THE WAR ON THE ITALIAN FRONT

LUIGI VILLARI, M.C. With a Foreword by the RT. HON. SIR RENNELL RODD,

LONDON COBDEN-SANDERSON 1932

FOREWORD The record which my friend Luigi Villari has compiled of the military operations in Italy from 1915 to 1918, will at length give English readers an opportunity to understand the exceptional difficulties of the war on the Alpine front. The author has qualities which few others possess to be an interpreter of Italy to the British, or of Britain to the Italians, both because he has the rare advantage of being completely bilingual and because circumstances have enabled him to acquire an intimate knowledge of the temperament of two peoples so essentially different, and yet so ready, as experience has repeatedly shown, to appreciate each other's virtues. Such a volume as this, the matter of which is drawn from authoritative sources, is valuable for two reasons. Firstly, because there has as yet been no other book in English which gives a complete picture of the war in Italy as a whole. And secondly, because until after Caporetto had led to active co-operation between the allied forces our people, following hour by hour the fortunes of their own armies on the western front, were able to give relatively little attention to a detailed study of the arduous campaign in which our ally was engaged. The treaties which enabled the union of Italy to be achieved, made her mistress of the northern plains and the foothills of the Alps, but left the new kingdom under the continual menace of the mountain posts held by her hereditary enemy. The story of the sacrifices entailed by the desperate struggle to secure and retain a foothold in the mountain ring, of the unremitting conflict on the exposed and rocky Carso, and of the eleven battles of the Isonzo is little known to the majority of our countrymen. Nor have they probably ever had occasion to reflect what it meant to the men of southern Italy, unfamiliar with the rigours of an Alpine climate, to have to accustom themselves to new conditions of life at the edge of and even beyond the snow line. When in December, 1917, some of our divisions arrived in Italy, and could survey the scene of action with their own eyes, the whole army had been withdrawn to the line of the Piave, a far less inhospitable battleground, and indeed, a relatively pleasant one as compared with the country in which the earlier phases of the war were staged. Moreover, after the final Austrian assault on the new line had been checked and eventually repulsed, a long period of comparative inactivity ensued before the Italian advance in October, 1918, which led to the crowning victory of Vittorio Veneto and the Armistice. Signor Villari has devoted little space, one chapter only, to the events antecedent to Italy's entry into the world's war which have been amply dealt with in other works. He is really only concerned with her military contribution to the united effort of the allies. From this he rarely allows himself to deviate, as he does in a brief but welcome picture of the King continuously at the front throughout the whole two and forty months, living the simple life of a soldier among his people. For the same reason he only refers incidentally to one of the gravest preoccupations of those grim years, the uncertainties and delays in the regular supply of coal and indispensable material to a country entirely dependent on external resources, and at that time from

force of circumstances as insular in character as our own. The feats of engineering accomplished in carrying roads and aerial-wire lines into lofty gorges, till then only known to the sparse inhabitants of those Alpine valleys, can only be realized by those who actually saw these remarkable improvisations, and even Signor Villari's book will hardly help readers to form a real impression of the obstacles which had to be surmounted. But of the long and gallant struggle maintained against an army reckoned among the most efficient and best prepared in Europe ; of the tenacity with which assaults were renewed on apparently impregnable positions, carried, lost again, and once more retaken ; of the wonderful recovery of a broken and retreating army, and of the final advance to victory, they will read with interest and admiration. They will also, I think, appreciate the frankness with which mistakes and miscalculations are admitted by the author, and his eminent desire to be fair. He has avoided entering directly into contentious matter. At the same time, in summarizing in a brief appendix the respective sacrifices of the three chief allied European powers, he would probably not disclaim an intention of delicately suggesting that the tremendous effort made by the youngest and the poorest of them did not perhaps receive due credit in certain quarters. In the after-study of great historic events, our appreciations may be assisted by posing the hypothetical "if". Had Italy not entered the war on the side of the allies and forthwith engaged some twenty Austro-Hungarian divisions; had she not after the defection of Russia held up almost the whole military power of the dual monarchy, some fifty to sixty divisions, on the Isonzo and the Piave; had it been possible to transfer such a vast accession of manhood power to the western front, could the cause of the allies have prevailed against the sheer weight of numbers? That she did, at the cost of the lives of fourteen per cent of her mobilized sons, detain through good and evil days, and finally disperse that formidable fighting machine in the battle of Vittorio Veneto, marks the debt which we owe to a greathearted and lovable people. RENNELL RODD.

CONTENTS 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. INTRODUCTION THE OUTBREAK OF THE WORLD WAR ITALY'S INTERVENTION THE FIRST MONTHS ISONZO-ASIAGO GORIZIA FROM THE SEVENTH TO THE NINTH ISONZO BATTLES 1917 - SPRING AND SUMMER THE BAINSIZZA CAPORETTO I - THE ANTECEDENTS CAPORETTO II - THE BATTLE THE RECOVERY RECONSTRUCTION JUNE 1918 THE ITALIAN TROOPS ON THE WESTERN FRONT THE ITALIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE IN MACEDONIA THE ITALIAN TROOPS IN ALBANIA VITTORIO VENETO THE ARMISTICE Appendix

INTRODUCTION It is a notorious fact that the complete history of the various wars of the past has taken many decades to write, and that many points concerning wars fought centuries ago are still matters of dispute among historians. The World War will be no exception to the rule. Although with the abundant material collected, much of which is already available for the student, the innumerable official records, and the many memoirs of the men who played a more or less important part in the struggle, it should be possible to acquire a fairly accurate idea of the course of that war and of its main features, yet there are phases and aspects of it, certain important elements bearing on its history, of which the knowledge possessed even by well informed people in this or that country, or in every country, is surprisingly inadequate. This ignorance not only renders the comprehension of the War as a whole and of its significance and its accompanying phenomena incomplete and lacking in perspective, but when it concerns the part played in it by some particular belligerent or a particular front, it is apt to produce a state of feeling in other countries not conducive to good international understanding. Much of the unfriendliness between peoples who collaborated and suffered for a great cause is indeed due to the ignorance and incomprehension of each other's efforts. The above remarks are particularly applicable to the part played by Italy, and to her contribution towards the common victory. That contribution was not only important, but essential, as without Italy's intervention the Entente would have had far greater difficulty and required a far longer time to win the War, even admitting that in those circumstances victory would have been achieved. Yet Italy's effort is, to a large extent, ignored in the other countries with which she was allied in the War, although paradoxically enough it is now more adequately and equitably appreciated in ex-enemy countries, where some competent military writers appear to have realized the importance of the part played by Italy better than writers in allied countries. There are many reasons for this. In Great Britain and the United States a vast war literature has grown up which naturally deals with the War from the British and American points of view, and concerns the course of events on the Western Front, and, to a lesser extent, in Macedonia, Palestine and Iraq. The equally vast French war literature equally naturally deals almost exclusively with the fighting in France, and French books are generally accessible to the British and American public, both because the number of Anglo-Saxons who can read French is considerably larger than that of those who read other foreign languages, and because all the more important French books have been translated into English. It should be added that most French war historians, owing to the various political disagreements which have arisen between their own country and Italy since the Armistice, make a point of systematically ignoring Italy's achievements, and in some cases of deliberately belittling and misrepresenting them, although there are of course some honourable

exceptions. Even the principal German books on the War have been translated into English, and the ones selected for translation (and this, too, is natural) are those dealing with the Western Front, as being of greater interest to the Anglo-Saxon public. On the other hand, the Italian war literature is a closed book to the immense majority of English readers, not only because those who understand Italian are comparatively few, but also because hardly a single Italian war book has been translated into English, not even such animportant work as the late Field-Marshal Cadorna's memoirs. Nor have the various German and Austrian books on the War on the Italian Front appeared in an English guise. 1 If it is, as I said, comprehensible that the English-speaking public should be more interested in the history of the War in those areas where the bulk of the British and American armies were engaged, it is, I feel convinced, desirable that the dramatic story of the War on the Italian Front should be better known and the immense effort made by Italy more adequately understood, in order that the history of the War in general may be grasped and justice done to the Italian people. Among the English books on the War John Buchan's "History of the War" deals appreciatively with Italy's achievements, and so do William McClure's excellent articles in the Encyclopedia Britannica. There are also some volumes of memoirs by British officers who served on the Italian Front, and realized the importance and difficulty of Italy's task, notably one by Mr. Dalton, entitled "With British Guns in Italy", and George Trevelyan's "Scenes from Italy's War". But these writers are either concerned with a limited aspect of the subject or are writing of the War as a whole and only devote a comparatively small amount of space to the events of the Italian Front. Other writers show a tendency to stress the importance of the contribution of the British units in Italy, and although the value of those forces was considerable and is fully realized by Italian opinion, their action was not, and indeed could not, be decisive, owing to the small numbers of the forces in question. Nor is it realized in Great Britain that the part played by Italian units on other fronts than that of Italy was very important; and far less is known about it than about the action of British and French forces in Italy. The late Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson's otherwise valuable memoirs contain certain passages on Italy so full of malice and ignorance that they can only be excused on the ground that they were written without reflection. There are some other English books dealing incidentally with the War in Italy which are frankly comic, such, for instance, as Wickham Steed's "Through Thirty Years", or Sir Campbell Stuart's "Secrets of Crewe House", but these, of course, need not be taken seriously. The War in Italy, moreover, presents many peculiar features which make it wholly different from that on other fronts. Its history may appear somewhat disjointed and confused, but this is due to the extremely broken nature of the ground on which
1 The Italian public is better informed about the War on the Western Front because most Italians read French and most of the important English and German war books have been translated into Italian or French. 6

it was fought, whereby the operations were split up into innumerable small actions in separate sectors, cut off from each other. The general lines tend to be blurred, except in a few great battles such as Gorizia, Caporetto, the Piave and Vittorio Veneto. It was these features of the ground which made the task of the Italians so incredibly hard. During the first twenty-nine months of the War, except on the very short stretch on the extreme southern end of the line, the fighting was almost wholly among the mountains, usually in altitudes 1,000 metres above the sea, to a large extent above 2,000, and in some places above 3,000. After Caporetto the total length of the line was reduced from 640 kilometres to 440; but even then the greater part of the line was still in the mountains, and the rest along an unfordable river. For these reasons I have thought it of interest to publish the following summary of the history of the War as it was fought by Italy for the common cause. I do not pretend to have produced an original work, nor to make sensational revelations. I have merely told the plain story to English-speaking readers, and if it contributes to improve good feeling between Italy and the Anglo-Saxon peoples, my work will not have been in vain. I have purposely not dealt with the naval operations, which would have filled another volume, but limited myself to recounting certain episodes which had a direct bearing on military operations. It is for tihis reason that I have not dealt with the admirable actions carried out by the Allied fleets in the Adriatic, particularly by the British ships and trawlers, because they were of a primarily naval character with naval objects, and have only mentioned those actions designed to collaborate with the military operations in Italy or Albania. In preparing this book I have had generous assistance and advice from many quarters, but I wish particularly to acknowledge that extended to me by Colonel Giachi, of the Historical Section of the Italian General Staff, who allowed me to make use of the valuable library of the Staff Corps, by Major Amedeo Tosti, who helped me directly in many ways and from whose books and essays on the history of the War I have, with his permission, made considerable use, by Mr. William McClure, of (he British Embassy in Rome, who was Times correspondent on the Italian Front, by Colonel Harold Stevens, R.A., who kindly collected the military terms, and by the librarian of the Imperial War Museum, an institution containing a collectin of books Indispensable for anyone wishing to study the history of the war on any front. Above all, I wish most cordially to thank Sir Rennell Rodd, the author of the Foreword to this volume, not so much for the flattering remarks which he has been good enough to make about myself, as for the warm appreciation which he shows for the efforts and achievements of the Italian Army and people during the War. Every Italian will feel that he has incurred yet another debt of gratitude towards Sir Rennell Rodd, who has thus added one more to the many services he has rendered to Italy. For the illustrations I am indebted to Biblioteca del Risorgimento of Rome, whose librarian kindly had the photographs selected reproduced with permission to make use of them. The sketch maps were prepared for me by Sig. Guglielmo Laurenti.

THE OUTBREAK OF THE WORLD WAR On the outbreak of the World War the first countries involved were Serbia, Montenegro, Belgium, Russia, France, Great Britain and Japan on one side, Germany and Austria on the other. Italy, Turkey, Bulgaria, Rumania, Greece, the United States and sundry minor countries who afterwards also intervened, were then still neutral, while several other Powers remained neutral to the end. Of the Powers neutral in August, 1914, the one on which attention was at once most closely focussed and which both sides were most anxious to secure as an ally was Italy. The reasons for this concentration of attention on Italy are obvious. Italy was the largest and most important of the European neutrals, had the most powerful army and the only navy not yet involved in the struggle, and by her geographical position she was able to strike either east or west; she could therefore cause the balance of military success to drop on the one side or the other if she decided to intervene herself. The feelings of the Italian people on the outbreak of hostilities were at first very mixed. Italy had for thirty years been the Ally of the Central Powers in the Triple Alliance, and had also had many causes of disagreement with France; indeed, her entry into the Triplice had been largely inspired by the necessities arising out of those disagreements; Italy's commercial relations with Germany were also very intimate, especially after the outbreak of the tariff war with France in the last years of the nineteenth century. Nor had Italy any particular desire to see France's Ally, Russia, expanding into the Mediterranean and possibly the Adriatic. But towards Austria-Hungary Italian feeling had never been friendly, and the alliance had in this case, even more than in that of Germany, been merely a manage de convenance. Italian unity had only been achieved after three wars against Austria, hatred of Austria was traditionally ingrained in the Italian people, and Austria continued to dominate and tyrannize over several provinces inhabited by highly civilized Italian communities or by peoples which, if the Italian and Slav elements were mixed, the civilization was essentially Latin and Italian. Austria continued to remain a menace to Italian security in spite of the Alliance, to arm against Italy, to fortify the frontiers of the Trentino and the Venezia Giulia, to cover the border area with a network of strategic roads and railways. The authorities egged on the German and the Slav inhabitants of the frontier provinces against the local Italians, and even hinted at the possibility that Austrian rule might be extended beyond the then existing frontiers. The extreme Clericalism of the Hapsburgs and of the Imperial and Royal Government was another cause of Italo-Austrian dissension, and the Austrian bigots professed to regard Italy as a sacrilegious Power because she had wrested Rome from the Papacy. The Emperor-King, Francis Joseph, never visited King Humbert in his own capital to return the Italian King's visit to Vienna lest he offend the Pope by officially recognizing Italy's right to the Eternal City. The Archduke Francis Ferdinand was ever inspired by the most uncompromising hatred of Italy. Many of the leading military men in Austria-Hungary were simply itching to attack Italy, and General

(afterwards Field-Marshal) Conrad von Hotzendorff more than once proposed a "preventive war" against her, and if the Emperor-King and the Heir to the Throne would not agree to the scheme it was because they thought it inopportune rather than because they felt any sympathy for Italy. Moreover, the Central Powers by the manner in which they had brought about the outbreak of war had definitely violated the terms of the alliance with Italy, inasmuch as they had deliberately committed an act of aggression, prepared warlike action against Serbia, and were about to occupy a part of the Balkans without consulting Italy. Finally, there was a supplementary agreement whereby Italy was not bound to intervene on the side of her Allies if Great Britain should be ranged in the opposite camp, and this situation had now arisen. Independently of treaty obligations, friendship with Great Britain was as traditional in Italy as antipathy for Austria. For all these reasons Italy was both legally and morally free to intervene on the side of her partners in the Triple Alliance or to remain neutral or to take such other action as she might deem necessary for the defence of her interests and the realization of her national aspirations 1. Public opinion in Italy was from the first divided as to the policy to be followed, and this division did not disappear even after she had actually intervened in the War, although then it assumed a different aspect. For decades the Italian people had been taught by their political leaders that war was a thing of the past, or at all events that it was a luxury which only wealthy States could indulge in and not a poor country like Italy. Many Italian statesmen, imbued with this inferiority complex, advocated peace at any price, and could not conceive that circumstances should ever arise in which Italy must have recourse to arms. The Socialists, who rejected the notion of patriotism, were ready to give up all the Italian colonies and even perhaps a part of the national territory, rather than defend them by force of arms, not from any love of peace, but for fear lest a war against a foreign nation might arouse patriotic feelings among the masses and distract them from class war and revolutionary activity. Other political groups, especially those under the leadership of Giovanni Giolitti, who for many years had been omnipotent in Italian political life, were averse to war because they had no confidence in the Italian people and did not believe that it could bear up against the hardships, dangers and terrible sacrifices which war entailed; most of these politicians were probably quite sincere in this attitude, which had been engendered by their lack of contact with the deeper currents of Italian thought, and above all by their failure to appreciate the change produced by the Nationalist movement in the early years of the century, a movement which affected a far wider stratum of public opinion than the actual numbers of those who called themselves Nationalists would warrant. It was a movement outside Parliament and Parliamentary politics, and indeed a reaction against all that Parliament and the politicians associated with it stood for. Then of course there were numbers of persons of all parties and no party who dreaded the idea of war simply on account of the suffering
1 Even Prince von Bulow, in his memoirs, exonerates Italy from the charges of faithlessness to her Allies for not having marched with them in August, 1914. 9

and discomfort and pecuniary loss which it would entail on themselves: not a very noble state of feeling, and one common to large classes in all countries, but which in Italy was more openly expressed in consequence of the teachings of the then predominant politicians and political groups. There were, however, some men who advocated intervention on the side of the fellow-Allies of the Triplice, and, although few in numbers, they were not without influence, owing to the positions they held. A part of the officers of the Army (fewer in the Navy), and a small number of political men and diplomats, men who had been brought up in the atmosphere of the Triple Alliance and could not conceive of an Italy outside or independent of it. This was the mentality of men such as Senator Bollati, then Italian Ambassador in Berlin, and formerly Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, of Sig. Fusinato, ex-Under-Secretary in the same department, and who was actually driven to insanity and suicide by what he regarded as Italy's defection, and to a less extent of the late Duke of Avarna, then Ambassador in Vienna1. Even among the Nationalists there were a few who, feeling instinctively from the first that Italy could not remain neutral to the end without forfeiting her position as a great Power and renouncing all hopes of ever completing her national unity and playing a worthy part in world politics, saw no other course of action than intervention on the side of the Central Powers. This attitude was merely an aspect of the reaction against pacificism at any price, but it was shared by only a very small section of the Nationalists, who were soon drawn into the pro-Entente interventionist current inspiring the rest of the party. A far larger section of public opinion, independently of party, felt an instinctive repugnance at the thought of intervention on behalf of the Central Powers, both because the motives which had inspired those Powers to provoke Armageddon appeared objectionable and aggressive in themselves, and because Italy's historic tradition and her century-old conflict with Austria could not be easily forgotten. Had the men then at the head of the Government been as convinced Triplicists as Senator Bollati they might perhaps have brought the country round to the idea of the necessity of intervention on the side of the Central Powers, although they would have also produced a deeper division in public opinion than did the course eventually followed. But the Cabinet was not Triplicist. The Premier, Sig. Salandra, and his colleagues, especially the Marquis di San Giuliano, Sig. Orlando and Ferdinando Martini, believed from the first that a Triplicist policy was contrary to the interests of the nation and to the feelings of the great majority of the people. Had the casus foederis arisen Italy might have been drawn into the war on the side of the Central Powers from a sense of moral obligation and of a debt of honour; but hardly any Italian, not even Giolitti, who was certainly more Triplicist than Ententophil, took that view, and the documents subsequently published have proved that the opposite view held by the majority was the right one. This being the situation, the declaration of Italian neutrality announced by the
1 In justice to Avarna it must be said that he loyally carried out his instructions in the letter and the spirit, even when they did not coincide with his own views. 10

Government was received with a sense of profound relief throughout the country, and it was felt that Antonio Salandra and the Marquis di San Giuliano, in assuming the responsibility for that declaration, and it was no light one, had deserved well of their country1. When on August 4 Great Britain declared war on Germany the relief was accentuated a thousandfold, although the public did not then know of the clause in the Triple Alliance Treaty concerning British intervention. In the Entente countries of course Italy's neutrality aroused great enthusiasm. M. Delcasse, the French Foreign Minister, in an interview published in the Corriere della Sera of August 27, 1914, declared that the Allied Powers would not oppose Italy's aspirations. The Marquis di San Giuliano, who as Minister of Foreign Affairs, was, together with the Prime Minister, Sig. Salandra, chiefly responsible for Italy's decision to remain neutral, died on October 16, and Salandra himself temporarily took charge of the Consulta, while retaining the Premiership. But a few weeks later he invited Baron Sidney Sonnino to enter the Cabinet as Minister of Foreign Affairs, an office which he was to hold under three successive Premiers until the fall of the Orlando Cabinet in June, 1919. On December 3 Sig. Salandra declared in the Chamber of Deputies that Italy "had vital interests to safeguard, just aspirations to affirm and sustain, a situation as a great Power not only to keep intact, but to protect against any relative reductions as a result of the possible enlargement of other Powers". This clearly alluded to the clause in the Triple Alliance Treaty entitling Italy to compensation should Austria extend her territorial possessions in the Balkans, and the conception here outlined was to inspire Italy's negotiations with the Central Powers. "Our neutrality", he added, "must therefore not be impotent, but formidably armed and ready for all eventualities". Italy's decision to remain neutral was indeed of immense value to the Entente Powers; it was indeed Italy's first contribution to the common victory. It is easy to realize this by a consideration of the French military position at the time. If the greater part of the French Army was concentrating on the N.E. and E. frontiers, there were between 200.000 and 300.000 men and many batteries of artillery on the Italian frontier and the Mediterranean Litoral to guard against a possible Italian attack in cooperation with the Central Powers. But as soon as Italy's declaration of neutrality was announced these forces were withdrawn and sent to strengthen the Armies deployed against Germany. Had Italy declared war on France or even maintained a doubtful attitude, not only would those troops have had to remain in the south, but France, with her communications with her North African colonies menaced, would have found it very difficult to summon her numerous coloured troops to her aid. The forces on the German and Belgian frontiers who, as it was, held their own with such great difficulty against the onrush of the German avalanche and had indeed to evacuate a considerable amount of territory to the invaders, might well have been swept out of existence; but it is idle to speculate on the might have beens, beyond asserting the undoubted fact that Italy's neutrality was a powerful factor in the winning of the battle
1 The then Counsellor of the German Embassy in Rome assured the writer, just before the British declaration of war, that Italy's declaration of neutrality had secured that of Great Britain! 11

of the Marne and consequently of the war1. Once Italy had declared her neutrality the question which everyone was asking was no longer whether she would intervene on behalf of the Entente or of the Central Powers or remain neutral; the choice, in the minds of the great majority of the Italians, lay between the first and last of these courses. That public feeling was predominantly on the side of the Entente, even in those circles which were not yet favourable to intervention, is shown by the formation of bands of volunteers who went to fight on the French side. Early in November, 1914, the Italian legion, four battalions strong, first came under fire in the Argonnes, and in January one of its officers, Bruno Garibaldi, son of Ricciotti Garibaldi and grandson of the great Garibaldi, was killed in a bayonet charge; a few days later his brother Costante also fell in action, while four other brothers fought in the same unit. Ricciotti himself was too old and infirm to fight in 1914, but he had fought for France already in 1871 under his father, who, magnanimously forgiving the French siege of Rome in 1849 and Mentana in 1867, had commanded a legion of Italian volunteers in the FrancoPrussian war; at Dijon the legion had captured the flag of the 61st Prussian Regiment, the only Prussian colours captured in that war. Not a single Italian volunteered to fight for Germany or Austria. During the whole period of Italian neutrality, a neutrality which was gradually becoming ever more favourable to the Entente and approaching intervention on that side, Austria-Hungary, whose armies were at first concentrated on the Russian and Serbian fronts, had to send an ever increasing number of divisions towards the Italian frontiers, divisions which otherwise would have gone to reinforce the armies fighting against Russia and Serbia, or even to join the Germans in France. Here again one may speculate as to what would have been the effects on the general course of the War if these extra Austro-Hungarian forces had not been concentrated in the Venezia Giulia and the Trentino. In the years preceding the War Germany and Austria had professed to regard Italy as an inferior partner in the Triple Alliance, useful no doubt, especially after the conclusion of the Franco-Russian Alliance, but of second-rate quality, of poor moral and military value and unreliable 2. Sig. Salandra, in his work on Italian neutrality 3, writes that the sinister Herr von Holstein, in advocating the conclusion of the Triplice, said to the Austrian Ambassador: "It is a question, not of a lasting alliance, but of securing a force of mercenary auxiliaries, like the Lanxknechts of the Middle Ages". German and Austrian political and military men never took the trouble to hide their contempt for Italy and her army and navy. But as soon as war appeared an imminent probability the German Government became alarmed at the possible hostility of Italy and began to insist that Austria should at all costs compose her quarrel with the
1 Prince von Bulow states in his Memoirs that "Italy's declaration of neutrality gave France the enormous advantage of being able to withdraw from the Southern Alps all the troops deployed along the Italian Frontier, and throw them against Germany. This prepared the situation for the battle of the Marne". (Italian edition. Vol. II, p. 171) 2 Pribram, "Les traites politiques secrets de l'Autriche-Hongrie, 1897-1914. Le secret de la Triple Alliance", Paris, 1923 3 "La neutralit italiana", p. 90 12

former Power concerning the compensation to which it was entitled under the terms of the Triple Alliance Treaty. On July 27, when the situation had become extremely grave, the German Ambassador in Vienna implored Count Berchtold, as a personal request from the Emperor William and of Herr von Jagow, "for God's sake (um Gottes Willen) to settle the dispute with Italy" which was jeopardizing the whole of Germany's military action. It is said that Berchtold's reply was to the effect that Germany might secure peace with France by restoring Alsace-Lorraine. While the Austrian Government was absolutely opposed to the idea of giving Italy any satisfaction, either before the actual outbreak of war or after it during the period of Italian neutrality, some of the most eminent soldiers of the Dual Monarchy did not fail to realize, when face to face with the crisis, that Italy might well become a menace to the very existence of their country. Field-Marshal Conrad had, as we have seen, repeatedly insisted on the necessity of a preventive war against Italy while she was weak, as otherwise she would attack Austria as soon as she felt strong enough to do so. Conrad's idea, from the point of view of his own mentality and in the atmosphere of the pre-war period, was logical, for Italy did represent a danger for the Austro-Hungarian Empire. But she was such a danger because the policy of persistent hostility on the part of that Empire had made her an enemy and kept the old Irredentist spirit ever alive and an important factor in Italian political life. Italy's declaration of neutrality produced a profound and disastrous impression in Germany and Austria, and both Powers were determined that if, as they felt absolutely confident would be the case, they won the war, they would make Italy pay dearly for her defection. In Vienna it created at first almost a panic, and rumours of an imminent attack by Italy were widely circulated, so much so that Conrad sent S.O.S. messages to Berlin imploring German assistance, and General Freytag von Loringhofen, German liaison officer at the Austro-Hungarian G.H.Q., had to reassure him and promise German support if the Italian attack should materialize. Germany understood the danger of Italian hostility to the Central Powers better even than Austria, and she at once set to work to bring pressure to bear on Italy to induce her to abandon her neutrality and march with her old Allies, and later, when that course appeared obviously impossible, to obtain that she should at least not intervene on the side of the Entente, but remain neutral to the end of the war. This pressure was of a two-fold nature; on the one hand Germany attempted to attract Italy by offering her bribes to do as she was told, but bribes at the expense of other Powers. Nice, Savoy, Corsica and Tunis to be wrested from France, the Trentino and perhaps Istria, which Austria was to be induced to give up (there never was any question of Trieste, which was not only Austria's only great seaport, but was regarded by Germany as in a sense a port of her own, her window on to the Mediterranean); and on the other hand by thinly veiled threats as to what would be her fate if she did not remain at least benevolently neutral. One of these threats, as Sig. Salandra recounts, was that the German Government might be forced by the powerful Centre Party to provide for the restoration in some form of the Temporal Power of the Papacy. It should be added that the Papacy never lent itself to intrigues of this sort. By threatening Italy Germany showed her usual lack of psychological

13

insight, for her menaces only irritated public opinion as a whole and stiffened antiGerman feeling in pro-Entente circles. The rumours sedulously spread abroad that a large part of the German Army was kept inoperative so as to be ready to fall on Italy if she dared act in a manner hostile to the Central Powers, and that the atrocities committed by the Germans in Belgium and France would be as nothing compared with what they would do when they invaded Italy, produced effects contrary to those which were intended. The pressure which Germany brought to bear on Austria to induce her to make some concession to Italy was based on the terms of the Triple Alliance. In view of the extension of Austrian rule in the Balkans, which the attack on and invasion of Serbia would entail, no one for a moment believed in Austria's professions that her occupation was only to be a temporary military measure. At the same time AustriaHungary, not being in any sense a unified national State, but a hotchpotch of rival races, nationalities and creeds, might easily have given up some portion of her outlying territories without feeling that she was cutting off a piece of her own flesh or breaking up her national unity. Subsequently, under the pressure of Germany and in view of the course of events, she made some half-hearted promises full of mental reservations; she only suggested that she might grant a small part of what Italy was asking for and was prepared to make even that concession only after the end of the war. But the Emperor-King and his Ministers were extremely reluctant to give up even the smallest fragment of territory which was regarded almost as the private property of the Habsburgs. One of the arguments for rejecting any cession of territory in the Trentino was that one of the Emperor's titles was that of "Count of Tirol", and that the Trentino was part of that county. At the same time Austria-Hungary, as appears from a statement made by the late Count Tisza, was determined after the war to break any promises which she might be induced to make to Italy and refuse to hand over such territories as she undertook to give her1. Sig. Salandra and Baron Sonnino refused to consider the German offers at the expense of France, but they could not reject the proposed concessions by Austria off hand. They felt that they would not be justified in plunging the country into the awful holocaust of war until all hope of completing Italian independence in some other way was lost. In spite of Austria's reluctance to make any concession to Italy's demands, there was a general conviction even in official circles that if Italy did join the Entente the Dual Monarchy was doomed. As the interventionist movement gathered momentum Germany sent Prince von Bulow as special Ambassador to Italy 2, and Austria sent Baron Macchio in a similar capacity to supersede the insolent and contemptuous Merey von Kaposmerc, and make a last attempt to keep Italy out of the war. In March, 1915, Austria made a first more or less definite offer to Italy; she was prepared to hand over the Trentino as far as a line immediately to the north of Trento, in exchange for Italy's benevolent neutrality, a free hand for herself in the Balkans and with the understanding that no more territories were to be demanded by
1 This is confirmed by Baron Macchio, the last Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to Italy, who speaks of the "momentary" concessions to be made. 2 He was chosen on account of his Italian aristocratic connections, his wife being a daughter of Donna Laura Minghitti by her first husband, Prince Camporeale. 14

Italy whatever further acquisitions Austria might effect. Italy rejected this offer as wholly inadequate, as no cessions in the Venezia Giulia were made. On May 10 Baron Burian1 improved her original offer by extending it to the whole of the Trentino and to the linguistic frontier on the east so as to include Cormons, but not Gorizia; Trieste was to be a free city and the island of Pelagosa to become Italian; the last two proposals if accepted were to be carried out at once, while the union of territories in the Trentino and the Venezia Giulia would not be effected until after the end of the war2. These concessions, even if loyally carried out, which we now know Austria had no intention of doing, would have been but a partial and incomplete solution, leaving many serious problems concerning the Italo-Austrian frontiers and the Irredentist question unsettled and fruitful sources of future dispute. The real reason at the back of the minds of the Austrian statesmen and soldiers in their reluctance to arrive at a satisfactory understanding with Italy was that they wished to retain a frontier enabling the Austrian armies to invade Italy at any moment, whereas Italy demanded one which offered no encouragement to aggression on either side. In the meanwhile Italy had been also negotiating with the Entente3 as to the possible conditions on which she would be prepared to intervene on that side, and when the above-mentioned Austrian offer was made and agreement with the other group had already been concluded in the shape of the Treaty of London of April 26, 1915, Giolitti's attempt to bring about the fall of Salandra and the acceptance of the Austrian offer broke down before an outburst of national indignation, voiced to a large extent by Benito Mussolini's organ, the Popolo d'Italia, and Italy went to war on May 24. The terms which Italy had asked for and obtained from the Entente as a condition of her intervention deserve examination as they were to have a deep influence on the course of subsequent events both during and after the War, especially in view of the attempt repeatedly made by the other signatories of the Treaty of London to go back on their undertakings. Italy desired in the first place to complete her national unity by annexing the districts inhabited by a population wholly or predominantly Italian or with a definitely Italian tradition and civilization, and still under Austrian bondage, viz. the Trentino, Trieste, Gorizia-Gradisca, Istria and Dalmatia. Secondly, it was imperative that she should secure a satisfactory frontier which could be easily defended; Italy had not wished for facilities to attack her neighbours, but was determined to be rid of the incubus of Austrian aggression represented by the iniqui confini established in 1866. Hence, in addition to the Trentino, she asked for the Alto Adige, in order to extend her frontier to the Brenner watershed, and besides the purely Italian districts beyond her then north-east frontier, the whole area up to the crest of the Julian Alps including some Slav and some mixed Italo-Slav districts. These, and certain other requests concerning Albania, the Near East and the
1 2 3 He had succeeded Count Berchtold as Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister in January, 1915. Austrian Red Book, N.178. These negotiations had begun, as Salandra proves, before Austria had made any definite offer, but had been shilly-shallying for months. 15

colonies in Africa which I need not go into here, were agreed to by Great Britain, France and Russia, except with regard to Dalmatia; the majority of the inhabitants of that province, although certainly not as large a one as was made out by the Austrian Government and the Slavs, were Croats and Serbs, and Russia, as the protector of all the Slavonic races, objected to their incorporation in Italy 1. Russia was indeed at one moment actually averse to Italy's intervention, as she wished to reserve the whole of the lands east of the Adriatic for her proteges, and failed to realize the necessity of that intervention, although she herself was in greater need of it than the other Allies. Finally a somewhat rough and ready compromise was effected whereby Northern Dalmatia, including the towns of Zara and Sebenico, was assigned to Italy and the southern part to Serbia and Montenegro. Fiume was not included in the Italian sphere, but assigned to Croatia; this provision shows that there was at that time no thought of the complete destruction of the Austro Hungarian Empire, for it was believed that that Power would continue to exist although shorn of its outlying territories, including Trieste and Istria, and would require some outlet to the sea, which could be supplied by Fiume; hence the clause providing that Fiume should be assigned, not to the Yugoslav State which did not then exist and of which no one had thought, but left to a still presumably Austro-Hungarian Croatia. Italy's demands for the annexation of the districts inhabited by Italian communities then under foreign yoke, for secure frontiers and for colonial areas where her growing population might expand, appeared eminently reasonable, and cannot in any way be described as evidence of the Imperialist tendencies and landgrabbing hunger of which she was afterwards accused less by her enemies than by her Allies in the War, who had themselves practised Imperialism on a vast scale and with great success. The Italian Government made the mistake of not including financial assistance among the conditions for her intervention. Although poorer than the other principal Allied Powers, all that she stipulated was that the British Government should assist Italy to float a loan for 50.000.000 on the London market, a mere fleabite for a war of such proportions. Subsequently she did secure further assistance when it was obvious that without it she could not carry on the war, and before some of the other ex-belligerents she began regularly to pay her debts to creditors who are, particularly the United States, immeasurably richer than she is, even though the loans were contracted for the purpose of purchasing war material and other supplies in the lending countries at exorbitant prices 2. On these conditions Italy undertook to throw the full weight of all her resources on land, on the sea and in the air into the common struggle.

At first Sazonoff had actually offered Italy the whole of Dalmatia, so anxious was he to secure her intervention, but later he went back on this offer. (See Salandra, "L'Intervento") 2 The profits made by the contractors and manufacturers in the United States on war material and other goods supplied to Italy are stated by American authorities to have been as high as 80 per cent. 1 16

ITALY'S INTERVENTION It has been stated that during the period of Italian neutrality a French diplomat said that Italy "voler au secours du vainqueur". Whether this spiteful falsehood was ever actually pronounced or not, there is no doubt that it expressed the sentimenls of a number of people in France and elsewhere, and is an indication of how completely Italy's policy and action have been misunderstood in many quarters, and misrepresented ever since the outbreak of the World War. In spite of Italy's subsequent intervention and the great sacrifices which she made for the common cause, the above-quoted sentence remained a mental slogan with a large section of public opinion, which was convinced that from August 1, 1914, to May 24, 1915, Italy "sat on the fence" waiting to see which side would win before deciding what action she was to take. A writer in the Revue des deux Mondes (May, 1925), M. d'Hauterive, in an article on the war of 1866 expressed more or less the same view, although in a less brutal form, when he asserted that "la victoire des autres assurait a l'Italie un bnfice. considrable, comme le fait s'etait deja produit, comme il devait se reproduire un demi siecle plus tard". Even those who do not indulge in these malevolent misinterpretations of history saw, or professed to see, in Italy's conduct only a grasping determination to extort the maximum benefit as the price of her intervention. On the contrary, Italy only demanded an absolute minimum of compensation for the immense risks she was running, and indeed failed on many points to advance demands which she might legitimately have made. Moreover, Italian intervention, far from awaiting a decision of the War favourable to the side into which she threw her lot, occurred at a most unpropitious moment for her Allies. It was clear that whatever decision Italy might eventually becalled upon to arrive at, she had of necessity to consider the possibility of intervention from the moment the World War broke out, and to take the necessary measures for the protection of her own interests and own security. The Army had been severely tried by the Libyan War, wherein a large part of its supplies and material had been used up, and Giovanni Giolitti, then Prime Minister and practically dictator of Italy, had omitted to replenish the stores. In spite of his great power, even when out of office, he was always afraid of arousing the wrath of the Extreme Left, and of being accused by them of wasting the country's resources on "unproductive expenditure", as it was then the fashion to define the military and naval budgets. His fear of the extremists had become such a habit with him that it continued even when their blustering threats of revolution if Italy did go to war against Turkey had failed to materialize. When Salandra became Prime Minister he inquired into the state of the army's supplies and was appalled at the deficiencies which came to light1. The number of men under arms in August, 1914, was larger than it would ordinarily have been owing to the circumstances which, in Italy, preceded the outbreak of the War. At that time the period of compulsory military
1 Antonio Salandra, "La neutralit"

17

service was two years, so that there were normally always two "classes" under arms1. But at the time, in addition to the classes of 1893 and 1894, those of 1891 and 1892, which should have been disbanded, had been retained with the colours on account of the continued resistance of the Arab tribes in Libya, even after peace with Turkey had been concluded in October, 1912, the revolutionary outbreak in the previous June, and the threat of renewed troubles by the extremists. The number of effectives consequently amounted to 14,000 officers and 284,000 men. After the outbreak of the War the classes of 1889 and 1890 were also called back to the colours, which brought the total up to six classes instead of the normal two. Although improvements had been effected in the Army during the years 19061914, it was by no means yet in a state of complete efficiency; an excessive number of youths of military age had been exempted from service, and those of the so-called third category, exempted by law from the normal two-years' service, although supposed to receive a short period of military training, had not received it, so that only thirteen classes could be counted on for active service in case of a general mobilization. The number of officers and N.C.Os. was inadequate, and the training of the ufficiali di complemento2 had been neglected. The field artillery was in process of transformation, being still partly armed with guns of an obsolete type; the heavy and medium artillery had few guns, ammunitions were scarce. The infantry was armed with only one machine-gun section per regiment, and the air force and mechanical transport services were in embryo. Uniforms and all other supplies were insufficient, and so were the transport animals. Immediately after the declaration of neutrality the Ministry of War set itself to the task of reorganizing the Army, replenishing the magazines and providing new artillery, so that Italy's neutrality should be, as the communiqu stated, "vigilant and armed". Let us now consider what was the general military situation when Italy entered the War on May 24, 1915. After the battles of the Marne and in Flanders, the War on the Western Front had become practically immobilized over a vast system of trenches throughout North-Eastern France, and the North-West corner of Belgium, from the English Channel to the Vosges. Marshal Joffre had held up the German advance towards Paris and the Channel ports, but not feeling able to attempt a vigorous counteroffensive against the invaders, he adopted the method of what he called grignoter (to wear out by attrition) the enemy by means of a series of minor actions over restricted areas, with limited objectives, such as the operations in Picardy, Artois and Champagne, in the late autumn of 1914. But these actions proved very costly, and if their objectives were limited their results were even more so, and the Allies were at least as much grignots as the Germans. On the Eastern Front, after the great battles of Tannenberg, the Masurian Lakes and Lemberg, fighting had continued uninterruptedly throughout the winter. The Russians had succeeded in repelling Field-Marshal von Hindenburg's third attack on Warsaw, and in March, 1915, attempted the passage of the Carpathians;
1 2 A military class consists of all the men attaining military age (20 years) in a particular year Men of education who had performed their ordinary military service, had been promoted officers after examination, served for three months as officers and then returned to civil life until called to the colours again 18

by the end of the month they had captured the great fortress of Przemysl, and were threatening Cracow and the passes into Hungary: one of the most vital and sensitive areas throughout the territories of the Central Powers. But if the winter appeared to have ended in a manner not unfavourable to the Entente, at the beginning of the spring the situation had decidedly changed for the worse. In the West the Germans had managed in April, by violent attacks accompanied by the use of poison gas on a large scale, to reduce the Ypres salient to a considerable extent, while the French offensive in Artois, which had been launched on May 9, secured only meagre results at the cost of heavy losses. Far more serious was the situation on the Eastern Front. Hindenburg, advancing in a northeasterly direction, recaptured Memel, occupied Libau, and got to within 50 kilometres of Riga. On May 1 five Austro-German armies attacked the Russians between Tarnow and Kolomea in Galicia, and Field-Marshal von Mackensen's famous phalanx broke through at Gorlice between Tarnow and Bartfeld; further to the north the Archduke Joseph had forced the passage of the Dunajetz river, and to the south General Bohm-Ermolli's Austrian Army drove the Russians from the Carpathian passes. The Russian armies were pushed back beyond the San, and Mackensen, after crossing that river on May 15, re-entered Yaroslav and then Przemysl, the capture of which by the Russians a few months previously had been one of their most notable successes. The Galician population, which had at first received the Russians as liberators from Austrian thraldom, were now glad, after a few months' experience of Russian methods, and above all, of their religious propaganda in favour of Orthodoxy and their persecution of the Catholics, only too pleased to see them depart. The Austro-German advance was from now on a triumphal march, which was only held up in the late summer east of Warsaw, along the line from Kovno to Brest-Litovsk. The Russian armies had literally begun to crumple up, and in spite of the brilliant but ephemeral successes which they were afterwards to achieve, they never recovered their full driving power. They had indeed received a knock-down blow which marked the beginning of the end of Russia as an ally, and indeed as a civilized European Power, and her transit into the chaos of Asiatic barbarism. The Serbs, after a series of brilliant victories over the Austrians, had lapsed into inertia, and in spite of the urgent appeals of the French, Russian and British commands, and a personal message from the Tzar of Russia to King Peter, to attack the weak Austrian forces, which alone then held the area between the Save and Agram, at the moment when Italy was about to intervene, refused to budge 1. The Dardanelles expedition, which had been admirably conceived by Mr. Winston Churchill, but far less well Conducted both by sea and on land, appeared a pronounced failure; its withdrawal was inevitable and beginning to be discussed. In Bulgaria King Ferdinand and his Prime Minister, Radoslavoff, deaf to the appeals of Allied diplomacy and the call of race feeling and gratitude towards Russia and the memory of the "Tzar Liberator" 2, were preparing to throw in their lot with the Central
It is said that this refusal was due to the influence in the Army of the Secret Societies, who were opposed to any action likely to assist Italy. 2 After whom one of the principal boulevards of the capital is still named. 1 19

Powers; this policy was not inspired by innate wickedness, nor by particular sympathy for Germany or Austria, but by the hope of seeing the injustices of the Peace of Bucarest redressed and of realizing the dearest ambition of the whole Bulgarian people, viz. the annexation of Macedonia. Both the King and his Ministers believed that they had a better chance of achieving this result by joining the Central Powers, who had not only made them definite promises, instead of the vague possibilities hesitatingly suggested by the Entente, but appeared in a far stronger military position, and therefore more like to win the War. In Greece pro-German, or at all events neutralist, tendencies predominated, and the King and the General Staff were not friendly to, nor had confidence in the Allies. Rumania was still a very uncertain quantity. Thus the whole situation in April-May, 1915, was thoroughly unfavourable to the Entente, and there seemed no prospect of securing a victory in the near future. Many believed, in Italy and elsewhere, that the Central Powers would emerge victorious, while others hoped at best for a drawn game. Those who were really convinced that the Entente would prove victorious in the end were not numerous. It was at this moment that Italy finally decided to intervene on the side of the Entente. She had had many serious obstacles to overcome before she reached the point of intervention. In the first place there was the strong neutralist feeling of many leading political men, beginning with Giolitti, who, although not in office, was still as we have seen the dominant political figure in Italy and enjoyed the support of the majority of the Chamber and the Senate in whatever policy he elected to adopt. Then there was the perplexity of many Italians who, although they realized that it was Austria who had broken the terms of the Triple Alliance, hesitated before they felt they could definitely take sides against their former Allies, nor should the small, but vigorous, active and influential pro-German group be neglected. Above all, in the spring of 1915, the Italian public, unlike that of the belligerent countries in August, 1914, had fully realized what the horrors of war meant: not to the fighting men alone, but to the whole nation and understood that, even if the struggle were to end in a victory for the Entente, it was not going to be a few weeks' effort. Italy's declaration of neutrality had already, as we have pointed out, produced important consequences. The French General Staff recognized this at once, and the ex-French Ambassador in Rome recently admitted that that declaration had enabled G.H.Q. to transfer General d'Amade's six divisions, then in the South of France, to the Western Front. The German General, von Falkenhayn, writes that Italy's neutrality caused considerable hesitation in Austria and Germany as to the possibility of withdrawing Austrian troops from the Italian frontier area, and in fact, instead of withdrawing those troops, Field-Marshal Conrad subsequently decided to strengthen them by additional units, to the detriment of the operations on the Russian and Serbian fronts. In certain quarters it has been claimed that, owing to her inadequate military preparations in the spring of 1915, Italy's intervention, instead of proving a decisive factor, as it should have been, failed to be of much assistance to the Allied cause. As a matter of actual fact, valuable as Italian intervention was to be, it was not to be expected that it would secure immediate victory. What it did do from the first was to contribute to

20

restore the balance between the two belligerent groups which was then heavily weighted in favour of the Central Powers, and to prevent those Powers from developing an irresistible mass movement on any one of the Allied Fronts, and perhaps effecting a victorious breakthrough. In the early days of the War the Austrian positions in the Trentino and the Julian Alps were weakly held, but as Italian intervention appeared ever more probable they were gradually strengthened, so that by May, 1915, they were far from being practically undefended or held only by scratch forces, gathered together at haphazard. Critics of General Cadorna's strategy, even in Italy, have sometimes asserted that if he had attacked vigorously on the outbreak of the Italo-Austrian War, he might have penetrated far into enemy territory without difficulty, and perhaps achieved a complete victory and thus hastened the end of the War on all fronts. A careful examination of the facts and records fails to bear out this view. Conrad, in a letter to Baron Bolfras, the Emperor's A.D.C., on May 21, i.e. three days before Italy declared war, wrote: "Italy's perfidy has brought the fruits which I had for many years foreseen, and the flowers of which I had long wished to destroy. Then we should have been able to carry out such an undertaking with ease; to succeed now we need foreign help. You may well imagine how painful it is for me to realize the necessity of such help. We must bear in mind that an Italian offensive will have for its chief objective the valley of the Isonzo. All defensive measures have consequently been taken in that connection". Conrad was speaking the truth, and in fact for many months the defences of the Isonzo Front had been carefully prepared, while the Trentino Front, even easier to defend in view of its natural features, had been converted into a vast fortress many years before the war; every mountain and every essential vantage point bristled with guns, and was protected by elaborate fortifications with steelplated domes, and numerous military roads branched out in all directions, with interior lines of railway to feed them. From the outbreak of the World War, ten months before Italy's intervention, the Austro-Hungarian High Command had considered "the necessity of carefully studying the defences of the south-western frontiers of the Empire and of organizing them accordingly". General von Rohr was entrusted with the command of all the forces in that area, and instructed to take all the necessary measures. At first he did not have many troops at his disposal, nor were they of the highest quality, but consisted chiefly of march units, Landwehr battalions, volunteers, and labour formations of prisoners of war. But he devoted the greatest care to this force, and set himself to make the best use of such material as he had to hand. As for the defensive works carried out during the ten months of Italian neutrality, the Austrian official statements describe them eloquently; many hundreds of caverns had been dug out of the rocks (there were 300 of them in the Trentino alone), and the natural ones, very numerous in the Carso, had been utilized and exploited to the fullest extent, scores of kilometres of trenches had been excavated and were defended by vast networks of barbed wire, often 12 metres thick, block-houses had been erected, new roads and railways built -in a word, nothing had been neglected to create a complete and organic system of defence, unique in character, inasmuch as it had

21

been carefully prepared on the basis of the experience acquired on other fronts during the past months and undisturbed by hostile attacks while it was being created. On the Isonzo itself the defensive work was somewhat delayed, the AustroHungarian High Command being uncertain at first as to where the lines of resistance should be established. There was indeed one plan whereby the Italians were to be allowed, and even attracted, to advance as far as Laibach in Carniola, where they would have been attacked on the flank and in the rear by the forces concentrated in the Save and Drave valleys, consisting of three army corps, to which ten German divisions were to have been added, and thus completely annihilated. But the plan had to be abandoned as General von Falkenhayn, then Chief of theGerman General Staff, sceptical as he was as to its chances of success, refused to provide the German contingent which was a necessary part of it, and also because he was unwilling to immobilize so large a German force for an indefinite period. Moreover, as he himself stated, as long as Italy did not declare war on Germany he did not see any object in interrupting the Empire's communications with the outer world through Italy 1. As a matter of fact those communications were interrupted even while Italy was still technically not at war with Germany, but Falkenhayn, like other German authorities, hoped that some arrangement might be made to continue trading with and through Italy. Conrad had, therefore, to change his original dispositions, and on April 21 he ordered that "the passages across the Isonzo south of Tolmino be closed, and the defences along the western edge of the Carso organized". Before the end of the month the defensive works in the Isonzo sector were rapidly carried out, and by the middle of May the general commanding the Graz territorial area and General von Rohr were able to affirm that the whole line of defence was considerably strengthened. General Lukachich, who had been entrusted with the work on the Carso plateau, attests to the vigour and speed with which it had been executed2. The Archduke Eugene judged the Sabotino impregnable, and General Krauss, Chief of the Staff to Field-Marshal Boroevich, wrote that "from the first days of the war, instead of a hasty and partial occupation, and consequently of a not solid front, a first line of defence had been created by the will to resist absolutely, a line the garrison of which was determined not to give up by so much as an inch"3. On the Alpine sector operations had been conducted in very high altitudes, often amid deep snow, ice and blizzards, on the edge of dizzy precipices and deep gullies, where a false step meant being hurled down hundreds of feet, where peaks and positions could be held by a handful of men with a few machine-guns against whole brigades, and where stones dropped from great heights were as deadly as shrapnel or shell. The Carso Front was a howling wilderness of stones as sharp as knives, which tore the strongest boots to pieces and mangled the feet of the most hardened mountaineers, and where every shell which exploded had its deadliness multiplied tenfold by the fragments of rock added to the jagged edges
1 2 3 Falkenhayn, "Die oberste Heeresleitung" p. 82 Lukachich, "The Defence of Doberd", Budapest, 1918. A. Krauss, "The First Defence of the Isonzo" in Schwarte, "Der grosse Krieg"

22

of broken steel. There was no water except what was carried up in barrels on muleback. It is true that the Austrians also suffered from these same hardships, as the Archduke Joseph recounts in his grim description of "the hell of Doberd", but they at least enjoyed the advantage of the higher and better protected positions. The first phase of the operations on every other front was a war of movement. Only on the Austro-Italian Front were the enemy able to impose on the assailants the methods of warfare most favourable to themselves. From the very first weeks of the War the Italian Army had to face the relentless, deadly, and heartbreaking drudgery of a war of attrition.

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THE FIRST MONTHS The Italian Army and people entered the War with all the enthusiasm of the Risorgimento, the War of 1915-18 is indeed officially comprised among the campaigns of Italian Independence, and those who fought in it are entitled to the Independence Campaign medal. The troops poured across the Austrian frontier singing the war songs of 1848, 1859 and 1866. It seemed as though the old Garibaldian spirit, long dormant during the dreary decades of the uninspiring political life of the aftermath, had been aroused once more, although in war conditions very different from those of the campaigns of Garibaldi and La Marmora. Whatever were the causes which had brought about the decision taken by Salandra's Cabinet to intervene in the World War on the side of the Entente, popular imagination was stirred more than by any other motive by the Irredentist idea, the determination to liberate the Italian-speaking peoples of the Trentino and the Venezia Giulia from Austrian thraldom, and to punish the Austrians for their contempt for and their insults to the new Italy ever since the last Austro-Italian War. For close on fifty years Irredentism had been the dominant note of the foreign policy of the Italian people, as distinguished from that of the Government which was often inspired by other considerations. If the Irredentist feeling was particularly strong in Venetia and Lombardy, where the memories of Austrian oppression were still fresh, it was general over the rest of Italy as well. Trento and Trieste were ever names to conjure with from the Alps to Sicily. On the Austrian side the war against Italy was more popular than that on any other front. General von Cramon, representing the German G.H.Q. at that of Austria, writes : "The war against Italy was the best which Austria could fight. The German-Austrians ardently desired to send home the bleeding head of the hated Welsch, who thrust forward his rapacious hand towards the old German towns of Meran, Bozen, Brixen and Sterzing. The Kaiserjager and the Landesschiitzen in particular only fought halfheartedly on the other fronts from the day Italy declared war against the Danubian Monarchy. The Southern Slavs are no whit less bitter than the Germans in their hatred of the Italians . . . As for the Hungarians, in view of the memories of 1848 and 1866, a certain sympathy for the Italians was attributed to them; but these feelings had been entirely eliminated by Italy's treachery"1. The Austrian authorities counted particularly on the assistance of the Tirolese population, into whom for many decades a hatred of all things Italian had been sedulously instilled. After the outbreak of hostilities proclamations had been issued appealing to their "proved loyalty to the Sovereign" and to their "traditional patriotism". There had not, it is true, been any traditional hostility on the part of the Tirolese due to bitter memories of past persecution; such memories indeed were rather on the other side, for while Italian troops had never invaded nor occupied Tirol, except a few regiments in Napoleon's armies, in which the majority of the regiments were French and Bavarian, Tirolese units in the Austrian Army had for several
1 "Quatre ans au G.Q.G. austro-hongrois", p. 99

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decades occupied parts of Italy. But to the Tirolese the Italians had been systematically represented by the Austrian lay and ecclesiastical authorities, even in the days of the Triple Alliance, as cowards, brigands, and above all, as we have seen, sacrilegious criminals who had wrested from the Pope his legitimate sovereignty and deprived him of his liberty by keeping him a prisoner. This last offence to the extremely devout Tirolese Catholics was the most heinous of all. Even in Germany the bitter hatred of the Austrian people against Italy was counted on as an asset. "The long-nurtured indignation against the ally turned enemy broke out in high flames everywhere throughout the Danubian Empire", wrote General von Falkenhayn. "This was no doubt an advantage, as just indignation strengthened the power of resistance of the Austrian troops". But among the Germans themselves the feeling was not so bitter. In the first place relations between Italy and Germany had in the past never been very close, and there was consequently neither friendship nor hatred. Secondly, Italy did not at once declare war against Germany when she declared it against Austria, and for over a year the two countries were in a peculiar relation which was neither war nor peace. The Italo-Austrian frontier, as established in 1866, was unfavourable to Italy throughout almost the whole of its 600 kilometres. From the Ortler to the sea it stretched out in an immense S. The Trentino formed a salient into Italian and the Friuli a salient into Austrian territory, but the former was far more dangerous for Italy than the latter was for Austria. With the exception of the last 30 kilometres, from the point where the Isonzo debouches into the East Friuli plain and flows down to the sea, the line is wholly mountainous. The extreme western sector amid the high altitudes of the Ortler and Adamello groups made large scale operations impossible. The Garda, Val Lagarina (Adige valley) and Vallarsa sectors were less arduous, but still mountainous. Further east the chief heights were on Italian territory as far as the Val d'Assa, but the Austrians had created a powerful system of defensive works on the Folgaria and Lavarone plateaux within their own frontier. This area was a peculiarly vital one for Italy, for if the enemy did succeed in breaking through the Italian defences, they could descend into the rich Venetian plain, menace the important industrial centres of the country, and cut the armies in the Friuli from their base. Italy had consequently built fortifications in this zone. The danger of an irruption from the Trentino by these routes had been realized over a hundred years before when Eugene Beauharnais was fighting the Austrians in the Friuli, in many of the areas where the Italians were now to fight; but he was reassured by Napoleon, whose forces, with his Bavarian Allies, neutralized any possible Austrian move in the Tirol. Now, on the contrary, the Austrians had full liberty of movement, and Bavaria was for them a source of reinforcements and supplies instead of a hostile land. If the Trentino salient was a danger for Italy, an Italian break-through there would have had less serious consequences for Austria. Behind the first line of defence there were others, all in mountainous areas with range beyond range of mighty peaks, and however deep the Italians might penetrate there were no vital centres within striking distance. The Valsugana was another open road for invasion into the Venetian plain

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from Trento, strongly fortified both by the Austrians and the Italians. The Cadore sector was again in the high Alps, with passes and valleys between 2,000 and 3,000 metres above sea level amid sheer walls of rock and fantastically impervious peaks. All the best military positions were far more easily accessible from the Austrian than from the Italian side. The Austrians could be supplied by means of the road and railway through the broad Pusterthal running parallel to the front from Franzensfeste on the Brenner line to Villach on the Tarvis-Vienna line, and connected via the Glockner railway as well as the Brenner with Salzburg and Munich. In the Carnia the frontier followed the crest of the range, but here again the slopes on the Austrian side were gentler than those on the Italian side, and also easily accessible through the Gailthal running conveniently parallel to the frontier. From the east end of the Carnia the frontier ran roughly southwards to the sea. A formidable mountain bastion, with the Monte Nero1 at its highest point, dominated the upper Isonzo Valley on the east side, the frontier running west of the river. There were no pre-war fortifications here, but since August, 1914, the Austrians had created a powerful bridgehead at Tolmino on the left bank, with the advanced posts of Santa Maria and Santa Lucia on the right. Further south rises the Bainsizza plateau, the western edge of which drops almost sheer into the Isonzo, and at its eastern edge extends to the forest of Ternova. The next bridgehead was Gorizia. A pleasant little town on the heights to the east of the river, it had been a place of some historic importance in the past, and in more recent times a favourite resort for elderly Austrians, especially retired officers and civil servants. It constituted an admirable defensive position on account of the rugged hills by which it was surrounded, and the Austrians had created a formidable entrenched camp within the area. On the north it was defended by the three "saintly" mountains (those who afterwards fought on them regarded them as anything but saintly!), Monte Santo, San Gabriele and San Daniele, on the south by the Carso range, and on the west and north-west, beyond the river, by the Podgora - Sabotino bastion rising immediately above the river where it emerges from the Plava gorge. Between the heights of the Sabotino and the Podgora are the Oslavia and Peuma hills, and south of Podgora the Calvario (Hill 144) and Hill 240, above the village of Lucinico opposite Gorizia. Here were no permanent pre-war works, but an elaborate system of trenches and field defences of a most formidable nature, protected by broad barbed wire entanglements, had been created since August, 1914. South of Gorizia rises the Carso range, one of the wildest and strangest mountain systems in the world, a perfect wilderness of razor-like rocks with no streams or indeed water of any kind, mostly sterile and bare of vegetation, except for occasional well-like depressions known as doline, little patches of earth out of which the hardy and hardworking local peasantry earn a scanty living. Here and there are small stretches of woodland. Several rivers descend towards the Carso and are lost in its underground channels to emerge once more full grown a few miles from the sea. Other rivers running parallel to the Isonzo, further west, traverse the Friuli plain.
1 The Slav name is "Krn" i.e. crown, but from its similarity to "Crn" (black) it was translated into Italian as "Nero" 26

The plains of Venetia and the Friuli were covered by a network of good roads. But the Italian railway system was less complete than the Austrian. A main line ascends the Adige Valley from Verona, another crosses the plain from Verona to Venice and at Mestre divides into two branches, one towards the north-east to Udine and Tarvisio, and the other due east to Cervignano and Trieste. Two subsidiary lines run from Venice to the Cadore and the Valsugana, with a few other branches and connecting lines in between. All of these railways, except the ones from Verona to Venice and Venice to Casarsa, were single track lines. During the War a few new lines were built, notably one from Vicenza to Treviso and one from Udine to Palmanova, and several existing ones were double-tracked. The Italian plan of operations was to act on the defensive on the Trentino Front, where there were no important objectives to be secured, and to concentrate offensive operations on the Isonzo. This latter front offered the more important objectives of Trieste and Laibach; moreover, as General Cadorna points out1, the Italo-Austrian campaign being part of the general war, it was advisable to operate in a direction where there were possibilities of cooperation with the Allies: in the case of the Isonzo Front, with the Russians and the Serbs. At the same time, in view of the possibility of an Austrian offensive from the Trentino, it was indispensable so to conduct the operations on the Julian Front as to be able to transfer troops rapidly from east to west whenever the menace should show signs of materializing. Cadorna's plan was therefore to launch a general offensive on the Julian Front, and to conduct a strategic defensive action in the Trentino, with tactical offensives to improve the Italian position in the Cadore and possibly to cut the enemy communications in the Pusterthal and debouch into the Rienz and Drave valleys. With these objectives in view, the Italian Army was thus distributed: 1st Army (General Brusati), comprising the III and V Corps and the 15th Division of the VIII Corps, deployed along the mountain range from the Swiss frontier to the Lake of Garda. 4th Army (General Nava), comprising the IX and I Corps from the Lake of Garda, through the Cadore to the upper Piave. The Carnia force (General Lequio), comprising the XII Corps plus sixteen battalions of Alpini, stretched out along the crest of the Carnic Alps, which, as we have seen, coincided there with the frontier. 2nd Army (General Frugoni), comprising the IV, II and VI Corps, along the Julian Front from Monte Maggiore to the Cormons-Gorizia road. 3rd Army (General Zuccari, afterwards succeeded by H.R.H. the Duke of Aosta), comprising the X, XI and VII Corps, holding the rest of the Julian Front to the sea. There was in addition a reserve force at the disposal of the Comando Supremo2 consisting of the XII and XIV Corps of three divisions each, spread out between Desenzano and Verona, while the H.Q. of the VIII Corps and its other
1 2 "La Guerra alla fronte italiana". Vol. I, p. 89 I shall use the words "Comando Supremo" for the Italian G.H.Q., while I shall call that of the Austrians the High Command 27

division, the 16th, were at Bassano. This reserve was to watch the Trentino Front, and to mark time until a better line had been secured by the Italians in that area, and then be transferred to the Julian Front and cooperate in the offensive in that sector. Thus of the thirty-five divisions composing the Italian Army on the outbreak of the war, fourteen were deployed along the 500 kilometres between the Stelvio and the Carnia, fourteen were concentrated on the 90 kilometres of the Julian Front, and seven were in reserve. These dispositions were laid down in August, 1914, in view of the possibility of intervention against Austria, and were actually effected in May, 1915. The Comando Supremo was at Udine, with the Intendenza at Treviso. On the day of Italy's declaration of war, May 24, the total strength of the Italian Army was 22,800 officers and 843,000 men; of these a large proportion were still in training in the interior of the country, along the lines of communication, or attached to the various services. The nominal Commander-in-Chief was H.M. the King. But in actual fact he exercised no effective command, and indeed never interfered in the conduct of military operations or in the activities of the Comando Supremo; he limited himself to keeping contact with the troops, leading the same life as any other officer, constantly visiting the most exposed positions under the heaviest fire, and giving the Army and the nation the example always given by the House of Savoy, a House whose princes have never known the meaning of fear. The effective command devolved upon the Chief of the General Staff, General (afterwards Marshal) Count Luigi Cadorna, son of General Raffaele Cadorna, who had distinguished himself in the Risorgimento campaigns and is best known to history as the general commanding the Italian troops who entered Rome in 1870. General Luigi Cadorna had succeeded General Pollio, who had died on July 1, 1914 on the very eve of the World War. He came in for a great deal of criticism in connection with Caporetto, and after that event many other faults were attributed to him with greater or less justice. But there is no doubt that he had many high military qualities and was a first-rate organizer, and if for nothing else the country owes him a debt of gratitude for having practically recreated the Army between July, 1914, and May, 1915. His chief defect was his failure to keep in touch with the feelings of the officers and troops and to understand the psychology of the soldier: to realize what can be done with them and what is the best way to carry them along. For this some of his immediate entourage were more directly responsible, but of course as Commander-in-Chief he cannot be exonerated from his own share of blame. General Cadorna had counted on a surprise advance beyond the frontier and the capture of a more favourable line as soon as war was declared. But when Gioitti delivered his onslaught on the Salandra Government in the hope of upsetting it and maintaining Italy neutral, the Treaty of April 26, 1915, by one of those journalistic indiscretions which are a common practice on the part of French ruling circles, was published in France in order to eliminate the danger that Italy might back out at the last moment. The effect of this indiscretion was to eliminate not an Italian defection, which the Italian nation took care to prevent, but the element of surprise in Italy's initial military action, and Austria, now certain that Italy was going to war, concentrated all her available troops on the Julian and Trentino Fronts. Moreover, Serbia's inaction had

28

enabled Austria to reduce her army on the Save and the lower Danube to 48,000 men, and utilize practically all her forces then on the Serbian Front against Italy. The Italian Army was woefully deficient in heavy artillery; what there was of it was distributed as follows: 1st Army, six batteries of 280 mm. guns and one of 210 mm. howitzers; 4th Army, twelve batteries, plus five of howitzers; Carnia force, two batteries; 2nd and 3rd Armies, twenty batteries of medium artillery, four of 149 steel, and seven of 149 castiron guns. The initial order of operations provided that the 2nd and 3rd Armies were to cross the frontier, advance to the Isonzo and secure the passages across the river, the XII Corps to operate on the Predil pass. The general idea was that the left wing (2nd Army) was to press forward across the Isonzo, occupying Caporetto, and the Monte Nero - Sleme - Mrzli massif, while the right wing (3rd Army) was to advance more slowly, securing the bridges at Pieris, in order to avoid the danger of a flank attack from the mountainous country on both banks of the middle reaches of the river. It was expected that the passage of the upper Isonzo would be comparatively easy, and that the occupation of the Bainsizza plateau further east would automatically bring about the fall of the Gorizia entrenched camp and the Carso positions. In actual fact the operations worked out otherwise, as heavy resistance was encountered in the Tolmino area, and the Gorizia-Carso lines had to be tackled first. The original Austrian plan to evacuate the whole of the Isonzo area and let the Italians advance as far as Laibach, and then attack them on both flanks with forces a part of which were to be supplied by Germany, had, as we have seen, been abandoned. It was instead decided to evacuate only the flat country west of the Isonzo and some advanced positions in the extreme south of the Trentino, and concentrate the defence on the more favourable positions of the mountain zone and on the two bridge-heads of Tolmino and Gorizia, including their advanced positions on the right bank of the Isonzo. We have seen how the Austrians had had time to organize the material defences of the frontier. In order to realize the character and difficulties of the task before the Italian Army, it is important to bear in mind what was the actual strength of the Austrian forces to whom the defence of the south-west frontiers of the Monarchy was entrusted. To the thirty battalions placed at General von Rohr's disposal during the winter, many new formations had been added, so that by the end of April, a few weeks before Italy declared war, he had been able to form five divisions out of them, numbered from ninety to ninety-four. The Austrians on this front thus amounted in all to 125 battalions, with seventy batteries of artillery. By the middle of May the 57th Division, commanded by General von Goiginger, arrived on the scene, and three army corps (VI, XV and XVI) were in process of formation in the interior and were hurried forward as soon as it was decided to hold the Isonzo line instead of falling back on Laibach. Along the lower reaches of the river was deployed the 5th Army, commanded by Field-Marshal Svetozar Boroevich von Bojna, composed of the newlyformed XV and XVI Corps and the 93rd and 94th Divisions.
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The Tirolese command was entrusted to General von Dankl, while Rohr retained the Carinthian command. On May 21, three days before Italy declared war, the three corps began to move forward; one division of the XV and one of the XVI were in position by the 24th, and the others by the end of the month. The Austrian forces on the outbreak of the war with Italy were distributed in the following order of battle: Tirolese Command (General von Dankl), comprising two divisions, several Landsturm battalions, three squadrons of cavalry and nine heavy batteries (besides the divisional artillery). Carinthian Command (General von Rohr), comprising one division, fifteen battalions of Landesschiitzen, to which a few days after the declaration of war the VII Corps, withdrawn from the Russian Front and commanded by the Archduke Joseph, was added. 5th Army (Field-Marshal Boroevich), comprising three divisions and two army corps of three divisions each, withdrawn from the Balkan Front. Although Italy and Germany did not go to war until the following year, the Bavarian Alpenkorps was sent to Tirol to assist the Austrians. The enemy forces on the Italian Front thus amounted altogether, including the units of the three Austrian corps still en route, to twenty divisions, soon increased to twenty-five, comprising 234 battalions of infantry, twenty-one squadrons of cavalry, and 155 batteries; of these seventy-nine battalions, five squadrons and seventy-one batteries, grouped in twenty divisions, were in the Julian or Isonzo area. The Italian forces opposed to this amounted to thirty-five divisions. But the Austrians were far better provided with artillery, especially of the heavier calibres, and with machine-guns and every other kind of modern war appliance. Above all they enjoyed the immense advantage of occupying more favourable positions, carefully prepared and organized during the ten months preceding Italian intervention, and of acting on the defensive. On the night of May 23-24 the Italian advance began all along the frontier in order to secure at once if possible certain positions dominating the approaches to vital areas of enemy territory. If the effects of a surprise action had been discounted by the publication of the London agreement, they were not wholly eliminated, as the Austrians did not think that the Italians would attack until their mobilization was completed, while they believed that the delay would give them time to wait until Galicia was entirely evacuated by the Russians before bringing more troops from that area to the Italian Front. The Italians were thus able from the first days to occupy a number of points along the whole line, particularly in the ist Army area, including the Tonale Pass in Val Camonica, Ponte Caffaro in Val Giudicaria, Monte Baldo and the slopes of Monte Altissimo immediately to the east of Lake Garda, Monte Corno and Monte Foppiano, north of the Monti Lessini, Monte Pasubio and Monte Baffelan dominating the Vallarsa and the Pian delle Fugazze. The Pasubio was to prove of vital importance during the Austrian offensive of May, 1916. In the Cadore the frontier passes and some others beyond the frontier were seized. On the upper Isonzo Caporetto, Monte Kozliak, Monte Pleka and Monte Libussina, all east of the river, were also occupied, and further south the ridge
30

between the Judrio and the Isonzo. The towns of Cormons, Versa and Cervignano west of the river, were entered without resistance. On the lower Isonzo a force consisting of the 1st Cavalry Division and some other units under General Vercellana was to have secured the passage of the river, but it failed to carry out the task entrusted to it in time; the delay was partly due to the false rumours spread about purposely by the Austrians that every road and bridge was mined; when the cavalry did advance the bridge at Pieris had actually been blown up, but the other obstacles reported proved fantastic. Other errors were imputed to the commander, who was in consequence superseded. On May 27 the Comando Supremo issued orders for a further advance, and the 1st Army was able to attain other positions in the area between the Val Lagarina and the Asiago plateau, in some cases after sharp engagements. In the Cadore (4th Army) Cortina d'Ampezzo and the Tre Croci, Fedaia, and San Pellegrino and Valles passes were seized. In the Carnia, apart from minor engagements, the Freikofel was taken and lost several times, but finally remained in Italian hands. The most important operation on the upper Isonzo was the attack on the Monte Nero east of the river. The Sleme and Mrzli massifs, south of Monte Nero, were first attacked between May 28 and June 4, but without success. The 12th Bersaglieri Regiment greatly distinguished itself in these operations, but lost 400 men in action, besides many who fell over precipices. The Officer Commanding, Colonel De Rossi, was seriously wounded, and the two battalion commanders were both killed. The Modena Brigade lost thirty-seven officers and 1,200 men, and the Salerno Brigade also suffered severely. The Mrzli was never captured, in spite of repeated attacks, and remained a menace to the Italians in that area until Caporetto. The Sleme was the scene of heavy fighting, and the men of the Cividale Alpini Battalion managed to clamber up to just below the enemy lines, but were thrown back by an avalanche of stones hurled down on them by the defenders (June 2). The enemy counter-attacks on the positions already in Italian hands were, however, repulsed. A week later General Etna, commanding the Alpini troops of the 2nd Army, determined to make an attempt to secure the Monte Nero itself, the highest position in that sector. His instructions were: "Use small forces, preceded by groups of picked men, advance in isolated parties from shelter to shelter, take the greatest care to keep in touch, avoid all noise, do not reply to enemy fire; be determined to win through at all costs; firm hearts and bayonets". The advance was begun on the night of June 15-16 by the 35th Alpini Company (Susa Battalion) under Captain Vittorio Varese; proceeding from Monte Vrata, they crept up in silence, burst into the enemy trenches on Peak 2138, and after a furious engagement, took the defenders prisoners. They then captured the next position on Peak 2133. At midnight the 84th Company (Exilles Battalion) made a dash for the summit of Monte Nero itself, via the steep and narrow Kozliak Ridge, and, after a short but desperate encounter, gained possession of Peak 2245, the highest of the massif, while the 31st Company came up and swept away the last detachments still holding out. Other Alpini units took prisoner a whole battalion of Hungarians sent up to reinforce the defence. The enemy repeatedly counter-attacked on Monte Nero, but were always successfully

31

beaten off, and the position was held until Caporetto. The Italians thus controlled the higher reaches of the Isonzo, one of the main objectives of this first offensive. But the powerful bridgeheads of Tolmino and Gorizia, with important advanced positions on the west bank, were still in enemy hands, and it was clear that the Austrians would make every effort to retain command of the river from Tolmino southwards. The Italians determined to try their hand on its middle and lower course with a general offensive from Plava, south of Tolmino, to the sea. At Plava the Isonzo flows through a narrow gorge dominated by precipitous cliffs, those on the left bank crowned by powerful defensive works. The II Corps under General Reisoli was to try to effect a crossing at Plava and carry out a demonstrative action on the Sabotino on the right bank north of Gorizia, while General Ruelle's VI Corps was to force the crossing south of Oslavia and capture Gorizia itself. The XI and VII Corps were to cross still lower down and establish themselves on the left bank south of Gorizia. The positions at Plava and on the Sabotino proved immensely strong, and the first attempt to cross at the former point on June 8 failed, the bridge of boats which the engineers started to build being destroyed by enemy fire. On the night of June 9-10, 200 men of the Ravenna Brigade managed to get across on boats and kept under cover on the other side throughout the day. The following night two battalions got across and attacked Hill 383 overhanging the river. They succeeded in reaching the summit in spite of the heavy fire, but were driven off it again by counter-attacks and held a line just below. Further reinforcements were sent across and for a whole week the deadly hill was attacked again and again: seven times on June 12 alone, the enemy pouring a murderous machine-gun fire and hurling hand grenades on to the assailants. Finally, on June 17, the troops of the 3rd Division succeeded in capturing the position; as Field-Marshal Boroevich himself stated in his report 1, these troops "carried out their attacks with great dash and gallantry, so that even the Austrian troops had to appreciate their behaviour". But the cost had been heavy on both sides; the Italians lost ninety-three officers and some 2.000 men; the Austrian 1st Mountain Brigade alone 2.300 men. But the situation was not by any means satisfactory for the Italians; the area wrested from the enemy on the left bank was extremely restricted and overcrowded with troops, who desperately needed wider breathingspace. The attacks of the VI Corps on Podgora (June 8 and 9), although delivered with great eln, failed to overcome the enemy resistance, and on the 10th the Comando Supremo suspended the operations. The 3rd Army was somewhat more fortunate, for while the attempt to cross at Gradisca failed, lower down Monfalcone was occupied, and the Granatieri Brigade seized and held a line between the castle of Monfalcone (above the town) and Aris. A few other positions east of the river were also seized, but practically no progress was made on the Carso range. By June 16 ended the first offensive push, characterized, as the Italian official history of the war states, "by the contrast between the tendency towards distant objectives to be attained by manoeuvred action, and a reality - not unforeseen, but which could not supply a rule of conduct save after mature
1 Unpublished.

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experience - which imposed an action of lengthy attrition. The experience of this period determined the type and method of the remaining actions of the year 1915: the strengthened barrier which the enemy has prepared with skill and feverish activity against our irruption, will require a series of attempts to wrest the strengthened positions beginning on June 23 with the first battle of the Isonzo"1. After a ten days' pause to complete the mobilization and bring up fresh troops, a new series of attacks was resumed between Tolmino and the sea. Fighting on the Tolmino-Podgora sector lasted for several days, but although the troops showed their accustomed spirit, they failed to overcome the powerfully defended lines. At Plava indeed the overcrowding of the small occupied area had reached such a degree that the Command of the 2nd Army ordered the withdrawal of the bulk of the troops to the right bank, leaving only a small force necessary to hold the dearly bought bridge-head on the opposite bank. The very costly attacks on Podgora, Oslavia and Peuma (June 23-26) and the onslaught of June 29-30 on the Sabotino led to no results. The same thing occurred on July 5, when Podgora was again attacked, and, although some detachments managed to break through the formidable defences, they were mown down by a hurricane of fire and forced back. On the Carso the XI Corps made some progress (June 24), but, exposed as it was to the bombardment from Doberdo, Jamiano, Flondar and Duino, it failed to dislodge the enemy from the powerful line along the crest of San Michele and Sei Busi to the sea. The attack was renewed on July 3, when the XI and X Corps wrested some positions from the enemy between Castelnuovo and Sei Busi, repulsed the hostile counter-attacks, and captured 400 prisoners. Further successes were registered the next day, when an extensive trench system between San Michele and San Martino was captured, but the positions taken by the 31st Regiment and the Regina Brigade were subsequently lost. On the 7th the action was suspended, the Italians having gained a line still below the summit of the relentless ridge and ever exposed to the fire from the enemy's higher and more favourable positions (Hills 170, 92 and 89, the villages of Vermegliano and Selz and the slopes of Sei Busi), and the Adria-Werke at Monfalcone; this latter was particularly useful as the hull of a ship being built at those yards provided a valuable observation post. The enemy lines were forced back here and there, especially on the Carso, but as a whole held firm. With the means of 1915 nothing more could be done. The formidable wire defences proved impervious to the weapons then employed by the assailants. The Italian losses in this first battle of the Isonzo amounted to 1,900 killed (110 officers), 11,500 wounded, 1,500 prisoners and missing. The Austrian losses were less considerable, and amounted to 10,400 in all. About ten days later the battle was resumed, an operation known as the Second Battle of the Isonzo having the same objectives as the first, viz. the occupation of further positions in the Monte Nero - Upper Isonzo area, of Podgora opposite Gorizia, and the crest of the Carso. In the Monte Nero sector Monte Rosso, Lemez and Smogar were attacked again and again, captured and lost several times, but the summits remained in possession of the enemy (July 18-19). The same thing happened on Podgora. On the Carso the
1 Ministero della Guerra, "L'esercito italiano nella grande guerra", Vol. II, p. 148.

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one success retained was the capture of the brow of the Doberdo plateau, which, although not of great direct importance, enabled the Italian artillery to take up more favourable positions for further action. The Italians lost 340 officers killed, 860 wounded, 5,400 men killed, 26,580 wounded, 466 missing in this second battle, while the enemy lost altogether some 47,000 men. During August and September there was a pause in the Italian operations, except for some minor actions, such as that of the IV Corps which succeeded in occupying the whole of the Plezzo basin (upper Isonzo), but the attacks on Monte Rombon, Javorcek and Lipnik in the same sector, and on the advanced posts of the Tolmino bridgehead at Santa Maria and Santa Lucia failed. The general situation of the Entente had become more serious during the summer months, especially on the Russian Front after the fall of the great Polish fortresses, and the Franco-British offensive in Artois and Champagne, although some 30,000 German prisoners were captured, resulted in a very small advance, and the troops were exhausted by the incessant fighting. In these circumstances considerable pressure was brought to bear on the Italian Comando Supremo to induce it to resume the offensive. General Cadorna undertook to carry out the requests of the Allies, and on October 1 issued orders for a new action (the Third Isonzo Battle), concentrating on the Gorizia positions, which were to be attacked both from the north and the south. The troops had had a rest, received reinforcements in men, although not anything like adequate artillery and other material means, and had been able to strengthen their positions. But a cholera epidemic had unexpectedly broken out after the occupation of trenches wrested from Austrian units which had come from the Russian Front; the Italian sanitary services were not prepared for this outbreak, as they expected any disease except cholera. Whole units had to be withdrawn from the line and isolated in consequence. The situation, however, was handled with great energy and ability, and the epidemic soon stamped out. A further difficulty was the weather. The Friuli is one of the wettest regions of Europe, and the autumn rains made all movements extremely difficult; the swollen Isonzo cut off the supplies of the units on the east bank for several days, and many soldiers were actually drowned in the water-logged trenches. In this Third Isonzo Battle the Italians enjoyed a considerable numerical superiority (273 battalions against 140), but it was not sufficient to make up for the lack of artillery and the technical means for overcoming the enemy defences, especially the broad stretches of wire entanglements, to cut through which the Italians had only garden pincers; indeed it was not until the invention and wide distribution of trench mortars that any effective method of dealing with those obstacles was discovered. Munitions too were woefully inadequate, and little help came from the Allied countries, who were themselves suffering, in spite of their much higher industrial development, from the same deficiency. The battle lasted from October 18 to November 4, and was divided into two phases (October 18-24 and October 28 to November 4). The object of the new offensive was the conquest of the Gorizia entrenched camp. It was to commence with an attack on the wings, against the Plava and Carso salients, so as to outflank Gorizia from both sides, with a

34

secondary action between Sabotino and Podgora. In a second phase an attack would be delivered against the central sector, between Sabotino and Rubbia, crossing the Isonzo below Gorizia. In practice the offensive, commenced with an organic plan, resulted in a series of isolated attacks, which here and there effected incisions in the enemy defences, but, as in the previous operations, failed to break through them1. In the Plava area an attempt was made to enlarge the intolerably cramped position of the Italians. The enemy lines were heavily bombarded and then attacked on October 22-24, but the infantry found them practically intact, as the Italian artillery proved inadequate for the purpose. Many of the guns were of an obsolete type, and not a few shells failed to explode. In the end no results were achieved. On the 26th Globna and Zagora were captured, but as the dominant Hill 383 still remained in enemy hands the more advanced positions recently occupied were untenable, and had to be evacuated. North of Gorizia the 4th Division again attacked the Sabotino, but after a slight advance had to fall back on the original lines with a loss of 3,000 men. On the Carso many positions, including the four humps of San Michele, San Martino, Sei Busi and the notorious Trincea delle Frasche were taken and lost several times, a few minor points were held definitely, but no real improvement in the general position was effected. After a few days pause the offensive was renewed on October 28, and Zagora near Plava was taken once more and held. But again the attempt to capture Hill 383 failed and General Montanari was killed in the action. The heavy rains and mud made the soldiers' life a veritable hell. The fighting on the Sabotino and Podgora was of the same inconclusive character. In the Plezzo - Tolmino sector an important trench on the Mrzli was captured by units of the Salerno Brigade, but the troops were unable to debouch from the Plezzo basin and capture the whole Mrzli -Vodil line, nor did the 37th Division succeed in crossing the Isonzo between Auzza and Canale. On November 12 the Lombardia and Ancona Brigades reached Oslavia, but were unable to hold it. Oslavia and Hill 188 were again attacked on November 17, and after three days fighting, were taken; Oslavia was lost again almost at once, but 188 was held, and the Casale Brigade stormed the Calvario on Podgora. Here the situation was somewhat improved, but the exhaustion of the troops and the inadequacy of the munitions supply made a further suspension of operations necessary. On the Carso there was furious fighting on November 10 to 12, and the famous Sassari Brigade distinguished itself for its supreme bravery. At the Trincea delle Frasche parties of volunteers cut the wire and the troops followed, penetrating right through the lines; on the 14th they also captured the Trincea dei Razzi. The enemy counter-attacks were all successfully repulsed, and the captured positions held. But the cost had been very serious, the gallant Sardinian Brigade having lost 14 officers killed, including its commander, General Berardi, and 44 wounded, 218 men killed, and 1,212 wounded, and 33 missing, besides 1,000 sick. Further desultory actions continued until the end of November, but the troops were now utterly worn out with the hard and ceaseless struggle, and could do no more for the present. The total casualties of the battle had
1 Ministero della Guerra, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 417 et seq.

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amounted to 113,000; the enemy losses had been somewhat less (90,000). The advance failed to come up to expectations, and proved altogether out of proportion to the cost. In the mountain area there had also been heavy fighting, amid quite extraordinary conditions, during the whole of this period. Several more passes and vantage points had been occupied in the western area (1st Army), some advance had been made towards the Folgaria and Lavarone plateaux in the centre, and up the Valsugana as far as the Maso torrent. But the more important actions were in the Cadore. The 45th Infantry captured the Cima Bois on August 10, and the Alpini seized the Tofane peaks west of Cortina d'Ampezzo, well known to Alpine climbers. But much attention was devoted to the Col di Lana, a cone-like eminence held by the enemy, whence the upper Cordevole valley in Italian territory was dominated. Several attacks were delivered on the peak itself, and on its outposts, known as the Panettone and the Cappello di Napoleone, by the troops of the 18th Division. More than once they reached the various summits, but were driven off again by the heavy fire from other surrounding heights still in Austrian hands. East of Cortina there were desperate engagements on another favourite climbers' haunt, the Cristallo, and here the Italians managed to wrest the whole mountain from the enemy. The Italian attempt to penetrate into the Sexten valley north-east of Cortina, giving access to the Pusterthal, failed, the Italians losing 1,000 killed and wounded and 500 missing. The weather was now getting even worse, and in the high mountain area heavy snow had fallen. Cases of frost-bite were extremely numerous, and adequate precautionary measures had not yet been evolved for dealing with them on so large a scale. The situation in the Cadore zone as a whole was not satisfactory; in spite of the serious losses, only slight progress had been achieved, and save in one or two sectors no dominant positions captured. Above all, the Col di Lana was felt to be an intolerable incubus. It was considered that General Nava, commander of the 4th Army operating in that district, had not proved equal to his responsibilities, and on September 25 he was superseded by General Count Nicolis di Robilant. The new Army commander decided to make one more attempt to wrest the baleful eminence from the enemy before the winter set in and made all further operations impossible. He also acted under instructions from the Comando Supremo to carry out diversive operations in his area such as would ease the pressure on the Isonzo. The 2nd Division attacked in the Forame, Rauchkofel and Cristallo sectors (October 18-25), without much success, beyond the capture of minor points, although the troops showed extraordinary gallantry in impossible conditions. The IX Corps began a general offensive against the enemy lines in the upper Cordevole and Val Parola, and secured some more satisfactory results. The 17th Division captured the Cima Lagazuoi and completed the occupation of the Cima Falzarego (October 20). On the rest of the sector a series of isolated minor actions followed, full of dramatic episodes and instances of individual dash and enterprise in high altitudes, often in positions which are usually only reached by expert climbers unencumbered with weapons, but there was no general plan. Against the Col di Lana, General Peppino Garibaldi,

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another grandson of the famous Giuseppe, led a column composed of two battalions of the 59th and one of the 51st Regiment. The Panettone and the Cappello di Napoleone were first tackled on the 23rd; the latter after several days fighting was carried on the 28th, and on the 30th the Monticolo just west of the Panettone as well. On November 7 a battalion of the 60th, also in Garibaldi's force, delivered a vigorous attack on the main position of the Col di Lana, and after a strenuous engagement reached the summit and captured the survivors of the garrison; but on the following night a terrific bombardment was opened on the Italians installed on the summit from the neighbouring heights still held by the Austrians, and made its retention impossible. The Italians were forced to withdraw and entrench themselves just below the highest point, where they remained, while the Austrians again got on to the top. They were not finally dislodged until the following April. This was the last important action before winter set in. On the whole, the Cadore situation as a result of the recent offensive was improved. The troops had shown great resistance in high altitudes, and although of course the Alpini, recruited in the mountain regions of Italy, were more at home, men from other parts of Italy, including Calabrians and Sicilians, soon adapted themselves to these absolutely unaccustomed surroundings, and became excellent mountaineers. Practically no change occurred in the Carnia sector, but the Carnia force contributed by its action to the occupation of the Plezzo basin in September. The results of the operations of 1915 were limited. Only the 1st Army, in spite of its inadequate means, succeeded in carrying out the tasks assigned to it, but these tasks were of a secondary nature. It had indeed pared the edge of the Trentino salient, extending its occupation to a series of eminences dominating the approaches to the other side, the Val Daone, Ledro, the Loppio depression, etc. The 4th Army was in possession of most of the Col di Lana, the upper Cordevole valley as far as Cherz, the Tofana group, the Cristallo, the Cortina d'Ampezzo basin, and some points between the Rolle pass and San Pellegrino, thus cutting the famous Dolomite road running more or less parallel with the frontier. The 2nd and 3rd Armies, whose operations constituted the main activities of the campaign, had succeeded in conquering the Monte Nero massif and the Polonik, thus dominating the Caporetto basin. The Plezzo basin and the Javorcek were also occupied, but as the summit of the Rombon was still held by the Austrians, the occupation was precarious. No progress at all was made in the Tolmino sector, and while the Plava bridgehead was somewhat enlarged, it was still too limited to give the occupying force breathing space. In the Gorizia zone Oslavia and Hill 188 had, at great cost, been conquered, but here too the occupation was precarious. On the Carso troops of the 3rd Army had established themselves just below the summit of the San Michele - Sei Busi ridge, but their position was insecure as long as the enemy held the Gorizia camp and could threaten them from the north. All the positions which had been captured, even if they were not actually in danger, were exposed to constant enemy fire, and the daily losses from bombardments and snipers continued to be serious, to say nothing of the large number of cases of sickness, frost-bite, etc. Altogether the Italians had lost by the end of the year 66,000 killed, 190,000 wounded and 22,500

37

prisoners. The enemy losses were less heavy, as was natural in the case of a force acting on the defensive in admirably sheltered positions; they amounted to 38,000 killed, 97,000 wounded, and 30,000 prisoners. The causes of these inadequate results of the first seven months of the war were of divers nature. In the first place the Italians were, as we have seen, deficient in heavy artillery, machine-guns, hand grenades, aeroplanes, and other mechanical instruments of warfare with which the Austrians were richly endowed. Secondly, the Austrian positions were naturally of immense strength and admirably prepared for defence. Nor must we fail to remember that in the long years of peace preceding the war (except for the Libyan campaign, which was fought in very different circumstances) the Italian troops had not been adequately trained, nor were the higher commands experienced in the employment of large masses of artillery or in conducting an offensive campaign in conditions never dreamed of before. Finally, there had not been that complete collaboration between the Allied Armies which Cadorna had advocated from the first, but which was not fully realized until after the great German offensive of March, 1918. Some authorities, like General Segato, consider that Cadorna would have done better to concentrate on the Cadore and Carnia sectors before attacking the Julian Front. But others are of opinion that, while a mountain offensive on a large scale would have required forces infinitely larger and material infinitely more abundant than those available, it would, even if successful, not have attained any of the enemy's vital centres, bases or lines of communications. Nevertheless the campaign of 1915 was for the Italian Army a campaign of heroic enthusiasm, and the troops faced death and deadly wounds unflinchingly as they hurled themselves time after time against the appalling enemy positions, the relentless stone barriers, often as steep as the sides of houses, vomiting fire and death from every hidden cranny. The limited results secured produced a feeling of disappointment and gloom in the country at large, but the fighting men themselves did not lose heart, and in spite of their sufferings remained convinced that with a little more effort a break through would be effected and the final victory achieved. Moreover, these apparently fruitless attacks had immobilised some twenty-five of Austria's best divisions and large masses of heavy artillery, which would otherwise have been available for use on other fronts where they might well have turned the scale in favour of the Central Powers. In some Allied countries the Italians were criticized for not having achieved greater results with their numerical superiority. But the enemy themselves were the first to realize the extent of the Italian effort, as its effects were more vividly brought home to them. While the Austrians at first affected contempt for their adversaries they subsequently recognized that the Italians had done as much was humanly possible in the conditions obtaining on the Italo-Austrian Front. A distinguished military writer, Colonel von Pohl, formerly chief of the staff to the 58th Austrian Division, in writing of General Cadorna's attacks, stated: "But did the French and the British secure greater results in all their battles in Champagne, on the Somme and in Flanders? Further, the French and British were not menaced in the rear as the Italians were (from the Trentino) while fighting on the Isonzo; on

38

the contrary, they (the French and the British) might have caught their German enemies as in a vice in Artois and Champagne. Cadorna achieved neither more nor less on the Isonzo than Joffre, Nivelle, Ptain and Haig achieved in the west, and the Grand Duke Nicholas and Brussilov in the Carpathians. Italy, however, by going to war against us, closed the ring in the south-west around the Central Powers, and from that moment corroded the energies of Hungary and Austria, as Great Britain and France were corroding those of Germany"1. Other Austrian and German writers recognized the value of the Italian troops and leaders to the full. Field-Marshal Boroevich, in reporting on the fighting around Plava, wrote: "The Italian troops carried out their attacks with great gallantry and valour". After the first battle of the Isonzo he expressed the warmest admiration for the Italian soldiers and officers, although he noted their inadequate training for war. A former Hungarian UnderSecretary, Bolgar, wrote in the Neue Freie Presse of August 11, 1915: "The enemy knows how to look death in the face. In these last days a detachment of Bersaglieri, which had been surrounded, fought until the last man had fallen rather than surrender. The infantry, even when composed of milizia mobile, know how to be very gallant in attack and the officers give the example by going ahead of their men, which explains the heavy percentage of casualties among them. The artillery is good and powerful, especially the heavy batteries, and moreover appears to have plenty of munitions (which unfortunately was not the case). The air service is excellent... I have heard all field officers speak with high appreciation of the enemy". Ludendorff himself admitted that the Italians had as early as 1915 begun to "grip the enemy by the throat". The reports of some of the enemy Army commanders contain certain criticism of Italian tactical systems and methods of fighting which are by no means without foundation. But in the course of the campaign, even as early as the latter part of 1915, the Italian troops acquired greater experience at the cost of heavy losses. The Commander of the 5th Austrian Army, in his report on the autumn campaign of that year, wrote: "The enemy seems now quite different; the efficiency of his artillery fire and the tenacity of his infantry attacks have made great progress, based on the experience of the war". No naval operations of great importance took place in this first period of the war. On the outbreak of hostilities the Austrian Fleet effected a raid on the Italian coast and bombarded Ancona and some other towns. On July 7 the Italian cruiser Amalfi was torpedoed and sunk by a submarine in the upper Adriatic, but most of the crew were saved by an Italian torpedo boat. Another loss was that of the cruiser Garibaldi, on July 18, torpedoed during an incursion on the Dalmatian coast. An Austrian raid on Durazzo, effected by the cruiser Helgoland and five destroyers issuing from Cattaro on December 28, resulted in the linking of one Italian steamer and some sailing boats lying at anchor; but the raiders were chased away, one of their destroyers was sunk by a mine, and the Helgoland herself was seriously damaged by Italian light warships issuing from Brindisi. Otherwise the Austrian Fleet kept within its well-defended ports.
1 Von Pohl, "Cadorna", in Militarwissenschaftliche Mittheilungen, Nov-Dec 1929

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ISONZO-ASIAGO The coming of winter raised another set of problems for the Italian Army, problems which were harder to solve on this front than on the others, on account of the mountainous nature of a very large part of the area involved. If military operations on a large scale were necessarily suspended, the weather created conditions for the masses of men in the rain-sodden, bora-swept trenches of the Isonzo and the Carso, and amid the snow-fields and rocky wildernesses of the high Alps. The soldiers showed wonderful powers of endurance to these unaccustomed hardships. But much had to be done to provide shelter and warmth, and in this first winter there were many deficiencies from lack of experience, The country responded most generously to the appeals of the soldiers welfare organizations, and supplies of extra winter clothing, medical comforts and appliances for cooking food were provided in vast quantities by private committees and individuals, in addition to what was issued by the military administration. "Date lana ai soldati" (give wool to the soldiers) was seen on posters all over Italy, and there was hardly a home where woollen clothing was not being knitted. Even the poorest stinted themselves to give something for the men up there. Innumerable methods, not always successful, were devised for preventing frostbite, and it was not till the third winter that really efficient means were discovered and adopted. There was at first a good deal of unnecessary hardship and suffering. A war on this scale had never been fought by Italy before, nor, in these conditions, by any other country, and knowledge could only be gained by bitter experience. Also the amusements of the troops were not sfficiently provided for. To the old fashioned regular officer, trained in the rigid, almost Calvinistic, discipline of the Piedmontese Army, of which that of Italy was the lineal descendant, the very idea of amusements and distractions in war-time sounded almost indecent. Officers of that school failed to realize that a war lasting not months but years, and involving not scores of thousand, but millions of men, could not be treated on the same footing as the campaigns of the eighteenth or nineteenth century. In this field too, things did not really improve until 1917, particularly after Caporetto. The first necessity was to provide further reinforcements to fill up the already large gaps in the ranks. At the end of November the class of 1896 (youths of 19) was called out and trained, and early in the following year the older classes of the territorial militia began to be recalled to form labour battalions and L. of C. units. One serious error, common to all the belligerent governments, was committed in Italy. The men exempted from active service because they were needed in munitions works and other war industries, instead of being treated as soldiers under military discipline temporarily detailed for non-military duties, were classed as ordinary workmen and paid high wages: higher than the increased cost of living, which had not yet assumed large proportions, warranted, thus creating an unfair discrimination between these privileged individuals and the men who were daily risking their lives and suffering fearful hardships for a few pennies a day. Yet it was among the former class that seditious ideal were to

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find most support and eventually contribute to Caporetto. The increased numbers of men available made it possible to raise further units. Thus by April, 1916, there were four new Army Corps of two divisions each, comprising in all thirty-four infantry regiments, four of Bersaglieri, eighteen battalions of Alpini, seventy-one battalions of territorial militia, seventy-five garrison companies, and 560 labour detachments. Armaments, too, were increased, especially the supply of machine-guns. The number of machine-gun sections had grown from 350 in May, 1915, to over 1,000, besides eleven cavalry machine-gun squadrons and six sections on motor lorries. The large number of guns which had exploded (half the heavy guns) were replaced, and measures were taken to preclude these accidents, which, in fact, greatly diminished. In addition to sixteen new field batteries, forty medium, fourteen mountain, 400 siege and thirty-six mule batteries were produced, and the first thirty-eight anti-aircraft batteries. Many steel guns of 149 mm. were withdrawn from the Tagliamento forts and several coast batteries and naval guns were sent to the front. The output of munitions rose to 30,000 field gun and 3,000 heavy artillery shells per day. Arms and munitions factories sprang up all over the country: no small effort for a country where industry on a large scale was only beginning to develop, and was in no way comparable to the much older, vaster and more elaborate industrial organizations of the other Allies, or of the Central Powers. Much progress was also made in the air force. At the beginning of the War Italian aviation was in its infancy, and in the first year it could do little owing to the imperfection of the machines and the too great diversity of types, and it was in a state of absolute inferiority as compared with that of the enemy. Nevertheless, Italian airmen showed great daring and resourcefulness, and effected some quite remarkable exploits. After the Austrians had bombed Milan, Rimini, Ancona and Venice, the Italian planes retaliated by bombing Laibach. On returning from the Laibach raid Captain Salomone, after both his comrades had been killed and he himself seriously wounded, managed to bring back his plane into the Italian lines. General Cadorna did not appear to have sufficiently appreciated the possibilities of the air arm, at all events, at first, regarding it as merely one means among many others for securing information of enemy movements. Throughout the winter months artillery action never ceased, and there were also numerous attacks by small parties; the Alpini on skis effected many audacious raids into the enemy lines across the snow-fields of the high Alps. West of the Adige some more important operations were carried out which resulted in the capture by units of the 1st Army of positions in the Loppio depression (between Adige and Garda). On March 26 the Austrians captured the Pal Piccolo in the Carnia, by a surprise attack, but after four counter-attacks by the Italians it was regained; the last of the attacks was led by Lieut. Michele Vitali, of the Bersaglieri, who was the first to climb up the face of the rock by means of a ladder, but was killed on reaching the summit; thirty-two other officers and 656 men were killed or wounded in the action. On the Isonzo Front no important operations took place until January 14, when the Austrians, having concentrated large forces, attacked and captured the Italian line between Oslavia and Hill 188; the Italians recaptured the position, but ten days later

41

the Austrians again secured Oslavia and the saddle separating it from Hill 188. The Italians wrested Oslavia and the saddle from the enemy, but as Hill 188 remained in Austrian hands the Comando Supremo ordered a withdrawal from the whole Peuma - Oslavia line. At the end of the month the advanced positions at the foot of Santa Lucia (Tolmino bridge-head) were also evacuated, but without enemy pressure. The operations of the various Allied armies had hitherto been carried out with no attempt at systematic co-ordination. It was as I have said, General Cadorna who first suggested the necessity, of inter-Allied military conferences, and it was at his initiative that the first of these meetings was held on July 7, 1915, at Chantilly. Mermeix, in his book "Le Commandement unique"1, erroneously attributed the idea to the French Prime Minister, Viviani, and the Minister of War, Millerand. At the second meeting in December, 1915, when the Italian Command was represented by General Porro, Sub-Chief of the Staff, it was agreed that as a decision could only be obtained on the principal theatres of the War (Franco-British, Russian and Italian), it must be sought by concomitant action on all those fronts; that all efforts must be directed to imparting to the various offensives the maximum vigour both from the point of view of effectives and material; that they should be launched at periods sufficiently near to each other in order to prevent the enemy from transferring their reserves from one area to another, and that in fixing the precise date of the various operations metereological conditions and eventual political reasons should be taken into account. As it turned out the offensive plans of the Allies, both in France and in Italy, were, to a large extent, upset by two great events: the German offensive against Verdun and the Austrian offensive in the Trentino. Italy, nevertheless, in 1916, carried out her own obligations towards her Allies to the extent of her possibilities. As soon as the German guns opened fire on Verdun on February 7, 1916, General Cadorna, in conformity with the Chantilly decisions, issued orders to the two armies on the Isonzo to resume their offensive action. It was an operation which aimed simply at preventing "enemy forces from being transferred towards other war theatres", and at reducing enemy pressure at Verdun. This, the Fifth Battle of the Isonzo, lasted from March 11 to 29. The 2nd Army comprised the IV, VIII and II Corps and two Alpini groups, the 3rd the VI, XI, XIII and VII Corps. On March 11, the artillery opened fire along the whole front from Plezzo to the sea, but the heavy fall of snow and rain held up the action of the 2nd Army, and its artillery fire proved ineffective. In the northern part of the line the enemy attacked OH several points; they drove the Italians from some positions near Santa Maria and on the Mrzli, but were repulsed in the Rornbon sector. In the 3rd Army area the 21st Division advanced on the 13th, against one of the four humps of San Michele, and after hard fighting wrested some trenches from the enemy. But further south the 22nd Division failed to effect any stable gains, and the terrific enemy bombardment with gas shells made the evacuation of the positions captured by the 21st necessary. Further fighting occurred in the Oslavia, Peuma, Podgora and Grafenberg sectors (on the right bank of the river, opposite Gorizia), with heavy losses on both sides, but without decisive results. At the end of the month units of the VII Corps on the
1 Vol. I, p. 123

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extreme right of the 3rd Army area achieved some successes at Selz, and were able to retain their gains in spite of hostile counter-attacks. In the Dolomites, fighting of the most extraordinary nature was going on. At the end of March a small detachment of the 23rd Infantry, commanded by Captain Bosio, ascended the steep Rauchkoe amid deep snow, and, roped together, clambered up a wall of rock and fell on the enemy garrison and destroyed it. They entrenched themselves just below the summit (1979 metres a.s.l.) and held out for several days in spite of repeated counter-attacks, until they were reduced from 208 to fifty-nine men, after terrific bombardments by heavy artillery, which loosened huge boulders on them. The few survivors were attacked by overwhelmingly superior forces and driven off the mountain (April 6). That same day a detachment of the 51st captured Punta Serauta, in the Marmolada group (2,961 metres), and lost it on the 14th, but a few days later another detachment of the same regiment, commanded ISONZOASIAGO 59 by Captain Menotti Garibaldi 1, succeeded in getting on to the higher Pizzo Serauta (3,035 metres) and thence descending on to the Punta, and capturing the garrison. In the I Corps area a surprise attack, converging from three sides, conducted by General Venturi, against the Passo delle Sentinelle, near Cima Undici, was fully successful, at the cost of very small losses. But the principal operation in the Cadore was the attack on the terrible Col di Lana. Other means having failed, a huge mine was laid by Lieut. Don Gelasio Caetani 2, which took a considerable time to prepare, and when it was ascertained that the enemy were engaged on countermining, the Italian mine was fired on the night of April 17-18. A terrific explosion followed, which blew the top off the mountain, burying a hundred men, while another 160 were taken prisioners by the Italians, who immediately advanced on to the crater. This operation liberated the upper Cordevole valley from the enemy menace, and it was also hoped that it would make the capture of another troublesome position, Monte Sief, possible; this was now attempted by troops of the 17th and 18th Divisions, but after heavy fighting, with the loss of 2,000 men, only the Montucolo, one of the outer bulwarks of the Sief, was captured. Weather conditions prevented the action from being continued. Minor operations were carried out in the Valsugana and the Val di Ledro (west of Lake Garda), with varying success. Another offensive of no decisive importance, but of a peculiar nature was undertaken by the 5th Division, commanded by General Cavaciocchi on the Adamello. The object was to capture the Monte Fuma - Lobbia Alta ridge, giving access to the head of the Val Fuma and Val di Genova. The action was carried out at a height of some 3,000 metres above sea level, over vast snow fields and glaciers, and commenced on April 12. The Lobbia Alta - Doson di Genova ridge was captured by Alpini battalions after a short but sharp engagement during a blizzard. The Italians failed to attain the summit of Monte Fuma that day, but succeeded on the 17th (3,418 metres). Another detachment of Alpini then tackled the enemy positions on the Crozzon di Fargorida Passo di Cavento line, on the night of April 20-21. The Crozzon di Lares and the
1 2 A brother of General Peppino. Don Gelasio Caetani, brother of the Duke of Sermoneta, had made a name for himself as a mining expert in the United States, and after the War was appointed Ambassador in Washington. 43

Lares Pass were captured at dawn, and the Cavento Pass in the afternoon. The enemy held the Fargorida pass with great tenacity, and while the Alpini succeeded in seizing an advanced redoubt the main position resisted all their efforts, and the assailants suffered heavy losses. But on the 30th a party of Alpini aspiranti (cadets) managed to attain the difficult ice-covered crest of the Crozzon di Fargorida, and several days later the Crozzon and Passo del Diavolo were also captured, which made the situation of the enemy on the Fargorida and Topete Passes untenable, and they were thus forced to evacuate both, as well as the whole of the head of the Val di Genova, as far as the ridge separating it from the Val Presene. This action could not be expected to achieve decisive results, owing to the natural obstacles and the scarcity of communications, which prevented the italians from spreading out in any considerable force, but it was unique as a test of endurance and indomitable pluck in conditions undreamed of on any other front, it had the advantage moreover of preventing the enemy from ever attempting a descent into Italy from that side. Throughout the winter, reports of an enemy offensive on a large scale in preparation in the central Trentino had been reaching the 1st Army Headquarters and the Comando Supremo. This offensive had always been Field-Marshal Conrad's pet scheme, not only since the beginning of the War, but for many years previously, since the days when he was the divisional commander at Innsbruck. The concentration of Italian activity on the Isonzo had, at first, prevented him from attempting to carry it out. He considered such an action as the most effective way of crushing Italy altogether. If the Austrians could only break through the comparatively slender mountain barrier in the sector between the Adige Valley and the Sette Comuni plateau and descend on Thiene, Bassano and Vicenza, into the Venetian plain, there would be no further natural obstacles barring their march to the sea and into the very heart of Italy, and the armies of the Isonzo would be cut off from their bases and forced to capitulate. As soon as the Italian activities on the Isonzo had died down during the winter of 1915-16, Conrad returned to his old plan. In order to carry it out he needed some eighteen divisions, and as these were not available at the time, he requested General von Falkenhayn to send nine German divisions to Galicia to replace the nine Austrian ones which he intended to transfer to the Trentino. But Falkenhayn was sceptical of the success of such a scheme, which he considered would require at least twenty-five divisions, which Conrad could in no case secure, and he tried to dissuade his Austrian colleague from attempting it. He even requested him to send some of his heavy artillery, with which Austria was exceptionally well provided, to reinforce the Germans at Verdun. But Conrad was not to be dissuaded; he refused to send the guns to Verdun, and commenced the concentration of all available troops and guns in the Tirol and Trentino. The forces were grouped in two armies, the 11th commanded by General Dankl, and the 3rd by General Kovess von Kovesshaza. The whole group was placed under the orders of the Archduke Eugene, and one of its corps was entrusted to the Archduke Karl Franz Josef, the future Emperor-King. In all, nearly 200 battalions had been concentrated in the area, provided with some 2,000 guns, including three monster pieces of 420 millimetres, and 273 other heavies of the latest

44

and most improved types. The general plan was a descent into the plain, with Thiene and Bassano as primary objectives. General Cadorna has been criticized for not having foreseen this offensive and taken adequate measures to counteract it, in spite of the many reports he had received of Austrian concentrations in the Bozen - Trento area. But as he knew that the Austrians were exposed to a Russian offensive in the north, and that they knew it too, he refused to believe that they would be so imprudent as to risk their northern front by withdrawing troops from Galicia to attack the Italians in the Trentino. His attitude was logical in the sense that the Austrians did commit a strategical error, as future events were to show. But it is open to argument whether he would not have done better to bear in mind the possibility that the Austrians might follow the wrong course. Moreover, he was busily engaged in preparing a new offensive on the Isonzo, which he always continued to regard as the really essential front, and was concentrating all his available forces on that river, with a view to the capture of the Gorizia entrenched camp, which made him somewhat neglectful of the Trentino sector. But it is only fair to state that he had not wholly neglected plans for the defence of that front, and that some of his subordinates were responsible for not having fully carried them into effect. In his memoirs he states that, according to his instructions, the function of the 1st Army was to have been a purely defensive one, and that its commander (General Brusati), after selecting the most favourable line of main resistance, should have strengthened it to the utmost, while throwing out advanced defences, whose sole function was to retard the enemy in case they should attack. Second, third and even fourth lines of defence should also have been created, to which the troops could withdraw gradually if unable to withstand the enemy onslaught on the first. Instead of which, General Brusati, with the idea at the back of his mind that even his Army should carry out an offensive, had pushed on his forces whenever the opportunity offered, and occupied advanced positions which would be useful in view of a further offensive, but were less favourable for defence; also he had concentrated most of his available material, which, in view of the greater importance attributed to the Isonzo operations, was not too abundant, on those advanced positions to the detriment of his main line of defence, and had neglected his second and third lines to a still greater degree. General Cadorna inspected the defences just before the Austrian offensive, and gave orders for the correction of these defects, but it was too late to eliminate them altogether. He did, however, strengthen the 1st Army during the first half of May, by sending it sixty-seven more battalions and twenty batteries, while the 9th and 10th Divisions were placed in reserve in the Army's rear. The Italian forces between the Lake of Garda and the Valsugana (the area against which the Austrians launched their offensive) were deployed along the line extending from Doss Casina Dosso Alto to the north of the Loppio depression and lake, Mori on the Adige, Val Terragnolo, Monte Maronia, right bank of the Astico and of the Torre, south-western slopes of Monte Armentera, Sant' Osvaldo, Monte Collo, Monte Setole, north of Cimon Rava and Cima d'Asta, where the 1st Army area linked up with the Cadore. These were the extreme limits attained after a series of offensive actions, and several of the positions, exposed to stronger enemy positions previously prepared,

45

were not always easy to defend. There were two other lines behind the first, but they were not adequately organized, as the first was only regarded as the jumping-off place for a further advance. A fourth line was merely sketched out, Cadorna says that it existed only in the shape of a coloured line on the map. The troops consisted of the 37th Division, General Zoppi's V Corps (comprising the 35th and 34th Divisions and some other units), and the Brenta - Cismon force (General Etna). The whole Army was commanded by General Pecori-Giraldi, who had replaced General Brusati since May 8. In all he had 118 battalions at his disposal, plus forty in reserve, and 623 guns (of which only thirty-six were of heavy calibre), many of them of antiquated type. The offensive began at dawn on May 15, with a bombardment of an intensity unknown on that front. The defences were annihilated by the terrific fire and serious casualties inflicted on the defenders, so that when the Austrian infantry attacked very soon afterwards they were able to overwhelm the first line at many points. It was the first instance on the Italian Front of the short but intensive concentrated fire of innumerable batteries immediately preceding the infantry onslaught. On the left, the troops of the 37th Division, their defences destroyed by the bombardment, were rushed by the enemy infantry in greatly superior force, and, although they counterattacked valiantly, in the end they were forced back on to the Matassone (Val d'Arsa) - Pozzacchio - Col Santo - Borcola line (May 17-18). During this action Damiano Chiesa, a native of Rovereto (Trentino), who had volunteered as an Irredento to serve in the Italian ranks, was taken prisoner, conducted to Trento, courtmartialled and shot. The central point of the new Italian line was now the Col Santo (2,114 metres), and the enemy launched a whole division against it. On the 18th it fell, and the Italians were thereby driven still further back on to the Serravalle (Adige) - Coni Zugna - Passo Buole - Cima de Mezzana - Monte Pasubio - Corno di Pasubio line. The two pillars of this line were the Pasubio and the Passo Buole; this pass dominated the connection between the Vallarsa and the Val Lagarina (Val d'Adige) and the military road of the Fugazze, built by the Austrians before the War, as a way of access from Rovereto in the Trentino to Schio in Italy, whence the Venetian plain could easily be reached. From May 20 onwards, the Austrians concentrated their attacks on these key positions, which they were determined to wrest from the defenders. Passo Buole was the scene of ceaseless fighting from May 23 to 28, and on the last day the Austrians threw a whole fresh division into the fray. The position was at first held by only one battalion of the 62nd Infantry, afterwards increased to five; the men held their own stubbornly, repelling the assailants time after time, and inflicting considerable losses on them. After a twodays' pause the attacks were renewed three times on the 30th, but again driven back. Colonel Gualtieri, commanding the defence force, was able to declare: "We have not given way an inch and we shall not give way, as long as there is a man left alive". After the attacks of the 30th no further attempt was made, and all hope of success in this sector was abandoned by the enemy. The Italians had suffered serious losses; on May 30 alone 10 officers and 148 men had been killed, 28 officers and 583 men wounded, and 152 missing - 911 casualties in all.

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The enemy plan had been to attack the two wings first, and while the operations on the Val Lagarina - Borcola line were being conducted on the western sector, a similar offensive was proceeding in the Valsugana sector to the north-east. During the first onslaught on May 15 the Italians were forced back from their advanced positions, although on Monte Collo (1,825 metres) the Ionio Brigade not only held its ground, but also counter-attacked and put the assailants to flight. Elsewhere, however, the enemy managed to pierce the Italian lines at various points and the whole front had to be withdrawn to a second line along Monte Civaron, across the Brenta south of Strigno, over Monte Cima (east of the Maso torrent), Monte Cimon Rava to the Cima d'Asta. The Austrians, realizing that further frontal attacks on this line had little chance of succeeding, decided to attempt to turn the whole position by debouching on to the middle reaches of the Brenta from the Sette Comuni plateau. These are a series of high table lands, thickly wooded in parts, surrounded by not very elevated, but precipitous peaks; they are accessible by several roads and one narrow-gauge cog-wheel line of railway from Rocchette and Schio. The whole area has practically no watercourses, and during the operations immense quantities of water had to be brought up for the troops by lorries. The attack had begun on the Folgaria plateau the same day as on the wings (May 15), with the usual terrific bombardment by heavy calibres. An Austrian corps, commanded by the Archduke Karl, advanced against the Monte Maronia - Soglio d'Aspio line, and although the Cagliari Brigade held out for a day on the shellshattered defences, it was forced back on to what was to have been the line of main resistance, along the Monte Toraro, Campomolon and Spitz Tonezza heights. But these positions were no less exposed to Austrian artillery fire from the Doss Sommo, Sommo Alto and Cherle than the ones previously held, and they too, soon became untenable under the appalling mass bombardment, and a further retreat was necessary. The Italians fell back on the third line, Monte Aralta - Monte Cimone (1,230 metres, north of Arsiero) - Barcarola, their retreat being protected by an Alpini group which retarded the enemy advance between Monte Toraro and Costa Mesola, repeatedly repelling the attacks until the main force had reached the rearward positions. But this was not the end. The Austrians succeeded in rapidly transferring their heavy artillery on to the newly captured positions of Monte Toraro and Campomolon, and thence bombarded the weary Italian troops and forced them to fall back to a third line on the Novegno group, south of Arsiero, which was the last barrier between the pre- Alpine mountain area and the Vicenza plain, and it was imperative that they should hold out here at all costs. The Asiago plateau was not attacked at the beginning of the offensive, although parts of it had been bombarded and Asiago itself considerably damaged. Its turn came on May 20, when the enemy launched numerous forces against the Costesin - Marcai defences. The Palermo and Ivrea Brigades holding the line resisted vigorously for some time, but after many days of desperate fighting were gradually forced back to the edge of the plateau, along the line extending from Punta Corbin to Monte Belmonte, Monte Lemerele, Monte Kaberlaba, Monte Sprunch, Monte Sisemol to the Melette di Gallio. General

47

Lequio, formerly commander of the Carnia force, now took over the command of all the troops in the Asiago area. General Cadorna had, in the meanwhile, suspended his preparations for the big Gorizia push, and sent all the troops he could spare to reinforce the 1st Army, while at the same time he created a new 5th Army as a strategic reserve. The reinforcements for the 1st Army consisted of ninety-three battalions, seventy-four field and mountain batteries and 700 medium guns; 294 guns had been lost during the retreat, but most of them had been destroyed by enemy fire or by the Italian troops before abandoning them. The new 5th Army consisted of the VIII, XX, XXII, XXIV and XXVI Corps, made up out of units of the 2nd and 3rd Armies, troops recalled from Libya, two cavalry divisions, and some new formations drawn from the interior of the country. It was spread out in the Venetian plain between Treviso, Vicenza and Cittadella, and was under the command of General Frugoni, formerly commander of the 2nd Army, which was temporarily grouped with the 3rd under the Duke of Aosta. The speed and efficiency with which these large masses of men were transferred from the Isonzo and from various parts of Italy to the Altipiani and the 5th Army area, was a truly remarkable feat, redounding to the credit of General Cadorna as an organizer and to the various commands and staffs entrusted with the work of supply and transport. Cadorna's idea in creating the 5th Army was that, should the enemy overcome the last Italian resistance in the pre-Alpine zone and succeed in descending into the plain, they should be met by a strong fresh reserve force ready to fall on them when they were exhausted by the long period of ceaseless fighting in the mountains. Fortunately the need for it never arose, and after the end of the Trentino offensive it was broken up and its units distributed among the other armies. In the last days of May the Austrians renewed their attacks on the new line, alternating their blows now on one sector, now on another. On the 25th they attacked Monte Cimone, north of Arsiero, and drove back the two Alpini battalions defending it, with the result that the whole of that sector of the front had to be withdrawn on to the Monte Aralta - Monte Giove - Monte Cengio line. On the Pasubio - Novegno sector, west of the former, the fighting was resumed at the same time; Monte Aralta and Pria For were lost on the 29th; the latter, defended by General Di Giorgio's Bisagno Brigade, was recaptured and lost again several times, the summit remaining finally with the enemy. Violent attacks were now delivered by the Austrians on the last mountain barrier before the longed-for plan could be attained, but on Monte Giove, Colle di Posina, Monte Galliano and Monte Alba the Italian resistance was unswerving, and on June 5 the attacks, which had cost the assailants heavy losses, ceased, and were not attempted again. In the central sector the Austrians tried to fight their way into and down the Val Canaglia, just below the edge of the Asiago plateau. Here, too, the Italians were obliged to evacuate their advanced positions, and there was desperate fighting on Monte Belmonte, while a battalion of Granatieri under Colonel Bignami held their ground with great tenacity at the head of Val Canaglia, until they were overwhelmed by superior forces. Another battalion of Granatieri defended Monte Cengio for several days; on June 1 they were attacked by five Austrian battalions, and although they had exhausted their food and ammunition,

48

suffered very serious losses and were almost surrounded they held on until the 3rd, when the few survivors were ordered to withdraw on to Monte Pau and Monte Zovetto, barring the entrance to Val Canaglia, but very few reached the new positions. The Austrian efforts were renewed between June 5 and 15, both on the Monte Lemerle - Zovetto sector, in order to get down the Val Canaglia, and on the Sisemol - Monte Fior - Castel Gomberto line, defending the access to the middle Brenta at Cismon. An Alpini force under Lieut.Colonel Stringa held the latter positions, and although repeatedly attacked, repulsed the enemy time after time, and even counter-attacked with vigour. On June 7 the Alpini were reinforced by the famous Sassari Brigade and repulsed the attacks of that day, but on the 8th they had to fall back yet a little on to the Monte Spil-Monte Miele line. The Etna Brigade had also had to evacuate the Monte Sisemol, and withdraw on to Monte Zaibena and Monte Valbella. On June 10 General Prestinari, the veteran of Adigrat (Eritrea), who had volunteered for active service in the War and had been given command of a territorial brigade, was killed in action. The Lemerle - Zovetto positions, held by the Catanzaro, Pescara, Forl and Liguria Brigades, were subjected to particularly virulent attacks on June 6-8, but the enemy was beaten off several times: on the 8th Lemerle was temporarily lost, but immediately retaken by the Forl troops, who also drove the enemy from one of its departure trenches. The Liguria Brigade gave an equally good account of itself under the gallant General Papa, although it lost a little ground on the 17th; its casualties amounted to 25 per cent of its strength, and its colours received the gold medal for valour. Although there had been some desperate fighting on certain sectors in the first half of June, since the very beginning of the month the enemy showed signs of exhaustion, and the vigour of the drive was visibly slackening. Then came the Russian offensive, which hastened the process, although, as we shall see, the Austrian Strafe-Expedition 1 had already shot its bolt before Brussilov struck. One Austrian division had been withdrawn as early as June 5, and transferred to the Russian front; others soon followed, and on June 17 the Austrian High Command ordered the suspension of the Trentino operations. The Italian Altipiani Command, now adequately reinforced, had given orders for a counter-offensive on June 14. This operation commenced on the 16th with four corps (the XX, XXII, XIV and XXIV). Monte Magari and Cima Isidora were captured, and some progress was effected in Val Posina and Val d'Astico. On the 25th the enemy began a general retreat all along the line on to new positions which they had recently prepared behind the most advanced sector they had succeeded in attaining, but still ahead of their old one. The new line commenced on the Adige, north of Mori, ascended the Zugna Torta and the Col Santo, to the northeast of the Vallarsa, kept north of the Pasubio, which the Austrians, in spite of repeated attacks, had never captured, followed the ridge north of the Posina torrent, went over Monte Cimone north of Arsiero, then round the northern edge of the Asiago plateau (Asiago itself, now a heap of ruins, was reoccupied by the Italians), north of the Val d'Assa, Monte Rasta, Monte Mosciagh, Monte Interrotto, Monte Ortigara, Monte Civaron, Monte Salubio, crossed
1 The Trentino offensive was so-called because it was expected to punish Italy for her "treachery"

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the Valsugana, west of Strigno (which was thus again in Italian hands), ascended the west bank of the Maso torrent, and thence on to the Fassa Alps. On July 2 the Austrians delivered their last attack on the Pasubio, which, however, was successfuly defended by the Verona and Volturno Brigades, both sides losing heavily. On the Asiago plateau the Italian pressure was continued and some advance was made, although at heavy cost; two successive commanders of the Sassari Brigade, Brigadier-Colonels De Maria and Mattei being both killed. Desultory fighting continued until July 16, and some successes were registered in the Vallarsa and Val Posina. On the 10th an Alpini battalion attempted to conquer the Corno di Vallarsa, and some of the men managed to gain the saddle just below Peak 1801, capturing the garrison, but were forced by heavy enemy fire and counter-attacks to evacuate it, leaving a certain number of prisoners behind; among these were Lieutenant Cesare Battisti, a native of Trento and a former deputy in the Austrian Rceichsrat, who, although well over military age, had volunteered to fight for the liberation of the Trentino, and Fabio Filzi, another Trentino volunteer. They were both conveyed to Trento, court-martialled and hanged as traitors in the Castello del Buon Consiglio, where Damiano Chiesa had previously met his fate. Many of the Italian troops had now been withdrawn from the 1st Army front and brought back to the Isonzo area, where major operations were in course of preparation. But on July 22-24, two final offensive actions were carried out by the Italians, against Monte Cimone, north of and dominating Arsiero, west of the Astico, and the Bocchetta di Portule (1,949 metres) north of the Val d'Assa. The latter operation failed after three days' hard lighting by the Alpini, but Monte Cimone was captured as the result of a well-planned surprise attack early on July 23 by an Alpini battalion and part of the 154th Regiment. Thus ended the Italian counter-offensive in the Trentino area. The Austrian offensive was sound in its intentions, for, had it broken through the last Italian defences, the results might have been disastrous for the whole Italian Army. But Conrad made the mistake of attempting to carry out this ambitious scheme with inadequate forces, in spite of Falkenhayn's wise warnings. His overwhelming superiority in heavy artillery, and at first also in infantry, enabled him to shatter and break through the first line of defence which, as we have seen, was in exposed advanced positions, and then the second and third lines, which had not been properly organized for defensive purposes. The Austrian attacks also caused the Italians considerable losses in men, guns and materials (15,000 killed, 76,000 wounded, 56,000 prisoners and 294 guns). But by the time the enemy had attained the last line of the Italian defence they were themselves worn out; they, too, had suffered losses which, if less serious than those of the Italians, were considerable (10,000 killed, 45,000 wounded and 26,000 prisoners, besides a large number of sick), and their reserves were exhausted, their supplies beginning to run low, and they were ever further from their bases, whereas the Italians were receiving more reinforcements and getting nearer to their bases. The Austrians had, furthermore, committed the error of concentrating excessively large forces on a limited area, without taking the situation on their other fronts into sufficient consideration. Before

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they had achieved the essential results which they had aimed at they had to recall troops from the Trentino to deal with the situation on the Russian Front. With the Italians now counterattacking, there remained nothing more for them to do but to withdraw as best they could and abandon all idea of a breakthrough into the Venetian plain. On their credit side there was the permanent occupation of a part of the area which they had conquered in their first onslaught, but it was an area containing no important towns, industrial centres or bases of supply 1, nor was the new line which they now held by any means so great an improvement on the old as to make the losses which its capture had cost worth while. For the Italians the Trentino offensive came as an unexpected blow, and caused a considerable impression in the country, as hitherto, although no decisive successes had been achieved, the Italian army had been almost always the attacking force; many positions, some of them important, had been wrested from the enemy, and the fighting was practically all on enemy territory, which was more than can be said for the other Allies, except the Russians in Anatolia. Now instead, the Italians were being driven back on to Italian territory. General Cadorna attributed the initial defeats partly to the incapacity of certain commanders 2, and also to "the tactical surprise produced on us, as on all other armies, when commanders and troops had not yet had experience of mass attacks organized with the most formidable deployment of artillery"3. The territory which the enemy was able to retain did undoubtedly increase the pre-existing danger of an irruption from the Trentino into the plain, by reducing the breadth of the already slender mountain barrier. But the result did not justify the Austrians' confidence that the Italians would thereby have been pinned down on that front and unable to carry out their plans in the Gorizia area. Cadorna, moreover, organized a defensive system on the new line which was to prove invaluable later on. The consternation which the first Austrian successes produced in the country at large brought about the fall of the Salandra Cabinet on June 12. Public opinion, rightly or wrongly, attributed the chief blame not to the Commander-in-Chief, but to the Government for not having conducted the War policy with sufficient energy, and for having failed to supply the Army with all the necessary men and materials. On the resignation of Salandra the King sent for the veteran statesman, Paolo Boselli, who formed a Cabinet comprising representatives of all parties and groups, except the extreme Socialists, and was consequently styled the National Ministry. Boselli was a man of sterling honesty and great political experience. But he was too old to inject into the Government that driving force which, in such critical times, was indispensable for the will to victory. Baron Sonnino remained at the Foreign Office, but Signor Orlando, a man who was to render useful services as Prime Minister between Caporetto and the Armistice, did not prove an ideal Minister of the Interior, just as he was to fail at the Peace Conference.
The only towns which the Austrians occupied were Asiago and Arsiero, but they lost them again during the Italian counter-offensive. It is said that the heir born to the Archduke Karl during the occupation was created "Count of Asiago and Arsiero" 2 He mentions no names, undertaking to return to the subject in a further publication, which has not appeared. 3 "La Guerra alla Fronte Italiana" Vol. I, p. 239 1 51

A question which has aroused a good deal of controversy among war historians is the connexion between the Trentino offensive and General Brussilov's offensive against the Austrians. It has often been claimed by foreign writers that it was the Russian steam-roller which held up the Austrian advance in the Trentino and saved the Italian Army from annihilation in June 1916. General Brussilov himself, in his posthumous memoirs published in the Revue des Deux Mondes (May-June, 1929), reasserted this statement. "The results of my offensive", he writes, "were very important for the Allies. The Austrians had renounced their offensive in Italy and transferred to the Russian Front all the forces they could, so that Italy did not have to suffer invasion". In another passage he states that his offensive "surpassed all expectations and answered to what was demanded of it, viz. it saved Italy and prevented her from withdrawing from the War". These assertions, and others to the same effect, have been to a large extent accepted without question 1. But an examination of the dates of the various events and of the documentary evidence relating to them fails to bear out General Brussilov's contention. In the first place Brussilov's offensive had been planned some time before the launching of Conrad's Strafe-Expedition. The Russian commander himself declares that he had proposed an offensive on the Lutzk Front at a war council held on April 14, presided over by the Tzar. At that Council General Kuropatkin, commander of the North-West Front, and General Evert, commander of the South-West Front, stated that, owing to a variety of circumstances, they deemed it necessary to remain on the defensive for the time being. General Brussilov, on the other hand, maintained that on his own front it was not only possible but necessary to take the offensive, and that he had every hope of achieving success. The proposal was agreed to and the offensive decided on, although the Chief of the Staff, General Alexeiev, had informed Brussilov that he could give him no more troops or guns. Although the Lutzk offensive was thus decided on one month before the Austrians launched theirs in the Trentino, the preparations took some time, owing to the slowness with which the cumbersome Russian military machine always worked, and to the lack of an adequate railway system. But everything was ready by May 23, i.e. eight days after the Austrians had attacked. Brussilov writes that on May 23 he received a telegram from General Alexeiev stating that "the Italian troops had suffered a serious reverse and that the Italian Command, convinced that it would not be able to hold up the enemy on its front, asks us to launch the offensive at once, so as to distract a part of the Austrian forces from the Trentino Front". Brussilov replied that his armies were now ready for the attack, and that the offensive could be launched a week after the order was issued; subsequently, he gave the order for the attack on June 2. It was evidently thought that no excessive haste was required. General Cadorna's appeal for cooperation was sent off on May 19. Everything, we are told, was ready by May 23. The Russian commander gave orders on May 24 for the offensive to begin on June 2, i.e. eight days later, chiefly because Brussilov wished to be certain that Evert
1 See also Sir William Robertson, "Soldiers and Statesmen", Vol. II, p. 108 (note); according to him Russia antedated her offensive in response to Italy's appeal, and further (p. 118), Italy, relieved by the Russian offensive, repulsed the Austrians 52

would also attack on his own front. When Brussilov learned from Alexeiev that the attack on the front adjoining his could not commence before June 14, he retarded his own attack for three days more to June 5. These delays seem to indicate that the events on the Italian Front did not exercise any particular influence on the Russians. General Cadorna, in fact, in asking for Russian collaboration, recommended his Allies not to carry out their offensive prematurely so as not to spoil its effect, and to limit themselves to demonstrative action on other parts of the front 1. The telegram from the Italian Comando Supremo to the Italian Military Attach in Russia is dated May 19, and General Alexeiev, in his reply, stated that it was inadvisable- to attract the attention of the Austrians by demonstrative actions, that the preparations for the general offensive would be complete by May 25, and that the attack would commence at once. There is every reason to doubt that Cadorna ever said that he could not hold up the Austrians on the Trentino Front, or that when Brussilov launched the offensive which had been decided on for some time previously and was at that moment ready in all its preparations, the Italian situation was so serious that only Russian intervention could save it. In Cadorna's request of May 19 for assistance, transmitted to the Russian G.H.Q. through the Italian Military Attach, Colonel Romei, there is no statement whatever capable of being so interpreted. The despatch merely declares that if the Austrian offensive continued with the violence with which it had commenced it might cause "such a considerable withdrawal (of the Italians) in the immediate future as to prevent us absolutely from subsequently launching an offensive on the Isonzo at the same time as the offensives to be launched by the Russians and the other Allies", which had been agreed upon at the inter allied conferences at Chantilly and Paris. It was, in fact, with reference to these agreements that the Italian Comando Supremo requested that "the Russian Army should immediately make its vigorous pressure felt on the Austrian Front, which had in the meanwhile been lightened by the withdrawl of several divisions". Baron Sonnino made a similar request to the Russian Ambassador in Rome, M. de Giers, calling his attention to the fact that if in May and June, 1915, Russia's failure to cooperate when Italy went to war against Austria had been due to circumstances superior to the goodwill of the Imperial Government, now, after the agreements recently concluded by the Allied Staffs, "it would not be possible to explain the lack of combined action". While he did not hide the gravity of the Austrian pressure, Cadorna never despaired. As he said himself some time afterwards at Versailles, "I was never so calm as at that moment. Those who were with me know it"2. It is important to note that even before Brussilov's offensive began Cadorna had the impression, based on many definite indications, that the Austrian effort was gradually weakening. "From May 27 to 28", he writes, "I felt that for the Austrians the grand phase of their attempt, the irresistible advance which each day opened a fresh wound in our flesh, was over. Why did I have this sensation? There are intuitions which, for a chief,
1 2 A.. Alberti, "L'azione militare italiana", p. 106 Angelo Gatti, "Uomini e folle di guerra", p. 176

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acquire the value of facts. I felt that the Austrian strength was ebbing". On June 2, in fact, forty-eight hours before Brussilov's armies struck, he wrote to the Command of the 1st Army that "the general situation enables us now to resume the initiative", and the communiqu of June 3 began with these words: "The Austrian offensive has been definitely held up along the whole front of attack". It is obvious that it could not have been the Russian offensive which saved Italy, when at the end of May the Austrian onslaught in the Trentino was nettamente held up on both wings, and was uselessly butting into a cul de sac against an Italian line, which was daily becoming stronger and receiving fresh troops, a line which was based on the key positions of the Coni Zugna, the Pasubio and the Novegno, barred the Fugazze road, covered the Schio plateau, blocked the Arsiero basin and hemmed in the enemy in the Vallarsa and the Posina - Astico basin. Further evidence of this view is supplied by some German and Austrian military historians. General von Cramon, German military representative at the Austro-Hungarian G.H.Q., writes: "In any case, I am certain that it was not the Russian intervention on the Eastern Front which held up the Austrian offensive in South Tirol; the latter had reached its culminating point before the Russian offensive was launched, and could not have been pursued further without a considerable number of fresh troops, which were lacking"1. General von Arz, Conrad's successor as Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, says the same thing in his memoirs. Falkenhayn adds: "Even by May 27 the Austrian G.H.Q. had been compelled to ask us to give up a division of the Austrian XII Corps, forming part of Prince Leopold's Army Group, for the Italian Front. As this corps had a purely Rumanian reserve, which could hardly be employed against Italians, and had moreover shown itself to be untrustworthy in the autumn of 1915, this suggestion furnished significant indications of their (the Austrians') critical situation on the battle front. Meanwhile, the Italian counter-offensive had begun. Conducted with superior numbers . . . they brought the offensive to a complete standstill. It became clear in June, and indeed before things grew lively on the southern half of the Eastern Front, that our Ally could neither continue the offensive, remain in the salient, nor yet take advantage of the weakening of the Italian Isonzo Front, as a result of the transfer of troops to the Tirolean Front. As regards the last alternative, the Austrian Staff even doubted whether, in case of an Italian attack, they could succeed in holding their own Isonzo positions, which had also been unduly denuded for the benefit of the Tirolean operations"2. It would, of course, be unfair to deny that the Russian offensive did have a favourable effect on the Italian situation, for it obliged the Austrians to withdraw part of the troops concentrated in the Trentino and thus facilitated the Italian counteroffensive. General Cadorna accurately summed up the situation in the following passage: "The offensive of General Brussilov . . . was useful also to us, inasmuch at it induced the Austrians to withdraw a certain proportion of their forces from our war theatre. But it did not in any way have influence in holding up the Austrian
1 2 Op. cit., p. 104 "General Head-Quarters, 1914-16" pp. 243-4

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offensive"1. Brussilov omits to mention one very important point, viz. to what extent the Austrian Trentino offensive against Italy helped the Russian push against Austria. There is no doubt that Austria withdrew large forces from her Eastern Front to launch them against the Italians; Field-Marshal Conrad was, in fact, severely criticized for having depleted the Eastern Front to a dangerous extent for the sake of his pet Trentino scheme. There is abundant evidence in support of this contention. Hindenburg writes: "If these troops, which not only Austria and Hungary, but also Germany, contemplate with pride (i.e. the pick of the Austro- Hungarian armies), are launched against Italy, what remains to face the Russians ?"2. Falkenhayn, in explaining the surprising facility and speed with which Brussilov's Russians advanced, writes: "As it appeared, the Galician Front was not only weakened by the withdrawl of troops for the benefit of the Italian Front, but even its capacity for resistance had been reduced below any reasonable standard by the withdrawal of its strong complement of artillery (the heavy artillery which had pulverized the Italian defences), the importance of which for unreliable troops is well known, and further, by the loss, partly by exchange and partly by the addition of unreliable reserves, of a considerable part of its most reliable elements. This explains the collapse"3. Italian co-operation was not limited to the indirect assistance to the Russian offensive afforded by the Austrian attack in the Trentino. As soon as Cadorna had brought the enemy offensive to a standstill, he not only launched a counter-offensive, which prevented the Austrians from transferring more troops from the Tirol to the Galician Front, and indeed forced them to continue demanding reinforcements from it, but he also got ahead of the enemy on the Isonzo, where he prepared and carried out an offensive of his own. Here again we have Falkenhayn's evidence. "The important bridgehead, west of Gorizia, was lost on the 6th of August, and shortly afterwards the town itself. The enemy gained ground in many places on the east bank of the Isonzo. This produced a serious crisis. It was even necessary to bring up several divisions from the Eastern Front, who were replaced by German troops, in order to restore the situation. It is unnecessary to point out how this increased the difficulties in the East, not for the Austrian Headquarters alone, but for the general prosecution of the War. The evil consequences of Austria's independent enterprise in the Tirol were increasingly felt; the last of these, Rumania joining the Entente, are still to come"4. It must, therefore, be admitted that if the Russian offensive produced beneficial effects on the Italian Front, the advantages for the Russian Army of the operations in the Trentino and later on the Isonzo, were at least as important, as they not only eased the initial pressure on the Galician Front, thereby favouring Brussilov's offensive, but also brought about the successive withdrawal of important Austro-Hungarian forces from the Eastern Front and finally determined Rumania's intervention5.
1 2 3 4 5 Op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 239-240 "Aus meinem Leben", p. 141 Op. cit., p. 211 Op. cit., pp. 281-2 The whole question is amply dealt with in Major Amedeo Tosti's "Revisione di giudizi" (Rome, 1930), pp. 33-39 55

GORIZIA General Cadorna had always regarded the Isonzo operations as the most important aspect of the War on the Italian Front. Preparations for the offensive against the Gorizia entrenched camp were commenced, he tells us, as early as December, 19151. Detailed instructions were imparted to the Command of the 3rd Army in the spring of the following year, and the operations were scheduled to begin in the second half of June. But, as we have seen, in view of the Austrian Trentino offensive the preparations on the Isonzo had to be suspended, and a large part of the troops, guns and other war material, sent to or destined for the Julian Front, were transferred to the Altpiani area instead, or employed to make up the 5th (Reserve) Army in the Venetian plain. Nevertheless, on June 2, when Cadorna felt that the enemy effort in the Trentino was slackening, he informed the Duke of Aosta, Commander of the 3rd Army, that he intended to resume preparations for the Isonzo operations. He added (June 16) that the events in the Trentino-Asiago sector had not altered his original strategic conception of operating offensively on the Isonzo Front. What had altered was the amount of means available, as so much had been consumed in the Trentino, and this involved a more limited range of action. Consequently, he decided to concentrate everything on Gorizia, with the sole object of gaining full possession of the Gorizia threshold in the first phase. The extension of the operations to the Plava sector had to be deferred to a later date. The reshifting of the reinforcements for the 1st Army back to the 3rd was planned in the first half of June. The artillery, trench-mortars and munitions were to be transported first, and then the troops. The offensive was timed to commence eight days after the transport had begun, as surprise was to be an essential feature of the action. The Italians enjoyed the advantage of operating on interior lines, and could transport troops from one front to the other more rapidly than could the Austrians, who had to follow a long and circuitous route. The Duke of Aosta's plan was to attack between Plava and Monte San Michele, concentrating particularly on the SabotinoPodgora sector, and General Cadorna informed the G.O.C. 1st Army that, as he did not dispose of sufficient artillery for offensive actions on both fronts, as soon as the enemy resistance on their new prepared positions or the necessity of bringing forward the Italian guns imposed a delay on the advance, all the heavy and medium artillery, which could be withdrawn without endangering the safety of the Trentino Front should be rapidly transferred to the Isonzo. For the purposes of the new offensive, the 2nd Army, which had been broken up to provide for the formation of the 5th, was reconstituted with Headquarters at Cividale, on July 3. On the 9th orders were issued for the suspension of all offensive operations in the Trentino, except a few minor actions still in course of execution, and July 27 was fixed as the date for the commencement of the general movement towards the Isonzo (the transport of the heavy guns had already begun to move a
1 Op. cit., Vol. I

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few days previously). By July 30 all the fifty-eight batteries of medium artillery and the twenty-two of trench-mortars had been transported to the Isonzo; the two reserve Army Corps (VIII and XXVI) followed immediately after. Every precaution was taken In keep these movements absolutely secret, and reports were purposely spread about, both in Italy and in neutral countries, that an offensive in the Valsugana was in preparation. The 3rd Army, in addition to its original eight divisions, was now strengthened by the 19th, 24th, 47th, 43rd, 48th, 23rd, 46th and 49th, plus a dismounted cavalry division. Subsequently, the 34th Division was added, joined after the taking of Gorizia by the 10th (three brigades strong) and the 3rd Mounted Cavalry Division. From the 1st Army and the Carnia Corps 41 heavy, 151 medium and 44 light guns were transferred to the 3rd Army, in addition to its own divisional artillery; by August 4 it thus came to dispose of 56 heavy, 467 medium and 728 light guns, and 76 batteries of trench mortars (774 pieces, of which 138 were of the heavy 249 mm. type). The trench-mortars were indeed to play an important part in the action, as by their means alone did it prove possible to cut up the wire entanglements and shatter the other defences. This weapon became a speciality of the Italian Army, and a trench-mortar school was established at Susegana. For some time before these vast preparations had been completed, indeed, before they were even begun, and while the Trentino operations were still proceeding, some by no means unimportant actions were proceeding on the Isonzo Front itself. On May 14, the day before the launching of their great Trentino offensive, the Austrians attacked the positions held by the Italian 4th Dismounted Cavalry Division in the Monfalcone sector, and succeeded in capturing the Adria shipyard and Hills 12 and 93; a counter-attack drove them from the first position, but the two latter were not recaptured until a month later. Further fighting took place on the VI Corps Front on June 28-29, between Monte Cosich and the sea, and the enemy delivered a gas attack on units of the 21st and 22nd Divisions while they were still asleep; it was the first time that gas had been used on the Italian Front on a large scale, and no adequate gas protection had been provided. The enemy were thus able to raid the Italian trenches and a number of men, half-suffocated by the gas but still alive, were finished off with nail-studded iron maces, issued to certain enemy units for the purpose. Nevertheless, reinforcements led by General Sailer and Colonel Gandolfo, Commanders of the Regina Brigade and the 10th Regiment respectively, hurried up and drove the enemy from the captured positions. But the units attacked by gas suffered 6,300 casualties. In order to distract the enemy's attention from the intensive preparations for the major offensive the troops of the VII Corps on the extreme right of the Italian Isonzo line effected a minor action in the Selz area on July 1-3; some gains were registered and 500 prisoners captured. The Gorizia operations were divided into three sectors. General Capello's VI Corps on the left was to begin by attacking in the Sabotino - Oslavia - Podgora Lucinico area, the VII, on the extreme right (Monfalcone area), was to conduct a demonstrative action before the main offensive commenced, while the XI was to

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tackle Monte San Michele at the same time as the VI came into action. The reconstituted 2nd Army, which only comprised a small number of troops, was to limit itself to carrying out a heavy bombardment on the Tolmino positions, in order to lend support to the VI Corps in its attack on the Sabotino. For some months before the attack, the terrain had been prepared by creating an elaborate system of trenches, communication trenches, dug-outs and other means of approach, in order to enable the troops to get within striking distance of the enemy under cover. The work was particularly extensive on the Sabotino, where it was carried out under the personal supervision of Colonel Badoglio, first as Commander of the 74th Regiment, then as Commander of the mixed force detailed for the Sabotino operations, and finally as Chief of the Staff of the VI Corps. He explored the ground with the utmost care, going night after night on to the slopes of the terrible hill, up to the enemy lines, until he knew every inch of it. The Sabotino was regarded as the key to the Gorizia position, rising as it did to a height of 609 metres in the bend of the Isonzo on the right bank, immediately to the north of the town, and dominating the access to the passage across the river from the northwest. The Austrian High Command had withdrawn troops for the Trentino offensive from all the other fronts, including that of the Isonzo, and, although in July it had begun to send some of the units back there, at the commencement of the Gorizifi battle the 5th Army defending the entrenched camp consisted of nine divisions only (116 battalions) with 540 guns. The forces immediately defending the town on the right bank were those of the 58th Division (three brigades) with five or six march battalions, while then were three more regiments in reserve. The artillery was admirably placed along a line extending from Monte Kuk (611 metres ) above Zagora on the middle Isonzo, to Monte Santo (682 metres ), and Monte San Gabriele (646 metres). Other batteries in the town itself, at Sant' Andrea, and at the head of the Vallone del Carso, a deep, broad depression behind San Michele. Behind Gorizia other batteries and infantry positions were on Monte San Marco and Monte Santa Caterina. All these defensive works and emplacements were well known from air observations, prisoners' statements and the reports of patrols who had carried out raids into the enemy lines1. By August 4 all preparations were completed, and the various objectives assigned to the troops were set forth as follows : 1. The Sabotino was to be rushed by a comparatively small force commanded by Colonel Badoglio (the 78th Regiment, a battalion each from the 58th and the 115th, two companies of engineers, two trench-mortar batteries, two mountain batteries), while another force under General Gagliano (77th Regiment, one battalion of the 146th and two engineer companies) was to advance towards the San Mauro
1 Mr. Wickham Steed, in his "Through Thirty Years", maintains that the victory was due to the revelations of the plans of the fortress by a Yugoslav deserter. To anyone acquainted with elementary military matters such an explanation is absurd. In Austria, too, this story has been definitely exploded. Colonel von Pohl, Chief of the Staff to the 58th Austrian Division, attached no importance whatever to the alleged "revelations", and admitted that the Italian success was due to the perfectly prepared organization and the excellent leadership of the offensive. (Wehrzeitung, Aug. 1-15, 1926.) 58

height further to the south-east, where the Isonzo flows in a south-westerly direction. 2. Hill 188, which had been captured in 1915, but lost in 1916, was to be attacked by the Lambro Brigade, Oslavia by the Abruzzi Brigade, Peuma by the 11th Division, one of whose Brigades (the Pavia) was to advance along the Lucinico road towards the two Isonzo bridges (railway and road). The battle opened with the diversive action of the VII Corps (16th and 14th Divisions) on August 3, against a point south of Sei Busi and Hills 85 and 121. These positions were taken and retaken several times, and General Chinotto, Commander of the 14th Division, although wounded and ill, continued to lead his troops to the attack, and had to have himself carried on a chair into action; he finally succumbed in hospital. A striking episode of the fighting was the action of Enrico Toti, a Roman of the people, who, although he was no longer young and had lost a leg some years before in an accident, had insisted on volunteering for the War as a Bersagliere; he was among the first to hobble over the top, supporting himself on a crutch, was twice seriously wounded, and finally, just before dying, gathered strength to hurl his crutch into the enemy lines as a last gesture of defiance. The main action against the Sabotino and Gorizia began at 7 a.m. on August 6, with artillery and trench-mortar bombardments of a violence unprecedented on this front. The defences were shattered, literally pulverized, many of the enemy batteries silenced, and the troops demoralized by the appalling hurricane of fire; then the range was lengthened, and at 16 hours the infantry moved forward. Colonel Badoglio's force rapidly ascended the Sabotino, overwhelmed the garrison and attained the summit and also the somewhat lower hill of San Valentino beyond (536 metres), to the south-east, capturing numbers of prisoners ensconced in dug-outs, caverns and tunnels. Contact was soon established with the Gagliano column on the San Mauro hill. The advance of the Badoglio force had come as a surprise to the enemy, and its success had cost but small losses, whereas the Gagliano force encountered serious resistance, especially in Val Peumica, and its commander was killed; General De Bono1 of the Trapani Brigade took his place. In the meanwhile, the Abruzzi Brigade had rapidly swept over the long fought-for Oslavia position and Hill 165, but the Lambro was strenuously opposed on Hill 188 and the Dosso del Bosniaco, and its advance was slower. The Cuneo got on to the Grafenberg with splendid dash and proceeded towards the river, but was held up by a strongly fortified position on the hill, nor did the Treviso succeed in overcoming the stubborn enemy resistance on the Peuma heights further north. The Pavia advanced from Lucinico and wrested from the enemy the defences on the Calvario and those between the road and the railway to Gorizia, but Hill 240 on Podgora still held out obstinately. The fighting on the blood-stained heights from Sabotino to Podgora lasted throughout the night. A battalion of the 149th Regiment managed to capture the little fort on the lower slopes of the Sabotino towards the river, with its garrison. The enemy counter-attacked repeatedly in considerable force, and succeeded in penetrating into the valleys and gullies along the San Valentino- San Mauro line. The
1 Successively Governor of Libya and Minister of the Colonies

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fighting was of a desperate nature, and the 77th Regiment particularly distinguished itself in this action; all its other officers having been killed or wounded, Captain Vaiarini took command. Finally the Austrians were definitely driven back and pursued at the point of the bayonet, leaving 500 prisoners in Italian hands. A column commanded by General Cantella cleared the enemy out of their trenches in Val Peumica, and two battalions of the Trapani Brigade drove them off Hill 138. Thus the whole Sabotino massif in the bend of the Isonzo, one of the chief bulwarks of the Gorizia camp, was conquered. Colonel Badoglio was chiefly responsible for this brilliant operation; it ensured him promotion and decorations, and when he was eventually raised to the rank of Field-Marshal, he was also created Marchese del Sabotino. Further successes were to follow. Early on the 7th the Lambro attacked and captured the formidable Hill 188 and (he Dosso del Bosniaco, the Abruzzi Hill 165 (north-west of Peuma), while the Etna rushed Peuma itself and captured 700 prisoners. On Podgora the Austrian still resisted and counter-attacked with vigour, and on the slopes of the Grafenberg they managed to surround some detachments of the Cuneo Brigade who had reached the Isonzo. But in the afternoon the Italians attacking Podgora were reinforced by units of the 48th Division, and everyone had the sensation that the enemy could not hold out much longer on any of the positions on the right bank of the river. The railway bridge between Lucinico and Gorizia was blown up. At dawn on the 8th, the Trapani and Etna attained the Isonzo, capturing 300 prisoners, while the 11th Division overtopped the Peuma heights, and the Cuneo captured the fort and village of Grafenberg, with 350 prisoners, liberating the Italian detachments which had been surrounded in the fighting of the previous day. By noon the Austrians still remaining on Hill 240 (Podgora) were forced to surrender. The Italians were now in complete possession of the bridgehead west of the Isonzo, and able to rout out and take prisoners the few remaining enemy detachments who had sought refuge in the caves and gullies of the sector. The first Italians to cross the Isonzo, partly by the road bridge, which the Austrians had failed to destroy, and partly by wading the then shallow river, were four battalions of the Casale and Pavia Brigades. They rushed up the slopes towards the town at the double; Lieutenant Aurelio Baruzzi of the 28th Regiment had got through ahead of the rest, passing under the railway with four men only, captured 200 prisoners, and raised the first Italian flag on the station building. He was rewarded for this action with the gold medal. During the battle for Gorizia no less desperate fighting was going on in the Carso area. Of the four humps of San Michele the Catanzaro Brigade gained possession of the first two on the 6th, overwhelming two successive lines of defence, the Brescia and Ferrara captured the other two, and the 21st Division got on to the saddle of San Martino del Carso, a village in which a bit of wall four feet high pierced by a tiny barred window was the only evidence that houses had once been there. Over 1,000 prisoners were taken in these actions. The battle continued to rage over the rocky wilderness throughout the 7th, 8th and 9th, and gradually the 23 rd, 22nd

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and 21st Divisions extended their gains from one fortified position to another, repelling all counterattacks. The whole of San Michele and the Boschini heights to the north of it were now in Italian hands, and on the 10th the defensive system on the Carso as far as the Debeli between Monfalcone and Doberdo collapsed. The Austrians were in full retreat towards the Vallone, that wide sheltered depression which had stood them in such good stead as a supply depot. The Italians followed in hot pursuit, and the same day units of the 23rd Division reached the Vallone, which had become untenable for the enemy and had to be abandoned by them. The resistance on the right proved more obstinate and the ground which the Italians of the XIII Corps had to get over was extremely broken: trenches, wire entanglements and other artificial obstacles, added to the natural ones, rocky ramparts and unexpected steepsided doline, made the advance under a heavy fire from the rearguards difficult and painful in the extreme. But they advanced nevertheless, and the Austrians were forced back on to a new line from Nad Logem (Hill 212), over Hill 187, Oppacchiasella, Nova Vas, Hill 208 North and Hill 208 South, to the heights east of Monfalcone. Some further resistance was offered here, but on the 12th Nad Logem and Hill 187 fell, the enemy retiring further back on to Hills 144 and 77. After the first battalions had entered Gorizia on the 8th, other forces poured across the river in increasing numbers. General Cadorna intended to follow up the advantages secured by his important victory and to clear the hills to the north-east and east of Gorizia of the Austrians, so as to open the way for a further advance towards the heart of the enemy country, Laibach being still his objective. His orders to his subordinate generals were "to give wings to all". At the request of General Capello, Commander of the VI Corps, a new light force had been concentrated at San Lorenzo di Mossa, just west of the Isonzo on the Cormons - Gorizia Road, under General Baratieri, composed of eleven squadrons of cavalry, two battalions of Bersaglieri cyclists and two machine-gun sections on lorries. The cavalry patrols rapidly spread over the country round Gorizia, and soon ascertained the existence of a new organized defensive system extending from Monte Santo, over the Dol saddle to the Veliki Kribach, San Gabriele, Santa Caterina, the Gorizia cemetery, San Marco, and down to the Vertoibizza stream. The VI and VIII Corps got into touch with the enemy once more on the 10th and received orders to attack the new line immediately, but they found it very strongly held and in admirable defensive positions, and while the enemy was receiving reinforcements from all parts, the Italians were utterly exhausted by the ceaseless efforts of the last days under the blazing August sun, and could only count on very scanty reserves of fresh troops. Some advance was made to the north-east of Salcano on the Isonzo (north of Gorizia) and to the north of Santa Caterina, but the attempt to seize the village of Santa Caterina and Hill 174 south of Castagnevizza failed. All the forces north of the Vippacco River were now placed under the 2nd Army commanded by General Piacentini. The action was suspended for a few days to give the worn-out troops a rest, replace the most exhausted units by such reserves as were available, reorganize the whole force and prepare a systematic offensive against the new lines.

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On the Carso the heights east of the Vallone were attacked on the 12th. Nad Logem was captured with great dash by the Lombardia Brigade, which secured 1,400 prisoners, and also San Grado di Merna, and the Regina occupied the ruins of Oppacchiasella. Hill 246 was taken by the Catanzaro on the 13th, and some positions on the Veliki Kribach and Pecinka by the Granatieri, Regina and Pisa at the cost of heavy losses; 900 prisoners were captured in this action. Further attacks were delivered on the 14th, and here and there some hills and trenches were secured, but the main positions of the new line still held firm. All the units of the XI Corps had greatly distinguished themselves, and the colours of the Granatieri and Regina Brigades and of the 141st Regiment, as well as a number of individual officers and men, were decorated. The Corps' two exhausted divisions (21st and 23 rd) were replaced by the 22nd and 49th, which attacked on the 15th and 16th, but without any appreciable success. The Carso action was now suspended, and a part of the 3rd Army artillery sent north to reinforce the 2nd Army, which was to attempt another push against the heights north-east and east of Gorizia, in order to give the town a wider breathing space and deliver it from the enemy artillery fire to which it was subjected. The 2nd Army now comprised four corps and was to attempt on the 14th to gain possession of Monte Kuk, Monte Santo, San Gabriele, San Marco and the Ovca-Draga heights west of the railway in the Vertoibizza Valley. A little further north an advance from Plava was also to be made. The II Corps tried to overcome the Zagora defences in the latter sector, but failed, owing to the enemy's artillery superiority (most of the II Corps artillery had been handed over to the VI). Heavy fighting went on throughout the 14th, 15th and 16th, involving serious losses, but without appreciable results, and on the 17th the action was suspended. The Gorizia offensive undoubtedly came as a surprise to the Austrians, who never expected that the Italians would have recovered so rapidly from the two months' hard struggle in the Trentino and transferred such large forces from that area to the Isonzo. That transfer was indeed one of the biggest troop movements for strategic purposes carried out during the whole of the World War, and, as General Cadorna himself writes, it "made it possible to effect a manoeuvre on interior lines of a new character, and of an amplitude never attained in the past, when troops were only transported by road without heavy artillery, and within a far more limited radius". So much was it a surprise that General von Zeidler, commanding the 58th Austrian Division, to which the defence of the bridgehead west of the river was entrusted, was actually away on leave when the offensive opened. The victory did have important strategic results, inasmuch it improved the Italian position, but its moral effects were even more valuable. The army and the country at last felt that they had really achieved a success and had secured a fairly large slice of enemy territory which had been strenuously defended to the bitter end, as the Austrians attached great value to it. The losses had been considerable, and larger on the Italian than on the enemy side (74,000 Italians killed and wounded, as against 61,000 Austrians, but the Italians had, in addition, captured some 20,000 Austrian prisoners). The Austrians had, however, been able to save most of their

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guns, only thirty falling into Italian hands. After the fall of Gorizia the Austrian communiqu stated: "Gorizia has been abandoned in consequence of the evacuation of the bridgehead . . . Undisturbed by the enemy, we have executed the required correction of the front". The fall of Gorizia had been a serious blow to the Central Powers, and whereas its importance has not always been adequately appreciated by some military historians in Allied countries, it is unquestioningly admitted by German and Austrian writers, notably by General von Falkenhayn. "When the Italians", he states, "met with sustained resistance in the higher mountain regions, they broke off their counter-attack on the Tirolese frontier and transferred their reserves to the Isonzo, where they attacked in greatly superior strength at the beginning of August. The Austrians had not been able to respond speedily enough to this change of plan. Indeed the troops thrown into the Isonzo after the heavy fighting in the Tirol no longer possessed the necessary powers of resistance"1. Field-Marshal von Hindenburg tells how, in the days immediately following the fall of Gorizia, he was summoned by telephone to G.H.Q. to be invested with the supreme command of the War, and adds: "I put down the telephone and think of Verdun and Italy, of Brussilov and the Austrian Front, and also of the next piece of news: 'Rumania has declared war on us'. Nerves with great powers of resistance will be necessary". General Cadorna considered the battle a model of the breakthrough action. The work of the Italian artillery and trenchmortars "represents a classical example of the concentration of fire on fortified lines. It had been long and minutely prepared; the reconnaissance of the ground had been effected by means of aeroplane patrols and optical observation, the enemy positions had been perfectly identified and registered on paper, the objectives of fire accurately distributed in extension and depth, the methods of fire laid down with scrupulous precision. Thus, at the moment established, a veritable hurricane of iron and fire was unexpectedly directed on the enemy positios, devastating then lines and observation posts and interrupting their communications". The dash and gallantry of the troops were magnificent. "In three days of unceasing struggle, under the violent and concentrated fire of the enemy artillery, machine-guns, rifles and trenchmortars, they broke through the successive lines of resistance, dispersing the defenders at the point of the bayonet, preventing any reconstruction of the front, and supporting the intense bombardments and furious counter-attacks of the adversary with indomitable steadfastness"2. The action on the Carso was not less important, "The Carso plateau", he adds, "dominating the plain of the lower Isonzo as far as Cormons and Gorizia on the one hand and to the sea on the other, is by its very nature a formidable position, protected in front by the broad moat of the Isonzo and supported on the wings by the powerful bastions of San Michele to north, the Cosich, the Debeli and Hill 121 on the south. The area of the plateau undulating, broken up by numerous gullies and
1 2 "General Headquarters, 1914-18", p. 382 Op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 293-4. 90

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caverns, is admirably suited for defence, and the Austrian Command had made good use of it, creating a close and intricate network of trenches deeply embedded in the rocks, to a large extent protected by armour plate, provided with numerous thick lines of wire entanglements and connected by a vast system of communication trenches, enabling the defending troops to move rapidly and safely in all directions. This complicated and perfect defensive organization might appear well-nigh impregnable, and so indeed the Austrians regarded it. Thus their defeat appeared all the more serious, all the deeper the repercussion in our country and abroad, all the greater the merit of those who were able to carry out the arduous enterprise". As long as the Italians were clinging to the inferior positions below the summit of the Carso ridge they were in a precarious situation. But once they were in possession, not only of the crest of the Carso and all the ground to the west of the Vallone, but also had secured a foothold beyond it, they acquired a degree of security and a proper base whence to attempt the conquest of the higher summits of the range and gain access to the hinterland. The newly-won terrain was now strongly fortified, so as to resist any possible counter-offensive. Events were indeed to prove that Cadorna's confidence was well founded, for if fourteen months later these positions had to be abandoned, it was in consequence not of a direct attack, but of the break-down of the defences further north.

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FROM THE SEVENTH TO THE NINTH ISONZO BATTLES At this moment the general situation of the Allies appeared more favourable than it had been for some time past. The Russian offensive had wrested a large area from the Austrians and resulted in the capture of some hundreds of thousands of prisoners. The British Somme offensive had forced the Germans out of a part of the occupied territory and obliged them to relax the pressure on Verdun, thus enabling the French to counter-attack successfully. On August 29, 1916, Rumania intervened on the side of the Entente, and on the same day Italy declared war against Germany. General Cadorna decided to resume the offensive on the Isonzo as soon as possible in order to exploit the successes already achieved on that and on the other Allied fronts. The victory of Gorizia had secured greater moral than material results, and if the latter were by no means inconsiderable the lack of adequate reserves had made it impossible to take full advantage of it and to follow it up. The town of Gorizia and the whole of the bridgehead with the strongly fortified positions on both sides of the river were in Italian hands, and the Vallone del Carso further south was also held. But the heights to the east and north-east of Gorizia: San Gabriele, San Daniele, Panowitz, Rosenthal, San Marco were still firmly held by the enemy and linked up by the San Grado di Merna hill with the lines on the Carso south of the Vippacco river, which cut across the area east of the Vallone between the Nad Logem and the Veliki Kribach, leaving Loquizza and Oppacchiasella to the west, touched Nova Vas, ascended Hills 208 north and 208 south, dominating the sinister lake of Doberd below the village of that name, followed the crests of Hill 144 and a series of lesser elevations down to the marshes of Lisert and Hill 21 by the sea. The principal task before the Italians was to relieve the pressure on Gorizia and give the forces concentrated in that area wider breathing space, and this might be achieved in two ways. Either the positions east of the town could be attacked directly, or, by breaking through the lines east of the Vallone, the positions further north could be turned. What Cadorna had hoped to do was to extend his action along the whole Gorizia-Carso Front at the same time, but he lacked the indispensable material means for so a vast an operation, and was forced to limit his attack to one of the sectors for the moment, leaving the other to a later phase. He decided to begin with the positions east and north-east of Gorizia, facing the 2nd Army, and proceeded to concentrate his available heavy artillery and trenchmortars on that front, with the intention, as soon as this action was terminated, to shift these guns to the 3rd Army and initiate operations on the Carso. A careful study of the ground resulted in a change in the original plan of operations. If the action destined to relieve the pressure on Gorizia, prevent the enemy from shelling the passages across the Isonzo, and eliminate all danger of the recapture of the town, appeared the most urgent for political as well as military considerations, Cadorna was convinced that an attack on the San Marco heights

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would have required a much longer period of preparation than one on the Carso, as the thick woods on the former made it very much more difficult to identify the enemy positions and gun emplacements there than on the Carso. Consequently, the 2nd Army was ordered to limit its activity to holding the positions occupied and make preparations for a subsequent attack, while the 3rd Army was to begin the offensive at once. The 3rd Army, grouped in two corps, now comprised ten divisions in the first line and four in reserve, 430 heavy and medium guns, 566 light guns, and 584 trench-mortars. The XI Corps was under General Cigliana, and the VII under General Tettoni. The enemy forces were still those of the 5th Austrian Army (Field-Marshal Boroevich), whose strength had been raised from 116 to 148 battalions. At the extreme northern end of the Carso positions there is a sharp drop into the Vippacco, so that an advance on the plateau could be effected even without an accompanying action to the north of the river, provided that the enemy batteries north of it were neutralized, and this task was entrusted to the artillery of the 2nd Army, which was to prevent the enemy guns from enfilading the troops of the 3rd during their advance. The two key positions at each end of the enemy's Carso positions were the Trstelj to the north, and the Hermada to the south, the latter rightly regarded as dominating the gateway to Trieste. If the Trstelj fell, the 3rd Army could push through to Komen almost unopposed, and thus outmanoeuvre the enemy both to the north of the Hermada, and to the east and south-east of Gorizia, enabling the 2nd Army to deliver a frontal attack on the San Marco lines. But the Trstelj and the Hermada were most formidable positions; the centre offered less serious obstacles, both natural and artificial, although it was exposed to a flanking fire from the two lateral bulwarks. On September 4 the Comando Supremo issued orders to the 2nd Army to coordinate its fire with that of the 3rd on the day scheduled for the attack; it was to open a heavy bombardment so as to engender the belief that the Italians intended to attack a sector of the Gorizia Front and thus prevent the enemy from sending reinforcements against the XI Corps (3rd Army), to which the most important part of the offensive was to be entrusted. The 2nd Army infantry was not to attack, except for local operations on a limited scale. The VIII Corps, on the right of that Army, was, however, to hold itself in readiness to support the XI if the latter should succeed in affecting a considerable advance, and eventually support the XXVI if it should actually be ordered to attack San Marco. The 3rd Army launched its attack on September 14, preceded by an intensive bombardment on the enemy trenches, caverns and wire entanglements, lasting for several days. When it appeared that the fire had been effective the XI Corps infantry sprang forward at 9 a.m. and soon achieved some important successes in the northern sector. A part of the Veliki Kribach area (Hill 265) was captured by the Granatieri and Lombardia brigades: in the centre Nova Vas and Hill 208 North fell to units of the XIII Corps, but had to be relinquished under the pressure of counterattacks soon after, and further south the Brescia and Ferrara Brigades pushed on to

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the east of Oppacchiasella and units of the 16th Division (VII Corps) got on to Hill 144, occupying a part of it. On the 16th the Granatieri, supported by the Napoli Brigade, achieved another success with the capture of the important position of San Grado di Merna, while the 15th Bersaglieri and units of the Macerata Brigade captured part of Hill 208 South. The same day a mixed force, composed of the 22nd Infantry and three cyclist battalions, attacked the still unconquered part of Hill 144 from the north, and the 132nd Infantry and the dismounted Genova Cavalry Regiment from the west, with the result that the enemy were driven off the summit and the northern slopes. The attempt of the Granatieri and Lombardia to advance beyond San Grado on to Hill 123 and complete the occupation of the Veliki Kribach failed; it was here that the gallant General Gandolfo (gold medal), Commander of the Pisa Brigade, was wounded. Some advantages had been secured and 4,500 prisoners captured, at a cost of 17,000 Italian casualties, but the weather now became so bad that the offensive had to be suspended. According to General Cadorna the reasons why greater results had not been achieved in this seventh battle of the Isonzo were that the breaches effected in the enemy wire defences were not wide enough to permit of a rapid irruption of the infantry; that the irruption was in fact not even as rapid as it might have been in the circumstances; that the artillery showed a tendency to extend its fire to the second lines before the first had been sufficiently shattered, and that the visibility was so bad that it was impossible to carry out a really destructive fire and to make good use of gas shells. While the 3rd Army was organizing its newly occupied positions, General Cadorna ordered the 2nd Army to carry out what was intended to appear a bombardment preparatory to an attack on the positions opposite Gorizia, but with the real object of preventing the enemy from sending further reinforcements to the Carso. The troops on the Isonzo were allowed but a brief three weeks to rest and recuperate, and then were called upon for another offensive. On both sides the new lines had been strengthened and extensive preparations made for further operations. The Italian attack was to be carried out by the XI and XIII Corps of the 3rd Army (left and centre) on the Carso, with the VIII Corps (2nd Army) acting in co-operation further north. The main objectives of the XI and XIII Corps were the Faiti ridge and Monte Trstelj. General Ruggeri-Laderchi's VIII Corps was to try to break through the line staked out by Hills 98, 123 and 97. As it had been ascertained that the VIII Corps had only thirteen battalions facing it and the XXVI further north ten, Cadorna issued orders that the right of the VIII should co-operate with the left of the XI and advance along the Biglia - Ranziano line and eventually, when the enemy resistance there had been broken, converge to the left so as to support the action to be carried out by the XXVI against San Marco. The whole of the artillery of the 2nd Army, which could bear upon the enemy defences opposite the VII, VIII and XII Corps fronts, was to come into action. After a bombardment lasting from the morning of the 9th to the afternoon of the 10th of October, the infantry attack was launched at 14 hours 30 minutes under

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torrents of rain. The n th Division (VIII Corps) wrested Hill 95 south-east of San Pietro in the Gorizia area from the enemy, and then Monte Sober, and the 12th Division further south advanced on to Hill 86. The Austrians counter-attacked the occupied positions, but were driven back. On the Carso the XI and XIII Corps, in spite of the vigorous resistance encountered, managed to capture the positions between the Vippacco River and Hill 208 South, including the village of Nova Vas. Further to the right the 16th Division swept over Hill 144 and reached Jamiano, but was forced to fall back from the village under the heavy fire. A thick fog prevented all artillery activity on the 11th , and the only progress made was along the Kostanjevica 1 road, but the enemy counterattacks, effected with fresh troops, were successfully repulsed. The pressure on the Austrians had been relentless, and by the 12th they were forced to evacuate the whole of their first line east of the Vallone, and the Italians pushed on towards the second line, attaining the eastern slopes of Monte Pecinka and the first houses of Loquizza and Hudi Log. On the evening of the 12th the operations were once more suspended. The Italian tactical success had been noteworthy; a considerable amount of ground had been gained, 8,000 prisoners captured, and heavy losses inflicted on the enemy, some of whose units were entirely wiped out. But the Italian losses too had been very severe, heavier than in the seventh battle: 19.000 men in the 3rd Army and 5.000 in the 2nd. After a fortnight's respite, yet a third autumn offensive, the Ninth Battle of the Isonzo, was launched. It should have commenced even earlier than it did, but the constant bad weather and the consequent imperfect visibility had caused the preliminary bombardments to be suspended more than once. Finally, on October 31, it was possible to open fire with good results, and on November 1 the infantry of the XXVI and VIII Corps attacked east of Gorizia. Some positions on the western slopes of San Marco and east of the Vertoiba (Hills 171 and 123 North) were captured, but the troops, laboriously advancing up to their waists in mud, were subjected to a very heavy fire and finally held up; Hill 123 had finally to be evacuated. On the Carso the objectives were the second enemy lines to the east of the Vallone, and the action on the left was crowned with success; the Toscana Brigade, in whose ranks DAnnunzio was serving, seized the Veliki Kribach and advanced beyond it as far as Hill 376, while Monte Pecinka fell to the 1st Bersaglieri and Lombardia Brigades, who also gained possession of Hills 278 and 308 further east. The 4th Division advanced to the Pecinka - Segeti line and Hill 202 on the Oppacchiasella - Kostanjevica Road, but the XIII Corps on the right could effect no appreciable progress. On the night of November 1-2 the enemy counter-attacked the positions captured by the XI Corps, but, although they at first succeeded in regaining possession of Hill 278, they were driven off it once more on the 2nd by the 126th Regiment and the Ferrara Brigade, and the Italian advance was resumed. The next day the Pinerolo Brigade stormed the strongly fortified positions of the Volkovniak,and the Toscana-Lombardia group those of the Dosso Faiti, where they entrenched themselves; on the extreme left the Napoli Brigade was able to secure
1 I have adopted the Slav spelling to distinguish this village from Castagnevizza near Gorizia

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Hills 123 beyond San Grado and 126 near the Vippacco. On the 4th the XIII Corps attempted a turning movement on the far right in the direction of Selo, but failed of its object, except for a small advance in the area between Oppacchiasella and Kostanjevica. That same day, in view of the persistently bad weather and the heavy losses, the Comando Supremo decided to suspend the offensive. On the whole some not unimportant results had been achieved, 9,000 prisoners captured and heavy losses inflicted on the enemy. The Italians had suffered 28,000 casualties in all. These three offensives, known as the Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Battles of the Isonzo, but which may be regarded as three phases of a single great battle, lasted only a few days each. General Cadorna, like his Allied colleagues, had found by experience that the best results were secured in the first impetus when the offensive had been prepared in all its details, the ground reconnoitred and the attacking troops were still fresh, whereas subsequently the losses increased out of all proportion to the diminishing territorial gains, and the troops rapidly became ever more exhausted. Hence the practice of suspending the action before it wore itself out. The Commander-in-Chief intended to carry out yet another offensive later in the autumn, but the weather became so appalling that he had to abandon the idea, in the Vertoiba area between Gorizia and the Carso soldiers had been drowned in the mud during the advance. With the Italians beyond the first and second lines of defence cast of the Vallone and touching the third, centring on Kostanjevica, the Austrians began to be anxious for the safety of their whole lituation. Field-Marshal Borocvich wrote at this time: "The zone immediately protecting Trieste is becoming ever slenderer, and with every fresh step backwards our front becomes ever more extended and the number of troops required to hold it grows ever larger". General Ludendorff states that these offensives and the losses which the Austrians suffered in consequence prevented them from sending troops to Rumania. The losses in the three offensives amounted in all to 9,000 killed, 43,000 wounded, and 23,500 prisoners and missing. During the Isonzo battles fighting had also been going on in the mountain area. To the east of the Adige between the Val Terragnolo and the Vallarsa rises a group of heights formed by the Pasubio and the Col Santo, on the northern and western sides of which flow the two Leno torrents, while the massif is bounded on the south by the Pian delle Fugazze and on the east by the Colle della Borcola. The average elevation is 1,900 metres, but the Pasubio attains 2,236, and the Col Santo 2,114. In the spring of 1916 the Austrians had secured possession of the Col Santo and advanced as far as the Pasubio, which they attacked desperately, without being able to capture it. They had strongly fortified the positions which they had seized, and pressed the Italians hard. The situation of the latter on the Pasubio was a very uncomfortable one, and it was desirable for them to improve it. A first attack by the 44th Division on September 10 had failed owing to the excessive dispersion of the forces employed, who had conducted offensives both in the Pasubio area and against the Pozzacchio - Monte Spil line further west. On October 9 another attack was delivered on a more limited front, from the Sogi to Peak 2059, the Alpe

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Cosmagnon, the plateau between Cosmagnon and the Roite, and the Dente del Pasubio (a peak in the Pasubio group held by the enemy, opposite the Italian positions on that mountain). Alpini and Bersaglieri clambered painfully up the "chimneys" towards the Vallarsa, swooped down on the Cosmagnon, capturing the important Peak 2043, and advanced beyond it to the lower slopes of the Roite (October 12). On the Pasubio the Monte Berico Alpini Battalion ascended the Dente, under a heavy fire, by means of ladders, and gained possession of the lower part of it below the summit, while the Adamello and Monte Suello Battalions broke through the enemy defences, attacked and captured Peak 1895 and the Panettone between Pasubio and the Costone della Lora, entrenching themselves on the newly conquered eminences. After a brief respite the action was resumed on October 27, and the Aosta Alpini Battalion and the Liguria Brigade, in a brilliant attack, captured the whole of the Dente. The enemy opened a terrific fire on the occupying troops and forced them to fall back; they again attacked and captured the Dente; again they lost it, recaptured it once more, but were finally obliged to relinquish the prize, as the situation had become untenable. The attack by the troops who had captured Cosmagnon on the Roite had to be suspended, as the latter position proved too strongly fortified (October 19 and 20). The winter having now set in on those high altitudes, all largescale operations were held up, and only small isolated actions took place from time to time amid the deep snows. Another mountain operation was carried out about this time further to the north-east in the Dolomite area by some units of the 4th Army. An important strategic area was formed by a group of precipitous rocky peaks separating the Travignolo and Avisio valleys to the north, and, barring the head of the Cismon and Vanoi valleys to the south, a veritable wilderness of stone, the needle-like points, all over 2,000 metres in height, separated from each other by deep gullies. The road from the Rolle Pass, held by the Italians, descended to Predazzo, where the Travignolo and Avisio torrents join, to Vigo di Fassa and the Costalunga Pass to Bolzano, and by Cavalese to Ora, so that if the Italians had managed to break through they would have cut the enemy communications with the Trentino along the Brenner railway. The Austrians realized this danger, and, whereas at first they had held this part of the country with weak units, as soon as they ascertained that the Italians were preparing to attack it they brought considerable fresh forces into it. In July the Italians had extended their occupation in the neighbourhood of the Rolle and Colbricon Passes at the head of the Val Cismon, on Peak 2354 south of the Cima di Cece, and on the Cauriol at the head of Val Vanoi. The objective now was to extend these occupations and link them up so as to dominate the famous Dolomite road, leading towards the middle Adige valley. Operations began on September 15, when the Monte Rosa Alpini Battalion succeeded in climbing up the rocky wall to the northeast of Monte Cauriol, and, after four strenuous assaults, captured a strongly fortified ridge 2,318 metres high, together with prisoners and machine-guns. After repelling repeated counter-attacks in the Colbricon area, the Italians also captured Peak 2094 at the head of Val Fosservica, and on the 23rd the

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same Monte Rosa Battalion, assisted by the Feltre Battalion, secured the important position of Monte Gardinal (2,354 metres) north-east of Monte Cauriol, overcoming the vigorous enemy resistance. The few survivors of the defending force were taken prisoners, and the Alpini entrenched themselves beyond Monte Gardinal further to the north. The Austrian counter-attacks continued with ever-increasing forces until September 28, but always without success. The new positions were strengthened and organized, and the access to them, very difficult from the Italian side, was improved. While the eastern peak of the Colbricon (2,604 metres) had been in Italian hands since July, at the beginning of October a new offensive was launched with the object of capturing the second peak of that mountain. This was achieved on October 2 by detachments of Bersaglieri turned into Alpini for the purpose, who further repelled various counter-attacks and pushed on to the northern slopes of the Colbricon. On the 5th they seized strongly fortified positions on the slopes of Monte Costabella in Val San Pellegrino, and the following day an Alpini Battalion captured Peak 2435 in the Busa Alta massif at the head of Val Vanoi. The enemy counterattacks, lasting from the 6th to the 8th, were unsuccessful and cost the Austrians heavy losses. On the 9th the Austrians, whose strength in that area had been brought up to thirty-three battalions, commenced a yet more determined counteroffensive. After a demonstrative action on the Cima di Bocche (on the north side of Val Travignolo), they again attacked the second Colbricon Peak in great force. Repulsed here, they turned once more to the Cima di Bocche, and succeeded in wresting some trenches from the Italians, but were immediately driven out of them again. They hoped by these various activities to concentrate the attention of the Italians on the Val Travignolo area, while they were preparing a more important attack on the Busa Alta (Val Vanoi); this commenced on the evening of the 10th, and was supported by a formidable artillery fire. But again the Bersaglieri and Alpini drove the enemy off with serious losses. Operations also in this area were now suspended for the winter. The year 1916 had thus witnessed a series of important events on the Italian Front. The Austrian offensive in the Trentino had inflicted heavy losses in men and guns on the Italians, and forced them to fall back some distance in the mountainous area north of Vicenza, but it had finally been held up and much of the lost ground was recovered; if the attempt to regain the whole of it was eventually abandoned, it was because it would have involved heavy losses incommensurate with the results to be achieved. The enemy losses, too, had been considerable, and while a part of the area first conquered remained in Austrian hands when the operations were finally suspended in the summer, the Strafe-Expedition as an attempt to break through the mountainous barrier and descend into the Venetain plain was a complete failure. As subsequent events were to prove, the positions which the Austrians held in this area did not enable them to break through even after Caporetto. On the Isonzo the Italians had achieved an important material and moral victory by the capture of the town and bridgehead of Gorizia in August. But the powerfully prepared second lines of enemy defences prevented a further advance

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and a full exploitation of the previous successes. On the Carso, after a series of carefully prepared actions, in which many thousands of prisoners were taken, an advance of some 5 kilometres had been effected at the cost of heavy losses, as here too the enemy had organized successive lines of defence, which enabled them to offer an obstinate resistance even with inferior forces, and to make the Italian advance painfully slow. The Isonzo battles had resulted in an enormous consumption of munitions, which the Italian industrial organization, as it was in 1916, was unable to make good as rapidly as was possible for the Austrians. On the other hand, the Austrian Army had been subjected to a process of attrition which prevented it from making any attempt to assist the Germans in their operations on the Western Front, and weakened the Empire as a whole to the point of preparing its final break-up, only temporarily delayed by the events of October, 1917.

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1917 - SPRING AND SUMMER During the early months of 1917, while no extensive operations were possible on account of weather conditions, much was done to strengthen and improve the Army. Eight complete divisions, comprising 151 newly-raised battalions, of which 96 were infantry, adequately provided with technical, supply and transport services, were created, together with 52 new light field, 44 mountain and 166 medium batteries, and the heavy and medium guns were raised from 1,180 to 2,101. The number of machine-guns, hitherto very inadequate, was considerably increased. The air force was strengthened both in the numbers and quality of the machines, and in the training of the pilots. The output of munitions was greatly Speeded up. The effort, for a country whose industrial organization was still imperfect, and where the number of mechanical workers was comparatively small, was remarkable. The capital invested in war industries had grown from 100,000,000 lire in 1915 to 1,332,000,000 in 1917, the output of iron and steel from 600,000 tons to nearly one million, the auxiliary plants for the production of war material from 125 with 115,000 workmen in 1915 to 1,800 with 600,000 workmen in 1917. Italy was even able to export a certain amount of war material, such as light guns, aeroplanes, motor cars and lorries, small arms, etc., to other Allied countries. Nevertheless, the total amount of production was still inadequate for conducting a general offensive war on such a vast scale to the bitter end. Towards the end of 1916 another meeting of the Allied military representatives had been held at Chantilly, where on November 15 and 16 the French proposal that offensives should be launched on all fronts more or less contemporaneously in February, 1917, had been agreed to. But these various actions were not coordinated, except with regard to time, and even in this respect the various commanders were to be free to subordinate the dates of their respective offensives, within a limit of three weeks, with the possibility of prolonging the delay still further, to the particular circumstances of the various fronts at the particular moment. Moreover, each offensive was to aim at its own objectives, regardless of those of the others. This was evidently not the way to secure a true collaboration of all the Allied efforts towards the common end. On January 6 and 7, 1917, the fifth inter-Allied conference of political and military chiefs was held in Rome, and here proposals of a novel kind were made. Cadorna had long felt that to achieve victory for the common cause it was necessary to concentrate the various forces, not only in time, but in space, i.e., to maintain along the whole of the Allied Fronts just as many troops as were necessary to prevent the enemy from breaking through, and to hold up the enemy reserves but no more, and to concentrate all the other available forces on one particular sector, so as to attain one particular object. In other words what may be called the "linear" war and the system of armies stretched out along the two sides of a vast line, approximately equal to each other in manpower and material, must be abandoned, and the method of mass attacks substituted for it with a concentration and consequently a superiority

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of force on a single comparatively restricted sector. The sector to be selected should be one where the moral and material effects of a break-through would be greatest and most likely to lead to decisive strategic results. It was Mr. Lloyd George who suggested that the effort should be made on the Italian Front, which would create a diversion and might lead to far reaching results. The British and French staffs, however, were opposed to the idea of weakening the Western Front. Cadorna, who was privately sounded, was of course favourable in principle, although naturally he made certain conditions. When the matter was brought up before the Conference, the French and British military representatives repeated their objections to the scheme, while Cadorna did not hide its difficulties, but affirmed that if reinforced by some French and British divisions and guns an offensive could be launched on the Julian Front in the spring, and expressed confidence that he could effect a breakthrough. Were Austria to be thus knocked out, Germany would be left isolated and forced to surrender, as indeed she was to be in November, 1918. For this purpose he did not demand an immense force of Allied troops, as some foreign military historians have stated. Jean de Pierrefeu's assertion in his book "G.Q.G." that Cadorna's exigencies were "impossible" and that he had said: "Give us a million men or none at all", is wholly apocryphal. Cadorna's first idea was that eight divisions and 300 heavy guns would suffice; he afterwards raised this estimate to ten divisions and 400 heavies. In Cadorna's opinion the capture of Laibach and Trieste, which he expected to achieve were he thus reinforced, and the opening of the routes into undefended southern Germany would have led to better results as far as the ending of the War was concerned, than a break-through on the Western Front, where important military objectives were very distant and where at most the liberation of a part of the French districts occupied by the Germans, might have been achieved, a very important result no doubt, but more political than military, and little likely to force the Central Powers to their knees. But the opposition of the British and French General Staffs to any participation on a large scale in operations on other fronts than that of the West, persisted. At the outside they were prepared to lend Italy 300 heavy guns, but on condition that they were returned by April. This did not meet Cadorna's views, because, owing to climatic conditions, no important operations on the Italian Front could be carried out before April. The hostility of the British and French military representatives resulted in the abandonment of Lloyd George's scheme. It was not a question of personal or national jealousy on either side, but simply a divergence between two schools of military thought, Cadorna believing in the principle of concentration on the weakest enemy, his British and French colleagues on the strongest. When the plan was again mooted later, General Foch wrote to General Cadorna that "the British and French forces will form two distinct armies under the command of your Excellency". But this idea never took on in France. General Sir William Robertson, who had been very sceptical as to the results of a large inter-Allied operation on the Italian Front, afterwards admitted that "if, as desired by the Prime Minister, Anglo-French troops

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had been sent to the Italian Front in prosecution of a campaign against Austria, the Italian defeat at Caporetto would at any rate not have occurred, even if the (Allied) offensive itself had achieved nothing of importance"1. Soon after the Rome conference Cadorna drafted a report to the Italian Prime Minister Boselli (January 17, 1917) setting forth in greater detail his views on the possibilities of a successful offensive on the Julian Front. He began by pointing out that if Trieste, and still more if the Save valley could be reached, decisive results would be obtained both by provoking a grave crisis in the Dual Monarchy, and by making the Julian Front the centre of gravity of the operations. The Italian Army had not the material means for such an offensive; Allied assistance might consist of artillery alone, or of artillery and a few large units. In the first instance, with 3,000 more guns, the Isonzo action could be conducted with greater vigour, while at the same time an energetic push might be conducted against the Trentino. Breaches could thus be opened on two fronts and exploited by a manoeuvre along interior lines. In the second case the action would be limited to the Julian Front, but carried out on a much larger scale. In either case the Allied forces should be concentrated in the Gorizia area. He concluded that "Allied co-operation on the Isonzo Front would have most important consequences in the general interest of the coalition", and he, therefore, requested the Italian Government to try "to convince the Allies that no other sector of the whole Western war theatre was so sensitive for the enemy as that of the Isonzo, and that here a vigorous and powerful offensive would provoke so energetic a reaction on the enemy's part as to distract them from other offensive intentions, and to render the contemporaneous Allied action on the Anglo-French Front more effective". He insisted that if Allied assistance on the Italian Front were to be granted it must come at once and that the transport of troops should begin in the middle of February2. Cadorna further adds in his book that the operations of August and September, 1917, reduced the Austro-Hungarian Army to such a plight that if Allied reinforcements had been forthcoming the result would have been decisive and Austria forced to capitulate a year earlier than she actually did. But the Allied Staffs remained obdurate and rejected the proposal. De Pierrefeu, in his above-quoted book, alludes to the claim of the Italians that in case these inter-Allied operations were carried out the command should be entrusted to an Italian general. This is perhaps the real reason of the French refusal. It had always been the practice during the War that the chief command of every inter-Allied army should be entrusted to a general of the nation whose troops were the most numerous contingent in that force. On the Isonzo Front, even with the maximum of ten divisions requested by Cadorna, the Italians would still have formed the overwhelming majority of the troops, and the command would be held by an Italian general. This the French could not swallow. The motive of the British refusal was simply the reluctance to withdraw more troops from the Western Front, in addition to those already sent out to the "side-shows" of Macedonia, Palestine, Iraq, etc., in a
1 2 "Soldiers and Statesmen", Vol. II, p. 252 Cadorna, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 34-39

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word to the predominance of the "Westerners" over the "Easterners". The Allies did contribute a quota of artillery to the Italian operations, not the 300 guns offered but refused because they were to remain only during a period when there was nothing going on, but sixteen batteries of British howitzers (152 mm.) and thirtyfive French guns, mostly heavies. During the battle of the Bainsizza in the early autumn, 102 more French guns were being sent out to Italy, but as soon as that operation terminated they were withdrawn, together with the ninety-nine British and French guns already there. It is curious that a neutral observer, the Swiss Colonel Egli, writes that Italy had received 1,500 British and American guns 1, whereas as a matter of fact, even as late as the battle of the Bainsizza, only one U.S. division had landed in Europe, and that neither a man nor a gun from America had come to Italy (the only American contingent ever in Italy was a single regiment at the very end of the war). For some time past there had been rumours of a possible enemy offensive on the Italian Front, and during the operations of the autumn of 1916 General Cadorna had given orders to the 3rd Army to make preparations in view of this contingency. As he gathered from his conversations with Nivelle and Robertson, the Allied staffs seemed to think that they could assist Italy best by means of offensives on their own fronts; but as Cadorna pointed out, operations elsewhere were not likely to be of much use to the Italian Front, which was so isolated and distant from the others that it would be some time before the effects of such operations could be felt and before help could be forthcoming if it should be needed 2. He reported these conversations to the Prime Minister, concluding that for the coming offensive the Italians must rely on themselves alone, and that it was necessary "to call upon all our energy and all our resources". The chief energy, he comments, was the moral one. "How the Government acted in support of the country's moral energy was made clearly manifest some months later". During the early months of 1917 the situation of the Entente, as a whole, had certainly not improved. On January 1 Germany had announced her unrestricted submarine warfare, which was to place Allied maritime traffic in very serious jeopardy, even though, by bringing the United States into the War, it later secured a great increase of strength for the Entente. In March the Russian Revolution broke out, and with it Russia's military power, already stricken at Gorlice in the spring of 1915, was definitely destroyed. Italy was now to bear the brunt of the whole of the Austrian Army, except for a number of weak and tired divisions left on the Russian Front to share the plunder, such as it was, with the Germans, and a few small units in Macedonia and Rumania. In that same month General Nivelle launched his long expected and prepared offensive on the Western Front, but as the Germans had fallen back on the strongly fortified lines between Arras and Soissons, fifty kilometres to the rear, the Allies had to devote another month to preparations on a vast scale for a further advance, so that the real offensive only began on April 16. On the credit side was the breaking off of relations between the United States and Germany, on March 3, followed by the American declaration of war on April 5, but the coming of
1 2 Karl Egli, "Das vierte Jahr und der Schluss des Weltkrieges", p. 42 Cadorna, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 40

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the American troops to Europe was far slower than the break-up of the Russian Army, and the consequent liberation of large numbers of German and Austrian divisions for operations on the Western and Italian Fronts. The Italian offensive commenced on May 12. This date has been criticized by certain foreign military historians as excessively tardy. De Civrieux, for instance, writes: "In spite of the repeated requests, based on the highest and most legitimate reasons, Russia and Italy marked time, while the French and the British hurled themselves on to the formidable German positions. Only on May 14 did Cadorna make up his mind to carry out a general attack on the Isonzo and the Carso"1. This statement is misleading and inaccurate. At Chantilly, as we have seen, it had been decided that the various Allied offensives were to be ready for February 15, but each commander was entitled to a delay of three weeks, which might even be extended a little longer. While preparations were being made by the Allies, events of various natures occurred, which induced them all to postpone action. On February 9 the Germans had commenced their withdrawal on to the "Siegfriedstellung"; a month later the Russian Revolution had broken out, and about the same time the Italian " I " service reported the concentration of a considerable mass of fresh artillery on the Tonezza and Asiago plateaux, and of reinforcements in the upper Adige valley. General Nivelle's offensive in France had consequently been postponed, and did not begin till April 16; even that date appeared premature, as the exceptionally bad weather should have counselled further delay. In order to be within the prescribed time limit of three weeks agreed upon, General Cadorna should have attacked on May 7, and in fact, on April 12, as soon as he had ascertained that there was no danger of an enemy offensive in the Trentino 2, he issued orders for the Isonzo attack to commence on May 7. The operation was only retarded on account of the bad weather for five days, a delay beyond the three weeks period laid down at Chantilly. In any case the slight difference in date between the commencement of the French and Italian offensives did not produce any ill-effects, as not a man nor a gun of the Austrian Army was transferred from the Italian to the Franco-German Front. Moreover, the French offensive was from the first a pronounced failure, and by May 5, i.e. before the Italian operations began, it had come to a premature end. The disappointment in France was such that a series of very grave mutinies broke out in a large part of the French Army; M. Painleve, who at that time was Minister of War, afterwards stated that at the beginning of June there were only two divisions which could be absolutely counted upon between Soissons and Paris, if the Germans had attacked 3. The French Army thus had its moral crisis, as the Italian was to have at Caporetto, but fortunately for France and the Allied cause it did not occur contemporaneously with a great enemy offensive; moreover, nothing was allowed to transpire, so that no one outside the area immediately concerned and the units
"Pages de vrit" (sic), p. 126 General Conrad had indeed proposed an Austro-German offensive in January on the Plezzo and Trentino Fronts, but his plan was rejected, and soon afterwards he was removed from his post as Chief of the General Staff 3 In "Le Petit Parisien", Jan. 21, 1922 1 2 77

affected heard of the trouble until a long time afterwards. General Petain, who succeeded General Nivelle, superseded immediately after the failure of his offensive, had to limit himself to reorganizing his forces before he could think of further active operations. It was, in fact, not until the end of October that he felt that he could safely demand a further effort of his men, and this first effort was the comparatively secondary action known as the battle of La Malmaison. Nivelle's failure, and the consequent inaction lasting several months, produced the more disastrous results; General Mangin indeed goes so far as to assert that but for this, "the collapse of Russia and Caporetto would have been avoided"1. That a successful French offensive would have prevented the collapse of Russia is more than doubtful, as the country and army were already in a state of advanced disintegration; but Caporetto would in all probability not have occurred. Ludendorff, however, states that the comparative calm on the Western Front enabled Germany to transfer seven divisions from France to the Eastern Front, where they contributed to the failure of the Kerensky offensive; but even without those seven divisions the already Bolshevized Russian Army was no longer a force to be reckoned with. Cadorna's activities in the first months of 1917 may be divided into two phases: in the first he was engaged in taking the necessary measures in view of a possible enemy offensive, of which the indications supplied by his " I " service were insistent, and in the second he was preparing for and carrying out his own spring offensive on the Isonzo. As operations in the Trentino were not possible in winter, the reserve artillery of the 1st and of the newlyformed 6th Army 2 were transferred to the Isonzo. On March 4 the Gorizia Zone Command was created, comprising the VI, XXVI and VIII Corps, withdrawn from the 2nd Army; later the II Corps was also added to it, so as to unify all the forces operating between Monte Kuk and Monte Santo. The Command was entrusted to General Capello, who had distinguished himself in preparing and conducting the Gorizia bridgehead offensive. The 2nd Army was reduced to the IV Corps, to which the XII (Carnia Force) was afterwards added. The Commander-in-Chief laid down that in the event of an enemy offensive the troops were to oppose it without excessive wastage and hold it up as long as possible on the existing first lines, and then fall back on the line of chief resistance, based on the Sabotino, Gorizia, the Lucinico bridgehead, the Isonzo, the Savogna bridgehead, and the line east of the Vallone, passing along Nad Logem, Hill 208 South and Hill 144. By April 5 Cadorna created an important reserve at the disposal of the Comando Supremo, consisting of the XIX, XXIV and XXVI Corps, plus the 12th, 54th, 57th and 60th Divisions (ten divisions in all). But in the meanwhile, the signs of an imminent enemy offensive were diminishing, and he issued orders for a new Italian action to the Gorizia Command and the 3rd Army. The operation was to be developed in three phases: the first, a heavy bombardment along the whole Isonzo Front from Tolmino to the sea; the
1 2 "Comment finit la guerre", p. 168 It had been created after the Austrian offensive of May, 1916, and comprised the troops on the Asiago plateau and in the Valsugana 78

second, an attack by the troops of the Gorizia Command on the heights between Plava and Gorizia, especially on Monte Kuk, Monte Vodice, Monte Santo and Monte San Gabriele, and on the hills east of the town; the third, an attack by the 3rd Army from the Vippacco river to the sea, in order to advance on Monte Hermada, guarding the access to Trieste. The Gorizia Command comprised 12 divisions, 140 field batteries, 528 heavy guns and 67 trench-mortar batteries, the 3rd Army, commanded by H.R.H. the Duke of Aosta, 16 divisions, 190 field batteries, 530 heavy guns and 63 trench-mortar batteries. The enemy strength had also been increased by four more corps, two of which were on the Carso, under General Wurm, one of the best Austrian leaders. The whole force, constituting the 5th Army under Field-Marshal Boroevich, comprised 215 battalions, 915 field guns and 410 heavies, besides trench-mortars. Another corps was added on the Bainsizza plateau, and later on further reinforcements and guns were brought up from the Russian front, which was already beginning to crumble. In one respect the Austrians had the advantage of the Italians: in the abundance of munitions. We shall see later how this affected the course of the operations. The bombardment began at dawn on May 12, as arranged, and lasted for two days along the whole front, until noon on the 14th, when the infantry attack was launched from Plava to Gorizia. The Udine Brigade took Hill 383 east of Plava, by assault, a hill also known as Quota Montanari after the gallant general of that name who had found his death there; the Firenze got on to a spur of the Kuk system, and the Avellino overcame the defences of Zagora and occupied part of the Zagomila forts. The 230th Regiment (Campobasso Brigade) climbed laboriously up on to Monte Santo and reached the ruined convent on the summit. Further south the Messina captured Hill 174 north of Tivoli (east of Gorizia), and Hill 126 near Grazigna, but these two positions had to be evacuated under the heavy counterattacks. During the night, a battalion of Bersaglieri and one of Alpini succeeded in getting across the Isonzo between Loga and Bodrez by surprise, and forming a temporary bridgehead for the passage of other troops. After a short pause, the battle was resumed on the 15th with no less ardour, and in spite of the formidable Austrian resistance, General Badoglio's II Corps attained the summit of Monte Kuk and the saddle of the Vodice, and established itself firmly on the conquered positions. Throughout the following week the battle moved forward to the attack. The action of the XI Corps on the left was to be a demonstrative operation with the object of engaging the enemy on the heights east of Monte Volkovniak, and on Hills 370 and 363. On the centre and right between Kostanjevica and the coast, the XIII and VII Corps attacked resolutely, and with a dashing onslaught overwhelmed the first line, occupied the area south of the road from Kostanjevica to Hudi Log, turned the positions in the last-named village, advanced beyond Lukatich, reached Jamiano, and occupied Hills 92, 77, 58, the baths east of the Adriawerke and Hill 21 on the extreme right. Some 130 aeroplanes took part in the action, dropping bombs and sprinkling the enemy lines with machine-

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gun fire. The following day the battle continued to rage. The enemy counter-attacked time after time, but were ever beaten off and none of the conquered positions were lost. On the 25th, the strongly fortified lines at Flondar were attacked with extreme vigour, and in spite of the gallant defence put up by the defenders, the Italians succeeded in breaking through and pushing on to the slopes of the formidable Monte Hermada, the chief bulwark of the defence of Trieste. The villages of San Giovanni and Medeazza were reached, 2,000 prisoners taken, and that same day the whole of the Hudi Log salient fell into Italian hands. Some further advantages were secured during the following days, and the troops of the 4th Division were able to occupy the much disputed village of Kostanjevica on the 26th. But the enemy concentrated masses of artillery fire on it, and forced the Italians to evacuate the ruined houses. On the 26th and 27th, the XIII Corps fought its way forward, repelling all counterattacks, and the VII reached the mouth of the Timavo river, where some 800 prisoners were taken. Hill 28, beyond the river, which had also been seized, had to be abandoned; it was on the bridge over the Timavo that the gallant Major Randaccio died in the arms of the poet D'Annunzio, who had taken part in the action, and afterwards celebrated the death of the hero. On the 29th, minor actions were fought, but the fury of the battle was dying down, and the troops set to work to organize the newly captured lines for defence. In all, 16,000 prisoners had been taken in the Carso operations, besides the 6,000 in the Gorizia raged unceasingly; the Austrians delivered repeated counterattacks on the Vodice lines, but were always beaten off by General Gonzaga's 53rd Division. Further gains were registered, notably with the capture of Hill 363 east of Plava, Globna, Paljevo, the whole of the Kuk-Vodice ridge, and some positions on the Grazigna hill and near the Gorizia cemetery. The Bodrez bridgehead, having served its purpose, was evacuated on the night of the 19th without enemy pressure. General Cadorna describes the fighting of those days as "of unheard-of violence and of imperishable glory for our troops"1. It resulted in the occupation of the whole massif separating the Isonzo from the deep defile south of Anhovo. The Italian line had now been extended, and followed the ridge of Hill 363, Monte Kuk (611), Hills 592 and 652 of the Vodice, the saddle of Hill 503, the eastern slopes of Monte Santo (the summit had been occupied for a short time, but could not be held), and merged into the old line opposite the Isonzo. Over 7,000 prisoners were taken, together with quantities of war material of all kinds. The enemy attempt to create a diversion by attacking in the Valsugana, Asiago and Pasubio areas and some other points, was everywhere repulsed. The third phase of the Isonzo action began on May 23, with a fresh attack on the Carso. Cadorna had intended to make another attempt on Monte Santo and San Gabriele, north-north-east of Gorizia, at the same time, but the scarcity of munitions rendered the double operation impossible. The number of guns had greatly increased, especially of the heavies, but shell shortage seriously attenuated this advantage. On the 17th, he had to give orders that the medium and heavy artillery
1 Op. cit. , Vol. II, p. 58

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should not be used except when offensive actions were actually proceeding, or the enemy attacking in force 1. He consequently decided to limit the new attack to the sector between the Vippacco and the sea, i.e. to the 3rd Army area. The bombardment commenced at 6 hours on the 23rd, and effectively shattered the enemy positions which had already been previously damaged, and at 16 hours on the same day the infantry moved forward to the attack. The action of the XI Corps on the left was to be a demonstrative operation woth the object of engaging the enemy on the heights east of Monte Volkovniak, and on Hills 370 and 363. On the centre and right between Kostanjevica and the coast, the XIII and VII Corps attacked resolutely, and with a dashing onslaught overwhelmed the first line, occupied the area south of the road from Kostanjevica to Hudi Log, turned the positions in the last-named village, advanced beyond Lukatich, reached Jamiano, and occupied Hills 92, 77, 58, the baths east of the Adriawerke and Hill 21 on the extreme right. Some 130 aeroplanes took part in the action, dropping bombs and sprinkling the enemy lines with machine-gun fire. The following day the battle continued to rage. The enemy counter-attacked time after time, but were ever beaten off and none of the conquered positions were lost. On the 25th, th strongly fortified lines at Flondar were attacked with extreme vigour, and in spite of the gallant defence put up by the defenders, the Italians succeeded in breaking through and pushing on to the slopes of the formidable Monte Hermada, the chief bulwark of the defence of Trieste. The villages of San Giovanni and Medeazza were reached, 2.000 prisoners taken, and that same day the whole Hudi Log salient fell into Italian hands. Some further advantages were secured during the following days, and the troops of the 4th Division were able to occupy the much disputed village of Kostanjevica on the 26th. But the enemy concentrated masses of artillery fire on it, and forced the Italians to evacuate the ruined houses. On the 26th and 27th, the XIII Corps fought its way forward, repelling all counterattacks, and the VII reached the mouth of the Timavo river, where 800 prisoners were taken. Hill 28, beyond the river, which had also been seized, had to be abandoned; it was on the bridge over the Timavo that the gallant Major Randaccio died in the arms of the poet D'Annunzio, who had taken part in the action, and afterwards celebrated the death of the hero. On the 29th, minor actions were fought, but the fury of the battle was dying down, and as the troop set to work to organize the newly captured lines for defence. In all, 16.000 prisoners had been taken in the Carso operations, besides the 6.000 in the Gorizia zone, and an advance of the Carso line of 2 to 4 kilometres had been effected. The enemy were particularly alarmed at the Italian advance towards the Hermada, which was the most delicate sector of this part of the front. Boroevich admitted that the action of May, 1917, was the first heavy blow suffered by the Austrians in that year, and when he was asked by the command of the Austrian South-Western Front whether he could still guarantee the safety of Trieste, he replied that the position of the Italians towards the sea was so threatening that a
1 Op. cit. , Vol. II, p. 62

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counter-offensive must be made. He was then given three fresh divisions, the 35th and 12th Infantry and the 21st Landesschutzen, and on June 4 he delivered a powerful attack on the Italian 3rd Army lines. The Italian troops, exhausted by twenty-three days of ceaseless fighting involving very heavy losses, and occupying rudimentary trench positions not yet adequately organized between the Faiti and the sea, were forced back, and a considerable part of the ground gained in the previous days was lost. The Italians reacted no less obstinately and restored the situation throughout. On that same day the positions occupied by General Diaz's XXIII Corps, which had replaced the XII between Versic and Jamiano, were attacked, but the enemy failed to make any impression. Further south the Austrians attacked the Italian 20th Division with fresh troops, and surprised a force holding the two railway tunnels north of San Giovanni on the Monfalcone Trieste line, and took most of the men prisoners. This episode determined the break-down of the Italian line on the ground captured in the May offensive on the extreme right, and the troops were forced to fall back on their departure trenches. As General Cadorna wrote, while there were then innumerable episodes of extreme gallantry, "we must confess for the sake of historic truth that in some units episodes which were not creditable occurred". In this counterattack, in fact, the Austrians had taken 25,000 prisoners, mostly in the Flondar-Hermada area, which "made the Comando Supremo realize that something was changed in the spirit of the troops, in consequence of the poisonous propaganda conducted by the seditious parties. The Comando Supremo did not fail to inform the Government repeatedly of its anxiety on this score in that same first half of June, with what effect will be told in a future publication"1. Altogether the Italian losses had amounted to 36,000 killed, 96,000 wounded and 25,000 prisoners. The enemy losses too had been severe: some 100,000 killed and wounded and 24,000 prisoners. Important advantages had been secured in the Kuk and Vodice massif and the Carso. But the dominant positions of Monte Santo, San Gabriele, Panowitz and Rosenthal remained in enemy hands, together with the approaches to the Hermada, which attenuated the advantages secured on the Carso. The Italians had already borne more than their share of the Allied operations in the first half of 1917. The Tenth Battle of the Isonzo, lasting from May 12 to June 4, had involved heavier losses than those of the Nivelle offensive, and had secured somewhat more tangible results, even if it had failed to prove decisive. The French now seemed disinclined to make any further efforts on a large scale until the following year, when the weight of American intervention would make itself felt. On the Western Front the British alone continued to attack doggedly and without respite. General Cadorna too was not content with the partial success achieved, and was determined to launch yet another offensive as soon as he had organized his new positions and secured the necessary reinforcements and munitions. This time the effort was to be made on the Bainsizza plateau, north-east of Gorizia. While making his preparations for the new move on the Isonzo, Cadorna
1 Op. cit., Vol. II, p. 70-71. The publication alluded to has not yet appeared

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ordered a minor operation to be entrusted to the 6th Army on the Ortigara group. The Italian counter-offensive of June, 1916, although largely successful, had left the enemy still in possession of a strong line of defence along the summits of Monte Ortigara, Monte Campigoletti, Monte Chiesa, Monte Forno, Monte Colombara and Monte Zebio, south of the Valsugana, which enabled them to conduct operations against the Val d'Assa and Val Galmarara. These positions represented a constant menace to the rear of the Italians in the Cadore, the Carnia, and to some extent even on the Isonzo, which it was desirable if possible to eliminate. The 6th Army, which was to carry out the operations, was commanded by General Mambretti. General Montuori's XX Corps was to break through the lines on Monte Ortigara and Monte Forno, while General Negri's XXII was to operate further south between Cima Zebio and Monte Mosciagh. When the two breaches had been made, the XX was to press through them and secure possession of the whole northern edge of the plateau towards the Valsugana, and the XXII was to attain the eastern edge of the lower Val Galmarara. The XXVI Corps (General Fabbri) and the XVIII (General Etna) were to lend support. On the morning of June 10, the artillery opened fire, and at 15 hours the infantry rushed to the attack. The 52nd Division (18 of the best Alpini battalions) and the 29th (12 infantry battalions) advanced on the Ortigara and Monte Forno; the Bassano and Aroscio Battalions, after a desperate hand-to-hand struggle, captured the Passo dell'Agnella, and took the surviving defenders prisoners, and the Monte Baldo, Val d'Ellero and Monte Clapier Battalions secured Peak 2101 of the Ortigara. The men had fought magnificently, but the losses had been terribly heavy; nearly all the officers had fallen. The Sette Comuni and Verona Battalions had in the meanwhile tackled the summit of Ortigara (2105 metres), but had been held up by the still intact defences and wire entanglements which the artillery had failed to destroy. Assisted by the survivors of the other battalions, further attacks were delivered on Peak 2105 under the lead of General Di Giorgio on that and the following days, but without success and with serious losses on both sides. On June 10 alone, the Italians lost 122 officers and 2,154 men. Further south the battalions of the 1st and 2nd Alpini Groups unavailingly attacked Monte Campigoletti and Costone Ponari, nor were the units of the 29th Division more fortunate in their attempts on Monte Forno, which they captured and lost again, or those of the XXII Corps units against the lines between Monte Zebio and Monte Mosciagh. On the 19th, General Di Giorgio's two groups (8th and 9th), reinforced by two battalions of the 4th Infantry, delivered a systematic onslaught on the summit of Ortigara, and succeeded in getting on to it and capturing 1,000 prisoners. But Monte Campigoletti and the other positions south of the Ortigara still held out in spite of repeated attacks, and Di Giorgio's force found itself in a most precarious situation, almost isolated, with very difficult communications, and exposed to an infernal fire. It held its own with splendid doggedness for several days, but on June 25, after a still more intensified enemy bombardment which shattered the improvised defences and cut all remaining communications, strong Austrian reinforcements, under General

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von Goiginger, delivered a vigorous attack, while assault detachments with Flammenwerfer and hand-grenades rushed the summit. A desperate melee ensued on the rugged peak, and the Alpini and infantrymen, split up into small groups, defended themselves tooth and nail, until the survivors were finally overwhelmed. Ortigara was thus lost, and four days later the now untenable Passo dell'Agnella was also evacuated. On the 25th, the Italian losses amounted to 2,989 killed and wounded, and 2,644 missing, but of the latter some 800 more must have been killed, as the Austrians only reported 1,800 prisoners. During the whole action, the Italian 52nd Division, which bore the brunt of the fighting, lost 657 officers and 15,181 men, and the Austrians 307 officers and 8,985 men. Altogether it was a most unfortunate episode, and involved the supreme sacrifice of the Alpini. General Cadorna attributes the failure partly to certain errors of leadeship in the conduct of the operation, and to the unfavourable weather conditions which handicapped the Italian artillery fire on the enemy defences, but also to the effects of that same seditious propaganda which had made itself felt during the Austrian counter-offensive on the Carso at the beginning of June. He adds, however, that certain units, notably the Alpini of the 52nd Division, who suffered the heaviest losses, were unaffected by the poison. "It was", he adds, "four months before Caporetto and certain phenomena, although suddenly manifest in all their magnitude, are always preceded at longer or shorter intervals of time by symptoms which must be regarded, and they were so regarded by the Comando Supremo, as alarm signals"1. It was also considered in some quarters a mistake to entrust mass operations to the Alpini, whose peculiar and admirable qualities appear at their best in isolated actions by small groups, when individual initiative is all-important. On the other fronts the situation was no less unsatisfactory in this third quarter of 1917. In July, the Kerensky offensive had been launched, and after an ephemeral success ended in disaster, and was indeed the very last flicker of life in the Russian Army. For the moment the Western Front was not directly affected, as the Germans had for a long time concentrated nearly all their most efficient units in France, while even after the Russian debacle they continued to employ considerable numbers of second line troops to occupy as large an area as possible of Russian territory. But for the Austrians it meant the liberation from an incubus, and the possibility of concentrating practically the whole of their Army on the Italian Front. Already during the May-June operations on the Isonzo Front, the Italians had begun to feel the effects of the disappearance of Russia from the ranks of the Allies, in the increased pressure of the Austrians, who, as we have seen, had begun to withdraw troops and guns from the Eastern Front.

Vol. II, p. 75

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THE BAINSIZZA General Cadorna had decided to resume the offensive on a large scale for the second time in 1917, and on August 18 commenced what Earl Haig was to define as a splendid effort beyond the Isonzo. Field-Marshal Boroevich, although he had been reinforced by three more divisions and an artillery brigade, calculated to infuse new life into his badly shaken troops, actually meditated a withdrawal behind the Chiapovano valley. But General von Goiginger made him realize the extreme risk of such a movement and urged him to hold his ground on the eastern edge of the Bainsizza plateau, as he believed the Italian troops to be now exhausted in consequence of their recent strenuous efforts; he finally persuaded him to take this course. The battle which was to follow, sometimes called the Eleventh Battle of the Isonzo, but more generally known as the Battle of the Bainsizza, from the plateau where the most desperate fighting took place, had a front extending from Tolmino to the mouth of the Timavo river. On account of the large number of troops and guns engaged, it was the most important battle hitherto fought on the Italian Front. The reasons which induced General Cadorna to launch this offensive were of a four-fold nature. 1. The Tenth Battle of the Isonzo in the previous spring had, as we have seen, resulted in the capture of some important positions, notably the Kuk - Vodice massif, but these gains had remained isolated and, in spite of the great effort and heavy losses, the general outcome was incomplete. The Bainsizza plateau, between the Isonzo opposite Plava and the broad valley of Chiapovano, the formidable heights east of Gorizia, so often attacked in vain, and the Trstelj-Hermada line form a series of bastions or bulwarks covering the middle and lower Isonzo, and if they could be wrested from the enemy they would constitute the best protection for the whole Julian Front against an enemy offensive, which was regarded as probable in view of the collapse of the Russian Front and the consequent strengthening of the AustroHungarian military situation. For offensive purposes, the conquest of these positions would entail that of the dangerous Tolmino bridgehead and open the way to a further and perhaps decisive advance into enemy territory. 2. At the various inter-allied conferences, Italy had undertaken to collaborate with the operations now to be carried out on the Franco-British Front. At the July meeting, the other Allied chiefs had requested the Italians to carry out two great offensives before the winter set in, and if the lack of reserves and the insufficiency of munitions made this impossible, at least one such operation must be conducted. 3. The knowledge of the difficult internal situation of the Central Powers, especially of Austria, engendered the belief that by a fresh successful onslaught the enemy might be forced to surrender. 4. Finally, the general state of the country and the political situation made a protracted period of inaction inadvisable. Public feeling in Italy was then at a very low ebb; seditious propaganda, fostered perhaps by the Central Powers by means of

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their own Socialist parties and certainly by Bolshevik agents, was active, as was seen in the artificially-promoted riots in Turin in August. The pacifists, who at that time were practically indistinguishable from enemy spies and Bolshevik revolutionists, were busily at work, and public opinion was divided. Defeatism was widespread in many spheres, owing to the terrible losses, the collapse of Russia, the apparent impossibility of securing decisive results, and the hardships suffered by the civil population. "The victory of the Bainsizza", afterwards wrote the Minister Bissolati to Captain Gallarate-Scotti, on September 2, "saved the country from collapse". Orders for the preparation of the new offensive began to be issued as early as May 28, immediately after the termination of the spring battle, and preparations were actually commenced a little later. The Comando Supremo proceeded to concentrate all available forces on the Julian Front, and by August 18, 51 divisions, comprising some 600 battalions out of a total of 887, were distributed throughout the Friuli, with nearly 5,000 guns of all calibres and trench-mortars. The Gorizia Zone Command had been suppressed after the spring offensive, and the 2nd Army reconstituted with six corps (26 and a half divisions) under General Capello. The IV Corps (3 divisions in line and a brigade in reserve) was deployed from Plezzo to the Tolmino bridgehead, the XXVII (3 divisions and 2 brigades in reserve) from Tolmino to Ronzina, the XXIV (2 divisions and one brigade in reserve) from Ronzina to Anhovo, the II (3 divisions and one brigade in reserve) from Anhovo to the Dol saddle, the VI (2 divisions) from the Dol saddle to Panowitz, the VIII (3 divisions in line, one division and one brigade in reserve) from Panowitz to the Vippacco river. The IV, II, VI and VIII Corps were for the most part on the left of the Isonzo, the XXVII and XXIV between Plava and the western slopes of Monte Santo. The VIII Corps was to some extent an autonomous force, maintaining the liaison between the 2nd and 3rd Armies, and destined to extend the occupation of enemy territory in case of success. It formed part of the 3rd Army, but its transfer to the 2nd was provided for. The 2nd Army had been increased by 100 battalions and one cavalry division, and disposed of 2,366 guns and 960 trenchmortars. The 3rd Army comprised 18 divisions (204 battalions), 1,200 guns and 800 trench-mortars. In addition lo these forces, the Comando Supremo had constituted a special reserve, consisting of six division and a half of infantry and a division and a half of cavalry. The enemy forces opposing the Italians were still grouped in the 5th Army, which, however, now took the name of the Isonzo Armee, comprising five corps with 248 battalions in all. Three divisions had arrived from the Russian Front, six were in course of transfer, and the arrival of eight more was reported as probable. The French Army being still practically inactive, the Germans could dispose of 18 divisions to strengthen the Austrians on the Eastern or the Italian Front, if necessary. For these reasons, General Cadorna requested the Prime Minister, Signor Boselli, to take energetic diplomatic action in order to induce the Russian Provisional Government to carry out its undertakings as an ally under the terms of the Pact of London, to assist Italy by attacking the Austrians. He did not of course realize the utter demoralization into which the Russian Army and people had fallen.

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The fact that the Tolmino bridgehead was still in Austrian hands to a large extent rendered nugatory the advantages accruing to the Italians from the possession of most of the left bank of the Isonzo, and accessible as that bridgehead was by a railway and good roads, it could become a valuable concentration area for an enemy offensive, as indeed was afterwards the case. The Bainsizza plateau was another concentration area, whence troops could be directed towards the Gorizia, Carso and Upper Isonzo sectors via the Vallone of Chiapovano between the Britof basin and the Idria valley. The action against the Bainsizza was entrusted mainly to the XXIV and XXVII Corps; if these units succeeded in breaking down the enemy defences opposed to them, they were to push on to the Ternova forest plateau and thus turn the positions east of Gorizia, and eventually occupy the Aidussina zone east of the Carso as well. The 3rd Army was to resume the offensive interrupted in the previous June, and attack along the line from the Vippacco to the coast. On the night of August 18-19, General Caviglia's XXIV Corps threw its bridges across the Isonzo at Loga, Aiba and Anhovo, General Vanzo's XXVII was to do the same at Javor, Doblar and Ronzina. The task was a formidable one: to force the passage of an unfordable river in the face of an enemy strongly fortified on elevations descending precipitously to the water's edge, with masses of machineguns ensconced in rock-hewn dug-outs. Of the 14 bridges planned, it actually proved possible to throw across only six, as the enemy resistance was exceedingly vigorous, especially on the XXVII Corps front; the V Alpini Group, instead of crossing at Javor as arranged and attacking the Lorn heights, had to be transferred to Doblar, and the Trapani Brigade crossed at Loga by the bridges of the XXIV Corps. This delayed the passage of the XXVII Corps units, who consequently found themselves at some distance from the objectives assigned to them, while the 60th Division was held up at Canale. By the morning of the 19th, 8 battalions of the XXVII and 4 of the XXIV had got across and tackled the enemy's lines, which were in triple order: along the bank, halfway up the hill-side and along the higher ridge formed by the Vrh (601 m.), the Kuk (711 m.), the Jelinek (788 m.) and the Kobilek (627 m.). Other units now intervened in the operations, and while the XXVII Corps was attacking the Auzza lines, the IV and VI engaged the enemy in diversive actions to the north and the south. General Badoglio's II Corps overwhelmed the defences on Hill 300, and the two Bersaglieri Brigades of the 47th Division (XXIV Corps) with dashing gallantry, broke through the Fratta- Semmer-Kuk lines. With the help of concentrated artillery fire on the positions near Canale, and an attack on their rear by two Bersaglieri battalions, the 60th Division also managed to get across the river. On the night of the 19-30, the bridges damaged by hostile fire were repaired, and some others built, 10 that most of the remaining troops of the XXVI Corps were able to cross, and although they were at first held up by the enemy on the Avsek and at the head of the Siroka Nijva valley, which the Austrians dominated from Hill 645, units of the XXIV advanced on the Ossoinica - Osedrih sector, and attacked the Kuk and Jelenik from the flank and rear. The following day the XXVII Corps troops were

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at Auzza and crossed the Avsek, the 5th Bersaglieri Brigade took Ossoinica by assault, and the 1st Bersaglieri Brigade established themselves on the saddle between Hill 856 of the Osedrih, still strongly held by the Austrians, and on the Jelenlk; they managed to get on to the Osedrih by noon, but lost it soon after. Monte Kuk fell to the Tortona Brigade (60th Division). On the 22nd, the Jelenik, attacked on three sides and gripped as in a vice, was wrested from the enemy, and the II Corps, after overcoming the fierce resistance on the Rutarse - Bavterca line, pushed on to the attack of the Kobilek. This mountain and the Osedrih, the last buttresses of the enemy defence system, collapsed on the 23rd, and the whole of the Vrh and the Bate also fell into Italian hands. Further south the formidable Monte Santo (683 m.) had likewise been captured. In the Mesniak and Veliki Vrh areas, the XXVII Corps and the XIV (General Sagramoso), which had also been brought into action, were held up. But during the night of the 23rd 24th, fires and explosions along the whole of the enemy line indicated that a general withdrawal was being carried out, and the Italian commanders gave orders for a vigorous pursuit. The Austrians intended to fall back on the Mesenjak - Kal - Vrhovec - Madoni - Zagorie - San Gabriele line, where other defensive systems had been prepared, and the progress of the Italians across the plateau was unavoidably slow and arduous. There was no water, the roads had been destroyed, and the ground, naturally very broken, was further pitted with innumerable shell-holes, so that, although the enemy had suffered a really severe reverse, the forces defending the Bainsizza had not been destroyed. The Italians had advanced some 10 kilometres in depth and occupied an area of 200 square kilometres, captured 20,000 prisoners, 125 guns and immense quantities of stores and war material of all kinds. But they were exhausted to the verge of collapse, and also had to slow down their advance in order that their artillery and supply services, naturally slower than the infantry, might catch them up. What was more serious, was that there were scarcely any reserves to make good the wide gaps in their ranks, and of the 3,500,000 heavy and medium shells accumulated for the offensive, over 2,000,000 had been used up; and although the supply of munitions was now well organized, the possibility of an enemy counter-offensive in the Trentino or on the Carso had to be borne in mind since the Russian front had ceased to exist. FieldMarshal Boroevich was indeed informed on September 1 that such an action was about to be undertaken in view of the large forces available from Russia. The battle did not altogether cease, but it split up into many isolated actions, and the XXIV and XXVII Corps succeeded in laboriously effecting some further progress, until on August 29, the Comando Supremo ordered the suspension of the offensive, except for a final effort to break through the defences north and east of Gorizia. While these operations were proceeding on the Bainsizza, another battle had been raging since the 19th, all along the 3rd Army front, supported on the extreme right by the fire of Italian and British monitors at the head of the Adriatic. The enemy resistance here was even more obstinate than on the Bainsizza, and very little progress was achieved. The advantages secured by General Ricci-Armani's VII

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Corps (now under the 3rd Army) east of Tivoli, and by the XI and XXV in the Kostanjevica area, were soon lost, and only General Diaz's XXIII and General Sailer's XIII Corps further to the right succeeded in advancing in the Versic-Selo and San Giovanni-Lokavez sectors. Some further progress was registered on the following days, but on the 23rd, operations were suspended on this front also, on account of the heavy losses incommensurate with the advantages obtained. The advance in the direction of Mt. Hermada, small as it was, again alarmed the Austrians as had been the case in the spring, and on September 4 they launched a formidable counter-offensive on that sector. The units of the XXIII Corps lost some ground rear Brestovica, but regained it at once; the XIII was driven back to its departure trenches, and, although some of its troops advanced once more as far as the railway, where they took 500 prisoners and liberated 1,000 Italians who had been bottled up in a railway tunnel, in the end after heavy fighting on the 5th and 6th, they had to fall back on their old lines across the Lisert marshes. On September 11, another attempt was made to capture San Gabriele. After a bombardment of unheard-of intensity, the 11th Division (VI Corps) succeeded in reaching the summit where it captured 2,000 prisoners, but immediately afterwards the equally intense enemy fire forced them to withdraw to positions 100 metres lower down. The fighting on San Gabriele continued for several days with appalling violence and ghastly losses on both sides. Lieut.-Colonel Sauer, of the 14th Austrian Regiment, wrote: "Who could fully describe this San Gabriele, this sort of Moloch which swallows up a regiment every three or four days, and doubtless, even if it is not admitted, changes ownership from day to day?" An attempt to secure the fall of the mountain by isolating its defenders by means of an even more violent bombardment from all sides was now made, but it had to be abandoned on account of the incredible consumption of ammunition which it entailed. On September 4 and 5, the Austrians counter-attacked from the Dol saddle to Santa Caterina, and drove the Italians back a little between the Veliki Hrib and San Gabriele; the lost ground was at once recovered, but eventually they were obliged on a part of this sector to fall back to the trenches whence they had started. Fighting was resumed on a minor scale on the Bainsizza in September; the famous Sassari Brigade captured Hills 895 and 862 on the extreme eastern edge of the area after a brilliantly fought action on the 15th, while the 44th Division, commanded by General Papa, captured the Na Kobil (778) further south on the 29th, but the gallant commander was himself killed in action on the conquered position on October 5. These operations definitely terminated the Battle of the Bainsizza. In this battle, the Italians had secured important tactical advantages on the Bainsizza itself, although strategically the operation had been indecisive, as the enemy still held the impregnable key positions of Tolmino and San Gabriele, without which any further advance would have been seriously hampered, and indeed their possession by the enemy jeopardized the security of the Italian forces on the newlyconquered territory. The passage of the river in the conditions described, the storming of a series of formidably fortified parallel lines over a rugged mountainous area, and the manoeuvred fighting of large units constituted one of the most brilliant

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actions of the World War, which reflected great credit on both leaders and men. But the creation of this great salient menaced from the north and the south is open to expert criticism. Subsequent events were to prove that the fears of those who regarded the results with misgiving were at least partially justified1. In the Gorizia area, practically no advantage had been obtained, and on the Carso such advance as had been effected had been secured at too heavy cost. In all, the Italians had lost 40,000 men killed, 108,000 wounded, and 18,000 prisoners. The enemy losses too had been severe, although less so than those of the Italians, except as regards prisoners, the Italians having captured over 19,000 on the Bainsizza and 11,000 on the Carso. General Ludendorff admitted that Italy had Austria by the throat, and General von Arz, Field- Marshal Conrad's successor as Chief of the General Staff of the Austrian Army, told a German journalist immediately after the Bainsizza battle, that "the ever-increasing reinforcements which are being sent by the Western Powers to the Italian Army will induce the latter to redouble its efforts to cut its way through to Trieste", hinting that the Austrians would be unable to hold out against another, attempt. The Allied reinforcements alluded to in actual fact only consisted of the 99 British and French heavy guns already mentioned, but von Arz expressly exaggerated their importance for publicity purposes so as to explain the reverse suffered and those which he feared he might suffer, and also to justify the appeal which he was about to make for German assistance. The Germans realized Austria's serious danger and were gravely anxious lest she might be forced to conclude a separate peace; the Sixtus negotiations proved, although the Germans did not know of them at the time, that she did indeed contemplate such an action. As General Ludendorff wrote, "at the end of August, the Eleventh Battle of the Isonzo had begun on a front of 70 kilometres and proved successful for the Italians. Early in September the fighting was continued with determination. The Italians were again successful. The Austro-Hungarian armies had indeed held their ground, but their losses on the Carso Plateau had been so heavy, and they were so shaken, that the responsible military and political authorities of the Dual Monarchy were convinced that they would not be able to stand a continuation of the battle and a twelfth attack on the Isonzo. The Austrian Army on the Italian Front needed stiffening by German troops"2. As we have seen, the Italians had been unable to continue the Bainsizza battle because there were no more reserves available to throw into the struggle. Had Cadorna's plan of a joint inter- Allied offensive on the Italian Front been accepted and had the British and French reinforcements imagined by von Arz really materialized, the results, to judge by the above quoted admissions of enemy commanders, might well have been decisive. The chief criticism which can be made against Cadorna is that he undertook this action without the necessary reserves. But as we have said at the beginning of this chapter, other motives had forced his hand, and had not other factors intervened over which he had only partial control, the risk
I say "partially" because the creation of the Bainsizza salient was only one of the causes of Caporetto and not the most important 2 "My War Memories", Vol. II, p. 483 1 90

which he ran might have been justified even in these circumstances.

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CAPORETTO - I. THE ANTECEDENTS The position of the Entente in the latter part of 1917 was more critical than in any previous period. Russia, plunged into a welter of anarchical revolution, had ceased to exist as an Ally, and was indeed in some respects of actual assistance to the Central Powers, and if in the long run the danger of infection from her collapse was to prove seriously prejudicial even to Germany and Austria, for the moment it constituted a valuable asset for them. On all the war theatres the pressure of AustroGerman arms was intensified in consequence of the break-up of the Russian armies, but nowhere was this pressure more intense than on the Italian Front, as Austria was now free to concentrate practically all her forces there. The unrestricted submarine warfare was making itself felt with increasing gravity; 3,000,000 tons of Allied shipping had been lost in the first quarter of the year, the destruction was continuing, the civilian population in every Allied country was feeling the pinch, and even the army supply services were affected. Countries like Italy, which depended very largely on imports both for food and raw materials necessary for war industries and had a comparatively small mercantile marine, felt the restrictions most acutely. The United States had, it is true, entered the war on the side of the Entente and were to take the place of Russia, but they had only just begun to send over their troops, and it would be a long time before they could play an active part in the operations. No doubt in Germany too the food situation was becoming serious, to a greater extent than was then realized in Allied countries, and the military party was no longer so absolutely certain of victory, while the Socialists and the Catholic Centre were beginning to talk of peace. But peace at that moment would still have been wholly to the advantage of Germany, who held vast territorial guarantees with which to negotiate. The break-down of Russia, and the German occupation of yet wider areas of Russian territory (Riga was occupied on September 3, and Jakobstadt on the 11th) revived the hopes of the General Staff, which was still the arbiter of German policy, and the great British offensive in Flanders, conducted with vast resources and splendid bravery, after three months had produced no tangible results. The idea of peace was in the air. The Pope's Encyclical of August 15 spoke of "useless carnage", and proposed as a basis for the negotiations, the reciprocal evacuation of the occupied territories and the restoration of Belgium, while the questions of Alsace- Lorraine and Italia Irredenta could be settled directly by the interested parties themselves. Germany refused to accept these conditions, as she would not even consider a discussion of the Alsace-Lorraine question, and refused to restore Belgium 1. On the other hand, Great Britain and America were not prepared to make peace with the Hohenzollerns. We have seen that Austria did actually make peace proposals, and the Emperor-King had tried, through Prince Sixtus of Bourbon, to detach France and Great Britain from Italy, by offering the former terms which
1 Prince Bulow's memoirs show that the Kaiser intended to make of Belgium "a German Egypt"

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might be acceptable to them, but refusing to grant any satisfaction to Italy. The peace attempt fell through for obvious reasons. The conditions of Austria-Hungary, both military and political, were very grave, more so than those of Germany. The last battles on the Italian Front, if they had not brought about a complete break-down of the military machine, had put it to an extremely severe test, and the High Command was very doubtful if the Empire could survive a twelfth Isonzo battle, if left to its own resources. Hence it felt constrained, much as it disliked doing so, to appeal to Germany for assistance, and Germany ended by granting it. It was believed that if a serious defeat could be inflicted on the Italian Army, Italy would be knocked out, the antiwar parties would triumph and the country plunge into chaos like Russia. "The Austro-Hungarian Army on the Italian Front", wrote General Ludendorff, "needed the help of German troops. To send German divisions to Italy for purely defensive purposes was not a measure corresponding to our serious situation. The High Command must therefore understand that here too it is necessary to come to an offensive, to improve our general situation"1. "At the Austrian G.H.Q." wrote General von Cramon, "there was no certainty that Trieste could be preserved, if the Italians renewed their attacks; the number of those who saw in an offensive the most effective way of restoring the situation increased in consequence day by day"2. General von Arz too, in his report on the Eleventh Battle of the Isonzo, adds that an offensive against Italy was imposed also by the necessity of ending the attrition of the Army and preventing further enemy successes. "The fighting on the Isonzo Front involved very heavy losses and produced a slow but persistent exhaustion of human forces, and in this struggle it was inevitable that the Italians would prove successful. In any case, a decisive Italian success must be avoided". Until this moment the Austrians had always insisted on conducting the war against Italy by themselves, as their own private concern; only the Bavarian Alpenkorps had fought on the Italian Front, but it had now been withdrawn. They felt that they were not in a position to withstand another Italian onslaught and that they must consequently secure German help. A knowledge of the conditions of Italy and the Italian Army in October, 1917, is indispensable if we are to understand the reverse of Caporetto. The numerical strength of the Army had been doubled since 1915, its 35 divisions had grown to 65 on the Italian Front, plus 5 more in Albania and Macedonia. The number of heavy guns had increased from 200 or 300, many of them antiquated and of inferior quality, to 1.800, trench-mortars had taken the place of the primitive implements with which the men of 1915 had tried to cut through the wire entanglements. The Army as a whole was technically improved out of all recognition, its mechanical transport services enabled it to effect rapid movements and the war industry was supplying ever larger quantities of arms, ammunition and other war material. Many factories were actually producing more than they had been
1 2 Op. cit., p. 383 Op. cit., p. 213

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commissioned to do. Supplies were also being imported, although with great difficulty, from abroad. But the hardships and sufferings of the troops were appalling, apart from the huge casualty lists, and it seemed as if these difficulties were increasing instead of diminishing with the slow and painful advance over the heart-breaking rocky wilderness. It appeared impossible ever to overcome that solid mountain barrier, and a sense of depression and hopelessness began to permeate the ranks of the men who had entered the war so full of enthusiasm and determination. A bitter phrase was now often heard, "The maximum of effort with the minimum of results". It was realized that the war of attrition was bound in the long run to exhaust the weaker political organisms first, and Austria was to prove, in spite of Caporetto, a weaker organism than Italy. But in the meanwhile the process was most painful for Italy too. The general moral of the Army had deteriorated rather than improved, in spite of the material progress made. In the first place, as we have seen, the food and clothing supplies had decreased owing to transport difficulties. Relations between commands and troops and between officers and men were less intimate and cordial than before. The impression that commands and staffs lived in an Olympus, far detached from the daily life of the regimental officers and the privates, was growing ever more intense, and if this feeling was peculiar neither to the Italian Army nor to the present war, its consequences promised to be more serious in Italy now. The great majority of the original corps of regular officers and of the ufficiali di complemento and volunteers, a splendid body of men full of enthusiasm and capable of inspiring their subordinates, had been killed off, permanently disabled, or were employed in instructing recruits or given staff appointments, because their successors were of inferior quality and less capable of fulfilling these very important duties; but they were in consequence detached from the fighting troops. Many of the generals of the older school, accustomed to living in close contact with their men and to reconnoitring the ground in person in preparation for an attack 1, had also fallen, fine types such as Cantore, Trombi, Montanari, Cascino, Papa, and many others. On the other hand, many generals had been deprived of their commands for momentary errors of judgment or mistakes of comparative unimportance. Of the newly enrolled officers, not by any means all were of the highest quality; Italy too had her T.G.'s and later her N.E.T.'s. A great many of them had been given commissions not because they had voluntarily applied for them, but compulsorily on account of their university degrees or other study certificates, while others were extemely young, having barely left school and been converted into officers after a few weeks training in improvised cadet schools; these youths naturally had little authority over their men, many of whom were older and more experienced, and they often lacked adequate self-control. As Professor Volpe writes, in other belligerent countries the old military tradition, the more intense and widespread habits of sport, and the more feudal and warlike spirit of the upper classes traditionally accustomed to command, offered a better ground for recruiting officers, and made up for
1 As we have seen, General Badoglio had thus prepared his successful attack on Monte Sabotino

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deficiencies of training1. The higher commands were in reality too detached from the ordinary life of the Army, and many of the staff officers and consequently many of the generals had forgotten their practical regimental experience dating many years back2, and lost sight of the real war as it is fought by men of flesh and blood, in a cloud of paper. Some of the generals, even of the old school, so admirable in many respects, in others failed to understand the conditions of modern warfare; educated in the tradition of past wars, which lasted but a few weeks or months, they could not conceive the notion of giving the men adequate periods of rest, distractions and amusements. Others, few in number, but numerous enough to do a good deal of harm, regarded the troops and the war merely as elements for securing promotion in their career. Others again did not like to hear unpleasant truths reflecting on the health or moral of the men, and discouraged such communications until they ceased to be sent, although the unpleasant facts continued to happen, in spite of the hushhush policy, or perhaps even because of it. Nor were the various duties distributed with a proper sense of proportion and justice. The units known for their exceptional gallantry and efficiency were sent into action time after time and worked to death, and often the periods of rest promised as a reward for special services were not granted or unduly curtailed, while less meritorious units were left in quieter sectors or given longer rest. While many of the staff officers were men of the highest qualities who had fought with the troops and proved their mettle in action, this was not the case with all, and in the general opinion of the Army no distinctions were made and all officers with eagles on their caps3 were regarded as embusqus. The hatred of the embusqu came to assume the proportions of witch-finding. General Cadorna, who had at first been regarded as a demigod, after two years of war, began to come in for increasing criticism. He had great qualities as an organizer, as what he accomplished between August, 1914, and May, 1915, proves, a lucid mind, an exemplary calm, an iron will: "in that man, who was a thorough soldier, was a stout moral personality. But he was also a mediocre psychologist, a mediocre leader of men, of men, I mean, as history makes them and as a ruler of armies must know them. All closed within the circle of his thoughts and of his moral convictions, elementary in his conception of discipline, he looked around him, but acquired little from experience, from common humanity, even though he was thus able the better to control and dominate it. His relations with the outer world were difficult and scanty. He valued his generals perhaps too much for the success of the day, and the necessary selection, which indeed he had to make, was affected by this too simple outlook which deprived the troops even of good commanders. Hence the state of permanent agitation in the subordinate leaders, ever under the incubus of dismissal, a constant change of officers of high rank, which gave even the soldiers a
Volpe, "Ottobre, 1917- dall'Isonzo al Piave", p. 39 Staff officers in peace time were supposed to alternate their staff appointments with regimental duties, but this was not always done 3 The gold-embroidered eagle in the cap is the emblem of the staff, corresponding to the red tabs in the British Army 1 2 95

feeling of instability and general incompetence, to say nothing of the vast leaven of personal resentment which spread throughout the country, and found expression in recrimination against the conduct of the war, if not actually against the war itself"1. Cadorna's deep religious convictions aroused criticism in anti-clerical circles, where the fact that the C.-in-C. went to mass regularly and had his chaplain by his side at mess were regarded as grave shortcomings. This conduct, and the fact that he was by birth an aristocrat, were among the charges brought up against him in democratic circles, and helped to feed the campaign of criticism. If the higher commands in general were somewhat out of touch with the rest of the Army, this was particularly the case with Cadorna himself. There were some officers in his immediate entourage who tried to isolate him still further, a phenomenon not limited to the Italian Army. In the country the state of public feeling was even worse, and this fact in its turn reacted on the Army. A modern army is a selection of the nation. Those who were not serving comprised the men who lived on the war, not in it, the weak and the poor of spirit, and it was they who spent their time in criticizing, backbiting and talking politics. Then there were many real causes of discontent and suffering: food scarcity, increased cost of living, mourning in innumerable homes. The population found it increasingly difficult to keep the home fires burning, to till the land, to conduct business. But as a rule more discontent was aroused by minor inconveniences than by the real hardships, and it was less intense among those who had fought, been wounded themselves, or had lost their dear ones, than among those who had never been within a hundred miles of the front and had not lost a relative. It should not be forgotten that Italy had entered the War not in consequence of having been invaded like Belgium and France, but voluntarily, and if the course of events had made Italian intervention inevitable, its necessity was not obvious to all. The War came to be regarded as a political party question, as a victory of the interventionists over the neutralists. "In the eyes of the masses", writes Professor Volpe, "it appeared as the war of the signori (the gentlefolk), in those of the ultraConservatives as the war of the Revolutionaries, in those of Social-Democracy as the war of the Imperialists and the plutocrats, in any case, as a war imposed by an audacious minority on the Italian people. Hence a feeling of bitterness, as against an imposition, a humiliation inflicted on the legitimate representation of a people not disposed to accept the War, but forced to submit to it"2. In the early days of the War the neutralists seemed to have disappeared: you could not find one for love or money. But later, as the struggle dragged on and the sense of disappointment increased, they emerged from their funk-holes, and by the middle of 1917 they were well to the fore again. There were neutralists of many kinds: Clerical neutralists, particularly prominent in the rural districts, LiberalDemocratic neutralists gathered round the silent but by no means inactive Giolitti, who expressed the feelings of a part of the middle classes, but not without a touch of demagogic flattery towards the proletariat. The Socialist neutralists, to some extent, emanated from the working class masses, but still more from the professional
1 2 Volpe, op. cit., p. 42 Op cit

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politicians who "worked" the workers. The industrial workers had increased enormously in numbers with the vast development of the arms and munition plants, and it was among these men and women, far from the dangers of the front line, enjoying salaries such as they had never dreamed of before, and still far higher than the increased cost of living would have warranted, that the seditionmongers found the most willing listeners. All these various tendencies found expression in the general outcry against "the accursed war", against the men and parties who had advocated it and were now conducting it. No one could say how it could be ended, how a "just peace" could be achieved otherwise than by continuing to fight, yet all these feelings contributed to damp the war spirit, to undermine the moral of the Army and nation. Peace offensives and offers cropped up on all sides; the proposals of the Germans, who offered peace provided they could keep all the loot; Wilson's proposals (before America's intervention): self-determination, freedom of the seas, etc.; the proposals emanating from the world of political and financial profiteers of the Caillaux type, who had been active in Italy; those of the Holy See, who, while acting in perfect good faith and inspired by the highest motives, operated in a manner calculated to prove advantageous to the Central Powers still holding the trump cards. The Russian revolution, at first, deceived the statesmen of Europe into believing that it implied a more vigorous conduct of the War on the part of Russia. But the Socialists and Communists of Europe, including those of Italy, knew better, and realized that the Russian upheaval meant peace with the enemy and civil war at home, which was just what they wanted, it was so much easier and pleasanter to massacre unarmed men, women and children, and seize their property than to fight against well-armed Germans and Austrians. Hence the efforts to establish close connections with the Russian revolutionists. The Italian Socialist deputy Treves exhorted Baron Sonnino, when he was about to go to Paris in July, 1917, for the inter-Allied Conference solicited by Russia for the revision of war aims, to support all proposals emanating from that Power. "To communicate with Russia", he declared, "means, at this moment, to communicate with the heart of the masses of all Europe, and this means communicating with an enormous power". He concluded with his famous aphorism, "Next winter not another man in the trenches", which expressed the whole spirit of defeatism and treachery then in the air. The first consequence of contact with the Russian revolutionists was the outburst of seditious manifestations in the Lombard and Piedmontese factories, on whose walls the words Viva Lenin ! now appeared for the first time. A revolutionary outbreak at Turin followed immediately after the public reception in honour of the Soviet delegates1, in August, on the very eve of the Bainsizza battle. The pretext was a scarcity of bread in the city, but the Socialist town councillor Romita openly avowed: "It is true: here the workers are well off; it is not for bread that they are making revolution". In certain circles the social revolution was believed to be imminent, the War was regarded with indifference as an affair concerning the capitalists and the bourgeoisie alone, and even military reverses were hoped for so
1 Although the Soviets were not yet in power they already dominated the political scene in Russia

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long as they helped to overthrow "capitalist" Italy. The interventionists reacted against these forms of treachery. The Idea Nazionale among the intellectuals and the Popolo d'Italia (Mussolini's paper) conducted a vigorous campaign in favour of the prosecution of the War until victory was secured, and Il Fronte Interno fought the Socialists and neutralists and defeatists tooth and nail. But this reaction was split up into too many divergent currents to be really effective; there were Nationalist and Democratic interventionists, advocates of a purely Italian policy in the Adriatic and supporters of a compromise with the Yugoslavs, enthusiastic Francophils, and those who were suspicious of French aims and ambitions, Catholic interventionists and Masonic interventionists, the latter in close touch with their French "brothers" and lodges and dominated by the Grand Orient, and uncompromising enthusiasts for the claims of all the Allies of Italy, but lukewarm supporters of those of Italy. These various warring tendencies bewildered public opinion and impeded the formation of that unity of the national spirit which alone could produce the indispensable will to victory. The business classes did not give that example of self-discipline and sobriety of life which the situation demanded, but showed too much satisfaction over lucrative war contracts, and too strong a propensity to extravagance and riotous living. The working men and women in the munition factories, in the enjoyment of exceptionally high wages, followed the example of the profiteers. The consequent relaxation of morals was hardly in harmony with the dread ordeal through which the nation was passing, and did not offer any edifying spectacle to the men on leave from the trenches. The Government manifested an amazing indifference to this state of things, and appeared to believe that there was nothing to be done but to hope for the best, while expecting the worst. Many Italians were deeply anxious, and while confident that the troops would do their duty, feared an internal collapse. In Parliament and outside it, the authorities seemed far more anxious to placate the Socialists than to inject more vigour into the conduct of the War; some Ministers and other influential personages were obviously trying to create alibis for themselves against the day when the Reds would be in power, so that they could then prove that they too really had not wanted the War, and had done their best to saboter it, in spite of those horrid interventionists. A censorship of the Press had, it is true, been established, but the Socialist Avanti! was allowed to say or hint all that it wanted to, and spread its venom throughout the country, and if that paper and other seditious sheets were supposed not to reach the front, innumerable copies were, in fact, distributed among the troops; sometimes they were thrown or dropped into the trenches by the enemy. The writer remembers that, as an officer, he received a circular instructing him to prevent these poisonous publications from reaching the men in his unit; this was, of course, a sheer impossibility, whereas the one effective way of securing the desired result would have been to act at the source and stop the printing of the papers in question, but this was not done. There was little cordiality between some of the Ministers; Signor Orlando, the Minister of the Interior, was on bad terms with General Cadorna, nor did the latter always see eye to eye with Baron Sonnino, even though the general aims and policy

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of the two men were identical. The Government did not dare to remove Cadorna, who, in spite of the criticism directed against him in certain quarters, still enjoyed a wide measure of prestige in the country, but tried to place hindrances in his way. The Commander-in-Chief had noticed certain alarming symptoms in the spirit of the troops, which he attributed exclusively to seditious propaganda in the interior of the country, and had called the attention of the Government to them in a series of letters which remained unanswered. According to the report of the Commission of Inquiry on Caporetto, he appears to have received a verbal answer from Signor Orlando in September, but whatever that answer may have been no action was taken to counteract this propaganda. Dissatisfaction with the Boselli Cabinet, as a whole, and particularly with Signor Orlando, was growing in the country, but in the Chamber the Giolittian group tended to support it, and there were rumours of a proposed coalition between the two statesmen. Signor Mussolini in the Popolo d'Italia, on the other hand, demanded a radical change of government in the sense of a more definitely interventionist war policy. Signor Boselli, much as he was respected and esteemed by all, was regarded as lacking the energy and stamina necessary to guide the ship of state through such troublous waters. This general feeling of discontent and anxiety, this tendency to speak ill of everyone and everything, the perpetual bickerings and blabber of the arm-chair strategists, the suspicions of this or that politician, the contempt showered on many of the generals, could not but affect the spirit of the Army, which was in reality the nation. As to the effects of the seditious propaganda among the troops, it is not easy to determine the extent of the injury which it effected. Professor Volpe is of opinion that there was less of it at the front than was generally supposed at the time. The officers in direct contact with the troops did not attach much importance to it. But the Socialist party did undoubtedly operate as actively as it could, even at the front, "not without the connivance of a few officers and still more N.C.O.'s."1. Many railwaymen acted as intermediaries between the centres of revolutionary propaganda and the lines of communication. The soldiers who went home on leave found an atmosphere of defeatism and discontent in their families, where everything, great or small, that was troublesome was attributed to the War and to those who had willed it; they returned to the front much worse soldiers than when they had left it. Men who had been exempted from active service to work in the war material factories, and were subsequently sent back to the front as a punishment for insubordination or workshyness, or who had been "combed out" of the soft jobs were among the most rabid propagandists of sedition. The punishments inflicted on the soldiers at the front for offences against discipline or of other natures were often excessively severe and not always fairly distributed, while men who were guilty of inciting others to insubordination or desertion got off scot free. A gallant officer of the Alpini, afterwards killed in action, Eugenio Garrone, wrote as follows on July 17 (I quote his letter from Volpe's book): "The soldiers are
1 Volpe, op. cit., pp. 63-64

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excellent . . . really good at bottom . . . But under the rough rind what soul lies hidden? Perhaps, I must note it with sorrow, the long months of inaction have transformed these fellows. I should like to see them in the test of battle, perhaps I should still succeed in making them follow me; but there is a feeling of anxiety here which you cannot imagine. Certain seditious inscriptions which we come upon here and there, certain bad elements who have got into the units, worry me a good deal . . . Let us hope and put our trust in the good star of Italy ! . . . But there is in the bottom of my heart grave anxiety. It is from the cities that the depressing word emanates, we see it and feel it!" Many others noticed that units with splendid records were no longer inspired by the same enthusiasm or that same fighting spirit as before. The worst spirit was in the intermediate zone, where soldiers and civilians lived side by side; the soldiers, although they suffered fewer hardships there than their comrades at the front, who were also in constant danger and in direct contact with the enemy, felt the discomforts of the War more acutely. There were also sharp differences of moral between the various units. In the Duke of Aosta's 3rd Army, while it had been utterly exhausted by the terrible fighting on the Carso, and had suffered appalling losses in the eleven battles of the Isonzo, the moral was higher than in General Capello's 2nd Army, which had also fought with great gallantry, but was in a less dangerous sector, one in which the hardships were great, but the fighting was less continuous and the casualty lists were in consequence less heavy. There were certain sectors in the 2nd Army area where the sense of uncertainty, impotence and lack of confidence seemed attached to the very soil, and communicated itself to the units of the 3rd Army, who arrived worn out and weary, but with an excellent spirit; as Professor Volpe writes, "it was transmitted from brigade to brigade like the trench material and the gun emplacements"1. These positions were usually on the rougher mountain areas, dominated by an invisible enemy, where, owing to the wide extension of the sectors, the Headquarters were unavoidably far from the front lines, and out of touch with the troops. Such sectors were those on the Mrzli and the Sleme, to the left of the Isonzo. General Cadorna saw only political sedition as the cause of the trouble, and perhaps exaggerated its importance; as we have seen the causes were far more complex. In the autumn of the year he met Signor Comandini, Minister of Civil Assistance, and between them they drew up a scheme for organizing moral and material welfare among the troops, establishing closer contact between the Army and all that was best in the country, and carrying out a sound and active propaganda among the men. General Capello was preparing something of the same kind in his own Army, and the Duke of Aosta had already done a great deal along these lines. Caporetto was to hold up these plans for the moment, but they were resumed and improved upon afterwards. These phenomena were by no means limited to the Italian Army, warweariness, pacifism, defeatism, insubordination, Bolshevism and moral break-down. In France, as we have seen, the Army was seriously affected after the disastrous Nivelle offensive of 1917. Nothing of so serious a nature occurred in the Italian Army.
1 Volpe, p. 68

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In Germany there were mutinies in the fleet and attempts to form seamen's councils on the lines of the Russian Soviets. Indeed it would have been very difficult to get the crews to obey if an order to the High Seas Fleet to issue from the ports had been given. In Austria-Hungary the trouble was prevalently nationalist and internal; the Army was, as far as possible, isolated from the country, so that it took a long time before the racial agitations reached it. The slightest attempts at insubordination were ruthlessly repressed. Desertions were not infrequent, especially among the Czechs, other Slavs and Rumanians, but on the whole the Austro-Hungarian Army was more immune from the ferments of the civil population than the Italian or other armies. Yet even there certain serious episodes occurred. On October 15, 1917, a torpedo boat, which had emerged from the Bocche di Cattaro to escort a destroyer, crossed the Adriatic and surrendered in an Italian port with the unanimity of the whole crew. The Carzano affair all but led to extremely serious consequences for Austria. A Slovene lieutenant and some other officers of Czech nationality deserted to the Italians at Carzano, north-east of Borgo in the Valsugana, and communicated a detailed plan of the enemy positions and trenches in that area. They suggested an ingenious scheme for a surprise incursion through the enemy lines, which would enable the Italians to expand the breach thus to be effected and push on as far as Trento, thereby cutting off the enemy forces south of that town. The attempt was carried out on the night of September 18-19; five battalions were to attain the Salubio - Ceolino - Monte Civaron line, and in case of success a whole infantry brigade and three cyclist battalions were to have followed. Unfortunately the plan fell through, owing to inadequate staff work, the excessive concentration of forces in a too restricted space, the narrowness of the passage to the enemy lines, a single communication trench and a small wooden bridge across the Maso torrent, and to the appearance on the scene of untainted enemy forces. But the attempt had been so nearly a success that it caused serious alarm in Austria and was even the subject of questions in the Reichsrat. The Italians were warned of the coming enemy offensive on the upper Isonzo by deserters and from other sources, but for the reasons set forth above, as well as for certain errors of strategy and judgment on the part of the higher commands, which we shall analyze in the next chapter, the information received did not serve to avert the disaster.

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CAPORETTO - II. THE BATTLE We have seen how serious had been the effects of the Bainsizza battle on the Austrian moral, and how the enemy commanders doubted whether their armies could withstand a twelfth battle of the Isonzo. It was this situation which finally decided the Austrians to attempt an offensive action, as a mere defensive attitude might result in a further and perhaps fatal breakthrough; but for such an operation German help was necessary. As early as August 25, while the battle was still raging on the Bainsizza, the Austrian High Command sent General von Waldstatten to the German G.H.Q. to apply for it, and on the 26th the Emperor- King wrote to his German brother: "The experience of our eleventh battle convinces me that the twelfth will be a very hard task for us. My generals and My troops believe that it is best to overcome the difficulties with an offensive. Substitute German troops for Austro-Hungarians on the Eastern front, so that the latter may be relieved. I attach great importance to conducting the offensive against Italy with Austro-Hungarian troops alone. The whole Army calls this our war; every officer has grown up with the feeling of the war against the hereditary enemy transmitted from his fathers. But we will greet the German artillery, especially the heavy batteries, with joy. A successful blow against Italy will hasten the end of the war". To this appeal Wilhelm replied that Austria could count on Germany, on the whole of Germany, to attack "faithless" Italy. The Western front was fairly quiet, Rumania and Serbia were crushed, Russia dead. On August 29, General von Waldstatten submitted a plan of offensive to General von Arz, consisting of a principal action from the Tolmino bridgehead towards the valley of the Judrio and Cividale, a minor action from the Plezzo basin towards the Natisone. For this, 13 divisions, Austrian and German, were necessary. General von Ludendorff at first was not enthusiastic; he was afraid of reducing the forces in the west, and doubted if great results could be achieved1. But the plan, Conrad's work, was submitted to Field-Marshal von Hindenburg, and in the end both he and Ludendorff approved of it in the main, after it had been revised by General Krafft von Delmensingen, who had personally inspected the area where the operations were to be carried out. The idea of conducting an offensive with Austrian troops alone thus gave way to that of Austro-German co-operation. The German troops sent to Austria's aid were made to pass through the Trentino, so as to deceive the Italians as to the true direction of the coming attack. The 23 divisions on the Julian front with 1.800 guns, were reinforced by 14 more, seven German and seven Austrian, with 1.000 guns (800 of them German), and the Plezzo - Tolmino sector was decided on the front to be attacked. The spear-head force consisted of eight Austrian and seven German divisions, with a total strength of 168 battalions, 76 in the front line, 63 in support and
1 He would have preferred a new invasion of Rumania, to finish her off and secure the food supplies of the Modavian plain 102

29 in reserve, corresponding to 224 Italian battalions1. This force constituted the 14th Army, known as the Austro-German Army, commanded by the German General von Below, and was divided into four groups, viz. the Krauss group (three Austrian divisions deployed from Monte Rombon to Monte Nero), the Stein group (one Austrian and three German divisions, from Monte Nero to Tolmino), the Berrer group (two German divisions, from Tolmino to the Idria), the Scotti group (one Austrian and one German division, on the Lom Plateau), and four divisions in reserve 2. The 10th Austrian Army (General Krobatin) in the Carnia, and the 2nd Isonzo Army (General Henriquez), forming part of the Borocvich Army Group, opposite the northern edge of the Bainsizza Plateau, were to support the action of von Below's force. The objective of the offensive, as set forth in the operations order of the 14th Army Command, was "to drive the enemy from the Carso area, unfavourable for defence, and beyond the Tagliamento, and to attain the Gemona - Cividale line". To secure this result, it was necessary to gain absolute possession of the PlezzoTolmino and Caporetto areas; the Monte Maggiore - Monte Matajur - Monte San Martino - Monte Kuk - Monte Globocak line must therefore be conquered as the first objective by means of an uninterrupted advance, and the pressure continued in a southwesterly direction as far as the Gemona - Tarcento - Cividale line, and if possible the Tagliamento. At the same time, the 10th Army was to descend from the Carnia on Gemona by the Fella valley, and the 2nd Isonzo Army to attack the heights between the Isonzo and the Judrio, surmount Monte Kolovrat and try to capture Monte Korada. General Krafft von Delmensingen was not satisfied with these objectives, and declared that something more decisive must be secured if the effort was to be worth while; he suggested that at least the Adige line must be attained. To this Krauss retorted that he saw only one objective, viz. Lyons3. The date of the operation was adjourned several times on account of the bad weather, and was finally fixed for October 24 at dawn. It was to commence not with the usual prolonged bombardment which would show the Italians where the real attack was to take place, but with a short and extremely intense fire, followed immediately by the infantry attack between Plezzo and Selo at 8 a.m. The operation was to be carried out according to a method successfully practised by the Germans at Riga (and afterwards in France, in March, 1918), entrusted to specially trained assault units amply supplied with machine-guns, hand-grenades, bombthrowers and Flammenwerfer. As soon as a break-through had been effected, the rest of the infantry was to proceed rapidly forward, penetrating in among the enemy positions in small detachments, escorted by light artillery and machine-guns on motor lorries; in the mountain zones, the advance was to be effected preferably along the high roads, valleys and gaps in the terrain, without at first troubling to gain control of the heights, as this would involve delays and heavy losses, whereas the enemy positions on the
The Austrian and German battalions were then stronger than the Italian ones Krauss himself gives eight divisions for the 14th Army at the Tolmino bridgehead, four at Plezzo, and four in reserve, plus twenty for the two Isonzo Armies ("Die Ursachen unserer Niederlage", p. 228) 3 See Krauss, ibid., p. 220 1 2 103

mountain tops could be subsequently outflanked and turned. The main object was to gain possession of the chief bulwarks of the defence and the vital points of the lines of communication, so as to cut the nerves of the enemy. The method was quite new on the Italian Front, and the defenders were wholly unprepared for it; this explains at least in part its swift and almost incredible success. The Italians were not unaware of these preparations. The movements of enemy troops had been noted, and the closing of the Swiss frontier on September 14 was significant. According to information from Bern, confirmed from other sources, the date of the attack was known, and although its exact point was uncertain, it appeared probable that the middle course of the Isonzo had been selected. By October 6, 43 enemy divisions had been identified, eight and a half on the 3rd Army front, and 18 on the 2nd; the Bavarian Alpenkorps, the 12th German (Silesian) Division and two Austro-Hungarian divisions were announced subsequently. Other details were supplied by the Italian " I " services to the effect that the offensive was to begin between October 16 and 20, along a line extending from Tolmino to Monte Santo, but as we know, it was in fact postponed to the 24th. On the 20th, a Czech officer, who had deserted, informed the Italians that it was to commence on the 26th, from Plezzo to the sea; but the next day, two Rumanian deserters gave further details, indicating that the break-through was to be attempted between Plezzo and Selo, with particular violence at Tolmino1. As soon as these data became fairly certain, General Cadorna took such measures as seemed necessary to ward off all danger. Any idea of an Italian offensive was abandoned, and preparations were made to meet a hostile onslaught. The threatened area was held by General Capello's 2nd Army, thus deployed: IV Corps (General Cavaciocchi), from Plezzo to Costa Raunza opposite Tolmino, with three divisions in the front line (50th, 43rd and 46th, plus several battalions of Alpini and Bersaglieri, and one division, the 34th, in reserve); XXVII Corps (General Badoglio), from Costa Raunza to Kal on the Bainsizza Plateau, with four divisions (19th, 66th, 22nd and 54th, one of which, the 19th, was about equal to an army corps). The southern sector of the 2nd Army zone, as far as the Vippacco, was entrusted to the XXIV Corps (General Caviglia), the II (General Albricci), the VI (General Lombardi) and the VIII (General Grazioli), eleven divisions all told.

General Capello thus disposed of nine corps (25 divisions), comprising 353 battalions, 231 of which were in the front line. The sector where the attack was expected was held by 71 battalions belonging to the 50th, 43rd, 46th and 19th Divisions, besides 42 more battalions in the second line, or 113 in all. Against these the enemy, as we have seen, had concentrated 168 battalions. The enemy battalions were thus somewhat more numerous, and above all they were up to full strength and composed of picked and specially trained men, whereas the Italian units were greatly
1 Cadorna, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 123. He could not, however, be quite sure that the information was accurate, and had to provide for possible attacks on other sectors (p. 128) 104

reduced, considerable numbers of men were on leave, and others in poor health, some of the regiments were only up to one-third of their normal strength. Moreover, many of the units were still suffering from the effects of the exhaustion caused by the heavy fighting in the spring and summer. The artillery of the 2nd Army on the front of attack, was also somewhat weaker than that of the enemy, who had concentrated on it 198 heavies and 41 super-heavies, besides many batteries of field-guns. But although the Austro-Germans enjoyed a measure of numerical superiority in men and guns on the Plezzo - Tolmino sector, that superiority would not have sufficed to explain the break-through. It was the disposition of the Italian defences which was, as Hindenburg observes1, one of the chief causes of Italian inferiority. In the IV Corps front, all of it east of the Isonzo from the slopes of the Rombon to the river, were two weak spots. The 50th Division, in the Plezzo basin, had all its troops at the bottom of the valley, and its area was inadequately provided with shelters and dug-outs on account of the infiltration of water; the positions, moreover, were dominated by the enemy on the Rombon and the Javorcek. A part of the 46th Division's front followed a line on the slopes of the Mrzli and the Vodil, parallel and close to the higher enemy lines, and the ground behind it fell rapidly down to the river, so that the daily life of the troops, constantly exposed not only to hostile fire, but also to the masses of rock which were frequently hurled down on them, to say nothing of the natural avalanches, was intolerably uncomfortable as well as dangerous. Moreover, there were far too many troops concentrated in the first lines 2. The second line of main resistance, although on the whole better fortified than the first, was too close to the first, and in some sectors actually identical with it. The first line of the XXVII Corps started from Gabrije east of the Isonzo, crossed the river, ascended the Jeseniak, faced the Tolmino bridgehead, recrossed below Selo, mounted on to the Bainsizza Plateau and spread across it as far as Kal. It was somewhat stronger than the first line of the IV Corps, but was not less dominated by the enemy positions. Its second line started from the Isonzo south-east of Selisce, ascended the Costa Raunza and the Jeseniak, followed the Casa Cemponi ridge and descended to the river again one kilometre south-west of Selo. This line was by no means completely organized, the shelters were inadequate, and a good deal of work which ought to have been done had not been carried out, in spite of Cadorna's orders. Thus the IV Corps had a weak first line and a somewhat stronger second, while the XXVII had a stronger first and an inadequately prepared second; in both cases, the advanced positions were exposed to the enfilading fire of the enemy entrenched on higher positions. The enemy lines at Tolmino were exempt from the drawback of most bridgeheads inasmuch as, owing to the eastward curve of the river, they did not form a salient and could not therefore be enfiladed. There were two more lines of defence behind the IV and XXVII Corps, but they had not been kept in repair, and the trenches were of an older type. Cadorna, when once he had decided to abandon all idea of an offensive
1 2 Op. cit., pp. 261-262 Cadorna (op. tit., Vol. II , p. 131) had given orders that the defence of the first lines was to be entrusted to small forces, who should count on machine-gun and artillery support. But his orders were not executed 105

action, issued orders for a purely defensive attitude and for the organization of the positions and the distribution of the troops in view of this change of plan. The XXVII Corps "was to gravitate with the greater part of its forces to the right of the Isonzo, while only the most mobile part of its medium guns were to remain on the Bainsizza", and the withdrawal even of these was to be prepared for. These orders were only carried out in part: on October 24, of the 49 battalions of the corps, 22 were still on the left bank of the river. All the artillery of the 2nd Army was to concentrate on a counter-preparation fire so as to disorganize the attack before it began, but this order too, as we shall see, was not carried out. The divergence between the C.-in-C.'s orders and their execution by the G.O.C. 2nd Army, was the result of a conflict of views between the two leaders. Capello, who was essentially a man of vigorous action and had deservedly acquired a reputation for dash in attack at the battle of Gorizia, could not adapt himself to the idea of a purely defensive attitude; rather than passively await the enemy's onslaught, he would have preferred an "offensive-defensive" action, with the intention of delivering a counterattack on the assailants' left flank in the Vrh basin towards Santa Lucia while they were advancing. Cadorna himself had at one moment seemed inclined to accept Capello's "offensive-defensive" or strategic counter-offensive plan, also advocated by Badoglio, but he subsequently decided in favour of the defensive pure and simple, accompanied by a merely tactical counteroffensive, in the main a sound conception. In a conversation with Capello on the 19th, he defined his intentions, and Capello provided for their execution, but it was late in the day, and above all Capello did not put his whole heart into the scheme, so that the withdrawal of the artillery from the east to the west bank of the Isonzo had only been partially carried out by the 24th, and many batteries sent up to the menaced sector at the last moment, were in course of transport when the attack commenced, and were unable to open fire. There was still too much heavy artillery in dangerously advanced positions, too many troops on the Bainsizza and other sectors of the front lines, and too few for the defence of the Isonzo positions between Plezzo and Tolmino, one corps only, albeit a strong one (53 battalions) plus 9 other battalions, and the other 8 between the Bainsizza and the sea. Nor were the reserves wed distributed. The Comando Supremo still had some doubts as to whether the attack might not also be delivered on the middle Isonzo sector, and it consequently kept numerous reserves in the area opposite Gorizia whence the Tolmino sector could not be rapidly attained. Of the 114 battalions of the general reserve at the disposal of the Comando Supremo, 39 were in the 2nd Army area, 60 in that of the 3rd Army, and the rest in other sectors1. Another unfortunate accident was the illness of General Capello. On October 20, ill-health forced him to hand over his command to General Montuori; on reaching Padova, he learned that the enemy offensive was imminent, and immediately returned to the front and summoned his subordinate commanders to Cividale for instructions only a few hours before the attack began, but soon afterwards he was
1 Cadorna, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 133

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again forced by illness to relinquish his command. General Cadorna considered him one of his most intelligent generals, but his sense of discipline was not absolute, and he did not know how to adapt himself to a plan of operation out of harmony with his own conceptions, and he consequently carried it out in an incomplete fashion. Nevertheless, the Comando Supremo was not anxious about the situation, although on October 7, General Cadorna had visited the defensive works on Monte Grappa between the Piave and the Brenta, and had given orders for their prosecution (they had been begun in 1916, but were not yet far advanced). The enemy offensive was known to be a certainty, but it was believed that its objectives were limited to the recapture of the positions lost in the last battles; indeed, most of the German and Austrian commanders themselves did not think that they could advance as far as they actually were to do, and merely hoped that, by inflicting a defeat on the Italians, a revolution in Italy would be brought about, followed by a separate peace, as had happened in Russia. At 2 a.m. on the dark and rainy night of October 23-24, the enemy artillery opened fire on the Italian positions with gas shells, mostly on the second lines, commands, artillery emplacements and lines of communication, and then the destructive bombardment followed with unparalleled intensity. In a very short time the defences were shattered, the trenches, dug-outs and shelters overwhelmed in a hurricane of fire, and all communications between commands and advanced lines destroyed. The gas attack was absolutely perfect, whereas the means of defence against it were inadequate. The units which bore the brunt of the attack on the first day were the three divisions of the IV Corps, and the 19th of the XXVII. Among the first-line troops, the terrific bombardment produced much confusion, and the Italian artillery failed to give them adequate support by counter-battery fire, partly on account of the mist and partly because the enemy fire had destroyed all communications, so that the transmission of orders was difficult; but some of the corps commanders and the artillery commander of the XXVII were also at fault, as they had not carried out the orders received for some reason not yet fully cleared up. Indeed, the inadequacy of the Italian gun-fire engendered in the enemy a belief that the Italian Command had only kept a veil of troops in the first lines and withdrawn the bulk of its forces further back. The artillery, which had done so splendidly on the Carso and the Bainsizza, was now almost silent. At 8 a.m., after the explosion of two huge mines on Monte Rosso and Monte Mrzli, the infantry of the 14th Austro-Germany Army moved forward against the lines of the IV and XXVII Corps. General Krauss, commanding the forces in the Plezzo sector, drove ahead with the Saga defile as his first objective, but he also meant to capture the Stol as well, as he believed that if that position were captured, the Italians would be forced to evacuate the whole front 1. The IV Corps front was broken through in its central sector at Fornace by 9.30 a.m., and the enemy advanced along the bottom of the valley, but was at first held up at Saga. The lateral sector of the Rombon and Cezsoca resisted on the first lines for a while, but on being threatened
1 Krauss, op. cit., p. 227 et seq

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by the enemy advance along the valley, fell back. Before 14 hours, the enemy had also broken through the 43rd Division's front and spread into the Za Kraju basin; on the right of the division, the enemy secured Peak 2133 north of Monte Nero, and appeared in the Kozliak area. The 46th Division was attacked by the 50th Austrian and the 12th German Division. General Stein attacked the point of suture between the two Italian Corps just north of Tolmino. The defence of this, the weakest point of all, had at first been entrusted to the Alessandria Brigade (46th Division) on the extreme right of the IV Corps, but at the last moment it was handed over to the Napoli (19th Division) on the extreme left of the XXVII, and at the time of the attack it was actually held only by a small force of the Napoli. A part of the XXVII Corps was on the heights opposite Tolmino, but the rest of it was still on the Bainsizza. Many detachments of the 46th on the Mrzli-Sleme sector resisted vigorously and maintained their ground even after they were hopelessly outflanked; the enemy themselves attested to the stubbornness of the defence and to the difficulty they encountered in overcoming it. But elsewhere the defence was overwhelmed, and this produced a breakthrough between the Mrzli and the river. Von Lequis's 12th German Division was easily able to overcome the battalion of the Napoli at the junction of the two Corps, and open a passage to the right bank of the river, thus contributing to break through the first line on the left of the Isonzo near Gabrije before 11; soon after it overcame the second line near Selisce. By 16 hours it had occupied Caporetto, a village whose sinister name was given to the whole battle 1, and swept over the Starjiski-Staroselo-Matajur line, and by evening the IV Corps front extended from Valle Uccea to Robic by Monte Stol, Potoki and San Volario. In the meanwhile, the Alpenkorps (von Berrer's group) attacked the Italian positions directly opposite Tolmino; by a skilfully conducted advance it overcame the first lines, and through the gap thus created the 12th German Division was able to push forward up both banks of the river; the valley being full of mist, some of the Italian units on the heights to the right of it did not even see the enemy defiling below, and consequently took no action to stop them. Krauss, who wishes to extol the exploits of his own Austrian troops, states, perhaps unfairly, that the task of the 12th Division was the easiest 2. The Alpenkorps, advancing from Volzana (west of Tolmino), now attacked the Kolovrat, held by a part of the 19th Division, the Berrer and Scotti groups pushed on to the left between Santa Maria and Santa Lucia, and between Santa Lucia and Doblar towards Monte Jeza and the ridge separating the Isonzo from the Judrio Valley and dominating both, with the intention of descending the Isonzo, while the Stein group was marching up stream. On the same 24th, the Comando Supremo ordered the 2nd Army Command to provide for the defence of the second line of the XXVII Corps along the JezaGlobocak ridge, so as to prevent the enemy from holding the Cemponi - Krad Vrh line if they should succeed in getting on to it. General Capello replied that he had done so. The Command of the VII Corps, informed of the loss of Selisce, ordered the
1 2 In German it is called Karfreit Op. cit., ibid.

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62nd Division to occupy Luico and the Golobi - Idersko buttress in liaison with the IV Corps, and the 3rd Division to defend the Kolovrat and the sector from Pusno to the Globocak. But during the night of the 24th-25th, the head of the Judrio Valley fell. It was the great breach through the XXVII Corps front, not closed in time by the VII, which produced the fatal break-down of the 2nd Army. By the evening of the 24th, the enemy had overwhelmed three lines of defence on the fronts of the XXVII Corps to the right of the IV, reached Caporetto, and caused the whole of the advanced defences of the IV to collapse, and on that and the following days took most of its troops prisoners. On the Bainsizza, the units of the XXVII and XXIV Corps, although attacked by superior forces under General Henriquez, put up a gallant resistance, and even counter-attacked, took prisoners and recaptured some of the positions which they had at first lost. General Caviglia, commander of the XXIV, was indeed prepared to undertake the protection of the northern flank of the other forces of the 2nd Army further south, and took over the command of the units of the XXVII Corps still in that area. But the able manoeuvre of the Scotti group menaced these forces in the rear. The Comando Supremo ordered the 2nd Army Command to withdraw the Bainsizza forces on to the line of main resistance, and if necessary to recross the Isonzo. This was attempted, but enemy forces struck the XXIV Corps as it was descending towards the river, capturing some of its troops and driving the rest southwards. Here and there units of the different corps still held out. Troops of the 43rd and 46th Divisions remained on Monte Nero the whole day, not knowing what was happening elsewhere, as all communications were cut, indeed, the Alpini stuck to the Monte Nero for several days more. On the western slopes of the Mrzli and the Sleme there were heavy engagements, and even where the troops fell back they withdrew fighting. The Caltanisetta and Etna Brigades, and the 243rd Regiment greatly distinguished themselves, and the Albergian Alpini Battalion remained on Monte Pleka till the evening of the 25th. Parts of these forces managed to retire across the river, but the rest were captured. Other units failed to put up a vigorous resistance, and some broke down altogether. Cadorna believed that the valley of the Natisone might still be defended by holding a line from the Globocak to Monte Xum and the Zagradan pass, Luico, Monte Matajur and the Robic defile, not an ideal line, but one which had the advantage of being far from the enemy and unseen by their artillery. Further back there was yet another line, the last defence of the Friuli plain, based on the Monte Maggiore and following the circuit of hills round the head of the Natisone Valley (Monte Cuniza, Monte Carniza and Monte Juanez) and linked up with the Korada and the spurs on the right of the Isonzo. On the 24th, the Carnia Zone Command was ordered to provide for the defence of Monte Maggiore, and to close the outlets of Valle Uccea and the Rio Bianco. The next day the 3rd Army Command was ordered to withdraw the heaviest artillery to beyond the Piave, and the more mobile artillery to the west of the Vallone del Carso. On the 25th, the 2nd Army Command informed Cadorna that the breakthrough of the IV Corps front had caused the loss of all the positions east of the

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Isonzo, that the enemy were advancing on Creda and attacking the Stol with success and pressing on Luico. The Stol was held by the Alpini, who had evaded capture at Plezzo and on the Monte Nero, and who, when their munitions were finished, defended themselves with stones; but they now found themselves surrounded and overwhelmed. Some of them managed to break through the enemy and reached Bergogna on the Natisone. But the loss of the position was a serious blow. The Potenza Brigade put up a gallant fight in the defile between Monte Matajur and Monte Mia, but the Salerno sent up to defend a part of the Matajur, arrived late in the day, not knowing what to do, and was unable to hold out. On the 26th, the 2nd Army had fallen back on the Monte Maggiore - Monte Cavallo - Monte Purgessimo - Korada - Kuk - Vodice - Monte Santo line, which it was hoped could be held, but the enemy succeeded in breaking through this new line with the capture of its main bulwarks, Monte Maggiore and Monte Juanez, and drove back the defence on to lines further back of small value. In Val Resia, the enemy attained San Giorgio, and on the Carso the Dosso Faiti. After the fall of Monte Maggiore, Cadorna ordered the whole of the 2nd Army to fall back on the Tagliamento by echelons, defending the outlets into the plain; the withdrawal was to begin from the north-west, the Carnia force was to resist at Chiusaforte at the confluence of Val Raccolana and Val Fella, and the 4th Army to retreat from the Cadore on to other lines of resistance, and eventually take over the Monte Grappa from the 1st Army. For the first time since the beginning of the war on the Isonzo front, the enemy was on Italian soil. Early on October 27, the C.-in-C. decided to order the withdrawal of the 3rd Army from the positions which it had conquered and held with such splendid valour and at the cost of such terrible losses. It was a painful resolution, for the Duke of Aosta's Army was still undefeated, but it had to be taken, as the lines of communication were threatened and the whole force was in grave danger of being lost. Before it evacuated the Isonzo area, the plain had been flooded in order to delay the enemy's advance. The heavy guns could not be removed in time, and remained on the original positions, where they were found a year later after the Italian victory at Vittorio Veneto. Vast masses of men, horses, guns, transport of all kinds now began to pour across the Friuli plain towards the Tagliamento. Many units marched steadily, in order, with arms and accoutrements, and maintaining their discipline to the last. The 3rd Army troops in particular preserved that "army spirit" infused into it by its commander, a spirit which had been his pride. Others were broken up into crowds of disbanded men who had lost all semblance of discipline and all sense of military duty, and were demanding the conclusion of peace, or inveighing against the alleged traitors. With the troops were hordes of civilians, men, women and children, flying before the enemy from whose savagery those who remained behind were to suffer, and making confusion worse confounded. The retreating soldiers blew up or set fire to the bridges, depots and dumps wherever possible, but quantities of material fell intact into the enemy's hands. On the 29th, the 3rd Army succeeded in getting across the Isonzo without

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much difficulty, its left protected by the right wing of the 2nd Army (VI and VIII Corps) which had been placed under the Duke of Aosta's command, and deployed between the Isonzo and the Torre, as yet not much affected by the disaster further north. But the enemy had overwhelmed the units of the VII Corps on the Torre line between Solt and Beivars, and that same day entered Udine early in the afternoon, whence the Comando Supremo and the 2nd Army command had withdrawn only a few hours previously. A dramatic episode of the occupation was the death of the German Army commander, General von Berrer, shot down by an Italian carabinier as he was driving into the town in his car. General Cadorna conducted the retreat methodically, opposing the enemy's advance, throwing one brigade after another into the ever-widening breach. His calmness was astonishing, and throughout the catastrophe he never lost his head, which is more than can be said of some of his subordinate generals. On the same 29th, the bulk of the 2nd and 3rd Armies and the Carnia force continued the retreat without enemy pressure, while the 4th Army began to withdraw from the Cadore, evacuating the upper valleys of the Visdende and the Sesis. In order to protect the evacuation of the Carnia and of the area on the left of the 2nd Army, and cover the bridges over the Tagliamento at Cornino and Pinzano, Cadorna created a new special corps composed of the 20th and 33rd Divisions, entrusting the command to General Di Giorgio. He continued to bear in mind the necessity of constituting other lines of defence further back. His first intention had been to hold the Tagliamento, at all events for a time, and he had already given orders for the organization of the positions along the right bank of that river. During the night of October 28-29, the troops began to cross it, but encountered great difficulties as the stream was in flood, and many bridges had been washed away, so that masses of troops, transport and civilians crowded on to the few bridges still available. The forces who had got across began to prepare the defences. The British and French Governments at once offered assistance to Italy in her dire need. The very day of the break-through at Caporetto, General Delm-Radcliffe, head of the British Military Mission at the Comando Supremo, had announced British help. The offer was confirmed by the two Allied Governments, who a month earlier, not believing in the coming enemy offensive, had withdrawn most of the heavy guns they had sent out, as soon as General Cadorna decided not to launch a new offensive on his front. On the morning of October 30, General Foch arrived at Treviso, where the Comando Supremo had been transferred, to discuss the situation with General Cadorna. He made various useful suggestions, but Cadorna was able to assure him that they had already been carried out or were in course of execution. Cadorna was no doubt confirmed by Foch's encouragement and approval in his determination to hold out to the bitter end, and to establish his line of resistance on the Piave, as the Tagliamento could not be held, but the decision was Cadorna's own. British and French forces soon began to arrive in Italy, but the problem was how and where to utilize these valuable reinforcements. Cadorna's idea was that they should be sent to the Montello, the wooded hill dominating the middle Piave and

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forming the connecting link between the Grappa area, which was to be held by the 4th Army, then in process of retirement from the Cadore, and the 3rd on the lower Piave, while the remains of the 2nd were being reorganized behind the front. But Foch refused. He may have feared the effect of the contact between his own troops and those who had been defeated at Caporetto, or he may not have believed in the possibility of holding the Piave line itself, the defences of which were to a large extent improvised; he may also not have wanted to engage a part of the French Army on this distant front until he knew the capacity of resistance of the new line. In any case, he considered that it was up to the Italians to delay the enemy on the Tagliamento and establish the defence of the Piave and the Trentino. Cadorna then asked him to send two of his divisions, then beginning to arrive in Italy, to the Brescia area, to ward off a possible attack from the Giudicarie. But this request was likewise refused, and Foch decided to keep the French force under General Duchesne for the present between Brescia and Verona. Nothing had been arranged as to the command of the Allied forces in Italy, for although at the Rapallo Conference a few days later the necessity for some form of inter- Allied command had been recognized, the principle was not put into practice then nor for a considerable time longer, even with regard to the French and British forces in Italy, which continued to take orders from their respective General Headquarters in France, and not from the Italian Commander-in-Chief. French assistance above all was not offered unquestioningly. But it was useful nevertheless, as it enabled Cadorna to summon some of his own units from the quieter western sectors to the battle front, and it was of great moral value; this applies a fortiori to the British forces, whose command raised far fewer difficulties than that of the French1. The Italian nation felt that inter-Allied solidarity was real, and was afterwards grateful to Foch for having declared that the Italians must hold the Piave unaided, as they actually did. But after the war, a wholly false "Foch legend" was created. It was not Foch who suggested the Piave line, nor was it Foch who defended the Piave line in October-November, 1917. French propaganda has invented "a Foch, who vigorously counselled resistance on the Piave to Italians who wished to retire still further back, a Foch who restored courage and virile determination to an Italian Command and Government who had lost confidence, a Foch who refused to go into line on the Montello merely because Cadorna's request betrayed vacillation and uncertainty"2. Indeed, Marshal Petain, in his speech on being received into the French Academy in 1931, did full justice to Italy's effort. He then stated: "After having sent four French divisions to the Italian front and persuaded the British to follow our example 3, Foch went himself to Italy on October 28. Fifteen days later, the enemy was held up on the banks of the Piave, even before it was necessary to engage our divisions. Leaving to the Italian Armies the
The difficulties were not created by the Allied commanders in Italy, but by the instructions issued to them by their respective G.H.Q.'s and War Offices 2 Volpe, op. cit., p. 132. See also the Revue des Deux Mondes, July 15, 1920, for the Foch legend, and Angelo Gatti's reply in "La parte dell' Italia", p. 162 et seq, and La Rassegna italiana, May-June, 1923, and also Cadorna's article in the Army Quarterly, Vol. VII, pp. 235-244 3 See p. 157 of this book for the British offer of October 24 1 112

merit and the honour of saving their Fatherland, Foch, with his presence and with that of the Franco-British divisions, had affirmed the solidarity of the Allies". In all, five British and six French divisions came to Italy before the end of the year, but subsequently two of the former and three of the latter were withdrawn. The cavalry, which had been inactive throughout most of the War, except for those divisions which had been dismounted and had indeed greatly distinguished themselves as infantry in the trenches1, now came into action as cavalry, and rendered invaluable service by retarding the enemy's advance across the plain. On the 28th, the Saluzzo Light Horse had attacked the enemy forces who had got across the Torre at Beivars and San Gottardo; on the 29th, the 4th Cavalry Brigade (Aosta and Mantova Lancers) charged the hostile advanced guard at Fagagna, and the 1st Brigade (Roma and Monferrato Light Horse) at Pasian Schiavonesco. At Pozzuolo del Friuli, on the 30th, the Genova and Novara Lancers, supported by detachments of Bersaglieri, put up a magnificent fight against vastly superior forces to cover the retreat of the troops along the Palmanova - Gonars - Talmassons Codroipo road. Lancers and Bersaglieri fought from house to house with rifle and bayonet, and then the survivors of the two cavalry regiments remounted and charged the enemy repeatedly, inflicting heavy losses on them until they themselves were reduced to a mere handful. Genova2 and Novara were almost annihilated; of one squadron which attacked to avoid being surrounded, only ten men survived, not an officer among them. Captain Count Carlo di Castelbarco, who although he had been severely wounded at Pasian Schiavomesco, continued to lead his squadron until he was killed, Lieutenant Carlo di Castelnuovo delle Lanze, commanding the machinegun section, and Captain Laiolo, who also fell after fighting with legendary courage, all received the gold medal for valour ad memoriam. The heroic sacrifice of the cavalry served its purpose by delaying the enemy and enabling many units to withdraw in order. The Air Force too did wonders; the names of Baracca, Piccio, Lisa, Ruffo di Calabria, Ancillotto, Lanza di Trabia and many others will never be forgotten. The Italian airmen attacked and brought down many enemy planes, while others bombed the advancing infantry and artillery units with great effect. Many acts of gallantry were performed during those terrible days, and if some men fled panic-stricken, lost to all sense of discipline and military duty, others were simply carried away by the force of events and were ready to obey orders when they were given, and often sought their units and commanders amid the awful welter of confusion along the Friuli roads. On the 30th, while masses of troops were slowly crossing the Tagliamento, the enemy entered San Daniele, north-west of Udine, constituting a menace to the Pinzano and Codroipo bridges to the north of the line of retreat. The Bologna Brigade and other infantry units tried to hold up the advance and succeeded for a time, but at 14 hours, General Agliardi, who was in command, ordered the three Codroipo
Of the 25,000 cavalrymen mobilized more than half had fought in the trenches, and of the 3,000 officers a third had been transferred to other arms 2 "Genova Cavalleria" more than lived up to its splendid traditions and its proud motto: "Soit pied, soit cheval Mon honneur est sans gal". 1 113

bridges to be blown up; it was a premature measure, and a considerable number of men and batteries remaining on the left bank fell into the enemy's hands, including a large number of heavy and medium guns, which had been withdrawn in the face of incredible transport difficulties from the Bainsizza, through the energy of Colonels Baistrocchi and Garrone and other officers. More troops now converged towards the already overcrowded bridges at Madrisio and Latisana, pursued by the Austrians of the Scotti group. On November 1, the Pinzano bridge was blown up, and later in the day that of Latisana. Large Italian forces were now deployed along the right bank of the Tagliamento opposite the Austrians and Germans on the left. But Cadorna had realized that that river offered no real security, and that the final battle for the salvation of Italy must be fought on the Piave. The enemy had in fact already begun to cross the upper Tagliamento at Cornino and Valeriano on the night of November 2-3, and menaced the Italians on the right bank lower down. Di Giorgio's special corps conducted a series of dashing rearguard actions, which held up the enemy throughout the 3rd and 4th, thereby giving the 3rd Army time to attain and cross the Piave. On the 4th, Di Giorgio was ordered to withdraw across the Meduna river, which he proceeded to do, but the 36th and 63 rd Divisions from the Carnia foothills found themselves cut off from their line of retreat. Under the command of General Rocca, they fought their way southward, repelling the enemy's advanced guards on the 5th at Pielungo and Forno, and on the 6th at Pradis, until the surviving remnants of the two units were surrounded by superior forces and compelled to surrender. There were now signs that the Austro-German advance was beginning to slow down. Field-Marshal Boroevich had failed to hold back the Italian 3rd Army which had slipped through his fingers, and now that he was following it, he did not show sufficient energy for the terrible Carso fighting had broken the spirit of his forces in that sector. In his attempt to advance in a north-westerly direction, he crossed the line of the 14th German-Austrian Army, thereby causing considerable confusion, and intensifying the annoyance of von Below, at what he regarded as Austrian inefficiency1. The Italian rearguard actions and the holocaust of the cavalry had caused further delay, and the Austrian Army did not dispose of a sufficient number of fast units capable of pushing forward and overcoming all obstacles, nor of adequate material for repairing the blown-up bridges. Nor was the liaison between the various units perfect. The success of the assailants had been amazing, but the units had almost got out of hand, and the command was unable to exploit it to the full. The evacuation of the maritime area on the extreme right of the 3rd Army, was effected with the help of the Navy. Admiral Murzolo had received his orders on October 26, and he carried them out admirably amid the most adverse circumstances. The weather was abominable, high seas and the waters of the Isonzo in flood hampered his action, while the fire from enemy ships and aeroplanes was extremely violent. The 4,000 or 5,000 seamen warded off the danger of a turning movement by land, kept open the communications between Grado and Venice along the land-locked waterways, saved a great deal of war material and
1 See Krauss, op. cit, p. 233

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destroyed what they could not save. By October 30, when the 3rd Army was reaching the Tagliamento, the seamen had finished their work, and set themselves to the task of strengthening the defences of Venice, although it was still doubtful whether the beautiful city could be saved. The retreat towards the Piave was now proceeding regularly. The 3rd Army had lost many men, but it had improved in quality, it had shed its most doubtful elements, while those who remained were the men determined to fight it out to the bitter end. The rearguard actions on the Tagliamento and the Livenza were well fought by units of all arms. Columns of men and transport, which before the Tagliamento had marched in confusion, spread out to the right and left of the main body, after crossing the river proceeded to rejoin it. Many disbanded brigades were rapidly reformed. A notice-board would be put up by the road-side with the name of this or that unit, and soon the scattered men belonging to it would stop on seeing the name written up and wait for their comrades, until the officers had restored the organization. Even in the broken 2nd Army many units retained their formation and spirit. Some of its detachments held up the enemy for twelve hours on the Mauria Pass between the upper Tagliamento and the upper Piave Valleys. The Belluno Alpini Battalion which had suffered fearful losses on the Stol, reached its depot headquarters at Belluno at the beginning of November; the officer-in-command allowed the men, worn out by fatigue, who had been fighting and marching for many days, a short respite to visit their families, with orders to rejoin him in a few hours, and within the prescribed time they had returned. The fighting in this mountain area served the purpose of retarding the enemy's progress, hampered the liaison between Krobatin's forces and Conrad's, and thus helped the orderly retreat of the 4th Army from the Cadore. By November 7 the greater part of the 3rd Army, after crossing the Monticano and the Livenza, attained and crossed the Piave. The withdrawal of the 4th Army was also proceeding; it had been ordered at first to defend the pass at Serravalle, near Vittorio, but this was now no longer necessary, as that area was to be evacuated. General Cadorna considered that General Di Robilant had been too slow in effecting his retreat, but if in so doing he did run a grave risk, actually he proved able to carry out his withdrawal without excessive pressure on the part of the enemy, and without suffering serious losses. At Longarone to the north of Belluno, however, enemy forces on November 9 did get across from the Carnia, by the Vajont valley, and intercepted the retreat of a large column of 4th Army troops. The Italians fought hard to cut their way through on the 10th, but only a small portion succeeded in getting away over the mountains; the rest, some 10,000 in all, were captured. But the delay enabled the other units of the 4th Army to attain their new positions between the Piave and the Brenta, with guns and material. The IX Corps now held the line from Monte Pallone over Monte Tomba and Monfenera down to the Piave, where it guarded the bridges of Vidor, Fener and the Priula. West of it, the XVIII Corps was deployed in liaison with the Altipiani (Asiago) Army. General Di Giorgio's Special Corps had fought a fierce rearguard action at

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Sacile, on the 6th, and now, having fulfilled its mission, followed the other forces and crossed the Piave. Colonel Francesco Rosso, commanding the rear of the XIII Corps, consisting of some squadrons of cavalry, a battalion of Bersaglieri cyclists and other detachments, when attacked by superior forces at Campagna di Cesalto, was ordered to fall back. But he continued to hold out until nearly all his men had been killed or wounded, and he too fell, having probably taken his own life. The Piave line was now held by fairly numerous forces, and on the Grappa massif between Piave and Brenta, the positions were being hurriedly completed so as to bar the access to the plain between the two rivers 1. On the 7th, General Cadorna had issued his impassioned appeal to the Armies to resist to the utmost. "We are inflexibly determined", he concluded, "on the new positions from the Piave to the Stelvio the honour and the life of Italy are being defended; let every fighter know what is the cry, the command issuing from the conscience of every Italian: to die, not to retreat!" These were the General's last words as Commander-in-Chief. On November 8, he was informed that he had been superseded, and on the 9th, he handed over his command to General Armando Diaz, who had been appointed to succeed him.

General the Earl of Cavan, while on his way to Treviso to confer with General Cadorna, encountered units of the 2nd Army in full retreat, and was very anxious. But after meeting Cadorna and finding him calm, and seeing how well he had filled the gap between the 1st and 3rd armies, he felt fully relieved 116

THE RECOVERY The Rome Cabinet had been growing steadily weaker, and had been in a state of crisis since October 21. Caporetto only hastened, but did not determine its fall. On October 26, a hostile vote in the Chamber caused Signor Boselli and his colleagues to resign, and Signor Orlando, the Minister of the Interior, was called upon to form a new Ministry. The choice seemed a strange one, as it was Signor Orlando who had been regarded as responsible for the excessive freedom of action allowed to the seditious parties in their campaign of treachery and defeatism. But it must in all justice be admitted that he was to do better as Premier in a moment of terrible danger for the nation, than he had done as Minister of the Interior. Baron Sonnino remained at the Foreign Office and General Giardino at the War Office. Giardino intended to ask the new Premier to confirm the confidence of the Government in General Cadorna, whom he still regarded, in spite of Caporetto, as the best man to command the Army. But at the last moment he was superseded as Minister of War by General Alfieri, notoriously unfavourable to Cadorna. Nevertheless, when Giardino went to pay his farewell visit to Signor Orlando, and asked him whether Cadorna was to retain his post, Orlando replied affirmatively, and in fact telegraphed to the Commander-in-Chief to that effect. But, on November 7, Cadorna was privately informed by the Sub-Chief of the Staff, who had represented him at the Rapallo inter-Allied Conference, that he had been superseded, and on the 8th he received an official communication in the same sense1. The reasons for this change in the High Command have been the subject of much discussion. According to one version it was the Parliamentary opposition which decided it, while according to another it had been demanded by the Allied representatives at Rapallo. Perhaps the chief reason was that the mere fact of Cadorna's defeat was enough to destroy the confidence of the Army and the nation in him, and that this lack of confidence, even if not wholly justified, would be fatal to future success. Undoubtedly public opinion was aghast at the magnitude of the disaster. The local authorities in the threatened areas, without instructions from the Comando Supremo or the Government, had fled together with a large part of the civil population, and refugees were soon spread all over Italy. Throughout the Veneto there was panic, and to some extent even in Lombardy. The neutralists now raised their heads higher than ever. The Socialists proclaimed the failure of "bourgeois Italy", and already expected and hoped that she would sue for a separate peace. In many quarters imprecations were heard against the Government, the governing classes, the Monarchy itself. General Cadorna had many enemies, not only among the officers whom he had superseded, but also among the neutralists, Giolittians, Socialists, etc., and even among those interventionists who were Democrats and Freemasons, to whom he personified either the war spirit or the spirit of authority and militarism. As long as he was victorious his opponents held their tongues, but now that he had been beaten, he became the butt of all these hostile forces, and even his
1 See General Giardino's "Ricordi e rievocazioni di guerra", Vol. I, passim

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supporters felt the ground slipping from under their feet. The most patriotic citizens were filled with a sense of the deepest depression and humiliation. Baron Leopoldo Franchetti, one of the finest characters of his time and an ardent advocate of intervention, could not bear up against the stunning blow, and committed suicide. Leonida Bissolati, the Reformist Socialist member of the Bosclli and Orlando Cabinets, also an ardent interventionist, who had fought in the ranks and had been wounded, felt that the whole world was breaking up, and was on the point of following Franchetti's example. Other political men such as Nitti only saw in Caporetto the harbinger of coming political change, and took care to prepare for the day when Socialists and Clericals would rule Italy. Many Italians, regardless of party lines, thought that all was up and that nothing could now hold up the triumphant progress of the enemy. We have seen how Cadorna was determined to hold the Piave line at all costs. It presented many advantages: it was shorter than the old line by 200 kilometres ; it was protected in the mountain sector by several powerful bulwarks, already to some extent fortified and organized, and in the plain the Piave river was broad and difficult to cross, while along the middle reaches the ground was higher on the right bank than on the left. In any case, the new line meant hope of recovery, and thoughout the country and the Army the determination that it must be held, the conviction that it could be held, spread rapidly and came to constitute an article of faith. The King, who throughout his reign has systematically kept himself in the background and out of the public eye, in moments of national crisis has come forward with acts of courage and energy, giving expression to the real feeling of the country and appealing successfully to its best traditions. Throughout the war he had always been with the Army, living among the troops, constantly visiting the danger points, preferably choosing the most exposed roads while going from one sector to another, ever giving an example of cool unostentatious courage, but without ever interfering in the conduct of the operations or the acts of the Comando Supremo. He took no more leave than was allowed to the humblest private. As soon as the withdrawal to the Piave had been effected, he issued a proclamation to the country, which resounded like a trumpet-call to duty and self-sacrifice. "ITALIANS! "The enemy, favoured by an exceptional combination of circumstances, have been able to concentrate their whole effort on us. The Austrian Army, which in thirty months of heroic struggle our Army had so often faced and so often beaten, has now received the long-invoked and long-awaited assistance of numerous and experienced troops. Our defence has been forced back, and to-day the enemy invades and tramples on that proud and glorious Venetian land whence the untamable gallantry of our forefathers and the unshakable right of Italy had driven them. "Since it proclaimed its unity and independence, the nation has never had to face a more difficult trial. But as My House and My People, welded into a single spirit, have never wavered before danger, so now too we look adversity in the face

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with a virile, dauntless heart. "From this same necessity we shall draw the virtue from within ourselves to raise our spirits up to the level of events. The citizens, of whom the Fatherland has demanded so many renunciations, privations and sufferings, will again respond to the new insistent appeal with a yet more fervent impetus of faith and sacrifice. The soldiers, who in so many battles measured themselves with the hated invader and stormed his bulwarks and drove him from the cities redeemed with their blood, will carry forward their glorious tattered colours once more, side by side with our Allies fraternally collaborating with us. "Italians, Citizens and Soldiers! "Be a single Army. All cowardice is treachery, all discord is treachery, all recrimination is treachery. May this appeal of unshakable confidence in the destinies of Italy resound in the trenches as in every remote corner of the Fatherland, and may it be the cry of the people who are fighting, of the people who are working. To the enemy who counts on the disintegration of our spirit and of our unity, let us reply with a single conscience and a single voice: We are all ready to do everything for the victory, for the honour of Italy. VITTORIO EMANUELE." The overwhelming shock of the Caporetto disaster did not produce the effect on which the enemy had calculated. Instead of a complete break-down of the Army and an internal revolution, the whole nation pulled itself together, and the Army settled down grimly to the task of holding the new line and saving the country. The Austro-German offensive "had been, perhaps, a masterpiece of military manoeuvre, but also a very grave psychological error"1. The defeat appeared to the nation and the Army undeserved, and aroused a firm determination to recover what had been lost, both morally and materially. Caporetto also created a stronger sense of inter-Allied solidarity. That solidarity had existed in fact between Germany and Austria, but only in theory in the Entente; it was now to find practical expression here too. Not only were British and French troops sent to Italy, but at the Rapallo Conference on November 5-6 the foundations were laid for that unity of command which Cadorna had long advocated, but which was not to become fully operative until after the German break-through in France in March, 1918. At Rapallo it was decided to create the Supreme War Council, composed of the heads of the Allied Governments, assisted by a military committee on which France was represented by Foch, Great Britain by Sir Henry Wilson and Italy by Cadorna, now no longer Commander-in-Chief. On the 8th the Allied representatives were received by the King of Italy at Peschiera. He showed himself thoroughly conversant with every aspect of the military situation, which he set forth in the clearest language, and aroused in his hearers the fullest confidence in Italy's determination to fight on to the bitter end and in her capacity to continue the struggle. All armies had suffered reverses, the Italian Army was still in being even after the disaster, the Italians would hold the new
1 Tosti, "La guerra italo-austriaca", p. 225

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positions, recovery was certain, and must be prepared, prepared on the Piave and not on the Adige or on the Mincio, these, in substance, were His Majesty's arguments1. It was the King's persuasive eloquence which induced the Allied Commands to increase their forces in Italy, and no longer to fear the "contagion" of the units which had broken down at Caporetto. The first French troops crossed the Italian frontiers on October 30, and soon after the French 10th Army under General Duchesne was in Italy (XXXI Corps: 64th and 65th Divisions, plus the 46th and 47th Divisions of Chasseurs des Alpes). It was, as we have seen, at first deployed between Brescia and Verona, and later it was joined by another corps with two divisions (November 20-December 2). Subsequently, the whole force was placed under General Fayolle. The first British contingent to arrive was the XIV (23rd and 41st Divisions), and was sent to the Mantova area. Later the XI Corps also arrived (three divisions). General Armando Diaz, the new Commander-in-Chief, was then fifty-six years old and had, until his appointment, been almost unknown to the general public. He was wholly outside the political world, his record as a colonel in the Libyan War was distinguished, and he had been wounded at Zuara. He had been secretary to Cadorna's predecessor, Pollio, and in that capacity had acquired a wide knowledge of military organization. For a time he had served under Cadorna himself at the Comando Supremo, then commanded a division and finally a corps, the XXIII, in the 3rd Army, and he was appreciated as a good corps commander. He was a strong believer in the value of the human element. While the lack of adequate material means had been acutely felt earlier in the War, the deficiency had subsequently been made good, but there was a tendency in certain high military quarters to regard the soldier as a mere machine, and forget that he was a human being. Diaz represented a reaction against this outlook, and he dedicated particular attention to the men's moral and material welfare. Cadorna was the greater man of the two; a leader with a very remarkable personality, as his record in the first two years of the War had proved and as his masterly conduct of the retreat after Caporetto had confirmed. Yet he had been seriously defeated, and in the eyes of the nation and the Army he was a beaten general. Later, he was to be rehabilitated and his past merits were to be recognized, as was only just and right. But in November, 1917, his name stood for defeat, and was consequently no longer one to conjure with2. Diaz was a wholly different type and mentality, and a new leader was wanted, who should be wholly different; he was more human, in closer touch with his subordinates from the sub-chiefs of the General Staff to the last private. Cadorna
See Signor Orlando's letter to General Segato, in Segato, "L'Italia nella guerra mondiale", Vol. I, p. 546 et seq 2 At the inter-Allied military council at Versailles Cadorna's was to prove the clearest intellect and the most penetrating mind. None of his colleagues showed the same grasp of the general situation, or the same instinctive intuition of the obvious course to be followed. But with the creation of the Commission of Inquiry on Caporetto, due to the pressure of the demagogues and the Freemasons, as well as of the late C.-in-C.'s personal enemies, his position at Versailles became impossible, and he was superseded. After a period of extreme unpopularity there was a reaction in his favour, and in 1924, consule Mussolini, he was created Field-Marshal, a rank not existing until then in the Italian Army, although it had existed in that of the old Sardinian Kingdom 1 120

belonged to the iron stock of the dour old Piedmontese military aristocracy, Diaz to the Neapolitan bourgeoisie; each of these classes has its undeniable merits, and when a scion of the one had failed, albeit temporarily, it was no bad thing to look for a successor in the other. The choice of Diaz had been made by the King, on the recommendation of General Alfieri, the Minister of War, but Professor Volpe thinks that Leonida Bissolati may have first suggested his name1. If the appointment of the Commander-in-Chief caused some surprise, that of Badoglio and Giardino as sub-chiefs met, at first, with scant approval. It was the front of Badoglio's Corps, the XXVII, which had first been broken at Caporetto, while Giardino was regarded by the public as a "political general" (until a few days previously he had been Minister of War), and politics are not considered a good training for an army leader. But if Badoglio had failed at Caporetto he had given proof of admirable military qualities at Gorizia and on the Sabotino, and Giardino, besides having been Minister of War, had an excellent record as a gallant soldier. All three were to prove worthy of the high and difficult tasks entrusted to them. Of the two Badoglio was the stronger man, and soon after Giardino was sent to command the 4th Army. The reorganization of the Italian forces had been proceeding, in spite of enemy pressure, and the new line was being taken over and strengthened. From the Stelvio to the Asiago plateau it was practically unchanged; thence it cut across the Grappa massif, descended on to the Piave at Pederobba, and followed the course of this river to the sea. But on the Asiago plateau and on the Grappa it was not yet stabilized, and there were to be more desperate fighting and more moments of grave anxiety before an impassable barrier was erected. The state of the Italian forces in the first decade of November was as follows. The III Corps and the 1st Army, from the Stelvio to the Brenta, a mass of 400,000 men, were in full efficiency. The 4th and 3rd Armies, from the Brenta to the sea, about 300,000 men, utterly exhausted by the retreat and the fighting, its units far from up to full strength and inadequately supplied with arms and materials, were not demoralized, but needed a period of rest and reorganization before they could be brought into action again. The remains of the 2nd Army and the XII Corps, another 300,000 men, almost without organic cohesion, largely unarmed and without services, were demoralized and not to be counted on for the present. The losses had amounted to 265,000 prisoners, 10,000 killed, 30,000 wounded, and a large number of disbanded men scattered about the country, many of them in hospital, 3.152 guns, 1.732 trench-mortars, 3.000 machine-guns and other small arms, 22 aviation camps, and immense quantities of war material and supplies of all sorts. The units requiring reorganization were concentrated in two large nuclei, one comprising the VI, XXV, XXVIII and XXX Corps, belong to the 2nd Army, and the other comprising the II, XII and XIV Corps, forming the new 5th Army with
1 The first idea had been to appoint one of the Army commanders; but the best of them, the Duke of Aosta, was considered ineligible as a Royal Prince, and the others, for one reason or another, were open to criticism. Consequently the choice was limited to the Corps Commanders; and the choice fell on one of those of the 3rd Army 121

Headquarters at Borgo San Donnino, near Parma. The XXVII was reorganized on the spot and came into line on November 22; the VI, XXV, XXVIII and XXX joined it soon after. In all the following forces were reconstituted: 50 infantry brigades, 47 extra battalions, 812 machine-gun companies, 910 machine-pistol sections, 22 field artillery regiments (188 batteries), 50 mountain batteries, 75 trench-mortar batteries, 91 siege batteries, 570 handgrenade sections, 23 sapper battalions, 72 signal companies, 11 pontoon companies, and various minor units. By the beginning of February the reorganization was complete. It had been a colossal effort, inasmuch as during two of the four months which it had required, fighting had been incessant. By the middle of November there still remained an immense amount of work to be accomplished before the situation could be regarded as free from anxiety. In his diary General Giardino notes that the VI and XXV Corps were in moderately good condition and capable of being reorganized if reinforced, the II, XXIV, XXVII and XXX in less good condition, but capable of being reorganized with march brigades. For the future he then considered that by November 24 four corps could be reorganized, and later three more, the rest needing to be completely reconstituted far from the front. But in practice this forecast was not realized. On the 10th the enemy attack made it necessary to send up some of the march brigades to reinforce the 1st Army and the XXVII Corps to the 4th on the Grappa as soon as possible; the trench-mortar units, which were without trench-mortars, had to be made up into seven infantry battalions and sent to the Piave area. At the beginning of the new defensive battle the only available forces were those in action; no reserves would be ready before a fortnight. By the end of the battle some corps had been brought into action before they were reorganized, and there was only one in reserve, the XIX. The Comando Supremo could not hope to modify the moral state of the troops while the battle was raging; it had to take it as it was and hope for the best. Yet with the defences along the 100 kilometres of the new line only barely sketched, these troops had to hold up the enemy onslaught by themselves at a density of barely three men per metre, including the echelons in depth, with only weak sector reserves and no general reserve. On November 10, the battle began again, and lasted for a whole fortnight. It dissipated the uncertainty, for the men fought unaided, and although they were yet to fall back on many points they held the essential lines and won. The presence of the Allied troops in Italy did not yet contribute to the material result, but it did have a valuable moral effect. The Comando Supremo did all it could as soon as it could to restore confidence and raise the spirit of the men, but none of its measures could have any immediate effect or contribute to rapid moral recovery. The Italian order of battle was as follows: III Army Corps (2 divisions) from the Stelvio to the Lake of Garda; 1st Army (12 divisions) from the Lake of Garda to the River Brenta; 4th Army (7 divisions) from the Brenta to Nervesa on the Piave; 3rd Army (8 divisions) from Nervesa to the sea.
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In all there were twenty-nine divisions, with very inadequate artillery; aeroplanes, means of transport, mechanical and horsedrawn, and materials of all other kind were woefully deficient. Opposed to this "rump" Army was the Austro-German Army, fifty-five divisions strong (650 battalions), amply provided with masses of artillery of all calibres, and every other material means, flushed with victory and secure in its confidence that nothing now could stop its further triumphal progress. "If the commanders dreamed of receiving their field-marshals' batons in the Ducal Palace in Venice, the soldiers were intoxicated at the mad frenzy of the booty and devastation in which they had been able to indulge in the unlucky Friuli lands"1. The last units of the retreating Italian Army had barely crossed the Piave (the very last was a battalion of the ever-famous Sassari Brigade) and blown up the last bridge, when the advance guards of Boroevich's Group were already on the left bank. The next day von Below appeared, but his march along the lower slopes of the Alps was slower. He had detailed a part of the 14th Army under General Krauss to pursue the Italians in the mountains, for he feared an offensive in the Cansiglio forest. In the mountain area Conrad and Krobatin were not yet ready and could not cooperate with the Isonzo-Armee on the Piave. Soon the following order of battle was evolved: Field-Marshal Conrad's Group of Armies (10th and 11th, 17 divisions strong) from the Stelvio to the Valsugana; General von Below's 14th Austro-German Army (19 divisions) from the Valsugana to the Ponti della Priula on the Piave; Field-Marshal Boroevich's Group (1st and 2nd Isonzo-Armee, 19 divisions) from the Ponti della Priula to the sea. In all this force was a million strong. It seemed impossible that the beaten Italian Army could recover itself sufficiently to hold the new and as yet imperfectly organized line in the face of this mighty host. And yet the miracle was accomplished, although not without other moments of grave anxiety and danger. General Diaz's task was indeed no light one, and the great problem for commands and staffs was how the troops would behave. The soldiers and regimental officers on the other hand were asking themselves what the generals and commands would do. The leaders were still not sure of their men, the men not sure of their leaders, for after thirty months of victories which achieved little, with the everrepeated spectacle of generals deprived of their commands, it was but natural that they should have lost confidence in the capacity of chiefs claiming infallibility. Public opinion, too, had helped to shake this confidence by its demagogic tendency to exalt the private and damn the general2. The leaders were still under the incubus of Caporetto. Yet now there was no longer any defeatism. Many of the men of the units which had broken down at Caporetto were heard to say that they had been deceived by the assurance sedulously spread about by enemy agents and Socialist
1 2 Tosti, op. cit., p. 258 To some mentalities a general was not a human being, but a combination of incompetence and wickedness 123

propagandists that the Austrians and Germans would also have "downed arms" and that peace would follow. The enemy delivered their first attack on the Asiago plateau, Conrad's pet battlefield. The partition separating the Austrian positions from the Venetian plain was now dangerously thin, and it seemed as though a resolute push would break through it without difficulty and force the troops on the Piave to fall back on the Adige. The Comando Supremo hoped that the Allied forces now in Italy would relieve some of the utterly exhausted Italian units, for, as we have seen, there were no other reserves available. But the Allied Commands refused on the plea that they must watch the Giudicarie sector, and that they could not split up their forces. The Allied Commanders themselves realized the awkwardness of their position, but they had to obey orders, and it had been thought better that the Allied troops should stand on a reserve line until it became clear that the Italians could hold on the Piave. Although the Italians were, in effect, able to hold this line, the Allies and some Italian leaders were, at the time, still uncertain about it1. The advanced positions at Gallio and on Monte Ferragh were the first to be attacked (November 10); the Pisa and Toscana Brigades were forced back somewhat, but they counterattacked and regained the lost ground on the following day. On the 12th the battle continued to rage with varying success. The Italians had to evacuate the heights near Gallio, but after three days of violent attacks on Monte Sisemol and on the Melette - Monte Fior - Castelgomberto line, covering Val Frenzela, which gives access to the Brenta Valley, the enemy were unable to make any advance. In this defensive action the chief honours fell to the Regina and Liguria Brigades, and to the Monte Baldo and Marmolada Alpini. In the Grappa area the Austrians were more successful, and attacking in greatly superior numbers between the 15th and the 17th they captured the northern peaks of the massif, Monte Tomatico and Monte Roncone, and later Monte Prassolan and Monte Cornelia, and occupied the Quero gorge, forcing the Como Brigade, after a desperate resistance, back on to Monte Tomba and Monfenera, and the village of Fener. On the Piave, where the defences, as on the Grappa, were as yet only sketched and lacked adequate dug-outs and wire entanglements, a first attempt was made to cross the river by the Silesian Division at Vidor, but in spite of its dash it failed. In the night of November 11-12 an Austrian force succeeded in getting across at the loop near Zenson, and forming a small bridgehead, but while the Italians could not drive them back they prevented them from extending their occupation. On the night of the 15th-16th the Austrians got four more battalions across along the Treviso-Oderzo railway, at Ponte di Piave. But at Fagar they were met by the Novara and 3rd Bersaglieri Brigades of the XIII Corps (General Sani), and at Folina by the Lecce, who attacked furiously and routed them out of the houses in which they were ensconced, recaptured some of the ground lost on the previous days, and pressed them back to the river. Of the 92nd Austrian Regiment not a man survived to bring the news back across the Piave. About a thousand prisoners were
1 Giardino, op. cit., Vol. I., p. 183

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captured. This fight at Fagar was the first Italian success since October 24. The men who fought these battles were a scratch force, veterans of the Carso who had retreated in good order, isolated members of units disbanded in the rout who, on attaining the various camps for concentrating the disbanded regiments, took rifles and returned to the front, boys of the 1899 class (18 years of age), who, as soon as they descended from the trains and lorries, were at once sent into the furnace of battle and behaved admirably. "The Army should know", wrote General Diaz, "that our young brothers of the '99 class have shown themselves worthy of the heritage of glory which has descended on them". Other enemy attempts were equally unsuccessful, and the Austrians who had got on to the right bank of the Piave were forced to recross it. Except for the small force at Zenson, the 1,200 prisoners and the many dead, there were no more Austrians on the right bank. There was at last a feeling of confidence that the new line would really hold. Having failed on the Piave, the enemy now delivered alternate blows on the Grappa and Asiago sectors, determined to effect a breach at all costs in the thin grey line and debouch into the Venetian plain. Between November 18 and 22, Di Giorgio's XXVII Corps fought desperately and unceasingly on the bloodstained heights of the Grappa; the struggle was with rifle and bayonet, hand-grenades and stones, anything which might serve to hold up the oncoming enemy tide, and the men at times used corpses as barricades from behind which to fire. The enemy pressure was terrible, and the attacking forces were ever being renewed. Monte Fontanasecca was lost on the 20th. On Monfenera the 9th Mountain Artillery Group, placed in a very advanced position, had all its guns destroyed or buried in landslides produced by enemy shells, nearly all its men killed or wounded, until its commander, Captain Di Rocco, led a bayonet charge of the few survivors right on to the enemy machine-guns. Monte Tomba was the most vulnerable point of the Grappa area, with its low eminences and its valleys easy of access. Desperate engagements were fought on its slopes, and the best Austrian and German units were hurled into the deadly melee. Part of Tomba was lost, and on the 23rd the summit of Pertica was taken, retaken and lost again, in spite of the magnificent sacrifice of the Monte Baldo Alpini Battalion. When the Basilicata Brigade was relieved on Monte Tomba one of its regiments had only 400 survivors. Grappa was now held in a semi-circle of fire, and the commands at the various Headquarters held their breath in deadly anxiety for its faith, for it seemed as though nothing could now save it, and if Grappa fell the whole line would crumble. The VI Corps had been brought up near the front line on the 19th to the rear of the XXVII; it was not yet reorganized, but it was the only reserve available and helped to relieve the much tried IX Corps. There were, however, signs that the enemy drive was beginning to slacken, while the defenders were becoming more hopeful; even while the battle was raging it had been possible to strengthen the lines further back, both on the Grappa and the Altipiani. On November 23 the attack on the latter was suspended, for if Conrad had succeeded in capturing the Melette salient it had been at the cost of five divisions. On the 25th the last attack on the Grappa was launched, but it was everywhere

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beaten back. On the Col della Berretta the remnants of the units which had defended Monte Pertica (Aosta and Messina Brigades, Val Brenta Alpini Battalion and 60th Bersaglieri Regiment) attacked and overwhelmed the famous Edelweiss Division. The first to reach the trenches on the Col della Berretta was Lieutenant Testolini, who had left his office at the Divisional Headquarters to take part in the battle, where he was wounded and killed. The summit of Monte Pertica was taken and lost seven times in a few hours. In the end, swept by the gun-fire of both armies, it remained unoccupied, Italians on one side and Austrians on the other, clinging to positions just below the top until the final victory a year later. On the whole the situation of the Italians had decidedly improved. If some of their advanced positions had been lost, the main bastions were securely held and the defence had won. Even more remarkable was the spirit of the troops. General di Robilant wrote that in those days of desperate fighting the military police in the rear of the IX Corps did not find a single man trying to leave the front lines. "After a month of deep gloom", writes Professor Volpe, "the horizon clears. The battle itself gave the first factor of the moral reconstruction of the Army and also of the country, before the measures of the Government had been taken, or before their effects were felt, the new guiding principles of the Comando Supremo and the other commands, the new spirit of the citizens towards the fighting men". On the 22nd attention was shifted to the Asiago area, where the Austrians aimed at turning the Melette salient and pinching it out by converging the attacks on it from the north and west. But General Ferrari's brigade held its own magnificently. Monte Zomo was successfully defended by the Monte Cervino Alpini Battalion, which had lost two-thirds of its effectives. Castelgomberto was held by the Perugia Brigade, which drove off all attacks, although its commander, General Euclide Turba, was killed in action. The attacks now slowed down and for a few days the enemy was everywhere beaten off by Italian troops, by the vanquished of Caporetto. Two new legends were growing up: that of the Monte Grappa and that of the Piave. The fierce resistance of two weeks had generated the confidence of being able to resist still further. In the meanwhile, wherever possible, the work of organizing and completing the defences and preparing other lines further back was feverishly proceeded with. On the Bacchiglione a good deal had been done and plans were drawn up for the defence of the Mincio line if the Piave-Grappa line proved untenable, although no one wished to admit that possibility. By November 29 the Italian Army was still subject to hostile initiative, for the enemy disposed of more numerous and better armed forces. But no enemy success could now force the Italians to accept a battle in the open field, where superior forces would count. The new defensive line, even if as yet unfinished, would suffice to change the character of the battle, in which the Italians were still retreating. The Comando Supremo could not yet definitely affirm on which line the enemy would be held up, but it could confidently assert that they would be held up somewhere. But unity of command, which Cadorna had advocated for the Allied Armies as a whole, had not yet been fully achieved, even on the Italian Front. On November 18,

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while the battle was raging on the Grappa, a proposal was made by the Allied Commands to send five Franco-British and five Italian divisions to the Altipiani area, but the question of the joint command of this mixed force had to be settled first. The Italian Comando Supremo accepted, but proposed that for the sake of the unity of command, all the Allied divisions should be concentrated east of the Astico and the Italian ones to the west of it; it added that troops trained and clothed for mountain warfare would be needed on that sector. The plan fell through, and at an inter-Allied conference, held on the 22nd, the British and French Commanders proposed instead that all the non-Italian divisions be placed in reserve on both sides of the Brenta, and not in the front lines. The Comando Supremo once more agreed, and the movement was scheduled to commence on the 24th. But it did not. On that day the British Command offered to take over the Montello sector, a very important proposal which the Comando Supremo accepted, but the French Command had to be consulted first. It was consulted, but its reply was delayed for several days. Finally, on the 29th, an agreement was reached to the effect that both the French and the British units were at last to come into line. The Grappa, which had been held first by the XVIII Corps alone, then by the XVIII and XXVII, was now to be entrusted to the two latter corps plus the VI and two Alpini groups, all of which units had been reorganized and strengthened. In the area from the right of Monte Tomba to Nervesa the right sector of the 4th Army (IX and I Corps) was to be handed over to six Allied divisions (three French ones from Tomba to Rivasecca and three British from Rivasecca on to the Montello). The Grappa Army was to have a corps plus one division in reserve, while three more corps (the XV, XXVIII and XXX) were to be at the disposal of the Comando Supremo. Six of the Allied divisions were thus in line, four further back, and one more British division was to arrive on December 11. Other British divisions were announced, but the German attack in Flanders held them up and they never came. On December 4 the enemy offensive recommenced, and this time the Melette salient was again attacked after a terrifically heavy fire, largely with gas shells. The salient was protected on the right by Monte Badenecche and Monte Tonderecar, on the left by Monte Sisemol and Monte Zomo. On the latter side the position was held, but the attacks on the right, after a protracted and heroic resistance, were successful. In consequence the salient had to be evacuated. Sisemol, attacked by a whole German division, fell on the 6th, after having been taken and lost several times. On Monte Fior and Castelgomberto the Alpini, who had been cut off, held on to the very last. The defence of the salient had indeed been of value, for if it was overwhelmed in the end it had held up the enemy for several weeks and given the Italians time to organize the defences of Val Frenzela and prevent an attack on Grappa from the west. The Italians, reinforced by the XXV and XXX Corps in the plain, now held the line Cima Echar - Monte Valbella - Col del Rosso - Zaibena - right edge of Val Frenzela, ominously called the "marginal line". The first Allied troops now came into the front lines, two French divisions on Monfenera and two British on the Montello (right bank of the Piave), but for the first few days of their occupation they were not attacked.

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In the meanwhile the enemy were contemplating an offensive from the sea so as to enfilade the defences of the lower Piave. For this purpose a naval division had been concentrated at Trieste. But on the night of December 8-9 two M.A.S. 1 commanded by Luigi Rizzo penetrated into the bay of Muggia, broke through the barrage and torpedoed the cruiser Wien, thereby confounding the enemy's aggressive plans. The attacks on Grappa were renewed on December 11, with heavy German and Austrian forces. Asolone, Col della Berretta and Spinoncia were overwhelmed; Italian counter-attacks resulted in the recapture of the greater part of the Col della Berretta and, the next day, of its summit, but the other positions remained in enemy hands. Col dell'Orso, however, resisted successfully, and the hostile advance in the Val Calcino between Spinoncia and Valderoa was held up. On the following days the Col dell'Orso - Solaroli - Val Calcino - Porte di Salton line and Monte Valderoa were again attacked repeatedly, and General Tettoni's XVIII Corps covered itself with glory in its gallant resistance against an enemy superior in numbers and arms, and innumerable acts of heroism were performed by all ranks in that desperate struggle. On the 14th Col Caprile and the southern slopes of Col della Berretta were lost, and on the 18th the blood-stained summit of the Asolone, but the Solaroli still held out for a time, and it was here that the Aosta Battalion greatly distinguished itself with its old Piedmontese battle cry: "Ch'a cousta lo ch'a cousta, Viva l'Aousta!" The defence of Monte Valbella by the Feltre Battalion was truly epic; officers' servants, cooks, telephone operators, all threw themselves into the furnace and nearly all fell in action. Although the enemy, by desperate efforts with overwhelming forces and at the cost of terrible losses, had succeeded in wresting some of the positions to the north of the main massif of the Grappa, they could not continue attacking indefinitely. The situation for the Italians was still dangerous, for if Grappa itself might now be regarded as safe, there was the risk of penetration into the plain by the Canale di Brenta and the Santa Felicita valley. On the 19th the Italians counter-attacked and recaptured the greater part of the Asolone, without being able to attain the summit. The enemy pressure on the whole sector was evidently dying down, and for the time being no further attacks were delivered. On the Altipiani, however, Field-Marshal Conrad was determined to make a last attempt to break through before the winter set in and rendered further operations impossible. To incite the soldiers he promised them that if successful they would spend Christmas, far from the snows, at Bassano in the Venetian plain, with its wellstocked depots. After the usual short and intensive shell fire the infantry dashed forward on December 23, and in their first impetus they carried the Italian advanced positions on Monte Valbella, Col del Rosso, Col d'Echele, Monte Melago and Busa del Termine. The enemy now dominated the middle Val Frenzela, and the Italian right wing had given way; the situation was indeed alarming, and it seemed at one moment as if nothing could prevent a break through the last dangerously thin partition and a descent into the plain, Conrad's optatus alveus. But again the Italian counter-attacks, as in June, 1916, came in the nick of time; Monte Melago and Busa
1 i.e. Motoscafi antisommergibili (anti-submarine motor boats)

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del Termine were recaptured, on Col del Rosso all but the very summit was reoccupied, and the Pisa succeeded by a dashing assault in getting on to Valbella once more, but, being exposed to a terrific artillery fire, it had to relinquish the reconquered peak; the Toscana Brigade, the 5th Bersaglieri and other units managed on Christmas Day to restore a strong line of defence in this area, closing up the most dangerous passages which would have given access to the plain below. The enemy did not attack again, but the Italians and their Allies now took the initiative in the final actions of the winter campaign. On December 30 the French 37th Division, after careful and intelligent artillery preparation, gallantly attacked Monte Tomba (968 metres) and succeeded in wresting that important position from the enemy. At the same time units of the Italian 3rd Army, after heavily shelling the passages across the Piave, so that the Austrians on the right bank could get no more supplies, attacked them vigorously, pinched out the Zenson salient and forced the enemy back across to the left bank; there were now no more Austrians on the right bank below Pederobba, except the force holding the ground between the old and the new Piave at the estuary of the river, where they remained until the summer of 1918. The attack on Asolone by the 22nd Infantry (January 14) was less successful, for while the Italians in the first onrush got on to the summit, after two days' hard fighting, they had to relinquish it. But on January 27 and 28 the Sassari Brigade effected a surprise attack on the Asiago plateau with its traditional dash, and gained possession of Col del Rosso and Col d'Echele, while the Val dAdige, Monte Baldo, Stelvio and Tirano Alpini Battalions captured Monte Cornone and the slopes of Sasso Rosso. The enemy did not expect this onslaught, and threw their reserves, called up from all sides, into the fight without order or method. The objective of the 4th Bersaglieri Brigade was the recapture of Monte Valbella, but here they encountered the most desperate resistance, and while at first they managed to attain the summit they were driven off it on the 28th; on the 29th they delivered another formidable assault and succeeded in capturing the whole position. Thus ended the winter battle on the new lines, which may well be called the Battle of Recovery. For a victorious army, far superior in numbers, organization and armament, flushed with success beyond all expectation, to have been held up by the remnants of a defeated force immediately after a disastrous retreat (it should be remembered that the last Italian troops had crossed the Piave on November 9, and the first enemy attacks on the new line began on the 10th) was one of the most remarkable exploits in the whole War, and one of which Italy may well be proud. Marshal von Hindenburg wrote in this connection: "I had to convince myself that our forces were insufficient to secure possession of the Venetian Alps, which dominate a considerable tract of the Italian plain, and cause the resistance on the Piave to break down. The operation had reached a deadlock. The most tenacious will of the local commands and of their troops was forced to down arms before this reality. . . . In conclusion, our victory had remained incomplete"1. While Herr von Kuhlmann, the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, spoke of "the end of Italy", his Austro-Hungarian colleague, Count Czernin, in a speech to the Hungarian Foreign Affairs Committee
1 Op. cit., pp. 262-3 (It. text)

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on December 5, had hinted at peace offers to Italy on the basis of the territorial status quo. But Signor Orlando, the Italian Premier, declared on December 13, in the Italian Parliament, that before accepting this status quo Italy would go on fighting even if her armies had to fall back as far as Sicily. The Austrian General von Konopicky confesses the astonishment felt by his compatriots and the Germans on seeing that Army which they regarded as beaten and in a state of dissolution, arise once more and refuse to submit to its fate. "It seemed incredible that an army issuing from so vast a catastrophe as that of Caporetto could recover so rapidly"1. The German General Krafft von Delmensingen, formerly Commander of the Alpenkorps and then Chief of the Staff of the Austro-German 14th Army, in his book, "Das Durchbruch am Isonzo", concludes with the following passage: "Thus the offensive, so rich in promise, was held up at a short distance from its objective, and Grappa became the 'Sacred Mountain' of the Italians. For having held it against the heroic efforts of the best troops of the Austro-Hungarian Army, and of their German comrades, they may well be proud". A song, composed no one knows by whom, constantly sung by the children of Feltre and Belluno while those towns were occupied by the hated Austrians, begins with the words: "O Monte Grappa tu sei la mia patria". It was heard from a distance by the Italian troops, written down and sung and played by them during the weary and terrible months of the "Watch on the Grappa". It should not be forgotten that the defence of Grappa had at least in part been made possible by General Cadorna. Work on the mountain had been begun as early as 1916, after the Austrian Trentino offensive, and although at the time of Caporetto it was far from finished, the lorry roads leading up to the various positions, the cisterns on its waterless slopes, and some of the rock-hewn dugout had been made, and the defensive lines planned and partly executed. Had it not been for these timely precautions the mountain could not have been held and the positions along the Piave would have been exposed to out-flanking attack and have had to be abandoned in an another disastrous and perhaps definite retreat2. By the end of these operations the disproportion between the Italian and enemy forces had been, to a large extent, corrected. On November 13 there were 423 Italian battalions with reduced effectives and 3,500 guns, as against 736 AustroGerman battalions up to full strength and 7,000 guns. It was considered that a defensive force could hold up an attacking force if the former amounted to two-thirds of the latter; at that moment, in view of the inferior strength of the Italian battalions, the Comando Supremo was of opinion that a proportion of five-sixths for the defence was necessary. To attain that proportion the Italians needed another 200 battalions and 1,560 guns. By November 25 the Italian strength had been increased by 114 battalions and 964 guns, leaving a narrow margin of 86 battalions and 600 guns. By the end of the battle, early in December, there were 552 Italian and 86 Franco-British battalions: 638 in all. Moreover, the Italian units having been brought up to full strength, the proportion of two-thirds could be regarded as adequate, so that there
1 2 In Schwarte, "Der grosse Krieg", Vol. V, p. 451 See Cadorna, op. cit., Vol. II., pp. 250, et seq

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were actually 148 battalions more than was necessary for purely defensive purposes. The 5th Army (70-80 battalions) was now reorganized and only needed more arms; these were supplied at first by France, so that the force was ready to come into action by February. There was, therefore, now the possibility of contemplating offensive operations. But the winter season and other considerations precluded them for the moment. The negotiations for peace between the Central Powers and the Soviet Government were progressing rapidly at Brest-Litovsk; there were then seventy-five German and thirty-four Austrian divisions on the Russian and Rumanian fronts, and if even after the conclusion of peace some thirty German and ten Austrian divisions were still left on guard in the East1, there would yet be forty-five German and twentyfour Austrian divisions available as reinforcements to be sent west. Supposing all the German divisions were concentrated on the Franco-British Front, and all the Austrians on the Italian, the Franco-British Armies would have been inferior to the enemy by a few corps, the Italian by several. Hence it was deemed inadvisable to assume the offensive in Italy for the moment. But the holding of the Grappa-Piave line was, as General Giardino writes, "a definite accomplished fact, decisive for our war and for the general war"2.

Ever since the Russian Revolution and the defeat of Rumania, the Germans and Austrians had not only reduced the numbers of their forces on these fronts, but had kept only weaker units there 2 Op. cit., Vol. I, p. 254 1 131

RECONSTRUCTION The year 1918 began more auspiciously for Italy than would have been thought possible in view of the events of the preceding autumn. Not only had the enemy been held up on the new lines, but the country had pulled itself together and given its fullest support to the Army. The Army was now trusted and its conduct proved that Caporctto had been a momentary aberration on the part of certain units. Many of those who had failed to do their duty and thought only of going home in the hope of helping to bring the War to an end, felt a new and unfriendly atmosphere around them amid people who until a few weeks before had themselves cursed the War. Deserters were thus induced to present themselves to the nearest depot asking to be sent back to the Front. Even in the industrial centres where the overpaid munition workers had been most receptive of pacifist and defeatist propaganda, the interventionist groups began to find willing listeners; subscriptions for the civilian refugees from the invaded provinces or for sending gifts to the troops were opened and large sums raised. If petitions were presented to the Government demanding a better distribution of the rationed supplies and increased subsidies to the families of service men, there were also incitements in favour of more rigorous measures against defeatist and seditious propaganda. The revolutionary leaders found less support than heretofore, and their relations with foreign centres of Bolshevik activity were more carefully watched. The Government and the public generally set themselves to the task of organizing war services of all kinds. There were 200,000 civilian refugees from the invaded territories to be provided for, be sides 218,000 from the evacuated districts immediately behind the battle line. This work was carried out efficiently, and many of the refugees were employed in the newly erected munition factories. Also the works of art from the towns exposed to enemy fire or air raids were removed to places of safety or protected by sand-bags. Colleoni's famous statue was brought away from Venice, and the bronze lions of St. Mark's were temporarily lodged in the courtyard of the Palazzo Venezia in Rome, a most suitable refuge. Vast activity was developed in reconstituting the lost military stores and in stocking the new magazines behind the lines. In this task the Government and the manufacturers strained every nerve. The Ansaldo Company had produced hundreds of guns over and above those commissioned, and they were now ready to replace the ones lost after Caporetto. Many other important firms had shown similar foresight. General Dallolio, the Minister of Arms and Munitions, rendered invaluable services to his country in its dire crisis, and very rapidly masses of weapons, munitions, and other war material were pouring in ceaseless streams towards the everabsorbing front. In 1918 the auxiliary plants had grown to 3.700 with 900.000 workmen, and a capital of 2.000.000.000 lire. By the end of February the guns were 5.282, the aeroplanes 6.500, and 1.700 lorries were turned out every month. Numerous citizen committees arose all over the country to collect gifts for the soldiers, tobacco, woollen clothing, medical comforts, chocolate, soap, books, etc.,

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and everyone, even the poorest, made sacrifices to give something. The resistance propaganda committees were no less active. Amusements and distractions for the soldiers were also provided for. Case del soldato or soldiers' hostels, of which several had been set up before Caporetto and lost in the retreat, were reconstructed all over the new war zone1. Theatrical performances, concerts, etc., were organized for the various units, and the greatest artists in Italy willingly lent their services. The men felt that they were being cared for as never before, that a real spiritual liaison between the Army and the nation was established, that the nation's heart was going out to them, that their terrible sacrifices were really appreciated. Periodical publications on political and military problems were printed for the education of the officers. Soldiers who were natives of the invaded territories were offered hospitality while on leave in other parts of the country. In the meanwhile the reconstitution of the shattered and disbanded units and the creation of new ones was proceeding apace. A new Army, the 5th, was being formed and trained at Piacenza under General Capello. Men who had been overwhelmed by the Caporetto disaster were now reclothed, rearmed, morally recreated, and soon sent back to the front where they made good. The reconstituted 2nd Army took over the Montello area in the spring, and, rebaptized as the 8th, was to play an important part at Vittorio Veneto. Nor were the military lessons of Caporetto forgotten. Instead of concentrating large masses of men in the front lines, where they were exposed to a constant drain of casualties even when no great action was in progress, and to terrible losses during attack, the system of distribution in depth was adopted, with a thin veil of troops in the advanced positions and stronger forces holding the lines further back. Other measures were taken to guard the flanks of the positions so as to avoid the danger of turning movements and to fill up any gaps which might be made as the result of sudden attacks. The new Commander-in-Chief was less inclined than his predecessor to supersede his subordinate generals for trifling errors of judgment or the loss of some not too important position. Under Cadorna every officer above the rank of colonel had felt himself ever under the sword of Damocles of removal and disgrace; if such severe punishments are sometimes necessary their too frequent application tends to destroy all sense of initiative. Moreover, the excessively rigorous selection which had been going on for over two years made General Diaz's task easier, but he also was inclined to take a somewhat more lenient view of the shortcomings of his subordinates. As we have seen, the first French and British divisions had been in line since early in December, the former (XXXI Corps - 47th and 65th Divisions) on the Tomba - Monfenera area, the British XIV Corps (23rd and 41st Divisions) on the Montello between Vidor and the Ponti della Priula. Other Allied troops took over a part of the Asiago sector, and two French divisions remained near the outlet of the Val Giudicaria as part of the Italian 7th Army. The first commander of the British troops in
1 The first idea of creating case del soldato was suggested by the writer's niece, Miss Teresa Hulton (now Lady Berwick), who organized a large number of them herself 133

Italy was General the Earl of Cavan. Later when the three divisions had grown to five it was deemed necessary to send out an officer of higher rank, and General Plumer was selected; but when the expeditionary force was again reduced to three divisions Plumer left and Cavan resumed the command. It was under Lord Cavan that the chief battles of the British forces in Italy were fought, and no better commander could have been chosen for the task. Relations between the Italians and the Allies were not always easy. Some of the Allied troops, especially the French, assumed occasionally a certain air of superiority as saviours of the Italian front, although it must be said that this was not the attitude of the commanders or other responsible leaders. The enemy frequently dropped fly-leaves on the Italian lines in which it was stated that the British were masters of Italy, that British soldiers were shooting down Italians participating in peace demonstrations at Milan, etc. The great difference between the lavish equipment of the British forces and the more meagre one of the Italians could not fail to be noticed. But on the whole relations were good, and the fact that even after the Allies had taken over a part of the front line there was at first no fighting on the sectors concerned, and the knowledge that almost until the end of the year the Italians had fought alone and held up the enemy advance unaided, gave them a new-found sense of pride which helped to promote feelings of mutual respect. Signor Orlando as Prime Minister rendered greater services than he had done as Minister of the Interior in the Boselli Cabinet, and now showed a real determination to key up the country to the highest pitch of effort necessary to win the war. The Opera nazionale dei combatlenti, created to provide for the moral and material welfare of the ex-service men after the war, the Associazione madri, vedove e famiglie dei caduti e dispersi to assist the more needy survivors of the fallen and to maintain the cult of their memory, were of great moral as well as material value. Signor Comandini, to whom the work of civil assistance and internal propaganda was entrusted, did admirable work in co-ordinating these and other similar organizations. Another element which helped to strengthen the will to victory was the behaviour of the Austrian and German troops in the invaded area. Every day Italian prisoners of war and civilians managed to escape across the Piave and told terrible tales of the plight of those who had remained behind, stories of plunder, senseless devastation, starvation, rape, and every form of cruelty, which subsequent inquiry proved true. The enemy themselves often shouted derisively across the river, boasting of the manner in which they had treated the women. All this created a feeling of hatred for the foe which was new to the Italian soldiers and people, but necessary in the circumstances. If in times of peace all nations should love one another so as to reduce the danger of war between them, when a country is at war hatred of the enemy is an indispensable element of victory. When the war is over it should cease as soon as possible. Active propaganda for the war spirit was carried on among the troops and in the interior of the country by the disabled men. One of these was the heroic Lieutenant Fulcieri Paulucci de' Calboli; twice wounded, he had insisted on returning to the front, and when a third wound in the spine had paralyzed both his legs he

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toured the country from town to town, from factory to factory, to keep the torch of patriotism burning, until he died from the effects of his injuries. The intervention of the United States was also beginning to make itself felt; the Americans poured out money to assist the civil population and for Red Cross work with their habitual splendid generosity, while the mere knowledge that American soldiers were coming over to Europe in hundreds of thousands was of great encouragement, even if as yet none of them were in Italy1. All these factors helped to wipe out the incubus of Caporetto and prepare Army and nation for future action. Unfortunately the "Caporetto spirit" was to be revived, when the commission of inquiry on Caporetto was set up, less to establish responsibilities than to give vent to ill-feeling against political opponents and revive polemics which should have been buried. As Professor Volpe writes, " 'Caporetto' created to some extent by ourselves, as fifty years ago Custoza and Lissa, as twenty years ago Adua had been created; 'Caporetto' remained and still remains, and every now and then we Italians see it flaunted in our faces by all who have interest in opposing our progress. But the task is becoming for them ever more difficult. Italy, after having almost seen her own image in 'Caporetto', has found the Piave and Vittorio Veneto, viz. the consciousness of victory"2. On the Eastern front Germany and Austria dictated their peace to Bolshevik Russia at Brest Litovsk (March 3, 1918), and hoped thereby to induce the other enemy peoples to force their Governments to follow suit; they also expected to secure vast supplies of foodstuffs. But Brest Litovsk and its consequences for Russia showed the Allies how disastrous a German-Austrian peace would be, and strengthened instead of weakening the will to victory; at the same time the "bursting corn-bins" of Russia proved a fantastic illusion, and Germany had to supply her troops in Russia with foodstuffs from her own or her Allies' dangerously depleted stocks. Preparations for further offensives were now pushed on vigorously on all fronts. In Italy the winter season precluded important operations, but the air forces were active on both sides. The enemy planes dropped innumerable bombs on Venice3 and other cities so as to spread terror among the civilian population. The task of the Italian planes was more difficult, as the bombing of enemy lines and depots would have entailed injury to Italian towns and their inhabitants; they had to seek their objectives much further afield, beyond the Alps and the sea. Nevertheless a number of audacious air raids were carried out. The arsenal and fortified port of Pola were bombed many times in 1917, a flight of 300 kilometres there and back, and in October fourteen bombing planes flew from Gioia del Colle in Apulia across the Adriatic to Cattaro and dropped three and a half tons of explosives on the submarines in the Bocche and the naval base on shore. The poet-soldier, Gabriele D'Annunzio, who had found even trench warfare too tame for his exuberant spirit,
1 2 3 the city 135 Later one U.S. regiment came to Italy Op. cit., p. 213 I have found many foreigners greatly surprised at hearing that 3,000 bombs had been dropped on

took part in this raid. Innumerable observation flights were carried out to photograph enemy positions and movements and record the effects of artillery fire. An Austrian airman described these exploits as "shamelessly admirable". The airships too did effective work in bombing the defences of Pola, Monfalcone and Trieste. After Caporetto Italian planes helped to cover the retreating troops by bombing and machine-gunning the advancing Austrian and German columns. Longer flights were made to the enemy bases at Laibach and Klagenfurt, and in February 1918, the railway works at the latter town were heavily bombed and machinegun fire poured on the troop trains in the station. On December 26 an enemy flight of 25 planes, while making for an Italian aerodrome near Treviso was attacked by Italian planes and eight of them were brought down, and when eight more made a second attempt three were brought down. Padua was bombed on December 28 and 29 with the result that a number of civilians, including some old men and women in a hostel for the aged, were killed, and some churches of artistic value damaged. On March 4 and 5 Venice, Padua, Mestre and Treviso were bombed, Venice for eight consecutive hours, during which 300 bombs fell on it; thirteen enemy planes were brought down on that occasion. By way of reprisal a flight of seaplanes bombed Pola, where they caused many fires to break out. Together with the bombs fly-leaves were dropped bearing the words: "Reprisal for Venice". It was noticed that before Caporetto a large proportion of the bombs dropped by aeroplanes failed to explode, whereas subsequently the explosions were far more frequent; this was attributed to the fact that the Austrian airmen were able to use the more efficient bombs found in the Italian magazines after the retreat. Among the other audacious air exploits were the numerous incursions into enemy territory by Italian airmen who had themselves dropped beyond the lines. They remained there for days to pick up information from personal observation or from the inhabitants, who at the risk of their lives kept them in hiding day by day, and fed them from their own scanty resources; they then made their way back to the Italian lines, swimming across the Piave by night. The wanderings of Prince Charlie in the Highlands were hardly more romantic than those of many an obscure airman in the invaded Veneto. The Italian Navy continued to dominate the Adriatic, although, as the enemy ships hardly ever left port, no great actions were fought by sea. After Caporetto Italian naval detachments landed from time to time near the mouths of the Piave and on the shores of the lagoons between Cortellazzo and Cavazuccherina and took an active part in land operations. Many raids were carried out by Italian destroyers, submarines and M.A.S. Luigi Rizzo, who had torpedoed and sunk the cruiser Wien, also penetrated into the harbour of Buccari, together with D'Annunzio and Commander Ciano, with three motor boats, sank an Austrian vessel and dropped three bottles containing bitter satires on the Austrian fleet in enemy waters before dashing back to the Italian coast. Along the front no important action took place for some time after January 1918. In April raids by small enemy forces in the mountain area were attempted, but invariably repelled. As soon as the Germans effected their great push on the Franco-

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British front in March the Italian Government decided to send a contingent to help the Allies as a return for assistance afforded by the French and British divisions in Italy. Its story will be told in a subsequent chapter. On May 10 some infantry and assault detachment carried out a brilliant little operation on Monte Corno in the Vallarsa 1. Lieutenant Carlo Sabatini and four Arditi succeeded in gelling on to the summit, where they surprised and dispersed the enemy garrison; other troops followed, and in spite of repeated counterattacks the position remained in Italian hands. On the 25th Alpini of the IV group attacked in the Tonale-Adamello region, and after an amazing battle amid snowfields and glaciers succeeded in capturing and occupying the positions along the line Monte Zigolon (3,040 metres) - Cresta Maroccaro - Cima Presena (3,069 metres) - the Presena tarns - Monticello (2,550 metres). The Austrians could now no longer threaten the upper Val Camonica from these peaks, nor observe the movements of the Italians in the valleys below. On the lower Piave one enemy bridgehead had, as we have seen, remained on the right bank, at Caposile, but on the night of May 25-26 detachments of Bersaglieri and Arditi carried out a sudden incursion into the trenches, overwhelmed the defences and defenders and captured 400 prisoners. Two enemy counterattacks on the newly conquered positions were driven off.

It was here that Cesare Battisti had been captured in 1916

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JUNE 1918 In the early spring of 1918, when the Germans had decided to make a determined effort to effect a final break-through on the Western Front, they demanded of their Austrian Allies "a prompt and vigorous offensive, which, by putting the enemy on the South- West Front (Italy) out of action, enabling Austro-Hungarian units to reinforce the Germans in France and attracting a good part of the American reserves, would render the achievement of decisive victory possible in a short space of time". So General von Cramon insisted at the Austro-Hungarian G.H.Q. at Baden. This was the genesis of the Austrian June offensive from Asiago to the sea. The situation on the various Allied fronts in the early part of 1918 was not wholly favourable. On the French Front almost complete immobility reigned. On the British Front a protracted three months' offensive had come to an end after terrible losses had been incurred with no adequate result. On the Russian Front the once formidable and gallant Russian Army had become a mob of maniacs and traitors, and the Bolsheviks who had come into power the previous November were anxious for peace at any price, even at that of handing vast areas of Russian territory to the invader. Rumania was prostrate, with three-quarters of her territory occupied by the enemy. In Macedonia the situation had reached a deadlock. The United States had, it is true, joined the Entente, but their troops were coming over to Europe very slowly, and hardly any of them were ready to enter the fray. The one moderately bright spot was that the German submarine campaign was beginning to be mastered, although it still caused heavy losses to Allied shipping, and was particularly serious for that of Italy, whose comparatively small mercantile marine had been to a large extent destroyed. Germany, however, was not satisfied with the policy of Austria and General von Liebert publicly deplored the latter's immobility which enabled Italy to send troops to France, "so that Germany always had to bear the brunt of the war alone". The presence of an Italian Army Corps in France 1 was an act of defiance to Austria, who had practically the whole of her forces pinned down on the Italian Front; it was one of the factors which decided her to attempt a new offensive against Italy, an offensive which was also an attempt to revive the waning Austro-German solidarity. On the Italian Front, as we have seen, the situation had improved; a vast work of reconstruction had been rendered necessary by the losses at and after Caporetto, but the line had been firmly stabilized across the Altipiani-Grappa area and along the lower Piave. The Italian Army had been strengthened by six French and five British divisions, who were now in the line. But by June two of the British and three of the French divisions had been recalled, owing to events on the Western Front. Field-Marshal Foch, who immediately after the German breakthrough in France had been appointed Commander-in-Chief of all the Allied forces, wanted the Italians to assume the offensive at once. But there was then strong evidence that the enemy were themselves preparing an offensive with practically the whole of the
1 See next chapter

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Austrian Army. The Emperor Wilhelm had, in fact, telegraphed to the Emperor Karl: "Our duty is to attack on all the fronts", and General von Cramon at Baden was perpetually exalting the German victories in France and bringing pressure to bear on the Austrian G.H.Q. to resume action. In Austria too it was felt that only another great military victory could save the Dual Monarchy. Caporetto had had a most important moral effect at the time, but it had failed to put Italy out of action. The Italian territory occupied by the victorious Austro-German forces had proved a less valuable source of supplies than had been expected, largely because the invaders, instead of seizing and removing those supplies, simply took and consumed what they needed at the time and destroyed the rest. The Austrians still believed that the Italian troops were morally inferior to their own, and regarded the Italian positions between the Astico and the Brenta as extremely precarious. Field- Marshal Conrad, who was a specialist on that sector, said that the situation of the Italian Army was that of a shipwrecked mariner clinging with his hands to a spar, and that by cutting off his fingers with a hatchet he would be forced to sink into the depths. While the German troops sent to Italy for the Caporetto offensive had long since been withdrawn, the Austro-Hungarian Army was still in excellent fettle, although the political conditions of the Monarchy were becoming ever less satisfactory. There was a Czech division with the Italian Army, and a Rumanian division was also formed, and although they had not taken part in the fighting their presence was useful, even if it did not induce any large numbers of the Austrians on the other side to desert. An offensive on the Italian Front was actually considered by the Austrian G.H.Q. at the end of April and finally decided on at the Spa meeting of May 12. It was, according to the plan drafted by Conrad, to have consisted of a single attack on both banks of the Brenta, with the Bacchiglione river as its objective, while a subsidiary diversive action was to be launched across the Piave along the OderzoTreviso road. But Boroevich, commanding the Isonzo Army, insisted that from the Piave front the principal attack should be delivered instead of a merely diversive operation1. The staff of the Archduke Joseph, commanding the 6th Army opposite the Montello, took the view that to protect the right flank of the Isonzo Armee it was necessary first to seize the Montello. Then General von Waldstatten proposed an attack on the Tonale pass so as to effect a descent on to the Lombard plain. The Austrian High Command was somewhat perplexed by these different plans, and after some hesitation it decided to combine the three and launch two major offensives, one on the Grappa-Brenta area and the other on the Piave, with a minor, but fairly important diversive action on the Tonale preceding the other two. The reserves were to be divided between the two attacking groups on account of the divergent lines of communication. This seriously handicapped the leadership of the battle. The High Command was absolutely confident of success, and as beyond the Grappa-Piave lines there were no other material obstacles to overcome, it was believed that a victory would lead to the most far-reaching results. As early as the
1 The fact that he had played a comparatively minor role at Caporetto still rankled.

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end of March General von Arz had written to Field-Marshal von Hindenburg: "I am confident that, as a result of our offensive which must bring us to the Adige, we shall achieve the military dissolution of Italy". The Austrian General Staff looked forward to the coming victory not only as a military achievement calculated to save the Empire, but also as a measure for securing the abundant food supplies of the rich North Italian plains. In his proclamation to the Armies the Chief of the Staff declared: "We possess a number of divisions far superior to that of the enemy, our artillery is much more powerful than theirs. We shall attack them contemporaneously and concentrically on a very wide front; their weak reserves will certainly not be sufficient to resist our pressure on all sides; they will soon wear themselves out in a useless effort, and our victory will be all the easier and more decisive, as our advance will be the more rapid and unhesitating". General von Cramon, however, expressed his doubts to General von Arz as to the chances of success in view of the defective manner in which the offensive had been planned: its division into two operations of equal importance, besides a third lesser one, but von Arz, without being himself too enthusiastic, assured him that it would be "all right on the night". The three operations were given high-sounding names: that on the Altipiani was called the "Radetzky Offensive", the one on the Piave the "Albrecht Operation", and the attack on the Tonale pass the "Avalanche Action". Maps were distributed covering the whole area beyond the Piave as far as the Mincio. The men were promised booty in the shape of foodstuffs, textile fabrics, leather and soap for themselves and their families, and Boroevich insisted in his proclamation to the troops that "the conquest of the enemy positions would mean good food and abundant booty". The necessity for remedying the scarcity of everything throughout the Monarchy was the dominant note, and in order to avoid the wastage which had occurred after Caporetto special requisitions units (Requisitions und SammelKommandos) were created under expert officers to collect, preserve and distribute the loot and the requisitioned goods. "The principle must be observed", so ran the Army order, "that the troops should eat and drink abundantly, but not devastate. Let us remember the repulsive spectacles of the autumn offensive; barrels burst open in flooded cellars, oxen and pigs slaughtered of which only a small part was utilized, stores and shops sacked. Let us think also of our families at home. Factories and plants must not be destroyed". The offensive spirit of the Austrians was very high. "Officers and men", writes von Cramon, "were as ardent as in the first weeks of the war to measure themselves against the Welschen1 . . . At the end of the fourth year of the war the moral of the Army, which really deserved a better fate, was amazingly good"2. Indeed, although the Monarchy was feeling the strain of the war terribly and the spirit of sedition was beginning to spread among the nationalities, the Army still remained unaffected by racial rivalries and preserved perfect discipline. This was indeed one of the strange paradoxes of Austro-Hungarian conditions to the very end of the War.
1 2 Welsch was the name applied to the Italians by the Germans of Austria Op. cit., p. 278.

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Diaz, before he had convinced himself that the enemy were really preparing a large-scale offensive, had drawn up a plan for an attack from the Altipiani towards the Valsugana, and had communicated it to the Allies. But on May 28 he informed Foch and Sir Henry Wilson that in view of the coming enemy operations he would not launch his own attack, and would concentrate on defensive preparations instead. The Italian " I " services, completely reorganized since Caporetto, and very greatly improved, had secured ample data indicating that the Austrian onslaught was to commence on June 15, extending from the Astico to the sea, and this is exactly what happpened. Just before the attack began an important naval success was obtained. On June 10, Commander Luigi Rizzo, in the waters of Premuda, sank the Szent Istvan, one of the most powerful ships of the Austro-Hungarian Navy, by means of a M.A.S. with a torpedo of a special type, thereby preventing an attack on the Otranto barrage across the Adriatic, which Admiral Horthy was planning as a prelude to the land battle. The loss of the ship was kept secret in Austria and Hungary for several days, but it was known in official circles; when the public did hear of it, coupled as it was with the knowledge, also only recently acquired, of the loss of the Wien in the previous December, a painful impression was produced. The forces at the disposal of the enemy High Command for the coming offensive consisted of 60 divisions, numerically stronger than the Italian ones; 50 of them were destined to take part in the attack, 27 in the mountain area and 23 in the plain. The artillery comprised 7,500 guns and the Air Force 580 planes. The Archduke Eugene was Commander-in-Chief, and his forces were divided into two groups: the Tirol group from the Stelvio to Monfenera under Field-Marshal Conrad, comprising General Krobatin's 10th Army from the Stelvio to the Astico, and General von Scheuchenstuhl's 11th from the Astico to Monfenera, and the Piave Group under Field-Marshal Boroevich, comprising the Archduke Joseph's 6th from Monfenera to the Ponti della Priula, and the Isonzo Armee (General Wurm) from the Priula to the sea. The Italian Army had been reconstituted, and now comprised 56 divisions (50 Italian, 3 British1, 2 French and 1 Czechoslovak), with 7,043 guns, 2,046 trench mortars, 523 anti-aircraft guns. Of the divisions 44 were in the front line and 12 in reserve. The Italian Air Force disposed of 676 planes, 37 captive balloons and 4 airships. The order of battle was as follows : From the Stelvio to the lake of Garda, opposite the Austrian 10th Army, was General Tassoni's 7th, and from Garda to the Astico General Pecori-Giraldi's 1st Army, 12 divisions in all. The 6th Army (General Montanari) was deployed from the Astico to the Brenta, and the 4th (General Giardino) from the Brenta to Pederobba on the Piave, with 16 divisions, faced the Austrian 11th Army. The 8th, under General Pennella, from Pederobba to Palazzon, and the 3rd under the Duke of Aosta, comprising 13 divisions, faced the Boroevich Group along the lower Piave. As the date of the enemy attack was known, General Diaz had prepared a heavy counter-battery fire so as to weaken the enemy's artillery strength. He had
1 7th, 33rd, and 48th, constituting the XIV Corps

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also created an important mobile reserve of 19 divisions with 539 field and 28 heavy guns, 228 trench mortars, and 1,800 lorries with which troops could be rushed to any sector should the enemy effect a breach. Of the reserve divisions 10 were grouped in the 9th Army area directly at the disposal of the Comando Supremo, and 9, although constituting sector reserves, could not be employed save by order of the Comando Supremo. The general offensive was, as we have seen, to commence on June 15, but it was to be preceded on June 13 by the preliminary operation on the Tonale. But the Tonale action was held up at once and led to no result. Early on the morning of the 15th, after the usual very short, but terrifically intensive, bombardment, commencing at 3 a.m., the attack from the Astico to the sea was launched. The Emperor-King had transferred himself in the Imperial train to Merano accompanied by General von Arz, Conrad's successor as Chief of the Staff. General von Waldstatten, with part of the operations section, was at Belluno, so as to be as close as possible to the scene of the "Radetzky" offensive, while the rest of G.H.Q. remained at Baden near Vienna. This dispersion of commands and staffs could not, as von Cramon remarks, fail to affect the general conduct of the operations unfavourably; G.H.Q. was split into three parts, none of which was attached to either of the group commands of the two operating forces, and none of the three could take any important decision without consulting the other two. The Comando Supremo, now disposing of abundant reserves and supplies of war material, awaited the attack with confidence. The civilian population of the area immediately behind the front were busy gathering in the harvest, for it instinctively felt equally confident of the result. Violent as the enemy bombardment proved, that of the Italian artillery was equally violent and, moreover, unexpected. Many Austrian guns were silenced and a number of concentration points were so heavily shelled as to render communications and the moving up of reserves difficult if not impossible. The objective of the main attack in the mountain area was to break through the Italian lines on the right between the Val d'Assa and the Val Frenzela, and descend on Thiene by the Val Canaglia and on to Bassano by the Val Frenzela, and on the left to overcome the southern edge of Monte Grappa and turn the Italian positions on the Piave. In the first onslaught the troops of the Austrian 11th Army succeeded in the Altipiani area in penetrating into the sectors held by the British forces near Perghele and south of Roncalto, but were repulsed by a counter-attack in which the French also took part. Further south the enemy gained some ground near Cesuna, but lost it in a counter-attack at 13 hours, in which the artillery of the X Corps helped, and fell back leaving 1.000 prisoners and 7 guns behind. In the centre the enemy forced the French to evacuate the Capitello Pennar salient and occupied it, but were unable to emerge from it in spite of repeated attempts, and in the afternoon the 78th French Regiment drove them out again, taking 500 prisoners. The fighting on the right was even more violent. The enemy, after having demolished by gun fire the defences of Valbella, Col del Rosso and Col d'Echele,

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held by the Italian XIII Corps, penetrated into the lines as far as Cima Echar and Busa del Termine, closing the Val Chiama. But under the vigorous counterattacks of the Pinerolo and Lecce brigades they were slowly driven back, retaining only Col del Rosso and Col d'Echele. On Grappa, held by De Bono's IX Corps, Conrad's forces at first registered sonic successes. The plan, as in the previous autumn, was to turn the flanks of the main massif by capturing the positions cast and west of it: Val Brenta on one side, the Solaroli, Monte Tomba and Monfenera on the other, so as to debouch on to the Piave near Pederobba. If Grappa fell the whole defensive system between the Piave and the Brenta would collapse, and with it that of the Altipiani, and the Piave armies themselves, threatened in the rear, would be forced to fall back, even if undefeated, as had happened to the 3rd Army after Caporetto. At the first onslaught the enemy captured the Col del Miglio, Col Feniglio and Col Moschin, the key positions, and threatened Col Raniero, the wing support of the line of chief resistance. Only on the Asolone the 18th Division and the Bari Brigade held their own. Further east the enemy, helped by the mist, had also advanced, wresting Monte Pertica and Monte Coston from the VI Corps. But the latter, in spite of its inferior strength, prevented them from advancing further. Infantry and gunners fought together; the field guns had to be abandoned, but the breaches and sights were first removed, while the mountain batteries continued to fire until the enemy were actually among the guns, and even then the gunners managed to withdraw their pieces on to another line on the slope of the Osteria della Cibera, whence they opened fire again. On the Solaroli (1601), Valderoa, Coston Valderoa, Val Calcino and Col dell'Orso the most violent attacks were delivered, and in spite of the gallant defence put up by the Como and Ravenna Brigades (XVIII Corps) the northern part of the salient was lost, but the central sector held out, and at the Porte di Salton a battalion of the 120th Regiment, although surrounded and hard pressed, offered a desperate resistance. The Austrians tried to complete their conquest of the Solaroli by calling up the 20th and 48th Divisions, but even with these reinforcements they failed to achieve any definite success. To sum up the action of the morning, the left wing of the Grappa Army had been broken through to a depth of three kilometres, on the right there was danger of a turning movement, and in the centre the XVIII Corps was forced to attempt a counterattack, whatever the conditions on its right and left, as a retreat would have been extremely difficult on account of the precipitous nature of the ground to its rear. The Army's reserves were exhausted. Between the Col del Miglio and the Asolone the attacks converged from the north-west against the Italian marginal line, and from north-east on the two ridges of Col Spiazzoli and Osteria della Cibera and the Col Raniero-Capitello funnel, so as to pierce the line and penetrate along the ridge between the Brenta and Val Santa Felicita. The apex and the western flank of the triangular advancing force had driven in far, but its eastern flank was held up. It was learned after the battle was over that the observer on Cima Grappa, when the mist cleared for an instant, had seen an enemy mass advancing via the Asolone from Val Cesilla, and this enabled the Italian artillery to open fire on it, it turned out to be the

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Austrian 4th Division, and prevented it from reinforcing the assailants. The reserves promised to the Grappa Army were not forthcoming, as they had been diverted to the Piave sector, where the situation at that moment looked even more alarming. But its own units counter-attacked, and soon the action of the VI Corps proved successful. An infantry battalion reconquered Peak 1503 east of the Asolone, while part of the assault battalion ascended Val Damon and swept up the enemy infiltrations. The gunners took part in the action and recaptured their lost guns. The enemy thus lost all the ground it had gained except the important Peak 1490. The Ravenna Brigade, which had recaptured Peak 1671, failed on 1676 of the Solaroli. A battalion of the 119th Regiment (XVIII Corps) and units of the 120th counter-attacked towards the Porte di Salton and took 200 prisoners, recaptured Peaks 1292 and 1240 and attacked Monte Spinoncia. Here they were held up and eventually forced back. The assault detachment of the IX Corps at 16 hours attacked Fagheron and the redoubt on Peak 1316, recapturing both and forcing the enemy back on Col Fenilon and Col Moschin, while units of the Basilicata and Abruzzi Brigades and engineers occupied the strong Fagheron - San Giovanni line, thereby stopping a dangerous leak. At 22 hours the IX Assault Detachment, supported by a battalion of the 92nd Regiment, attacked Col del Fenilon, and by 23 hours had got possession of it. The enemy had repeatedly attacked Col dell'Orso, but without success. Action was now suspended for a few hours' respite in the night. At 7 on the 16th the IX Assault Detachment resumed its operations, supported by the artillery of the IX and XX Corps (the latter firing from the Altipiani positions), and in ten minutes had recaptured the much disputed Col Moschin, together with the guns of two batteries lost on the 13th. The whole of the "white" or second advanced line had been reoccupied during the night of the 15th-16th, and units of the VI Corps recaptured an advanced bulwark of Cima Grappa towards Monte Pertica. Half of the Case Tasson positions and other points were likewise recaptured during the morning and liaison with the XVIII Corps was restored at Valpore di Fondo. In these operations 200 Italian prisoners and some 149 mm. howitzers previously captured by the enemy were rescued. In the afternoon Peak 1490 towards the Asolone was recaptured, and some patrols advanced on to Peak 1478 abandoned by the enemy. The XVIII Corps, advancing from Peak 1671 of the Solaroli, now attempted to recapture 1676 and 1672, but found the positions strongly fortified, and could make no impression on them without reinforcements, which, however, were now not available, as all reserves had been thrown into the Montello sector. But those positions were the only conquests still in enemy hands in this area. By the end of the battle the IX Corps had fallen back a short distance from the "Alba" line to the "Bianca" line, a retreat of small importance. Repeated but unsuccessful attempts were made later to recapture the Solaroli, which with the vertex of the salient remained definitely lost. As General Giardino, commander of the Grappa Army, wrote, "at 3 a.m. on the 15th the whirlwind burst on the Grappa, at 10 all was smashed up, three of the last key positions were lost, the Austrians looked down on Bassano; the soldiers of the

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Grappa, without assistance, worn out, decimated, dashed forward again and again to the attack; the giant shook his leonine mane and hurled his assailants far away and broke them up. In twenty-four hours all was over and we could think of the Piave as inviolate"1. As we have seen, the Austrians were full of confidence at the beginning of the attack, and during the first few hours everything seemed to be going swimmingly for them. But a rapid change in the situation now took place. Field-Marshal Boroevich thus tells the story of those fateful hours: "At 11 a.m. I learned that the 11th Army in Tirol was proceeding well and that the first lines had been overwhelmed. At 12 His Majesty called me up on the 'phone and in an obviously agitated voice said: 'The Army of Tirol is defeated, the troops have lost all that they had gained and have been driven back to the line of departure.' I was struck as if by a thunderbolt; I tried to comfort His Majesty, who implored me, in the name of the Monarchy, to resist at all costs. I repeated that I had done all I could. At the same time I wired to the High Command to get accurate news. No one answered me. Only on the next day was the whole truth communicated to me by the Command of the 11th Army". What had happened was that on the Altipiani and the Grappa Conrad's troops had met with such a check as to render a fresh attack impossible. "There was not a single division", writes von Cramon, "which for the time being could be regarded as capable of fighting". The Conrad group had lost 347 officers and 7,095 men killed, 1,262 officers and 12,484 men wounded, 171 officers and 13,667 men prisoners and dispersed. On the Piave Boroevich aimed at securing possession of the whole of the Montello hill which dominates that tract of the river from the right bank, and then deploying in the plain beyond in an area covered with a network of roads. Other forces were to cross near Salettuol in the northern part of the Grave di Papadopoli island. Thus a broad and powerful bridgehead would be created enabling the reserves to cross over and gain possession of the Montebelluna-Treviso railway. The 6th Austrian Army began with the usual terrific bombardment, using large quantities of smoke shells to cover the throwing of the bridges. The Italians advanced detachments were overwhelmed, and early in the afternoon of the 15th a part of the Montello salient was lost, and the enemy got as far as the Casa Serena Col Marseille - Bavaria line, and further down the river had formed two more bridgeheads at Fagare and Musile. The Italian 8th and 3rd Armies had suffered severe losses, including some thousands of prisoners, and their resistance was somewhat weak. The Austrians hoped to effect a junction between the 17th Division (XXIV Corps) on the Montello and the 33rd (XVI Corps) advancing from the Grave di Papadopoli. But the southward movement of the 17th was held up by the Italian 50th near Giavera and the Abbazia di Nervesa, the 48th south-east of the Montello and the 79th Engineer battalion, while the 31st Division attacked the troops of the Austrian XVI Corps. Thus the junction could not be effected. General Wurm's troops had succeeded in crossing further downstream and
1 See Giardino's "Ricordi e ricevocazioni" passim

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secured a footing on the right bank between Candel and Capo Sile. But they were unable to radiate outwards and extend their occupation, and could do no more than exercise pressure on the Italians opposing them. The Caserta Brigade contained a part of the enemy forces between Candelu and San Bartolomeo, while the Cosenza and Potenza Brigades and units of the 3rd Army held up the Austrian VII and XXIII Corps, thus preventing the linking up of the two bridgeheads. The Italian 25th Division firmly held the ground between the two Austrian Corps (between Zenson and Croce). Thus both in the Montello area and on the lower Piave the two attempts at pincer-like operations failed and all efforts to establish a connexion between the two main areas on the right bank then in possession of the enemy and to spread out the two occupations were rendered impossible. The High Command still hoped to exploit the successes achieved on the Piave, and ordered Boroevich to maintain his occupation on the Montello at all costs, and by advancing in a south-easterly direction to facilitate the passage of the Piave for the rest of the Isonzo Armee. While he thus at last came to play the principal part in the general battle he had to undertake it in the most unfavourable conditions, and could expect no help from the operations in the Altipiani-Grappa sectors. By the afternoon of the 15th the Austrian offensive had lost all its initial impetus and was reduced to an attempt at slow and methodical penetration and pressure. Boroevich, who had previously dwelt on the numerical superiority of the Austrians, now declared that "the immediate prosecution of the operations against Treviso, in view of the numerical superiority of the enemy, would be highly imprudent. At present neither I nor the Army commanders dispose of reserves. We are also deficient in artillery of medium calibre, munitions and bridgebuilding material. We can only hope for success if the requests which I have already made1 are granted, and if I am given time to prepare an attack. But I cannot advise the ordering of premature attacks with inadequate forces". Boroevich's forces had initially been at least as numerous as those of the Italians opposing them; the difficulties he encountered were due to the excessively limited area which his troops had conquered and to the fact that they had been unable to overcome the Italian resistance in their attempts to extend their bridgeheads; also the Italian artillery on the Austrian bridges had impeded the passage of reinforcements. During the night of the 15th - 16th some more troops were, however, able to get across. In the afternoon of the 16th Italian counter-attacks were delivered on the Montello. The Palermo and Barletta Brigades, and the 48th and 50th Divisions reconquered some of the lost ground, as well as several of the guns previously lost. On the lower Piave the 3rd Army also counter-attacked and recaptured Fagar, Bocca di Collalto and La Fossa, while the ever-splendid Sassari Brigade and four Bersaglieri cyclist battalions regained the Croce position. The enemy command sent up further reinforcements, and later the Fagar and Musile bridgeheads were extended to a small extent, and on the 17th they were linked up by means of counterattacks from Zenson and Gonfo.
1 As soon as he had heard of Conrad's check he asked that the reserves destined for the mountain operations be transferred to his own front 146

On the same day the enemy also counter-attacked on the Montello and extended their occupation as far as the railway between San Mauro and Sant' Andrea, but failed to reach the Ponti della Priula owing to the counter-attacks of units of the Aquila Brigade. On the whole, the Italian situation was fairly satisfactory, as the Austrians, in spite of various important local successes, had been unable to extend the area occupied on the right bank and found themselves with large masses of troops concentrated in the very limited space which they conquered exposed to heavy fire and inadequately provided with communications 1. The twenty bridges thrown across the river were insufficient to carry the necessary supplies for a large-scale attack, and when on the night of the 17th 18th the river rose some 80 centimetres, nearly all the bridges were washed away. On the 18th a little further ground was occupied by the enemy on the Montello near the Nervesa railway bridge, and near Salettuol and San Bartolomeo on the lower Piave, but the Italian 1st Assault Division regained some of the lost ground near the San Don bridgehead, and captured 500 prisoners. The two Austrian forces across the Piave were now completely cut off from each other and surrounded on three sides by the Italians, with a broad and swift river in their rear. On the 17th the Piave rose still more, thereby rendering communication with the left bank ever more difficult. Austrian writers subsequently attributed the defeat in the June battle to the rising of the Piave, but as a matter of fact its consequences were not by any means decisive; the June flood was far less serious than that of October-November during the battle of Vittorio Veneto, and by the 19th it had already subsided considerably. On the 18th when it was at its height the Austrians might already be regarded as defeated. Some Austrian military historians have recognized this. Thus Captain Regele of the General Staff writes: "The Piave flood during the June battle might be regarded as prejudicial to us only in this sense, that we were still clinging too close to the river bank when it occurred. If our action, in fact, had had the same initial results as the one of the previous year, the Piave flood would never have had the prejudicial effects which it had, because our units would have been already advancing beyond the river for two days. In the circumstances in which we found ourselves on the other hand, this flood rendered very difficult communications and supplies, which by the force of things had to be effected in an area under heavy enemy fire"2. Field-Marshal Boroevich himself, while attributing the main responsibility for the defeat to the failure of the High Command to allow him to employ the troops still available in the mountain area, adds: "We cannot put the blame for the events on the Piave, but rather on the light-heartedncss and vacillation of the High Command"3. On the 19th the Italians counter-attacked on the Montello, and Boroevich, realizing that a disaster was imminent, asked for an audience with the Emperor-King, who had shifted his quarters to Spilimbergo on the Tagliamento. After giving him a
1 2 3 Their situation recalled that of the Italians at Plava in 1915-16 See his articles in Oesterreichische Wehrzeitung, August 6-7, and September 3, 1926 Letter to Baron von Bolgar in the New freie Presse, together with other letters on the subject, February 3, 1920 147

detailed account of the situation, the Field-Marshal said that it might be retrieved if fresh troops, munitions and supplies were provided. But von Arz declared that he was unable to give assistance, to which the deeply depressed and irritated Boroevich replied: "This is not the way to make war", and then returned to his headquarters, where he heard even more unsatisfactory news. Fierce fighting had been going on all day, the losses were terrible, and the Italians were proving ever stronger. On the evening of the 20th Boroevich telegraphed to the High Command: "The failure of the 11th Army (Tirol) to achieve victory and the slight successes of our own Army offer little hope for the prosecution of the offensive in the Brenta direction. The territorial gains of the 6th and lsonzo Armies are so exiguous that, owing to the dangers of the Piave and the fact that the enemy are becoming ever stronger, it is possible that the two Armies, lacking as they are in reserves, may be overwhelmed at the slightest incident in a catastrophe. As the Monarchy, with the present offensive, has loyally fulfilled its duties as an ally and cannot face the risk, by continuing the offensive, of remaining peihaps disarmed, I propose to withdraw the 6th and the Isonzo Armies behind the Piave, in order to be able, at the opportune moment, to initiate a new attack". This was indeed a complete confession of failure. The enemy forces on the right bank were terribly hard-pressed on all sides, and although on the 19th the river fell once more, both resistance and the supply services were becoming ever more arduous. On the same day the Comando Supremo decided on a general counter-offensive. The Montello sector was selected as the objective, as it dominated a wide tract of the plain and a considerable stretch of the river, and also because of its importance for the rest of the front further west. The operations in that area were entrusted to the 8th Army, reinforced for the purpose by the XXII Corps (two divisions), the 47th Divisions of the XXX Corps, three assault battalions and some extra artillery. The plan was to attack the part of the Montello held by the enemy from two sides and join up the two attacks at the vertex of the salient near Falz, while a frontal attack was to be delivered from south to north by smaller forces. The battle was engaged at 15 hours 30. The attack on the northern sector fluctuated back and forth throughout the afternoon, and by nightfall some progress had been achieved, but the Austrians still resisted doggedly. On the southern sector the XXII Corps delivered a series of fierce attacks and advanced considerably in the direction of Nervesa where some of the heaviest fighting of the whole campaign took place. The Corps Commander, General Vaccari, led the troops to the attack in person at the most critical moment. The artillery played an important part in this action, both in the preliminary bombardment and in the barrages accompanying the Italian advance. The enemy launched a number of aeroplanes on the Italian lines, but the Italian machines brought down fourteen of them and drove off the rest. It was in one of these air engagements that the gallant Francesco Baracca, the victor of fourteen aerial duels, was killed by a shot. The battle continued to rage throughout the 20th without decisive results, many positions changing hands several times. On the lower Piave the enemy threw further reserves across the river on the

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19th, and drove the Italians from the Fossalta - Caseria - Capo d'Argine line, which they had captured the day before, but failed to advance any further. Gradually the Austrian pressure was felt to be relaxing. The Comando Supremo now concentrated the artillery of the 1st, 6th and 4th Armies on the enemy lines, especially on the bridges, and further infantry attacks were launched on the lower Piave on the 21st and 22nd. On the night of the 22nd-23rd Boroevich finally ordered the withdrawal of the forces across the river; already on the 22nd units of the 6th Army had begun to cross, followed by those of the Isonzo Armee, and on the 23rd the movement became more accentuated, and the troops of the Italian 8th Army pushed forward and reoccupied the ruins of Nervesa at 13 hours. A little later they spread over the rest of the Montello area, encountering but slight resistance, until the whole of that part of the right bank of the river was once more clear of the enemy. The same day units of the 3rd Army attacked further down between Candelu and Zenson, where they took 2.000 prisoners and recaptured some batteries lost in the early days of the battle. Between Zenson and Capo Sile the Austrians still held out tenaciously in the hope of being able to retain that bridgehead and renewing the offensive later on. But after a series of hard-fought engagements on the 23rd and 24th the whole of the right bank even in this area was again in Italian hands. The Italian Command has been criticized for not following up the Austrians with an immediate offensive during and after their withdrawal. But the losses had been very heavy, the troops were thoroughly worn out, and the enemy positions on the left bank were still practically intact and could only have been tackled if large fresh forces had been available, which was not the case. Without such reserves it would not have been possible to pursue the enemy for any distance beyond the river, even if the crossing had been effected, and such Italian troops as might have got over would have found themselves with their backs to the Piave, in a situation similar to that of the Austrians who had crossed over to the right bank during the previous days. But the mere fact that the enemy offensive had failed so completely was in itself of immense significance, both morally and militarily. On June 26 the King issued the following proclamation to the forces: "Soldiers of the land and the sea! "Eight days of epic fighting, wherein the gallantry, abnegation and tenacity of you all, have given you the prize of victory. "At first your splendid resistance broke the impact of the enemy attack and set at naught their ambitious designs. The irresistible impetus with which, in fraternal competition with the Allies and our own seamen, you immediately sprang to the counter-offensive, drove the enemy beyond the river which is for us inviolable. Thus the enemy, with the immense effort with which they hoped to overwhelm us for ever, achieved nothing but heavy losses. This happened because you well obeyed the command of the Fatherland which redoubled your will to victory. "Soldiers of Italy! "The great outburst of jubilation and admiration with which the whole of Italy

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has acclaimed your victory bears witness to the fervour with which all Italy follows you. The battle now won is a brilliant and certain forecast of future successes which will guide us to the final victory. "Towards that victory we must strive with all our might and our whole soul; we must achieve it for the sake of the memory of our fallen brethren and the liberation of our oppressed brethren, for the greatness of Italy and the triumph of civilization, for which we are fighting side by side with our Allies "From G.H.Q., June 26, 1918." For the first time since Novara the Austrian Army realized that Italy was at last mistress of her own destiny. The Austrian Minister of War, General Czapp von Birchenstetten, attempted in a speech in the Reichsrat to exonerate the military authorities from blame for the failure, but he had to recognize that there had been errors on the part of the High Command, and although he defended Field-Marshal Conrad, he had to lign the decree placing him on half-pay 1. General von Arz also repeatedly offered his resignation to Karl, who at first accepted it and appointed Field-Marshal Bohm-Ermolli as Chief of the Staff, but as the latter in his audience with the Monarch requested that the Imperial and Royal authority should henceforth remain purely nominal and decorative, and that His Majesty should abstain from all interference in the conduct of operations, the appointment never materialized, and von Arz remained at his post2. Thus the great Austrian offensive, which should have put Italy out of action and enabled the Dual Monarchy to send reinforcements to the German Army in France, developed instead into a grave defeat. It was a disaster not for AustriaHungary alone, but for both the Central Powers. As Field-Marshal von Hindenburg writes: "Although our adversaries there (in Italy) were not strong enough to turn the failure of the Austro-Hungarian enterprise to greater advantage, the collapse of the offensive was accompanied by consequences which were worse than if it had never been undertaken. Our Ally's misfortune was also a disaster for us. The enemy knew as well as we did that with this attack Austria-Hungary had thrown her last weight into the scale of the war. From now onwards the Danube Monarchy ceased to be a danger for Italy. We must certainly anticipate that Italy would now be unable to refuse the urgent solicitations of her Allies and would herself send troops to the decisive theatre in the West, not only to prove the existence of a political united front, but to play a really effective part in the coming battle 3. If we were not to take this fresh burden on our own shoulders, we must make efforts to get Austro-Hungarian divisions sent to our Western Front. For us, this was the main motive of our request for immediate direct reinforcements from Austria-Hungary. We did not expect any great effect from these reinforcements, at any rate at first. The fate of the Quadruple Alliance hung more than ever on the strength of Germany"4.
The Emperor-King accepted Conrad's "resignation" with a gracious letter and created him Count and "Colonel of all the Guards" (Von Cramon, p. 249) 2 Novak, "Il crollo delle Potenze centrali", pp. 109-110 3 There was already an Italian corps in France (see next chapter) 4 "Out of my Life", p. 367 1 150

General von Cramon slates: "The June battle had the gravest consequences both for the internal situation of the Monarchy and for the general military situation, not only on account of the defeat in itself, but also for the losses suffered by the Austrian Army: about 150,000 men killed, wounded and prisoners. In the Hungarian Parliament the bitterest reproaches were levelled against the High Command. The cry of the 'Forty-eighters' demanding the liberation of the Hungarian Army from the hands of conscienceless Austrian generals had the widest repercussions among parties of all colours". The psychological results of the Battle of the Piave, as it came to be called, were almost as valuable as its material ones. A careful consideration of the facts cannot fail to lead to the appreciation of the importance of this victory, which was the first Allied success in 1918, and proved that one of the two chief enemy Powers was no longer capable of a successful offensive; it was the first time that an offensive on a large scale conducted with every possible material means and prepared with the utmost care had not only been repulsed, but had failed to result in the retention of any tract of the ground conquered in the first onrush. The victory undoubtedly raised the spirits of the Entente as a whole, just as it correspondingly depressed those of the Central Powers, and aroused in the former a confidence in the final victory which they had never felt before. Von Hindenburg, as we have seen, expected Austria to send reinforcements to the Western Front after the Piave. But if she had been unable to do so before, because her armies were pinned down by the Italian grip, she was still less able to do so now after the heavy losses suffered and the depression engendered by the ghastly failure. The Italians now proceeded to effect various local offensive operations. On June 29 and 30 the Altipiani Army reconquered Monte Valbella, Col del Rosso and Col d'Echele, capturing 2.000 prisoners and some guns. On the Grappa the Basilicata Brigade and units of the Calabria recaptured Col del Miglio on July 2 and pushed forward to Roccie Anzini. The Solaroli too were captured by the Ravenna Brigade, but lost again in a counter-attack; a second attempt on July 15 failed, and the position remained in enemy hands until the final battle of the war. The 3rd Army, which had completely cleared the enemy bridgehead at Capo Sile on June 24-25, undertook another operation between the Old and New Piave on July 2-6. The 54th Division, operating from the course of the Old Piave in a southeasterly direction, and the 4th, advancing from the Cavazuccherina - Cortellazzo line towards the north-east, attacked at dawn on the 2nd, and after four days of hard fighting the troops of General Petitti di Roreto's XXIII Corps succeeded in driving the enemy out of the whole area between the two channels of the river. Some 3.000 men and 20 guns were taken in this action, which registered the first important territorial gain for the Italians since the stabilization of the new line in the previous autumn. Thus ended the great Piave battle1.
1 Amusing side-lights on how the history of the War is written are offered by such books as "The Secrets of Crewe House" by Sir Campbell Stewart and Mr. Wickham Steed's "Through Thirty Years". In the former work it is claimed (p. 40) that the Austrian offensive, carefully planned for April, had been postponed to June on account of the unrest among the Austrian troops produced by the abundant distribution of 151

propaganda leaflets issued from Crewe House. As a matter of fact, the offensive was not decided on until the Spa meeting of May 12, and the time elapsing from that date to June 15 was just what was needed to prepare it. The book further states that "unhappily, the propaganda and consequently, the military, campaigns were impaired by reactionary tendencies within the Italian Government. Had the Italian Government been prepared in May 1918 to join with their Allies and Associates in making a joint public declaration in strong and unmistakable language in favour of the creation of a united and independent Southern Slav State, and in recognizing the Czechoslovaks as an Allied and belligerent nation, the result would undoubtedly have precipitated the collapse of Austria in the early part of the summer of 1918". This and other passages suggest that wars are fought and won, not by soldiers and arms, but by an unlimited output of paper and propaganda, which, as they say in mathematics, is absurd. The author, like Mr. Steed, does not appear to be aware of the fact that the Yugoslav soldiers in the Austro- Hungarian armies fought with quite as much vigour against their brother-Serbs as against the Italians. The only Yugoslavs who deserted and fought for the Allies in large numbers were the Bosnians and Herzegovinians on the Russian Front (for this episode see my "Macedonian Campaign", pp. 192-195). The G.O.C. the Piave Army Group, Field-Marshal Svetozar Boroevieh von Bojna, was himself a Yugoslav: he was born at Umetic in Croatia and was of the Orthodox Faith. Mr. Wickham Steed (vol. IT, pp. 196-208) tells an amusing story of how he "revealed" the composite nationality of the Austro-Hungarian units on the Italian Front to Lord Cavan and other commanders in the spring of 1918; their composite formation had, indeed, long been well known to the Italian and Allied staffs, so much so that the Comando Supremo, many months before the period mentioned, issued enemy orders of battle in which the various Austro-Hungarian units were depicted in different colours according to the nationality of their various component parts. 152

THE ITALIAN TROOPS ON THE WESTERN FRONT The story of the Italian II Corps in France is one of the least known, but by no means the least important, episodes of the World War. It is far less appreciated than that of the no less admirable action of the French and British forces on the Italian Front, and indeed the average intelligent man in the street outside Italy is usually unaware of the fact that there were any Italian forces on the Western Front at all. In January, 1918, the Italian Ministry of War had acceded to the French request that a number of unarmed Italian soldiers should be placed at the disposal of the Allies for organizing the defensive works on the Western Front. These men were to be some 60,000 in number, two-thirds of them unfit for the hardships of war, and the rest specialists in particular kinds of work, but they too were to be gradually replaced by unfit. Although these labour battalions performed very useful duties, they did not make a good impression in France. The Italian military authorities had inevitably not selected the best men, who were wanted in Italy, and sent rather the C3 men; their equipment and general appearance too left a good deal to be desired. Most of them were employed on defensive works on the advanced lines, and although unarmed, they ended by winning the respect of the French and British troops with whom they came into touch. During the German push of March-April, 1918, they too were involved in the retreat, and many of them picked up abandoned arms and fought with the others. One former machine-gun corporal-major, a veteran of the Carso, on seeing an enemy aeroplane flying low over the retreating French columns, seized a derelict machine-gun, turned it on the bomber, brought it down and took the airman prisoner. It was on the occasion of the German spring offensive that the question of sending Italian fighting troops to France, in return for the assistance offered by the French to Italy after Caporetto, was raised, and in consequence of an agreement between Orlando and Clemenceau, it was decided to send the II Italian Army Corps to France. This unit had achieved a fine record in the fighting in the Isonzo area, where both its divisions had distinguished themselves, and had withdrawn in good order after Caporetto, fighting its way back to the Piave line. It had remained on the Montello until November 10, 1917, when it was transferred to Parma for rest and reorganization. Its commander was Lieutenant-General Albricci, a leader of considerable distinction, and it comprised the 3rd Division (Napoli and Salerno Brigades) commanded by General Pittaluga, the 8th (Alpi and Brescia Brigades) commanded by General Giovanni Beruto, the 9th Heavy Field Artillery Regiment, the XIII Assault Detachment, the II Group of squadrons of the Lodi Light Horse, and some technical units. The corps began to entrain on April 18, and by the 27th, the last chelons had reached their destination. It was first concentrated at Mailly-le-Camp, except the 64th Regiment, which arrived a few days later. In all there were 1,747 officers and 51,079 other ranks. The Corps underwent a short period of training for war conditions on the

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Western Front, and on May 13, the 3rd Division was transferred to the Argonnes area, where it was attached to the XIII French Corps, the Aire sector west of Verdun being entrusted to it. As there was no heavy fighting there, the troops had no other work than the improvement of the defences; later they were sent to Triancourt to complete their training, while the Aire sector was handed over to the 8th Division. But General Albricci was not content to be out of the fighting, and on June 3 he requested General Petain to employ his force on more active service. The request was granted, and on the 7th the Corps was attached to the French 5th Army and entrusted with the defence of the Ardre sector on the Montagne de Reims. This sector comprised the two dangerous salients of Varigny and Bligny. The Corps' task was to bar the Ardre Valley against a German advance on Reims, and defend the passage across the Marne at Epernay. The most ticklish point was the junction between the Italian Corps and the French V Corps on its left, because it was there that access to Epernay, opening up the road to Paris, was easiest; had the Germans been able to break through they would have cut out Reims, held by the I Colonial Corps, and General Gouraud's 4th Army would have been exposed to a flank attack. Early in July, there were indications that the Germans intended to launch an offensive on both sides of Reims, and that the main attack was to be delivered between Reims and Dormans. Two defensive lines had been prepared, the second whence an eventual counter-offensive would be launched, considerably behind the first, so as to keep it out of range of the enemy artillery fire. There had been some minor engagements in the latter part of June, and on the 23rd-24th, the Alpi Brigade and the Arditi unit had repulsed a German attack on the Bligny Hill, the Italians losing 16 officers and 376 men. On July 7, General Berthelot, commander of the 5th Army, changed his defensive dispositions, and decided that resistance should be offered on a line further back than the original first line; this involved the creation of new positions, and on the 13th he ordered yet a further reduction of the forces in the first line. The consequence of these changes of plan was that when the attack came, the defensive works were not yet fully completed. In the meanwhile, General Albricci had arrived at the conclusion, on the basis of the data in his possession, that the attack would not be from north to south, but from west to east, as indeed proved to be the case. On July 14, the G.O.C. the 5th Army issued orders that the first vigilance line was to be reinforced by a small nucleus of men armed with rifles, machine-guns and handgrenades, in expectation of the attack. The Italian Corps was faced by two-and-a-half German divisions, plus one in reserve; subsequently the 8th Italian Division had to bear the brunt of the attack of three whole German divisions. The Germans were now preparing what was to prove their last great offensive on the Western Front, and it extended to several sectors. On the night of July 14-15, the enemy bombardment began along the whole line from Chateau Thierry to Massiges at ten minutes after midnight, but that of the Allies, who were expecting the attack, had preceded it by forty minutes. The brunt of the enemy gun-fire in this part of the front was borne by the Italian 8th Division, and the bombardment was followed

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at 3 hours 30 by an infantry attack on the right of the Italian force, from the Bois des Eclisses in a south-westerly direction. The II Battalion of the 61st Regiment, and the I of the French 404th were attacked first, and after a bitter struggle the Germans overwhelmed the defences of the Bois des Eclisses. The I/51 and units of the 19th held their own for a time, but were enveloped by superior numbers and forced back; communications had been destroyed and the battle split up into a series of isolated actions and episodes. The commander of the 20th Italian Regiment succeeded in collecting a body of men to defend the line from Marfaux to Epilly, made up out of the survivors of his own regiment, the 51st and the French 404th. But by 9 o'clock that same morning, practically the whole of the 8th Division was hors de combat, and its artillery almost entirely destroyed. The unit had been sacrificed together with the divisions of the neighbouring French Corps to the necessity of withstanding the first shock of the enemy onslaught. Nevertheless, its destruction had broken and disorganized the attack and prevented the enemy from reaching the second line until later when they were already exhausted by their first effort. The Commander of the 3rd Division now attempted to form a new pincer-like front further back, in the hope of thus withstanding the German onslaught on his own force. Unfortunately, the Commander of the 75th Regiment withdrew his men prematurely owing to a mistake, whereas the Arditi had repelled the German attack by furious counter-attacks, and a small indenture was thus created. This was an error on the part of the Command, as the troops were holding out with absolute firmness, and their moral was excellent in spite of the terrific violence of the shell-fire and the attack, and they might perfectly well have retained their first line positions for a longer time. At Vrigny, the German attack was beaten off. General Albricci then withdrew the 3rd Division, and by 14 hours a new line of resistance had been formed on which the Salerno Brigade and the 6th Battalion of engineers held up the enemy advance. The second line was held by the French 120th Division, the Italian II Assault Detachment, the I/76th and the 52nd Regiment. Further German attacks were repelled on that line also. The 3rd Division had had to fall back on the left, but maintained its position on the right, and thus formed a diagonal line of defence between the first and second lines; although it had suffered severe losses, it was still in a state of efficiency, whereas the 8th Division had been almost wiped out. The Germans had indeed broken the front of the II Corps with their fierce onslaught, but had failed to push through it. General Berthelot now placed another French division at General Albricci's disposal. At dawn on the 16th, the Germans delivered an attack on the I/52nd (Italian) and the II/4o8th (French); they were driven back by the Italian unit, but the French Battalion was almost surrounded and had to be rescued by the intervention of troops of the 14th French Division. Albricci then ordered his 3rd Division to counterattack, and the 89th Regiment succeeded in capturing Clarizet; the critical point in the situation was thus overcome, and while the Germans had broken through the front of the French 120th Division, they were held up after an advance of 2 kilometres. General Albricci's corps, now comprising one Italian (the 3rd) and two French divisions, delivered a general counter-offensive on the 17th. The Italian 75th hurled

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itself against the Germans, attained the edge of the Bois du Petit Champ, and then penetrated into the wood itself, where, however, it encountered a vigorous resistance on the part of a fresh German Division, and was forced to fall back on its departure trenches. Nevertheless the attack had effectively broken an offensive which the Germans were preparing to launch, and disconcerted it by this unexpected onslaught. Later, the Germans did succeed in driving back the 76th Italian Regiment a little way, but the same unit counterattacked and recovered the lost ground. At 0 hours on the 18th, the II Corps, after an artillery preparation, delivered an attack with the 3rd Italian and the 2nd French Colonial Division, overcame the obstinate enemy defence and effected an advance. But as the Corps was by now exhausted with the heavy fighting and its serious losses, it was temporarily withdrawn from the front to be given a period of repose and reorganized. The 3rd Division had lost 2,135 men, the 8th, 6,792, the whole Corps, 9,334. The battle of the Ardre was a first and somewhat hesitating application of what was called "elastic defence", and the importance of the action of the II Corps lies in its defence of Epernay. That town afterwards conferred a gold medal on General Albricci, "son defenseur et citoyen d'honneur, la ville d'Epernay reconnaissante, 1918". The II Corps had indeed greatly helped to hold up the last German offensive in France. After a short respite at Arcis-sur-Aube, the corps was transferred to the 4th Army, and on August 7, to the 5th, but for the moment a quiet sector was entrusted to it. In September it replaced the French XVI at Fismes, and from September 23 rd, held the Aisne line on the extreme left of the 5th Army; its infantry did not yet come into action, but its artillery (the 10th F.A. Regiment and the 105 mm. Group) supported the French XVI Corps in the battle of the Plateau de l'Arbre Romain. Towards the end of September, the Allied offensive in this area commenced, and General Albricci immediately asked to take part in it. His request was granted, and his troops proceeded to move forward on the night of September 28-29; on the 29th, the 90th Regiment, by a surprise attack, captured Chavonne and the heights to the north of the village, and made preparations for the passage of the river. The 8th Division also came into action and got across to the right of the 90th. By evening the whole Corps was deployed in pincerlike formation, the 3rd Division as far as Perche, Cour Soupir, the western edge of the Soupir wood and the Aisne canal. The next day, General Albricci went up on to the Chavonne plateau, and the 8th Division got across the canal; in spite of the obstinate enemy resistance and counter-attacks, by the evening it had succeeded in attaining the Ferme la Cour - Bois de Soupir (southwest corner) line, although at the cost of heavy losses. The 3rd also advanced laboriously and captured the village and park of Soupir and the important position of Croix sans Tete in liaison with the French on the left. On October 3, the Bois des Gouttes was captured, and the 8th Division was along the Aisne, but some of its units crossed the canal near Pont Arcy. The Corps was now placed, at Albricci's own request, under General Mangin's 10th Army, in order to manoeuvre more effectively, and was ordered to advance on to the famous Chemin des Dames ridge. On the 4th, the Italian troops and the French 121st Regiment attacked the enemy positions, but

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suffered heavy losses without being able to effect any advance. On the 6th, the corps was given another short rest for reorganization, having lost 75 officers and 2,084 men between September 28 and October 5. On October 9, the enemy showed signs of faltering, and Mangin promised Albricci a fresh division for the final effort, but as these reinforcements were not available, the II Corps had to push on with its own tired forces alone. The Alpi Brigade crossed the Aisne on the 10th, and the engineers threw a bridge across it under heavy fire between Bourg and Cornin. On the right bank of the river, the Brescia Brigade occupied Pont Arcy, and got across the Aisne-Oise canal together with the 90th and 73rd Infantry, overcoming the enemy's resistance and capturing prisoners and a number of machine-guns. Once across the waterways, the Corps' advance became easier, and it pushed forward, preceded by cavalry and cyclist detachments. At 1 a.m. on the night of October 11-12, the 3rd Division occupied the Chemin des Dames ridge, Courtepon and the spur over the Ailette; by noon, the 8th was also on the Chemin des Dames and reached Cerny-en-Laonnais. The II Corps had thus attained the objectives assigned to it, and General Mangin, the Army Commander, sent the following telegram to General Albricci: "Felicitez mon nom vos braves troupes, qui sous votre energique commandement viennent d'enlever la position du Chemin des Dames sur tout leur front et d'un seul elan atteignent et meme depassent l'Ailette". The German communique stated: "Our troops . . . have had to abandon the ridge of the Chemin des Dames, after incessant attacks by the Italian Division, delivered with supreme contempt for death". The advance now continued without encountering much further opposition, until on the 14th the 8th Division came up against the Hunding-Stellung line beyond Sissonne, where the Germans still held out obstinately and brought the whole of the 10th Army to a halt, and also the 6th French Division of the 5th Army failed to overcome the enemy at Boncourt. The II Corps was transferred to the 3rd Army (General Humbert) and entrusted with a broader sector extending as far as Liesse. The Italian troops were now gladdened with the news of the overwhelming victory over the Austrians at Vittorio Veneto. After some minor actions on November 4, the victory march in pursuit of the Germans in full retreat commenced. It was an Italian cavalry patrol which first entered Rocroy and cut the fuse set by the enemy to powerful explosives, which would otherwise have laid the historic town in ruins. By November 11, the II/19th Infantry was on the banks of the Meuse, and raised the regimental colours to celebrate the conclusion of the Armistice and the end of the War. In all, the Italians in France had lost 9,500 killed and wounded on the Ardre, and 5,168 on the Chemin des Dames and at Sissonne. On February 5, 1919, Field-Marshal Petain, commanding the French Armies in the East, summed up the work of the II Corps in the following letter addressed to General Albricci, when he was about to leave France: "At the moment when you are about to return to Italy, I wish to express the

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satisfaction I have felt at having had the II Italian Army Corps under my orders. "When in April, 1918 the II Corps arrived in France, its reputation for gallantry had already been consecrated by the glorious names of Plava, Monte Cucco, Vodice, Monte Santo, Bainsizza, Montello. I knew that I could ask much of such troops. They were in fact among those who contributed to repel the furious assaults of the enemy. "They were afterwards called upon to recapture the famous ridge of the Chemin des Dames, and vigorously participated with French troops in the pursuit which drove the enemy out of France. "In the name of the French Army I thank them. "I salute your glorious colours. "I also salute your heroes fallen on the field of honour. "France will honour with the same devotion all those who fell on her soil for the most noble of causes. Italy may well be proud of General Albricci and of the troops who, under his orders, have fought victoriously on the soil of France. "(Signed) Petain."

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THE ITALIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE IN MACEDONIA Since Bulgaria's intervention on the side of the Central Powers, an Allied expeditionary force had been sent to Macedonia, originally with the object of assisting the Serbs, who were being attacked by the Bulgars as well as by the Austrians and the Germans. The first Allied contingents had come from the Dardanelles, and began to land on October 5, 1915, and on the 12th General Sarrail arrived and took command of the joint Franco- British forces. By November 17 these amounted to some 120,000 men. In the course of 1916, the remnants of the Serbian Army, reorganized after the disastrous retreat through Albania in 1915, came to reinforce the Allies, and some Russian and Venezelist Greeks also joined them. The French Government had repeatedly applied to Rome for an Italian contingent, and General Cadorna had on July 24, 1916, expressed a favourable opinion on the proposal, as he considered that Italy could not afford to be permanently absent from a war theatre where nearly all the Allied Armies were represented, and where the operations, if successful, were calculated to hasten the intervention of Rumania on the side of the Entente. The absence of Italy might also have proved prejudicial to Italian interests in the Near East at the end of the war1. The Italian Government consequently decided to contribute a contingent to the Allied Armies in the Orient 2, as the Macedonian expeditionary force was called, and as a result of an agreement between the Italian and Allied Governments an organic division was sent to Salonica. The force was the 35th Division, originally comprising the Sicilia and Cagliari Brigades (61st, 62nd, 63 rd and 64th Infantry Regiments), some Bersaglieri machine-gun companies, a squadron of the Lucca Light Horse, eight batteries (4 guns each) of mountain artillery, seven engineer companies, and other minor technical units. Subsequently the Ivrea Brigade (161st and 162nd Regiments) and another squadron of Lucca Cavalry were sent out. In view of the dearth of artillery in Italy, it had been agreed that the field and medium artillery for the division would be supplied by the French, but placed under the command of the Italian artillery commander. At its maximum, the strength of the division amounted to 55,000 men, a larger force than that of the average army corps. The first commander was General Pctitti di Rorcto, who had taken over the command of the division in Italy in very difficult conditions after the retreat resulting from the Austrian offensive in the Trentino in the previous spring, and who had an excellent military record. The first echelons began to land at Salonica on August 11, 1916, and the last had arrived by the 25th, except the Ivrea Brigade and the second Lucca squadron, which came in the first half of October. The Italian and French High Commands had agreed that the Commander of the 35th Division should take orders from the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies (General Sarrail) for the tactical employment of the troops, but that he was to
1 2 Cadorna, "Altre pagine sulla grande guerra" (1925), p. 185 et seq The French contingent (minus a couple of divisions) was known as the A.F.O. (Armee francaise d'Orient) 159

be free to decide as to the manner of their employment, and that the division was not to be split up. According to the pre-arranged plan, the Italian contingent was to have taken part in a general Allied offensive on the Macedonian Front, in conjunction with a contemporaneous action by the Russians ami Rumanians from the north. But the Allied effectives proved too weak at that time for any large-scale operations, and from the very first the defects of the military organization of this mixed team became evident, while General Sarrail proved quite unequal to his task. The lack of confidence in him on the part of the subordinate Allied commanders, who regarded him as a political intriguer rather than as a general, led to constant friction, which was not conducive to military efficiency. As soon as he arrived at Salonica, General Petitti asked the C.-in- C. that a sector on the front line be assigned to his force; his request was granted and the area selected was on the Krusha Balkan, east of Lake Doiran, opposite the Belesh mountains, which were held and formidably defended by the Bulgarians. A month after the first echelon had landed at Salonica, the Italian troops were already in the line. The sector, 48 kilometres in length, had been taken over from the 57th and part of the 17th French Divisions, and had no defensive works to speak of, so that the Italians set to work to create them, which they did very efficiently, as well as building a network of good roads. Besides the Krusha Balkan, the Italians also took over from the French a series of advanced posts in the broad depression between their main positions and the enemy lines on the Belesh. General Petitti had immediately disapproved of this disposition, as the advanced posts were isolated and so far from the rest of the troops that they were not under the protection of the divisional artillery. But it was not until September 17 that he succeeded in securing General Sarrail's authority to withdraw the outposts. Orders for their evacuation were at once issued, but the same day a Bulgarian attack in force was launched against them, an attack which the Italians had themselves provoked in support of an operation which the British on their right were conducting. The Gornji Poroj post, held by a company, found itself cut off and surrounded by overwhelming Bulgar forces, but having been ordered to resist as long as possible so as to cover the withdrawal of the other posts, it held out for 36 hours, until it was overwhelmed and its few survivors captured. The 8th Company, near the railway station, was also heavily attacked and almost surrounded by a greatly superior force, but managed to withdraw during the night. On the left of the Italian division was the sector held by the French 17th Colonial Division. On September 26, part of the latter force was suddenly withdrawn without warning, so that the Italians found themselves with their left flank in the air. General Petitti vigorously protested against this action to General Sarrail, who was at last induced to send a British brigade to occupy the lines evacuated by the French. The Italian division now found itself with British units on both flanks, and relations with them were extremely cordial. Indeed, throughout the whole of the two years in which the Italians remained in Macedonia, there never was the slightest friction or disagreement between them and the British, which is more than can be said for any other two armies on that front.

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The Krusha Balkan was a particularly malarious sector, and while, after the incidents mentioned above, there were no further military operations on it, the health of the Italian troops suffered very severely, and a good many of the malarial cases which occurred later in the Czerna area were the result of the disease contracted in the Krusha Balkan. Since the spring of 1916, the enemy, consisting of Germans and Bulgarians, with a few Austrian and Turkish units, all under German command, had been making preparations for an important offensive movement, with the object of driving the Allies out of Macedonia. On August 17, they crossed the Greek frontier at two points1: the mouth of the Struma in the east, and the Fiorina area in the west. In the former sector no important operations took place, but in the latter the enemy advanced as far as Lake Ostrovo. The Allies succeeded in holding up their progress and subsequently launched an offensive themselves. General Petitti did not wish his Division to remain idle during these operations, and addressed a request to the Commander-in-Chief to take part in them. Sarrail gave him the choice of extending his front, or of derogating from the principle that the Division should not be split up and sending a brigade to the Fiorina area. Petitti preferred the latter course, as he meant his troops to take part in the fighting, and the transport of the Cagliari Brigade commenced on October 22, but owing to the appalling state of the roads it was not until November 11 that the contingent was able to initiate its forward march from Ekshisu. The Italians were to relieve the left brigade of the French 57th Division, and advance along the ridge of the Baba Range south-west of Monastir (held by the enemy), a French column was to follow a line parallel to that of the Italians half-way down the mountain, a Franco-Russian force to advance across the plain directly towards Monastir, and the Serbs were to operate in the mountainous area further east from the Czerna loop to Mount Kaimakchalan. The progress of the Italians was arduous, as the troops had not only to overcome a very obstinate resistance on the part of the German-Bulgar forces, but also to advance over extremely broken ground covered with deep snow, without any roads, in the midst of a terrific blizzard at 2,000 metres above the sea on a front of 12 kilometres. On October 18, the Ostretz hill was wrested from the enemy, on the 19th the 63 rd Regiment conquered the Velusina "Tooth" and Peak 2209. The advance of the central column was also strenuously opposed, but the progress of the Italians on the left and of the Serbs on the right rendered the situation of the enemy in and around Monastir untenable, and on the 19th they were forced to evacuate the town, which was occupied by the Franco-Russians. The Cagliari Brigade was to push on to the Tzrvena Stena in order to seize the positions northwest of Monastir and give the newly-occupied town a wider breathing-space, and in fact, on the 21st, the 63rd Regiment, after overcoming the enemy resistance, captured Bratindol. But the French column operating to the right of it lower down, instead of continuing its parallel advance, suddenly effected a conversion to the right and entered Monastir, which was not "according to plan", and consequently the
1 Greece was then neutral, but a secessionist pro-Entente government had been set up at Salonica by Venizelos since August 30, 1916 161

Cagliari was also obliged to deviate towards Monastir, as otherwise it would have found itself with its riglit flank uncovered. Sarrail now ordered a temporary suspension of the advance beyond Monastir, and this infused fresh courage into the enemy, who, after having retreated towards Prilep, doubled back, reoccupied some positions on Peak 1248 north-west of Monastir and recommenced the bombardment of the town, which never ceased until the armistice. General Petitti, who had come to join his troops in Monastir, Brigadier- General Desenzani and some other officers were wounded by an enemy shell, and Major Tamajo, Commander of the engineers, was killed. The Serbs had progressed rapidly along the wild ridges to the east of Monastir, dashing along from height to height, and had even captured Peak 1050, destined afterwards to achieve such sinister notoriety, but were unable to hold it, and were forced to evacuate the summit. General Sarrail, on visiting General Petitti in hospital at Monastir, informed him that he intended to transfer the whole Italian force from the Krusha Balkan to the Monastir area. There was some discussion as to the sector to be assigned to it, often of a bitter nature, but it was finally agreed that the 35th Division was to occupy the western half of the Czerna loop from Novak to Makovo: the area previously held by one Serb and one and a half French divisions. Within the month of December, the whole force, now strengthened by the arrival of the Ivrea Brigade, was transferred to its new sector, after a most exhausting march over impossible roads. The Headquarters was the little hamlet of Tepavci, the base at Salonica, and all the Italian military establishments aroused the admiration of the other Allies for the manner in which they combined efficiency and comfort with extremely modest expenditure. As the 35th Division was now wholly within the area of the Armee Francaise d'Orient (A.F.O.), it was placed under the tactical command of the latter. It was, as agreed, provided with a fixed quota of French field and medium batteries, all taking orders from the Italian artillery commander. General Joffre had contemplated a general offensive by the Allied Armies in Macedonia for the invasion of Bulgaria, and General Cadorna had agreed that such an action would be desirable, but he considered that it could not be effected from the south alone, and that it should be combined with a Russo-Rumanian offensive from the Danube. Were this possible, Cadorna was prepared to reinforce the Italian contingent by three more divisions. But as, owing to the collapse of Rumania and the incipient breakdown from which Russia was suffering, an offensive from the Danube was out of the question, Cadorna, at the Rome meeting of Allied Ministers and military chiefs in January, 1917, refused to send more Italian troops to Macedonia. It was agreed in Rome that the Allied Armies in the Orient should limit themselves to holding Monastir for the present, and, if the enemy attacked in force, to evacuate even that line and fall back on the second line, perhaps even on the Salonica entrenched camp1. Fortunately, the expected attack did not materialize, and it proved possible to hold the positions secured in the autumn of 1916. The new Italian sector was extremely rough and mountainous (except for the small tract of plain on its left),
1 See Cadorna, "Altre pagine sulla grande guerra", p. 190 et seq

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and the enemy held some of the dominant positions, especially the famous Peak 10502, whence the movements of the Italian troops could be observed and a murderous fire directed on them; 1050 stands up like a huge tooth: a poisonous tooth which stings and kills. For nearly two years the peak was the centre of interest of the Italian Expeditionary Force, and was studied in all its aspects, moods and details with the same care as might be devoted to some area of great archaeological importance. When the Italians took over the sector, it was almost undefended, the Serbs having merely dug some rudimentary trenches here and there. But General Petitti at once set to work to provide it with an elaborate system of trenches, communication trenches, dug-outs and wire entanglements. General Mombelli, who took over the command in June, 1917, completed the task, and by the end of the war, the 12 kilometre front (originally 15) was endowed with 100 kilometres of trenches, often two metres deep, 500 dug-outs and 120 kilometres of wire. All this work was performed by troops nominally at rest; for while two brigades were in line, the third was engaged on the defensive works. The system comprised three lines: the first along the crest of the rocky ridge of the terrible 1050, a second further back, and a third still further back, which was the strongest of all, so as to attenuate the dangerous consequences of a possible break-through. It was interesting to ascertain that while the enemy was fairly accurately informed about the first line, it knew very little of the second, and did not even suspect the existence of the third. Communications with the base, 170 kilometres distant, were effected by means of a poor, single-track railway and one road, which lines also had to serve several French and Serb divisions, an arrangement which on the Western or Italian Front would have been regarded as rank heresy! Later the Santi Quaranta route was opened up, and converted from the roughest of mule tracks (although it followed the course of the ancient Via Aegnatia) into an excellent motor road, built from Fiorina to Ersek by the French, and from Ersek to Santi Quaranta by the Italians. Reserves and troops going on or returning from leave now used this route, thus avoiding the long and dangerous sea-route from Taranto to Salonica, which was reserved for the transport of supplies. While the fighting in Macedonia was not as heavy or as constant as on other fronts, the climate was abominable, excessively hot in summer, intensely cold in winter, malarious during the greater part of the year; the problem of supplies too was difficult, as shipping was none too abundant and constantly exposed to the danger of submarine attacks. For some months after the capture of Monastir, no events of military importance occurred. On February 12, 1917, the Germans delivered a violent attack on the positions held by a part of the Italian 162nd Regiment. The defences were smashed up by the heavy bombardment and the defenders driven back. The Italians counter-attacked on the same and the following days, and reoccupied part of the lost ground. On the 27th, the Italian and French batteries opened a heavy fire on 1050, the Piton Rocheux and the Piton Brule (the two supporting bulwarks of 1050) and on the enemy's second lines, after which the Italian infantry dashed forward and
2

Its actual height was greater, but as the first erroneous survey had found its way into the maps, the name was retained
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captured many positions. But a mine, previously prepared by the enemy, exploded and destroyed almost the whole of the 11th Company of the 162nd; other units held on to the captured positions for a time, but were eventually forced back by the enemy artillery and machine-gun fire. In the end the Italians recaptured all the positions lost on February 11, except a hummock on 1050, which remained unoccupied by either side. The Italians had lost 400 men in all. The action proved that 1050 could not be taken and held unless the Piton Rocheux on the right were first captured, as it constituted the chief protection for the enemy artillery, which could not be silenced nor oven located in the deep gullies with steep rocky walls wherein it was ensconced. But Sarrail failed to take note of this lesson; indeed, it appears from his memoirs that he wholly misunderstood the nature of the action of February, 1917. The Commander-in-Chief now contemplated a general offensive against the whole enemy line, to be carried out in different phases. In the first phase (March 1118), the French troops of the A.F.O. attacked the positions west and north-west of Monastir, but although Peak 1248 and part of the Tzrvena Stena were captured and 1,200 prisoners taken, most of the gains were lost immediately after, and no sensible advance effected. The next phase commenced on April 22 on the Doiran sector, where the British attacked the Grand and the Petit Couronne barring the passage between Lake Doiran and the Vardar, but in spite of the splendid gallantry of the troops, none of the positions conquered in the first onrush could be held, except a few minor points on the extreme left, and very heavy losses were incurred. Early in May, General Petitti was recalled to Italy, and General Pennella sent to take over the command of the 35th. He reached his headquarters on the eve of the third phase of the offensive, which was to be launched on the Franco-Italian, Serb and British sectors. Sarrail, however, was at that time more interested in the political situation in Greece than in the military events of Macedonia, and transferred a part of his none too abundant forces to Thessaly and Athens to seize the wheat harvest1 and overthrow King Constantine. The second British attack was as unsuccessful as the previous one and even more costly. The attack in the Czerna loop began on May 9, extending from Point A on 1050 to the Piton Rocheux. But Sarrail had omitted to make adequate preparations for the action, and the preliminary bombardment, while it failed to destroy the enemy defences, lasted long enough to give ample warning. The infantry attack was entrusted to the Italian 61st, 161st and 162nd Regiments, with the 62nd in reserve, the 16th French Colonial Division and a Russian brigade. The fighting was of a desperate nature, the Italians captured some positions at heavy cost, and the French got on to the Piton Rocheux, but the latter having been forced to fall back again, the former could not hold their own gains. The attacks were renewed on the following days, but with no better result, the Italians losing some 3,000 men in all, the French about as many. The Serb attack on the Dobropolje and the Vetrenik were equally unsuccessful. By the 23rd, the offensive was suspended after 13,000 to 14,000 men had been killed or wounded and no results whatever achieved. Morally the whole operation had been a defeat, as it greatly encouraged the enemy; but the fact that, in spite of this failure and the
1 It was said that he cared more about wheat in Thessaly than laurels in Macedonia

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absence in Greece of a considerable part of the Allied forces, the enemy did not launch a counter-offensive, showed that fortunately they were in no position to follow a more active course. Before the operations were definitely ended there was another change in the Italian Command. General Pennella was recalled, after barely 20 days in Macedonia, to take up an important command in Italy, and on June 30, General Ernesto Mombelli, Military Attach in Athens, took over the command of the 35th. Sarrail continued to provoke disagreeable incidents, and was hardly on speaking terms with several of the Allied commanders, who trusted neither his military nor his moral qualities, and had repeatedly asked their Governments to try to obtain his recall. Even with the great bulk of the French army he was extremely unpopular. But it was not until Clemenceau became Prime Minister that Sarrail was at last superseded. He left Salonica in January, 1918, unwept, unhonoured and unsung. General Guillaumat, a soldier of very different calibre, succeeded him, and at once set to work to restore the discipline in the A.F.O., which Sarrail's methods had so grievously impaired. The strength of the Allied Armies had been reduced by the removal of the Russian division, which, after the revolution, had become Bolshevized and useless; but two new reinforcements were received in the shape of the Greek Army, which, now that Greece, under King Alexander and with Venizelos as Premier, had joined the Entente, was being trained and gradually sent up to Macedonia 1, and of some 8,000 to 9,000 ex-Austrian prisoners of Yugoslav race (nearly all Bosnians and Herzegovinians), who had come by devious routes from Russia. On the oilier hand, after the great German offensive in France, a number of French and British troops were recalled from Macedonia, and the Italian contingent was also somewhat reduced. General Guillaumat was himself summoned back to France, and General Franchet d'Esperey sent out in his place. Before leaving Salonica, Guillaumat had exhumed the offensive plan of Voivod Michich, the Serb leader, but it was his successor who was to complete it and carry it into effect. Franchet d'Esperey's idea was to concentrate a large force to attack the enemy between the Czerna and Nonte in the Moglena region, which, owing to its natural imperviousness, had not been strongly fortified, and to deliver containing attacks on the two wings: the British and Greeks in the Doiran area, and the A.F.O. and the Italians in the Czerna-Monastir area. In all the Allies disposed of 574,000 men (44,000 Italians), 1.600 guns, 2,680 machine-guns and 200 aeroplanes. The enemy's numerical strength was superior, 700.000 men, but the number of their guns was smaller (1,300) and they had only 80 aeroplanes. By now the enemy troops were nearly all Bulgarians, only some technical and special German units having remained, and there were neither Austrians nor Turks. But the Commander-in-Chief, General von Scholtz, was a German, and some of the subordinate commanders were also Germans. None of the Allied Governments would send any reinforcements to their respective contingents in Macedonia, for the expedition continued to be unpopular in
1 The array of the Salonica Greek State consisted of three divisions of three regiments each

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military and political circles, and, moreover, large-scale operations were in progress or preparation on the Western Fronts. Nor did they believe in the success of the operation planned in Macedonia, and even the Allied commanders on the spot only hoped to effect an advance of some 20 or 30 kilometres, and perhaps frighten Bulgaria into a separate peace. But the secret was well kept, and although the enemy realized that something was in the air, they did not know where the blow would fall. At 8 o'clock on September 14, a heavy destructive artillery fire was opened from the central Franco-Serb front, and at 5 hours 30 on the 15th, the infantry attacked. After overcoming an obstinate Bulgar resistance, the French broke through, followed by the Serbs, on the Sokol - Dobropolje - Kravitza - Vetrenik sector, and overwhelmed the whole first-line defensive system. Behind it there proved to be no second lines, and the advance was comparatively easy. The British, assisted by French and Greek units, again attacked in the Doiran sector, and although they were at first unable to make any headway and suffered grievous losses, they did prevent the enemy from sending reinforcements to the central sector. The task allotted to the Italians was first to effect an intense demonstrative action for a purpose similar to that of the British, then to make of the Italian sector a pivot for a turning movement by the Serbs, and finally advance on Prilep, the enemy's chief supply centre and headquarters of the 11th German Army1. The first tasks were carried out between September 14 and 21 by means of heavy artillery fire and local actions of such intensity as to induce the enemy to believe that the principal offensive was to be launched on the Czerna Front. Consequently they themselves counterattacked the Italians with extreme vigour, but were repulsed every time. Finally, at 17 hours 30 on the 21st, General Mombelli ordered a general infantry attack, the troops dashed on to the formidable 1050, and in a short time the whole vast defensive system collapsed. The enemy, fearing a turning movement, had offered but slight resistance, and abandoned their positions before the Italian push. Mombelli sent a column of cavalry and machinegun companies on lorries ahead in pursuit, and several sharp engagements took place with the enemy rearguards. The whole division now moved forward, and by the morning of the 22nd, it was 10 kilometres beyond the enemy's first lines; to the surprise of everyone, practically no second lines had been prepared even here. The objective of the Italian division had been, as we have seen, Prilep, but on the 23rd a message came from the C.A.A.2 ordering it to move in a north-westerly direction towards Krushevo so as to cut off the retreat of the enemy's forces north of Monastir towards Kichcvo. The 35th consequently effected a turn left of 90 degrees and pushed on rapidly in the prescribed direction. The enemy resisted with some obstinancy at various points, notably near Zapolchani, on the Baba Planina and at Draghishetz, but were everywhere forced back. By the 28th, the Italian Division and the French 11th
It had a German command and staff, but the men, except for a few infantry battalions and some specialist units, were Bulgars 2 Commandament des Armees Alliees 1 166

Colonial Division were closing round Sop, Mount Stramol and Mount Baba, where the Bulgars were concentrating and preparing to offer a last desperate resistance in strong natural defensive positions; they had in fact been reinforced by two regiments and several machine-guns units which, while retreating northwards from Monastir, had been summoned back. The fighting of these three days cost the Italian force some 500 casualties. Further west the four divisions of the A.F.O. came into action about the same time as the 35th, and they too at first encountered dogged resistance. The advance of the Serbs in the centre continued at astonishing speed, and the British and Greeks on the right also moved forward, but more slowly as the enemy resisted more energetically in the eastern sector. The result was that the Bulgar armies were cut in two, and the Germans, commands and units, when they realized that the game was up, departed after cutting the telegraph and telephone wires, so that the Bulgars remaining to the west of the Vardar had no knowledge of what was going on east of the river and in Bulgaria. On the 29th, General Mombelli prepared a general attack on the Sop positions, to be launched on the morning of the 30th. But at 5 hours 30 on that day, he received a wireless message from the C.A.A. to the effect that the armistice had been concluded and was to come into force at noon. The attack was therefore countermanded and the Bulgarian command summoned to surrender according to the armistice terms. But owing to the above-mentioned interruption of communications, the Bulgarians would not believe the news, and it took several days' negotiations before they agreed to lay down their arms. This was done on October 3, when some 8.000 men surrendered to the Italians at Sop, and another 11.000 on the Stramol mountains, who had also been fighting against the Italians, surrendered to the French 11th Colonial Division, whose lines were more easy of access, although they too should be counted as part of the Italian "bag". The fighting before Sop had been harder than on any other part of the front in the Battle of the Balkans, except on the British Doiran sector. On September 26, the Bulgarians had sent a messenger to sue for an armistice, and on the 28th a delegation followed. The first meeting with General Franchet d'Esperey was held on the morning of the 29th at 9, and by 14 hours 30 the armistice was signed. The Bulgars agreed to all the conditions, including that entitling the Allies to occupy strategic points in Bulgarian territory and to make use of the country's ways of communication for eventual operations against the other enemy forces (German, Austrian and Turkish) who had not yet surrendered. Some further military operations were in fact carried out in Serbia proper against the remaining German and Austrian units, which, however, opposed but slight resistance. To the Italian Division was entrusted the occupation of Bulgaria, which lasted until July, 1919, when the force was broken up and its units repatriated. An expedition had been planned under the command of the British General (now Field-Marshal) Sir George Milne, against Constantinople, in which an Italian brigade was to take part, but the Turks surrendered on October 31, before the advance began.

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In all the losses of the Italian Expeditionary Force in Macedonia amounted to 2,841 killed, 5,353 wounded and 80,000 sick1.

For further details of these operations see my "Macedonian Campaign" (Fisher Unwin, 1922)

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THE ITALIAN TROOPS IN ALBANIA Italy's interest in Albania dates from many years before the World War, but this is not the place to deal with the historical and political aspects of the Albanian problem. The object of Italy's Albanian policy has always been to prevent Albania from falling into the hands of an actually or potentially unfriendly Power. One has but to look at the map to see how near that coast is to Italy's, and how dangerous it would be for Italy too if a hostile Power were installed in Albania and able to utilize its ports for raids on the open Italian coast. It was this situation which first inspired Italy to send an expedition to Albania. On the outbreak of the World War, Albania was an independent State created as a result of the Balkan Wars, still in the birththroes of its first months of existence and in a condition bordering on chaos, after the departure of the Prince of Wied, who had been selected by the great Powers as ruler of the country. The Albanian Essad Pasha now took over the government of the country, but his authority was extremely limited. As there was a danger that Albania's neighbours might take advantage of these conditions to seize a part of its territories (the Greeks had indeed invaded Southern Albania and devastated it) Italy decided on a temporary occupation of Valona. On October 30, 1914, the little island of Saseno, dominating the Bay of Valona, which was particularly important for Italy, was occupied by a naval detachment. General Cadorna had always been opposed to the occupation of any part of the Albanian mainland, and considered that Saseno was enough to guarantee Italy's security in that area. But the Foreign Office was anxious about Greek activities in Southern Albania, and insisted on Valona itself being occupied as well. The first expeditionary force, which landed at the end of December, was a small one, consisting of the 10th Bersaglieri Regiment and one mountain battery. Cadorna was strongly of opinion that this force should not be exceeded, and the Minister of War, General Zupelli, held the same view. For several months nothing more was done, and the occupation remained limited to Valona and its immediate surroundings. The troops set to work to improve the hygienic conditions of the town, which were deplorable, to build roads and to sketch out the entrenched camp which was afterwards to be created. But when on October 8, 1915, four or five months after Italy's intervention, a joint Austro-German army delivered an offensive on a large scale against Serbia, and Bulgaria attacked from the cast on the 10th, the Allied Powers, including Italy, decided to attempt to come to the aid of the hard-pressed Serbian Army. Various plans were considered, one of which was to send an expedition across Albania; Cadorna, for militarygeographical reasons, was uncompromisingly opposed to it, whereas he supported the sending of an Italian contingent to the Allied armies in Macedonia, as we have seen in the previous chapter. The Serbs were completely defeated by their opponents, and forced to retreat ever further back. But instead of following the obvious course and attempting to join the Allies in Macedonia, they suddenly effected a conversion in a south-westerly

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direction into Albania, where they arrived in the most disastrous conditions. Italy wished to lend them all possible assistance, but this necessitated a considerable increase of the Italian forces in Albania. After much discussion it was agreed to raise them to a division three brigades strong, comprising twelve battalions of regular infantry (including the three of the Bersaglieri Regiment already at Valona) and six of the Territorial Militia, with adequate artillery and services. Two of the brigades were to be at Valona with the Divisional Headquarters, and the third (the Savona) at Durazzo. No part of the interior was to be occupied. The command was entrusted to General Bertotti, who was to take orders, not from Cadorna, but from the Ministry of War (decree of December 4, 1915). The Savona Brigade was sent to Durazzo from Valona by land, which, of course, involved the organization of elaborate lines of communication services, in view of the complete absence of roads and the presence of unfriendly bands. The Government was also considering the advisability of extending the Italian occupation to Berat, which would have required a further increase of force, but this scheme was eventually abandoned. In the meanwhile, the Serbs were pouring into Albania and dying by thousands along the route. One column went to Scutari and others towards Durazzo and Valona. From Scutari they would have to be evacuated via San Giovanni di Medua, where there was only an open roadstead, and conditions at Durazzo were hardly any better. The Italian Navy made superhuman efforts to meet the situation, and sent numerous ships to both places, but the Re Umberto, laden with supplies, and some smaller ships were sunk by mines or submarines, while the Savona Brigade was painfully marching on Durazzo. Altogether, some 185,000 Serbs, including several thousands of Austro-Hungarian prisoners, were evacuated - 113,000 by the Italian and the rest by the Allied navies. The sanitary assistance and commissariat services for this vast horde of starving and diseased humanity were provided by the Italian army and navy, without whose help it would have been impossible to save even a remnant of the Serbian Army. By February 9 the whole transport was terminated and the Serbs conveyed to Corfu, where they were re-equipped. M. Pashich, the Serb Premier, cordially thanked the Italian Navy and other authorities through whom "it had been possible to effect the evacuation rapidly and in a fully satisfactory manner"1. Once the evacuation of the Serbs was terminated there was no longer any object in retaining Durazzo, which was menaced by the advancing Austrian forces, as well as by a number of Albanian tribesmen in the pay of Austria. Of the Savona Brigade only one infantry regiment had reached Durazzo - the other was still en route - together with some artillery. No defence works had been carried out and there was nothing to prevent the Austrians, whose effectives were those of an Army Corps, from driving this force into the sea. General Ferrero was placed in command of the brigade, and Cadorna continued to insist on the immediate evacuation of Durazzo, to which Ferrero himself also concurred. But General Bertotti still hesistated, and on February 14 instructed Ferrero to hold it for the present. Preparations for defence were therefore commenced, and on the 19th the Italian outposts repelled Austrian
1 For further details see G. Corni, "Riflessi e visioni della grande guerra in Albania" (Milan, 1928)

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onslaughts on the Arzen River and the Pjeska heights, but on the 23rd they destroyed the bridges over the Arzen and fell back on Durazzo. That same day the Ministry of War informed Generals Bertotti and Ferrero that Durazzo was to be evacuated. The ships for the transport of the troops, which had been sent to Durazzo previously, but had left when it had been decided to hold the town, as they could not remain indefinitely in the open roadstead, exposed to the high seas and to submarine attacks, now returned. Essad Pasha and his staff and the Italian colony left, and during the next three days the evacuation of the garrison was carried out, while the Italian rearguards held back the enemy. On the last day the powder magazines across the Via Aegnatia, which follows the edge of the lagoon, were blown up, and the wooden pier at Durazzo was set on fire. General Ferrero and his staff were among the last to leave. While the men and the mountain batteries were all safely embarked, the 900 draught and pack animals and the stores had to be destroyed and the other guns abandoned. General Cadorna is severe in his strictures on General Bertotti for having so long retarded the evacuation; had it commenced on February 14, as General Ferrero had proposed, the troops would have suffered fewer losses and all the guns and stores would have been saved1. The Italian occupation, however, did not remain limited to Valona and its immediate neighbourhood, as Cadorna recommended, but was spread over a wider area in South Albania. The occupying force was increased and became the XVI Corps, three divisions strong, and the Valona entrenched camp, which was now created, extended to the Vojussa from the mouth of that river to the Dorza gorge, whence the line extended to the Guba heights and Mount Kjore, and here the Austrian advance was held up. During the Austrian spring offensive in the Trentino, two of the divisions were withdrawn from Albania, but later they were sent back, and in the summer of 1916 the Italians occupied Southern Albania, including Santi Quaranta, which was converted into a naval and military base. No military operations of importance took place during 1916, except outpost affairs, both with the Austrians and with the Albanian bands in the Austrian service. The Italians themselves also raised an auxiliary force among the Albanians. On December 11, 1916, General Bandini, Commander of the XVI Corps, was returning to Italy on leave on the warship Regina Margherita, when she struck a mine and sank, and Bandini himself was drowned. General Ferrero was then appointed to take over the command. Liaison was established in the last months of the year between the XVI Corps and the Armee d'Orient in Macedonia. There had previously been an unfilled gap between the two forces, through which Greek irregulars and Albanian bands owing to allegiance to Essad Pasha, whose fidelity to the Allied cause was doubtful, wandered and raided at will. Contact was established by Italian cavalry detachments on October 24, but it was not until the Italians had effectively occupied Ersek (February 12, 1917) and the French Koritza, that the two forces were properly linked up. At Koritza the French set up an opera-bouffe republic, which had an ephemeral existence. When in the spring of 1917 the French occupied Thessaly, the Italians in
1 Cadorna, "Altre pagine sulla grande guerra", p. 161 et seq. See also General Bertotti's reply

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Albania occupied the valley of the Kalamas, Yanina, the upper Osum and the Pindus, and on June 3, 1917, General Ferrero issued his famous manifesto from Argyrocastro, proclaiming Albanian independence under Italian protection. Preparations were now made for collaboration between the XVI Corps and the Armee d'Orient in the May offensive, but as it was obvious from the first that General Sarrail's plans stood not the slightest chance of success, General Ferrero refused to participate. The Italian troops and officials in Albania had, in the meanwhile, carried out an active work of civilization among the Albanians, many thousands of whom would have died of starvation but for Italian help. Over 1,000 kilometres of roads were built, many schools opened, agriculture was developed, good drinking water provided and sanitation cared for. The rough track from Santi Quaranta to Fiorina was converted into an excellent motor road. In the summer of 1917 sundry small attacks were made by the Austrians against the Italian positions at Chafa Chichok, Chiflik Idris on the Vojussa and Sharova in the Osum Valley, but were repulsed. It seemed at one moment that the Austrians were preparing for a large-scale offensive to separate the Armee d'Orient from the Italian XVI Corps, and the arrival of important enemy reinforcements was announced. The C.A.A. proposed to entrust the defence of the menaced area to Greek troops and Essadist bands, but General Ferrero had no confidence in these forces, and proposed instead that the Italian 35th Division be transferred from Macedonia to the Osum valley, so as to place it in direct contact with the XVI Corps. But General Guillaumat, who had succeeded Sarrail at Salonica, rejected the plan, as he feared that once the 35th were in contact with the XVI Corps, he would end by losing all control over it. In May, 1918, a joint Franco-Italian operation was carried out in eastern Albania, the French attacking between the junction of the Kelizoni and Devoli rivers, and the Mali Korore heights (south-west of Moschopolje), and the Italians from the line of the Osum near Cerevoda, with the object of pinching out the enemy salient formed as a result of the previous French operations at Pogradetz, and rendering the Santi Quaranta route safe from raids. The attacks were delivered on May 15 and encountered considerable resistance; some positions were taken and lost several times, but finally remained in the hands of the French and Italians, and on the 17th liaison between the two was established at Backa. The new line went from the junction of the Devoli and the Kelizoni to Cerevoda via Chafa Bechit, Maya Frenkut and Backa, and the Santi Quaranta route was now safe. The French resumed the offensive in their own sector on June 10 and captured some more positions. On July 6 a further Franco-Italian offensive on a large scale was launched on the whole Albanian Front. The French were to advance along the Devoli valley, as far as its great loop approaching the Skumbi valley, while the Italians were to turn the Malakastra, the most strongly fortified position held by the Austrians in Albania, and occupy Berat and Fieri. In the east the French, assisted by Italian units, advanced without encountering much resistance, and occupied the triangle formed by the Devoli and the Tomoritza, Gramsi, an important base of supplies and other positions,

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and the Italians advanced on the Tomor massif. General Ferrero in the meanwhile pushed on General Nigra's column, consisting largely of cavalry (Catania and Palermo Regiments and the Sardinian squadron), along the coast across the Vojussa near its mouth, and attacked Levani, north of the river, on the 7th; in the centre the Bersaglieri also crossed the river and occupied Feras and advanced on Izoni. While the infantry, under General Rossi, attacked Chafa Glava, Nigra's cavalry charged across the plain, fell on an aviation camp north of Fieri, and after a sharp fight occupied the town itself, and reached the Semeni river, supported by the fire of British monitors which shelled the enemy lines. Thus the whole of the Malakastra positions fell. Another Italian column occupied Berat, Headquarters of of an Austrian brigade, and reached the southern loop of the Devoli, and the passage of the Semeni river was also forced at the Metali bridge. These successes also had repercussions in the Tomor area, where the Treboldi column was able to advance northward in the rough slopes of Chafa Glunaka. These operations had cost the Italians 150 men killed and 700 wounded, and 2,000 Austrian prisoners had been captured. But the troops had suffered very severely from malaria, for the country was terribly unhealthy. As long as the men remained stationary and did not have to make great exertions they managed by careful precautions to keep in good health, but as soon as the advance began under the blazing summer sun malaria wrought fearful havoc. By July 23rd the advance was suspended. The Italian successes had alarmed the Austrian Command, and General Pflanzer-Baltin was sent out by air to take command of the troops in Albania, who were strengthened by large reinforcements from non-malarious regions in Dalmatia and Bosnia- Herzegovina. A general counter-offensive was now undertaken in the hope of wresting from the Italians the positions which they had recently conquered. General Ferrero got wind of these preparations and asked for reinforcements from Italy to fill up the gaps caused in his ranks by malaria (there were some 13,000 sick in August, 19,000 in September), but none were forthcoming, as all available troops were needed for an offensive on the Italian Front, which it had originally been intended was to take place in August. The enemy, forty-three battalions strong, launched their offensive in the second half of July, and General Ferrero, who had only twenty-three battalions, reduced by malaria from 12,000 to 8,000 rifles, decided to withdraw from the newly-occupied positions in the plain south of the Semeni, including the towns of Fieri and Bcrat. The Mali Siloves area on the extreme right had, in consequence, to be also evacuated, so as not to leave it with its left flank uncovered. But the withdrawal was an orderly one, and the important lines of the Malakastra were held. By the middle of August the enemy push ceased. The Italians were in positions easy to defend, and the Austrian troops, who had at first been fresh and healthy, now likewise began to feel the effects of the climate and to suffer from malaria. The Italians were able to fortify the Malakastra, and in the meanwhile Ferrero received important reinforcements - first a brigade, and then the 13th Division and some special units. It was now the Austrians who received no more reinforcements, partly because the Italian and Allied navies rendered transport from

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Dalmatia by sea almost impossible. The Austrian attempt to drive back the Italians on the Tomor on September 10 was beaten off successfully. The general offensive of the Allies in Macedonia was now in full preparation, and General Ferrero was to co-operate with it. While the French 57th Division was advancing from the Ochrida region, the Italian XVI Corps began to move forward about the end of September, and the Austrians, menaced on two sides, had to fall back. On September 30 Italian cavalry patrols attained the Skumbi, and on October 7 a light column of infantry and cavalry entered Elbasan, two hours ahead of the advance guard of the French 57th Division. The Tanaro Brigade, preceded by cavalry, crossed the Skumbi after a sharp engagement with the Austrian rearguards, and advanced on Kavaja and Durazzo. At the same time the Palermo Brigade pushed forward from Elbasan on Tirana via the Kraba pass. On the 14th the Italians defeated an Austrian force near Durazzo and occupied that town, and on the 15th entered Tirana; there they found a Serb detachment, which, however, immediately withdrew. On the 31st Italian and Serb forces appeared before Scutari and summoned the Austrian commander to surrender, and as he refused to do so the Italian artillery opened fire on the Tarabosh position, famous in the Balkan Wars, thereby obliging the enemy to evacuate the town. The Serbs were the first to enter; the Italians had the Drinassa river in flood before them, but on November 1 they built a bridge across it and got into Scutari. On the 3rd Virpazar, Antivari and Dulcigno were also occupied by Italian cavalry. General Ferrero and his staff now reached Scutari, warmly welcomed by the inhabitants, and on November 4 the Serb regiment, at the request of the Italian Government, left the town. The Austrian forces still in that area were in a state of complete dissolution and insubordination, and at the request of their own command the Italian troops extended their occupation to Cattaro. The whole of Albania was now in Italian occupation. The further history of Italy's connexion with Albania since the armistice does not come within the scope of the present work.

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VITTORIO VENETO During the remainder of the summer of 1918 the situation was comparatively quiet on the Italian Front. Some pressure was brought to bear by the Allies on the Italian Command to induce it to launch a large-scale offensive in the summer, in cooperation with the movements on the Western Front. General Diaz had considered two plans in this connection: the first was to deliver a general attack with every man available, provided that there should be the possibility of securing decisive results on all fronts; the second was a more limited operation in the Asiago plateau, to act as a prelude to a more important one later on. The former scheme was dropped, as the general situation did not appear to warrant so extremely strenuous an effort on the part of the Italians so soon after the Piave battle. The second, as we have seen in a previous chapter, had been in preparation in the spring and suspended in consequence of the information secured concerning the general offensive planned by the enemy for June. It now took shape once more as an action by thirty divisions destined to reconquer the Portule in the Asiago area, and thus acquire greater breathing apace and eliminate the risk of hostile incursions into the Venetian plain, with an extension westward to the Pasubio area, where the Col Santo was to be recaptured and an advance on to the Folgaria plateau effected1. Rumours of this plan were already spreading in well-informed quarters 2, but the proposed action was not carried out. In the first place General Diaz was expecting some tanks from the Allies to be employed for the first time in Italy, and secondly, he deemed it advisable to resume his plans for a more general offensive with the object of securing really decisive results on the Italian Front concomitantly with what appeared about to take place on the others. The limited action would at most have achieved a local success at heavy cost and a more favourable position for the general offensive then planned for the spring of 1919. Marshal Foch was annoyed at this refusal, but at the end of August General Diaz went to France and explained the situation in Italy to him, as well as to the French President and Premier, who had previously misunderstood it. General the Earl of Cavan believed that an Italian offensive in July would have proved successful, and so did General Gathorne-Hardy3. On July 17 the German offensive on the Marne was definitely held up, and on the 18th the French counter-offensive commenced with promising results. On August 8 the British attack was launched, and the German resistance at last appeared to be vacillating. The Franco-British-American offensive in France was slow and the Germans effected an orderly withdrawal, resisting at every point and giving no indication of a general collapse. But on the Macedonia Front the developments were fuller and more dramatic; after the great victorious inter-Allied offensive Bulgaria
For the negotiations with the Allies see Baldini's "Diaz", Dupont's "Vittorio Veneto", and Tosti's "Vittorio Veneto davanti alla storia" in the volume "Riflessi del Rogo" 2 The present writer heard them in Macedonia 3 See Cavan in The Army Quarterly, October, 1920, pp. 15-17, and Gathorne-Hardy, ibid, October, 1921, pp. 26-27 1 175

sued for an armistice, which was, in fact, concluded at Salonica on September 29 1. This enabled the Allied forces to re-enter Serbia, restore contact with Rumania and eventually invade Hungary. In Palestine Lord Allenby achieved a complete victory and drove the Turks before him in headlong flight, and although the Armistice with Turkey was not concluded until October 31, the Turkish Army was no longer in being. The Comando Supremo had addressed a circular to the various Army commanders, asking for their views concerning a possible Italian offensive on a large scale for the coming autumn. It was Colonel Nicolosi, D.M.O. of the 3rd Army, who suggested a plan for an attack beyond the Piave at the junction of the two enemy Army groups, but in somewhat general terms. Colonel Cavallero (afterwards Minister of War), D.M.O. at the Comando Supremo, was at once taken with this idea and developed it more fully in all its details; he persuaded the Commander-in-Chief to accept it, although not without difficulty, as it appeared a hazardous operation, and if it were to fail it would leave the Italians in a position similar to that of the Austrians after the battle of the previous June. This was the genesis of Vittorio Veneto. The objection to an attack due east was that the further the Italians advanced the more their flank would be exposed from the mountain area. An offensive in a northerly direction over the mountain area would have been very difficult so late in the year. The conception adopted of striking at the junction of the two Austrian army groups "bisecting the two lines of difficulty", was based on sound strategic lines and "one fully deserving more study and a higher meed of pain than it has so far received"2. Diaz began his preparations on the whole of the Italian front late in the summer, and he had completed them by September 25, a few days before the Bulgarian armistice. The greatest care was taken to prevent the enemy from getting wind of what was being planned; reports were sedulously spread about by means of the press in neutral countries concerning attacks to be delivered on various sectors other than those actually contemplated. The enemy did, it is true, hear rumours of the coming offensive, and on September 20 they were mentioned in the Vienna Neue freie Presse, followed by other papers. But the Austrian Government still felt full confidence in the Army, whose conditions had been improved since August by better food and more abundant munitions, and the High Command had succeeded in creating an isolation zone behind the troops, cutting them off from the revolutionary nationalist agitations fermenting in the interior of the Monarchy. The Italian plan consisted of two parts. In the first phase an attack was to be launched in the Grappa area between the rivers Brenta and Piave with the object of cutting the Austrian Army in two and separating the forces in the Trentino from those on the left bank of the Piave. In the second phase the enemy forces along the Piave from the Montello to the sea were to be attacked, concentrating on the junction between the Austrian 6th Army and the Isonzo Armee. It was the classical manoeuvre of driving a wedge through, so as to split up the enemy and then crushing the two broken limbs separately.
1 2 For Italian participation in the Macedonian campaign see previous chapter See Cavan, op. cit., pp. 16-17

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On September 25 General Caviglia, commander of the 8th Army, to which the passage of the Piave was to be entrusted, was summoned to the Comando Supremo and the plan was communicated to him. A day or two later General Giardino, commander of the 4th Army on the Grappa, was also informed of it. In the meanwhile the transport of troops and materials was being rapidly proceeded with: no light task, as 21 divisions, 1.600 guns, 500 trench-mortars and 2.400.000 shells had to be moved into the battle zone. By October 10 the operation was completed. The Italian forces were distributed in the following order of battle: 7th Army (General Tassoni) from the Stelvio to the Lake of Garda; 1st Army (General PecoriGiraldi) from Garda to the Melette di Gallio in the Asiago area; 6th Army (General Montuori) on the Altipiani; 4th Army (General Giardino) on the Grappa; 8th Army (General Caviglia) on the Montello; 3rd Army (H.R.H. the Duke of Aosta) on the lower Piave. Between the 4th and the 8th Armies the newly-created 12th Army, commanded by the French General Graziani, was inserted, and the sector between the 8th and the 3rd was entrusted to the new 10th Army, commanded by the British General, the Earl of Cavan; the 12th Army comprised one French and three Italian divisions, the 10th two British and two Italian divisions. The creations of these two armies commanded by non-Italian generals was due to a desire to accentuate the inter-Allied character of the operations on the part of the Allies 1. Their functions were to be strictly tactical, and the 12th Army was to harmonize its action with that of the 4th, the 10th with that of the 8th. There was another French and another British division incorporated in armies under Italian command. The general plan of operations, as embodied in the Comando Supremo's Operation Order of October 12, was to split the Austrian 5th and 6th Armies in two, concentrating the maximum effort at the point of suture between them, to cut the communications of the 6th Army, press it against the Piave in order to render its retirement or a defensive action impossible, and to exploit all the possible consequences of this manoeuvre. The sector where the enemy front was to be pierced was that between the Montello and the Grave di Papadopoli, and the task of effecting a breach was entrusted to the 8th and 10th Armies, the commander of the latter (Lord Cavan) to operate according to the instructions of the commander of the former (General Caviglia). The 4th Army, consisting of nine divisions, was to advance in the Cismon - Arten - Feltre direction, in order to cut the communications between the Tirol Army group and the Boroevich group. The 12th Army further east was to lend support to the operations of the 4th, and part of it (one French and one Italian division) was to cross the Piave together with the 8th and advance on Valdobbiadene, with Feltre and the Belluno basin as far as the opening of the Cordevole valley as its objectives. As things turned out it was the 4th Army which ended by having to support the 12th. The 8th Army (14 divisions) was to cross the Piave at Sernaglia, occupy
1 Possibly also to secure the support of the British and French High Commands for an action which they regarded without much favour 177

Vittorio Veneto, ascend the Santa Croce pass and descend on to Ponte nelle Alpi on the Piave above Belluno, its left was to occupy the Belluno basin and its right to extend to the sources of the Livenza. Lord Cavan's 10th Army (4 divisions) was to cross the river at the island of Grave di Papadopoli and push on to the Livenza; on reaching the latter river its dependence on General Caviglia was to cease and it was to come directly under the orders of the Comando Supremo1. The 3rd Army (4 divisions) was to co-operate with the 10th, and also advance across the Piave. The 1st Army (5 divisions) and the 7th (4 divisions) were to mark time awaiting developments, while the 9th (two Italian and one Czechoslovak divisions) and the 331st United States Regiment, were, together with four divisions unattached to any Army, to be at the disposal of the Comando Supremo. The Cavalry Corps under H.R.H. the Count of Turin, consisting of four divisions of four regiments each, concentrated in the Padua area, was to hold itself in readiness to pursue the enemy as soon as the break-through was effected.

In all, the Italian Army comprised 57 divisions (704 battalions of infantry), 51 of which were Italian, 3 British, 2 French and 1 Czechoslovak, plus 1 United States Regiment. The artillery consisted of 7,700 guns (7,250 Italian, 250 British and 200 French), and 1,745 trench-mortars. The Commander-in-Chief (Chief of the General Staff) was, as we have seen, General Armando Diaz, with General Pietro Badoglio as Sub-Chief. The Austro-Hungarian Army was somewhat stronger in manpower, comprising 58 divisions with 724 battalions (its battalions usually consisted of four companies, instead of three, as in the Italian battalions), but weaker in artillery, having only 6,030 guns, and it suffered from the disadvantage of being spread out along exterior lines with an imperfect connection between the Tirol and the Piave areas. It was divided into two Army Groups, one in the Tirol-Trentino-Asiago area, commanded at first by Field- Marshal Conrad, and the other along the lower Piave under Field- Marshal Boroevich. Since July 15 Conrad had been superseded by the Archduke Joseph, who, on the eve of the battle, was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the whole Italian Front, General Krobatin taking over the Tirolese command. Although, as we have seen, the Austrians were aware that an Italian offensive was in preparation, they were uncertain as to where it was to be launched. In the late summer they believed that the Vallarsa - Val Lagarina sector had been selected, and later the Grappa - Montello sector. By the end of September they ascertained that an action on the Piave was in preparation, and the High Command issued an order to
1 The British divisions in Italy had been reduced from thirteen to ten battalions each, the remaining nine battalions thus made available having been sent to France. The intention was to recall the three divisions to France and send out three tired divisions instead, but luckily there was then no rolling stock available. (Gathorne-Hardy, Army Quarterly, October, 1921, p. 37) 178

the effect that "the general situation makes us believe that the enemy will attempt to obtain success also on the Italian Front. They must find us absolutely ready to repel them at all costs and convince themselves that their undertaking will be useless and bloody, as was already the case on the Carso". By October 20 the enemy knew that the offensive was to be launched in both areas. The Army had been largely reorganized, the most tried units were reconstituted, the class of 1900 was called to the colours, the prisoners of war in Russia liberated by the Bolsheviks were re-enlisted, and the number of machineguns brought up to an average of 72 per regiment (as against 24 in the Italian Army, plus the machine-pistols which proved of little use and two companies of machineguns with six m.g. each at the disposal of the brigade commands). Every effort was made to improve the moral of the troops, the distribution of newspapers was forbidden and the postal censorship intensified. It has been repeatedly claimed that at this date the Austrian Army was already in a state of dissolution. But the only symptoms of trouble were that on October 22 two Croatian regiments refused to relieve two other regiments, also Croatian, in the trenches, and that on the 24th two Bosnian-Herzegovinian companies who had been ordered to the front declared that they had had enough of fighting. In both cases the mutineers were quickly reduced to obedience, and no further incidents of the kind occurred. While the Empire was politically on the verge of disintegration, the Army remained unshaken, disciplined and obedient to its leaders until the very last. On October 23 the Emperor-King issued a proclamation to the troops, which ended with the words: "Your discipline proven in innumerable battles, your loyalty, your iron subordination, which enabled you to perform a thousand glorious deeds, stand like a rock on which all assaults and all tempests break in vain". But Karl was in truth very doubtful as to the chances of success, and on that same date he telegraphed to the Pope imploring him to try to induce the Italian Government to abstain from the projected offensive. The operations were to have commenced on October 18, but were delayed for a few days on account of the bad weather and the Piave flood. This delay was not without its advantages, as it rendered possible the transfer of 400 more guns to the 4th Army, whose action from a merely demonstrative one was destined to become fundamental. Even by October 23 conditions were not perfect; the Piave was still in spate, and not all the batteries had been able to carry out their preparations for action. Nevertheless the order was issued to attack on the 24th: exactly a year after Caporetto. The battle of Vittorio Veneto was divided into two major operations, one on the Grappa and the other on the Piave. The left of the area from the Roccie Anzini to Peak 1490 was held by General De Bono's IX Corps, comprising the 17th and 18th Divisions, with the 21st in Army reserve, the centre by General Lombardi's VI Corps (15th and 30th Divisions, with the 22nd in Army reserve), extending from the slopes of the Asolone to the Croce di Valpore, and the right by General Montanari's XXX Corps (47th and 50th Divisions, with the 80th in Army reserve), extending to M. Tomba. The sector between M. Tomba and the Piave was entrusted to the I Corps

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(General Etna), which formed part of the 12th Army under the French General Graziani. Most of the troops on the Grappa had been on the mountain for many months and had come to acquire an "Army spirit", similar to that of the Duke of Aosta's 3rd Army, a sentiment which still binds the old comrades together to this day1. The action was opened at 3 a.m. on the 24th with the artillery fire of the XXX Corps on the extreme right, two hours before that of the 4th Army itself, so as to give the Corps' infantry time to get across the difficult ground separating it from the steep enemy positions in Val Calcina and on the Solaroli and Valderoa slopes, which were its objectives. At 5 the whole concert of gun fire broke out in a thunderous outburst. When the roar of the heavies began to die down, the lighter guns shrieked out their message, followed by the angry snarl of the machine-guns and the patter of the rifles. Then the infantry began to move forward. The enemy resistance was extremely obstinate, and while in the first impact of the assault the Bari Brigade (IX Corps) captured the Asolone and the Basilicata Brigade the advanced positions of Col Caprile, Austrian counter-attacks forced the Bari back from the Asolone and held up the advance of the Basilicata. In the central sector the Pesaro Brigade (VI Corps) gained possession of Monte Pertica and the Cremona of the ridge between that peak and M. Prassolan, but these gains were soon lost in consequence of the hurricane of artillery and machine-gun fire and infantry counter-attacks. The enemy guns and machine-guns had been so well placed that the Italian fire had failed to silence them. Further to the right the Lombardia and Aosta Brigades of the XXX Corps captured some positions on the Solaroli and M. Valderoa, the Aosta securing 400 prisoners. The enemy forced these troops to relinquish some of their gains, and the Lombardia had to fall back on to the saddle between the Solaroli and Valderoa. But the Udine and part of the Aosta were able to advance on to the Spinoncia, and into Val Calcino and Val Ornic, ill spite of the fierce enemy resistance, while units of the I Corps occupied the slopes of Vajal in the Alano basin. By the end of the first day the Italians had captured 1,800 prisoners and many machine-guns, but their losses had been heavy and the territorial gains very slight. Their moral was excellent and their confidence in ultimate success unlimited. In the Altipiani area Italian and Allied troops engaged the Austrians in order to prevent them from sending reinforcements to the Grappa zone. A French regiment captured Monte Sisemol and took 800 prisoners; it held the captured position until evening so as to disguise the real intentions of the Italian command. A British battalion also took 200 prisoners near Asiago. In the meanwhile another operation on an even larger scale was being attempted on the Piave. The plan, as we have seen, was to cross the river on the 24th at the Grave di Papadopoli, where a shingly island divides the stream into two main branches. Units of Lord Cavan's 10th Army succeeded on the night of the 24th in securing a foothold on the Grave, but the waters having again risen after the
1 The annual celebration on the Grappa is attended by many thousands of ex-4th Army men, including their ex-Commander, Field-Marshal Giardino 180

heavy rains, bridges could not be thrown across until the morning of the 25th. The heaviest burden of the fighting thus continued to be borne in those first days of the battle by the Grappa Army, and the Austrians sent four more divisions and an extra regiment to reinforce their own troops in that area, instead of to the Piave where the main Italian attack was to be launched. Early on the 25th the Italians attacked the principal strongholds of the enemy in the Grappa sector: Asolone, Pertica and the Solaroli. The attack was preceded by a terrific artillery fire, in which the guns of the XX Corps also took part. A vigorous irruption of part of the Bari Brigade and the IX Assault Detachment resulted in the capture of the Asolone, an advance on to the trenches of Col della Berretta and the capture of 600 prisoners. But a fierce counter-attack from all sides almost surrounded the audacious raiders and forced them to relinquish their gains, although they were able to fight their way back to their own lines, bringing their prisoners with them. Monte Pertica fell to the men of the Pesaro Brigade and the XVIII Assault Detachment (VI Corps) after a desperate fourhours' engagement. The 13th Mountain Artillery Group pushed forward its guns to within rifle range of the enemy and advanced yet further in support of the infantry attack. In spite of repeated counterattacks amid a storm of machine-gun fire, the Italian mountain guns smelt out the enemy machine-guns and enabled the infantry to hold the newly-captured peak. To the right of Pertica the Bologna Brigade and the VIII Alpini Group repeatedly attacked the Col del Cuc, Col dell'Orso and the Solaroli, but failed to make headway; the Levanna Battalion alone had 692 casualties and the 42nd Company of the Asolo Battalion 114. The enemy resistance still held firm, and there were as yet no signs of defection and still less of a general collapse, and on the 25th 10 more battalions and the Edelweiss Alpine Division were thrown into the burning fiery furnace of the Grappa. The 34th Division had also been ordered to the same area, but it was held up by a new Italian offensive opposite the Montello on the night of the 25th-26th. The Forl Brigade, which had relieved the Bari, tackled the terrible Asolone once more, and actually attained the summit, but was forced back by the enemy with heavy losses. Nor did the attack by the Pesaro and the XVIII Assault Detachment at the strongly fortified Osteria del Forcelletto position fare better. The Abruzzi Brigade's attempt on the Col Caprile on the 26th was likewise fruitless, the Roma and Cremona's attack on the Prassolan resulted in heavy losses and no substantial advance, but the 239th Regiment of the Pesaro and the XVIII Assault Detachment did make some progress on the northern slopes of Pertica. Further east the Austrians counter-attacked the Istrice position held by the remnants of the Aosta Alpini Battalion. They hurled themselves on to the position from all sides with the utmost vehemence, but the Alpini charged the assailants with the bayonet and succeeded in driving them off. The attack on M. Forcelletto by two Austrian regiments was likewise repulsed by the Italian 40th Regiment, and afterwards some companies of the latter, of the 39th and of the Pelmo Alpini Battalion captured Peak 1186 of M. Forcelletto. The two first attacks on Col del Cuc

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were repulsed, but the third was successful. The Lombardia and two Alpini battalions had less luck in their attempt on the Col dell' Orso-Solaroli positions, and the enemy from the latter and from the Valderoa resumed the offensive and tried to overwhelm the two companies of the Aosta Alpini on the Istrice. But the gallant mountaineers held on grimly and forced the assailants to fall back. The battalion had lost 8 officers and 97 men killed, 11 officers and 444 men wounded, and 8 missing. Renewed attacks by the Italians in the Solaroli, Valderoa, Spinoncia, Porte di Salton, Punta Zocana and Fener sectors had resulted in some gains, which afterwards had to be relinquished once more, and in view of the heavy losses of the Grappa Army General Giardino decided to suspend its operations in order to give his men a rest and time to consolidate their positions. On the evening of the 26th Field-Marshal Boroevich expressed his "special appreciation and cordial thanks" to the men of the Belluno Group and his full confidence "that they would convince the enemy that their blood had been shed in vain". But the Austrian effort was beginning to slacken, and they too had suffered terrible losses; there were also hints of mutiny and refusals by some units to continue fighting. After the declaration of secession from the Dual Monarchy by Hungary a Hungarian division on the Altipiani between October 26 and 27 asked to be withdrawn from the front, and its example was followed by two others. According to General Alberti 11 regiments of the 49 at the disposal of the Army Group mutinied almost in their entirety, so that there were only 36 left, plus 12 assault battalions, which could be relied upon (and even of these three regiments were doubtful) as against the 36 of the Italian 4th Army, the 8 of the I Corps and 5 assault detachments. On the Grappa, however, the furious fighting still continued unabated and the Austrians reinforced the defence with the 60th Division and the 20th Schutzen Division. The 27th passed off quietly on the Asolone, but the Pertica, Solaroli and Valderoa sectors were heavily engaged. The Pertica, in Italian hands, was held by the remnants of 14 battalions who had not had time to reorganize the defences, and at 5 a.m. the enemy opened a terrific fire on the peak, which the infantry attacked 50 minutes later. The surviving defenders were soon overwhelmed, but managed to cling on to the lower slopes just below the summit, while awaiting reinforcements. An Italian bombardment severely strafed the Austrians on the contested summit, and then the infantry dashed forward to the attack; after six hours of desperate hand-tohand fighting, in which gunners, machine-gun crews, sappers and staff orderlies took part, the enemy were driven off and hotly pursued. The enemy counter-attacks were more fortunate on the Solaroli - Valderoa sector, and the mist enabled the Austrians to approach the Valderoa saddle and the Istrice unseen and to capture both positions, which made Valderoa itself untenable, and forced its defenders to evacuate it, leaving 600 prisoners in the hands of the enemy, mostly of the 5th Regiment (Aosta Brigade). On the 28th the Italians heavily bombarded the enemy lines and approaches in order to hold up further counterattacks, and on the morning of the 29th the Calabria Brigade and three assault detachments captured Asolone, while the IX Assault Detachment and two infantry

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battalions got to within a kilometre of Col della Berretta. But the Austrians still could sting, and by what proved to be their last offensive effort recaptured the lost positions. While this gigantic diversive action on the Grappa area was proceeding, preparations were being made for what was intended to be the main attack across the Piave. The river flows to the sea in a south-easterly direction except along the base of the Montello, where its course is due east. Between Quero and the sea its average width is 250 to 300 metres, but just below Quero it spreads out to 1.500 metres; at the Grave di Ciano between Vidor and Falz it is 2 kilometres wide, and at the Grave di Papadopoli 4 kilometres. The banks are steep and difficult, and between the Ponti della Priula and the sea there are artificial embankments as a protection against floods. The floods are sudden and frequent, but never last more than five days. The plan was to cross on the 8th Army front, for which eight bridges and thirteen foot-bridges were to be built; one bridge and one foot-bridge were for the 12th Army, one bridge and several foot-bridges for the 10th. Before the bridges were built some detachments of Arditi and infantry were to be ferried across in boats. Ever since the 14th the bridge-building material had been brought up and kept carefully hidden from the enemy's observation. But the heavy rains rendered the transport difficult and also caused the river to rise considerably, thereby inducing the Comando Supremo to suspend the attempted crossing on the 8th and 12th Army fronts. Lower down where the channel was divided into many branches by the islands of the Grave di Papadopoli, on the 10th Army front, the Italian pontoon companies were able to transport the 2nd Battalion of the Hon. Artillery Company and the I Royal Welch Fusiliers over to the island on the evening of the 23rd. The Austrian garrison was taken by surprise and 350 prisoners were captured. At the same time three battalions of the Foggia Brigade, three of the Macerata and an assault detachment, all of the XI Corps, were able to get on to the Caserta island lower down, but they failed to cross over to the Isola Maggiore on account of the enemy fire and the great depth of the water. The Austrian artillery destroyed most of the footbridges on the 24th and poured a heavy fire on to the islands, but failed to dislodge the infantry ensconced on them. Part of these troops, however, withdrew later to the right bank, leaving only enough men on the islands to hold the positions until further reinforcements should be available. The 8th Army was deployed along the right bank higher up stream ready for another attempt to get across, the XXVII Corps (51st, 66th and 2nd Divisions) between Pederobba and the Grave di Ciano, the XXII (12th, 57th and 60th Divisions) and the 1st Division of the Assault Corps on the Montello and the VIII (7th, 48th and 59th Divisions and 2nd Assault Division) opposite the Priula as far as Palazzon. Behind these forces were two cavalry divisions in reserve. Opposite the 8th Army was the Austrian 6th Army, consisting of two Corps (six divisions), deployed from Quero to Susegana. At 21 hours on the 26th the pontooners succeeded in the face of enormous difficulties in getting some boats across at Pederobba, and in beginning the

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construction of the bridges. The current, however, swept everything before it, and the work had to be begun all over again at 23 hours under a heavy fire. By 3 a.m. on the 27th the first troops were got across: the Bassano and Verona Alpini battalions, the French 107th Regiment and two companies of the Messina Brigade. At 6 the enemy had rendered the bridges useless. At Vidor the pontooners built foot-bridges across nine branches of the river, but failed at the last but one and had to give up the attempt. On the XXII Corps front the pontooners managed to get an assault detachment across, and by 23 hours bridge B was built; work on bridge C went on through the night, but had to be suspended at dawn. A second bridge had been built further up stream. The troops now began to pour across in deathly silence. The enemy fire was incessant, but the passage of men proceeded uninterruptedly. Many of the soldiers devoutly crossed themselves as they were passing over what had become for Italy a sacred river and many knelt down and kissed the ground on the other side. Soon the 57th Division, the 1st Assault Detachment and two mountain batteries were safely conveyed over to the left bank. At dawn on the 27th the enemy fire became more intense, and by 8 o'clock the two bridges built with so much difficulty were mere masses of contorted iron and broken timber: useless. As it proved impossible to construct bridge E on the VIII Corps' front, 400 Arditi of the 2nd Assault Division embarked on boats, but only 200 got across, the others being drowned. Further attempts at building bridges failed. The 10th Army, under the protection of the Grave di Papadopoli proved more fortunate. On the night of the 25th-26th the Italian 37th and the British 7th Divisions occupied the whole of the Grave, and on the following night a solid bridge was constructed enabling the forces of two Corps to get across. Three bridgeheads had now been established on the left bank, but there was as yet no connection between them, and except for that of the forces of the 10th Army, the other two were cut off from the right bank and consequently from their bases of supply, and the river continued to rise. The Pederobba sector between Valdobbiadene and the Ponti della Priula was held by the Austrian II and XXIV Corps (three divisions plus two extra battalions in the front line, with another division and some lesser units in reserve), while its right was supported by the XV Corps of the Belluno Army Group. The Italian troops who had got across found themselves isolated and without communications, except for such messages as could be brought over by plucky swimmers: the famous "caimani del Piave". But they attacked the enemy at once with the 3rd Assault Group and the Cuneo Brigade, overcame the enemy resistance along the so-called line of the mills, and advanced on to the line of the villages (Vidor, Mosnigo, Moriago, Sernaglia, Falz). Mosnigo and Sernaglia were soon overwhelmed in a vigorous attack, and the Italians reached the first enemy batteries, capturing 700 prisoners and 20 guns. The Austrian artillery continued to inflict heavy losses on the assailants, but by noon several squadrons of dismounted Honved units had been captured or dispersed in confusion, and some of the men were beginning to demand to be sent back to Hungary. The 25th Austro-Hungarian Division,

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however, counter-attacked gallantly, and at first succeeded in repelling the Arditi, but when these were reinforced by the Cuneo Brigade and some companies of the Messina the advance was resumed. In the Moriago - Sernaglia sector the Pisa and Mantova Brigades, who had relieved the exhausted 1st and 2nd Assault Groups, overcame the resistance of Hungarian units, and the attempted counter-attacks were easily contained. The Arditi of the LXXII Assault Detachment effected a rapid turning movement, which resulted in the capture of two battalions of the 32nd Honved Regiment; the III Battalion fell back and broke up. Some 2,200 prisoners had now been captured, but as it had not been possible to send them across the Piave they suffered from the fire of their own batteries. In the meanwhile the 10th Army had continued to register excellent progress. The XIV British Corps on the left pushed on rapidly, and the Italian 37th Division, while its progress was at first somewhat retarded by the many canals it had to cross and the heavy losses inflicted by the enemy's machine-gun fire, also attained its objectives, supported by the 6th Bersaglieri Brigade and the XI Assault Detachment, and the enemy's counter attacks were repulsed. By evening the 10th Army had formed a solid bridgehead extending along a line of which the most advanced points were Stabiluzzo, San Polo di Piave, Borgo Zanetti, Borgo Malanotte and Cava Tonon. About 5,600 prisoners and 40 guns had been taken. If the situation of the Italian troops of the 8th and of the French of the 12th Army, short of munitions and food and cut off from their bases of supply and reinforcements as they were, was a delicate one, that of the Austrians was becoming far more serious. The last reserves were now thrown in: the 34th Austro-Hungarian Division towards Sernaglia and the 44th Schiitzen Division to defend the line south of Vittorio Veneto; but two battalions of the former mutinied and two regiments of the latter broke up and turned eastward contrary to the orders received. The enemy artillery was still unaffected by the spirit of insubordination, and continued to pour a heavy fire on the passages across the river. On the 28th attempts were made to rebuild the destroyed bridges at Molinetto di Pederobba, opposite Vidor, bridges B and D near Moriago, F and G near Nervesa. Another bridge was built on the 12th Army front, enabling the French 108th Regiment and the Stelvio Alpini Battalion, as well as food and munitions, to get across and the wounded to be brought back, but soon after it was destroyed by enemy fire. Bridge D was finished by midnight, and the 60th Division and a battalion of the Messina Brigade got across before it too was destroyed; during these operations the men of the 4th Pontoon Company, who had worked manfully at bridge-building, were almost wholly wiped out by a single 305 millimetre shell just as they were about to rebuild D. Nothing could be done at Nervesa, and two-thirds of the men and all the officers of four pontoon companies were out of action while engaged on rebuilding the bridges on that sector. By the morning communications between the two banks were cut once more, and only small supplies of food and munitions could be dropped across by means of aeroplanes, while the gallant "caimani" continued to swim across with messages. Heliographs were also set up, and later, after overcoming immense difficulties, two telephone lines were laid under water. Yet in spite of their dangerous isolation the men on the

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other side instinctively felt that the resistance of their far more numerous opponents was beginning to weaken and that their moral was breaking down, even though they knew nothing of the mutinous behaviour of some of the Austro-Hungarian units. General Caviglia now conceived one of those masterstrokes which so often decide the fate of battles. Seeing the extreme difficulty of throwing bridges across on the front of his own 8th Army and realizing that the 10th, although it had created a solid bridgehead in the Grave di Papadopoli area, was not strong enough to exploit this advantage to the full and overcome the resistance of the Austrians strongly entrenched on the San Salvatore heights, he had the idea of throwing part of his troops across by means of the bridges of the 10th. He therefore temporarily transferred the XVIII Corps from the 8th to the 10th Army, with instructions to utilize the latter's bridges at the Grave in order to get across, and then wheel left towards Susegana and Conegliano, thereby relieving the pressure on the units of the 8th and 12th Armies already across further up stream and open the way for an advance from Nervesa. The XVIII began to cross on the evening of the 27th by the 10th Army bridges, and early on the 28th another bridge was begun at Palazzon, north-west of the Grave, where the river is 800 metres broad and divided into eight or nine channels. By noon it was finished, and the 23rd Regiment (Como Brigade) dashed across at the double and plunged into the battle already engaged by the troops who had crossed by the other bridges. The Bisagno and Sassari followed immediately after and joined the melee. The whole action was an admirable instance of the close and cordial collaboration between British and Italian troops. On the Grappa the fighting was resumed, and the enemy continued to counterattack, but their attempts on Valderoa were repeatedly repulsed, and the 8th and 12th Army units on the left bank of the Piave continued to attack in order to extend their breathing space. An important enemy position near Valdobbiadene was the Montagnola hill bristling with machine-gun nests, and this the Alpini Group, reinforced by the Stelvio Battalion, now determined to tackle. The attack, conducted by the Verona Battalion, and a company of the Stelvio, was at first held up by the enemy's devastating fire; but Captain Tonolini, an elderly civil engineer who had volunteered for service in the Alpini, dashed across the dangerously exposed ground at the head of two platoons of his company, struck the enemy in the flank with such impetus that part of the defenders were captured and the rest put to flight. Tonolini himself was killed, but the Verona Battalion were enabled by his heroic action to gain possession of the Montagnola. That same day the French 107th and 108th regiments captured M. Pianar and M. Perlo, the Bassano Alpini got on to Col di Roc, and the whole Alpini force were soon within a short distance of Valdobbiadene itself. Round Sernaglia the troops of the XXII Corps were hard pressed by the Austrians, who here showed as yet no signs of defection, and by the night of the 28th a counter-attack in force was expected, so much so that some of the Corps commander's subordinate generals proposed that the occupied area should be reduced. But General Vaccari realized that such a withdrawal would be a serious error, psychologically as well as from a military point of view, and rejected the proposal, giving orders for the maintenance of all the captured positions. The troops

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on the left bank, in spite of the difficulties of communication, felt themselves powerfully supported by the heavy artillery booming across from the Montello, whence the King was watching the operations. The enemy was now no longer able to maintain an aggressive attitude, and at 8.30 on the 28th the Command of the 6th Austro- Hungarian Army issued orders for a general retreat. Its H.Q. was transferred from Vittorio Veneto, now deemed no longer secure, to Pordenone, and the G.O.C., Prince Schonburg-Hartenstein, handed over his command to General Hadfy, commander of the XXIV Corps, and proceeded to Vienna. A new attempt to bring over the 8th Army was now made and its bridges were all rebuilt. "The whole of the Italian people", General Caviglia declared in his proclamation to his troops, "is looking at this moment on us, to whom the fate of the Fatherland is now entrusted. The future history of Italy, perhaps for a century, will depend on the firmness and the fervour of which our spirit will be capable in the next twenty-four hours". The largest possible number of troops were to be got across and sent out to attack so as to attain the prescribed objectives. "It is Italy who commands this", he concluded, "and we must obey"1. Caviglia had barely issued this order when a general came in and told him that he had actually seen the troops of the Bisagno and Como Brigades above Ca' dei Pescatori, and another message informed him that the river was at last falling; it was no longer raining and a bright sun was shining: symbolically as well as materially. By the afternoon the XVIII, now, as we have seen, under Lord Cavan, had overcome all resistance, crossed the railway at Susegana opposite the Ponti della Priula, and thereby cleared the way for the advance of the VIII corps. The 10th Army had by now attained the Roncadelle - Ormelle - Tempio - Rai - Ca' Milanese - Santa Lucia - Ponti della Priula line, and was rapidly approaching the Monticano torrent. Lord Cavan specially mentioned the Como and Bisagno Brigades for the magnificent dash with which they had attacked, capturing 3,000 prisoners, 7 guns and 150 machine-guns. The King also sent a cordial message expressing his appreciation to the Como, which he had commanded years ago as a young brigadier. The Austro-Hungarian communiqu of October 29 stated that the Italian attacks on the Piave front had failed to break through at any point, but added that "in the evening it was decided to withdraw the more strongly attacked sectors to a line further back; this movement was carried out during the night". On the night of October 28-29 the enemy batteries on the heights above Susegana one after another ceased fire. It was really the beginning of the end. FieldMarshal Boroevich, who well knew which units had mutinied and which could still be relied upon, issued an urgent appeal to the latter to hold out to the very last. But by midnight all the bridges of the 8th Army had been rebuilt, no longer disturbed by enemy fire, the infantry, escorted by a few batteries, was pouring across in a ceaseless stream, and by dawn on the 29th the three bridgeheads were solidly linked up. Between Pederobba and Stabiluzzo nine army corps were deployed in an arc of a circle from three to nine kilometres deep, and the advance continued.
1 Dupont, "Vittorio Veneto", p. 175

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The 8th Army was marching on Vittorio, the Campania Brigade on the left towards Miane, the 66th Division in the centre towards Folina and Soligo, and the XXII Corps on Valmarino and Vittorio itself, the VIII Corps on the right reaching Colle della Tombola and Monte Cucco, capturing the remaining enemy batteries in that area and occupying Susegana. The same morning the King crossed the Piave enthusiastically acclaimed by the troops. Further to the east south of Conegliano the Austrian 43 rd and the 26th Schutzen Divisions, held until then in reserve, attempted a counter-attack on the 10th Army front, but were easily repulsed by units of the Italian XVIII and the British XIV Corps, and the Sassari and Bisagno occupied Conegliano in spite of hostile resistance. Some British cavalry then seized a bridge across the Monticano between Vazzola and Cimetta, which the Austrians had tried in vain to blow up. The 12th Army too had got across the Piave at Settolo Alto, and while the French 78th Regiment occupied Segusina, capturing 1,000 prisoners and 18 guns, the Alpini advanced in the Cesen area, dashing forward from height to height, overcoming all resistance until they had pinned down the last enemy forces in the folds of the hills. The I Corps, advancing up the right bank of the Piave, attained Quero. On the Grappa the battle had continued to rage throughout the 29th, for here the Austrians still held firm. Units of the IX Corps and various assault detachments bore the brunt of the fighting, and some of them managed to reach the summit of the Asolone, but, attacked by the enemy in superior numbers, they were forced back. The IX Assault Detachment on Col della Berretta, now reduced to a mere handful, was also attacked furiously by far more numerous Austrians, but held its own, until, finding itself completely isolated, it too had to fall back. But the enemy casualties had been terrific: the XXVI Corps alone had lost 40 per cent of its strength. On the afternoon of the 29th the Belluno Group Command had ordered a general retreat, but the order was not executed until the night of the 30th-3ist, and the defenders were determined to hold out to the bitter end. Their defences indeed had not been definitely broken through, but the men's moral was failing. The Italian Grappa Army had nobly fulfilled its task by pinning down the best units of the Austro-Hungarian Army, preventing reinforcements from being sent to the Piave, and even attracting the last available reserves. By the morning of the 29th the 12th Army had penetrated deep into the enemy lines on both banks of the Piave and was approaching Quero, which one of its Corps, as we have seen, had already reached. The 50th Austro-Hungarian Division was now driven out of Alano, the 31st defending Valdobbiadene was almost annihilated, and the 20th Honved was falling back along the Cesen heights, fighting a rearguard action. Further east the 8th Army was continuing its advance; its 60th Division was just south of Refrontolo, where fighting had gone on all day, the 58th Division, with a light force of the Firenze Lancers, Bersaglieri cyclists and machine-gun sections on lorries were approaching Vittorio Veneto. The 10th Army had reached Conegliano and was across the Monticano stream.

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The joint operations of the 8th and 10th Armies had secured the desired result of splitting up the Austrian 6th Army, its II Corps falling back on Col Visentin (east of Belluno) and its XXIV on the Tagliamento. Field-Marshal Boroevich now informed the High Command that "the eventuality of having to evacuate the Veneto under enemy pressure must be considered", and on the night of the 28th-29th he informed the Emperor-King that the military situation was "untenable". On the afternoon of the 29th the 6th Army Command ordered a general withdrawal of its forces to the third line, the hills north-east of Vittorio, Caneva, Sacile and the Livenza, and later in the evening the High Command announced its decision "to evacuate the Veneto methodically in order to show its good will towards peace". Peace proposals had, as we shall see, by now already been made. By the morning of the 30th the Italian cavalry and cyclists had entered Vittorio, followed immediately afterwards by the Tevere Brigade and the 58th Division. The Austrian 34th Division was forced back and the Italians ascended the heights separating the plain from the Belluno basin. To the south-east way was made through the advancing infantry for the whole of the cavalry divisions (16 regiments), accompanied by three battalions of Bersaglieri cyclists, four batteries of horse artillery and two armoured car detachments, to push forward across the Livenza in pursuit of the enemy now in full retreat. The right wing of the 8th and the left and centre of the 10th Armies still encountered tenacious but disconnected resistance here and there, and at Cimetta units of the British 7th Division greatly distinguished themselves. Sacile on the Livenza was reached on the same evening and occupied after fierce house-tohouse fighting. Further down stream the 3rd Army was now launched forward; its artillery opened fire at 4 a.m., and at 6 the 53rd, 25th and 445th Divisions, three assault detachments, the San Marco Marine Regiment and the Aquila Light Horse got across the Piave between Salgaredo and Revedoli. Enemy resistance was still obstinate on this sector, and up to noon the Italians had only secured three points on the left bank. But by 13 hours the XI Assault Detachment and the 6th Bersaglieri Brigade attacked Ponte di Piave, and soon after the whole of the 23 rd Division, preceded by the Aquila Light Horse, came into action. These units formed the vanguard of the 3rd Army, which was now advancing across the Venetian plain. The 70th Honved Division was driven from its positions on the river bank, and further south the Austrian XXII Corps received orders to retire under the protection of a strong rearguard; but the following day the whole of this covering force was taken prisoner without much resistance. The 12th Army was rapidly pushing up the Piave northward; by evening the Alpini had extended their occupation on the Cesen, the 24th Division (Italian I Corps) was beyond the Quero narrows, the 70th was at Uson and the French 23rd beyond Segusino. The XXVII, XXII and VIII Corps of the 8th Army had occupied a wide area on the hills above Vittorio and were engaging the enemy rearguards on the San Boldo pass and the Serravalle gorge. The Austro-Hungarian armies were in a state of great perplexity and their commands were bewildered and confused. The Belluno group was still holding on to

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the Grappa, although many of its positions had been lost; the 5th (Isonzo) Army, after contesting the passage of the Italian 3rd Army across the Piave, had commenced its retreat in good order, but the 6th was hopelessly broken up. The High Command, although it realized that it had no longer the slightest chance of achieving victory, hoped to be able to effect an orderly withdrawal and to hold up the Italian advance by resisting on successive lines: first on the Visentin - Sacile Livenza line, then on the Cortina - Aviano - Leonardo - Vivaro - Arzena line; new groups were to be formed out of the fragments of other units. But on that same day the 6th Army Command received a despatch from Vienna stating that the various national councils were tending to set up Republican governments; and expressions of opinion from the troops were asked for, especially from the German units, "without pressure on the part of the officers". This message convinced the Army that the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was finished, and it determined the complete disintegration of the Boroevich Group. The conquest of the Cesen hills by the Alpini, the cutting in two of the AustroHungarian 6th Army and the advance of the Italian 12th along the natural line of retreat of the enemy forces of the Grappa, and the delay of 24 hours in commencing that retreat were to prove fatal to the whole of the Austro-Hungarian forces. Giardino ordered the general advance of his own 4th Army, and at dawn on the 31st the three Corps began their mass movement, sweeping over the terrible positions where such desperate fighting had taken place. The last Austrian resistance south of Col Caprile and north-cast of Pertica gave way, and the line was now broken through at many points. Col Caprile, Col della Berretta, the Asolone, Prassolan, Spinoncia, the Solaroli and Monte Zoc were soon occupied, the enemy resisting sporadically, and even attempting occasionally to counter-attack, as on Prassolan. But nothing could now withstand the advancing avalanche, and by 17 hours the Exilles and Pieve di Cadore Alpini Battalions were in Feltre, where the civil population helped the Italian soldiers to rout out the last Austrians ensconced in the houses of the town. Masses of prisoners were captured and marched back towards the internment camps, escorted by mere handfuls of guards. The 57th Division (8th Army) came in for some heavy fighting on the San Boldo pass, but it soon broke the Austrian resistance and pushed forward so rapidly that its vanguard captured a whole enemy battalion, which it found resting on the way. It reached the Piave between Lentiai and Trichiana. The 48th Division of the same Army also had to overcome some obstinate resistance on the Fadalto pass and the Cansiglio forest, while the 2nd advanced on Ponte nelle Alpi on the Piave. The 2nd Cavalry Brigade (Genova and Novara Lancers)1 at 15 hours reached Fiaschetto, where they charged an enemy force, then trying to blow up a bridge on the Livenza, and just prevented it from doing so, crossed the river themselves and pursued other enemy units towards Pordenone. The same day the King visited Conegliano, Vittorio and other towns liberated by the advancing troops. The main body of Cavan's 10th Army reached the Livenza and occupied its banks between
1 The same regiments which had so greatly distinguished themselves after Caporetto, especially at Pozzuolo del Friuli 190

Sacile and Motta, while the 3rd was deployed along the same river from Motta to the sea, throwing forward its vanguard. The retreat of the Austrian 6th Army was blocked by the Italians at Vittorio, and it could only try to fall back on the Canal del Ferro, but the Italian 1st Cavalry Division was pushing on in the same direction. The Belluno Group likewise found the way barred at Cismon and at Lentiai on the Piave. The enemy were also beginning to withdraw from the Lavarone plateau, blowing up or setting fire to their dumps, but they were hotly pursued by the Italian 6th Army, which, after some small rearguard actions, reached the Canove - Fortino Stella - Cima Tre Pezzi - Melaghetto line by the evening of the 31st. On the night of October 31-November 1, two Italian naval officers; Raffaele Rossetti and Raffaele Paolucci, penetrated into the port of Trieste on a tiny torpedo boat and sank the Austrian battleship Viribus Unitis; by an act inadmissible in international law the Austro-Hungarian fleet had just been handed over by the Imperial and Royal Government to the Yugoslav National Council set up at Zagreb, an episode which gave rise to a bitter dispute between the Italian Government and the Serbs, then enjoying the full patronage of France. All the Italian armies were now advancing and the enemy were degenerating even more rapidly into an undisciplined rabble, but several of their units still had some fight left in them. The XIII Corps, comprising the 14th Italian and the 24th French Divisions, preceded by two assault detachments and the Lecce Brigade, were spreading over the Asiago plateau on November 1, and the Murge Brigade, after overcoming the last hostile resistance in that area, gained possession of the long-disputed Melette salient, capturing 3,000 prisoners and all the artillery defending it. On the previous night the 70th Infantry clambered on to the steep Monte Spitz and Col Chior from the Brenta valley by means of ropes and captured thirty-five guns, which they immediately turned on the retreating enemy. Further to the left of the 6th Army the XII Corps encountered more vigorous resistance; the right wing of its 48th (British) Division managed to get on to Monte Calz, but the left of that unit and the Italian 20th were held up for a while and unable to emerge from the Val d'Assa. The Commander of the 48th then decided to try to outflank the position by attacking Monte Mosciagh, while the 20th was to continue its attempt to ascend from Val d'Assa. By dawn on the 2nd the 48th was on Monte Mosciagh and Monte Interrotto, and the 20th had also effected considerable progress. With the collapse of the Camporovere defences the XX Corps (also of the 6th Army) was able to push on ahead rapidly. The 4th Army, after descending from the Grappa and occupying the Feltre basin, ascended the Valsugana to Primolano and Tezze, and one of its divisions at Grigno cut off the Austrian retreat from the Altipiani. The Padova Light Cavalry had scrambled down from the Grappa by footpaths, and one of its squadrons, covering 90 kilometres in twenty-four hours, reached the Piave above Feltre. Units of the 8th Army, which had attained the Piave still higher up were at Belluno by 23 hours on November 1, after four combats, and the 2nd Assault Division, after cutting its way through enemy forces concentrated near Ponte nelle Alpi, dashed on to Longarone

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and Pieve di Cadore, These movements cut the line of retreat up the Piave of large enemy forces, who consequently doubled back and tried to find a way of escape up the Cordevole (an affluent of the Piave), but here they found awaiting them the Reggio Brigade, which made a big haul of prisoners and guns. The Austro-Hungarian High Command issued this, its last, communiqu on November 1: "In the Veneto the evacuation operations proceeded". The Italian 1st Army, between the Lake of Garda and the Altipiani, did not come into action until November 2, and it constituted an advanced guard, formed of the 32nd Division, the IV Alpini Group, the 20th Assault Group and three squadrons of the Alessandria Light Horse, with orders to ascend the Adige valley in the direction of Trento. On the night of November 1-2 a brigade of the X Corps overcame the last enemy opposition in the Val d'Astico without much difficulty, by evening a squadron of the Alessandria were trotting along the Trento road, and by 21 hours a force of Alpini, Arditi and mountain artillery had entered Rovereto, where they captured the whole of the 36th Schutzen Regiment; at 3 a.m. on the 2nd they were at Calliano. The V Corps was advancing in the Col Santo area, and while that famous mountain was occupied by the Piceno Brigade, the Liguria was temporarily held up by the Pozzacchio defences. The Altipiani area was almost wholly in Italian hands, and by nightfall the enemy retreat from the Folgaria plateau and Val Terragnolo was blocked, and so, too, were the communications of the enemy forces between the Adige and Astico valleys. In the Fonzaso basin sofne Austrian units opposed the advance of the 4th Army, but the Massa-Carrara Brigade broke them up on the same day, and by evening the vanguard of the Army was at Ospedaletto and Cima di Campo. In the plain the Cavalry Corps was whirling forward at the greatest possible speed. The 1st Division aimed at the Ampezzo - Tolmezzo line so as to cut off the forces retreating from the Mauria pass (west of the upper Piave). The Saluzzo Light Horse (3rd Division) had an encounter near Pinzano, where it captured 300 prisoners and a battery of artillery, while the Savoia and Montebello Lancers took Spilimbergo by storm and also effected large captures. On the extreme western sector the 7th Army, reduced to two corps (the XXV and XXIX), began to move on the 2nd, and at first found the enemy units opposed to it still prepared to fight, but on the morning of the 3rd the Pavia Brigade, assisted by gunboats on the Lake of Garda, succeeded in capturing Monte Pari, the main defensive bastion of that area, and various Alpini units descended from the high passes towards the upper Adige Valley and blocked the various lines of retreat for the Austrians in the western sectors. Italian columns were pushing along up the Val Lagarina on both banks of the Adige, and when the Alessandria cavalry had caught up with the Alpini near Calliano, the latter handed over to the former the tricolour which the commander of the 32nd Division had given them to raise on the castle at Trento. It was now a race between the Alessandria horsemen and the Alpini on lorries as to which of the two units would reach Trento first. The Volturno Brigade was also speeding on towards the same objective by forced marches, but it was Alessandria who won, and at 15 hours 15 minutes the first cavalleggeri clattered into the town, followed almost immediately

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after by the Arditi of the XXIX Assault Detachment. Trento was thick with Austrian troops in a state of wild confusion, all fighting to get on to the trains going north. When the Italians arrived they at once occupied the railway station, blocked the roads leading out of the town and mopped up masses of Austrians, who surrendered by the thousand without the slightest attempt at resistance. In a few minutes the flag brought by the Alessandria horsemen was hoisted on the grim Castello del Buon Consiglio, where Ccsare Battisti had been hanged for the cause of Italy. The whole town was now gay with tricolours fluttering from every window. On that same morning the 7th and 6th Armies continued their advance, and the British 48th Division, after easily overcoming the last flicker of Austrian opposition at Vezzena and Basson, took fourteen infantry battalions prisoners, together with one corps and three divisional commands, and pushed on towards Caldonazzo amid a horde of now disbanded Austrians. The G.O.C. XII Corps (Italian) got on to a lorry with his staff and speeded up the Valsugana, ordering every enemy detachment which he encountered en route to surrender. By noon he was at Caldonazzo, where he forced a whole regiment to lay down their arms. In the plain the advance of the cavalry was even more rapid; the Aquila Light Horse was at Latisana on the Tagliamento at 13 hours 30 minutes on the 3rd, and the Savoia Cavalry at Udine on the same day. As we shall see in the next chapter, the complicated armistice negotiations had been proceeding during these days, and had been concluded on the 3rd; hostilities were to cease at 15 hours on the 4th. On November 3, the following paragraph appeared in the Popolo d'Italia: "It is the great hour of divine joy, when the tumult of emotion suspends the beating of hearts and gives us a lump in the throat. The long passion, crowned at last by triumph, draws tears even from eyes which have seen much and wept much. "We are at Udine. "More, we are at Trieste. We are at Trento. Who is the Italian, worthy of the name, who does not grasp the immense historic significance of what has been accomplished in these days by our heroic armies? "Let a rending shout arouse the piazze and the streets from the Alps to Sicily: "Viva, viva, viva l'Italia!" The article bore the signature: "Mussolini". By armistice hour the 7th Army had captured 75,000 prisoners and 650 guns; the 1st, which had reached Mezzacorona, San Michele and Cembra, 100,000 prisoners and 1,000 guns; the 6th, 115,000 prisoners; the 4th, at Fiera di Primiero, 30,000 prisoners; the 12th, in the upper Cordevole valley, 7,000 prisoners and 422 guns; the 8th, 20,000 prisoners and several hundred guns; the 10th, now beyond the Tagliamento at Bassagliapenta, Meretto di Tomba, San Daniele del Friuli and Pinzano, 40,000 prisoners and 240 guns. The 4th Cavalry Division was at Pontebba (the old Austro-Italian frontier) on

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November 4, and a column on lorries had encountered resistance at Procenicco on the Stella torrent at 9 a.m., and near San Giorgio di Nogaro later, where one of its officers, Lieutenant Citarelli, although twice wounded, continued to lead his men on until a third shot killed him. But the enemy had been put to flight. Another officer who fell just before armistice hour was the 18-year-old Alberto Riva-Villasanta, celebrated by D'Annunzio. At the extreme right of the 3rd Army the San Marco Marine Regiment closed its rapid advance with a brilliant little action. On November 3, two gunboats had ascended the Tagliamento, captured an Austrian battery and reopened the lock gates so as to render the canals as far as Grado accessible. A force consisting of the Bafile Battalion and some Arditi, led by Commander Borghese, managed to get across an intricate network of canals until at the Muzzanella bridge it came upon a force of 10,000 Austrians, and while the commander was reorganizing his men behind the railway line, preparatory to attacking the enemy, Lieutenant Insom, at the head of a small detachment of Arditi, intercepted the traffic along the Muzzana-San Giorgio di Nogaro road; attacked by overwhelming forces, he and his men held out in a home all night. By dawn on the 4th the defenders had exhausted all their munitions, the house was riddled with bullets, and at 8 a.m. they were forced to surrender. But their protracted resistance had given the 54th Division time to reach the Muzzana- San Giorgio road and capture the whole enemy division, thereby liberating Insom and his gallant little band. The 1st Cavalry Division, after an all-night march, almost without food or fodder, reached Tolmezzo and the Stazione per la Carnia by 14 hours, having captured 6,000 prisoners. Its right column had attacked and dispersed the escort of a long transport train on the Osoppo - Venzon road, while an armoured car detachment reached Pontebba at 15 hours. Advanced patrols were at the ill omened Caporctto at the same time. The 4th Cavalry Division, after a series of engagements, reached the Lumignacco - Tissano line. The 2nd had also fought enemy rearguards at various points and was on the Fauglis - Grado line. At 16 hours General Diaz issued his Armistice communiqu: "On the basis of the conditions of the Armistice stipulated between the Comando Supremo of the Royal Italian Army in the name of all the Allied Powers and of the United States of America, and the plenipotentiaries of the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian High Command, hostilities by land, sea and air on all the fronts of Austria-Hungary have been suspended as from 15 hours to-day." "(Signed) Diaz." On November 3, almost at the same hour as Trento was occupied, an Italian expeditionary force, consisting of the 2nd and n t h Bersaglieri Regiments and other units, which had been embarked at Venice on every kind of craft which happened to be available, including the small lagoon steamers, under the command of General Petitti di Roreto, landed at Trieste, where they received as warm a welcome as had the Alessandria Light Horse at Trento. General Petitti took possession of the city in

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the name of the King and raised the Italian colours on the campanile of the mediaeval cathedral of San Giusto. Thus the Austro-Hungarian Army was definitely annihilated. The situation was summed up by General Diaz in his famous victory communique, now reproduced in every town hall of Italy: "The war against Austria-Hungary, which, under the high command of His Majesty the King, supreme leader, the Italian Army, inferior in numbers and material means, began on May 24, 1915, and waged with unshakable confidence and tenacious valour, for forty-one months, has been won. "The gigantic battle, commenced on the 24th of last October, and in which fifty-one Italian, three British, two French and one Czechoslovak Divisions and one American Regiment, against seventy-three Austrian divisions1, is ended. The lightning-like dashing advance of the XXIX Corps of the 1st Army on Trento, blocking the retreat of the enemy in the Trentino, overwhelmed in the west by the troops of the 7th Army and in the east by those of the 1st, 6th and 4th, determined yesterday the complete break-up of the Austrian Front. "From the Brenta to the Torre the irresistible push of the 12th, 8th and 10th Armies, and of the cavalry divisions, drives ever further back the fleeing enemy. "In the plain H.R.H. the Duke of Aosta advances rapidly at the head of his unconquered 3rd Army, ardently determined to return to the positions which it had already victoriously conquered. "The Austro-Hungarian Army is annihilated; it has suffered enormous losses in the obstinate resistance of the first days and in the pursuit; it has lost immense quantities of material of all kinds and practically all its stores and depots; it has left in our hands, up to the present, about 300.000 prisoners with whole staffs and not less than 5.000 guns2. "The remains of what was one of the most powerful armies in the world are reascending in confusion and without hope the valleys whence they had poured down with proud assurance. "(Signed) Diaz" The battle of Vittorio Veneto had hardly been concluded when the polemics concerning it began; they have been going on ever since. Not a few military writers, especially in France, have tended to belittle the importance of the battle, and to make out that its results were in no way decisive, while others almost ignore its effects on the general course of the War. Even FieldMarshal Foch in his memoirs speaks of the collapse of Austria-Hungary as if it had merely happened for no particular reason; and Arnould de Civrieux and others are unfriendly critics of Italy's part in the War, and although their statements have been repeatedly and conclusively refuted by Italian historians, notably by General Albcrti,
The number of Austrian divisions here given is due to an error of calculation, the real number as we have seen was fifty-eight 2 The actual number of prisoners and guns captured proved very much larger 1 195

Major Tosti, General Gatti, and others, they still find currency among the many foreigners who read French and not Italian, whereas the refutations have passed unnoticed, except among those who have taken the trouble to investigate for themselves. General Mangin in his otherwise excellent work "Comment finit la guerre", sums up the Austrian defeat in the following passage: "Aprs la Bulgarie et la Turquie, l'Autriche s'effondra son tour". Professor Louis Leger of the College de France, in his "Histoire de l'Autriche-Hongrie", writes that "on October 24 the Allies took the offensive, the Austrian Army collapsed and the Italians, without striking a blow (sic) went to Trento and Trieste!" Clemenceau, in his memoirs, asserts that "events in Germany undertook to bring the War to an end". Wickham Steed claims that the battle was simply the result of an initial British success, after which "the Italian General Staff promptly ordered a general offensive which made rapid progress and ended in the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Army at Vittorio Veneto on October 29". The facts as set forth in the preceding chapter prove what a travesty of the truth these statements are. Other writers, including some of the collaborators of "Les archives de la grande guerre", edited by Raymond Poincar, state that Italy, in order to take advantage of the common victory, decided to launch her troops against the AustroHungarian Army "already in dissolution". We have seen how the Austrian Army only collapsed after many days of desperate fighting. There were cases of mutiny on the Grappa sector, but it was just there that the fighting was hardest, as the casualty returns clearly prove. The Austrian writer, Novak, is far more accurate in his book "The March to Catastrophe". "At the front", he writes, "incomprehensible and astounding spectacle, the Austro-Hungarian Army still resisted and fought as on the first day, while the State was already dead. Croats repulsed the enemy, Magyars and Germans defended themselves strenuously. A marvellous Czech division was fighting heroically. The peoples of the Monarchy were breaking up, everything was collapsing, but the enemy did not succeed in breaking our Front". Nor did the events on the Balkan Front directly influence Italian action, as has been claimed in some quarters. Bulgaria asked for an armistice on September 26, and obtained it on the 29th, whereas General Caviglia had already received instructions for the coming offensive, as we have seen, on September 25, and on the same day the orders for the necessary movements were issued. Moreover, there were no Austrian troops on the Macedonian Front, and only some weak units in Serbia and Rumania, and none were transferred thither from Italy. Neither the Germans nor the Austrians considered themselves beaten when the battle began. On October 24, when the Grappa was already aflame, the German War Minister declared: "The Army is not yet defeated and the Fatherland has not collapsed. We have therefore the necessary strength to render possible a fully successful defence . . . to the enemy's will to annihilate us we must oppose Germany's will to fight". Boroevich was to say a few days later: "Victory will belong to him who has the strongest will to win". The Austrians, like the Germans, no longer hoped to achieve a victory, but both expected to be able to effect an orderly withdrawal on to a second line of

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defence, there hold up their opponents and thus secure more favourable peace terms. It was the Italian attacks which prevented the Austrians from doing so. As Colonel Repington wrote in the Morning Post, Vittorio Veneto was a moral and also a great military victory, for it was the Italian Army, and not the cleverness of negotiators, which drove the Austrians from Italian territory. Asquith himself declared in the House of Commons on November 5: "The terms of the armistice With Austria . . . will, I think, give a universal sense of security, and none more than the fact that Austro-Hungarian territory is now open to the operations of the Allied forces"1. This last point was the essential one. The Italian Comando Supremo had never lost sight of the all-important possibility offered by the approaching victory, and as early as October 30 General Diaz had telegraphed to Paris urging that in the armistice terms, which were being drafted by the Supreme War Council, a clause be inserted providing for the right to utilize Austria's railway and road communications and for the free passage of troops through her territory. Such a clause was, in fact, inserted2, and on November 2 and 3 the Supreme War Council was already Studying a plan for regrouping the Allied Forces on Austrian soil, so as to operate against Germany. On November 4 Diaz telegraphed to Orlando, the Italian Premier, then in Paris, as follows: "Plans for proceeding with war operations against Germany, advancing en masse from Italian war theatre northwards, have been prepared some time ago by spontaneous initiative of this Command.... If Germany does not submit to armistice conditions, which will be imposed on her by Allies, Italian Army will intervene to force her to surrender". According to an official Stefani communiqu, issued on that same day, "The Allies will continue more united than ever in their task of justice until victory is achieved and the noble aims for which we are fighting are fully attained. In this final and decisive phase Italy will firmly hold her place of honour. . . . Until the final moment of the gigantic conflict arrives, it is a debt of honour for Italy, and she will meet it with firmness and confidence, to remain by the side of her Allies. We shall only lay down our arms all together, when victory has crowned our efforts, our sacrifices, our heroism". On November 9 the Bavarian Minister of War telegraphed to the Tirolese National Council, which had practically taken over authority from the Imperial and Royal representatives in Tirol: "The conditions of the Armistice between Austria and the Entente oblige us to send troops to North Tirol. . . . Our advance guards will cross the frontier on the 10th and will be followed by very strong contingents". But in spite of these brave words resistance was no longer possible even for Germany. General Kalisch, who had taken part in the conference of the German G.H.Q. at Spa, wrote that: "In consequence of Vittorio Veneto the door into South Germany is open to the Italians, and Germany has no reserves with which to oppose them. For this reason Germany must accept any armistice conditions; she is at the mercy of her enemies"3. On the same day the German Chancellor, Prince Max of Baden, stated that:
1 2 3 As we have seen, there was a similar clause in the Armistice with Bulgaria See The Times, November 6, 1918 Kolnische Zeitung, January 18, 1923

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"The German people, abandoned in the fifth year of the War, by its Allies, could no longer continue the War". Germany was, in fact, forced to capitulate. But her troops, unlike those of Austria-Hungary, returned home in good order and marched past under the triumphal arches erected in their honour by the Fatherland, which refused to admit defeat. That the fighting at Vittorio Veneto was serious and indeed desperate, especially on the Grappa, I think I have proved in the preceding pages. The numbers of the fallen serve to bear out this contention. Altogether 37.819 men were killed in the ten days' struggle; the greater part of them belonged to the 4th or Grappa Army, 24.507, and the rest were distributed among the remaining armies.

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THE ARMISTICE The armistice negotiations between Italy and Austria- Hungary were somewhat protracted, and led to a good deal of misunderstanding both at the time and afterwards, so that an account of the actual sequence of events in connection with them may be useful. As soon as the Imperial and Royal Government began to realize that a victory for the Central Powers was no longer possible, the necessity of applying for an armistice, and the best means for obtaining one were considered. Even before the battle of Vittorio Veneto had begun, as far back as October 4, the High Command had appointed an Armistice Commission, under the presidency of General Viktor Weber von Webenau, to prepare for an eventual armistice treaty. As soon as President Wilson's reply to Germany's proposals was known, the Austro-Hungarian High Command communicated to the German one and also to the Imperial and Royal Foreign Office that it proposed to inform the Italian Comando .Supremo that it was ready to treat for an armistice on the basis of the evacuation of the occupied Italian territories. Colonel Nyckhegyi, a member of the newly-created Armistice Commission, wrote that the evacuation must be effected by degrees and that it would take nine months in all! But the Austrian-Hungary Foreign Office replied that as no American answer to Austria-Hungary had arrived, and as the GermanAmerican negotiations had not reached a conclusion, the High Command should abstain from instituting negotiations with Italy. No further steps were, in fact, taken in this connexion, and as soon as the Italian offensive began the members of the Armistice Commission returned to their respective units. The Emperor- King, however, telegraphed, as we have seen, to the Pope on October 23, the very eve of the battle, imploring him to induce the Italian Government to abstain from any further military action. But he was not prepared to capitulate, and the appeal led to no result. The internal situation of the Empire was already very precarious. Several of the nationalities were in a state of ferment, and indeed, of almost open rebellion, and the writ of the Imperial and Royal Government in many provinces no longer ran. But the Army, as we have seen, still held firm; its traditional discipline and the ruthless severity of the commands succeeded in isolating the troops from the rest of the population, so that agitations at Prag, Zagreb and Lemberg did not yet affect the armed forces. The "kaiserlich-und-konigliche Schaar" was still in being, and a powerful instrument in the hands of the Government and the High Command. Only here and there had instances of insubordination or lessened resistance occurred. It was still possible to say to the Commander-in-Chief, as had been said to old Radetzky, "In deinem Lager ist Oesterreich". The vigorous resistance opposed by the forces on the first days of the battle on the Grappa brought encouragement to the Austrians, and it was not until the 26th that the Emperor-King informed Kaiser Wilhelm of his intention to ask for an armistice within twenty-four hours and conclude a separate peace, "as order within

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the country and the Monarchical principle will run a very grave risk if we do not bring the struggle to an end". The Kaiser replied on the 27th by telegram, expressing his pained surprise at this decision and imploring his Imperial and Royal brother to abstain from any action which, by giving the enemy the certainty that the alliance was broken, could not fail to render the conditions which they would impose more onerous. In spite of the Kaiser's exhortations the Vienna Government, on October 28, sent President Wilson a note asking for an armistice or peace independently of the negotiations with other Powers. As soon as the contents of this note were known to the public the National Councils of Prag and Zagreb proclaimed the secession of the Czechs and the Yugoslavs from the Monarchy. Until about noon on that day (the 28th) the High Command believed that the forces could hold out until Wilson's reply arrived and that the methodical evacuation of the Veneto would be sufficient to obtain an armistice. General von Arz, the Chief of the General Staff, in replying to the Archduke Joseph and Field-Marshal Boroevich, who had informed him of the precarious conditions of the Army, declared: "The High Command will estimate the painful incidents at their proper value. The situation as it presents itself to-day is the following: Germany's reply to Wilson was sent off this night. It states clearly that the German Government is awaiting armistice proposals. Our note has also been sent off this night. It too states clearly that we declare ourselves ready, without awaiting the results of other negotiations, to stipulate peace and an immediate armistice on all fronts. It is to be presumed that Wilson's reply will arrive Wednesday or Thursday (October 30 or 31). We could then conclude the armistice which is already completely drafted 1 and commence the evacuation. If, instead, the front fails to hold, it becomes problematical whether the Entente will enter into negotiations; its troops will advance in that case as far as Trieste, Trento, Villach, etc., and will dictate peace to us. We cannot even presume that, in view of the present situation, a separate armistice will be accepted, because, if we took such a step, we should find ourselves up against Wilson. It is, therefore, a question of keeping the troops calm and inducing them to hold out until next week. Then we shall certainly be able to count on an honourable armistice and peace"2. But the situation was going from bad to worse in the interior, and even in the Army signw of disintegration were becoming more frequent and marked, and on the evening of the 38th the high Command instructed General Weber to summon a meeting of the Armistice Commission and commence negotiations at once, but not to "accept dishonourable conditions, having the character of a capitulation and to regard any intention expressed by the Italians to utilize the territories of AustriaHungary as a passage for the continuation of military operations against Germany, as an impediment to the conclusion of an armistice". This last clause was imposed by the Emperor-King, who further assured Wilhelm that if the enemy were to impose the free transit of their troops through Austrian territory towards Germany, he would place himself at the head of his faithful German-Austrians to prevent it.
1 2 This refers to the Armistice as Austria would have wished it See Alberti's "L'ltalia e la fine della Guerra mondiale"

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Von Arz communicated the decision to ask for an armistice to the German High Command, purposely exaggerating the state of his Army, and declaring that thirty divisions had mutinied (whereas we now know that the number was very much less), and that there was a serious dearth of supplies. The Armistice Commission met at Trento on the evening of the 28th, and at dawn on the 29th Captain Ruggera of the Austro- Hungarian General Staff approached the Italian lines at Serravalle in the Adige Valley, bearing a white flag and requesting to be allowed to hand a letter from General Weber to the Comando Supremo. The letter asked that negotiations for an armistice be immediately instituted. The Comando Supremo replied that it had no objection to meeting the delegates of the Imperial and Royal Government, if provided with proper credentials, not in order to negotiate with them, but to communicate to them the decisions of the Italian and Allied Governments. At 17 hours on the 29th the High Command telegraphed to Weber that he should warn the Italians that a retreat under enemy pressure would involve the destruction of roads and bridges, the laying waste of fields, etc., whereas if hostilities were first suspended the evacuation of the Veneto would be carried out without devastation. A telegram to the same effect was sent to the Italian Comando Supremo. This was clearly a menace, a species of blackmail, in order to secure the possibility of an orderly withdrawal of the Army and consequently better peace conditions. General Krobatin, commanding the troops in the Tirol, informed the High Command that the instructions imparted could not be carried out in view of the conditions of the troops and that only an unconditional armistice could avert a catastrophe. But the High Command, although fully aware of the spreading disintegration of the Monarchy, had delayed suing for an armistice until the 29th, possibly because the Emperor-King did not wish to act independently of the Kaiser, and still believed that he could hold up an Italian offensive and obtain better terms; he failed to realize what the Italian Army was, and he felt reluctant to appeal to "the hereditary enemy". Captain Ruggera had reached the Italian lines at 8.30; at 8.40 the AustroHungarian High Command began already to be impatient and telegraphed to the Army Group commanders asking them "if in order to avert further bloodshed and prevent, as far as possible, the dissolution of the Army and anarchy in the country, it were advisable to suspend hostilities everywhere and negotiate the conclusion of further arrangements between fronts". At Baden the spirit and moral of the Italian Army were misunderstood to the very last. But Boroevich expressed the view that such a solution would lead to a catastrophe, and Krobatin replied that it was impossible because "a partial agreement between hostile fronts implied a state of insubordination among the Italian troops which was not to be expected". Both Commands communicated further details concerning the state of growing indiscipline in many of their respective units. Ruggera might have reached Rovereto, where he was expecting to find the other members of the Armistice Commission, in an hour from Avio, where he was

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received at the Headquarters of the Italian 26th Division. Instead he elected to reply to the Comando Supremo himself, stating that he was authorized to affirm that every member of the Austrian delegation was provided with proper credentials, and asking if, in these circumstances, the Comando Supremo was prepared to receive them. The Comando Supremo, however, refused to accept Ruggera as an intermediary, and requested that the reply be drafted by General Weber and made valid by the full powers of the Austrian High Command. Ruggera returned to RoveretO at a later hour, communicated the result of his exchange of views to General Weber, who asked the High Command for instructions. The reply from Baden was that the whole delegation was to go beyond the Italian lines to receive the conditions of the Comando Supremo. The Austrian Armistice Commission thereupon removed to Rovereto, and Captain Ruggera, at 7.45 on the 29th, moved on with his despatch, preceded by two trumpeters, but without a flag of truce, towards the Italian lines. A few shots were fired at the party in ignorance of their identity, and a trumpeter was wounded, for which incident apologies were made. Ruggera was conducted to the XIX Corps Headquarters, his despatch was forwarded, and at 21 hours the reply of the Comando Supremo arrived. It stated that it could not negotiate with General Weber because the documents transmitted did not confer on the Austrian delegates the proper authority of the Austrian High Command, that it did not intend to discuss the suspension of hostiiitie with any commission, but that it would receive a properly authorized delegation and communicate to it the conditions of the Italian Government acting in agreement with the Allies. Ruggera wrote to the Comando Supremo that every member of the delegation had the authority of von Arz, but the Comando Supremo again demanded a reply from Weber. Ruggera received this communication at 9 on the 30th, and went at once to Weber, who telegraphed to Baden. The High Command then instructed him to go to the Italian lines and learn the conditions of the Comando Supremo, but added that operations could not be suspended. On that same day the Austro-Hungarian Front had been broken through and mutiny was spreading. At 17 hours 30 Weber went to the Italian lines with two officers, and at Avio he handed over a despatch for the Comando Supremo asking in what manner the conditions would be made known. The Comando Supremo replied that they would be communicated at Villa Giusti near Padova, where all the delegates were to be conducted. Weber received this reply at 7 on the 31st, and sent a letter to the other delegates summoning them to Avio. They arrived at 14 hours 30, and at 16 hours they departed for Villa Giusti which they reached at 20 hours. The previous evening the German Colonel Baron Schaffer von Bernstein presented himself before the Italian lines in Val Lagarina, declaring himself to be the delegate of the German High Command, appointed to assist at the armistice negotiations. He was, however, informed by the Comando Supremo that no German delegate could be received as the Austrian delegates had never mentioned the participation of such a delegate. The Comando Supremo had studied the question of the future frontiers of Italy,

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and had exchanged views with the Italian political and military representatives at Versailles. On October 21, Orlando had appointed a committee to draft the clauses of the armistice agreement, and on the 31st he stated that they would be laid down by the inter-Allied Council sitting in Paris. In the meanwhile, the Comando Supremo had appointed a military armistice commission under the chairmanship of General Badoglio. On the 30th the Comando Supremo had asked if the passage of troops across Austrian territory would be included in the armistice conditions. Orlando informed the Comando Supremo that the conditions must be accepted by the Austrians without discussion. On November 1, between 1.50 and 6.15 a.m., the armistice conditions were communicated to the Comando Supremo from Paris by telephone, while an officer was being sent by train with the French text for confirmation. Later in the morning General Badoglio informed the Austrian delegation that the text could not be communicated to them until the officer bearing it arrived on the 2nd, but in the meanwhile he gave them the notes communicated by telephone. Weber transmitted the summary to Baden, and asked Badoglio for many explanations, adding that, in view of the political conditions of the Monarchy, there would be delay in obtaining a decision, and that it was necessary to end hostilities as soon as possible. Badoglio retorted that he could not accept any discussion on the conditions, but only on the methods of application, and that hostilities could not be suspended until the conditions had been accepted. Weber had sent Ruggera and Colonel Schneller to Trento to telephone the summary to Baden, and later Commander Prince Liechtenstein instructed them to inform the High Command that "the Commission did not feel authorized to accept these harsh and unexpected conditions, because points 2 and 4 of the military conditions, and all the naval conditions were incompatible with the honour of the Army and the Navy. It must be left to the High Command to decide whether the whole body of conditions is not so grave as to oblige us to continue our resistance". He suggested that the publication of the conditions might incite the peoples of the Monarchy to go on fighting, especially the Yugoslavs, and that the territorial claims might be exploited for a new appeal to Wilson. On the 2nd the officer bearing the full text of the armistice reached Villa Giusti; it was added that the latest moment for its acceptance was 24 hours on November 3. Weber afterwards accused the Italians of having imposed such grave naval conditions in order to be able to continue the starvation blockade, whereas it was Italy who, in spite of her own food shortage, was the first to send supplies to the peoples of the ex-Monarchy, as the Inter-Allied Relief Commission did not begin to operate until the spring of 1919. The first meeting of the two Armistice Commissions was held at 21 hours on the 2nd and lasted until 3 on the 3rd. There were protracted discussions on the method of application of the armistice, and the Austrians objected to the clause in point 1 that 24 hours should elapse between the signature of the armistice and the suspension of hostilities, a delay necessary on account of the difficulty of transmitting the order of suspension to troops rapidly advancing. The Austrians ended by

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accepting. There were further discussions on the naval clauses, owing to the obstructive tactics of Captain von Zwierkowski, in contrast with the correct courtesy of the other Austrian delegates. Finally, at 3, on the 3rd, agreement was reached on all points. In the meanwhile, the two Army Group commanders were telegraphing frantically to Baden that the troops could no longer be counted on. In Vienna all was chaos, and the k. und k. emblems were being torn down by the mob. The garrisons in the interior were disintegrating, masses of troops were coming home, and those on the lines of communication were abandoning their duties. At 23 hours on November 1, the High Command received the request of Bela Linder, Hungarian Minister of Defence, that all Hungarian troops should lay down their arms. This request was communicated to the Group commands without objections, together with a proclamation of the same Minister announcing the constitution of a popular force governed by soldiers' councils for the maintenance of internal order. On the 31st the sinister Count Karolyi had been appointed Prime Minister of Hungary, and the new Premier's first act was to withdraw the Hungarian units from their dependence on the High Command and place them under the Hungarian Minister of War, and to demand their recall from the front. The High Command transmitted this message to Boroevich and Krobatin, but the latter refused to act upon it. The main conditions of the armistice were that the Austro-Hungarian forces should evacuate all the territories assigned to Italy by the Treaty of London (April 26, 1915), that a large part of the artillery and the fleet be handed over to the Italians, that all prisoners of war captured by the Austrians be liberated without reciprocity, that the Entente be empowered to make full use for military purposes of all the ways of communication of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and eventually to occupy other parts of its territory for military purposes and for the maintenance of order. The Comando Supremo untertook to fix the hour for the cessation of hostilities, which, as General Badoglio had informed General Weber, would be twenty-four hours alter the acceptance of the conditions, so as to enable the order to reach the Italian troops pursuing the Austrians. The text of the armistice was communicated to the various National Councils of Austria-Hungary. When he heard of this Colonel Schneller immediately 'phoned to General Waldstatten, Director of Military Operations, that all delay was very dangerous and insisting on an immediate decision, as the troops were losing every trace of discipline and were beginning to pillage. On the morning of the 2nd von Arz had advised the Emperor-King to accept, and Karl had summoned the representatives of the German-Austrian National Council, stating that he could not undertake the reponsibility of accepting the clause concerning the transit of Allied troops to Bavaria. The Council, too, refused to assume this responsibility, and Karl then summoned the Crown Council that same evening. The Crown Council decided to accept the conditions and drafted instructions to Weber which, however, implied further discussion, and Waldstatten prepared an order for the immediate suspension of hostilities, before the Armistice came into force. This curious decision can only be eplained by the state of utter bewilderment in which all the autorities in Vienna found

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themselves. At the same time the Emperor-King handed over the Chief Command of the Army to von Arz, who was superseded the nexi day by General Kovess von Kovesshaza, Commander of the Balkan Front. Colonel Schneller received the order os suspension of hostilities at 1 a.m. on the 3rd, and left Trento at once for the Italia lines but on reaching Acquaviva he was recalled. The Austrian Prime Minister, Dr. Lammasch, and General von Arz had decided to make another effort to get the German-Austrian National Council to assume the responsibility of acceptance, but without success. Finally, at 3.30, the High Command communicated to the two Army Group Commanders the order to suspend hostilities, the armistice conditions imposed by the Entente having been accepted. A similar communication was sent to the Italian Comando Supremo by wireless, but it did not arrive until the following day. Colonel Schneller was authorized to return to Villa Giusti, "according to his own judgment, but he must not base himself on the order to suspend hostilities, which should be destroyed." It was comprehensible that von Arz should have tried to secure the approval of the German-Austrian National Council, but by retarding the communication to Weber and the Italian Comando Supremo, the latter only learned of the suspension of hostilities long after the order had reached the Austrian troops. The misunderstanding, was, therefore, due to the action of the Austrian High Command, and persisted throughout the 3rd of November. On his way back to Villa Giusti Colonel Schneller encountered various detachments of Italian troops advancing on Trento and tried to stop them, but without success. When the Comando Supremo heard of this incident it informed the Armies that it would communicate the hour for the cessation of hostilities if the negotiations were successful, and warned them to pay no attention to any unauthorized attempt to bring about that suspension. Colonel Schneller and his two colleagues reached Villa Giusti at 13 hours. The two commissions met for the last time at 15 hours; Badoglio protested against Schneller's attempt to hold up the Italian troops advancing on Trento, and Schneller replied that he had merely informed them that the High Command had accepted the armistice conditions. Badoglio then stated that the twentyfour hours' interval for the cessation of hostilities would commence from the moment the Austrian commission accepted the conditions. General Weber then read out the declaration of acceptance "in the name of the Imperial and Royal Army", not of the Austro-Hungarian Government, which had practically ceased to exist. When about to sign, Weber expressed the hope that, in view of the Austrian order to suspend hostilities at once, the twenty-four hours' interval would be suppressed. Captain von Zwierkowski declared that he dissociated his responsibility from that of General Weber and did not recognize the validity of the twenty-four hours' clause, and the three delegates, who had recently returned from Trento, declared their solidarity with Zwierkowski. But the point was finally waived, and at 18 hours the armistice was signed by both delegations; it was to come into operation at 15 hours on November 4. As soon as the signature was effected, it was communicated to Karl, who telegraphed to Willhelm, explaining how he had been obliged to agree to the

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conditions imposed "in order to avert a catastrophe", but expressed the hope that the two Emperors would conclude peace together, as they had declared war together. On the morning of the 3rd various Austro-Hungarian units had sent messengers to the Italian advance guards announcing the cessation of hostilities. A few of the Italian commanders accepted the Austrian communication, others asked the Comando Supremo for instructions, but the majority replied that without further orders from their own superiors the advance would continue. There were no cases of "fraternization", not even at Trento, where there were tens of thousands of Austrians, nor during the evacuation of the prisoners, which lasted ten days. That half the Austrian troops in Tirol were able to repatriate was due to the armistice; those troops had lost all discipline, and the command of the AustroHungarian 11th Army with Head quarters at Bozen-Gries, asked General PecoriGiraldi, who had been appointed Governor of the Trentino, to occupy the Trento Brenner and the Franzesfeste-Bruneck railways "to oppose the hordes of pillagers". If pillaging occurred in the German-speaking districts of the Austrian province of the Tirol, it is easy to imagine what would have happened to the Italian population of the Veneto, had the Italian troops not occupied almost the whole of the old provinces before the armistice came into operation. After the appeal of the command of the 11th Austrian Army, the Italian troops occupied the Alto Adige, and on November 7 the Austrian authorities informed the Italian Command that German troops, forming part of General Krafft von Delmensingen's II Bavarian Corps, were approaching by the Brenner railway. Troops were at once sent to drive them back, and the Austrian regional councils protested against the German advance. One or two German patrols got as far south as Bressanone (Brixen), but withdrew at once, and on the 10th Italian troops reached the Brenner where they were assured by the Officer Commanding the 4th Bavarian Division that he would retire to Germany on the 11th. On the 11th Germany signed the armistice and the World War ended. On the 23rd Italian troops occupied Innsbruck and Landeck, a British battalion was later sent to Imst and a French one to Schwaz. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the Austro-Hungarian Government had, on November 1, handed over the Imperial and Royal Fleet to the Yugoslav National Council at Zagreb1, an act which could not be regarded as valid by any interpretation of the recognized canons of international law, The Supreme Council at Versailles subsequently decided that the fleet should go to Corfu and surrender to the United States Admiral. But it could not sail owing to lack of crews, and the operations for the execution of the naval clauses of the armistice were carried out by the Italians at Pola, by the Americans at Spalato, and by the French at Cattaro. At Pola Admiral Cagni had the Yugoslav colours hauled down, the Austro-Hungarian crews landed, and placed Italian crews on board the ships. On the morning of the 4th General Weber informed the Comando Supremo of the wireless message received from Baden concerning the handing over of the fleet to the Yugoslav Council, which had already occurred several days before, as he himself was aware. He further
1 This body represented the Austro-Hungarian Yugoslavs alone, not the other peoples of the future Yugoslav State 206

protested against the continuation of hostilities until 15 hours of that day, asked for the release of all prisoners taken after November 3 and a delay for the withdrawal of the German troops from Austro-Hungarian territory. But the Comando Supremo rejected all these requests. The report of the Austrian commission of inquiry on the armistice negotiations entirely accepted the Italian point of view, and concluded that the Austro-Hungarian High Command had acted on the erroneous assumption that with the suspension of hostilities on the Austrian side hostilities would be automatically suspended also on the Italian side, as had happened on the Russian Front, where, however, conditions were profoundly different and where, as far as the Russians were concerned, there was practically no longer any army at all. After the conclusion of the Italo-Austrian armistice, Germany still remained to be dealt with. Although her armies were falling back their retreat was orderly, and even Field-Marshal Foch believed that she could still hold out "for three, for five months longer". The Allied Armies were also exhausted: on October 25 Sir Douglas Haig declared at a meeting of Allied generals that they were at their last gasp, and Mr. Lloyd George stated at Versailles that "at the present moment each of our Armies is losing more men in a week than in any other week of the first four years of the war". But now Germany was threatened from another quarter. The conditions of the armistice with Austria entitled the Allies to utilize Austrian territory for an invasion of Germany. The Italian troops could easily march over the Brenner Pass and descend into Bavaria. General Diaz telegraphed to Paris on the 4th: "If Germany does not submit to armistice conditions which will be imposed on her by Allies, Italy will, intervene to force her to surrender". The "back door" was now open into Germany, and it was this danger' which contributed very materially to force her to accept the armistice and thus hastened the end of the World War.

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APPENDIX The extent of Italy's war effort may be further illustrated by a few figures. Out of a total population of 36.120.000 at the moment of her intervention in the War, Italy mobilized altogether 5.230.000 men, equal to 14.48 per cent. Of the Allied Powers, France alone mobilized a higher percentage of her population: 7.935.000 men out of a total of 39.500.000 inhabitants, or 20.08. Great Britain mobilized 5.704.000 out of 46.300.000 inhabitants, or 12.31 per cent. It should be remembered, moreover, that the War on the Italian Front lasted ten months less than that on the French and British Fronts. If the population of the respective colonial and dominion possessions of the various Entente Powers be taken into account the Italian percentage of mobilized men is considerably higher than that of cither the French or the British Empire. The United States, who did not intervene until April, 1917, only mobilized 3.500.000 men out of a population of 105.000.000, or 3.34 per cent. The number of men killed in action in the Italian Army was 680.000 or 14 per cent of the mobilized men, as against 16.15 per cent for the French and 11.05 per cent for the British Army. The remark concerning the duration of the War is, of course, equally applicable. The cost of the War was proportionately far greater for Italy than for the other Allies. Out of a total national wealth estimated at 400.000.000.000 gold francs Italy spent no less than from 110.000.000.000 to 120.000.000.000, whereas France spent 180 billions out of a total wealth of 1.350 billions. Italy's losses in mercantile shipping were also proportionately greater than those of her Allies. Out of a total tonnage on August 1, 1914, of 1.534.738, Italy lost 905.383, or 58.93 per cent, whereas Great Britain lost 42.63 per cent and France 39.44 per cent. The enemy tonnage assigned to the Allied Powers after the War was 51.047 to Italy, 1.971.741 to Great Britain, 490.912 to France, 110.056 to Belgium and 48.252 to Greece. The colonial territories assigned to the different Powers in the way of compensation were distributed as follows: To Great Britain, 2.620.000 square kilometres, with 9.335.000 inhabitants; To France, 922.000 square kilometres, with 4.325.000 inhabitants; To Belgium, 54.000 square kilometres, with 3.000.000 inhabitants; To Italy, 100.000 square kilometres, with 90.000 inhabitants.

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