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Blast Effects on Fixed and Portable

Structures
Occupied Buildings and Facility Siting
March 1, 2011
Presented by:
Raymond Bennett, P.E., Ph.D.
2007 Baker Engineering and Risk Consultants, Inc. 2009 Baker Engineering and Risk Consultants, Inc.
y
Content
Determining the Blast Load Determining the Blast Load
Scenario Definition
Blast Load Prediction
St t l A t Structural Assessment
Building Response
Damage Criteria g
Occupant Vulnerability
Mitigation
Summary Summary
SCENARIO DEFINITION SCENARIO DEFINITION
Scenario Selection
Hazards associated with operations:
Loss of containment Loss of containment
Releases from flares
Process vent stacks
Atmospheric relief devices Atmospheric relief devices
Based primarily on process specific factors:
Failure rate data
Equipment design Equipment design
Process stream composition
Operating conditions
Also consider Also consider:
Company and industry losses on similar types of
process or equipment
Identify Potential Sources
Define sources to represent all significant p g
hazards within the process
Highlight PFDs for the process to ensure
the main processing sections are covered.
Supplement the list with scenarios
identified b the site (PHA LOPA etc ) identified by the site (PHA, LOPA, etc.)
Review the site for additional hazards
Example of Highlighted PFD
Consequence vs. Risk Approach
early north wind, early ignition (fire)
N late north wind, delayed ignition (explosion)
outside of lethal concentration no impact
Initiator
Wind
Direction
Ignition Scenario Size Weather
Toxic
Concentration
Toxic
Mitigation
outside of lethal concentration no impact
10% OV Evac Successful escape from toxic plume
none PPE failure 10% perish due to toxic impact
90% OV Evac Successful escape from toxic plume
PPE failure 90% perish due to toxic impact
NNE
NE
MCE
ENE
E
F1.5 ESE
SE
SSE SSE
6" S
SSW
SW
WSW
Each release direction is assessed the same. Early (fire), delayed
(explosion), and nonignition (toxic plume) are considered.
Release W
WNW
NW
NNW
D3
D5
B5
2"
0.5"
Each size / weather condition is assessed the same. Multiple wind directions
and ignition probabilities are considered.
Each size is assessed the same. Multiple weather conditions, wind directions,
and ignition probabilities are considered.
Sequence of Events
(Explosion, Fire, and Toxic) (Explosion, Fire, and Toxic)
early north wind, early ignition (fire) F
sequence
= F
release
x Pw x P
wind
x P
ign
N late north wind, delayed ignition (explosion)
th i d i iti (t i l if )
Initiator
Wind
Direction
Ignition Scenario Size Weather Frequency
none north wind, no ignition (toxic plume if any)
NNE
NE
ENE
E
F 2 ESE
SE
SSE
6" S
Each release direction is assessed the same. Early (fire), delayed (explosion),
and nonignition (toxic plume if any under 4 weather conditions) are considered.
SSW
SW
WSW
Release W
and nonignition (toxic plume if any under 4 weather conditions) are considered.
WNW
NW
NNW
B3
E h i / th diti i d th M lti l i d di ti d
D 4
D7
2"
0.5"
Each size / weather condition is assessed the same. Multiple wind directions and
ignition probabilities are considered.
Each size is assessed the same. Worse weather condition, wind directions,
and ignition probabilities are considered.
Frequency Analysis Initiating Event
lineal feet of pipe
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0.75 2. 0E-3 1. 1E-2 1.1E-3 1.4E-3 9. 6E-6 7.0E-6 4. 6E-6 3.7E-6 3.1E-6 2.9E-6 2.8E-6 1.8E-3 9. 8E-6 1.0E-3 7.2E-4 7. 4E-4
2 8. 5E-4 3. 8E-3 3.9E-4 7.5E-4 0. 0E+0 3.0E-7 2. 1E-6 1.6E-6 1.5E-6 1.4E-6 1.2E-6 5.5E-4 5. 5E-6 5.2E-4 3.7E-4 3. 8E-4
6 2 2E-4 7 5E-4 8 3E-5 2 6E-4 0 0E+0 0 0E+0 0 0E+0 1 8E-7 4 3E-7 4 0E-7 2 8E-7 1 3E-4 1 3E-6 1 1E-4 7 9E-5 8 1E-5
/Component)
6 2. 2E 4 7. 5E 4 8.3E 5 2.6E 4 0. 0E+0 0.0E+0 0. 0E+0 1.8E 7 4.3E 7 4.0E 7 2.8E 7 1.3E 4 1. 3E 6 1.1E 4 7.9E 5 8. 1E 5

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lineal feet of pipe
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count for
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BFLP-01-T4201-ethy-top 100 1 1
BFLP-02-T4201-mixT6201bot 1000 1 1
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BFLP-03-D4201-ethy 1 500 1
BFLP-04-Cxxx-Propy 1 1000 1 1
BFLP-05-T4801-Propy-bot 100 1 1
BFLP-06-T4801-Propy-top 1 1000 1
Sab-01-T6201-ethy-top 100 1 1
Sab-02-T6201-mixT6201bot 1 1000 1
Sab 03 D6201 eth 1 500 1 Sab-03-D6201-ethy 1 500 1
Sab-04-D6301-Propy 1 500 1
Sab-05-C5401 1 1000 1 1
Sab-06-TK9811-Butadi 1 1000 1
Toxic-Sab-05-C5401 1 1000 1 1
Discharge Modeling g g
Input
Storage Conditions
Type of storage
Pressurized Gas
Liquefied Gas
Refrigerated Liquid g q
Liquid at Atmospheric temp and pressure
Temp and Pressure of the material
Material Composition
Type of leak Type of leak
hole, tank rupture, pipe rupture
Temperature and Pressure outside the tank
Output
Discharge Rate
Quantity Released or Duration
The phase of a release and flash fraction
The geometry of the release after expansion The geometry of the release after expansion
Velocity of the release
Examples of Released Phase
Liquid Discharge
Hole in atmospheric storage tank or pipe under Hole in atmospheric storage tank or pipe under
liquid head
Hole in vessel or pipe containing pressurized liquid
b l it l b ili i t below its normal boiling point
Gas Discharge
Hole in equipment containing gas under pressure Hole in equipment containing gas under pressure
Boiling-off evaporation from liquid pool
Relief valve discharge from top of pressurized
storage tank
Two-phase Discharge
Hole in pressurized storage tank or pipe containing Hole in pressurized storage tank or pipe containing
a liquid above its normal boiling point
COMPUTING THE BLAST LOAD COMPUTING THE BLAST LOAD
Explosion Analysis Model
Need to include in the model:
Potential sources Defined in scenarios
Zones of congestion and confinement
BST Mapped by on site evaluation BST - Mapped by on-site evaluation
CFD Use of 3-D Solid Modeling
Locations of buildings used to calculate incident
and reflected pressures and impulses.
Need pressure, impulse, and wave shape to
predict building response Shock waves predict building response. Shock waves
assumed in most cases but this is changing.
Explosion Analysis
Flammable Vapor Cloud
Contours of Blast Overpressure or
Building Damage Level Building Damage Level
Source vs. Damage Location g
Occupied Occupied
Buildings
Source
2007 Baker Engineering and Risk Consultants, Inc.
Mina Al-Ahmadi Refinery, Kuwait, 2000, 4 fatalities.
STRUCTURAL ASSESSMENT STRUCTURAL ASSESSMENT
Blast Resistant Design vs Conventional Design
Conventional Blast Resistant
Design Basis Defined by:
Use
Codes
Consistent among owners
ithi ifi
Defined by risk:
Implied, or
Explicitly calculated
Differs widely among owners.
within a specific area.
Structural
Performance
Expected to resist normal
service loads indefinitely.
Varies with Level of Protection.
Design Structure remains elastic, Plastic deformations typically
Approach includes safety factors:
Allowable stress design
LRFD design
allowed:
Strength Increase Factors
Dynamic Increase Factors
Static analysis used even
Dynamic analysis common.
for dynamic loads.
Static Equivalent Loads
discouraged.
Example of Acceptable Performance (non Load Bearing)
Levels of Protection
Varies with intended use and client
philosophy
Select severe threat or accident scenarios and
f low level of protection
Select median or average threats and provide
medium levels of protection medium levels of protection
Select common accident or threat and
provide high levels of protection
Use quantitative risk approach
Once an LOP has been selected it be tied
to building damage levels
Response Criteria
Response criteria set the amount of deformation
t d a component can undergo.
Response criteria per ASCE, and CIA is in terms
of ductility and support rotations. High response y pp g p
corresponds to incipient failure.
Ductility is maximum deflection / deflection at yield.
Edge rotations defined next slide g
Response criteria per API (off-shore) is in terms
of peak strain.
Models used to calculate these may be: Models used to calculate these may be:
SingleDegree-of-Freedom (SDOF)
Multiple-Degree-of Freedom (MDOF)
Fi it El t A l i Finite Element Analysis
Support Rotations





u = Support Rotation
L
x


x
m
|
.
|

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|
=

L
x
m
2
tan
1
u
|
.

\
L
tan u
ASCE Component Response Levels
Component Damage
or Response Level
Component Consequence
Low Onset of visible damage; component can be repaired Low Onset of visible damage; component can be repaired.
Medium Permanent deformation of components requiring replacement.
High
Substantial plastic deformation approaching incipient collapse.
Replacement is required. Component failure is possible, g p q p p ,
although not probable, especially near the upper bound.
Failure
Complete failure of component creating debris hazard.
Replacement required.
ASCE Response Criteria
Upper Bound Criteria For Response Or Damage Levels
Low
Medium
High Element Type

u

u

u
Beams, Girts, Purlins 3 2 10 6 20 12
Frame Members 1.5 1 2 1.5 3 2
Cold-Formed Panels 1.75 1.25 3 2 6 4
Open-Web Joists 1 1 2 1.5 4 2
Plates 5 3 10 6 20 12
Failure occurs when the upper bound of the High Response Level
is exceeded.
Medium is typically the maximum acceptable response for design.
ERC BakerRisk Building Damage
Levels Levels
ERC tool (BEAST) predict a Building ( ) p g
Damage Level
BDL1 Minor
BDL2a or BDL2 Light Moderate or Light
BDL2b or BDL2.5 Heavy Moderate or
Moderate
BDL3 - Major
BDL4 C ll BDL4 Collapse
BDL can also be based on component
responses with emphasis on load bearing responses with emphasis on load bearing
walls and roof response.
US Corps of Engineers Damage Levels
1 AT Standards refers to AntiTerrorism Standards 1 AT Standards refers to AntiTerrorism Standards
Comparison of Damage Criteria
ERC Industry
Damage Level
US Army COE
Damage Level
Approximate
Level of g g
Protection
Provided
1 Superficial High
Damage
2a Repairable
Damage
High - Medium
2b Unrepairable
Damage
Medium - Low
3 Heavy Damage Very Low
4 Severe Damage
or Failure
Very Low to None
Comparison of Damage Criteria
ERC Industry
Damage Level
US Army COE
Damage Level
Approximate
Level of g g
Protection
Provided
1 Superficial High
Damage
2a Repairable
Damage
High - Medium
2b Unrepairable
Damage
Medium - Low
3 Heavy Damage Very Low
4 Severe Damage
or Failure
Very Low to None
Building Damage 1 (Minor)
Load Bearing Masonry g y
Building
Pre-engineered Metal Building Pre engineered Metal Building
Building Damage 2a (Moderate)
Load Bearing Masonry g y
Building
Pre-engineered Metal Building Pre engineered Metal Building
Building Damage 2b (Heavy-Moderate)
Load Bearing Masonry g y
Building
Pre-engineered Metal Building Pre engineered Metal Building
Trailer Damage Level 2B
Building Damage 3 (Major)
Load Bearing Masonry g y
Building
Pre-engineered Metal Building Pre engineered Metal Building
Occupant Vulnerability For Different Building
Types Types
100
Bldg 1
Bldg 2
60
80
i
t
y

(
%
)
Bldg 3
Bldg 4
20
40
u
l
n
e
r
a
b
i
l
Bldg 5
Bldg 7
Bldg 8
0
20
V
u
Bldg 8
Bldg 9
Bldg 10
0 1 2 3 4
Building Damage Level
Bldg 10
Bldg 11
Bldg 12
Example of Pressure-impulse (P-i)
Curve Curve
P-I curves represent a suite of blast p
loadings that will result in the same
deformation of a structure.
By setting the deformation value to the
bounds for damage levels the curves can
b d I D be used as Iso-Damage curves.
Example Generic Scaled P-i Curve
Example of Component Specific P-i
Curve Curve
Example US DDESB Curve
690
kPa - kPa
ms
69 kPa
Building Siting Tools
Several proprietary tools: p p y
BEAST
SHEPPARD
US Department of Defense Explosives
Safety Board (DDESB) has published
building level P-i diagrams for limited
suite of buildings
Design and Assessment Tools Available
Finite Element Analysis is becoming more widely
used but simpler methods still dominate design.
Simplified Tools developed by BakerRisk for the
COE and proprietary purposes:
Integrated Structural Analysis and Design Integrated Structural Analysis and Design
Spreadsheet (ISADS) (Proprietary)
SDOF and 2DOF Capabilities
Pull down menus for components
Concrete Masonry Unit (CMU) Upgrade Tool
(Proprietary) (Proprietary)
SBEDS Developed for COE
WBiggs SDOF (Proprietary) ggs S O ( op eta y)
LS-DYNA Model of Motor Control Center
MCC is three story steel
structure with two types structure with two types
of walls
Blast resistant walls on first
two levels on two sides
Crimped plate walls on
other sides
Model Parameters
3 in Shell Elements 3-in Shell Elements
422,057 Node
399,037 Elements
FEA of Off Shore MCC
MITIGATION MITIGATION
Mitigation Measures
What can be done to protect occupants p p
(control risk) if the existing building
performance is unacceptable?
Hierarchy of Mitigation Measures
Eliminate the hazard
PASSIVE
Prevent release upgrade design
Control size of scenario reduce inventory
Mitigate Effects to Building Occupants g g p
Relocate them
Harden the building
ACTIVE
Prevent release Safety instrumented systems
Control size of scenario ESD systems
Mitigate Effects to Building Occupants HVAC g g
PROCEDURAL
Prevent release permits, inspections, LO/TO
Control size of scenario manual firefighting g g
Mitigate Effects to Building Occupants - evacuate
BakerRisk Shock Tube
47
Loading Range For BakerRisk Shock
Tube (10 x 10 Maximum Target) Tube (10 x 10 Maximum Target)
50
k
35
40
45
s
i
)
310 kPa
15
20
25
30
P
r
e
s
s
u
r
e

(
p
s
Pressure and impulse can be
varied independently within
boundaries shown.
6900 kPa - ms
0
5
10
15
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200
Impulse (psi-mse)
Test of CMU Wall
Before Upgrade Before Upgrade
2007 Baker Engineering and Risk Consultants, Inc.
Test of CMU Wall Before Upgrade f f pg
Upgrade to CMU Wall Upgrade to CMU Wall
Steel Tube
Reinforcement
on Loaded Side on Loaded Side
of CMU Wall
2007 Baker Engineering and Risk Consultants, Inc.
Test of Upgraded
CMU Wall
2007 Baker Engineering and Risk Consultants, Inc.
Test of Upgraded CMU Wall
Examples of Post Upgrades in the
Field Field
New Exterior Posts and Angles New Exterior Posts and Angles
New Door Frame for
Blast Resistant Door
Government R&D Program- Polyurea Catch
Systems for Masonry and Glazing Units Systems for Masonry and Glazing Units
Test in Shock Tube LS-DYNA Analysis
Conducted for Sherwin Williams, funded by the US Air
F
55
Force
Additional Upgrade Examples
Modifications to Pre-Engineered steel g
buildings
Roof upgrades
Door strengthening
Wood trailer reinforcement
Example of Metal Building Upgrades
New wall girts New wall girts
N T dd d t f
New Stiffeners added to fram
New Tees added to frames
Example of Roof Strengthening
New purlins (grey)
Example of Wood Trailer
Strengthening Strengthening
New steel panels
dd d t added to
strengthen walls.
T il b i Trailers being
prepped for
attachment of steel attachment of steel
panels.
Steel Panels Steel Panels
added.
Upgrade of Conventional Hollow Metal
Doors Doors
Experimentally validated method for enhancing
strength of conventional hollow metal door. strength of conventional hollow metal door.
Existing door at 3 psi
(21 kPA)
Upgraded door at 4 psi
(28 kPa)
60
Example of Door Strengthening
Typical Existing Door
Retrofitted Door
Monolithic Window Test
High speed video of window test g p
conducted at BakerRisk shock tube
facility
Window 50 in x 68 in, annealed glass
1.25 m x 1.7 m x 6 mm
Blast Load ~ 4 psi, 60 psi-ms
28 kPa, 410 kPa-ms
Window fails in High Hazard Mode
Note formation of glass fragments
Monolithic Window Test
Laminated Window
Window test conducted at BakerRisk
shock tube facility
Blast Load ~ 5 psi, 60 psi-msec (35 kPa,
410 kPa-ms)
Window passes in Minimal Hazard Mode
Laminated Window Test
Summary and Conclusions
Blast resistant design allows for damage to the
structure.
Flexibility and ductility more important than
rigidity and strength rigidity and strength
A clear understanding of the desired level of
protection is required.
Existing structures can be readily hardened or
upgraded.
Wi d d d i t t Windows and doors are important.
Use of Static Equivalent Loads generally
discouraged. discouraged.