)(A)(i). Moreover, in light of the district courts ruling earlier today, the
district courts likely ruling on that motion is apparent. Given the timing of Judge
Yeakels ruling, it also was impossible for Texas to file this motion in the Fifth Cir-
cuits clerks office by 2 PM. See 5TH CIR. R. 27.3. And given the exceptional circum-
stances forced upon the State and the court because of the plaintiffs dilatory filing,
this motion should be considered by a single circuit judge if necessary. See FED. R.
APP. P. 8(a)(2)(D).
Undersigned counsel certifies (1) that this motion was preceded by multiple tel-
ephone calls to the clerks office before 2 PM today, and (2) that the facts supporting
emergency consideration of this motion are true and complete to the best of counsels
knowledge. See 5TH CIR. R. 27.3. Undersigned counsel further certifies that the par-
ties conferred by email regarding this motion, and Planned Parenthood opposes it.
See id.
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iv
CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS
Planned Parenthood of Austin Family Planning, Inc., et al. v. Suehs,
No. 12-50377
The undersigned counsel of record certifies that the following listed persons
and entities as described in the fourth sentence of Rule 28.2.1 have an interest in the
outcome of this case. These representations are made in order that the judges of this
court may evaluate possible disqualification or recusal.
Planned Parenthood Association of Hidalgo County Texas, Inc.
Plaintiff;
Planned Parenthood Association of Lubbock, Inc. Plaintiff;
Planned Parenthood of Cameron and Willacy Counties Plaintiff;
Family Planning Associates of San AntonioPlaintiff;
Planned Parenthood of Central TexasPlaintiff;
Planned Parenthood of Gulf Coast, Inc. Plaintiff;
Planned Parenthood of North Texas, Inc. Plaintiff;
Planned Parenthood of West Texas, Inc. Plaintiff;
Planned Parenthood of Austin Family Planning, Inc. Plaintiff;
Carrie Y. Flaxman, Helene T. Krasnoff, Roger K. Evans, Planned
Parenthood Federation of Americacounsel for Plaintiffs;
P. M. Schenkkan, Susan G. Conway, Matthew B. Baumgartner, GRAVES
DOUGHERTY HEARON & MOODY, PCcounsel for Plaintiffs;
Thomas M. Suehs, Executive Commissioner, Texas Health and Human Ser-
vices Commission, in his Official CapacityDefendant;
Jonathan F. Mitchell, Arthur C. DAndrea, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERALcounsel for Defendant.
/s/ Jonathan F. Mitchell
Jonathan F. Mitchell
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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1
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that
should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of per-
suasion. Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (citation omitted). The
plaintiffs in this case have not made this clear showing on any of the factors rele-
vant to a preliminary injunction. Whether this Court should stay the district courts
preliminary injunction pending appeal turns on four factors:
(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to
succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured ab-
sent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other
parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.
Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987). All four factors favor a stay.
I. DEFENDANT WILL LIKELY PREVAIL ON THE MERITS.
The district court held that Plaintiffs would likely prevail on the merits of their
federal constitutional claims. Order at 22-23. The State contends, however, that it
likely will succeed in persuading either the Fifth Circuit or the Supreme Court to reject
this analysis.
A. The District Court Erred By Concluding That Provisions of State
Law Violate the First Amendment.
The district courts analysis of the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine is legal-
ly flawed. It has never been the law that the government may not condition partici-
pation in a government program or receipt of a government benefit upon an appli-
cants exercise of protected rights. Order at 12. That proposition contradicts nu-
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2
merous decisions of the Supreme Courtsome of which the district court acknowl-
edged, see Order at 17, and others that the district court did not reference in its deci-
sion. Based upon that flawed premise, the district court held that Texas is forbidden
to withhold taxpayer subsidies from any entity that wishes to participate in the Wom-
ens Health Program on account of its First Amendment activitieseven when that
First Amendment activity is antithetical to the goals of the program. But the Consti-
tution does not require Texas to admit all comers into the Womens Health Program,
and the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine allows Texas to exclude organizations
who seek to advance agendas contrary to the values that the State and its Legislature
seek to promote in this program.
The district court was correct to note that the unconstitutional-conditions doc-
trine prohibits States from withholding subsidies in an effort to penalize would-be
recipients for their constitutionally protected conduct. But an unconstitutional pen-
alty occurs only when the condition is non-germane to the benefits provided by the
government subsidy. If, for example, the State of Texas decided to withhold police
and fire protection for Planned Parenthood on account of its First Amendment activi-
ty, that would represent an unconstitutional penalty because it is not related to the
goals of police and fire protection and would be undertaken only to spite Planned
Parenthood for its abortion-related advocacy. But the district court erred by assuming
that an unconstitutional penalty arises whenever the government withholds taxpayer
subsidies on account of constitutionally protected conduct that occurs beyond the
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3
scope of the government programeven when the condition is admittedly germane
to the benefits that the government subsidies seek to provide.
1. The District Court Erred by Holding That Texas May Not
Condition Participation in a Government Program or Re-
ceipt of a Government Benefit Upon an Applicants Exercise
of Protected Rights.
The district courts assertion that government may not condition participation
in a government program or receipt of a government benefit upon an applicant's ex-
ercise of protected rights, Order at 12, contradicts at least six decisions of the Su-
preme Court. The Supreme Courts rulings in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 130 S.
Ct. 2971 (2010) (CLS), and Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004), establish that States
do not violate the Constitution when they condition taxpayer subsidies on refraining
from certain First Amendment activity or speech. Locke upheld a state law that pro-
hibited even indirectly funding religious instruction, 540 U.S. at 719, and required
students wishing to study theology to enroll at a separate institution from the one re-
ceiving the state scholarship funds, id. at 721 n.4. Distinct from imposing civil or
criminal sanctions or requiring students to choose between their religious beliefs and
receiving government benefits, the restriction was simply a choice not to fund a dis-
tinct category of instruction. Id. at 721. Christian Legal Society allowed a public law
school to deny recognition to a student chapter of the Christian Legal Society on ac-
count of its First Amendment activities, and upheld the prohibition because the state
was dangling the carrot of subsidy, not wielding the stick of prohibition. 130 S. Ct.
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at 2986. The district court did not address either of these binding Supreme Court
pronouncements.
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987), also cannot be reconciled with the
district courts overbroad assertion. Dole permitted the federal government to with-
hold federal highway money from States that failed to raise their drinking age to 21,
even though the States enjoyed a constitutionally protected prerogative to set their
own drinking age. This federal highway program undoubtedly condition[ed] . . . the
receipt of a government benefit upon an applicants exercise of protected rights, and
the Supreme Court upheld it anyway.
Finally, it has long been established that governments may condition public
employment on the relinquishment of First Amendment freedoms. See, e.g., United
Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1973); U.S. Civil Serv. Commn v. Natl Assn of
Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006); and
Dole, 483 U.S. 203. The district court acknowledged these rulings (as well as Dole), but
dismissed them as not relevant or instructive. Order at 17. They are surely rele-
vant, as they contradict the major premise of the district courts argument: that gov-
ernment may not condition participation in a government program or receipt of a
government benefit upon an applicants exercise of protected rights. Order at 12.
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5
2. The District Court Erred By Holding That Strict Scrutiny
Applies to Conditions on Recipients of Government Benefits
That Implicate Free-Speech Rights.
The district court further erred when it held that strict scrutiny must be applied
whenever the government conditions the receipt of a government benefit on the re-
linquishment of First Amendment freedoms. See Order at 12. The only authority
that the district court cited for this proposition is Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
634 (1969), a case that dealt with the right to travel rather than the First Amendment.
Yet numerous decisions of the Supreme Court have refused to apply strict scrutiny
when governments withhold taxpayer subsidies on account of First Amendment ac-
tivity. When the Supreme Court upheld the Hatch Act, which prohibits the exercise
of certain First Amendment rights on the part of federal employees, it refused to ap-
ply strict scrutiny. Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 567 (balancing the needs of the government
with the freedoms of the employee); see also Natl Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at
564-67 (finding congressional concerns sufficient to enact law). And recently, in CLS
the Supreme Court declined to apply strict scrutiny to a rule that excluded certain reli-
gious groups from using campus facilities on account of their First Amendment ac-
tivity. 130 S. Ct. at 2985-86; see also Locke, 540 U.S. at 725 (refusing to apply strict
scrutiny to law that prohibited funding of theology instruction). The implication of
First Amendment rights is not enough, and the trial court erred in subjected the
States regulation to strict scrutiny.
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3. The District Courts Overbroad Readings of Sherbert and
Speiser Cannot Be Reconciled with Locke, CLS, and Nu-
merous Other Precedents of the Supreme Court.
The district courts citation of Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)and the
assertion that every denial of a government subsidy is functionally equivalent to a fine,
see Order at 12, is unreconcilable with Locke, CLS, and National Endowment for the Arts
v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587-88. Sherbert must be limited to the context of denying un-
employment benefits on account of First Amendment activityotherwise it cannot
be squared with the later precedents of the Court that distinguish between fines and
withholding of taxpayer subsidies.
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958), also does not support the district courts
broad conclusion that a government benefit cannot be conditioned on the recipients
agreement to restrain from exercising a constitutional right. See Order at 12. In
Speiser, the condition (a loyalty oath) was not germane to the benefit (a tax exemption);
it was aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas. Id. at 519. Whether a withhold-
ing of a subsidy penalizes the right depends on germaneness. And as the Supreme
Court has made clear, not all withholdings of subsidies amount to unconstitutional
penalties. See Locke, 540 U.S. 712; CLS, 130 S. Ct. 2971.
4. The District Court Erred by Adopting Planned Parenthoods
Outside the Program Theory of Unconstitutional Condi-
tions.
The district court erred in adopting Planned Parenthoods outside the pro-
gram theory of unconstitutional conditions. To begin with, several precedents of the
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Supreme Court directly contradict this approach by permitting governments to with-
hold taxpayer subsidies on account of constitutionally protected conduct that occurs
outside the scope of the federally funded program. See, e.g., Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75; Natl
Assn of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548; Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418; and Dole, 483 U.S. 203.
Mitchell rejected a First Amendment challenge to the Hatch Act, which prohib-
ited federal executive-branch employees from actively participating in political man-
agement or in political campaigns, even on the employees free time, away from work.
Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 78-79, 95. Contradicting the district courts outside the pro-
gram theory in this case, the Mitchell Court had no trouble finding the restriction
which extended to conduct outside the scope and hours of government employ-
mentto be a constitutional means for Congress to ensure efficient public service
and to avoid distortions in the political process. Id. at 99, 103.
The district courts conclusion also cannot withstand National Association of Let-
ter Carriers, in which the Court unhesitatingly reaffirm[ed] the Mitchell holding that
the Hatch Act was constitutional. 413 U.S. at 556. There, the Court held that nei-
ther the First Amendment nor any other provision of the Constitution invalidates a
law that prohibits partisan political conduct by federal employees, even when they
are off the clock. Id. The Court found significant the fact that the restriction was an
employment condition, since it seems fundamental in the first place that employees
in the Executive Branch of the Government, or those working for any of its agencies,
should administer the law in accordance with the will of Congress, rather than in ac-
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8
cordance with their own or the will of a political party. Id. at 564-65. Like the Hatch
Act, the WHP statute and regulations simply condition participation in the Program
on avoiding certain conduct in order to ensure that the State does not directly or indi-
rectly fund conduct that it opposes.
The district courts argument is also shut down by Dole, 483 U.S. 203, in which
the Court upheld Congresss authority to exercise its spending power to condition
federal funding for highway construction on the States raising the drinking age to 21.
The Court was not troubled that the drinking-age was set outside the federally funded
highway-construction program. Id. at 210-211. Although the district court considered
South Dakota, its discussion obscured the fact that it withheld taxpayer subsidies on
account of constitutionally protected decisions that were made outside the scope of
the federally funded program.
Garcetti also forecloses the district courts conclusion that the Commission can-
not withhold subsidies on account of speech activity that occurs outside of a taxpayer-
funded program. 547 U.S. at 418 (a public employer may punish an employee for
speech on matter of public concern so long as employer has an adequate justification
for treating the employee differently from any other member of the general public.);
Larry Alexander, Impossible, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 1007, 1009 (1995).
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9
5. The District Court Erred By Interpreting Rust to Establish a
Ceiling on Governments Ability to Withhold Taxpayer Sub-
sidies From Abortion-Performing Entities.
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), never establishes, even in dictum, that the
Constitution categorically forbids governments to withhold taxpayer subsidies on ac-
count of constitutionally protected conduct that occurs outside the scope of the tax-
payer-funded program. Although Rust turned aside the unconstitutional conditions
claim by holding that governments may implement measures to ensure that taxpayer
funds are spent for their designated purposes, Rust never suggested that this is the only
basis on which a court may reject an unconstitutional-conditions claim; if it did, it
would have overruled Dole, 483 U.S. 203; National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548;
and Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75. Rust establishes that a law designed to ensure that taxpayer
funds are spent for their designated purposes will always prevail over an unconstitu-
tional-conditions challenge.
6. The District Court Erred by Holding that Planned
Parenthoods Abortion-Related First Amendment Activity
Occurs Outside of the Taxpayer-Funded Program.
The district court failed to address the States argument that the plaintiffs af-
filiation activities fall within the scope of the Womens Health Program. As pointed
out in the States briefing, the plaintiffs have been excluded from the Texas Womens
Health Program for four independent reasons: (1) They promote elective abortions
by advocating for legalized abortion on demand; (2) They affiliate with entities that
both perform elective abortions and promote elective abortions by advertising
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10
for them. (3) They affiliate with abortion-performing and abortion-promoting enti-
ties by using the Planned Parenthood registered service mark; and (4) They affili-
ate with Planned Parenthood Federation of America (PPFA), an organization that
promotes elective abortions. See PI Motion at 6. The plaintiffs affiliation with
abortion-performing and abortion-promoting entities is a continuous activity that oc-
curs both inside and outside the program.
The plaintiffs do not suddenly drop the Planned Parenthood moniker and logo,
and suspend all of their affiliations with abortion-performing entities, whenever a
WHP patient walks into the door, or whenever they collect reimbursement from the
States taxpayers for services provided to these patients. The initial decision to affili-
ate may occur outside the program, but the act of affiliating remains continuous
and it is this act for which the plaintiffs are excluded from the program.
The plaintiffs suggested that at least some of them engage[] in advocacy in-
tended to protect and facilitate access to safe and legal abortion for women who
choose to exercise their constitutional right to choose. See PI Motion at 6. But nei-
ther the plaintiffs nor the district court explained how the plaintiffs separate their
abortion-promoting activities from the Womens Health Program or the taxpayer sub-
sidies that it provides. Money is fungible, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.
Ct. 2705, 2725 (2010), and when the State of Texas reimburses Planned Parenthood
for the family-planning services it provides to low-income women, it frees up other
resources for Planned Parenthood to use for its advocacy and promotion of elective
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11
abortion. Although the plaintiffs claim that they do not subsidize the abortion proce-
dure or encourage abortions, the promotion of elective abortion extends well be-
yond these two activities.
The plaintiffs have not made any clear showing that they have established
sufficient separation between their abortion-promoting advocacy and the taxpayer
subsidies that they receive under the Womens Health Program. Planned
Parenthoods silence on these matters should have led the district court to deny the
preliminary injunction under Mazurek.
7. The Proper Test Is Whether The Decision to Withhold Tax-
payer Subsidies from Planned Parenthood Is Germane to the
Purpose of the Benefits Offered By The Womens Health
Program, and the Conditions Imposed by the Texas Wom-
ens Health Program Satisfy This Test.
Planned Parenthoods claim that a State violates the Constitution whenever it
withholds a taxpayer subsidy on account of constitutionally protected conduct that
occurs outside the program is irreconcilable with at least four decisions of the Su-
preme Court, and in all events Planned Parenthoods unconstitutional-conditions
claim fails even on its own terms. The proper test for resolving an unconstitutional-
conditions challenge is to ask whether the restriction is related to the benefit that the
State seeks to confer. In Dole, for example, the Court concluded that a States deci-
sion to establish a drinking age below 21even though it occurred outside the scope
of the federally funded highway programwas sufficiently related to the goals of the
federal project (safe and effective transportation) to survive an unconstitutional condi-
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12
tions challenge. Had the federal statute conditioned the receipt of federal highway
funds on a State decision to provide agricultural subsidies, then a different result
would have obtained. See Daryl J. Levinson, Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law,
111 YALE L. J. 1311 (2002).
Numerous decisions of the Supreme Court, along with lower federal courts and
scholarly commentators, have recognized that germaneness is the touchstone for
evaluating an unconstitutional-conditions claim. See, e.g., Dole, 483 U.S. at 208; Dolan
v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386 (1994) ([T]he government may not require a per-
son to give up a constitutional right . . . in exchange for a discretionary benefit con-
ferred by the government where the property sought has little or no relationship to
the benefit.); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Commn, 483 U.S 825, 839 (1987) (requiring a
nexus between the benefit and the right surrendered); Nat'l Amusements, Inc. v. Town
of Dedham, 43 F.3d 731, 747-48 (1st Cir. 1995) ("Not all conditions are prohibited,
however; if a condition is germanethat is, if the condition is sufficiently related to
the benefitthen it may validly be imposed. In the final analysis, the legitimacy of a
government proposal depends on the degree of relatedness between the condition on
a benefit and the reasons why government may withhold the benefit altogether.);
Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 972 (9th Cir. 2009) (McKeown, J., concurring in part
dissenting in part) ("To determine whether the government has violated the unconsti-
tutional conditions doctrine, the court must look to whether the condition placed up-
on the receipt of a benefit furthers the end advanced as the justification for the prohi-
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13
bition. In other words, the government cannot impose a condition for a reason not
germane to one that would have justified denial of the benefit.) (citations and quota-
tion marks omitted); see also Robert L. Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional
Rights, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 321, 350-52 (1935); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional
Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415, 1456-76 (1989). The conditions that Texas has
imposed on participants in the States WHP easily satisfy the germaneness test.
The Texas Legislature created the Womens Health Program to expand access
to preventative health and family-planning services among low-income women who
do not qualify for Medicaid. One important aim of the program is to reduce elective
abortions by preventing unwanted pregnancies; WHP achieves this end by subsidizing
birth-control strategies but not elective abortion. This is a legitimate and constitu-
tionally permissible goal for States to pursue, so long as they do not impose undue
burdens on women who want an abortion. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980)
(holding that States are permitted to allocate tax subsidies in a manner that prefers al-
ternatives to abortion over abortion).
The Texas Legislature excluded Planned Parenthood from the program for two
reasonsboth of which are germane to the benefits that WHP seeks to provide.
First, Planned Parenthoods mission and philosophy is fundamentally inconsistent
with the goals of the Womens Health Program. The Womens Health Program is de-
signed to promote womens health and reduce unwanted pregnancies by encouraging
family-planning methods and birth-control strategies, while specifically excluding
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14
abortion. The Womens Health Program does not pay for abortions, and it seeks to
reduce abortions and unwanted births by encouraging women to avoid unintended
pregnancies before the fact, rather than aborting their fetuses after the fact. Although
Planned Parenthood shares some of the programs goals (such as promoting womens
health and reducing unwanted pregnancies), it also contravenes the very purpose of
the program by actively promoting elective abortion as an appropriate and ethical
means of birth control. Planned Parenthood and its affiliates have every right to hold
that belief and advocate for elective abortion, but they are not entitled to receive tax-
payer subsidies from a government program that is designed to encourage preventa-
tive birth control and discourage abortion.
It is no answer to say that Planned Parenthood finances its abortion-related ac-
tivities and advocacy with funds that come from outside the States coffers. Planned
Parenthood does not provide any assurance that the tax subsidies it receives from the
Womens Health Program have not been used directly or indirectly to subsidize its
advocacy of elective abortion. Nor is it possible for Planned Parenthood to provide
this assurance. Money is fungible, and taxpayer subsidieseven if earmarked for
nonabortion activitiesfree up other resources for Planned Parenthood to spend on
its mission to promote elective abortions. Cf. Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2725-26 (because
[m]oney is fungible, First Amendment does not prohibit application of federal ma-
terial-support statute to individuals who give money to humanitarian activities per-
formed by terrorist organizations). Planned Parenthoods involvement in the Wom-
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15
ens Health Program enables Planned Parenthood affiliates across the country to redi-
rect their fundraising efforts toward their abortion-related activities, now that their
non-abortion activity receives a generous subsidy from state taxpayers. Id. (noting
that money is fungible and that when organizations that have a dual structure raise
funds, they highlight the civilian and humanitarian ends to which such moneys could
be put.). And by empowering Planned Parenthood to expand its provision of pre-
ventative health care and family-planning services throughout the State, it enables
Planned Parenthood to cultivate additional paying clients and makes those patients
more receptive to Planned Parenthoods ideologyeven though the services are
funded by the taxpayers of Texas rather than Planned Parenthood donors who sup-
port its desire to promote abortion.
Planned Parenthood was excluded from the Womens Health Program for a
second reason: Planned Parenthoods exclusion was necessary to persuade the Texas
House of Representatives, the Texas Senate, and the Governor to establish the Wom-
ens Health Program in 2005. Without the Planned Parenthood exclusion, the Wom-
ens Health Program would not exist because the statute creating it would never have
been enacted into law. And if Planned Parenthood succeeds in persuading this Court
to put Texas to the all-or-nothing choice of operating a womens health program that
provides taxpayer subsidies to Planned Parenthood or having no program at all, state
law requires HHSC to ensure that no taxpayer flows to abortion-promoting entities,
which means that the program will cease to exist and cannot be revived. The legisla-
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16
tors duly elected to represent the interests of their constituents object to Planned
Parenthoods mission, and they are not willing to support any government program
that causes Planned Parenthood to receive taxpayer subsidiesno matter how much
good that program may accomplish. There is nothing a federal court can do to change
that legislative policy prerogative. The exclusion of Planned Parenthood is therefore
germane to benefits provided by the Womens Health Program, because without
that restriction there would be insufficient legislative support for the program to exist.
II. DEFENDANT WILL SUFFER IRREPARABLE INJURY ABSENT A STAY.
Refusing to stay the district courts injunction will prevent the State from en-
forcing a statute duly enacted by the Texas Legislature. The 2005 Act passed with
overwhelming majorities, and it is undisputed that the administrative rule faithfully
implements the 2005 Act. See Order at 9; Doc. 24-1. Enjoining the enforcement of
democratically enacted legislation harms the State by keeping its Legislature from im-
plementing the will of the people that they represent. See New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Or-
rin W. Fox Co., 434 U.S. 1345, 1351 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers) ([A]ny time a
State is enjoined by a Court from effectuating statutes enacted by representatives of
its people, it suffers a form of irreparable injury.); Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122
F.3d 718, 719 (9th Cir. 1997) ([I]t is clear that a state suffers irreparable injury when-
ever an enactment of its people . . . is enjoined.).
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III. ISSUING A STAY WILL NOT SUBSTANTIALLY INJURE OTHER PARTIES
INTERESTED IN THE LITIGATION.
On the other side of the balance, Planned Parenthood has not clearly shown
that enforcement of the law pending appeal will cause it irreparable injury. Through
unsworn declarations, Planned Parenthood claims that it will be deprived of hundreds
of thousands in taxpayer funding, and suggests that it may be forced to shut down
clinics, though it hope[s] it will not come to this. See, e.g., Mot. for Prelim. Inj. Ex.
L at 4; Ex. K at 3. But monetary damages incurred by private plaintiffs rise to the lev-
el of irreparable injury if and only if the private partys financial viability is threat-
ened. Caballo Coal Co. v. Indiana Michigan Power Co., 305 F.3d 796, 801 (8th Cir. 2002).
None of the plaintiffs has demonstrated that its financial viability is threatened; at
very most, they have baldly asserted that they may, at some point in the future, have to
close one or more of their hundreds of clinics because their revenues from the State
of Texas and its taxpayers may drop. See Order at 20. A temporary loss of public
funding is neither a substantial nor irreparable injury. See People Who Care v. Rockford
Bd. of Educ. Dist. No. 205, 921 F.2d 132, 135 (7th Cir. 1991) ([Plaintiffs] prefer money
now to money later, but the difference is not an irreparable loss . . . .) (Easterbrook,
J.).
Moreover, plaintiffs allegations of harm are speculative and conclusory. Plain-
tiffs have not allegedmuch less shown with the certainty that should be demanded
for winning a federal injunction against a State officialparticularized facts to support
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18
their allegations of harm. Cf. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). Planned
Parenthood also has not shown that any losses in State reimbursements will not be
recouped from private donations or other sources. To the contrary, Planned
Parenthood has demonstrated that it does not need taxpayer money to thrive. See
Meghan McCarthy, Planned Parenthood Raises $3 Million in Wake of Komen Funding Contro-
versy, NATIONAL JOURNAL (Feb. 3, 2012).
Moreover, Plaintiffs have not shown that the temporary loss of taxpayer money
will prevent a single woman from undergoing an abortion, or that it will prevent a sin-
gle Plaintiff from affiliating with anyone. Planned Parenthood simply and incorrectly
claims that a federal-court injunction is the only way to prevent irreparable injury to
the women of Texas. But as Commissioner Suehs explained in a sworn affidavit if
Planned Parenthood obtains the relief it seeks, it will cause the entire Womens Health
Program to be shut down. It is in the best interest of Texas women for this Court to
ensure that does not happen by staying the preliminary injunction pending appeal.
IV. A STAY PENDING APPEAL IS BY DEFINITION IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST.
A stay of the preliminary injunction would allow Defendants to carry out the
statutory policy of the Legislature, which is in itself a declaration of the public inter-
est which should be persuasive. Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fedn No. 40, 300 U.S. 515,
552 (1937). See also Ill. Bell Tel. Co. v. WorldCom Techs., Inc., 157 F.3d 500, 503 (7th Cir.
1998) (When the opposing party is the representative of the political branches of a
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19
government the court must consider that all judicial interference with a public pro-
gram has the cost of diminishing the scope of democratic governance.).
V. THE TRIAL COURTS FAILURE TO ORDER THE PLAINTIFFS TO POST
SECURITY PURSUANT TO RULE 65(C) REQUIRES REVERSAL OF THE
INJUNCTION.
The district court decided, without any explanation, that no bond would be re-
quired from Plaintiffs under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c). Order at 23. This
Court has held that the failure to require a bond, alone, is sufficient to reverse an in-
junction. Nichols v. Alcatel USA, Inc., 532 F.3d 364, 379 (5th Cir. 2008); Phillips v.
Charles Schreiner Bank, 894 F.2d 127, 131 (5th Cir. 1990); Continuum Co. v. Incepts, Inc.,
873 F.2d 801, 804 (5th Cir. 1989); see also FED. R CIV. P. 65(c) (preliminary injunction
may issue only if the movant gives proper security). The bond requirement ensures
that the enjoined party may collect its damages should a court eventually determine
that the injunction was wrongful. Phillips, 894 F.2d at 131. If a plaintiff cannot post a
sufficient bond, an injunction should not issue. Nichols, 532 F.3d at 379.
In the present case, Plaintiffs receive funding of over $1 million a month. Or-
der at 19 (noting that Plaintiffs receive $13.5 million in annual funding). Should the
State ultimately prevail in this suit, it will have no recourse to recover those taxpayer
dollars spent contrary to State law. Moreover, Plaintiffs have given no indication that
they have the means to repay such an amount to the State, failing to brief the bond
issue entirely. The trial courts failure to order any type of security requires reversal of
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20
the injunction, and should Plaintiffs be unable to post sufficient security, no injunc-
tion should be permitted.
CONCLUSION
The district courts preliminary injunction should be stayed pending appeal.
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21
Respectfully submitted.
GREG ABBOTT
Attorney General of Texas
DANIEL T. HODGE
First Assistant Attorney General
DAVID C. MATTAX
Deputy Attorney General for Defense Litigation
/s/ Jonathan F. Mitchell
JONATHAN F. MITCHELL
Solicitor General
State Bar No. 24075463
ANDREW S. OLDHAM
Deputy Solicitor General
ARTHUR C. DANDREA
Assistant Solicitor General
MICHAEL P. MURPHY
Assistant Solicitor General
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
P.O. Box 12548 (MC 059)
Austin, Texas 78711-2548
Tel. (512) 936-1695
Fax. (512) 474-2697
Counsel for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 30th day of April, 2012, a copy of this Emergency
Motion was served via the CM/ECF system to Plaintiffs counsel.
/s/ Jonathan F. Mitchell
JONATHAN F. MITCHELL
Counsel for Defendant-Appellant
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23
CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC COMPLIANCE
Counsel also certifies that on April 30, 2012, the foregoing Emergency Motion
of Appellant to Stay Preliminary Injunction Pending Appeal was transmitted to Mr.
Lyle W. Cayce, Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, via
the Courts CM/ECF Document Filing System, https://ecf.ca5.uscourts.gov/.
Counsel further certifies that: (1) required privacy redactions have been made,
5TH CIR. R. 25.2.13; (2) the electronic submission is an exact copy of the paper docu-
ment, 5TH CIR. R. 25.2.1; and (3) the document has been scanned with the most re-
cent version of Symantec Endpoint Protection and is free of viruses.
/s/ Jonathan F. Mitchell
Jonathan F. Mitchell
Counsel for Defendant-Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE
On April 30, 2012, we conferred with counsel for plaintiffs and they oppose
this motion and intend to file an opposition.
/s/ Jonathan F. Mitchell
Jonathan F. Mitchell
Counsel for Defendant-Appellant
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APPENDIX
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COMPLAINT Page 1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AUSTIN DIVISION
PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF AUSTIN
FAMILY PLANNING, INC.,
PLANNED PARENTHOOD ASSOCIATION
OF HIDALGO COUNTY TEXAS, INC.,
PLANNED PARENTHOOD ASSOCIATION OF
LUBBOCK, INC.,
PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF CAMERON
AND WILLACY COUNTIES,
FAMILY PLANNING ASSOCIATES OF SAN CIVIL CASE NO. 1:12-CV-00322
ANTONIO,
PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF CENTRAL TEXAS,
PLANNED PARENTHOOD GULF COAST, INC.,
PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF NORTH
TEXAS, INC., and
PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF WEST TEXAS, INC.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
VS.
VS.