^' Academy of Management Journal 20(10. Vol. 43. No. 6. 1283-1291.

FREDERICK W. TAYLOR'S 1899 PIG IRON OBSERVATIONS: EXAMINING EACT, EICTION, AND LESSONS EOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM
CHARLES D. WREGE Cornell University RICHARD M. HODGETTS Florida International University Taylor's pig iron observations at Bethlehem Iron in 1899 are often cited as an example of how scientific management helped increase industrial efficiency. The current research, relying almost exclusively on primary sources, reveals that Taylor's famous pig iron anecdote was erroneous. Additionally, this article offers lessons and guidelines for managers in the new millennium. Although Frederick W. Taylor's impact on management cannot be denied, whether his work always represented the use of science to solve management problems is questionable. George has said that Taylor believed "to maximize output with a given level of effort . . . the scientific method had to be applied to worker selection, job determination, creation ofa proper environment, and so on, to determine properly the task for each man" [1972: 93). This concept of a scientific, research-based approach in management practice was not new (Hoagland, 1955). For example, in Poland in the late 1890s Karol Adamiecki was developing work flow network diagrams to solve production problems in local factories [Marsh, 1975). However, Taylor did impress his audiences by describing the apparent use of scientific methods to reduce costs and to create prosperity for the workforce. More importantly, his claims were readily accepted by practitioners and scholars until almost 75 years later, when they were challenged by Wrege and Perroni [1974). These authors focused on how Taylor's account of his study of pig iron loading at the Bethlehem Iron Company continually changed in the years from 1901 to 1911. However, they did not attempt to study the details of pig iron loading or whether the company or the workers actually prospered from the piece rate system that Taylor recommended. The current research focuses on these latter three aspects of Taylor's work. The reason for the continued acceptance of Taylor's observations largely lies in the persistent reliance of management scholars on published sources (usually those appearing in management publications) rather than on original documents prepared at the time of the actual events Taylor described.
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Unfortunately, for the majority of the readers of management publications, the printed word has an aura of authenticity that is seldom questioned, and original documents are neglected. This study draws on original documents and presents an analysis of what really happened during the famous pig iron observations of 1899. It also presents lessons to be learned by researchers in general and management scholars in particular.

BACKGROUND Management history is replete with anecdotes regarding the work of prominent people. Yet perhaps no story is more famous that that of Frederick Taylor's pig iron observations, which were conducted at the Bethlehem Iron Company of South Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, in March-May 1899. Taylor had come to Bethlehem at the behest of Robert Linderman, president of the company, to reduce costs by introducing a piece rate system [South Bethlehem Globe, 1898; Taylor, 1898). When Taylor arrived at Bethlehem, pig iron was selling at $11.50 per long ton [2,240 pounds) [Hobson, 1899), and the company had 10,000 tons on hand. However, it was waiting for a better price before selling. By March 1899, the price had risen to $13.50 per long ton [Iron Age, 1899), and the company quickly sold its inventory and began preparations for loading the iron onto gondola cars for shipment. At this point Taylor decided to take advantage of the opportunity to study pig iron loading for the purpose of lowering loading costs, as well as to secure data for a book he was preparing on time and performing work. He assigned two of his assistants, James Gillespie and Hartley C. WoUe, to study the loading process. They reported

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their observations to Taylor, who made decisions. The two men began by first selecting ten of the very best workers and having them work as fast as they could loading pig iron for a full day. Commenting on the results, Wren (1994) reported: During the first day, the workers loaded 75 tons each, filling one car. Since the average tons per day had previously been about \2Vi tous per worker, the workers were exhausted. Gillespie aud Wolle then deducted 40 percent for time to be allotted to rest and delays, establishing the new standard at 45 tons per worker per day. (1994: 117) On the basis of these results, Taylor then set a piece rate of $0.0375 per ton. So a worker who met the standard of 45 tons would earn SI.69 for the day, a substantial increase over the $1.15 day rate that the average pig iron loader was then earning. On countless occasions, Taylor used the story he had fashioned about the pig iron observations to explain how productivity increases at Bethlehem Iron were achieved and how the workers earned more money. The "win-win" aspect of the anecdote was extremely attractive to Taylor's listeners. However, was his story accurate, or was it contrived through the use of omissions and generalizations regarding what really happened a century ago at Bethlehem?

Layout and Loading Pigs and piles. In 1899 at Bethlehem, a pig of iron (or ingot; 92 pounds) was 32 inches long, 4V2 inches high, and 4 inches wide. These pigs were organized for loading by first putting them into "basic piles." Each pile consisted of 390 pigs and was approximately 2 feet high, 2 feet deep, and 35 feet long. Then the workers added the basic piles together to create a pile of full pigs 10 feet tall. As seen in Figure la, the final result was 12 rows with 5 basic piles per row and then a shorter row in front that consisted of just over 2.5 basic piles. The reason for the shorter row was to make it possible to erect planks supported by wooden blocks from the pile of full pigs to the gondola car, located directly in front of the short pile. The men could then pick up the pigs, walk on the plank, and put them into the car. Gangs and gondolas. In the period March-May 1899, two types of standard gauge, wood gondola railway cars were being used at Bethlehem. According to John O'Connor, a freight car historian, the older of the two types was the 1869 gondola, which was 30 feet long and made to hold 25,000 pounds; the newer was tbe 1880 gondola, which was 33 feet long and made to hold 36,000 pounds (J. O'Connor, personal interview, September 2, 1997). In either case, it was possible to line up ten cars in front of a full pile and begin loading. As already noted, planks would be placed from tbe top of the gondola car to the front portion of the pile, which was five feet high (again, see Figure la) and three feet from the car. Two people in the gang would remain in the car, and the rest would bring the pig iron to them to be stacked neatly in the gondola so that the car would not tilt in transit and derail. The gang would start with level 1 of the pile and then move on to level 2. As the pig iron loading continued, the top of the pile would be reduced and the elevation of the planks would be increased, so that the men could load levels 3, 4, and 5. This explanation fits well with Taylor's description and gives the impression that the loading was both simple and routine. In fact, it was not so simple, for four reasons we discovered after careful analysis of tbe original documents but that Taylor failed to include when he told his pig iron story. First, considerable time was required to adjust the wooden blocks that were needed to support the planks [Gillespie & Wolle, 1899). Second, during bad weather the workers had to walk very carefully on the ingots and the planks, thus reducing their outputand weather in this geographic region during the winter and spring was sometimes brutal [Allentown Daily Call, 1899). Third, controlled ex-

METHODS

In an effort to clarify the work of Wrege and Perroni (1974) on Taylor's pig iron observations through use of greater detail and to evaluate the accuracy of Taylor's reports of his observations, we took four approaches. First, the report written by Gillespie and Wolle regarding the results of the observations in 1899 was studied in detail to determine the amount of work that the pig iron loaders did and their rates of pay. Second, an analysis was made of the weather conditions at Bethlehem during this time period. Third, the personal diary of Robert Sayre, second largest stockholder at Bethlehem, was studied. Fourth, from these new findings, lessons were derived for management scholars for the new millennium. A number of important considerations are critical in examining Taylor's pig iron story. One of the most significant is the nature of the product and the layout of the shipping area at Bethlehem Iron. A second is the process that was used in loading the iron for shipment. A third is the performance of the workers and the costs associated with the work. The following sections examine each of these.

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FIGURE 1 Configurations of Iron to Be Loaded (la) A Full Pile of Pigs

(lb) Types of Pocket Casts

Type 1 cast, hemmed in on all sides. Average loading time = .576 minutes

Type 2 cast, hemmed in on two sides, Average loading time = .548 minutes

Type 3 cast, hemmed in front and rear. Average loading time = .552 minutes

periments conducted by Gillespie and Wolle in the middle of March 1899 revealed that the work done by each of the work teams varied sharplyas did the labor cost per ton (see Table 1). So from the very beginning there were different amounts being loaded by different work teams, and Taylor and his associates were having trouble determining both standard work levels and incentive rates. Fourth, much of the loading was actually done from what were called "pocketed casts." These were piles of pigs located in various configurations around the

yard and containing special pig iron orders of 25 tons each, as shown in Figure lb. The average time it took a man to load a pig from a pile when walking 1 to 15 feet in good weather was .271 minutes; in contrast, loading from pocketed casts could require, as can be seen in Figure lb, as much as .576 minutes per pig because of the configuration of the casts (Gillespie & Wolle, 1899). Therefore, Taylor had to raise the pay rate for loading from pocketed casts, in some cases to as much as $0.0700 per long ton, and this significantly influenced overall costs.

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TABLE 1 Controlled Observations of Pig Iron Loading*

Factors Storage conditions Type of pig Total pounds loaded Pigs loaded Tons loaded Walk on levei Walk on plank Top of car Size of gang Friday, March 10 Saturday, March 11 Pile of 25.7 long tons (pocketed) Full: 92 pounds 57,568 (25.7 X 2,240) 626(57,568/92) 25.7 (57,568/2,240) ^ _ 5 feet 10'6" rise 2'6" above the plank 12 men (2 in the car. 10 loading) 54.0 minutes Cloudy. 55, clear, milder 2.14 (25.7/12) 0.03963 (2.14/54.0) 2.38 (0.039630 X 60) 23.8(2.38 X 10) 285.6(23.8 X 12) $13.80 ($1.15 X 12) (12 men) $0.048319 ($13.80/285.6) Monday, March 13 Pile of 16.6 long tons (pocketed) Full; 92 pounds 37,184(16.6 X 2.240) 404 (37,184/92) 16.6 (37.184/2,240) 7 feet 2'9" rise 2'6" above the plank 10 men (2 in the car. 8 loading) 14.0 minutes Fair, 60. cloudy, threatening 1.66 (16.6/10) 0.1660 (1.66/10) 9.96 (0.1660 X 60) 99.6 (9.96 X 10) 996 (99.6 X 10) Sn.50 ($1.15 X 10) (10 men) $0.011546 ($11.50/996)

Pile of 17.9 long tons (pocketed) Half: 46 pounds 40,096 (17.9 X 2,240) 872 (40,096/46) 17.9(40,096/2,240) 5 feet 12'3" rise 2'6" above the plank 4 men (2 in the car, 2 ioading) 52.5 minutes Time spent loading Cloudy, 50, Weather conditions clear, milder 4.48 (17.9/4) Tons per man Tons loaded per man per minute 0.08533 14.48/52.5) 5.12(0.08533 X 60) Tons loaded per man in 1 hour Tons loaded per man in 10 hours 51.2 (5.12 X 10) 204.8 (51.2 X 4) Tons loaded by gang $4.60 ($1.15 X4) Cost to load (4 men) $0.022461 ($4.60/204.8) Cost per ton " Source: Cillespie and Wolle (1899: 23-28).

In all likelihood, Taylor overlooked these prohlems because the work approach was eventually revised and the new one was easier to explain. Performance and Pay Gillespie and WoUe's ongoing analysis led them to conclude that the initial method of loading the pigs was inefficient. Too much time was lost in placing the planks in their proper position and supporting them with blocks of wood. So they designed metal hangers that hooked over the side of a gondola car, hanging two feet below the top of the car. The hangers made it possihle for one man to place one end of a plank on a pile and the other end in the hangers, thus eliminating the need to arrange the wooden hlocks on the railway tracks. Gillespie and Wolle also met with Taylor to determine the piece rate incentive plan. Taylor had set a rate of SO.0375 per long ton but found that the men would not load pig iron at this rate. There were two reasons for this reluctance. One was that the day rate was $1.15, and a worker would have to load 31 long tons in order to make more than this amount ($0.0375 X 31 = $1.16). The second reason was that the work of loading the increased tonnage was extremely fatiguing, as will be seen shortly, and many loaders found that after a day or two of loading they had to he reassigned to other work on a day rate basis because they could not continue their loading efforts. As a result, a revised incentive

plan based on how far the workers had to carry the iron was introduced. The piece rate per ton was increased to $0.0438 for those who were loading pig iron piled no more than 15 feet from the side of the car and not more than 5 feet below the top edge of the car. For those who had to walk greater distances or faced ohstacles in carrying the iron, the rate went as high as $0.0700 per ton (Gillespie & Wolle, 1899). Under the revised incentive plan, a few workers continued to load the cars, but the others had become too fatigued to remain on the incentive plan. So Gillespie and Wolle again changed the system. Each man was now assigned to a gondola, and he would simply throw the pigs into the car. With this arrangement, some workers were able to make more money by loading the pig iron under the incentive system than by accepting the $1.15 day rate. Of course, the actual wages earned depended on the distance the iron had to be carried, the elevation of the planks, and the difficulty of the loading. Moreover, most workers were unable to make more than $0.90 a day on the piece rate system, and so they chose to go back to the day rate of $1.15. However, two workers, Henry Noll and Simon Conrad, did profit from the incentive system because they were loading from distant pocketed casts and were thus paid as much as $0,070 per long ton. Yet not even they worked on the piece rate system every day. They needed time to rest and recover their energy. As seen in Table 2, in March 1899 Noll was on

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TABLE 2 Henry Noll and Simon Conrad's Work Records*

Date
Noll

Day Thursday and Friday Saturday, Monday, and Tuesday Wednesday-Friday Saturday Monday and Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday-Thursday Friday and Saturday Monday-Saturday and Monday Tuesday Wednesday and Thursday Friday and Saturday ' Monday and Tuesday Wednesday and Thursday Friday and Saturday Monday-Thursday Friday Saturday and Monday . Monday-Friday Saturday Monday * Tuesday and Wednesday Thursday
Friday

Type of Pay Incentive Incentive Daywork Incentive Daywork Incentive Daywork Incentive Daywork Daywork Incentive Daywork Incentive Deywork Incentive Daywork Incentive Daywork Incentive Daywork Incentive Daywork Incentive Daywork Incentive Daywork Incentive Daywork Incentive Daywork Incentive

Days 2 days 3 days 9 days 1 day 2 days 1 day 1 day 6 days 2 days 7 days 1 day 2 days 2 days 2 days 2 days 2 days 4 days 1 day 2 days 5 days 1 day 1 day 2 days 1 day 1 day 1 day 2 days 1 day 2 days 4 days 4 days

March 30-31 April 1, 3, 4 April 5-14 April 15 April 17-18 April 19 April 20 April 21, 22. 24-27 April 28-29 May 1-6. 8
May 9

May May May May May May May Mav

10-11 12-13 15-16 17-18 19-20 22-25 26 27-29

May 1-5 May 6

Miiy 8

May 9-10 May 11 May 12 May 13 May 15-16 May 17 May 18-19 May 20. 22-24 May 25-27. 29

Saturday Monday and Tuesday Wednesday Thursday and Friday Saturday and Monday-Wednesday Thursday-Saturday and Monday

Source; Wrege and Greenwood (1899).

the piece rate system for only 2 days. During April and May of that year, he was on the piece rate system only 11 days each month and was paid on a day work hasis for the remaining 14 work days in each month, A close analysis of Table 2 shows that, in early April 1899, Noll worked under the incentive payment plan for 3 days and then returned to day work for 9 days. Later in the month, he worked 6 days on incentive (a day off, Sunday, fell in the middle of this work period) and then went on day rate for 9 days. Only at the end of May did he work steadily on the incentive system. Of course, some of ihe occasions on which he was paid a day rate were a result of the weatherbut many were not. This is evident (see Table 2) from the records of the other loader. Simon Conrad, who had 12 incentive days during May. Six of these days were ones on which Noll was on day rate! So it is highly likely that Noll could also have worked on incentive these days. Why did he not? Fatigue was a key reason.

Another factor that was never explained by Taylor is how the pig iron handlers could have saved the company money, given that there were so many costs associated with their efforts. Taylor reported that his goal was to load a long ton at a cost of S0.0500 [Taylor. 1901). In fact, this goal was impossihle. given that workers could earn more than $0.0500 by loading from the pocketed casts, where the rates were as high as $0.0700 per long ton. How much, then, did Taylor save the company with his new method of loading the iron? In analyzing the costs for the 7.490 long tons that were actually loaded from March 30 through May 31, 1899, it is important to realize that only 27 percent (2,015/7,490) of this work was done under the incentive plau. The bulk of the tonnage was loaded hy day gangs paid $0.0940 per ton. Exhibit 1 (next page) provides an analysis of these data. So Taylor's story about loading the pigs at $0.0500 per ton was not true, although he did man-

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EXHIBIT 1 Costs for Loading Pig Iron at Bethlehem Iron Company, March 30-May 31, 1899: The Old Method versus Taylor's Modified Approach
old method: Totai cost of loading 7.490 long tons under day rate of $0.0904/ton Modified approach: Amount Loaded under Piece Rate Worker Noll Conrad All others Total Long Tons
745 457 813

$677.10

Amount Earned $ 41.58 23.01 24.32 S 88.91

2.015
Cost of Loading Remaining Amount

7,490 -2,015 5,475

long tons long tons loaded under piece rate long tons left to be loaded under day rate (S0.904/ton) $494.94

Total cosi of loading 7,490 long tons under modified approach. March 30-May 31. 1899

88.91

494,94 $ 583.85
Savings based on use of modified approach

ples of Scientific Management, or from current textbooks. In Taylor's case, he simplified the observations by presenting only some of the information. As a result, the story is fluid and consistent, but it omits many significant facts, as reported here. In retrospect, it is evident that Taylor took some of the facts associated with the observations and wove them together into a coherent and logical story that intrigued his audience. hi fairness, Taylor is not the only person to have presented erroneous anecdotal data. Many management textbook authors have drawn on secondary sources in presenting Taylor's studies. In the process, they have embellished the data and added "facts" that are simply not true. As a result, Taylor's anecdotes have now taken on mythical proportions. For example, the data from Gillespie and Wolle show that, after tbey had conducted one day of walking experiments with a group of seven workers, Gillespie and Wolle assigned the pig iron handlers to their tasks. In contrast to what some basic textbooks report, Taylor and his assistants conducted no training of workers and made no refined adjustments to the loading routines. The only changes that were made were in the amount of money paid per long ton (up to $0.0700 for some pocketed casts) and the way the workers loaded the cars (initially in teams and then individually).

$ 677.10
-583.B5 $ 93.25

Primary Sources Must Be Consulted The second lesson to be learned for management historians is that original sources must be examined because they offer a more complete, more detailed picture. The data provided by Gillespie and Wolle clearly show that the pig iron loading techniques had to be continually changed because the work was too demanding and the money was not sufficiently motivational. Additionally, original documents reveal that Taylor's primary interest in conducting these observations was probably to convince )oseph Wbarton, Bethlehem's primary stockholder, to let him buy stock at a reduced price (Taylor, 1899). Taylor's observations may well have been influenced by his attempts to ingratiate himself with the major stockholders, who knew little about what he was doing and were likely to believe his reports of great success. In fact, Robert Sayre, who was at Bethlehem when Taylor was supposedly saving the company money, wrote in his diary for April 8, 1899. that Taylor was "causing a great deal of money to be spent imnecessarily" [Robert Sayre Diary, 1899).

age to reduce the overall cost of loading the 7,490 long tons by a total of $93.25 (see Table 3). On the other hand, he omitted a significant additional cost; Because the pig iron handlers were now throwing the iron into the car, there would be damage to the gondolas, and these costs would be billed back to Bethlehem. LESSONS TO BE LEARNED ;

The pig iron observations offer some very useful lessons to management researchers, especially those in the management history area. The following is a discussion of five of the most useful. Anecdotal Data Are Often Erroneous Most of what management scholars know about the pig iron observations has been learned from secondary sources, such as Taylor's (1911) Princi-

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All Data Have Inconsistencies One of the reasons why Taylor's pig tale has survived for so long is that it has no inconsistencies. Everything in the story fits together neatly. In fact, an analysis of the primary data associated with these observations shows that a number of things made it difficult to state definitively what was happening and to measure the full bottom-line impact of the work. When there are no inconsistencies in the data, one has to wonder what has been left out of the calculations. For example, before undertaking the studies, Taylor relied on data generated by Gillespie and Wolle from company records in March 1899. They found that a total of 3,430 long tons had been loaded in 2,697 hours at a cost of $310.10, or $0.1106 per ton (3,430/S310.10), and that the average person loaded 12.7 tons daily [Gillespie & Wolle, 1899). These records, however, were inadequate because they did not cover the number of men loading the iron, how the iron was stored (whether in unobstructed piles or pocketed casts), the distance the iron had to be carried, the height of the planks, the type of railway cars being loaded, or the weather conditions from March 1 to March 15, 1899. Second, the cost of loading a pig varied considerably, as seen in Table 1. One of the determining factors was how long the crews worked. The data In this table show that the crew loading iron on March 13 did so at a cost of less than 2 cents per ton, but they worked for only 14 minutes. The other two crews worked for a little less than 1 hour. Given that the fatigue factor was critical in this work and the typical workday was 10 hours, how valuable were findings that were based on less than 60 minutes of work? Third, when each worker was assigned his own gondola to load and the pigs were thrown into the wooden car rather than stacked neatly in it, the useful Ufe of the car would have been reduced. The reason the pigs had been stacked was to ensure that they did not slide about and cause excessive wear and tear on a gondola's bearings and undercarriage, injuries that would cause derailment. Damage from this new loading method would have been costly, and the railroad would have passed these costs on to Bethlehem. However, this fact was never explored by Gillespie and WoUe, an omission that leaves one to ponder what the long-run cost of loading the pigs under this new arrangement would have been.

drive down their own loading costs. Yet such evidence would be the best proof that the observations did indeed produce the results that Taylor cited. In every science, replication is critical to theory validation. One reason for the lack of replication is undoubtedly that Taylor's approach was no more efficient than the old method of loading iron. Any company that carefully examined the costs and the savings would have quickly concluded that the prize was not worth the pursuit. A second reason overlooked by most by researchers is that Taylor's observations could not have added much to the company's bottom line, even if everything worked according to plan. His stated objective was to cut the cost of loading pig iron from $0.0904 per long ton to $0.0500, thus saving the company $0.0404 per long ton. Overlooking the fact that his payment plan, with its incentives running as high as $0,070 per long ton, made a $0.0404 saving impossible, one must consider the fact that even if Taylor had been totally successful in his efforts, he would have saved Bethlehem Iron a total ofonly $302.60 (7,490 long tons X .0404). So for the 50 days that the observations lasted, the firm would have been able to reduce expenses by a mere $6.05 a day! When other companies analyzed the value of Taylor's approach, it is likely that they also realized that all of this effort would, at best, produce little (if any) savings. This calculation was undoubtedly why there were no large-scale replications of the study. Taylor told a good tale, but he could not sell it to senior-level managers who focused on facts and not anecdotes. Digital Archiving Is Now Critical In 1994, two national groups, the Commission on Preservation and Access and the Research Libraries Group, created the Task Force on Digital Archives. Since then, this not-for-profit task force has been extremely active in helping to develop guidelines for ensuring the successful transfer and protection of digital material from one generation of computer technology to another. In particular, the group is helping archivists organize, preserve, and protect access to a wide range of stored resources by: (1) compiling and distributing guidelines, standards, and best practices for digital preservation, (2) developing varied means to coordinate digital preservation activities within institutions, and (3) helping to formulate institutional policies for acquiring, converting, storing, and maintaining digital materials (Hedstrom & Montgomery, 1998). As these kinds of efforts continue to make headway, records such as those used In the current research will be

Replication Is the Hallmark of Good Science There is no reported evidence of other companies' copying Taylor's approach and being able to

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better protected, and the ability to review and analyze original documentation will be significantly increased. THE VALUE OF THE OBSERVATIONS FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM In retrospect, the 1899 pig iron observations are important because they show that one of the primary goals of management has not changed in over a century: to reduce costs. At the same time, however, the observations point out the importance of researchers being more systematic and sophisticated in their approach to reaching their goals. Taylor and his associates made copious mistakes, the most important being that they simplified the results of their study and glossed over the inconsistencies. In the new millennium, where hypercompetition will rule the day, firms that repeat Taylor's mistakes will find themselves unable to compete effectively. A second and complementary conclusion that emerges from the reanalysls of Taylor's observations is that "benchmarking" is going to be a critical activity in the new millennium. In fact, this approach, and related strategies, are proving extremely important in helping organizations maintain a competitive stance. If Taylor and his associates had gone farther in studying all the elements influencing pig iron handling, they might have realized quite clearly that their cost figures were erroneous. Additionally, they did not get the workers involved in the process via feedback regarding how the work could be done more efficiently. Today many enterprises are sidestepping this problem by creating empowerment programs. Admittedly, empowerment was not a concept that would have been accepted in 1899, but that observation helps reinforce our point: new methods must be continually introduced if organizations' managements hope to increase their productivity levels. A third useful point to be derived from the Taylor studies is that in the new millennium, increased focus must be given to the scientific collection of data. Too much of Taylor, Gillespie, and Wolle's work was limited in scope and value. For example, the controlled observations that were conducted in March 1899 and reported in Table 1 did not contribute any substantive value to the study because the conditions under which each team worked were significantly different, thus making it impossible to answer key questions like these: What is the ideal work crew size? How do the working conditions correlate with the amount of output per day? Is there any difference in the physical characteris-

tics of the workers that results in some people doing more work than others? Even more importantly, if these work crews continued working for the entire ten-hour day, what conclusions could have been drawn regarding how to organize the crews for maximum efficiency? A fourth important point is that anecdotal data are no substitute for quantitative analysis. Modern organizations pursuing higher-quality outputs have now realized that record keeping, charting, feedback, and objective analysis are far more important than anecdotes. After studying some of America's most successful corporations, Hodgetts (1998) found that all of them used quantitative and ongoing measures to determine their quality and performance. Anecdotes typically smooth out inconsistencies and lead to misinterpretation of dataand these actions result in erroneous conclusions. In the new millennium, managers and scholars will need to pay far less attention to story telling and far more to data collection and analysis. In conclusion, the major reason for examining the pig iron observations is to reemphasize that reduced cost has long been and remains a major goal of management. However, the tools and techniques contemporary organizations must use to pursue this objective will have to be different from those of the past. What Taylor did was standard practice for his dayand the results show that he really did not accomplish much more than generate a story that has been retold and refashioned in so many ways that what the typical management reader "knows" about what happened at Bethlehem Iron a century ago is more fiction than fact. In the new millennium, managers will have to increasingly focus on data collection and analysis and fight the tendency to accept anecdotes and hearsay as accurate. In an emerging world of hypercompetition. this lesson could spell the difference between success and failure. REFERENCES
Allentown Daily Call. 1899. Microfilm records of weather conditions. March-April. George, C. 1972. History of management thought (2nd ed.) Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Gillespie, G., & Wolle, H. 1899. Report on the establishment of piecework in connection with the loading of pig-iron at the works of the Bethlehem Iron Co., South Bethlehem, Pennsylvania (compiled June 17). Hohoken, NJ: Frederick W. Taylor Collection, Stevens Institute. Hedstrom. M., & Montgomery, S. 1998. Digital preservation needs and requirements in RLG member institutions. http://www.rlg.org/preserv/digpres.htm}.

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Hoagland. J. 1955. Management before Frederick Taylor. Academy of Management Proceedings: 15-24. Hobson, T. 1899. The Philadelphia iron market in 1898. Iron Age, January 5: 21. Hodgetts, R. M. 1998. Measures of quality & high performance. New York: American Management Association. Iron Age. 1899. March 5: 23. Marsh. E. R. 1975. The harmonogrem of Karol Adamiecki. Academy of Management Journal, 18: 358-364. Robert Sayre Diary. Easton, PA: National Canal Museum Archives. South Bethlehem Globe. 1898. May 27; 1. Bethlehem, PA: Archives of the Moravian Church. Taylor. F. 1898. F. Taylor to R. Davenport, January 3. In Frederick Taylor's papers. Hoboken, NJ: Frederick W. Taylor Collection, Stevens Institute. Taylor, F. 1899. F. Taylor to J. Wharton, March 20. In Frederick Taylor's papers. Hohoken, NJ: Frederick W. Taylor Collection, Stevens Institute. Tayior. F. W. 1901. Discussion of H. L. Cantt paper. /American Society of Mechanical Engineers Transactions, December 5: 119.

Taylor, F. W. 1911. Principles of scientific management. New York: Harper. Wrege, C, & Greenwood, R. 1998. Frederick W. Taylor's "pig iron loading observations" at Bethlehem, March 10, 1899-May 31. 1899; The real story. Canal History and Technology Proceedings, 17: 189-191. Wrege, C, & Perroni, A. 1974. Taylor's pig-tale: A historical analysis of Frederick W. Taylor's pig-iron experiments, Academy of Management Journal, 27: 6-27, Wren, D, 1994. The evolution of management thought. New York: Wiley. Charles D. Wrege received his Ph.D. from New York University. He is the Academy of Management historian and archivist and the curator of the History of Management Theory Collection at Cornell University. His research focus is in management history, with particular emphasis on Frederick W. Taylor. Richard M. Hodgetts received his Ph.D. from the University of Oklahoma. He is a professor of strategic management at Florida International University. His current research focuses on strategy in multinational enterprises and the use of high-performance work groups in the international arena.