On Subject and Object “Tolead in with reflections about subject and abject ase the difeuky of stating what exacly the topic of discussion shouldbe, The terms are putenly equivocal, Thus “subject” tan refer the particular individual Sewell acto universal aributes of “consciousness in genera” in thea izvage of Kant’s Prolegomena The equivocation cannot be removed "Simply through terminolgial danfstion. Foe both meanings have rec ‘prowl ned of eachother one can hardy be comprchended without the other. No concept of the subject can have the clement of individual Ihumanity-—what Schelling called “egoity"™—separated. from it in thought without any reference tot, subect woul lose al significance ‘Conversely the particular human inividual as son a one reflects upon itunder the guise ofthe universality of ts concept which docs noe nify merely some particular being hi ef mune is alteady transformed neo universal, similar to what was expressed inthe idealist concept of the subject even the expression "particular person” requires the concept ‘of species simply inorder to be meaningful, The relation to that univer- sal sul inheres implicitly in proper names They designate someone who hassuehand such 3 name and no other, and someone” stands ellipticlly fora person.” On the ther hand, fone wanted to escape complications ‘ofthis lind by ying to define dhe two terms then one would falnto an246 ‘carenwonps: enimieat MODELS = pora that attends the problematic of definition in modern philosophy Since Kant The concept of subject and objector rather what they refer toy have ina certain way priority overall defition. Defining means 35 ‘much a subjectively by means of «rigidly applied concep, capturing, something objective, no matter what i may bein itself. Hence the resis tance of subject and objet tothe ac of defining. The determination of ‘eit meanings requires tellection on the very thing the ac of defining trancates forthe sake of conceptual managetlty, Therefore it is adv thle o start by taking up the words "subjece” and “objet” suchas they {re handed down by th well-honed philosophic language, asa histor ‘al sediment: not of course, sticking fo such conventonalism but contin ‘ing further with aerial analysis, One coud begin with the allegedly nave, though already mediated, view that a knowing subject, whatever kind it may Be, stands confronting an object of knowledge, whatever kind itmay be The reflection, which in philosophical terminology goes by the rare of intent abligua is then a relating fom that ambiguous concept ‘of abject back to ano lss ambiguous concept of subject. A second reflec tion rele the frst, more dosely determining the vagueness for the she ofthe contents of the concep of subject and object, 2 “The separation of subject and objec is both eal and semblance Tue, because in the realm ofcogition it lends expresion tothe real separa tion the rivers ofthe human condition, the result of coercive his- torial proces untrue, becuse the historical separation most not be hypostsized, not magically transformed into an invariant. This contra- diction inthe separation of subject and object is imparted vo epsternl- ogy. Although as separated they cannot be thought away, the Yeb8os of the separation is manifested in ther being mutually mediated, object by subject and even emote and diferenly subject by objec. Az soon si fixed without mediation, the separation becomes ideology, its normal form, Mind then aerogatesto ise the status of being absolutly inde- pendent—ohich ti not minds claim to independence announces is tlsim to domination. Once racially separated from the objec subject redaces the abject tse subject swallows objec, forgetting how mich itis objet sll The image of » temporal or extatempor original state of blissful identity berween subject and objects romantic, however at times a wishful projection today jus a le Before the subject const tuted itself undifferentiatedness was the terror of the blind nexus of nature, was myth; it wasn their protest against his myth thatthe great religions had their truth content. Afterall, undifferentiatedness is not (On Subject and Object oar sity, forthe latter requires, even according ro Platonic dialect diverse entities of which it isthe unity, For those who experience the new hor ror of separation transigares the ol hororof chaos, and both are eter zal sameness The fear of gaping meaninglessness made one forget a feat that once was a les compelling that ofthe vengeful gods Epicurean materialism and the Christan “fear not” wanted to spre mankind. Tie ‘cannot be accomplished except through the subject. Were i guided insted of sublaed into a higher form, the result would be not merely 2 repression of consciousness but a regression to real barbarism. Fate the Complicity of myth with nator, somes from the otal plitalinmaru- tity of soley fom an age in which self-reflection had na yet opened its {yes in which subject didnot yet exe, Instead of conjuring the revurnof| ‘his age through collective praxis the captivating spel ofthe old und ferentatedness shouldbe obliterated, prolongation s mind’ identity consciousness, which repressvely makes its Other lik itself Were spec- ‘lation concerning the sate of reconaiatin allowed, then it would be Impossible to conceive that state as ether the undifferentiated unity of subject and objet or thei hostile antithesis: ater i would be the com ‘munication of what is differentiated. Only then would the concept of Communication, as an objective concep, come into ts own. The present ‘concept so shameful crust Betrays what is bette potential for Sgreemene between human beings and things—to the idea of imparting information between subjects according tothe exigencies of suljecive reason. In its proper place, even epistemologcally the relationship of subject and abject wouldlie in a peace achieved betwen human beings ‘well as erveen them andthe Other Peace isthe state offferentiation without domination, with the diferentated participating in each other 3 In epistemology, ‘subject is usally wndertood to mean the eranscen- dental subject According to idealist doctrine, it either constucts the ‘jective world out of an undifereniated material asin Kantor since Ficht,t engenders the worl itself. The ertique of idealism was noe the first to dacover that this transcendental subject, which consttates all conten of experienc, sin turn abstracted from living individual human beings. Ie is evident thatthe abstract concepr of she transcendental sub {et that the forms of thoght, thet unity, and the originary produc tity of consciousness, presupporespreciely what it promises 10 estab lish: acral, Iving indivsals. The idealist philosophies were aware of this point Indeed, Kent tried to develop a fundamental, coasttive nd hierarchic distinction between the transcendental and the empirical sub-aus ccaTcHWons:cnIvIcAL MODELS 2 ject in his chapter on the psychological paralogisms? His successors, however particularly Fiche and Hegel, bu alo Schopenhaver with sub- tlelines argumentation endeavored to deal withthe unavoidable prob- lem of circularity: Frequently they returned to the Ariotcian motive that wae comes firs for consciousners—here, che empirical subject is not che Fst in itself and that it postulates the transcendental subject at its condition or arigin. Even Hise!’ polemie aginst peychologim, replete with the distinction between genesis and validity, continues th mode of argumentation It x apologetic. The conditioned eta be justi fed as unconditioned, the derivative as primary. Here a topos of the centre Wester tradition x epeated, which holds hat only the Fistor 8 Nietache critically formulated it only something that has not evolved, canbe true* The ideological function of the thesis enor be overlooked “The more individuals are in effect degraded into functions within the soxietal totality as they are connected up othe system, the more the per ton pure and simple, a © principle = consoled and exalted with the aneibutes of ceative power absolute rule, and sprit. Nonetheless the question of the reality of the transcendental subject ‘weighs heavier than appears in i sublimation a pure spirit and, above all in the critical revocation of dealin In a certain sone, although de- lism would be the lst to admit i, che transcendental subject i move ‘eal havi fat more determines the el conduct of people and society than do those psychological individuals from whom the transcendental subject was abstracted and who have ite to say inthe word for ther part they have turned into appendages ofthe social machinery, ult mately into ideology. The living individual person, such ashe is con- strained to act and fr which he was even internally molded sa hora Deconomicus incarnate clsee to the tanseendental subject than the lv ing individual he must immediately take himself tobe, Tothisextentde- lst theory was realistic and ned nt fel embarrassed when proached for idealism by is opponents The doctrine of the transcendental subject faithfully discloses the precedence ofthe abstract rational relations that are abstracted from individils and their conditions and for which fexchange is the model. If the standard strutute of society i the exchange form, it rationality constitutes people: what they are for ‘themselves, what they think they ares secondary. They are deformed at ‘the outset by the mechanism that was then philosophically taneigored. Ino the transcendental. What is supposedly most obvious, the empirical subject, would actually have tobe considered as something not yet exis Ing’ from this aspect the transcendental subject is “constitutive” Allegedly the ovigin of all concrete objects, nite righ timelesnese 6 concretely objected, fully in keeping withthe Kantian doctrine ofthe ‘stable and immutable forms of transcendental consciousness Ite solidity On Subject and Object 9 andinarianc, which coding ro anscendentl hlnophy engenders abject oat est prescribe the relay the reece form ofthe relerion of human beings that ha objecvelyccsred in the cond tine of eet, The fee hare socal necessary semblance hi tory bas Boome the pie of what scoring tote concept woud ave ob the posters The pilsopieal problem of constation has en inverted int its miro age ye in ts inversion i expresses the truth about the Rito stage that hs been talned: truth Tobe sure that a send Copernican tun might theoretically negnte, Kcr flo hast positive momen: that the antscedent ory kesp elf and ite members alive. The putas indvdual ones the possbiity of fe trioecs othe univer proof of tis hough wich et a Stir ad to that tent sol elton. Though given roy rer the inal ot only fos Ba esis Rypoatnes nly one ede which incomprehensible except in relation othe eer Ser the given the shandalon of eam cam however not remove, Almonte asin and agin he are fat pone 4 The insight into the primacy of the abject doesnot restore the old inten tho recta, the slawish confidence in the external world existing precisely as ieappeate this sie of etigue an anthropological tate davai ofthe elf consciousness that frst crystallizes in the context of the elaionship leading from knowledge beck tothe ower The crude confrontation of subject and objec in naive realism is of course historically necessitated and cannot be dismissed by an ac of wil. But atthe same ime i isa product of false abstraction, already a piece of reification. Once this is Seen through, then a consciousness objected to itself and precisely as such dinected outward, vieually striking outward could no longer be ragged along without self-reflection. The turn tothe subject though from the outset intent omits primacy, des not simply disappear with its reson this revision ccc ot least ofall the subjective interest in {recdom, The primacy ofthe object means rather tha subject forts part fs objet in a qualitatively differnt, more radial sense than object, [ocnse object cannot be known exept through consciousness hence is also subject. What is known trough consciousness must bea something ‘mediation applies to something metiatd. But sbjet, she epitome al ‘mediation, the How, and neve a contrasted to he objet the What’ tha is postulated by every conceivable idea for 2 concep of subject. Potentially though not actully, objectivity can be conceived without 8 “subject but not likewise object without subjectivity. No matter how sub-