THIRD DIVISION

APOLINARDITO C. QUINTANILLA and PERFECTA C. QUINTANILLA, Petitioners,

G.R. No. 160613 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, * CORONA, NACHURA, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: February 12, 2008

-versus-

PEDRO ABANGAN and DARYL'S COLLECTION INTL. INC., Respondents.

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x RESOLUTION NACHURA, J.: Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking the reversal of the [2] [3] Court of Appeals (CA) Decision dated April 21, 2003, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 57 of Cebu City, dated June 21, 2000. This controversy flows from a case for Easement of Right of Way filed by petitioner Apolinardito C. Quintanilla (Apolinardito) and his mother, petitioner Perfecta C. Quintanilla (Perfecta) against respondent Pedro Abangan (Pedro) and respondent Daryl's Collection International, Inc. (DARYL'S). Sometime in the 1960s, Perfecta bought Lot No. 3771-B-1-A, with an area of 2,244 square meters, located at Inayawan, Cebu City (the dominant estate) from one Dionisio Abasolo, who formerly owned all the properties therein. Thereafter, [4] Perfecta donated the dominant estate to Apolinardito, who is now the registered owner thereof. Petitioners own QC Rattan Inc., a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture and export of rattan-made furniture. In the conduct of their business, they use vans to haul and transport raw materials and finished products. As they wanted to expand their business and construct a warehouse on their property (the dominant estate), they asked for a right of way from Pedro sometime in April 1994. However, it appears that Pedro, who was the owner of Lot No. 3771-A-1, containing an area of 1,164 square meters (the [6] servient estate) and a lot near the dominant estate, sold the same to DARYL'S on March 24, 1994, and thereafter, DARYL'S constructed a warehouse over the servient estate, enclosing the same with a concrete fence. Petitioners, thus, sought the imposition of an easement of right of way, six (6) meters in width, or a total area of 244 square meters, over the servient estate. On June 21, 2000, the RTC dismissed the case for lack of merit. The RTC held that petitioners failed to establish that the imposition of the right of way was the least prejudicial to the servient estate. The RTC noted that there is already a concrete fence around the area and that six (6) meters from the said concrete fence was a concrete warehouse. Thus, substantial damage and substantial reduction in area would be caused the servient estate. Moreover, the RTC observed that petitioners' insistence on passing through the servient estate would make for easy and convenient access to the main thoroughfare for their vans. Otherwise, if the right of way were to be constituted on any of the other surrounding properties, their vans would have to make a turn. On this premise, the RTC opined that mere convenience to the dominant estate was not necessarily the basis for setting up a compulsory easement of right of way. Aggrieved, petitioners went to the CA on appeal. In its Decision dated April 21, 2003, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision, holding that the criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the shortest distance. A longer way may, thus, be established to avoid injury to the servient tenement, such as
[5] [1]

when there are constructions or walls which can be avoided by a round-about way, as in this case. Petitioners filed a Motion for [8] [9] Reconsideration, but the same was denied in the CA Resolution dated September 24, 2003. Hence, the instant petition based on the following grounds: a) IN A COMPULSORY EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY, AS SET [10] [11] FORTH IN THE PRECONDITIONS UNDER ARTICLES 649 AND 650 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE, THE DETERMINATION OF THE LEAST PREJUDICIAL OR LEAST DAMAGE TO THE SERVIENT ESTATE SHOULD BE AT THE TIME OF THE FILING OF THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT AND NOT AFTER THE FILING, ESPECIALLY WHEN THE OWNER OF THE SERVIENT ESTATE IS GUILTY OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS CONSIDERED AS THE GREATEST OF ALL POSSIBLE WRONGS OR BAD FAITH BY CONSTRUCTING A CONCRETE FENCE AND WAREHOUSE THEREON THROUGH MISREPRESENTATION TO THE OFFICE OF THE CEBU CITY BUILDING OFFICIAL THAT IT HAD GRANTED A RIGHT OF WAY OF SIX (6) METERS TO PETITIONERS; AND b) WHETHER OR NOT COMPLIANCE WITH THE PRECONDITIONS SET FORTH IN ARTICLES 649 AND 650 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE IS SUPERIOR TO THE MERE CONVENIENCE RULE AGAINST THE OWNER OF THE DOMINANT ESTATE.

[7]

Petitioners claim that DARYL'S constructed the concrete fence only after petitioners filed the case for an Easement of Right of Way against Pedro on May 27, 1994. They submit that the criterion of least prejudice should be applied at the time of the filing of the original complaint; otherwise, it will be easy for the servient estate to evade the burden by subsequently constructing structures thereon [12] in order to increase the damage or prejudice. Moreover, they pointed out that a Notice of Lis Pendens was annotated on Pedro's title. Thus, petitioners aver that DARYL'S is in bad [13] [14] faith and is guilty of abuse of rights as provided under Article 19 of the New Civil Code. On the other hand, DARYL'S counters that petitioners belatedly imputed bad faith to it since petitioners' pre-trial brief filed with the RTC contained no allegation of bad faith or misrepresentation. Moreover, DARYL'S reiterates its position that establishing a right of way over the servient estate would cause substantial damage, considering that a concrete fence has already been erected thereon. Most importantly, DARYL'S submits that petitioners can have adequate ingress to or egress from the dominant estate by passing through other surrounding vacant lots. Lastly, DARYL'S points out that when Perfecta bought the dominant estate from Dionisio Abasolo, the surrounding lots were also owned by the [15] latter. For his part, Pedro manifests that he is adopting all the defenses invoked by DARYL'S in the belief that he is no longer a party to [16] the instant case as he had already sold the servient estate to DARYL'S and a title already issued in the latter's name. The instant petition lacks merit. We hold that Apolinardito as owner of the dominant estate together with Perfecta failed to discharge the burden of proving the [17] existence and concurrence of all the requisites in order to validly claim a compulsory right of way against respondents. It should be remembered that to be entitled to a legal easement of right of way, the following requisites must be satisfied: (1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity has been paid; (3) the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; and (4) the right of way claimed is at the point least [18] prejudicial to the servient estate. The fourth requisite is absent. We are in full accord with the ruling of the CA when it aptly and judiciously held, to wit: As provided for under the provisions of Article 650 of the New Civil Code, the easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. Where there are several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, and the easement may be established on any of them, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be chosen. But if these two circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, as in the instant case,the way which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the shortest. The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the criterion of shortest distance. The court is not bound to establish what is the shortest; a longer way may be established to avoid injury to

the servient tenement, such as when there are constructions or walls which can be avoided by a round-about way, as in the case at bar. As between a right of way that would demolish a fence of strong materials to provide ingress and egress to a public highway and another right of way which although longer will only require a van or vehicle to make a turn, the second alternative should be preferred. Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as the basis for setting up a compulsory easement. Even in the face of necessity, if it can be satisfied without imposing the easement, the same should not be imposed. Finally, worthy of note, is the undisputed fact that there is already a newly opened public road barely fifty (50) meters away from the property of appellants, which only shows that another requirement of the law, that is, there is no adequate outlet, has not been met to establish a compulsory right of way. Such pronouncement by the CA is in line with this Court's ruling in Quimen v. Court of Appeals, where we held that as between a right of way that would demolish a store of strong materials to provide egress to a public highway, and another right of way which, although longer, will only require an avocado tree to be cut down, the second alternative should be preferred. As a rule, findings of fact of the CA, affirming those of the trial court, [20] [21] are generally final and conclusive on this Court. While this Court has recognized several exceptions to this rule, none of these exceptions finds application in this case. Ergo, we find no cogent reason and reversible error to disturb the unanimous findings of the RTC and the CA as these are amply supported by the law and evidence on record. WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Court of Appeals Decision, dated April 21, 2003, and Resolution dated September 24, 2003 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners. SO ORDERED. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice WE CONCUR: CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice Chairperson MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice RUBEN T. REYES Associate Justice
[19]

ATTESTATION I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice

In lieu of Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario per Special Order No. 484 dated January 11, 2008. [1] Dated October 24, 2003, rollo, pp. 3-18. [2] Particularly docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 68349, penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico with Associate Justices Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and Hakim S. Abdulwahid, concurring; rollo p. 19-26. [3] Particularly docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-16081; id. at 27-30. [4] Covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 133582; Folder of Exhibits, p. 1. [5] Covered by TCT No. 99281; id at 29. [6] Pedro's Manifestation; rollo, pp. 59-60. [7] Citing II Arturo M. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines 390 (1992). [8] Dated May 27, 2003; CA rollo, pp. 71-78. [9] Rollo, p. 31. [10] Article 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use any immovable, which is surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other persons and without adequate outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way through the neighboring estates, after payment of the proper indemnity. Should this easement be established in such a manner that its use may be continuous for all the needs of the dominant estate, establishing a permanent passage, the indemnity shall consist of the value of the land occupied and the amount of the damage caused to the servient estate. In case the right of way is limited to the necessary passage for the cultivation of the estate surrounded by others and for the gathering of its crops through the servient estate without a permanent way, the indemnity shall consist in the payment of the damage caused by such encumbrance. This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is due to the proprietor's own acts. [11] Article 650. The easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be shortest. [12] Reply dated February 14, 2005; rollo, pp. 66-70. [13] Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. [14] Supra note 1. [15] DARYL'S Comment dated February 11, 2004; rollo, pp. 44-50. [16] Supra note 6. [17] Costabella Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80511, January 25, 1991, 193 SCRA 333, 340. [18] Woodridge School, Inc., and Miguela Jimenez-Javier v. ARB Construction Co., Inc., G.R. No. 157285, February 16, 2007, citing Costabella Corporation v. Court of Appeals, supra. [19] 326 Phil 969, 979 (1996). [20] Solidbank Corporation/Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Spouses Peter and Susan Tan, G.R. No. 167346, April 2, 2007, citing Bordalba v. Court of Appeals, 425 Phil. 407 (2002). [21] The exceptions are: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion.

Republic of the Philippines Supreme Court Manila

SECOND DIVISION FILOMENA R. BENEDICTO, Petitioner, G.R. No. 185020 Present: VELASCO, JR., J., ** NACHURA, Acting Chairperson, PERALTA, MENDOZA, and *** SERENO, JJ. Promulgated: ANTONIO VILLAFLORES, Respondent. October 6, 2010
*

- versus -

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION NACHURA, J.: Petitioner Filomena R. Benedicto (Filomena) appeals by certiorari the September 30, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals [2] (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 80103, which affirmed with modification the decision dated December 10, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 19, in Civil Case No. 674-M-2000. The antecedents. Maria Villaflores (Maria) was the owner of Lot 2-A, with an area of 277 square meters, in Poblacion, Meycauayan, Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-84.761 (M). In 1980, Maria sold a portion of Lot 2-A to her nephew, respondent Antonio Villaflores (Antonio). Antonio then took possession of the portion sold to him and constructed a house thereon. Twelve (12) [3] years later, or on August 15, 1992, Maria executed in favor of Antonio a Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan covering the entire Lot 2A. However, Antonio did not register the sale or pay the real property taxes for the subject land. On August 31, 1994, Maria sold the same Lot 2-A to Filomena, evidenced by a Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan. Filomena registered the sale with the Registry of Deeds of Meycauayan on September 6, 1994. Consequently, TCT No. T-84.761 (M) in the name of Maria was cancelled and TCT No. T-208265 (M) was issued in the name of Filomena. Since then Filomena paid the real property taxes for the subject parcel of land. On September 28, 2000, Filomena filed a case for Accion Publiciana with Cancellation of Notice of Adverse Claim, Damages [5] and Attorneys Fees against Antonio. She alleged that she acquired Lot 2-A in 1994 from her grandaunt Maria by virtue of the Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan. At the time of the sale, she was not aware that Antonio had any claim or interest over the subject property. Antonio assured her that there was no impediment to her acquisition of the land, and promised to vacate the property five (5) years after the sale. In August 1999, Antonio requested an extension of one (1) year, and offered to pay a monthly rental of P2,000.00, which she granted. However, in 2000, Antonio refused to vacate the property and, instead, claimed absolute ownership of Lot 2-A. Antonio traversed the complaint, asserting absolute ownership over Lot 2-A. He alleged that he purchased the subject property from Maria in 1980; and that he took possession of the same and constructed his house thereon. He came to know of the sale in favor of Filomena only in 2000 when the latter demanded that he vacate the property. He averred that Filomena was aware of the [6] sale; hence, the subsequent sale in favor of Filomena was rescissible, fraudulent, fictitious, or simulated. After trial, the RTC rendered a decision sustaining Filomenas ownership. According to the RTC, Filomena was the one who registered the sale in good faith; as such, she has better right than Antonio. It rejected Antonios allegation of bad faith on the part of Filomena because no sufficient evidence was adduced to prove it. Likewise, the RTC found Antonios evidence of ownership questionable. Nevertheless, it declared Antonio a builder in good faith.
[7] [4] [1]

The RTC disposed, thus: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows: a) [Filomena] is adjudged the absolute and real owner of the property-in-question and covered by TCT No. T-208265 (M) registered in her name; b) ordering [Antonio] and all persons claiming right under her to vacate the premises; c) [Antonio] is declared to be a builder in good faith of his improvement/building erected in TCT No. T208268 (M) and the provisions of Art. 448 of the New Civil Code applies; d) all other claims of [Filomena] and counterclaim of [Antonio] are dismissed for lack of legal as well as factual basis. SO ORDERED.
[8]

Both parties moved for reconsideration of the decision, but the RTC denied the motions for lack of merit. Filomena and Antonio then filed their separate appeals with the CA. Filomena assailed the RTC pronouncement that Antonio was a builder in good faith, and the denial of her claim for damages. Antonio, on the other hand, faulted the RTC for sustaining Filomenas ownership of the subject lot. On September 30, 2008, the CA rendered the now challenged Decision affirming with modification the RTC decision. The CA affirmed the RTC for upholding Filomenas ownership of Lot 2-A and for declaring Antonio a builder in good faith. However, it remanded the case to the RTC for further proceedings to determine the respective rights of the parties under Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code, and the amount due Antonio. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
[9]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal of [respondent] Antonio Villaflores is GRANTED in part. The Decision dated December 10, 2002 issued by Branch 19, Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan in Civil Case No. 674-M-2000 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that Antonio Villaflores, being a builder in good faith, is entitled to reimbursement of the necessary and useful expense with the right of retention until reimbursement of said expenses in full. The partial appeal of [petitioner] Filomena Benedicto is DENIED. In accordance with the foregoing disquisitions, let the case be REMANDED to the trial court which is DIRECTED to receive evidence, with dispatch, to determine the amount due [respondent], the rights of the parties under Arts. 448 and 546; and to render a complete judgment of the case. SO ORDERED.
[10]

Before us, Filomena faults the CA for holding that Antonio was a builder in good faith and was entitled to reimbursement for the necessary and useful expenses incurred, with right of retention until reimbursement of the said expenses in full. Filomena asserts that Antonio is not entitled to any reimbursement because he possessed the property by mere tolerance. Maria merely allowed Antonio to construct his house on a portion of Lot 2-A; hence, he is not entitled to any reimbursement or retention. The appeal lacks merit. The question of whether a possessor is in good or bad faith is a factual matter. As a rule, a party may raise only questions of [11] law in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The Supreme Court is not duty bound to analyze and weigh again the evidence considered in the proceedings below. This Court is not a trier of facts and does not embark on a reexamination of the [12] evidence introduced by the parties during trial. This rule assumes greater force in the instant case where the CA affirmed the factual findings of the trial court. It is not disputed that the construction of Antonios house was undertaken long before the sale in favor of Filomena; that when Filomena bought the property from Maria, Antonios house which he used as residence had already been erected on the property. As explained by the CA:

[Antonio] claims not being aware of any flaw in his title. He believed being the owner of the subject premises on account of the Deed of Sale thereof in his favor despite his inability to register the same. The improvement was, [13] in fact, introduced by Antonio prior to Filomenas purchase of the land. x x x.

Thus, we sustain the finding that Antonio is a builder in good faith. Under Article 448, a landowner is given the option to either appropriate the improvement as his own upon payment of the proper amount of indemnity, or sell the land to the possessor in good faith. Relatedly, Article 546 provides that a builder in good faith is entitled to full reimbursement for all the necessary and useful expenses incurred; it also gives him right of retention until full [14] reimbursement is made. The RTC found good faith on the part of Antonio. Yet, it did not order the reimbursement of the necessary and useful expenses he incurred. The pronouncement of this Court in Pecson v. CA,
[15]

which was reiterated in Tuatis v. Escol,

[16]

is instructive, viz.:

The objective of Article 546 of the Civil Code is to administer justice between the parties involved. In this regard, this Court had long ago stated in Rivera vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila [40 Phil. 717 (1920)] that the said provision was formulated in trying to adjust the rights of the owner and possessor in good faith of a piece of land, to administer complete justice to both of them in such a way as neither one nor the other may enrich himself of that which does not belong to him. Guided by this precept, it is therefore the current market value of the improvements which should be made the basis of reimbursement. A contrary ruling would unjustly enrich the private respondents who would otherwise be allowed to acquire a highly valued income-yielding four-unit apartment building for a measly amount. Consequently, the parties should therefore be allowed to adduce evidence on the present market value of the apartment building upon which the trial court should base its finding as to the amount of reimbursement to be paid by the landowner.

Thus, the CA correctly ordered the remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings. Filomena then argues that the CA overstepped its bounds when it ruled on Antonios right to reimbursement and retention. She asserts that this issue was not raised in the proceedings a quo. Indeed, the issue of Antonios right to reimbursement and retention was not specifically raised during the pre-trial because Antonio insisted on his claim of ownership. However, Filomena is now estopped from questioning the CA for ruling on this issue because she was the one who raised it in her appeal before the CA. More importantly, the CA had to rule on the issue because it is essential and indispensable for the just resolution of the [17] case. In Villaflores v. RAM System Services, Inc., we had occasion to state that issues or errors not raised by the parties may be resolved by this Court when it is necessary to arrive at a just decision, and the resolution of the issues raised by the parties depend upon the determination of the unassigned issue or error, or is necessary to give justice to the parties. Finally Filomena faults the RTC and the CA for denying her claim for attorneys fees. She asserts that there is overwhelming proof on record to support her claim, and insists on entitlement to attorneys fees and litigation expenses amounting to P440,700.00 We disagree. It is settled that the award of attorney's fees is the exception rather than the general rule; counsel's fees are not awarded every time a party prevails in a suit because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. Attorney's fees, as part of damages, are not necessarily equated to the amount paid by a litigant to a lawyer. In the ordinary sense, attorney's fees represent the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services he has rendered to the latter; while in its extraordinary concept, they may be awarded by the court as indemnity for damages to be paid by the losing party to the prevailing party. Attorney's fees as part of damages are awarded only in the instances specified in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. As such, it is necessary for the court to make findings of fact and law that would bring the case within the ambit of these enumerated instances to justify the grant of [18] such award, and in all cases it must be reasonable. Certainly, Filomena was compelled to file this suit to vindicate her rights. However, by itself, it will not justify an award of [19] attorney's fees. In Mindex Resources Development v. Morillo, this Court, in denying a claim for attorneys fees, held:

We find the award of attorneys fees to be improper. The reason which the RTC gave because petitioner had compelled respondent to file an action against it falls short of our requirement inScott Consultants and Resource Development v. CA from which we quote: It is settled that the award of attorneys fees is the exception rather than the rule and counsels fees are not to be awarded every time a party wins suit. The power of the court to award attorneys fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal, and equitable justification; its basis cannot be left to speculation or conjecture. Where granted, the court must explicitly state in the body of the decision, and not only in the dispositive portion thereof, the legal reason for the award of attorneys fees. Moreover, a recent case ruled that in the absence of stipulation, a winning party may be awarded attorneys fees only in case plaintiffs action or defendants stand is so untenable as to amount to gross and evident bad faith. Indeed, respondent was compelled to file this suit to vindicate his rights. However, such fact by itself will not justify an award of attorneys fees, when there is no sufficient showing of petitioners bad faith in refusing to pay the said rentals as well as the repair and overhaul costs.

Thus, we sustain the denial by the RTC and the CA of Filomenas claim for attorneys fees and litigation expenses. In fine, we find no reversible error committed by the CA in the challenged Decision. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80103 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio per Special Order No. 897 dated September 28, 2010. In lieu of Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio per Special Order No. 898 dated September 28, 2010. *** Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad per Special Order No. 903 dated September 28, 2010. [1] Penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok, with Associate Justices Mariano C. del Castillo (now a member of this Court) and Romeo F. Barza, concurring; rollo, pp. 45-56. [2] Records, pp. 571-580. [3] Id. at 552-553. [4] Id. at 17. [5] Id. at 3-14.
** [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17]

Id. at 53-60. Supra note 2. Id. at 579-580. Supra note 1. Id. at 55. De Guia v. Court of Appeals, 459 Phil. 447, 467 (2003). Rodrigo v. Ancilla, G.R. No. 139897, June 26, 2006, 492 SCRA 514, 521. Supra note 1, at 53-54. Spouses Nuguid v. Court of Appeals, 492 Phil. 343, 352 (2005). 314 Phil. 313, 324-325 (1995). G.R. No. 175399, October 27, 2009, 604 SCRA 471, 492-493. G.R. No. 166136, August 18, 2006, 499 SCRA 353, 365. Padillo v. Court of Appeals, 422 Phil. 334, 356-357 (2001). 428 Phil. 934, 948-949 (2002). (Citations omitted.)

[18] [19]