G.R. No. 146728 February 11, 2004 GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs HON.

COURT OF APPEALS, GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION INDEPENDENT LABOR UNION (GMCILU), and RITO MANGUBAT, respondents. DECISION QUISUMBING, J.: Before us is a petition for certiorari assailing the decision1 dated July 19, 2000, of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 50383, which earlier reversed the decision 2 dated January 30, 1998 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Case No. V-0112-94. The antecedent facts are as follows: In its two plants located at Cebu City and Lapu-Lapu City, petitioner General Milling Corporation (GMC) employed 190 workers. They were all members of private respondent General Milling Corporation Independent Labor Union (union, for brevity), a duly certified bargaining agent. On April 28, 1989, GMC and the union concluded a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) which included the issue of representation effective for a term of three years. The CBA was effective for three years retroactive to December 1, 1988. Hence, it would expire on November 30, 1991. On November 29, 1991, a day before the expiration of the CBA, the union sent GMC a proposed CBA, with a request that a counter-proposal be submitted within ten (10) days. As early as October 1991, however, GMC had received collective and individual letters from workers who stated that they had withdrawn from their union membership, on grounds of religious affiliation and personal differences. Believing that the union no longer had standing to negotiate a CBA, GMC did not send any counter-proposal. On December 16, 1991, GMC wrote a letter to the unions officers, Rito Mangubat and Victor Lastimoso. The letter stated that it felt there was no basis to negotiate with a union which no longer existed, but that management was nonetheless always willing to dialogue with them on matters of common concern and was open to suggestions on how the company may improve its operations. In answer, the union officers wrote a letter dated December 19, 1991 disclaiming any massive disaffiliation or resignation from the union and submitted a manifesto, signed by its members, stating that they had not withdrawn from the union. On January 13, 1992, GMC dismissed Marcia Tumbiga, a union member, on the ground of incompetence. The union protested and requested GMC to submit the matter to the grievance procedure provided in the CBA. GMC, however, advised the union to "refer to our letter dated December 16, 1991."3 Thus, the union filed, on July 2, 1992, a complaint against GMC with the NLRC, Arbitration Division, Cebu City. The complaint alleged unfair labor practice on the part of GMC for: (1) refusal to bargain collectively; (2) interference with the right to self-organization; and (3) discrimination. The labor arbiter dismissed the case with the recommendation that a petition for certification election be held to determine if the union still enjoyed the support of the workers.lawphi1.nt The union appealed to the NLRC. On January 30, 1998, the NLRC set aside the labor arbiters decision. Citing Article 253-A of the Labor Code, as amended by Rep. Act No. 6715, 4 which fixed the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, the NLRC ordered GMC to abide by the CBA draft that the union proposed for a period of two (2) years beginning December 1, 1991, the date when the original CBA ended, to November 30, 1993. The NLRC also ordered GMC to pay the attorneys fees.5 In its decision, the NLRC pointed out that upon the effectivity of Rep. Act No. 6715, the duration of a CBA, insofar as the representation aspect is concerned, is five (5) years which, in the case of GMC-Independent Labor Union was from December 1, 1988 to November 30, 1993. All other provisions of the CBA are to be renegotiated not later than three (3) years after its execution. Thus, the NLRC held that respondent union remained as the exclusive bargaining agent with the right to renegotiate the economic provisions of the CBA. Consequently, it was unfair labor practice for GMC not to enter into negotiation with the union. The NLRC likewise held that the individual letters of withdrawal from the union submitted by 13 of its members from February to June 1993 confirmed the pressure exerted by GMC on its employees to resign from the union. Thus, the NLRC also found GMC guilty of unfair labor practice for interfering with the right of its employees to self-organization. With respect to the unions claim of discrimination, the NLRC found the claim unsupported by substantial evidence. On GMCs motion for reconsideration, the NLRC set aside its decision of January 30, 1998, through a resolution dated October 6, 1998. It found GMCs doubts as to the status of the union justified and the allegation of coercion exerted by GMC on the unions members to resign unfounded. Hence, the union filed a petition for certioraribefore the Court of Appeals. For failure of the union to attach the required copies of pleadings and other documents and material portions of the record to support the allegations in its petition, the CA dismissed the petition on February 9, 1999. The same petition was subsequently filed by the union, this time with the necessary documents. In its resolution dated April 26, 1999, the appellate court treated the refiled petition as a motion for reconsideration and gave the petition due course.

On July 19, 2000, the appellate court rendered a decision the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The NLRC Resolution of October 6, 1998 is hereby SET ASIDE, and its decision of January 30, 1998 is, except with respect to the award of attorneys fees which is hereby deleted, REINSTATED.6 A motion for reconsideration was seasonably filed by GMC, but in a resolution dated October 26, 2000, the CA denied it for lack of merit. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari alleging that: I THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION VIOLATED THE CONSTITUTIONAL RULE THAT NO DECISION SHALL BE RENDERED BY ANY COURT WITHOUT EXPRESSING THEREIN CLEARLY AND DISTINCTLY THE FACTS AND THE LAW ON WHICH IT IS BASED. II THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY FINDING OF SUBSTANTIAL ERROR OR GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION. III THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN NOT APPRECIATING THAT THE NLRC HAS NO JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF A COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT.7 Thus, in the instant case, the principal issue for our determination is whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in (1) finding GMC guilty of unfair labor practice for violating the duty to bargain collectively and/or interfering with the right of its employees to self-organization, and (2) imposing upon GMC the draft CBA proposed by the union for two years to begin from the expiration of the original CBA.lawphi1.nt On the first issue, Article 253-A of the Labor Code, as amended by Rep. Act No. 6715, states: ART. 253-A. Terms of a collective bargaining agreement. Any Collective Bargaining Agreement that the parties may enter into shall, insofar as the representation aspect is concerned, be for a term of five (5) years. No petition questioning the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent shall be entertained and no certification election shall be conducted by the Department of Labor and Employment outside of the sixty-day period immediately before the date of expiry of such five year term of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. All other provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement shall be renegotiated not later than three (3) years after its execution.... The law mandates that the representation provision of a CBA should last for five years. The relation between labor and management should be undisturbed until the last 60 days of the fifth year. Hence, it is indisputable that when the union requested for a renegotiation of the economic terms of the CBA on November 29, 1991, it was still the certified collective bargaining agent of the workers, because it was seeking said renegotiation within five (5) years from the date of effectivity of the CBA on December 1, 1988. The unions proposal was also submitted within the prescribed 3-year period from the date of effectivity of the CBA, albeit just before the last day of said period. It was obvious that GMC had no valid reason to refuse to negotiate in good faith with the union. For refusing to send a counter-proposal to the union and to bargain anew on the economic terms of the CBA, the company committed an unfair labor practice under Article 248 of the Labor Code, which provides that: ART. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers. It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practice: ... (g) To violate the duty to bargain collectively as prescribed by this Code; ... Article 252 of the Labor Code elucidates the meaning of the phrase "duty to bargain collectively," thus: ART. 252. Meaning of duty to bargain collectively. The duty to bargain collectively means the performance of a mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement.... We have held that the crucial question whether or not a party has met his statutory duty to bargain in good faith typically turn$ on the facts of the individual case. 8 There is no per se test of good faith in bargaining.9Good faith or bad faith is an inference to be drawn from the facts.10 The effect of an employers or a unions actions individually is not the test of good-faith bargaining, but the impact of all such occasions or actions, considered as a whole. 11 Under Article 252 abovecited, both parties are required to perform their mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement. The union lived up to this obligation when it presented proposals for a new CBA to GMC within three (3) years from the effectivity of the original CBA. But GMC failed in its duty under Article 252. What it did was to devise a flimsy excuse, by questioning the existence of the union and the status of its membership to prevent any negotiation. It bears stressing that the procedure in collective bargaining prescribed by the Code is mandatory because of the basic interest of the state in ensuring lasting industrial peace. Thus: ART. 250. Procedure in collective bargaining. The following procedures shall be observed in collective bargaining:

(a) When a party desires to negotiate an agreement, it shall serve a written notice upon the other party with a statement of its proposals. The other party shall make a reply thereto not later than ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such notice. (Underscoring supplied.) GMCs failure to make a timely reply to the proposals presented by the union is indicative of its utter lack of interest in bargaining with the union. Its excuse that it felt the union no longer represented the workers, was mainly dilatory as it turned out to be utterly baseless. We hold that GMCs refusal to make a counter-proposal to the unions proposal for CBA negotiation is an indication of its bad faith. Where the employer did not even bother to submit an answer to the bargaining proposals of the union, there is a clear evasion of the duty to bargain collectively. 12 Failing to comply with the mandatory obligation to submit a reply to the unions proposals, GMC violated its duty to bargain collectively, making it liable for unfair labor practice. Perforce, the Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding that GMC is, under the circumstances, guilty of unfair labor practice. Did GMC interfere with the employees right to self-organization? The CA found that the letters between February to June 1993 by 13 union members signifying their resignation from the union clearly indicated that GMC exerted pressure on its employees. The records show that GMC presented these letters to prove that the union no longer enjoyed the support of the workers. The fact that the resignations of the union members occurred during the pendency of the case before the labor arbiter shows GMCs desperate attempts to cast doubt on the legitimate status of the union. We agree with the CAs conclusion that the ill-timed letters of resignation from the union members indicate that GMC had interfered with the right of its employees to selforganization. Thus, we hold that the appellate court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in finding GMC guilty of unfair labor practice for interfering with the right of its employees to self-organization. Finally, did the CA gravely abuse its discretion when it imposed on GMC the draft CBA proposed by the union for two years commencing from the expiration of the original CBA? The Code provides: ART. 253. Duty to bargain collectively when there exists a collective bargaining agreement. .... It shall be the duty of both parties to keep the status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement during the 60-day period [prior to its expiration date] and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties. (Underscoring supplied.) The provision mandates the parties to keep the status quo while they are still in the process of working out their respective proposal and counter proposal. The general rule is that when a CBA already exists, its provision shall continue to govern the relationship between the parties, until a new one is agreed upon. The rule necessarily presupposes that all other things are equal. That is, that neither party is guilty of bad faith. However, when one of the parties abuses this grace period by purposely delaying the bargaining process, a departure from the general rule is warranted. In Kiok Loy vs. NLRC,13 we found that petitioner therein, Sweden Ice Cream Plant, refused to submit any counter proposal to the CBA proposed by its employees certified bargaining agent. We ruled that the former had thereby lost its right to bargain the terms and conditions of the CBA. Thus, we did not hesitate to impose on the erring company the CBA proposed by its employees union - lock, stock and barrel. Our findings in Kiok Loy are similar to the facts in the present case, to wit: petitioner Companys approach and attitude stalling the negotiation by a series of postponements, non-appearance at the hearing conducted, and undue delay in submitting its financial statements, lead to no other conclusion except that it is unwilling to negotiate and reach an agreement with the Union. Petitioner has not at any instance, evinced good faith or willingness to discuss freely and fully the claims and demands set forth by the Union much less justify its objection thereto. 14 Likewise, in Divine Word University of Tacloban vs. Secretary of Labor and Employment,15 petitioner therein, Divine Word University of Tacloban, refused to perform its duty to bargain collectively. Thus, we upheld the unilateral imposition on the university of the CBA proposed by the Divine Word University Employees Union. We said further: That being the said case, the petitioner may not validly assert that its consent should be a primordial consideration in the bargaining process. By its acts, no less than its action which bespeak its insincerity, it has forfeited whatever rights it could have asserted as an employer.16 Applying the principle in the foregoing cases to the instant case, it would be unfair to the union and its members if the terms and conditions contained in the old CBA would continue to be imposed on GMCs employees for the remaining two (2) years of the CBAs duration. We are not inclined to gratify GMC with an extended term of the old CBA after it resorted to delaying tactics to prevent negotiations. Since it was GMC which violated the duty to bargain collectively, based on Kiok Loy and Divine Word University of Tacloban, it had lost its statutory right to negotiate or renegotiate the terms and conditions of the draft CBA proposed by the union. We carefully note, however, that as strictly distinguished from the facts of this case, there was no pre-existing CBA between the parties in Kiok Loy and Divine Word University of Tacloban. Nonetheless, we deem it proper to apply in this case the rationale of the doctrine in the said two cases. To rule otherwise would be to allow GMC to have its cake and eat it too. Under ordinary circumstances, it is not obligatory upon either side of a labor controversy to precipitately accept or agree to the proposals of the other. But an erring party should not be allowed to resort with impunity to

schemes feigning negotiations by going through empty gestures. 17 Thus, by imposing on GMC the provisions of the draft CBA proposed by the union, in our view, the interests of equity and fair play were properly served and both parties regained equal footing, which was lost when GMC thwarted the negotiations for new economic terms of the CBA. The findings of fact by the CA, affirming those of the NLRC as to the reasonableness of the draft CBA proposed by the union should not be disturbed since they are supported by substantial evidence. On this score, we see no cogent reason to rule otherwise. Hence, we hold that the Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it imposed on GMC, after it had committed unfair labor practice, the draft CBA proposed by the union for the remaining two (2) years of the duration of the original CBA. Fairness, equity, and social justice are best served in this case by sustaining the appellate courts decision on this issue. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the assailed decision dated July 19, 2000, and the resolution dated October 26, 2000, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 50383, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 130693 March 4, 2004 MINDANAO STEEL CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. MINSTEEL FREE WORKERS ORGANIZATION (MINFREWO-NFL) CAGAYAN DE ORO, respondent. DECISION SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: At bar is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the Decision1 dated May 30, 1997 and Resolution 2 dated August 22, 1997 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40919, entitled "Mindanao Steel Corporation vs. Atty. Marieto Gallego and Minsteel Free Workers Organization MINFREWO-NFL, Cagayan de Oro City." The undisputed facts of this case are as follows: On June 29, 1990, Mindanao Steel Corporation (herein petitioner) and Minsteel Free Workers Organization MINFREWO-NFL Cagayan de Oro City (herein respondent) executed a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) providing for an increase of P20.00 in the workers daily wage. Prompted by the December 5, 1990 fuel price increase, the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board (RTWPB) of Region X, Northern Mindanao, Cagayan de Oro City, issued Interim Wage Order No. RX-02 3. This Interim Wage Order granted to all workers4 an emergency cost of living allowance (ECOLA) 5 for three (3) months or from January 7, 1991 to April 6, 1991. Petitioner refused to implement the Interim Wage Order, prompting respondent to file with the National Mediation and Conciliation Board (NCMB) a complaint for payment of ECOLA against the former. Then the parties, in a Submission Agreement dated April 8, 1991, agreed to submit the case for voluntary arbitration. After the parties had submitted their position papers and other pleadings, the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a Decision dated January 8, 1992 ordering petitioner to pay respondents members and other workers their ECOLA. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in an Order dated January 28, 1992. Thereafter, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. On May 30, 1997, the Appellate Court promulgated its Decision affirming the Voluntary Arbitrators Decision dated January 8, 1992 and Order dated January 28, 1992. The Court of Appeals ratiocinated as follows: "In the case at bench, Interim Wage Order No. RX-02 was issued specifically to grant employees atemporary allowance pending the approval of the wage increase being petitioned by them due to the fuel price hike on December 5, 1990. "The grant of the P20.00 wage increase under the CBA did not have the purpose of granting such temporary allowance due to the contingency stated in the subject wage order, but was actually intended as wage increase to be effective January 1, 1991. Thus, as stated by the Supreme Court, it should be termed as wage increase, pure and simple, and not part of the emergency allowance. "Not to be overlooked is the provision under the CBA which was executed between the parties herein, Section 3, Article VII of which provides that: It is hereby agreed that these salary increases shall be exclusive of any wage that may be provided by law as a result of economic change. (p. 55, rollo)

"There indeed is nothing contrary to law, customs, public order or public policy in a stipulation subordinating, as does the aforesaid provision in the collective bargaining agreement, contractual wage increases to those imposed or prescribed by law. They were therefore perfectly free to agree thereon, and having thus agreed, are bound by such stipulation as constituting the law between them." (Filipinas Golf and Country Club, Inc. vs. NLRC, 176 SCRA 625) "The increase provided by the subject wage order, moreover, was not intended to be purely a wage increase, that may be credited to any wage increase granted by employers because of or in anticipation of the fuel price hike, but for emergency purposes for only three months. "The petitioner should, therefore, not be entitled to the creditable benefit provided by the implementing rules and regulations of interim wage order no. RX-02. "This Court thus finds no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of excess of jurisdiction on the part of the respondent voluntary arbitrator in issuing the questioned decision. "WHEREFORE, THE INSTANT PETITION IS HEREBY DISMISSED FOR LACK OF MERIT. "SO ORDERED." On August 22, 1997, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner contends that it is exempt from paying the ECOLA because pursuant to the CBA, it already granted a wage increase of P20.00 a day or P523.20 a month effective January 1, 1991. Likewise, petitioner claims it is entitled to creditable benefits on the basis of Section 7 of Interim Wage Order No. RX-02 which provides: "(W)age increases, rice allowance (in kind or cash), and other allowances granted by employers to their workers because of, or in anticipation of the fuel price hikes on December 05, 1990 and exclusive of compliance with Wage Order Nos. RX-01 and RX-01-A are creditable, provided that if the amount is less than that prescribed in this Interim Wage Order, the employer shall give the difference." Along the same line, petitioner maintains that under Section 5 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Wage Order No. RX-02, its grant of wage increase to its workers pursuant to the CBA is considered compliance with the Order, thus: "Section 5. Creditable Benefits - Any wage increases or adjustments granted between November 22, 1990 and January 06, 1991 shall be considered as compliance with the Order provided that if the amount is less than that prescribed, the employer shall pay the difference. "In addition, any of the following shall be considered as compliance: "a. All forms of wage increases granted unilaterally or under collective bargaining agreement excluding company anniversary increases and those resulting from regularization, promotion and merit increases. "b. All kinds of allowances in cash or in kind for whatever purpose, such as transportation, meal allowance, rice subsidy and others. "c. All forms of economic assistance such as productivity bonus, housing, bus services for the family and other similar activities." Petitioners contentions lack merit. To begin with, any doubt or ambiguity in the contract between management and the union members should be resolved in the light of Article 1702 of the Civil Code which provides: "(I)n case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer."6 The basic issue for our resolution is whether or not petitioner is exempt from paying the ECOLA in light of the CBA entered into by the parties. Pertinent is Section 3, Article VII of the CBA which provides: "It is hereby agreed that these salary increases shall be exclusive of any wage increase that may be provided by law as a result of any economic change." The above provision is clear that the salary increases, such as the P20.00 provided under the CBA, shall not include any wage increase that may be provided by law as a result of any economic change. Hence, aside from the P20.00 CBA wage increase, respondents members are also entitled to the ECOLA under the Interim Wage Order. The CBA provision under Section 3, Article VII needs no interpretation. Contracts which are not ambiguous are to be interpreted according to their literal meaning and not beyond their obvious intendment. 7 In Mactan Workers Union vs. Aboitiz,8 we held that "the terms and conditions of a collective bargaining contract constitute the law between the parties. Those who are entitled to its benefits can invoke its provisions. In the event that an obligation therein imposed is not fulfilled, the aggrieved party has the right to go to court for redress." Finally, the P20.00 daily wage increase granted by petitioner to its employees under the CBA can not be considered as creditable benefit or compliance with the Interim Wage Order because such was intended as a CBA or negotiated wage increase and not "because of, or in anticipation of the fuel price hikes on December 5, 1990 x x x." Thus, the Court of Appeals did not commit any error when it rendered the assailed Decision and Resolution, the same being consistent with law and jurisprudence. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated May 30, 1997 and Resolution dated August 22, 1997 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40919 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 155690 June 30, 2005 CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment, and CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-AFW, respondents. SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: For our resolution is the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the Decision 1 dated September 20, 2001 and the Resolution 2 dated October 18, 2002 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 53479, entitled "Capitol Medical Center, Inc. vs. Hon. Cresenciano B. Trajano, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment and Capitol Medical Center Employees Association-AFW." The factual antecedents as gleaned from the records are: Capitol Medical Center, Inc., petitioner, is a hospital with address at Panay Avenue corner Scout Magbanua Street, Quezon City. Upon the other hand, Capitol Medical Center Employees Association-Alliance of Filipino Workers,respondent, is a duly registered labor union acting as the certified collective bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of petitioner hospital. On October 2, 1997, respondent union, through its president Jaime N. Ibabao, sent petitioner a letter requesting a negotiation of their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). In its reply dated October 10, 1997, petitioner, challenging the unions legitimacy, refused to bargain with respondent. Subsequently or on October 15, 1997, petitioner filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR), Department of Labor and Employment, a petition for cancellation of respondents certificate of registration, docketed as NCR-OD-9710-006-IRD.3 For its part, on October 29, 1997, respondent filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB), National Capital Region, a notice of strike, docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-10-453-97. Respondent alleged that petitioners refusal to bargain constitutes unfair labor practice. Despite several conferences and efforts of the designated conciliator-mediator, the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement. On November 28, 1997, respondent staged a strike. On December 4, 1997, former Labor Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing, now Associate Justice of this Court, issued an Order assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute and ordering all striking workers to return to work and the management to resume normal operations, thus: "WHEREFORE, this Office assumes jurisdiction over the labor disputes at Capitol Medical Center pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended. Consequently, all striking workers are directed to return to work within twenty-four (24) hours from the receipt of this Order and the management to resume normal operations and accept back all striking workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike. Further, parties are directed to cease and desist from committing any act that may exacerbate the situation. Moreover, parties are hereby directed to submit within 10 days from receipt of this Order proposals and counter-proposals leading to the conclusion of the collective bargaining agreement in compliance with aforementioned Resolution of the Office as affirmed by the Supreme Court.

SO ORDERED." Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in an Order dated April 27, 1998. On June 23, 1998, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for certiorari assailing the Labor Secretarys Orders. Pursuant to our ruling in St. Martin Funeral Home vs.The National Labor Relations Commission, et al.,4 we referred the petition to the Court of Appeals for its appropriate action and disposition. Meantime, on October 1, 1998, the Regional Director, in NCR-OD-9710-006-IRD, issued an Order denying the petition for cancellation of respondent unions certificate of registration. 5 On September 20, 2001, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision affirming the Orders of the Secretary of Labor. The Court of Appeals held: "Anent the first issue raised by the petitioner, We find the same untenable. The public respondent acted well within his duty to order the petitioner hospital to bargain collectively, for it was the surest way to end the dispute. In LMG Chemicals Corporation vs. Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment, the Hon. Leonardo A. Quisumbing and Chemical Workers Union (G.R. No. 127422, April 17, 2001), the Supreme Court made the following pronouncement, to wit: It is well settled in our jurisprudence that the authority of the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to national interest includes and extends to all questions and controversies arising therefrom. The power is plenary and discretionary in nature to enable him to effectively and efficiently dispose of the primary dispute. xxxxxx Indeed, We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Secretary of Labor whose power is plenary and includes the resolution of all controversies arising from the labor dispute. In fact, he was merely following the directive laid down by the Supreme Court (Decision dated February 4, 1997) in the case of Capitol Medical Center Alliance of Concerned Employees-Unified Filipino Service Workers (CMC-ACE-UFSW) vs. Hon. Bienvenido E. Laguesma, Undersecretary of the Department of Labor and Employment, Capitol Medical Center Employees Association-Alliance of Filipino Workers and Capitol Medical Center Incorporated and Dra. Thelma Clemente, President, ordering petitioner hospital to collectively bargain with the Capitol Medical Center Employees Association-Alliance of Filipino Workers (private respondent herein) the certified bargaining agent. As earlier mentioned, the petition for cancellation was dismissed by the regional director in a decision dated September 30, 1998. x x x. xxxxxx Said decision by the regional director was affirmed by the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations in a resolution dated December 29, 1998, dismissing the appeal of the petitioner hospital from the said DOLE-NCRs decision. Finally, the petition for certiorari (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 52736) entitled Capitol Medical Center, Inc. vs. Hon. Benedictor R. Bitonio, Jr., in his capacity as Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, Department of Labor and Employment; Hon. Maximo B. Lim in his capacity as Regional Director, National Capital Region, Department of Labor and Employment and Capitol Medical Center Employees Association (CMCEA-AFW), was dismissed in a decision dated January 11, 2001. The motion for reconsideration which was subsequently filed was denied on March 23, 2001. xxxxxx In order to allow an employer to validly suspend the bargaining process, there must be a valid petition for certification election. The mere filing of a petition does not ipso facto justify the suspension of negotiation by the employer (Colegio de San Juan de Letran vs. Association of Employees and Faculty of Letran and Eleanor Ambas, G.R. No. 141471, September 18, 2000). If pending a petition for certification, the collective bargaining is allowed by the Supreme Court to proceed, with more reason should the collective bargaining (in this case) continue since the High Court had recognized the respondent as the certified bargaining agent in spite of several petitions for cancellation filed against it. xxxxxx Secondly, We are inclined to agree with the public respondents statement that the primary assumption of jurisdiction may be exercised by this Office even without the necessity of prior notice or hearing given to any of the parties disputants. (page 56 of the Rollo). xxxxxx We are also not convinced by the arguments raised by the petitioner with respect to its third assigned error. This Court fails to see any supervening event that would render the execution of the decision of public respondent impossible. The petitioner asserts that the respondent union has lost its legitimacy, but at every turn it has been ruled by the various labor administrative officials that the respondent union is legitimate. It has failed to convince the labor administrative officials, We are likewise not persuaded. Unless and until the Certificate of Registration of the union is cancelled, it (union) remains the certified bargaining agent and the Hospital has the duty to enter into a collective bargaining agreement with it. xxxxxx WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED, hereby AFFIRMING the two assailed orders, dated December 4, 1997 and April 27, 1998, of the public respondent in OS-AJ-0024-97 (NCMB-NCR-NS-10-45397). SO ORDERED." On October 18, 2002, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner contends that its petition for the cancellation of respondent unions certificate of registration involves a prejudicial question that should first be settled before the Secretary of Labor could order the parties to bargain collectively. We are not persuaded. As aptly stated by the Solicitor General in his comment on the petition, the Secretary of Labor correctly ruled that the pendency of a petition for cancellation of union registration does not preclude collective bargaining, thus: "That there is a pending cancellation proceedings against the respondent Union is not a bar to set in motion the mechanics of collective bargaining. If a certification election may still be ordered despite the pendency of a petition to cancel the unions registration certificate (National Union of Bank Employees vs. Minister of Labor, 110 SCRA 274), more so should the collective bargaining process continue despite its pendency. We must emphasize that the majority status of the respondent Union is not affected by the pendency of the Petition for Cancellation pending against it. Unless its certificate of registration and its status as the certified bargaining agent are revoked, the Hospital is, by express provision of the law, duty bound to collectively bargain with the Union. Indeed, no less than the Supreme Court already ordered the Hospital to collectively bargain with the Union when it affirmed the resolution of this Office dated November 18, 1994 directing the management of the Hospital to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement with the Union. That was the categorical directive of the High Court in its Resolution dated February 4, 1997 in Capitol Medical Center Alliance of Concerned Employees-United Filipino Service Worker vs. Hon. Bienvenido E. Laguesma, et al., G.R. No. L-118915." Moreover, as mentioned earlier, during the pendency of this case before the Court of Appeals, the Regional Director, in NCR-OD-9710-006-IRD, issued an Order on October 1, 1998 denying the petition for cancellation of respondents certificate of registration. This Order became final and executory and recorded in the BLRs Book of Entries of Judgments on June 3, 1999. Petitioner also maintains that the Secretary of Labor cannot exercise his powers under Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code without observing the requirements of due process. Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended, provides: "ART. 263. Strikes, Picketing and Lockouts. xxxxxx (g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same. x x x. In labor disputes adversely affecting the continued operation of such hospitals, clinics or medical institutions, it shall be the duty of the striking union or locking-out employer to provide and maintain an effective skeletal workforce of medical and other health personnel, whose movement and services shall be unhampered and unrestricted, as are necessary to insure the proper and adequate protection of the life and health of its patients, most especially emergency cases, for the duration of the strike or lockout. In such cases, therefore, the Secretary of Labor and Employment is mandated to immediately assume, within twenty-four (24) hours from knowledge of the occurrence of such a strike or lockout, jurisdiction over the same or certify it to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. For this purpose, the contending parties are strictly enjoined to comply with such orders, prohibitions and/or injunctions as are issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission, under pain of immediate disciplinary action, including dismissal or loss of employment status or payment by the locking-out employer of backwages, damages and other affirmative relief, even criminal prosecution against either or both of them. The foregoing notwithstanding, the President of the Philippines shall not be precluded from determining the industries that, in his opinion, are indispensable to the national interest, and from intervening at any time and assuming jurisdiction over any such labor dispute in order to settle or terminate the same. x x x x x x." In Magnolia Poultry Employees Union vs. Sanchez,6 we held that the discretion to assume jurisdiction may be exercised by the Secretary of Labor and Employment without the necessity of prior notice or hearing given to any of the parties. The rationale for his primary assumption of jurisdiction can justifiably rest on his own consideration of the exigency of the situation in relation to the national interests. In sum, petitioners submissions are bereft of merit. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated September 20, 2001 and the Resolution dated October 18, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 53479 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-54334 January 22, 1986 KIOK LOY, doing business under the name and style SWEDEN ICE CREAM PLANT, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC) and PAMBANSANG KILUSAN NG PAGGAWA (KILUSAN), respondents. Ablan and Associates for petitioner. Abdulcadir T. Ibrahim for private respondent. CUEVAS, J.: Petition for certiorari to annul the decision 1 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated July 20, 1979 which found petitioner Sweden Ice Cream guilty of unfair labor practice for unjustified refusal to bargain, in violation of par. (g) of Article 249 2 of the New Labor Code, 3 and declared the draft proposal of the Union for a collective bargaining agreement as the governing collective bargaining agreement between the employees and the management. The pertinent background facts are as follows: In a certification election held on October 3, 1978, the Pambansang Kilusang Paggawa (Union for short), a legitimate late labor federation, won and was subsequently certified in a resolution dated November 29, 1978 by the Bureau of Labor Relations as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of Sweden Ice Cream Plant (Company for short). The Company's motion for reconsideration of the said resolution was denied on January 25, 1978. Thereafter, and more specifically on December 7, 1978, the Union furnished 4 the Company with two copies of its proposed collective bargaining agreement. At the same time, it requested the Company for its counter proposals. Eliciting no response to the aforesaid request, the Union again wrote the Company reiterating its

request for collective bargaining negotiations and for the Company to furnish them with its counter proposals. Both requests were ignored and remained unacted upon by the Company. Left with no other alternative in its attempt to bring the Company to the bargaining table, the Union, on February 14, 1979, filed a "Notice of Strike", with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) on ground of unresolved economic issues in collective bargaining. 5 Conciliation proceedings then followed during the thirty-day statutory cooling-off period. But all attempts towards an amicable settlement failed, prompting the Bureau of Labor Relations to certify the case to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for compulsory arbitration pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 823, as amended. The labor arbiter, Andres Fidelino, to whom the case was assigned, set the initial hearing for April 29, 1979. For failure however, of the parties to submit their respective position papers as required, the said hearing was cancelled and reset to another date. Meanwhile, the Union submitted its position paper. The Company did not, and instead requested for a resetting which was granted. The Company was directed anew to submit its financial statements for the years 1976, 1977, and 1978. The case was further reset to May 11, 1979 due to the withdrawal of the Company's counsel of record, Atty. Rodolfo dela Cruz. On May 24, 1978, Atty. Fortunato Panganiban formally entered his appearance as counsel for the Company only to request for another postponement allegedly for the purpose of acquainting himself with the case. Meanwhile, the Company submitted its position paper on May 28, 1979. When the case was called for hearing on June 4, 1979 as scheduled, the Company's representative, Mr. Ching, who was supposed to be examined, failed to appear. Atty. Panganiban then requested for another postponement which the labor arbiter denied. He also ruled that the Company has waived its right to present further evidence and, therefore, considered the case submitted for resolution. On July 18, 1979, labor arbiter Andres Fidelino submitted its report to the National Labor Relations Commission. On July 20, 1979, the National Labor Relations Commission rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE, the respondent Sweden Ice Cream is hereby declared guilty of unjustified refusal to bargain, in violation of Section (g) Article 248 (now Article 249), of P.D. 442, as amended. Further, the draft proposal for a collective bargaining agreement (Exh. "E ") hereto attached and made an integral part of this decision, sent by the Union (Private respondent) to the respondent (petitioner herein) and which is hereby found to be reasonable under the premises, is hereby declared to be the collective agreement which should govern the relationship between the parties herein. SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied) Petitioner now comes before Us assailing the aforesaid decision contending that the National Labor Relations Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in rendering the challenged decision. On August 4, 1980, this Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Upon motion of the petitioner, however, the Resolution of dismissal was reconsidered and the petition was given due course in a Resolution dated April 1, 1981. Petitioner Company now maintains that its right to procedural due process has been violated when it was precluded from presenting further evidence in support of its stand and when its request for further postponement was denied. Petitioner further contends that the National Labor Relations Commission's finding of unfair labor practice for refusal to bargain is not supported by law and the evidence considering that it was only on May 24, 1979 when the Union furnished them with a copy of the proposed Collective Bargaining Agreement and it was only then that they came to know of the Union's demands; and finally, that the Collective Bargaining Agreement approved and adopted by the National Labor Relations Commission is unreasonable and lacks legal basis. The petition lacks merit. Consequently, its dismissal is in order. Collective bargaining which is defined as negotiations towards a collective agreement, 6 is one of the democratic frameworks under the New Labor Code, designed to stabilize the relation between labor and management and to create a climate of sound and stable industrial peace. It is a mutual responsibility of the employer and the Union and is characterized as a legal obligation. So much so that Article 249, par. (g) of the Labor Code makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse "to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with respect to wages, hours of work, and all other terms and conditions of employment including proposals for adjusting any grievance or question arising under such an agreement and executing a contract incorporating such agreement, if requested by either party. While it is a mutual obligation of the parties to bargain, the employer, however, is not under any legal duty to initiate contract negotiation. 7 The mechanics of collective bargaining is set in motion only when the following jurisdictional preconditions are present, namely, (1) possession of the status of majority representation of the employees' representative in accordance with any of the means of selection or designation provided for by the Labor Code; (2) proof of majority representation; and (3) a demand to bargain under Article 251, par. (a) of the New Labor Code . ... all of which preconditions are undisputedly present in the instant case. From the over-all conduct of petitioner company in relation to the task of negotiation, there can be no doubt that the Union has a valid cause to complain against its (Company's) attitude, the totality of which is indicative of the latter's disregard of, and failure to live up to, what is enjoined by the Labor Code to bargain in good faith.

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We are in total conformity with respondent NLRC's pronouncement that petitioner Company is GUILTY of unfair labor practice. It has been indubitably established that (1) respondent Union was a duly certified bargaining agent; (2) it made a definite request to bargain, accompanied with a copy of the proposed Collective Bargaining Agreement, to the Company not only once but twice which were left unanswered and unacted upon; and (3) the Company made no counter proposal whatsoever all of which conclusively indicate lack of a sincere desire to negotiate. 8 A Company's refusal to make counter proposal if considered in relation to the entire bargaining process, may indicate bad faith and this is specially true where the Union's request for a counter proposal is left unanswered. 9 Even during the period of compulsory arbitration before the NLRC, petitioner Company's approach and attitude-stalling the negotiation by a series of postponements, non-appearance at the hearing conducted, and undue delay in submitting its financial statements, lead to no other conclusion except that it is unwilling to negotiate and reach an agreement with the Union. Petitioner has not at any instance, evinced good faith or willingness to discuss freely and fully the claims and demands set forth by the Union much less justify its opposition thereto.10 The case at bar is not a case of first impression, for in the Herald Delivery Carriers Union (PAFLU) vs. Herald Publications 11the rule had been laid down that "unfair labor practice is committed when it is shown that the respondent employer, after having been served with a written bargaining proposal by the petitioning Union, did not even bother to submit an answer or reply to the said proposal This doctrine was reiterated anew in Bradman vs. Court of Industrial Relations 12 wherein it was further ruled that "while the law does not compel the parties to reach an agreement, it does contemplate that both parties will approach the negotiation with an open mind and make a reasonable effort to reach a common ground of agreement As a last-ditch attempt to effect a reversal of the decision sought to be reviewed, petitioner capitalizes on the issue of due process claiming, that it was denied the right to be heard and present its side when the Labor Arbiter denied the Company's motion for further postponement. Petitioner's aforesaid submittal failed to impress Us. Considering the various postponements granted in its behalf, the claimed denial of due process appeared totally bereft of any legal and factual support. As herein earlier stated, petitioner had not even honored respondent Union with any reply to the latter's successive letters, all geared towards bringing the Company to the bargaining table. It did not even bother to furnish or serve the Union with its counter proposal despite persistent requests made therefor. Certainly, the moves and overall behavior of petitioner-company were in total derogation of the policy enshrined in the New Labor Code which is aimed towards expediting settlement of economic disputes. Hence, this Court is not prepared to affix its imprimatur to such an illegal scheme and dubious maneuvers. Neither are WE persuaded by petitioner-company's stand that the Collective Bargaining Agreement which was approved and adopted by the NLRC is a total nullity for it lacks the company's consent, much less its argument that once the Collective Bargaining Agreement is implemented, the Company will face the prospect of closing down because it has to pay a staggering amount of economic benefits to the Union that will equal if not exceed its capital. Such a stand and the evidence in support thereof should have been presented before the Labor Arbiter which is the proper forum for the purpose. We agree with the pronouncement that it is not obligatory upon either side of a labor controversy to precipitately accept or agree to the proposals of the other. But an erring party should not be tolerated and allowed with impunity to resort to schemes feigning negotiations by going through empty gestures. 13 More so, as in the instant case, where the intervention of the National Labor Relations Commission was properly sought for after conciliation efforts undertaken by the BLR failed. The instant case being a certified one, it must be resolved by the NLRC pursuant to the mandate of P.D. 873, as amended, which authorizes the said body to determine the reasonableness of the terms and conditions of employment embodied in any Collective Bargaining Agreement. To that extent, utmost deference to its findings of reasonableness of any Collective Bargaining Agreement as the governing agreement by the employees and management must be accorded due respect by this Court. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order issued on August 27, 1980, is LIFTED and SET ASIDE. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 100490 August 12, 1992 PHILIPPINE RABBIT LINES, INC., Petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Second Division), LABOR ARBITER VALENTIN GUANIO, and SEVERINO ESTOQUE, Respondents.

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NARVASA, C.J.: chanrobles virtual law library At issue in this special civil action of certiorari is whether or not the respondent Commission had acted with grave abuse of discretion in declaring, in its Resolution of April 30, 1991, that Severino Estoque had been illegally dismissed from his employment by Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., (hereafter, simply Philippine Rabbit).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The record discloses that Estoque worked for Philippine Rabbit as bus conductor from October 31, 1984 until October 15, 1986, when the company's General Manager sent him a memorandum to the effect that since he (a) "had not reported for work nor been . . . heard from since August 31, 1986," (b) had failed to comply with the directive to report for investigation; and (c) as shown by his Service Record, had already been "warned and suspended" for various irregularities committed in the past, his employment was being terminated pursuant to Company rules prescribing, among others, "that employees who went on AWOL or have not been heard from for a period of ONE (1) MONTH are summarily separated from the service . . ." 1 chanrobles virtual law library Estoque was not thereafter heard from until two years and two months later, when he filed with the Labor Arbiters' Office, National Capital Region, a complaint for illegal dismissal dated November 24, 1988 in which he prayed for reinstatement and payment of back wages, premium pay, 13th month pay, damages and attorney's fees.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In his position paper, Estoque set forth his version of the events directly leading to his discharge: (a) that his last trip was on August 23, 1986; (b) that he was thereafter no longer given any assignment allegedly because the bus to which he was assigned was undergoing repair; (c) that eleven days later, on September 3, 1986, he went to the company premises and found out that the repair of the bus had not yet been completed; (d) that on September 19, 1986, he received a memorandum from the general manager, Ricardo L. Paras, informing that he had been placed under preventive suspension and directing him to report to Mr. C.V. Cabading for formal investigation of the charge of having abandoned work since August 31, 1986; (e) that Cabading told him however that the papers were already with the General Manager; and (f) that he tried to see the General Manager and when he failed in this effort, he decided to sue.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The evidence presented by Philippine Rabbit, consisting of the sworn statement of its Administrative Investigator C.V. Cabading, 2and various documents, is in part consistent with that of Estoque. Its evidence tends to establish the following facts: chanrobles virtual law library 1. Estoque had indeed been given notice in writing to report to Cabading for formal investigation for having allegedly abandoned his work since August 31, 1986.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 2. The notice was dated September 19, 1986 and contained the following cautionary advice: "Failure on your part to report for investigation will be construed to mean waiver on your part to present your side and the management will render the appropriate decision." 3 chanrobles virtual law library 3. Estoque however failed to "submit (himself) for investigation" as directed, and this was reported to the Operations Manager by the investigator's letter dated October 6, 1986. 4 chanrobles virtual law library 4. On October 15, 1986, as already mentioned, the company sent Estoque a memorandum stating that since he had not been heard from since August 31, 1986, had failed to report for investigation as directed, and had been punished for violations of company regulations at various times in the past, his employment was being terminated. 5 chanrobles virtual law library 5. Estoque's "Employee's Index Card" indeed shows many infractions of company rules on his part for which he had been meted several sanctions. 6The sanctions thus imposed, numbering no less than eight (8), and the corresponding offenses, are summarized in the Labor Arbiter's Decision dated May 22, 1990, infra. 7The records also show, in this connection, that Estoque had been investigated for said rule violations in writing (in question and answer form) by the company investigator, Cabading, and had in fact signed the reports of investigation. 8 6. For two (2) years after termination of his employment, Estoque was not seen or heard from. Then, on November 25, 1988, he filed a complaint against Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. for "unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal, non-payment of premium pay for holiday and rest day, violation of P.D. 851 and also moral damages and attorney's fees." Another employee, Romulo H. Obispo, also filed a complaint against the company but did nothing else and never bothered to prosecute his claim.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 7. On December 23, 1988 - about a month after filing his complaint with the Office of the Labor Arbiter, as aforestated - Estoque presented a written request to the General Manager of the following tenor: "Respectfully request your kind consideration and approval the withdrawal of my cash bond as conductor." 9This was approved on December 24, 1988 "subject to clearing procedure." 10 chanrobles virtual law library 8. The corresponding clearance document was then accomplished. 11Said document is in the form of a mimeographed letter which is evidently meant to go to various officers of the company - identified as: "Property incharge;" "Canteen;" "Uniform incharge;" Accounting Section; "SSS incharge;" and "Adm. Officer" - who are supposed to state in appropriate spaces in the clearance form if the employee concerned has or has no account and if so, how much; and below all these entries, but forming part of the document, is a "certificate of clearance." The form opens with the following sentences: I have the honor to tender my resignation as _________________ of the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library I have been cleared of all money, property and other responsibility as stated hereunder. xxx xxx xxx

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The clearance form, dated December 27, 1988, did not contain Estoque's signature. Nevertheless, it is clear that it was processed by the different officers concerned. The summary of the officers' action was thereafter entered in the clearance form by the Payroll Clerk after which, at the foot thereof, the General Manager made a declaration that the "certificate of clearance of Ceferino Estoque is issued this 30th day of December, 1988, at Tarlac, Tarlac." 12Completion of the clearance procedure revealed a refundable amount to Estoque of P847.00. This was paid to and receipted for by him on December 29, 1988. 13 chanrobles virtual law library This clearance document was then used by Philippine Rabbit as basis for a motion to dismiss Estoque's complaint. The motion was however denied by the Labor Arbiter on July 10, 1989 "for the reason that the supposed letter of resignation did not even bear the signature of the complainant thereby rendering it a mere scrap of paper." 14 chanrobles virtual law library After due proceedings, the Exclusive Labor Arbiter rendered judgment in Estoque's favor, dated May 22, 1990. 15The Arbiter rejected Philippine Rabbit's contention that Estoque had abandoned his job. He said: 16 . . . The records reveal that complainant had no intention to abandon his job. On one occasion, that is, September 3, 1986, he went to the terminal of respondent at McArthur Highway to check on the progress of the repair being undertaken on the bus where he was assigned. After having been informed by the bus driver that the repairs were still on-going and that he was not given any temporary assignment despite the fact that he frequently reported to the terminal for a possible assignment, the complainant must have presumed that he would be subjected to the same treatment: wait-till-the-bus-is-repaired. Moreover, the fact that he went to see Mr. Cabading and even the General Manager himself upon receipt of the memorandum dated September 9, 1986 negates the allegation by respondent that he had abandoned his job. The following disposition was accordingly made in the judgment, to wit: WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby ordered to reinstate complainant Estoque, to his former position as conductor without loss of seniority rights and privileges, and to pay his backwages for one (1) year computed at P112.00 per trip or an approximate average of P3,360 per month for a total of P40,320.00. Attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) is further awarded.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The other claims of the complainant are hereby dismissed for lack of evidence in support thereof.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library As to the complaint of Romulo M. Obispo, the same is hereby dismissed on account of his patent lack of interest to further prosecute his claim. The employer appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission but failed in its bid to reverse the Arbiter's Decision. In a Resolution dated April 3, 1991 the NLRC Second Division declared that the "appeal is not impressed with merit" and affirmed the Labor Arbiter's decision. 17Elaborating on the company's claim of abandonment, the Commission's Resolution states the following: If the complainant was admittedly dismissed for alleged abandonment on 19 October 1986, and even filed a complaint for illegal dismissal on 25 November 1988, why would he still resign as claimed by the respondent on 27 December 1988? chanrobles virtual law library The truth is, that the complainant did not resign. As conductor, he was required to put up a cash bond for the security of the respondent. Complainant, after his dismissal, would like to withdraw his cash bond. But to be able to do so, he must have to fill up a form-letter addressed to the company tendering his resignation. This letter, when processed and approved by the officers representing the different sections or departments of the company would serve as clearance from any financial or property accountability. Only then would he be allowed to withdraw his cash bond.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Definitely, that sort of resignation born out of necessity was not the kind of resignation that would dispel the existence of any act of dismissal on the part of the respondent. More specially so, where it took place two years after the complainant was actually terminated from his employment on the charge of abandonment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The foregoing defense of the respondent which is a classic example in contrast fails to convince us. The company has instituted the certiorari action at bar to annul said resolution of April 3, 1991 and the Arbiter's decision thereby affirmed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The Court is satisfied that the facts are as Philippine Rabbit's proofs tend to establish, i.e., that Estoque had in truth absented himself from work August 23, 1986, after learning that the bus to which he was usually assigned was under repair; that while he had gone to the employer's premises to inquire about the progress of the repair work on his vehicle on September 3, 1986, he had not made known to his superiors his willingness to resume work on any other vehicle or in any other position pending completion of said repair work; that he had admittedly received, on or about September 19, 1986, notice to report for investigation on the charge of having abandoned work since August 31, 1986; and that not only did he omit to submit himself to such an investigation, but after once trying to see the General Manager, unsuccessfully, according to him, and receiving, on October 15, 1986, a memorandum from the company dismissing him from the service, he continued to stay away from Philippine Rabbit for more than two (2) years and made no effort whatever to retain his job. The evidence also satisfactorily establishes that in the course of his employment, Estoque had been accused of about eight (8) violations of company regulations of one sort or another, been given due notice thereof and subjected to formal investigation in connection therewith, and been meted the corresponding administrative sanctions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

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The facts are essentially inconsistent with a finding that Estoque "had no intention to abandon his job." On the contrary, they persuasively demonstrate a desire on his part to renounce his work and seek or accept work elsewhere. This explains his utter indifference and lack of reaction to the company's act of terminating his services; why, after refusing to undergo investigation and even after being informed of his discharge from employment, he made no effort to return to his employer, or sue for reinstatement until after two (2) years. It is significant that neither he nor the public respondents attempt to deal with, much less justify such inaction for more than two (2) years.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It is not unreasonable to assume that, having become disenchanted with whatever new venture he had undertaken, or having been unable to keep whatever other work he might have obtained, he had turned his attention back to his former employer in an attempt to get back his old job. Nor is it unreasonable to suppose that having sued for reinstatement, he had changed his mind and applied for a return of his cash bond.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Now, a few words about this cash bond, of which much has been made by the respondent Commission. There is no question that Estoque had indeed applied for a return of his cash bond, that his application was acted upon by several officers of the company in accordance with fixed routine, and that he had in fact been given back, and had duly receipted for, his cash bond. That application for and acceptance of the return of his cash bond are clearly inconsistent with any desire to remain in employment, being on the contrary entirely in accord with an intention to permanently sever connection with his employer. Obviously, the cash bond is required of all employees to answer for any property damage that might be caused to, or indebtedness incurred in favor of, the employer, and is returnable only upon termination of employment. The retrieval by an employee of his cash bond - or whatever remains of it after deducting therefrom the amount of any indebtedness he might have to the employer - removes the last of his ties to the company. This is the reason why the application for the return of the cash bond or deposit opens with a declaration by the employee that he is resigning from employment, i.e., of severance of the employment relation; there would otherwise be no occasion for the return of the cash bond.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The foregoing facts and considerations are plain and patent on the record. They were regrettably misread or ignored by the Labor Arbiter and the respondent Commission. They consequently drew conclusions of fact and law without adequate foundation, if not indeed in contradiction of the evidence and the logical inferences necessarily resulting therefrom. In a word, they acted whimsically and capriciously.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library WHEREFORE, the challenged Resolution of the respondent Commission dated April 3, 1991, and the Labor Arbiter's decision dated May 22, 1990 thereby affirmed, are NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE, and the private respondent's complaint is DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library SO ORDERED.

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