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Is Raising One's Arm a Basic Action? Author(s): Hugh McCann Reviewed work(s): Source: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 69, No. 9 (May 4, 1972), pp. 235-249 Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2025183 . Accessed: 22/07/2012 06:06
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THE JOURNALOF PHILOSOPHY

VOLUME LXIX, NO. 9, MAY

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are an arm or movinga finger, in most instancesof theirperformanceapt candidates for description as "basic actions," "simple actions," or somethingsimilar.' One reason for the importanceof such claims is that it does appear some actions mustbe theseactionsare and whatever in fundamental one or morerespects, is however, the factthat, theymustbe recognized.More important, have thisstatus,theycannot involvemore if actionslike arm-raising of musclesor willing the movement the actionsof flexing primitive arm. Since traditionalaccounts of action oftensuggestone or both is of these thingsmightbe the case, claims that arm-raising basic have come to be associatedwith attemptsto refutethese accounts. But it seems to me that,in so far as theytend to suggestraisingan I arm is a nonbasic action,the traditionalaccountsare correct. hold no view as to what actions are basic, but I shall attemptto show in what followsthat actions like raisingan arm never are. My contention is that these actions involve actions of physical exertion being of a sortgenerally on the part of the agent, the involvement taken to be excluded by an action's being basic.
A NECESSARY CONDITION FOR BASICNESS

IS RAISING ONE'S ARM A BASIC ACTION?*

e.g., actions, raising bodily claimedthatcertain T is frequently

One difficulty about decidingwhetheran action is basic is that the conceptof a basic action is clouded, therebeing no completeagreefor menton what conditionsmust be satisfied an action to be fully
* I am indebted to Alan Donagan, to my colleagues Charles E. Harris and Manuel Davenport, and especially to Michael Loux, for the many helpful suggestions they have given me on the mattersdiscussed here. 1 See, for example, A. Danto, "Basic Actions," American Philosophical Quarterly,iI, 2 (April 1965): 141-148, p. 144, and "What We Can Do," this JOURNAL, LX, 15 (July 18, 1963): 435-445, p. 436; A. I. Melden, Free Action (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961), p. 65; F. Stoutland, "Basic Actions and Causality," this JOURNAL, LXV, 16 (Aug. 22, 1968): 467-475, p. 471; and Richard Taylor, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 118. Action and Purpose (Englewood Cliffs,

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basic.2But widespreadagreement approached on one point: most is philosopherswho speak of basic actions appear to hold that, in order to be basic, an action A of an agent M must satisfy negathe tive condition that it not involve somethingB which is also an action of M's and which is related to A as an action of shootingor poisoninga personmightbe to thatof killinghim. An action would be considerednonbasic if it did involve somethingof this twofold description.Spelling out the requirementsof the descriptionwill provide a means for evaluating claims that an action is basic, which,thoughnot complete,suffices presentpurposes. for The first requirement thatB be an action. What it is forsomeis thingto be an action is of coursea vexed question,but I shall tryto avoid further vexingit here. I propose to adopt a list of conditions strongenough so that anything satisfying themwould generallybe consideredto belong in the categoryof action. I shall say B is an action of M's only if, like shootingor killing a person,B is an occurrencethat could ordinarilybe correctly describedas something M does. I shall further require thatM know he does B, thathe do B intentionally, and that he would be held responsiblefor doing B. On this criterion, then,killingwould be consideredan action only I if it were done knowingly, and responsibly. know intentionally, of no place where anything satisfying theseconditionsis treated all them as less than an action. In any case, if somethingsatisfying turnsout to be related to arm-raising is about to be described, as the claim that arm-raising a basic action would be robbed of its is if significance, not its truth. As to the relatednessin question, it seems most safelytreatedas itselftwofoldin character. Consider the case where Smithperforms the action of killing Jones. Here there will be another action of Smith's,say shootingJones,related to his act of killing; foractions like killing cannot be performed outright.In such cases, we tend between the frequently use theword 'by' in describing relatedness to the actions: we say Smithkills Jonesby shootinghim. But in typical relations that obcases where this is said, thereare two important tain between the actions. One can be explicated along lines suggestedby Stoutland.First,it mustbe observedthat althoughkilling Jones and shootinghim are logicallydistinctactions,in that it is the one of themwithoutperforming other,they possible to perform
2 For discussionsof what a basic action is, see the articles by Danto and Stoutland cited; also Danto's more recent "Causation and Basic Actions," Inquiry, Xiii, 1 (Spring 1970): 108-125, and Annette Baier, "The Search for Basic Actions," American Philosophical Quarterly,viii, 2 (April 1971): 161-170.

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On the contrary, when are not in this case totallyseparate events.3 one kills a personby shootinghim,thekillingincludesthe shooting. of The nature of the inclusion can be expressedin terms a distincand consequencesof actions.4 tion betweenresults and hence to act, is to bringabout a change or To do something, a changesin the world,and whetherone performs given action depends in part on what changesone bringsabout. If Jonesdoes not die, or if he dies but Smith cannot he said to have broughtabout his death, it follows logically that Smith does not kill him. The to change thatcorresponds an action in thisway,i.e., the change the bringingabout of whichis the action in question,maybe called the resultof the action.5Opposed to the resultof an action are its consequences, which are changes caused by the result of the action. Smith's action of killing Jones might,for example, have it as a grief;this would be so if her consequence that Jones'swife suffers husband'sdeath caused Mrs. Jonessadness.The crucial point is that the same change may be both the resultof an action A and a consequence of a logicallydistinctaction B. That is what obtains when Smith kills Jones by shooting him. Jones's death, the result of of Smith'saction of killinghim,is caused by the entry a bullet into his body, which is in turn the resultof Smith'saction of shooting Smith's him. The entiresequence of shootingand death constitutes When an act of killing; hence the killing includes the shooting. action A includes an action B in this way, I shall say B is causally more basic than A. Thus Smith's shootingJones is causally more basic thankillinghim. A second relation that obtains, at least in many cases where Smith would be said to kill Jones by shootinghim, is that Smith will have performed act of shootingJonesas a means to killing the him. This would especiallybe so in cases where the killingis intenfor tional,as the criterion action adopted above demands.Now insohis a means to A-ing, actionB is viewedby him faras a personB's as as ancillary to his action A; it occupies a place subordinate to A in his purposes,and is done by him with the intentionof A-ing. Actions that are viewed in this way by theiragentsmay be said to
3 Cf. Danto's earlier account of basicness, "Basic Actions," p. 142, and Stoutop. land's criticism, cit., pp. 468f. 4 Stoutland, op. cit., pp. 470ff.Stoutland borrows his terminologyfrom Von Wright, Norm and Action (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), pp. 39ff. But Von Wright uses 'consequence' to cover only causal consequences, whereas Stoutland uses the termmore broadly; here I followVon Wright. 5 The word 'change' here covers non-changes also, these being the results of acts of preventionand forebearance.

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be teleologically more basic than the action to which theyare consideredancillary.In the case at hand, then,Smith'saction of shooting Jones is both causally and teleologicallymore basic than his action of killingJones. It seems best to interpretthe requirementfor basicness cited above as having it that,in orderto be basic, an action must involve no other action of the same agent that is both causally and teleologically more basic. For suppose a person knows enough about physiology be able to describeand pick out preciselythe set of to muscles that control the upward movementof his arm. It is generally agreed that such a person,because he knows those muscles will be flexedif he raises his arm, is able to perform the action of flexingthem. If he does performthis physiologicalaction, it will be included in raisinghis arm Justas Smith'saction of shootingis included in that of killing: ,thetensingof the muscles will cause the arm to go up. Yet in such cases we are inclined to say not that the person raises his arm by flexinghis muscles,but that he flexes his musclesby raisingthe arm. That is, we treatsuch cases as such that the agent views his act of arm-raising a means, if not of as performing the physiologicalaction, at least of seeing that it gets performed,in which case it, rather than the physiological act, would appear to be teleologicallymore basic. The question is whetherin such cases raising an arm is to be viewed as a basic action.6 On some accountsit cannot be, namelythosehaving it thatbasic actions cannot include otheractionsof the same agent.Arm-raising basic actions as violates that demand here. But if one characterizes actionsnot performed performing otheractions,arm-raising by may yet turn out to be basic in this case, for no action has yetbeen encounteredthat clearlyought to be viewed as an action by performing which the agent in this case raises his arm. In this respectat of least,the lattercharacterization basicnessis the moreliberal,since it would allow an action to count as basic when the former would not. Analogously, will demand less of an action in orderthatit be it basic if the requirement under discussionis explicated along lines I suggestedby this characterization. Accordingly, shall in what follows assume that,in order to be basic, an action A of an agent M must include nothingB that is also an action of M's and is both causally and teleologicallymore basic than A. This requirement
6 My discussion of this difficulty heavily indebted to that of Baier, op. cit., is pp. 166ff.She points out that cases like this render some criteria for basicness undesirable, if it be demanded that such criteria select only more bodily movements as basic.

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condiaccepted as a necessary would, I think,be all but universally tionforbasicness.7 There are, of course,cases wherearm-raising violatesthisrequireit ment,e.g.,wherea personraisesone arm by lifting withtheother. But this does not normallyoccur when one raises an arm, and the general opinion is that the requirementis not violated in the normalcase. I wishto argue thatit is.
TRYING TO RAISE ONE'S ARM

It is helpfulin thisconnectionto considercases wherea persontries involves to raise his arm. For even if not everycase of arm-raising trying raise it, actions that normallyserve as a means to raising to one's arm, if such therebe, mightbe more easily noticed in situaNow we generallyspeak of trytions where theycount as attempts. an ing eitherwhen someone sets out to perform action and unexthe pectedlyfails or when at the timehe setsout to perform action thereis doubt thathe will succeed. The reason forfailureor doubt it of successmay vary:wherea bodily action is attempted, mightbe I shall have nothingto say about cases that the agent is paralyzed. of paralysishere; they are important,but I suspect they can be betterunderstoodif one first understandscases where the agent is thereis much to be learned of normalphysicalability.At all events, fromcases of this normal sort.Here, then,are threecases wherean able-bodiedpersontriesto raise his arm: (1) A man's arm is being held down by his young son, who in a challengeshim to raise it. The fatherdoubts testof strength he can, but says he will try.He then tries to raise his arm, and succeeds. (2) The same as (1), except that the fatherfails to raise his arm. bit. It does not move theslightest (3) A man seated at a lecture wishes to ask a question. Unbeknownstto him his sleeve has got caught on the arm of his chair. He triesto raise his arm to get the speaker'sattention. He fails; thearm does not move at all. Generally at least, attemptsconsistin somethinga person does, If and thesecases are no different. we were to ask the agent in each to of themwhat he did by way of trying raise his arm,we would be surprisedto hear him say that,although he tried to raise his arm, his therewas absolutelynothinghe did that constituted attemptto
condition: numerous furtherdemands can be made, e.g., 7 But not a sufficient that the action have no other action related to it as raising an arm is to signalling a turn.See Stoutland,op. cit., p. 474.

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raise it.8 Rather, we would expect his reply to be a descriptionof he something did. As to what the doing mightbe, that could vary. The father, being aware of an obstacle,mightby way of trying to raise his arm have jerked upward on it with his freehand. But he need not have behaved in this way (perhaps his son would have considered it cheating), and the man in (3) probably would not have done this,since he anticipatedno difficulty. Accordingly, it let be assumed that in none of thesecases does the agent's attemptinvolve the use of some part of his body that does not ordinarily serveas an instrument raisinghis arm. for If thisbe assumed,then in all threecases roughlythe same reply would most likelybe given to the question what was done by way of trying. We would be told the attemptconsistedin puttingforth to a physicaleffort raise the arm. The degreeof effort, the sudand dennesswith which it was made, mightvaryfromcase to case: perhaps it was verystrenuousand sudden in (1) and (2), for example, but less so in (3). But in mostcases like these,thiswould be the only Asked what he did by way of trying raise difference. to significant his arm,the agent in each case would probablysay,"I exertedeffort of to raise my arm," "I strainedto raise it," or something the sort, and onlookers would give the same type of account. Making a to physicaleffort raise one's arm can, then,count as an attemptto raise it in casessuch as these. It is importantto observe that, in all these cases, we treat the he in agent'sattemptas consisting something can do and yetfail to said thatattempts perform to raise his arm. It is sometimes acts like arm-raising the consist,in some or all cases,in actually performing it action, or in performing with a special degree of exertionYAccountsof thissortwill not do. In the first to place, trying raise one's arm cannotalwaysinclude raisingit,forthenit would be impossible to tryto raise one's arm and fail, which quite obviouslyit is not. But even wherethe agenttriesand succeeds,as in (1), his trying does not include raisinghis arm. If that were so, what his attemptconor sistsin would depend on whetherit was successful not, and tryIf ing never has this characteristic. it did, we should be able to inferfromstatements like "He will tryto raise his arm,but it is not such as "He will try certainwhetherhe will succeed," a statement
8 Taylor seems to think something like this might be said when a completely paralyzed man tries to raise his arm and fails, op. cit., pp. 84f. But I think he would concur that such a statementwould be odd when the agent is able-bodied. 9For example, Danto, in "What We Can Do," pp. 439f., holds that "trying to do B" is equivalent to "doing B with a special effort," and gives the example of movingone's arms against ropes that bind one.

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to raise his arm, but it is not certainwhat his attemptwill consist are ever drawn; in fact,in most cases in." Yet no such inferences is statement true,thesecondis false. wherethe first involvesphysical It is a further errorto suppose that when trying exertion,the exertionmust be to some special degree. It often is in cases where the agent is unsure of success,but this is less likely is And even where difficulty anwhere he anticipatesno difficulty. ticipated,no special degree of exertionneed occur. Thus a person mightsuspecthis sleeve is caught on his chair, tryto raise his arm avoid exertinghimselfto any in order to findout, and specifically extraordinary degree, so that in the event the sleeve is caught,it will not be damaged. in Now if in the cases describedthe agent'sattemptconsists makto ing a physical effort raise his arm, the question arises whether peris in case (1), where the action of arm-raising successfully formed, the action violates the requirement for basicness cited I earlier.I want to argue that it does, but first want to argue that is the normal act of arm-raising much like that which occurs in case (1).
THE NORMAL ACT OF RAISING ONE'S ARM

an to It oftenhappens that,by way of trying perform action A, a person does somethingof a sort that would normallybe involved to By in A-inganyway. way of trying kill Jones,forexample,Smith to mightshoot him. The above cases of trying raise an arm are like to this.Normally,raisingone's arm does not involvestraining raise to the arm, but it does involve making an effort raise it. One way to see this is by noting that the agent in (3) did not know his sleeve was caught,and so had no reason to suppose beforehandthat he would fail to raise his arm. This being so, his attemptwould not consist in anythingvery unusual. That is to say, what the agent would be nothingin addition to what in (3) does by way of trying he usually does in raisinghis arm, except in so far as having once noticed difficulty, mightinstead of ceasing to trybegin to strain. he makes an effort Hence it mustbe thathe, and anyoneelse, normally to raise his armwhenhe does raise it. lead to the same conclusion.SometimesatOther considerations temptsto raise an arm do consist in exertinga special degree of forceto raise it. But how can we speak of a special degree of exertion in these cases if thereis no normal degree of exertionassociatd withraisingan arm?There mustbe some degreeof exertionby Also, we comparisonwith which other degrees are extraordinary. any need to accountforthe factthat the averagepersonwould resist

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suggestionthat he does not, in normal cases of raising an arm, to make an effort raise it. If the agent in (1), for example, were from normal in that here he differed told his act of arm-raising exertedhimselfto raise his arm,whereashe normallyjust raises it, he would say that if by "just raises it" we mean he does not normally engage in any exertion at all to raise his arm, the analysisis false. In the normal case too, he would say,he makes an betweencases where one raises that is one of the differences effort; his arm and cases wherethe arm goes up because someoneelse raises it. One can, of course,say a person "just" raiseshis arm in the normal case, but to say this is not to say he does nothingelse. It is to say the action comes offin the normal way,with no undue complication, as when a practicedand callous murderersays,"There was nothingto it really;I just killed him." Another point needs to be noted here, one which, though puzzling in some ways,also indicatesthat the normal act of arm-raising to involvesmaking an effort raise the arm. It was assumed that,in the the above cases of trying, attemptdid not involve jerking upward on the arm withone's freehand. Yet someonewho did do such a thingcould, afterall, also be said to have made a physicaleffort to raise his arm. Now suppose we were to ask one of the agentsin fromthat of the man cases (1) to (3) how his exertionhad differed who jerks upward on his arm. Aside fromtelling us what he had not done, i.e., that he had not used his free hand, about the best thingthe agentcould saywould be this: thathe had exertedhimself in the way normally suited to raisingthe arm,whereasthe man who jerks on his arm does not. That is how he would have to go about tellingus whathe did do. More will have to be said below about the for necessity this reply,but the importantthinghere is that it too indicates that the normal act of raising an arm is like that performedin case (1). Hence I conclude that this is so; the typicalcase of raising one's arm is a case in which one makes a physicaleffort to raise it. I turnnow to the question whetherthe normal act of raisingone's in arm,and thatperformed case (1), violatesthe conditionforbasicness set forthabove. The crucial business here, as it turns out, is to to see that makingan effort raise one's arm, as it occursin these cases,is an action, and to understandthe kind of action it is. Once thisis done, it is an easymatterto deal withthe otheraspectsof the of conditionforbasicness.Now it is obvious that the first necessary criterionfor action I have embodied in the the four requirements
MAKING AN EFFORT TO RAISE ONE'S ARM AS ACTION

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adopted is satisfied here. Making an effort raise an arm is clearly to somethinga person can be said to do. It is not difficult see that to theotherrequirements satisfied well. are as When a personmakes a physicaleffort raise his arm,he knows to it. The man in case (3) would be surprised, doubt, that when he no set out to raise his arm he failed to raise it. But he would hardlybe surprisedat having made an effort raise it. Indeed, it is preto ciselybecause he knowshe made an effort raise it, and knowsthe to effort generallyissues in success,that he would be surprisedhe did not raise his arm. Equally, he would have knownhe had made the effort he had raised his arm. No one who performs if the typical act of arm-raising needs to be told that in so doing he makes an effort raise the arm. The condition of knowledgeis, then, fulto filled. Making an effort in these cases, also something do intenis, we tionally.What a person does is done intentionally provided it is done with some intention.Now when a person exertshimselfto raise his arm,he exertshimself withthe intention raisinghis arm. of This is signified the 'to' in the description the doing. "He exby of erted himselfto raise his arm, but did not exert himselfwith the intention of raising his arm," is self-contradictory. The person might,of course,have had other intentionsalso, but if he did not make the effort with the intentionof raisinghis arm,thenwhatever else it may have been, it was not an effort raise his arm. to Finally, a person's making an effort raise his arm is in most to cases a doing over which he would ordinarilybe understood to exercisefull controland forwhichhe would be consideredresponsible. The averageperson would, I submit,say that if when a person raises his arm he is not responsiblefor exertinghimselfto raise it, then he is not responsibleforraisingit either, foranything or he does by raisingit. Also, thereis the consideration that the agent in to case (3) mightbe blamed forexerting himself raise his arm. Someto one mightsay, "He had no businesseven makingan effort raise his arm when he did; the speaker was still in the middle of his But if he is retalk," and to say this is to hold him responsible.10 sponsible,then anyone who raiseshis arm in normal circumstances
10Generally, a person's making an effortto raise his arm is not a doing of peculiar moral value, so the question of responsibilitydoes not arise. But the same goes for raising the arm, and for the same reason. Both doings tend to have moral significance, only where they serve as means to achieving a good or bad outcome, and then theyare embedded in a more complex doing of bringing about the outcome in question. It is this larger deed for which the agent is called to task.

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must also be responsiblefor exertinghimselfto raise it. For up to is and including the point at which the effort made, what goes on in in (3) does not differ any respect relevant to questions of refromwhat goes on in the normal act of arm-raising. sponsibility oneselfto raise one's arm is, in cases (1) I conclude that exerting as to (3) and in the normal act of arm-raising well, an action.To see just what kind of action it is, it must be decided what its resultis; depends above all on what forwhat sortof action a personperforms What, sortof changeis broughtabout when the action is performed. then,is the resultof this action? It is, I submit,the verychange a would describe as the tensingof those muscles which physiologist control the upward movementof one's arm. When, in the cases a under discussion, person exertshimselfto raise his arm,he brings intenabout what is in fact this change,and he does so knowingly, That is not to say, however,that the tionally,and responsibly. action ought to be describedas one of flexingmuscles.There is a earlier between it and the act of muscle-flexing crucial difference seen to raise problems for the concept of basicness.The latter is an action comprehendedby its agent in physiologicalterms; the act of exertionthat normallyoccurswhen an arm is raised is comprehendedby theway it feels. It is oftendeemed erroneousto speak of actionsof muscle-flexing where bringingabout an event of except in special circumstances, an explicitlyphysiologicalsort is somethingthe agent understands himselfto be doing, and intends to do. I see nothingwrong with this view; to describean action in physiologicaltermsis to suggest is it the agent comprehends as such,and thissuggestion only rarely to in order.But merely say thisis to overlookthe factthat a change normallyof interestonly to physiologists that has characteristics by mightbe comprehended the average person in virtueof its havand ing othercharacteristics, as such count as the resultof an action that is quite commonplace. That is what obtains regardingthe What the act of exertion normally associated with arm-raising. physiologistunderstands as the tensing of certain muscles the by ordinaryperson understandsas an event characterized what he feelswhen it occurs,i.e., tensionin a certainpart of his body. As so the characterized tensingof thosemusclescountsas the resultof the act of exertion. Any able-bodied person knows what it feelslike to engage in an act of exertionof the sort that counts as an attemptin cases (1) to (3); indeed thereis little besides the feelingby which to know the action, for no publicly observable event like the movementof an

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The event that is arm need occur for the action to be performed. the agent'ssensingof the exertionis not, however,the resultof the act of exertingoneself; if it were,producing the sensationby artito ficial stimulationof the brain would count as making an effort false. Rather, the result of the raise one's arm, and that is surely action is the exertion itself,the event characterizedby the tension felt when it occurs. But what is this event except the tensing of the musclesthat controlthe upward movementof one's arm? It is where those muscles lie that we would locate the tension felt, and it is felt just when those muscles contract.It must, then, be the tensingof thosemusclesthat is the resultof the act of exertion in in cases (1) to (3), and the similar act performed the usual case of raising an arm. It counts as the result,however,not in that its some detailed physioare characteristics such that it would satisfy but in that it feels just as it does, for it is in logical description, the latterrespectthatit is understoodand intended. It is because its resultis understoodby the agent in thisway that it is misleadingto speak of the act of exertioninvolved in raising one's arm as an act of flexingmuscles.But if this sort of description is ruled out, how is the action to be described?It seems to me the is that the best,if not the only alternative to characterize action by speaking in termsof the publicly observableevent it is usually of associatedwith,i.e., the upward movement the arm. The reason fromotheracts of in is that the characteristics which the act differs are exertion,and in virtueof which it is intentional, feltcharacteraccessible,in any given case where the istics. They are therefore it. only to the agent who performs Our lanaction is performed, of guage is spare in the apparatus it providesfor speaking directly of to so such characteristics, it is difficult give precise descriptions acts of exertion in terms of them. We can speak of bringing about a felt tension,and give the rough location of it, but little more. And though this approach might sufficeto distinguish to to making an effort move an arm from,say, making an effort move a leg, it is doubtful that it could be used to make finerdistinctionsthan this, at least without getting into descriptionsso complexas to becomeimpractical. can be Greater accuracyand speed in making such distinctions acts of exertionin termsof overtbodily achieved by characterizing motions associated with them. This is done when an act of exerto as tion is characterized makingan effort raise an arm or as makof ing an effort the sortnormallysuited to raisingan arm. Part of and mostof thatof the second,is to description, the role of the first

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betweenthis act of exertionand othersin which implya difference is one might engage. The difference not, of course, described in intrinsicto the act of exertionin question, termsof characteristics but accountslike this can be used to make clear in an indirectway are, what those characteristics provided the listeneris himselfable of to make an effort this sort. He will know what it feels like to make the effort, that it is normallyassociatedwith the upward and movementof one's arm; hence he will understandwhat is being talked about.1"Most of us are in this position with respectto a lot thusthisway of speakingabout them of actionsof physicalexertion, is themostuseful. however,that the need fordescriptions It should not be thought, of of this sort must be taken to imply that the only characteristic to raisingan arm is that it is so suited, suited the exertionnormally we or that this is the only characteristic know it to have.'2 It has a many of which we know,but not all of lot of other characteristics, communicationwith othersabout it. which are suited to effective We know how it feels,and mostof us know the resultof thisaction is in fact the event which is the tensingof the musclescontrolling of theupwardmovement thearm. If this last point be doubted, consideragain somethingthat was said earlier: that the best way for the agent in cases (1) to (3) to his distinguish act of exertionfromthat of the man who jerks upward on his arm is by sayinghis own exertionis of the normalsort. The reasonswhythisis the best course should now be obvious; but note it was not claimed thatthisis what the agentwould say,and he might well not have said it. Anyone who has ever discussedthese matterswith the philosophicallyuninitiatedknows that,as like as thinghe would say is that he had flexedthe muscles not, the first
11Such an account would, of course, be useless to a man who has never been able to performacts of exertion,but that is not because the account is indirect: any other would be equally useless. The reason is that acts of exertion must, like colors, be experienced before words describing them can be understood. The need for this experience also explains why teaching others to perform bodily acts, e.g., complicated dives, involves little verbal instruction,and much showing and supervised practice. It is not that such actions are basic, for if that were so there would be nothing to teach. Rather, it is that the means for perthem need to be felt to be fullylearned. forming 12 This misapprehension could arise if the idea that actions are known and intended by their agents "under descriptions"is taken too literally.The point should be that actions are known and intended in so far as their results are understood to have certain characteristics.There is no harm in making this point by speaking of descriptions,but it should not be thought that, in the abin sence of words that stand for the characteristics virtue of which somethingis known, it cannot be known. Such a view would be odd, to say the least: it suggests that language had to exist before anyone ever came to know anything, including a language.

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that raise his arm. We, being initiated,would seek to to dislodge him fromwhat this implies,but we should not do so withoutseeking to understandwhyhe would say this. It is because he, like us, knowsthe rudiments physiology, of and knowsthat when he makes the normal physicaleffort raise his arm,he does in fact flexjust to those muscles.Being unable to say much about the felt characteristics of the exertion,he seeks to describe the action in this way, even though he cannot name the muscles in question, could not pick them out in an anatomical diagram, explain the role of each, etc. He does so because this too is a way of givingthe listener some idea of what the resultof the action is. For all its misleadingness, then, this kind of account also can be used for conversing about actsof exertion, and it frequently is.
RAISING ONE'S ARM BY MAKING AN EFFORT

It remainsonly to be observedthat the act of exertionthat is normally suited to raisingone's arm is both causally and teleologically more basic than that of raising it. Both points should by now be obvious. As for the first, is a matterof physiologicalfact that, it when a person performs normal act of arm-raising, upward a the motion of his arm is caused by the tensingof a set of muscles. Since in such cases the event which is the tensingof those muscles is the resultof an action of physicalexertionon the agent'spart,it followsthat the upward motion of the arm is a consequenceof the act of exertion.But the motionof the arm is the resultof the action of raising it; hence making a physical effort raise one's arm is, to in the general case, an action causally more basic than raising it. It would be uselessto object here thatthe causal relationbetween the resultof the act of exertionand the resultof the act of arm-raising cannot obtain, because the former action needs to be characterized, in the usual case, by referenceto the latter,or because the result of the act of exertionmight,for some purposes,need to be characterizedas a tensing of a sort associated with the upward movementof one's arm. It is sometimesclaimed that this sort of descriptive dependence bespeaks a logical relationshipbetween the events so characterized, at least that it does so where no indeor pendent descriptions available, and that this rules out a causal are relationshipbetween the events.13 Presentspace does not permita detailed treatment such arguments, of which have in any case come under heavy fire from other quarters.14 But such a treatment is
Cf. Melden, op. cit.,pp. 51f.,and Taylor, op. cit.,pp. 68f. See especially D. Davidson, "Actions,Reasons and Causes," this jouRNAL, LX, 23 (Nov. 7, 1963): 685-700, and J. J. Valberg, "Some Remarks on Action and Desire," ibid., LXVII, 15 (Aug. 6, 1970): 503-520.
13
14

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all have unnecessary: that needs to be noted is that such arguments not because, as it turns no forceagainst the view I have set forth, out, independent physiologicaldescriptionsare available for the events I have said are causally related, but because of the simple fact that these events are causally related, regardlessof how they are or must be described.If this turnsout to be incompatiblewith claims about alleged logical relationsbetween events,those claims must,I would argue,be abandoned. Finally, the act of exertionusually involvedin raisingan arm is morebasic than thatof raisingit. The action is one of teleologically making an effort raise the arm, and to say this is to say the to agent engagesin the exertionas a means to raisingthe arm, hence in with the intentionof raising it. When an action is performed this way it is understoodby its agent as ancillary to raising his arm,and occupies a place in his purposessubordinateto the latter more basic. In the case where,in raisact; hence it is teleologically the physioing his arm,the agent also intendsto perform explicitly logical action of tensingthe set of musclesthat controlthe upward movementof his arm, there occurs the interesting phenomenon that the bringingabout of preciselythe same event counts as an action in two different respects: firstas exertion,and second as morebasic than In muscle-tensing. the first aspect,it is teleologically it is in the second. It is worthnoting that this sort of thingoccurs frequently: signaling a question by raising an arm is such a case, and so is exactingrevengefromJones by killing him. The claim that exertingoneself to raise one's arm is an action teleologicallymore basic than that of raising it should not, of course,be taken to implythatin raisingan arm we need necessarily give serious thought to the act of exertion, or deliberate over whetherto employit as a means. We might,but thisis usually not to necessary, just as it is not necessary give serious thoughtto actions like raisingan arm, when theyare done as a means to doing else. The reasonis thatin mostcases an action performed something anotheris a commonlyemployedmeans, as a means to performing and this is such a case. and so does not meritany special attention, as In addition,when an action B is performed a means to A-ing,it is at least in most cases not a distinctevent fromA, in which case to considerperforming action A, whereB is understoodas the the standard means to be employed, is to consider B-ing, and indeThis also appendent deliberation about B becomes unnecessary. plies in the presentcase, and is doubtlessa large part of the reason whyactionsof exertionhave tended generallyto be overlooked.

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CONCLUSION

I If the considerations have presentedare correct,then the necessary condition for basicness adopted earlier is violated in case (1), and in the normal case of raising an arm. I conclude, therefore, analogous thatraisingone's arm is not a basic action.Considerations to those raised here apply to other actions which, like raising an arm, have publicly observablemotionsof the agent's body as their result; so it seems a reasonable conjecturethat the entire class of overt bodily actions possessesfew,if any, membersthat are basic. argued, Naturally,thisgivesrise to a problem: If, as is frequently the view that all actions are nonbasic givesrise to an unacceptable The question thus infiniteregress,there must be basic actions.15 arises which actions have this status,and that is a question I have it not triedto answer.It seemsto me thatanswering requiresgiving accountof cases whereparalytics to perform bodily try a satisfactory thingsfirst: actions,and that is a storylong in the telling.But first more has been learned about if what has been said here is correct, actionslike raisingan arm,and thatis a gain.
HUGH MCCANN

and Mechanical University Texas Agricultural BOOK REVIEWS A Theory of Human Action, ALVIN I. GOLDMAN. 1970.x, 230 p. $5.95. N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs,

The currentphilosophical interestin human action and related topics can be traced to Gilbert Ryle's Concept of Mind (1949). In has recentyearsthisinterest accelerated:withinthe last decade over 400 articlesin this area have appeared in the respectedphilosophical journals. With few exceptions, the profitablediscussion has taken place in the journals.1The resulthas been piecemeal, often discussion. disunified Alvin Goldman's book marks the beginning of a new level of time, of in sophistication the treatment human action. For the first manyof the issues discussedin the journals-for example, act indiinto viduation,basic action,reasonsas causes-have been integrated a coherentwhole. But the value of this book is not limited to the
15There are several such arguments;see Danto, "Basic Actions," p. 145, Stoutland, op. cit., p. 467, and Taylor, op. cit., p. 118. 1 Some of the exceptions are: A. I. Melden, Free Action (New York: Humanities Press, 1961); Charles Taylor, The Explanation of Behavior (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964); and Richard Taylor, Action and Purpose (EngleN.J.: Prentice-Hall,1966). wood Cliffs,