G.R. No.

47800

December 2, 1940

MAXIMO CALALANG, petitioner, vs. A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL., respondents. LAUREL, J.: Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before this court this petition for a writ of prohibition against the respondents, A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila. It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animaldrawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarias Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution aforementioned, in pursuance of the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads; that on August 2, 1940, the Director of Public Works, in his first indorsement to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, recommended to the latter the approval of the recommendation made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission as aforesaid, with the modification that the closing of Rizal Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion thereof extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street; that on August 10, 1940, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, in his second indorsement addressed to the Director of Public Works, approved the recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during the hours as above indicated, for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulations thus adopted; that as a consequence of such enforcement, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above-mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well. It is contended by the petitioner that Commonwealth Act No. 548 by which the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations for the regulation and control of the use of and traffic on national roads and streets is unconstitutional because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. This contention is untenable. As was observed by this court in Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro (39 Phil, 660, 700), The rule has nowhere been better stated

than in the early Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney, and since followed in a multitude of cases, namely: The true distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made. (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Commrs. Clinton County, 1 Ohio St., 88.) Discretion, as held by Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman vs. Southard (10 Wheat., 1) may be committed by the Legislature to an executive department or official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments or subordinate officials thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. (U.S. vs. Kinkead, 248 Fed., 141.) The growing tendency in the decisions is to give prominence to the necessity of the case. Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548 reads as follows: SECTION 1. To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines, the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on such roads and streets. Such rules and regulations, with the approval of the President, may contain provisions controlling or regulating the construction of buildings or other structures within a reasonable distance from along the national roads. Such roads may be temporarily closed to any or all classes of traffic by the Director of Public Works and his duly authorized representatives whenever the condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest, or for a specified period, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The above provisions of law do not confer legislative power upon the Director of Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The authority therein conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic whenever the condition of the road or the traffic makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest. The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law. As was said in Lockes

Appeal (72 Pa. 491): To assert that a law is less than a law, because it is made to depend on a future event or act, is to rob the Legislature of the power to act wisely for the public welfare whenever a law is passed relating to a state of affairs not yet developed, or to things future and impossible to fully know. The proper distinction the court said was this: The Legislature cannot delegate its power to make the law; but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action depend. To deny this would be to stop the wheels of government. There are many things upon which wise and useful legislation must depend which cannot be known to the law-making power, and, must, therefore, be a subject of inquiry and determination outside of the halls of legislation. (Field vs. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 694; 36 L. Ed. 294.) In the case of People vs. Rosenthal and Osmea, G.R. Nos. 46076 and 46077, promulgated June 12, 1939, and in Pangasinan Transportation vs. The Public Service Commission, G.R. No. 47065, promulgated June 26, 1940, this Court had occasion to observe that the principle of separation of powers has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of subordinate legislation, not only in the United States and England but in practically all modern governments. Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, the rigidity of the theory of separation of governmental powers has, to a large extent, been relaxed by permitting the delegation of greater powers by the legislative and vesting a larger amount of discretion in administrative and executive officials, not only in the execution of the laws, but also in the promulgation of certain rules and regulations calculated to promote public interest. The petitioner further contends that the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 constitute an unlawful interference with legitimate business or trade and abridge the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion. Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the National Assembly in the exercise of the paramount police power of the state. Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations complained of were promulgated, aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads, in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic. which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education and personal discipline, so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all. The doctrinal rulings 1

moment greater authority is conferred upon the government, logically so much is withdrawn from the residuum of liberty which resides in the people. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preservation. The scope of police power keeps expanding as civilization advances. As was said in the case of Dobbins vs. Los Angeles (195 U.S. 223, 238; 49 L. ed. 169), the right to exercise the police power is a continuing one, and a business lawful today may in the future, because of the changed situation, the growth of population or other causes, become a menace to the public health and welfare, and be required to yield to the public good. And in People vs. Pomar (46 Phil., 440), it was observed that advancing civilization is bringing within the police power of the state today things which were not thought of as being within such power yesterday. The development of civilization, the rapidly increasing population, the growth of public opinion, with an increasing desire on the part of the masses and of the government to look after and care for the interests of the individuals of the state, have brought within the police power many questions for regulation which formerly were not so considered. The petitioner finally avers that the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people. The promotion of social justice, however, is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group. Social justice is neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy, but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extraconstitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about the greatest good to the greatest number. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Writ of Prohibition Prayed for is hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered. G.R. No. 128845 June 1, 2000

Manila; and INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL, INC., respondents. KAPUNAN, J.: Receiving salaries less than their counterparts hired abroad, the localhires of private respondent School, mostly Filipinos, cry discrimination. We agree. That the local-hires are paid more than their colleagues in other schools is, of course, beside the point. The point is that employees should be given equal pay for work of equal value. That is a principle long honored in this jurisdiction. That is a principle that rests on fundamental notions of justice. That is the principle we uphold today. Private respondent International School, Inc. (the School, for short), pursuant to Presidential Decree 732, is a domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents.1 To enable the School to continue carrying out its educational program and improve its standard of instruction, Section 2(c) of the same decree authorizes the School to employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally or abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending their employment, except laws that have been or will be enacted for the protection of employees. Accordingly, the School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires. The School employs four tests to determine whether a faculty member should be classified as a foreign-hire or a local hire: a. What is one's domicile? b. Where is one's home economy? c. To which country does one owe economic allegiance? d. Was the individual hired abroad specifically to work in the School and was the School responsible for bringing that individual to the Philippines?2 Should the answer to any of these queries point to the Philippines, the faculty member is classified as a local hire; otherwise, he or she is deemed a foreign-hire. The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded localhires.1avvphi1 These include housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-hires. The School justifies the difference on two "significant economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure, namely: (a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure. The School explains: A foreign-hire would necessarily have to uproot himself from his home country, leave his family and friends, and take the risk of deviating from a promising career path all for the purpose of pursuing his profession as an educator, but this time in a foreign land. The new foreign hire is faced with economic realities: decent abode for oneself and/or for one's family, effective means of transportation, allowance for the education of one's children, adequate insurance against illness and death, and of course the primary benefit of a basic salary/retirement compensation.

Because of a limited tenure, the foreign hire is confronted again with the same economic reality after his term: that he will eventually and inevitably return to his home country where he will have to confront the uncertainty of obtaining suitable employment after along period in a foreign land. The compensation scheme is simply the School's adaptive measure to remain competitive on an international level in terms of attracting competent professionals in the field of international education.3 When negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement were held on June 1995, petitioner International School Alliance of Educators, "a legitimate labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty members"4 of the School, contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and local-hires. This issue, as well as the question of whether foreign-hires should be included in the appropriate bargaining unit, eventually caused a deadlock between the parties. On September 7, 1995, petitioner filed a notice of strike. The failure of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board to bring the parties to a compromise prompted the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to assume jurisdiction over the dispute. On June 10, 1996, the DOLE Acting Secretary, Crescenciano B. Trajano, issued an Order resolving the parity and representation issues in favor of the School. Then DOLE Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing subsequently denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in an Order dated March 19, 1997. Petitioner now seeks relief in this Court. Petitioner claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the School is discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination. The School disputes these claims and gives a breakdown of its faculty members, numbering 38 in all, with nationalities other than Filipino, who have been hired locally and classified as local hires.5 The Acting Secretary of Labor found that these non-Filipino local-hires received the same benefits as the Filipino local-hires. The compensation package given to local-hires has been shown to apply to all, regardless of race. Truth to tell, there are foreigners who have been hired locally and who are paid equally as Filipino local hires.6 The Acting secretary upheld the point-of-hire classification for the distinction in salary rates: The Principle "equal pay for equal work" does not find applications in the present case. The international character of the School requires the hiring of foreign personnel to deal with different nationalities and different cultures, among the student population. We also take cognizance of the existence of a system of salaries and benefits accorded to foreign hired personnel which system is universally recognized. We agree that certain amenities have to be provided to these people in order to entice them to render their services in the Philippines and in the process remain competitive in the international market. doctrinal rulings 2

INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE), petitioner, vs. HON. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING in his capacity as the Secretary of Labor and Employment; HON. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO in his capacity as the Acting Secretary of Labor and Employment; DR. BRIAN MACCAULEY in his capacity as the Superintendent of International School-

Furthermore, we took note of the fact that foreign hires have limited contract of employment unlike the local hires who enjoy security of tenure. To apply parity therefore, in wages and other benefits would also require parity in other terms and conditions of employment which include the employment which include the employment contract. A perusal of the parties' 1992-1995 CBA points us to the conditions and provisions for salary and professional compensation wherein the parties agree as follows: All members of the bargaining unit shall be compensated only in accordance with Appendix C hereof provided that the Superintendent of the School has the discretion to recruit and hire expatriate teachers from abroad, under terms and conditions that are consistent with accepted international practice. Appendix C of said CBA further provides: The new salary schedule is deemed at equity with the Overseas Recruited Staff (OSRS) salary schedule. The 25% differential is reflective of the agreed value of system displacement and contracted status of the OSRS as differentiated from the tenured status of Locally Recruited Staff (LRS). To our mind, these provisions demonstrate the parties' recognition of the difference in the status of two types of employees, hence, the difference in their salaries. The Union cannot also invoke the equal protection clause to justify its claim of parity. It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guarantee of equal protection of the laws is not violated by legislation or private covenants based on reasonable classification. A classification is reasonable if it is based on substantial distinctions and apply to all members of the same class. Verily, there is a substantial distinction between foreign hires and local hires, the former enjoying only a limited tenure, having no amenities of their own in the Philippines and have to be given a good compensation package in order to attract them to join the teaching faculty of the School.7 We cannot agree. That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our Constitution and laws reflect the policy against these evils. The Constitution8 in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. International law, which springs from general principles of law,9 likewise proscribes discrimination. General principles of law include principles of equity, 10 i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice, based on

the test of what is reasonable. 11 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 12 the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 13 the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 14 the Convention against Discrimination in Education, 15 the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation 16 all embody the general principle against discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness and justice. The Philippines, through its Constitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its national laws. In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often skewed in favor of capital, inequality and discrimination by the employer are all the more reprehensible. The Constitution 17 specifically provides that labor is entitled to "humane conditions of work." These conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace the factory, the office or the field but include as well the manner by which employers treat their employees. The Constitution 18 also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for all." Similarly, the Labor Code 19 provides that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed." It would be an affront to both the spirit and letter of these provisions if the State, in spite of its primordial obligation to promote and ensure equal employment opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms and conditions of employment. 20 Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 135, for example, prohibits and penalizes 21 the payment of lesser compensation to a female employee as against a male employee for work of equal value. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. Notably, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra, in Article 7 thereof, provides: The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work, which ensure, in particular: a. Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with: (i) Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind, in particular women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work; xxx The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries. 22 This rule applies to the School, its "international character" notwithstanding.

The School contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence that local-hires perform work equal to that of foreign-hires. 23 The Court finds this argument a little cavalier. If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these employees perform equal work. This presumption is borne by logic and human experience. If the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he receives less or why the others receive more. That would be adding insult to injury. The employer has discriminated against that employee; it is for the employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly. The employer in this case has failed to discharge this burden. There is no evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both groups have similar functions and responsibilities, which they perform under similar working conditions. The School cannot invoke the need to entice foreign-hires to leave their domicile to rationalize the distinction in salary rates without violating the principle of equal work for equal pay. "Salary" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed.) as "a reward or recompense for services performed." Similarly, the Philippine Legal Encyclopedia states that "salary" is the "[c]onsideration paid at regular intervals for the rendering of services." In Songco v. National Labor Relations Commission, 24 we said that: "salary" means a recompense or consideration made to a person for his pains or industry in another man's business. Whether it be derived from "salarium," or more fancifully from "sal," the pay of the Roman soldier, it carries with it the fundamental idea of compensation for services rendered. (Emphasis supplied.) While we recognize the need of the School to attract foreign-hires, salaries should not be used as an enticement to the prejudice of local-hires. The local-hires perform the same services as foreign-hires and they ought to be paid the same salaries as the latter. For the same reason, the "dislocation factor" and the foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot serve as valid bases for the distinction in salary rates. The dislocation factor and limited tenure affecting foreign-hires are adequately compensated by certain benefits accorded them which are not enjoyed by local-hires, such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances. The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare," 25 "to afford labor full protection." 26 The State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital. 27 These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good. 28 Should such contracts contain stipulations that are contrary to public policy, courts will not hesitate to strike down these stipulations. In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. The practice of the School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public policy and, certainly, does not deserve the sympathy of this Court.1avvphi1

doctrinal rulings

We agree, however, that foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-hires. A bargaining unit is "a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law." 29 The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1) the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees' interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment status. 30 The basic test of an asserted bargaining unit's acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights. 31 It does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped together with local-hires for purposes of collective bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the School also shows that these groups were always treated separately. Foreign-hires have limited tenure; local-hires enjoy security of tenure. Although foreign-hires perform similar functions under the same working conditions as the local-hires, foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not granted to local-hires. These benefits, such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance, are reasonably related to their status as foreign-hires, and justify the exclusion of the former from the latter. To include foreign-hires in a bargaining unit with local-hires would not assure either group the exercise of their respective collective bargaining rights. WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is hereby GRANTED IN PART. The Orders of the Secretary of Labor and Employment dated June 10, 1996 and March 19, 1997, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as they uphold the practice of respondent School of according foreign-hires higher salaries than local-hires. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988

to domestic helpers and females with similar skills;" 3 and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character. In its supplement to the petition, PASEI invokes Section 3, of Article XIII, of the Constitution, providing for worker participation "in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law." 4 Department Order No. 1, it is contended, was passed in the absence of prior consultations. It is claimed, finally, to be in violation of the Charter's nonimpairment clause, in addition to the "great and irreparable injury" that PASEI members face should the Order be further enforced. On May 25, 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondents Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, filed a Comment informing the Court that on March 8, 1988, the respondent Labor Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada, Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway, Austria, and Switzerland. * In submitting the validity of the challenged "guidelines," the Solicitor General invokes the police power of the Philippine State. It is admitted that Department Order No. 1 is in the nature of a police power measure. The only question is whether or not it is valid under the Constitution. The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." 5 As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace. "Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits." 6 It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the Charter. Along with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it to perform the most vital functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the expression has been credited, 7 refers to it succinctly as the plenary power of the State "to govern its citizens."8 "The police power of the State ... is a power coextensive with selfprotection, and it is not inaptly termed the "law of overwhelming necessity." It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society." 9 It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. According to Fernando, it is "rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to ensure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare." 10 Significantly, the Bill of Rights itself does not purport to be an absolute guaranty of individual rights and liberties "Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to

act according to one's will." 11 It is subject to the far more overriding demands and requirements of the greater number. Notwithstanding its extensive sweep, police power is not without its own limitations. For all its awesome consequences, it may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise, and in that event, it defeats the purpose for which it is exercised, that is, to advance the public good. Thus, when the power is used to further private interests at the expense of the citizenry, there is a clear misuse of the power. 12 In the light of the foregoing, the petition must be dismissed. As a general rule, official acts enjoy a presumed vahdity. 13 In the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, the presumption logically stands. The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," 14 but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution 15does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class. 16 The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers rests on substantial distinctions. As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen our female labor force abroad, especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions marked by, in not a few cases, physical and personal abuse. The sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers, are compelling motives for urgent Government action. As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the Government's efforts. The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In the first place, there is no evidence that, except perhaps for isolated instances, our men abroad have been afflicted with an Identical predicament. The petitioner has proffered no argument that the Government should act similarly with respect to male workers. The Court, of course, is not impressing some male chauvinistic notion that men are superior to women. What the Court is saying is that it was largely a matter of evidence (that women domestic workers are being ill-treated abroad in massive instances) and not upon some fanciful or arbitrary yardstick that the Government acted in this case. It is evidence capable indeed of unquestionable demonstration and evidence this Court accepts. The Court cannot, however, say the same thing as far as men are concerned. There is simply no evidence to justify such an inference. Suffice it to state, then, that insofar as classifications are concerned, this Court is content that distinctions are borne by the evidence. Discrimination in this case is justified. As we have furthermore indicated, executive determinations are generally final on the Court. Under a republican regime, it is the executive branch that enforces policy. For their part, the courts decide, in the proper cases, whether doctrinal rulings 4

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON as Secretary of Labor and Employment, and TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, respondents. SARMIENTO, J.: The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm "engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement," 1 challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Specifically, the measure is assailed for "discrimination against males or females;" 2 that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only

that policy, or the manner by which it is implemented, agrees with the Constitution or the laws, but it is not for them to question its wisdom. As a coequal body, the judiciary has great respect for determinations of the Chief Executive or his subalterns, especially when the legislature itself has specifically given them enough room on how the law should be effectively enforced. In the case at bar, there is no gainsaying the fact, and the Court will deal with this at greater length shortly, that Department Order No. 1 implements the rule-making powers granted by the Labor Code. But what should be noted is the fact that in spite of such a fiction of finality, the Court is on its own persuaded that prevailing conditions indeed call for a deployment ban. There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane to the purpose behind the measure. Unquestionably, it is the avowed objective of Department Order No. 1 to "enhance the protection for Filipino female overseas workers" 17 this Court has no quarrel that in the midst of the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered abroad, a ban on deployment will be for their own good and welfare. The Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions. Rather, it is intended to apply indefinitely so long as those conditions exist. This is clear from the Order itself ("Pending review of the administrative and legal measures, in the Philippines and in the host countries . . ." 18), meaning to say that should the authorities arrive at a means impressed with a greater degree of permanency, the ban shall be lifted. As a stop-gap measure, it is possessed of a necessary malleability, depending on the circumstances of each case. Accordingly, it provides: 9. LIFTING OF SUSPENSION. The Secretary of Labor and Employment (DOLE) may, upon recommendation of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), lift the suspension in countries where there are: 1. Bilateral agreements or understanding with the Philippines, and/or, 2. Existing mechanisms providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of Filipino workers. 19 The Court finds, finally, the impugned guidelines to be applicable to all female domestic overseas workers. That it does not apply to "all Filipina workers" 20 is not an argument for unconstitutionality. Had the ban been given universal applicability, then it would have been unreasonable and arbitrary. For obvious reasons, not all of them are similarly circumstanced. What the Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select person or group of persons within an existing class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or resulting in an unfair advantage to another person or group of persons. To apply the ban, say exclusively to workers deployed by A, but not to those recruited by B, would obviously clash with the equal protection clause of the Charter. It would be a classic case of what Chase refers to as a law that "takes property from A and gives it to B." 21 It would be an unlawful invasion of property rights and freedom of contract and needless to state, an invalid act. 22 (Fernando says: "Where the classification is based on such distinctions that make a real difference as infancy, sex, and stage of civilization of minority groups, the better rule, it would seem, is to recognize its validity only if the young, the women, and the cultural minorities are singled out for favorable treatment. There would be an element of unreasonableness if on the contrary their status that calls for the law ministering

to their needs is made the basis of discriminatory legislation against them. If such be the case, it would be difficult to refute the assertion of denial of equal protection." 23 In the case at bar, the assailed Order clearly accords protection to certain women workers, and not the contrary.) It is incorrect to say that Department Order No. 1 prescribes a total ban on overseas deployment. From scattered provisions of the Order, it is evident that such a total ban has hot been contemplated. We quote: 5. AUTHORIZED DEPLOYMENT-The deployment of domestic helpers and workers of similar skills defined herein to the following [sic] are authorized under these guidelines and are exempted from the suspension. 5.1 Hirings by immediate members of the family of Heads of State and Government; 5.2 Hirings by Minister, Deputy Minister and the other senior government officials; and 5.3 Hirings by senior officials of the diplomatic corps and duly accredited international organizations. 5.4 Hirings by employers in countries with whom the Philippines have [sic] bilateral labor agreements or understanding. xxx 7. VACATIONING DOMESTIC HELPERS AND WORKERS OF SIMILAR SKILLS--Vacationing domestic helpers and/or workers of similar skills shall be allowed to process with the POEA and leave for worksite only if they are returning to the same employer to finish an existing or partially served employment contract. Those workers returning to worksite to serve a new employer shall be covered by the suspension and the provision of these guidelines. xxx 9. LIFTING OF SUSPENSION-The Secretary of Labor and Employment (DOLE) may, upon recommendation of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), lift the suspension in countries where there are: 1. Bilateral agreements or understanding with the Philippines, and/or, 2. Existing mechanisms providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of Filipino 24 workers. xxx The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right. The right to travel is subject, among other things, to the requirements of "public safety," "as may be provided by law." 25 Department Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its basic policy to "afford protection to labor," 26 pursuant to the respondent Department of Labor's rule-making authority vested in it by the Labor Code.27 The petitioner assumes that it is unreasonable simply because of its impact on the right to travel,

but as we have stated, the right itself is not absolute. The disputed Order is a valid qualification thereto. Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power. It is true that police power is the domain of the legislature, but it does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated. As we have mentioned, the Labor Code itself vests the Department of Labor and Employment with rulemaking powers in the enforcement whereof. 28 The petitioners's reliance on the Constitutional guaranty of worker participation "in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and 29 benefits" is not well-taken. The right granted by this provision, again, must submit to the demands and necessities of the State's power of regulation. The Constitution declares that: Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. 30 "Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of employment alone. What concerns the Constitution more paramountly is that such an employment be above all, decent, just, and humane. It is bad enough that the country has to send its sons and daughters to strange lands because it cannot satisfy their employment needs at home. Under these circumstances, the Government is duty-bound to insure that our toiling expatriates have adequate protection, personally and economically, while away from home. In this case, the Government has evidence, an evidence the petitioner cannot seriously dispute, of the lack or inadequacy of such protection, and as part of its duty, it has precisely ordered an indefinite ban on deployment. The Court finds furthermore that the Government has not indiscriminately made use of its authority. It is not contested that it has in fact removed the prohibition with respect to certain countries as manifested by the Solicitor General. The non-impairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by the petitioner, must yield to the loftier purposes targetted by the Government. 31 Freedom of contract and enterprise, like all other freedoms, is not free from restrictions, more so in this jurisdiction, where laissez faire has never been fully accepted as a controlling economic way of life. This Court understands the grave implications the questioned Order has on the business of recruitment. The concern of the Government, however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of business firms. In the ordinary sequence of events, it is profits that suffer as a result of Government regulation. The interest of the State is to provide a decent living to its citizens. The Government has convinced the Court in this case that this is its intent. We do not find the impugned Order to be tainted with a grave abuse of discretion to warrant the extraordinary relief prayed for. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. L-58639 August 12, 1987

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CEBU ROYAL PLANT (SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION), petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE DEPUTY MINISTER OF LABOR and RAMON PILONES, respondents. CRUZ, J.: The private respondent was removed by the petitioner and complained to the Ministry of Labor. His complaint was dismissed by the regional director, who was, however, reversed by the public respondent. Required to reinstate the separated employee and pay him back wages, the petitioner has come to us, faulting the Deputy Minister with grave abuse of discretion. We have issued in the meantime a temporary restraining order. The public respondent held that Ramon Pilones, the private respondent, was already a permanent employee at the time of his dismissal and so was entitled to security of tenure. The alleged ground for his removal, to wit, "pulmonary tuberculosis minimal," was not certified as incurable within six months as to justify his separation. 2Additionally, the private respondent insists that the petitioner should have first obtained a clearance, as required by the regulations then in force, for the termination of his employment. The petitioner for its part claims that the private respondent was still on probation at the time of his dismissal and so had no security of tenure. His dismissal was not only in conformity with company policy but also necessary for the protection of the public health, as he was handling ingredients in the processing of soft drinks which were being sold to the public. It is also argued that the findings of the regional director, who had direct access to the facts, should not have been disturbed on appeal. For these same reasons, it contends, the employee's reinstatement as ordered by the public respondent should not be allowed. The original findings were contained in a one-page order 3 reciting simply that "complainant was employed on a probationary period of employment for six (6) months. After said period, he underwent medical examination for qualification as regular employee but the results showed that he is suffering from PTB minimal. Consequently, he was informed of the termination of his employment by respondent." The order then concluded that the termination was "justified." That was all. As there is no mention of the basis of the above order, we may assume it was the temporary payroll authority 4submitted by the petitioner showing that the private respondent was employed on probation on February 16, 1978. Even supposing that it is not self- serving, we find nevertheless that it is self-defeating. The six-month period of probation started from the said date of appointment and so ended on August 17, 1978, but it is not shown that the private respondent's employment also ended then; on the contrary, he continued working as usual. Under Article 282 of the Labor Code, "an employee who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee." Hence, Pilones was already on permanent status when he was dismissed on August 21, 1978, or four days after he ceased to be a probationer. The petitioner claims it could not have dismissed the private respondent earlier because the x-ray examination was made only on August 17, 1978, and the results were not immediately available. That excuse is untenable. We note that when the petitioner had all of six months during which to conduct

such examination, it chose to wait until exactly the last day of the probation period. In the light of such delay, its protestations now that reinstatement of Pilones would prejudice public health cannot but sound hollow and hypocritical. By its own implied admission, the petitioner had exposed its customers to the employee's disease because of its failure to examine him before entrusting him with the functions of a "syrup man." Its belated concern for the consuming public is hardly persuasive, if not clearly insincere and self-righteous. There is proof in fact that the private respondent was first hired not on February 16, 1978, but earlier in 1977. This is the 1977 withholding tax statement 5 issued for him by the petitioner itself which it does not and cannot deny. The petitioner stresses that this is the only evidence of the private respondent's earlier service and notes that he has not presented any co-worker to substantiate his claim. This is perfectly understandable. Given the natural reluctance of many workers to antagonize their employers, we need not wonder why none of them testified against the petitioner. We are satisfied that whether his employment began on February 16, 1978, or even earlier as he claims, the private respondent was already a regular employee when he was dismissed on August 21, 1978. As such, he could validly claim the security of tenure guaranteed to him by the Constitution and the Labor Code. The applicable rule on the ground for dismissal invoked against him is Section 8, Rule I, Book VI, of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code reading as follows: Sec. 8. Disease as a ground for dismissal. Where the employee suffers from a disease and his continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health or to the health of his coemployees, the employer shall not terminate his employment unless there is a certification by a competent public health authority that the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six (6) months even with proper medical treatment. If the disease or ailment can be cured within the period, the employer shall not terminate the employee but shall ask the employee to take a leave. The employer shall reinstate such employee to his former position immediately upon the restoration of his normal health. The record does not contain the certification required by the above rule. The medical certificate offered by the petitioner came from its own physician, who was not a "competent public health authority," and merely stated the employee's disease, without more. We may surmise that if the required certification was not presented, it was because the disease was not of such a nature or seriousness that it could not be cured within a period of six months even with proper medical treatment. If so, dismissal was unquestionably a severe and unlawful sanction. It is also worth noting that the petitioner's application for clearance to terminate the employment of the private respondent was filed with the Ministry of Labor only on August 28, 1978, or seven days after his dismissal. 6 As the NLRC has repeatedly and correctly said, the prior clearance rule (which was in force at that time) was not a "trivial technicality." It required "not just the mere filing of a petition or the mere attempt to procure a clearance" but that "the said clearance be obtained prior to the operative act of termination. 7

We agree that there was here an attempt to circumvent the law by separating the employee after five months' service to prevent him from becoming a regular employee, and then rehiring him on probation, again without security of tenure. We cannot permit this subterfuge if we are to be true to the spirit and mandate of social justice. On the other hand, we have also the health of the public and of the dismissed employee himself to consider. Hence, although we must rule in favor of his reinstatement, this must be conditioned on his fitness to resume his work, as certified by competent authority. We take this opportunity to reaffirm our concern for the lowly worker who, often at the mercy of his employers, must look up to the law for his protection. Fittingly, that law regards him with tenderness and even favor and always with faith and hope in his capacity to help in shaping the nation's future. It is error to take him for granted. He deserves our abiding respect. How society treats him will determine whether the knife in his hands shall be a caring tool for beauty and progress or an angry weapon of defiance and revenge. The choice is obvious, of course. If we cherish him as we should, we must resolve to lighten "the weight of centuries" of exploitation and disdain that bends his back but does not bow his head. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the temporary restraining order of November 18, 1981, is LIFTED. The Order of the public respondent dated July 14, 1981, is AFFIRMED, but with the modification that the backwages shall be limited to three years only and the private respondent shall be reinstated only upon certification by a competent public health authority that he is fit to return to work. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.

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