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---------Calimutan vs people ---------Manuel vs people

Mistake of Fact People v. Oanis Nature of the Case: Accused Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta, chief of police of Cabanatuan and corporal of the Philippine Constabulary, respectively, were, after due trial, found guilty by the lower court of homicide through reckless imprudence of Serapio Tecson. Defendants appealed separately. Facts: Captain Godofredo Monsod received this information: escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan get him dead or alive." As such, Defendants Galanta and Oanis were instructed to arrest Balagtas and, if overpowered, to follow the instruction contained in the telegram. When the group of policemen arrived at Irene's house, Oanis inquired where Irene's room was. Defendants Oanis and Galanta then went to the room of Irene, and an seeing a man sleeping with his back towards the door where they were, simultaneously or successively fired at him with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers. Awakened by the gunshots, Irene saw her paramour already wounded, and looking at the door where the shots came, she saw the defendants still firing at him. Shocked by the entire scene. Irene fainted; it turned out later that the person shot and killed was not the notorious criminal Anselmo Balagtas but a peaceful and innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour. These are the facts found by the trial court and fully supported by the evidence, particularly by the testimony of Irene Requinea. Appellants however, gave a different version of the tragedy. Galanta claimed that Oanis went to the room and upon opening the curtain covering the door, he said: "If you are Balagtas, stand up." Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, and Irene woke up and as the former was about to sit up in bed. Oanis fired at him. Wounded, Tecson leaned towards the door, and Oanis receded and shouted: "That is Balagtas." Galanta then fired at Tecson. On the other hand, Oanis testified that after he had opened the curtain covering the door and after having said, "if you are Balagtas stand up." Galanta at once fired at Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, while the latter was still lying on bed, and continued firing until he had exhausted his bullets: that it was only thereafter that he, Oanis, entered the door and upon seeing the supposed Balagtas, who was then apparently watching and picking up something from the floor, he fired at him. The testimonies of the two defendants contradict each other and their mutual incriminating averments dovetail with and corroborate substantially, the testimony of Irene Requinea. According to Requinea, Tecson was still sleeping in bed when he was shot to death by appellants. And this, to a certain extent, is confirmed by both appellants themselves in their mutual recriminations. The true fact of the case is that, while Tecson was sleeping in his room with his back towards the door, Oanis and Galanta, on sight, fired at him simultaneously or successively, believing him to be Anselmo Balagtas but without having made previously any reasonable inquiry as to his identity. Issue: Whether or not the defendants may be held responsible for the death caused to Tecson. It is contended that, as appellants acted in innocent mistake of fact in the honest performance of their official duties, both of them believing that Tecson was Balagtas, they incur no criminal liability. Held: Under the circumstances of the case, the crime committed by appellants is murder through specially mitigated by circumstances to be mentioned below. They are not excused by mistake of fact. In support of the theory of non-liability by reasons of honest mistake of fact, appellants rely on the case of U.S. v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488. The maxim is ignorantia facti excusat, but this applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness. In the Ah Chong case, defendant therein after having gone to bed was awakened by someone trying to open the door. He called out twice, "who is there," but received no answer. Fearing that the intruder was a robber, he leaped from his bed and called out again., "If you enter the room I will kill you." But at that precise moment, he was struck by a chair which had been placed against the door and believing that he was then being attacked, he seized a kitchen knife and struck and fatally wounded the intruder who turned out to be his room-mate. A common illustration of innocent mistake of fact is the case of a man who was marked as a footpad at night and in a lonely road held up a friend in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled, pistol demanded his money or life. He was killed by his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack was real, that the pistol leveled at his head was loaded and that his life and property were in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. In these

instances, there is an innocent mistake of fact committed without any fault or carelessness because the accused, having no time or opportunity to make a further inquiry, and being pressed by circumstances to act immediately, had no alternative but to take the facts as they then appeared to him, and such facts justified his act of killing. In the instant case, appellants, unlike the accused in the instances cited, found no circumstances whatsoever which would press them to immediate action. The person in the room being then asleep, appellants had ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity without hazard to themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to that end had been made, as the victim was unarmed, according to Irene Requinea. This, indeed, is the only legitimate course of action for appellants to follow even if the victim was really Balagtas, as they were instructed not to kill Balagtas at sight but to arrest him, and to get him dead or alive only if resistance or aggression is offered by him. Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified in using such force as is reasonably necessary to secure and detain the offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and protect himself from bodily harm (People vs. Delima, 46 Phil, 738), yet he is never justified in using unnecessary force or in treating him with wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous means when the arrest could be effected otherwise (6 C.J.S., par. 13, p. 612). The doctrine is restated in the new Rules of Court thus: "No unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and the person arrested shall not be subject to any greater restraint than is necessary for his detention." (Rule 109, sec. 2, par. 2). And a peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses unnecessary force or violence in making an arrest (5 C.J., p. 753; U.S. vs. Mendoza, 2 Phil., 109). It may be true that Anselmo Balagtas was a notorious criminal, a life-termer, a fugitive from justice and a menace to the peace of the community, but these facts alone constitute no justification for killing him when in effecting his arrest, he offers no resistance or in fact no resistance can be offered, as when he is asleep. This, in effect, is the principle laid down, although upon different facts, in U.S. vs. Donoso (3 Phil., 234, 242). It is, however, suggested that a notorious criminal "must be taken by storm" without regard to his right to life which he has by such notoriety already forfeited. We may approve of this standard of official conduct where the criminal offers resistance or does something which places his captors in danger of imminent attack. Otherwise we cannot see how, as in the present case, the mere fact of notoriety can make the life of a criminal a mere trifle in the hands of the officers of the law. Notoriety rightly supplies a basis for redoubled official alertness and vigilance; it never can justify precipitate action at the cost of human life. Where, as here, the precipitate action of the appellants has cost an innocent life and there exist no circumstances whatsoever to warrant action of such character in the mind of a reasonably prudent man, condemnation not condonation should be the rule; otherwise we should offer a premium to crime in the shelter of official actuation. The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and not accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed without malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939). As once held by this Court, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence (People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232; People vs. Bindor, 56 Phil., 16), and where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless imprudence (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605) to support a plea of mitigated liability. As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime committed is murder with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia. There is, however, a mitigating circumstance of weight consisting in the incomplete justifying circumstance defined in article 11, No. 5, of the Revised Penal Code. According to such legal provision, a person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. There are two requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying one: (a) that the offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right; and (b) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. In the instance case, only the first requisite is present appellants have acted in the performance of a duty. The second requisite is wanting for the crime by them committed is not the necessary consequence of a due performance of their duty. Their duty was to arrest Balagtas or to get him dead or alive if resistance is offered by him and they are overpowered. But through impatience or over-anxiety or in their desire to take no chances, they have exceeded in the fulfillment of such duty by killing the person whom they believed to be Balagtas without any resistance from him and without making any previous inquiry as to his identity. According to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall, in such case, be imposed.

Diego v. Castillo Nature of the Case: This is an administrative complaint against RTC Judge Silverio Q. Castillo for allegedly knowingly rendering an unjust judgment in a criminal case and/or rendering judgment in gross ignorance of the law.

Facts: Accused Lucena Escoto contracted marriage with Jorge de Perio, Jr., solemnized before then Mayor Liberato Reyna of Dagupan City. The couple were both Filipinos. In the marriage contract, the accused used and adopted the name Crescencia Escoto, with a civil status of single. In a document, denominated as a "Decree of Divorce" and purportedly issued to Jorge de th Perio as petitioner by the Family District Court of Harris County, Texas (247 Judicial District), it was "ordered, adjudged and decreed that Jorge de Perio and Crescencia de Perio are granted a Divorce. Subsequently, the same Crescencia Escoto contracted marriage with herein complainants brother, Manuel P. Diego, solemnized before the Rev. Fr. Clemente T. Godoy, parish priest of Dagupan City. The marriage contract shows that this time, the accused used and adopted the name Lucena Escoto, again, with a civil status of single. After trial of the criminal case for bigamy, respondent Judge promulgated a decision ordering acquittal. It was stated in the decision that the main basis for the acquittal was good faith on the part of the accused. Respondent Judge gave credence to the defense of the accused that she acted without any malicious intent. The combined testimonial and documentary evidence of the defense was aimed at convincing the court that accused Lucena Escoto had sufficient grounds to believe that her previous marriage to Jorge de Perio had been validly dissolved by the divorce decree and that she was legally free to contract the second marriage with Manuel P. Diego. As an ordinary laywoman accused being a recipient of a divorce decree, she entertains the impression that she can contract a subsequent marriage which she did when she married the late Manuel Diego. To the honest evaluation of the Court the act complained of against the accused is not patently illegal for the reason that she acted in good faith believing that her marriage was already annulled by a foreign judgment. Complainant herein alleges that the decision rendered by the respondent Judge is manifestly against the law and contrary to the evidence. In his comment, respondent Judge explains that what was in issue was the criminal culpability of the accused under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Respondent Judge does not dispute that the second marriage was bigamous because at the time it was contracted, the first marriage was still subsisting since divorce is not recognized in our country and the accuseds first husband was still alive. Respondent Judge, however, maintains that what was controlling was whether by virtue of the divorce decree the accused honestly believed, albeit mistakenly, that her first marriage had been severed and she could marry again. According to respondent Judge, the same is a state of mind personal to the accused. He further stressed that knowledge of the law should not be exacted strictly from the accused since she is a lay person, and that ineptitude should not be confused with criminal intent. Issue: Was there mistake of fact in this case to justify the order of acquittal of Judge Castillo? Held: None. This Court, in People v. Bitdu, carefully distinguished between a mistake of fact, which could be a basis for the defense of good faith in a bigamy case, from a mistake of law, which does not excuse a person, even a lay person, from liability. Bitdu held that even if the accused, who had obtained a divorce under the Mohammedan custom, honestly believed that in contracting her second marriage she was not committing any violation of the law, and that she had no criminal intent, the same does not justify her act. This Court further stated therein that with respect to the contention that the accused acted in good faith in contracting the second marriage, believing that she had been validly divorced from her first husband, it is sufficient to say that everyone is presumed to know the law, and the fact that one does not know that his act constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him from the consequences thereof. Moreover, squarely applicable to the criminal case for bigamy, is People v. Schneckenburger, where it was held that the accused who secured a foreign divorce, and later remarried in the Philippines, in the belief that the foreign divorce was valid, is liable for bigamy. Judge Castillo was not held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment but was held liable for gross ignorance of the law.

[MISTAKE OF FACT] THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FERNANDO DE FERNANDO, defendant-appellant. FACTS:

Before the day of the crime several Moro prisoners had escaped from the Penal Colony of San Ramon, Zamboanga. The residents of the barrio of Municahan of the municipality of Zamboanga were alarmed by the presence of three suspicious looking persons who were prowling around the place. The accused Fernando de Fernando who, at that time, was a municipal policeman, when passing in front of the house of one Remigio Delgado, was called by the latter's daughter Paciencia Delgado, who stated that her father wished to see him. When the policeman came up the house Remigio Delgado informed him that three unknown and suspicious looking persons, dressed in blue, prowling around his house. The accused remained in the said house talking with Paciencia Delgado, both being seated on a bench near the window. While they were thus talking, at about 7 o'clock at night, there appeared in the dark, at about 4 meters from the stairs, a person dressed in dark clothes, calling "Nong Miong." At the time the accused nor Paciencia Delgado knew who was thus calling. The accused inquired what he wanted but instead of answering he continued advancing with bolo in hand. Upon seeing this Fernando de Fernando took out his revolver and fired a shot in the air. As he saw that the unknown continued to ascend the staircase he fired at him. The unknown disappeared and ran to the house of a neighbor Leon Torres, where, after placing upon a table the bolos that he carried, he fell on the floor and expired. ISSUES: WON the trial court erred (1) in holding that the acts committed by the accused constituted the crime for murder; (2) in not holding that the accused was exempt from criminal liability and in not acquitting him. DECISION: The crime committed by the caused, therefore, is homicide through reckless negligence defined and punished in article 568, in relation with article 404, of the Penal Code, the penalty prescribed by law arresto mayor in its maximum degree to prision correcional in its minimum degree. The appearance of a man, unknown to him, dressed in clothes similar in color to the prisoner's uniform who was calling the owner of the house, and the silence of Paciencia Delgado, who did not at the time recognize the man, undoubtedly caused the accused to suspect that the unknown man was one of the three persons that the owner of the house said were prowling around the place. The suspicion become a reality in his mind when he saw that the man continued ascending the stairs with a bolo in his hand, not heeding his question as to who he was. In the midst of these circumstances and believing undoubtedly that he was a wrongdoer he tried to perform his duty and first fired into the air and then at the alleged intruder. But it happened that what to him appeared to be wrongdoer was the nephew of the owner of the house who was carrying three bolos tied together. At that psychological moment when the forces of far and the sense of duty were at odds, the accused was not able to take full account of the true situation and the bundle of bolos seemed to him to be only one bolo in the hands of a suspicious character who intended to enter the house. There is, however, a circumstance that should have made him suspect that the man was not only a friend but also a relative of the owner of the house from the fact he called "Nong Miong," which indicated that the owner of the house might be an older relative of the one calling, or an intimate friend; and in not asking Paciencia Delgado who was it was that was calling her father with such familiarity, he did not use the ordinary precaution that he should have used before taking such fatal action. Taking into consideration the estate of mind of the accused at the time, and the meaning that he gave to the attitude of the unknown person, in shooting the latter he felt that he was performing his duty by defending the owners of the house against an unexpected attack, and such act cannot constitute the crime of murder, but only that of simple homicide. He cannot be held guilty, however, as principal with malicious intent, because he though at the time that he was justified in acting as he did, and he is guilty only because he failed to exercise the ordinary diligence which, under the circumstances, he should have by investigating whether or not the unknown man was really what he though him to be. In firing the shot, without first exercising reasonable diligence, he acted with reckless negligence.

[MALA IN SE] JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. FACTS: Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and 1 2 Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as amended by RA 7659, wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eight (8) separate Informations, docketed as: (a) Crim. Case No. 26558, for violation of RA 7080, as amended by RA 7659; (b) Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for violation of Secs. 3, par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e) and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 (AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act), respectively; (c) Crim. Case No. 26563, for violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees); (d) Crim. Case No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 of The Revised Penal Code); and, (e) Crim. Case No. 26565, for Illegal Use Of An Alias (CA No. 142, as amended by RA 6085). On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation with respect to specification "d" of the charges in the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558; and, for reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses under specifications "a," "b," and "c" to give the accused an opportunity to file counter-affidavits and other documents necessary to prove lack of probable cause. Noticeably, the grounds raised were only lack of preliminary investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses, and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. The purported ambiguity of the charges and the vagueness of the law under which they are charged were never raised in that Omnibus Motion thus indicating the explicitness and comprehensibility of the Plunder Law. On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that "a probable cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused." On 25 June 2001 petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan. On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558 on the ground that the facts alleged therein did not constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness, and that the Amended Information for Plunder charged more than one (1) offense. On 21 June 2001 the Government filed its Opposition to the Motion to Quash, and five (5) days later or on 26 June 2001 petitioner submitted his Reply to the Opposition. On 9 July 2001 the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to Quash. As concisely delineated by this Court during the oral arguments on 18 September 2001, the issues for resolution in the instant petition for certiorari are: (a) The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague; (b) The Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process; and, (c) Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the power of Congress to so classify it. As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the counsel, in defending one charged with its violation; and more importantly, the accused, in identifying

the realm of the proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with little difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at leastP50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of the Plunder Law. RULING: We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous - as there is obviously none - that will confuse petitioner in his defense. Although subject to proof, these factual assertions clearly show that the elements of the crime are easily understood and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions, petitioner is completely informed of the accusations against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent defense. The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because 6 general terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them; much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law. Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, 7 plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or 8 special legal meaning to those words. The intention of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers - to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction. The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a 12 sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. It must be stressed, however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes. As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion x x x Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner. Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Other heinous crimes are punished with death as a straight penalty in R.A. No. 7659. Referring to 36 these groups of heinous crimes, this Court held in People v. Echegaray: The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature, despicable, either because life was callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as a human being . . . . Seen in this light, the capital crimes of

kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting in death; and drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention, where the victim is detained for more than three days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very nature. There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide for its poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that bankrupted the government and impoverished the population, the Philippine Government must muster the political will to dismantle the culture of corruption, dishonesty, greed and syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of society and the psyche of the populace. [With the government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic services to its people, any form of misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates to an actual threat to the very existence of government, and in turn, the very survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the effects and repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving government officials, employees or officers, that their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further destruction and damage to society. The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For 37 when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts. PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

MALA INSE VS. MALA PROHIBITA People v. Go Shiu Ling


251 SCRA 379 FACTS: This is an appeal from the decision of the RTC of Pasay City, finding accused-appellant Antonio Comia guilty of conspiring with four others to import regulated drugs in violation of Art. III, 14 in relation to Art. IV, 21 of the Dangerous Drugs Act (Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended). The Accused-appelant was working with his brother brokerage firm, TASCO, through which a cargo consisted of about 30 parcels were sent from Hong Kong addressed to various individuals. Among these was a package marked "VGMO" and addressed to the accused-appellant which was found to contain metamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The accused-appellant contended, among others, he did not know that the packages contained shabu. Had he known, he would have stopped going to the Airmail Distribution Center (ADC) at the NAIA to inquire about packages and instead would have gone into hiding. ISSUE:

Whether or not a crime for violation of Dangerous Drugs Act is a crime malum prohibitum? HELD: Yes. Thus, claim of good faith is immaterial. RATIO: Even granting that Comia acted in good faith, he cannot escape criminal responsibility. The crime with which he is charged is a malum prohibitum. Lack of criminal intent and good faith are not exempting circumstances. The act of transporting a prohibited drug is a "malum prohibitum" because it is punished as an offense under a special law. It is a wrong because it is prohibited by law. Without the law punishing the act, it cannot be considered a wrong. As such, the mere commission of said act is what constitutes the offense punished and suffices to validly charge and convict an individual caught committing the act so punished, regardless of criminal intent. Likewise, in People v. Bayona, it was held: The rule is that in acts mala in se there must be a criminal intent, but in those mala prohibita it is sufficient if the prohibited act was intentionally done. "Care must be exercised in distinguishing the difference between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate to act." Moreover, Comia cannot claim to have acted in good faith in this case. The fact is that he tried to facilitate the importation of dutiable goods free of customs duties. He gave his consent for the importers of the illegal cargo to use his name for the purpose of concealing it from the authorities. He cannot now wash his hands and say he did not know that they would use his name to import shabu. He gave them license to use his name for whatever purpose and it was not at all unforeseeable that clients could employ the scheme to import shabu or other drugs and other contraband.

ART. 4: CRIMINAL LIABILITY

WRONGFUL ACT DONE BE DIFFERENT FROM THAT INTENDED Quinto v. Andres (453 SCRA 511)

FACTS Dante Andres and Randyven Pacheco invited Wilson Quinto and Edison Garcia to go fishing with them inside a drainage culvert. However, only Quinto assented. When Garcia saw that it was dark inside, he opted to remain seated in a grassy area about two meters from the entrance of the drainage system. After a while, respondent Pacheco, who was holding a fish, came out of the drainage system and left without saying a word. Respondent Andres also came out, went back inside and emerged again, this time, carrying Wilson who was already dead. He laid the boys lifeless body down in the grassy area and went to the house of Wilsons mother and informed her that her son had died. Melba Quinto rushed to the drainage culvert while respondent Andres followed her. The cadaver of Wilson was buried without any autopsy thereon having been conducted. After more than three months, the cadaver of Wilson was exhumed and the NBI performed an autopsy thereon. An information was later filed with the RTC changing Andres and Pacheco with homicide. After the prosecution rested its case, the respondents filed a demurer to evidence which the trial court granted on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. It also held that it could not hold the respondents liable for damages because of the absence of preponderant evidence to prove their liability for Wilsons death. CA Affirmed the trial court decision and further ruled that the acquittal in this case is not merely based on reasonable doubt but rather on a finding that the accused-appellees did not commit the criminal acts complained of. ISSUE Whether or not the respondents are civilly liable for the death of the victim. HELD NO. The prosecution failed to adduce preponderant evidence to prove the facts on which the civil liability of the respondents rest. RULING The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action. However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the

criminal action that the act or omission from where the civil liability may arise does not exist, as in this case. Moreover, a person committing a felony is criminally liable for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. The felony committed must be the proximate cause of the resulting injury. In this case, the Supreme Court agreed with the RTC and CA that the proximate cause of the death of the victim was not caused by any wrongful act of the accused. In sum, the petitioner failed to adduce preponderance of evidence to prove a cause of action for damages based on the deliberate acts alleged in the Information charging the accused with homicide by dolo. Under the law, it is the burden of the prosecution to prove the corpus delicti which consists of criminal act and the defendants agency in the commission of the act.

CRIMINAL LIABILITY (ART. 4)

PEOPLE vs. AGUILOS et al (People vs. Pilola)

Appeal of appellant Rene Gayot Pilola for the reversal of the Decision of Pasig RTC, convicting him of murder.

FACTS On February 5, 1988, at around 11:30 p.m., Elisa Rolan was inside their store at 613 Nueve de Pebrero Street, Mandaluyong City, waiting for her husband to arrive. Joselito Capa and Julian Azul, Jr. were drinking beer. Edmar Aguilos and Odilon Lagliba arrived at the store. Joselito and Julian invited them to join their drinking spree, and although already inebriated, the two newcomers obliged. An altercation between the Edmar and Julian ensued. Edmar and Odilon left the store. Joselito and Julian were also about to leave, when Edmar and Odilon returned, blocking their way. Edmar took off his eyeglasses and punched Julian in the face. For his part, Odilon positioned himself on top of a pile of hollow blocks and watched as Edmar and Julian swapped punches. Joselito tried to placate the protagonists to no avail. Ronnie and the appellant, who were across the street, saw their gangmate Odilon stabbing the victim and decided to join the fray. They pulled out their knives, rushed to the scene and stabbed Joselito. Odilon and the appellant fled, while Ronnie went after Julian and tried to stab him. When Julian noticed that Ronnie was no longer running after him, Julian stopped, looked back and saw Ronnie bashed Joselitos head with hollow block. Not content, Ronnie got a piece of broken bottle and struck Joselito once more.

The appellant denied stabbing the victim and interposed the defense of alibi. He testified that at around 11:00 p.m. of February 5, 1988, he was in the house of his cousin, Julian Cadion, at 606 Nueve de Pebrero Street, Mandaluyong City. He suddenly heard a commotion coming from outside. Julian rushed out of the house to find out what was going on. The appellant remained inside the house because he was suffering from ulcer and was experiencing excessive pain in his stomach. The following morning, the appellant learned from their neighbor, Elisa Rolan, that Joselito had been stabbed to death. The appellant did not bother to ask who was responsible for the stabbing. On June 7, 1988, Edmar Aguilos, Odilon Lagliba y Abregon and appellant Rene Gayot Pilola were charged with murder.

On May 3, 1995, the trial court rendered its assailed decision, hence this appeal.

ISSUE

WON conspiracy exists that would hold appellant (Pilola) criminally liable as a principal?

RULING The SC affirmed the RTC decision with modification. RATIO There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy as a mode of incurring criminal liability must be proved separately from and with the same quantum of proof as the crime itself. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence. After all, secrecy and concealment are essential features of a successful conspiracy. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a common purpose and design. One who joins a criminal conspiracy in effect adopts as his own the criminal designs of his coconspirators. If conspiracy is established, all the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the manner and extent of their participation since in contemplation of law, the act of one would be the act of all. Each of the conspirators is the agent of all the others. Even if two or more offenders do not conspire to commit homicide or murder, they may be held criminally liable as principals by direct participation if they perform overt acts which mediately or immediately cause or accelerate the death of the victim, applying Article 4, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.

In such a case, it is not necessary that each of the separate injuries is fatal in itself. It is sufficient if the injuries cooperated in bringing about the victims death. Both the offenders are criminally liable for the same crime by reason of their individual and separate overt criminal acts. In this case, all the overt acts of Odilon, Ronnie and the appellant before, during, and after the stabbing incident indubitably show that they conspired to kill the victim. The victim died because of multiple stab wounds inflicted by two or more persons. There is no evidence that before the arrival of Ronnie and the appellant at the situs criminis, the victim was already dead. It cannot thus be argued that by the time the appellant and Ronnie joined Odilon in stabbing the victim, the crime was already consummated. All things considered, we rule that Ronnie and the appellant conspired with Odilon to kill the victim; hence, all of them are criminally liable for the latters death. The appellant is not merely an accomplice but is a principal by direct participation.

PEOPLE VS. ORTEGA et. al Joint appeal interposed by Appellants Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia from the Decision, dated February 9, 1994 written by Judge Adriano R. Osorio, finding them guilty of murder. FACTS On October 15, 1992 at about 5:30 in the afternoon, Quitlong, the victim Andre Mar Masangkay, Ariel Caranto, Romeo Ortega, Roberto San Andres were having a drinking spree in the compound near the house of Benjamin Ortega, Jr. at Daangbakal, Dalandanan, Valenzuela. That while they were drinking, accused Ortega, Jr. and Garcia who were [already] drunk arrived and joined them. That victim Andre Mar Masangkay answered the call of nature and went to the back portion of the house. Ortega, Jr. followed him and later they heard the victim Andre Mar shouted, "Don't, help me!" That he and Ariel Caranto ran towards the back portion of the house and saw accused Ortega, Jr., on top of Andre Mar Masangkay who was lying down in a canal with his face up and stabbing the latter with a long bladed weapon. Ariel Caranto ran and fetched Benjamin Ortega, Sr., the father of accused Benjamin, Jr. Quitlong went to Romeo Ortega in the place where they were having the drinking session to pacify his brother Benjamin, Jr. Romeo Ortega went to the place of the stabbing and together with Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia lifted Andre Mar Masangkay from the canal and brought Andre Mar to the well and dropped the latter inside the well then they dropped stones in weight to the body of Andre Mar Masangkay. Romeo Ortega warned Quitlong not to tell anybody of what he saw. He answered in the affirmative and he was allowed to go home. He told his mother what he witnessed and went to the residence of Col. Leonardo Orig and reported the matter.

Col. Orig accompanied him to the Valenzuela Police Station and some police officers went with them to the crime scene. That accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia were apprehended and were brought to the police station. Appellant Manuel Garcia and Ortega Jr. Interposes the defense of alibi. The Court render a decision convicting the accussed of murder, hence this appeal. ISSUES 1. 2. WON appellant Ortega is guilty of homicide alone and not of murder? WON appellant Garcia is criminally liable?

RULING The Court finds the appeal partly meritorious. Appellant Ortega is guilty only of homicide. Appellant Garcia deserves acquittal.

RATIO: Liability of Appellant Ortega In the instant case, we have meticulously scoured the records and found no reason to reverse the trial court's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies insofar as Appellant Ortega is concerned. The narration of Eyewitness Diosdado Quitlong appears to be spontaneous and consistent. It is straightforward, detailed, vivid and logical. Thus, it clearly deserves full credence. Although treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength were alleged in the information, the trial court found the presence only of abuse of superior strength. It should be noted that Victim Masangkay was a six-footer, whereas Appellant Ortega, Jr. was only five feet and five inches tall. There was no testimony as to how the attack was initiated. The accused and the victim were already grappling when Quitlong arrived. Nothing in the foregoing testimony and circumstances can be interpreted as abuse of superior strength. Hence, Ortega is liable only for homicide, not murder.

Liability of Appellant Manuel Garcia Appellant Garcia merely assisted in concealing the body of the victim. But the autopsy conducted by the NBI medico-legal officer showed that the victim at that time was still alive,

and that he died subsequently of drowning. That drowning was the immediate cause of death was medically demonstrated by the muddy particles found in the victim's airway, lungs and stomach. This is evident from the expert testimony given by the medico-legal officer. The prosecution's evidence itself shows that Garcia had nothing to do with the stabbing which was solely perpetrated by Appellant Ortega. His responsibility relates only to the attempted concealment of the crime and the resulting drowning of Victim Masangkay. By parity of reasoning, Appellant Garcia cannot be convicted of homicide through drowning in an information that charges murder by means of stabbing. Although the prosecution was able to prove that Appellant Garcia assisted in "concealing . . . the body of the crime, . . . in order to prevent its discovery," he can neither be convicted as an accessory after the fact defined under Article 19, par. 2, of the Revised Penal Code (brother inlaw) and such relationship exempts Appellant Garcia from criminal liability as provided by Article 20 of the Revised Penal Code

-------------people vs page

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PABLITO DOMASIAN AND DR. SAMSON TAN, accused-appellant.

FACTS: In the morning of March 11, 1982, while Enrico was walking with a classmate along Roque street in the poblacion of Lopez, Quezon, he was approached by a man who requested his assistance in getting his father's signature on a medical certificate. Enrico agreed to help and rode with the man in a tricycle to Calantipayan, where he waited outside while the man went into a building to get the certificate. Enrico became apprehensive and started to cry when, instead of taking him to the hospital, the man flagged a minibus and forced him inside, holding him firmly all the while. The man told him to stop crying or he would not be returned to his father. When they alighted at Gumaca, they took another tricycle, this time bound for the municipal building from where they walked to the market. Here the man talked to a jeepney driver and handed him an envelope addressed to Dr. Enrique Agra, the boy's father. The two then boarded a tricycle headed for San Vicente, with the man still firmly holding Enrico, who continued crying. This aroused the suspicion of the driver, Alexander Grate, who asked the man about his relationship with the boy. The man said he and the boy were brothers, making Grate doubly suspicious because of the physical differences between the two and the wide gap between their ages. Grate immediately reported the matter to two barangay tanods when his passengers alighted from the tricycle. Grate and the tanods went after the two and saw the man dragging the boy. Noticing that they were being pursued, the man told Enrico to run fast as their pursuers might behead them. Somehow, the man managed to

escape, leaving Enrico behind. Enrico was on his way home in a passenger jeep when he met his parents, who were riding in the hospital ambulance and already looking for him. At about 1:45 in the afternoon of the same day, after Enrico's return, Agra received an envelope containing a ransom note. The note demanded P1 million for the release of Enrico and warned that otherwise the boy would be killed. Agra thought the handwriting in the note was familiar. After comparing it with some records in the hospital, he gave the note to the police, which referred it to the NBI for examination. ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in not finding that the sending of the ransom note was an impossible crime which he says is not punishable. HELD: Domasians reason is that the second paragraph of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability shall be incurred "by any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means." As the crime alleged is not against persons or property but against liberty, he argues that it is not covered by the said provision. Tan conveniently forgets the first paragraphs of the same article, which clearly applies to him, thus: Art. 4. Criminal liability. Criminal liability shall be incurred: 1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. Even before the ransom note was received, the crime of kidnapping with serious illegal detention had already been committed. The act cannot be considered an impossible crime because there was no inherent improbability of its accomplishment or the employment of inadequate or ineffective means. The delivery of the ransom note after the rescue of the victim did not extinguish the offense, which had already been consummated when Domasian deprived Enrico of his liberty. The sending of the ransom note would have had the effect only of increasing the penalty to death under the last paragraph of Article 267 although this too would not have been possible under the new Constitution.

-------------------- intod vs ca -------------------- people vs. balmores -------------------- Valenzuela vs people ------------------- people vs. palaganas

Art. 6 - Stages of Execution G.R. No. 166479 February 28, 2006 RODOLFO C. VELASCO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Facts:
While private complainant Frederick Maramba was cleaning and washing his owner type jeep, a motorized tricycle stopped near him. Accused Rodolfo Velasco dashed out of the tricycle, approached the complainant and fired at him several times with a .45 caliber pistol. The accused missed with his first shot but the second one hit the complainant at the upper arm, causing him to stumble on the ground. The complainant stood up and ran, while the accused continued firing at him but missed. The shooting incident was reported to the police sub-station. The police then pursued the accused who proceeded on board a motorized tricycle to the highway going to Barangay Banaoang in Calasiao town. The police caught up with the tricycle and brought the accused to the police sub-station. A firearm protruding from the waistline of the accused, three (3) magazines and fourteen (14) live ammunitions were confiscated from the possession of the accused. The police also recovered seven (7) spent ammunitions at the crime scene. At the City Jail in Dagupan City where the accused was subsequently brought, the private complainant Frederick Maramba identified and pointed to the accused as the one who fired at him, hitting him on the upper left arm. After trial, the RTC as affirmed by CA found the accused guilty with attempted murder.

Issue:
Whether or not accused committed attempted homicide.

Held:
Having commenced the criminal act by overt acts but failing to perform all acts of execution as to produce the felony by reason of some cause other than his own desistance, petitioner committed an attempted felony. Petitioner already commenced his attack with a manifest intent to kill by shooting private complainant seven times, but failed to perform all the acts of execution by reason of causes independent of his will, that is, poor aim and the swiftness of the latter. Private complainant sustained a wound on the left arm that is not sufficient to cause his death. The settled rule is that where the wound inflicted on the victim is not sufficient to cause his death, the crime is only attempted murder, since the accused did not perform all the acts of execution that would have brought about death. Treachery is present in the commission of the crime - (a) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (b) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods or forms of attack employed by him. The essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected attack on an unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim.It was

clearly established that private complainant, while washing his jeep, was suddenly fired upon by petitioner for no reason at all. It is likewise apparent that petitioner consciously and deliberately adopted his mode of attack making sure that private complainant will have no chance to defend himself by reason of the surprise attack. The penalty imposed by the trial court is correct. Under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower than two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principal in an attempted felony. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpertua to death. The penalty two degrees lower is prision mayor. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the minimum of the penalty to be imposed should be within the range of prision correccional, and the maximum of the penalty to be imposed should be within the range of prision mayorin its medium period.

Art. 6 - Stages of Execution


GR No 129433 People vs Campuhan

Facts: Ma. Corazon P. Pamintuan, mother of four (4)-year old Crysthel Pamintuan, went down from the second floor of their house to prepare Milo chocolate drinks for her two (2) children. At the ground floor she met Primo Campuhan who was then busy filling small plastic bags with water to be frozen into ice in the freezer located at the second floor. Primo was a helper of brother of Corazon. As Corazon was busy preparing the drinks, she heard one of her daughters cry, "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" prompting Corazon to rush upstairs. Thereupon, she saw Primo Campuhan inside her children's room kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas or "jogging pants" and panty were already removed, while his short pants were down to his knees. According to Corazon, Primo was forcing his penis into Crysthel's vagina. RTC: Found Primo guilty of STATUTORY RAPE Issue: WHETHER or Not Accused is guilty of statutory rape.

Held: Accused is only guilty of ATTEMPTED RAPE. The mere touching of the external genitalia by the penis capable of consummating the sexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge. But the act of touching should be understood here as inherently part of the entry of the penis into the labias of the female organ and not mere touching alone of the mons pubis or the pudendum.

Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must be entered for rape to be consummated, and not merely for the penis to stroke the surface of the female organ. Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching the mons pubis of the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated rape. Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.

Crysthel's testimony that Primos penis did not penetrate her organ should dissipate the mist of confusion that enshrouds the question of whether rape in this case was consummated. It has foreclosed the possibility of Primo's penis penetrating her vagina, however slight. Corazon even narrated that Primo had to hold his penis with his right hand, thus showing that he had yet to attain an erection to be able to penetrate his victim.

Note: On 3 April 1990 this Court in People v. Orita finally did away with frustrated rape and allowed only attempted rape and consummated rape to remain in our statute books.

-------------------- people vs. quirol -------------------- people vs. bulan -------------------- people vs. comadre ------------------- people vs. pacificador

People vs. Manero (G.R. Nos. 86883-85) Facts: On 11 April 1985, around 10:00 o'clock in the morning, the Manero brothers Norberto Jr., Edilberto and Elpidio, along with Rodrigo Espia, Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Efren Pleago and Roger Bedao, were inside the eatery of one Reynaldo Diocades at Km. 125, La Esperanza, Tulunan, Cotabato. They were conferring with three others of a plan to liquidate a number of suspected communist sympathizers. Among their targets are: Fr. Peter, Domingo Gomez, Bantil, Fred Gapate, Rene alias Tabagac and Villaning." "Fr. Peter" is Fr. Peter Geremias, an Italian priest suspected of having links with the communist movement; "Bantil" is Rufino Robles, a Catholic lay leader who is the complaining witness in the Attempted Murder; Domingo Gomez is another lay leader, while the others are simply "messengers". On the same occasion, the conspirators agreed to Edilberto Manero's proposal that should they fail to kill Fr. Peter Geremias, another Italian priest would be killed in his stead. They later on nailed a placard near the carinderia bearing the names of their intended victims. Later, at 4:00 o'clock, the Manero brothers, together with Espia and the four (4) appellants, all with assorted firearms, proceeded to the house of "Bantil", their first intended victim, which was also in the vicinity of Deocades'carinderia. After a heated confrontation, Edilberto drew his revolver and fired at the forehead of Bantil who was able to parry and was hit at the lower portion of his ear. Bantil tried to run but he was again fired upon by Edilberto. Though Bantil was able to seek refuge in the house of a certain Domingo Gomez, Norberto Jr. ordered his men to surround the house so that Bantil would die of hemorrhage. Moments later, while Deocades was feeding his swine, Edilberto strewed him with a burst of gunfire from his M-14 Armalite. Deocades cowered in fear as he knelt with both hands clenched at the back of his head. This again drew boisterous laughter and ridicule from the dreaded desperados. At 5:00 o'clock, Fr. Tulio Favali arrived at Km. 125 on board his motorcycle. He entered the house of Gomez. While inside, Norberto, Jr., and his co-accused Pleago towed the motorcycle outside to the center of the highway. Norberto, Jr., opened the gasoline tank, spilled some fuel, lit a fire and burned the motorcycle. As the vehicle was ablaze, the felons raved and rejoiced. Upon seeing his motorcycle on fire, Fr. Favali accosted Norberto, Jr. But the latter simply stepped backwards and executed a thumbs-down signal. At this point, Edilberto asked the priest: "Ano ang gusto mo, padre (What is it you want, Father)? Gusto mo, Father, bukon ko ang ulo mo (Do you want me, Father, to break your head)?" Thereafter, in a flash, Edilberto fired at the head of the priest. As Fr. Favali dropped to the ground, his hands clasped against his chest, Norberto, Jr., taunted Edilberto if that was the only way he knew to kill a priest. Slighted over the remark, Edilberto jumped over the prostrate body three (3) times, kicked it twice, and fired anew. The burst of gunfire virtually shattered the head of Fr. Favali, causing his brain to scatter on the road. As Norberto, Jr., flaunted the brain to the terrified onlookers, his brothers danced and sang "Mutya Ka Baleleng" to the delight of their comrades-in-arms who now took guarded positions to isolate the victim from possible assistance. From this judgment of conviction only accused Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Efren Pleago and Roger Bedao appealed with respect to the cases for Murder and Attempted Murder. The Manero brothers as well as Rodrigo Espia did not appeal; neither did Norberto Manero, Jr., in the Arson case. Consequently, the decision as against them already became final. Issue: Whether or not the appellants can be exculpated from criminal liability on the basis of defense of alibi which would establish that there is no conspiracy to kill. Held: The court did not appreciate the defense of alibi of the Lines brother, who according to them, were in a farm some one kilometre away from the crime scene. The court held that It is axiomatic

that the accused interposing the defense of alibi must not only be at some other place but that it must also be physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. There is no physical impossibility where the accused can be at the crime scene in a matter of 15-20 minutes by jeep or tricycle. More important, it is well-settled that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the authors of the crime by the prosecution witnesses. In this case, there were two eyewitnesses who positively identified the accused. Contrary to the claim of the Lines brothers, there is a community of design to commit the crime. Based on the findings of the lower court, they are not merely innocent bystanders but in fact were vital cogs in the murder of Fr. Fuvali. They performed overt acts to ensure the success of the commission of the crimes and the furtherance of the aims of the conspiracy. While accusedappellants may not have delivered the fatal shots themselves, their collective action showed a common intent to commit the criminal acts. There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit a crime and decide to commit it. It is not essential that all the accused commit together each and every act constitutive of the offense. It is enough that an accused participates in an act or deed where there is singularity of purpose, and unity in its execution is present While it may be true that Fr. Favali was not originally the intended victim, as it was Fr. Peter Geremias whom the group targetted for the kill, nevertheless, Fr. Favali was deemed a good substitute in the murder as he was an Italian priest. The accused agreed that in case they fail to kill the intended victims, it will be suffice to kill another priest as long as the person is also Italian.

People vs. Pugay (G.R. No. L-74324)

Facts: The deceased Miranda, a 25-year old retardate, and the accused Pugay were friends. Miranda used to run errands for Pugay and at times they slept together. On the evening of May 19, 1982, a town fiesta fair was held in the public plaza of Rosario, Cavite. There were different kinds of ride and one was a ferris wheel. Sometime after midnight of the same date, Eduardo Gabion was sitting in the ferris wheel and reading a comic book with his friend Henry. Later, the accused Pugay and Samson with several companions arrived. These persons appeared to be drunk as they were all happy and noisy. As the group saw the deceased walking nearby, they started making fun of him. They made the deceased dance by tickling him with a piece of wood. Not content with what they were doing with the deceased, the accused Pugay suddenly took a can of gasoline from under the engine of the ferris wheel and poured its contents on the body of the former. Gabion told Pugay not to do so while the latter was already in the process of pouring the gasoline. Then, the accused Samson set Miranda on fire making a human torch out of him. The ferris wheel operator later arrived and doused with water the burning body of the deceased. Some people around also poured sand on the burning body and others wrapped the same with rags to extinguish the flame. Both accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. After trial, the trial court rendered a decision finding both accused guilty on the crime of murder but crediting in favor of the accused Pugay the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong. Issue: Whether or not there is conspiracy between the two accused-appellant. Held: There is nothing in the records showing that there was previous conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and intention between the two accused-appellants immediately before the commission of the crime. There was no animosity between the deceased and the accused Pugay or Samson. Their meeting at the scene of the incident was accidental. It is also clear that the accused Pugay and his group merely wanted to make fun of the deceased. Hence, the respective criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson arising from different acts directed against the deceased is individual and not collective, and each of them is liable only for the act committed by him.

6.1 Supplementary Application of the RPC (1) Evangeline Ladonga vs. People of the Philippines G.R. No. 141066; February 17, 2005

Facts The Ladonga spouses obtained a P9,075.55 loan from him, guaranteed by United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Check No. 284743, post dated to dated July 7, 1990 issued by Adronico;8sometime in the last week of April 1990 and during the first week of May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained an additional loan of P12,730.00, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 284744, post dated to dated July 26, 1990 issued by Adronico;9 between May and June 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a third loan in the amount ofP8,496.55, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 106136, post dated to July 22, 1990 issued by Adronico;10 the three checks bounced upon presentment for the reason "CLOSED ACCOUNT";11 when the Ladonga spouses failed to redeem the check, despite repeated demands, the accused was then charged of a violation of BP 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law. While admitting that the checks issued by Adronico bounced because there was no sufficient deposit or the account was closed, the Ladonga spouses claimed that the checks were issued only to guarantee the obligation, with an agreement that Oculam should not encash the checks when they mature; and, that petitioner is not a signatory of the checks and had no participation in the issuance thereof. Petitioner staunchly insists that she cannot be held criminally liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 because she had no participation in the drawing and issuance of the three checks subject of the three criminal cases, a fact proven by the checks themselves. She contends that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in applying the principle of conspiracy, as defined under the RPC, to violations of B.P. Blg. 22. She posits that the application of the principle of conspiracy would enlarge the scope of the statute and include situations not provided for or intended by the lawmakers, such as penalizing a person, like petitioner, who had no participation in the drawing or issuance of checks. The Office of the Solicitor General disagrees with petitioner and echoes the declaration of the Court of Appeals that some provisions of the Revised Penal Code, especially with the addition of the second sentence in Article 10, are applicable to special laws. It submits that B.P. Blg. 22 does not provide any prohibition regarding the applicability in a suppletory character of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code to it. On August 24, 1996, the RTC rendered a joint decision finding the Ladonga spouses guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Issue: Whether or not conspiracy is applicable for violations of BP 22 (yes)

HELD:

B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the suppletory application of the provisions of the RPC. Thus,
in the absence of contrary provision in B.P. Blg. 22, the general provisions of the RPC which, by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily. Indeed, in the recent case of Yu vs.

People,31 the Court applied suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary imprisonment under Article 3932 of
the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22. The suppletory application of the principle of conspiracy in this case is analogous to the application of the provision on principals under Article 17 in U.S. vs. Ponte. For once conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.33 HOWEVER - the prosecution failed to prove that petitioner performed any overt act in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. As testified to by the lone prosecution witness, complainant Alfredo Oculam, petitioner was merely present when her husband, Adronico, signed the check subject of Criminal Case No. 7068.36 With respect to Criminal Case Nos. 7069-7070, Oculam also did not describe the details of petitioners participation. He did not specify the nature of petitioners involvement in the commission of the crime, either by a direct act of participation, a direct inducement of her co-conspirator, or cooperating in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have been accomplished. Apparently, the only semblance of overt act that may be attributed to petitioner is that she was present when the first check was issued. However, this inference cannot be stretched to mean concurrence with the criminal design. Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence.37 Conspiracy transcends mere companionship and mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy.38 Even knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.39

At most, the prosecution, realizing the weakness of its evidence against accused-appellant Franco, merely relied and pegged the latters criminal liability on its sweeping theory of conspiracy, which to us, was not attendant in the commission of the crime. ****

(2) People vs. Luisito Bustinera G. R. No. 148233; June 8, 2004

Facts: Sometime in 1996, Edwin Cipriano (Cipriano), who manages ESC Transport, the taxicab business of his father, hired Bustinera as a taxi driver and assigned him to drive a Daewoo Racer with plate number PWH-266. It was agreed that appellant would drive the taxi from 6:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m, after which he would return it to ESC Transports garage and remit the boundary fee in the amount of P780.00 per day. On December 25, 1996, appellant admittedly reported for work and drove the taxi, but he did not return it on the same day as he was supposed to. The following day, December 26, 1996, Cipriano went to appellants house to ascertain why the taxi was not returned. Arriving at appellants house, he did not find the taxi there, appellants wife telling him that her husband had not yet arrived.Leaving nothing to chance, Cipriano went to the Commonwealth Avenue police station and reported that his taxi was missing. On January 9, 1997, appellants wife went to the garage of ESC Transport and revealed that the taxi had been abandoned in Regalado Street, Lagro, Quezon City. Cipriano lost no time in repairing to Regalado Street where he recovered the taxi. A case was filed against the accused for Qualified Theft. The RTC found him guilty.

Issue: Which law should be applied, the RPC (Article 308 on Theft) or RA 6539 (An Act Penalizing Carnapping)

Held Since appellant is being accused of the unlawful taking of a Daewoo sedan, it is the anti-carnapping law and not the provisions of qualified theft which would apply as the said motor vehicle does not fall within the exceptions mentioned in the anti-carnapping law. The designation in the information of the offense committed by appellant as one for qualified theft notwithstanding, appellant may still be convicted of the crime of carnapping. For while it is necessary that the statutory designation be stated in the information, a mistake in the caption of an indictment in designating the correct name of the offense is not a fatal defect as it is not the designation that is controlling but the facts alleged in the information which determines the real nature of the crime. The special law on carnapping should be applied. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended defines "carnapping" as "the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things." The elements of carnapping are thus: (1) the taking of a motor vehicle which belongs to another; (2) the taking is without the consent of the owner or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or by using force upon things; and (3) the taking is done with intent to gain. Carnapping is essentially the robbery or theft of a motorized vehicle, the concept of unlawful taking in theft, robbery and carnapping being the same. The anti-carnapping law is a special law, different from the crime of robbery and theft included in the Revised Penal Code. It particularly addresses the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. But a careful comparison of this special law with the crimes of robbery and theft readily reveals their common features and characteristics, to wit: unlawful taking, intent to gain, and that personal property belonging to another is taken without the latter's consent. However, the anti-carnapping law particularly deals with the theft and robbery of motor vehicles. Hence

a motor vehicle is said to have been carnapped when it has been taken, with intent to gain, without the owner's consent, whether the taking was done with or without the use of force upon things. Without the anti-carnapping law, such unlawful taking of a motor vehicle would fall within the purview of either theft or robbery which was certainly the case before the enactment of said statute. That appellant brought out the taxi on December 25, 1996 and did not return it on the same day as he was supposed to is admitted. Unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is the taking of the motor vehicle without the consent of the owner, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things; it is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same. While the nature of appellants possession of the taxi was initially lawful as he was hired as a taxi driver and was entrusted possession thereof, his act of not returning it to its owner, which is contrary to company practice and against the owners consent transformed the character of the possession into an unlawful one. Appellant himself admits that he was aware that his possession of the taxi was no longer with Ciprianos consent as the latter was already demanding its return. *****

Urbano v. Peo. RTC: guilty of homicide CA: affirmed, modified granting moral damages SC: affirmed, modified term of imprisonment The prosecutions evidence established that:

1. On Sept. 2, 1993, 8pm, victim brigido Tomelden (V) and accused Rodel Urbano (A)were with their co-workers drinking beer in a resto. 2. The two had a heated altercation when V made insulting remarks at A. A asked V why he made such remarks. 3. Exchange of words led to exchange of blows. A delivered a lucky punch causeing Vs nosebleed and rendered him unconscious. 4. The next day, V informed his wife (W) of the fight. He complained of pain in his nape, head and ear. W brought V to a community hospital. 5. On Oct 2 and 7 V went back to the hospital complaining of diziness and frequent vomiting.

6. W brought V to a provincial hospital where Dr. Ramos diagnosed V suffering from brain injury, secondary to mauling to consider cerebral hemorrhage. 7. V was confined on 0ct. 10 but was discharged due to financial constraints. Befvore reaching the house, once again complained of extreme pain so W brought V to the community hospital. 8. Dr. Arellano noted that V appeared to be semi-conscious, sleepy and uncooperative, and not responding to any stimulant. V died the same day of cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to cerebral concussion with resultant cerebral hemorrhage due to mauling incident.
As defense:

1. No intent to kill 2. Hypertension for which V was being treated was the cause of death
Issues: A urges SC to set aside the appealed decision, or at least modify it.

1. W/N lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong was present 2. W/N sufficient provocation on the part of V was present
Decision: SC agrees that the said mitigating circumstances (MC) were present. 2 MC, no Aggravating C., penalty next lower than that prescribed by law, in the period the court deems applicable Rationale:

1. When the law speaks of provocation either as MC or as an element of self-defense (SD), the reference is to an unjust or improper conduct of the offended party capable of exciting, inciting or irritating anyone; it is not enough that the provocative act be unreasonable or annoying; and it should immediately precede the act. This 3rd element of SD is present when: a. No provocation at all was given to the aggressor; b. Even if provocation was given, it was not sufficient; c. Even if sufficient, it was not given by the person defending himself; or d. Even if a provocation was given by the person defending himself, it was not the proximate and immediate to the act of aggression. Salazar, the witness, testified that: a. During the picnic which took place before the fight, V insulted A. b. When they reached the LIWAD compound, V slapped and called A sipsip just to maintain As employment c. V challenged A to a fist fight but A declined because V is very much bigger

d. V delivered several fist and kick blows and was the aggresive one e. A only boxed V in retaliation, landing the lucky punch

2. While intent to kill may be presumed from the fact of death, the MC of no intent to commit so grave a wrong may still be considered when the circumstances so warrant as in this case. A bare-knuckle fight as a means to parry the challenge issued by V was comensurate to the potential violance A was facing. It was just unfortunate that V died from that lucky punch which could have possibly been adverted had V had the financial means to get the proper medical attention. A landed the lucky punch while their coworkers were trying to separate V and A.

Peo. v. Beltran, Jr. RTC: guilty of murder CA: affirmed, reduced actual damages and added civil indemnity SC: affirmed, modified term of imprisonment The prosecution established its case through the testimonies of: Ever Sales, gasoline boy

On Oct. 25, 1999, while on his way home, he saw A standing in front of his house with a bolo. On the opposite side of the road Norman (V) was standing in front of an automobile repair shop. Minutes later he saw A, from a distance of 6 meters, stalking V who was walking. Without a warning, A hacked V with a bolo. V moved backwards and shielded his face

with his left hand but the same was hit. V ran. A hacked V at the back causing V to fall. A repeatedly hacked V.
Rolando Dalisay

1. Same day he was walking outside to buy some medicine when at a distance about 15 meters he saw A hacking V with a bolo. 2. Testified that he personally knew both A and V. A used to be his employee in his carpentry biz. V was a relative of his wife.
SPO1 Julian Mendoza, investigationg officer

On Oct. 26, midnight, he received an info about the incident. He went to the scene and asked the people who killed V and Rolando identified A. On Oct. 27, Tomas Dimacucha surrendered A. As brother surrendered the bolo.
Dr. Dinah Lucero

Vs body was almost decapitated, suffered from 7 stab wounds, cause of death was massive blood loss secondary to multiple hacking wound.
Normita, Vs sister

A has a motive to kill V because an altercation occured between the 2 on Oct 22.
As defense is self-defense His version of the story is that he heard V shouting and insulting him outside his house and challenging him to a fight. V was accompanied by several unidentified persons. V slapped the back of his head and pulled out an ice pick from his pocket when A tried to pacify V. He retreated and saw a bolo under a tree and used it to defend himself. When V was about to enter his house, he hacked V. V wounded his forehead. When he gained control of the scuffle he hacked V 4 times on the head.

Issues: W/N JC of self-defense is present Decision: A did not act in self-defense. Rationale: 1st , No unlawful aggression. There was no actual or imminent danger on the life of A when he came face to face with V. Even if this court were to adopt the version of facts of A, the conclusion would be the same because mere slapping of ones head does not place a persons life in serious danger such that it compels him to use a bolo and hack the offender. Also, there was no ice pick found. The Dr.s testimony re his forehead wounds show that he was merely an out patient and his wounds were minor ones. In stark contrast, V was almost decapitated. It is difficult to believe that V was

the unlawful aggressor. The gravity, location and number of wounds sustained by V are eloquent physical evidence showing a determined effort on the part of A to kill V, and not just to defend himself. Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non is SD. SD as JC cannot be appreciated even if the 2 other elements are present. 2nd, SD requires that the means employed mustbe reasonably necessary to prevent or repel the unlawwful agression of the victim. The act of A in repeatedly hacking V was neither reasonable nor necessary even assuming arguendo that V was armed with an ice-pick.

G.R. No. 135981 January 15, 2004 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MARIVIC GENOSA, appellant. If the unlawful aggression is not continuous, it does not warrant self-defense. In the absence of such aggression, there can be no self-defense -- complete or incomplete -- on the part of the victim. FACTS Novermber 1983, appellant Marivic and Ben got married. After their marriage, they lived in the home of Ben's parents in Isabel, Leyte. At first, Marivic and Ben lived happily. But apparently, soon thereafter, the couple would quarrel often (because Ben usually goes home drunk) and their fights would become violent. In Novermber 1995, one Joseph Valida saw Marivic going out of their house with her two kids. He saw that Marivic locked their house. After several days, their neighbours noticed the foul odor emanating from the house of Marivic and Ben. One of the neighbours entered the house and then he saw the lifeless body of Ben lying on his side on the bed covered with a blanket. He was only in his briefs with injuries at the back of his head. November 1996, an information was filed against Marivic charging her with the crime of PARRICIDE committed 'with intent to kill, with treachery and evidence premeditation, x x x wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound x x x her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon x x x which caused his death.' Appellant Marivic admitted that he killed Ben - that after the first year of marriage, Ben became cruel to her and was a habitual drinker. She said he provoked her, he would slap her, sometimes he would pin her down on the bed, and sometimes beat her - that one day, when they were quarrelling, she smashed the arm of Ben with a pipe, causing him to drop the blade and his wallet. She then smashed Ben at his nape with the pipe as he was about to pick up the blade and his wallet. - that she ended the life of her husband by shooting him.

RTC: convicted - found Marivic guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide, and further found treachery as an aggravating circumstance, thus sentencing her to the ultimate penalty of DEATH. The case was elevated to the SC upon automatic review. The SC issued a Resolution remanding the case to the trial court for the reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the "battered woman syndrome" plea; and requiring the lower court to report thereafter the proceedings taken as well as to submit copies of the and additional evidence ISSUES: 1. Whether Marivic acted in self-defense arguing BWS (Battered Wife Syndrome) 2. Whether treachery attended the killing of Ben HELD 1. NO, Marivic did not act in self defense

Requisites of self-defense a. unlawful aggression (indispensable); b. reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression; c. lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes actual, sudden and unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a person. If it is not continuous, it does not warrant self-defense. In the absence of such aggression, there can be no self-defense -- complete or incomplete -- on the part of the victim. In the case at the bar, THERE WAS NO UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION. According to the testimony of Marivic, THERE WAS A SUFFICIENT TIME INTERVAL BETWEEN THE UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION OF BEN AND HER FATAL ATTACK UPON HIM. - that she had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their childrens room. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. THE REALITY OR EVEN THE IMMINENCE DANGER HE POSED HAD ENDED ALTOGETHER. HE WAS NO LONGER IN A POSITION THAT PRESENTED AN ACTUAL THREAT ON HER LIFE OR SAFETY. Had Ben still been awaiting Marivic when she came out of their children's bedroom -- and based on past violent incidents, there was a great probability that he would still have pursued her and inflicted graver harm -- then, the imminence of the real threat upon her life would not have ceased yet The court, however, is not discontinuing the possibility of self-defense arising from BWS. The following are the requirements: a. each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner b. the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered person's mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life c. at the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily immediate and actual -grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter. 2.No, treachery was not present. Requisites of treachery 1. that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself 2. that the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by him. In the case at the bar, the trial court inferred treachery merely from the fact that the lifeless body of Ben had been found lying in bed with an open, depressed, circular fracture located at the back of his head. BUT, AS TO HOW AND WHEN HE HAD BEEN FATALLY ATTACKED, THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO ESTABLISH IT INDUBITABLY. Also, there was no showing that Marivic intentionally chose a specific means of successfully attacking her husband without any risk to herself from any retaliatory act that he might make. In fact, the thought of using the gun occurred to her ONLY AT ABOUT THE SAME MOMENT WHEN SHE DECIDED TO KILL BEN.

Two mitigating circumstance present in the case at the bar: a. b. Illness of the offender (illness that diminished the exercise by appellant of her will power without, however, depriving her of consciousness of her acts.) Passion and obfuscation.

In effect: from death to RECLUSION TEMPORAL The penalty for parricide imposed by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death. Since two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance have been found to have attended the commission of the offense, the penalty shall be lowered by one (1) degree, pursuant to Article 64 of 88 89 paragraph 5 of the same Code. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period is imposable, considering that two mitigating circumstances are to be taken into account in reducing the penalty by one degree, and no other modifying circumstances were shown to have attended the commission of the offense.

G.R. No. 144933 July 3, 2002 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JERRY ANTONIO Y DIOLATA, accused-appellant. YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: When unlawful aggression ceases, it is no longer necessary to inflict injury (stab the victim) to defend yourself. FACTS November 1998, accused-appellant Jerry bought cigarettes in a store owned by Jomar Cardosa (victim). Jerry ordered Jomar and his companions to count the cigarettes he bought but they told him to let Jomar (store owner/victim) do the counting. Rebuked, Jerry left and returned few minutes later, and then he suddenly stabbed Jomar at the back, after which he immediately fled. The victim was rushed by his companions to the hospitals but dies the following day. During the arraignment, Jerry pleaded NOT GUILTY. He contended that he merely acted in self defense. - that after buying cigarettes from a store, he offered some of it to the people who were having drinking spree near the store but nobody accepted his offer. And then he just left. - that when he returned to the store to buy pulutan, for no reason, somebody struck hitting him on the left eyebrow. - that he fell on the ground but the group of the deceased (who were in front of the store) ganged up on him. After that, the victim attempted ho hit him but because the former was very drunk, he missed and fell on his belly. It was at this point when he (Jerry) got hold of a knife he saw under the table and stabbed the deceased at the back. Thereafter, he fled but the crowd chased and mauled him. RTC: convicted crime of murder; sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; and ordering him to pay the heirs of the deceased the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P20,000.00 as moral damages, plus the costs of suit. ISSUES 1. Whether he acted in self-defense 2. Whether the trial court failed to appreciate the presence of mitigating circumstance of illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of the will-power of the offender without however depriving him of consciousness of his acts. HELD 1. No, he did not act in self-defense The supreme court gave credence to the findings of the trial court as to the witnesses and testimonies over the version of Jerry as to what happened. A thorough review of the records of the case at bar shows that the trial court did not miss any such material circumstance nor did it commit any palpable error in upholding the facts as established by the prosecution. The positive and direct narration of the prosecution witnesses that accused-appellant suddenly stabbed the victim at the back, and that no altercation preceded the attack, deserves full faith and credence. These witnesses were not shown to have been impelled by ill-motive to falsely testify against accused-appellant. Even assuming that the version of the accused-appellant that the initial aggression came from the group of the deceased, still he did not act in self-defense because:

- the deceased who at that time was very drunk and who tried to hit him but missed and fell on the ground, AT THAT POINT, UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION CEASED AND IT WAS NO LONGER NECESSARY FOR HIM TO STAB THE DECEASED. It was him, therefore, who became the aggressor when he, despite the condition of the deceased, proceeded to stab the latter at the back. HIS ACTS CAN NO LONGER BE CONSIDERED/INTERPRETED AS AN ACT OF SELF-PRESERVATION BUT A PERVRSE DESIRE TO KILL. Hence, he cannot successfully claim the benefit of self-defense. - also, if it were true that the companions of the deceased ganged up on him, HIS ATTACK SHOULD HAVE BEEN DIRECTED AGAINST THEM AND NOT AGAINST THE DECEASED WHO WAS ALREADY DEFENSELESS AND LYING ON THE GROUND.

Treachery was present The attack on the deceased from behind completely caught the latter by surprise. Jerry therefore effectively executed the assault without any risk to himself arising from the defense which the deceased might make 2. No, the trial court was not at fault. The injury sustained by accused-appellant after he was allegedly struck by a stool on the head will not entitle him to a mitigating circumstance. The alleged injury hardly qualifies as mitigating circumstance analogous to illness or defect that would diminish the exercise of will-power. The injury he sustained did not deprive him of consciousness of his acts. More importantly, accused-appellant failed to prove that he was assaulted by the deceased and the latters companions.

------------------ people vs. Narvaez ------------------ balunueco vs. people ----------------- people vs. dijan

People vs. Toring, et al 191 SCRA 38 Facts: A benefit dance was held in one sitio in Lapu lapu City for the last canvassing of votes for the candidates for princesses, attended by the entire family of one of the candidates. Also present were members of the kwaknit gang, headed by Toring, noted for their bird-like way of dancing and their propensity for drunkenness and provoking trouble. Samuel, the father of the declared winner, while answering the call of nature, was approached by Toring and two others and was stabbed from behind by Toring using a knife handed to him by a companion. Samuel died of stab wound he sustained on the right side of his abdomen. An information for MURDER was filed against Toring. The lower court rendered a decision discrediting Toring's claim that the killing of Samuel was justified because it was done in defense of a stranger. While Toring testified that Samuel was aiming his shotgun at the chest of Ely Amyon (Amion), prosecution witness Joel Escobia claimed that he was at the receiving end of Samuel's thrusts with the butt of his shotgun. To the court, such discrepancy is fatal to the defense because in appreciating the justifying circumstance of defense of a stranger, the court must know "with definiteness the identity of the stranger defended by the accused.

Upon appeal, Toring seeks his exoneration by contending that his assault on Samuel was justified because he acted in defense of his first cousin, Joel Escobia is the first cousin of Toring their fathers being brothers, although no explanation appears on record why they have different surnames. At any rate, this allegation on relationship was not rebutted by the prosecution. Escobia attested that as he was about to dance with a girl, Samuel stopped him, pointed his shotgun at him, took a bullet from his jacket pocket, showed it to Escobia. Samuel pointed the shotgun at his chin and told him to eat the bullet. Issue: Whether the act of Toring in stabbing Samuel was justified for being done in defense of his relative, Joel Escobia. Held: NO. SC ruled that there was no reason to doubt Joel Escobia's assertion of Samuel's unlawful aggression and that prosecution failed to prove that Joel testified to favor Toring. However, the presence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim and the lack of proof of provocation on the part of Toring notwithstanding, full credence cannot be given, to Toring's claim of defense of a relative. Toring himself admitted in court that in 1979, he was shot with a .22 caliber revolver by Edgar Augusto, Samuel's brother. It cannot be said, therefore, that in attacking Samuel, Toring was impelled by pure compassion or beneficence or the lawful desire to avenge the immediate wrong inflicted on his cousin. Rather, he was motivated by revenge, resentment or evil motive because of a "running feud" between the Augusto and the Toring brothers. Indeed, vendetta appears to have driven both camps to commit unlawful acts against each other. As the defense itself claims, after the incident subject of the instant case occurred, Toring's brother, was shot on the leg by Edgar Augusto. Indeed, vendetta appears to to have driven both camps to commit unlawful acts against each other. Hence, under the circumstances, to justify Toring's act of assaulting Samuel Augusto would give free rein to lawlessness. Toring's should be credited with the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense of a relative.

State of Necessity Ty v. People Nature of the Case: Petition for review seeking to set aside the CA decision affirming conviction of petitioner of 7 counts of violation of BP 22 by the trial court. Facts: Petitioner Vicky C. Ty (Ty) made, drew and issued to Manila Doctors Hospital, Metropolitan bank checks, said accused knowing that at the time of the issue she did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment. The evidence for the prosecution shows that Tys mother Chua Lao So Un was confined at the Manila Doctors Hospital for arounf two years. Being the patients daughter, Ty signed the Acknowledgment of Responsibility for Payment in the Contract of Admission. The Statement of Account shows the total liability of the mother in the amount of P657, 182.40. Tys sister, Judy Chua was also confined at the hospital for almost two weeks, incurring hospital bills in the amount of P418, 410.55. The total hospital bills of the two patients amounted to P1, 075,592.95.

Ty executed a promissory note where she assumed the payment of the obligation in installments. To assure payment of the obligation, she drew several postdated checks against Metrobank payable to the hospital. The checks were all dishonored by the drawee bank and returned unpaid to the hospital due to insufficiency of funds, with the Account Closed advice. For her defense, Ty claimed that she issued the checks because of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury. She averred that she was forced to issue the checks to obtain release for her mother whom the hospital inhumanely and harshly treated and would not discharge unless the hospital bills are paid. She alleged that her mother was deprived of room facilities such as the air-condition unit, refrigerator and television set, and subject to inconveniences such as the cutting off of the telephone line, late delivery of her mothers food and refusal to change the latters gown and bed sheets. She also bewailed the hospitals suspending medical treatment of her mother. The debasing treatment, she pointed out, so affected her mothers mental, psychological and physical health that the latter contemplated suicide if she would not be discharged from the hospital. Fearing the worst for her mother, and to comply with the demands of the hospital, Ty was compelled to sign a promissory note, open an account with Metrobank and issue the checks to effect her mothers immediate discharge. RTC convicted Ty and CA affirmed. The Office of the Solicitor General contends that a check issued as an evidence of debt, though not intended to be presented for payment, has the same effect as an ordinary check, it falls within the ambit of BP. 22. What the law punished is the issuance of a bouncing check, not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum. Issues: 1. Whether the defense of uncontrollable fear is tenable to warrant defendant exemption from criminal liability. Held: No. For this exempting circumstance to be invoked the ff. requisites most concur: 1. Existence of an uncontrollable fear, 2. The fear must be real and imminent, and 3. The fear of an injury is greater than or at least equal to that committed. In this case fear was not uncontrollable or insuperable as to deprive her of all volition and to make her a mere instrument without will, moved exclusively by the hospitals threats and demands. The fear evoked on Ty was not real and imminent either but speculative, expected and anticipated; as for fear that her mothers health might deteriorate further due to the inhumane treatment of the hospital, or worse commit suicide. Ty also failed to satisfy the last criteria because the Court is not convinced she was left with no choice but to commit the crime. She did not take advantage of the many opportunities available to her to avoid committin gone. Therefore, the defense of state of necessity is also non-existent. By her very own words, she admitted that the collateral or security the hospital required prior to the discharge of her mother may be in the form of postdated checks or jewelry. She even testified her counsel advised her not to open an account nor issue postdated checks. In all these, she failed to give evidence of coercion and compulsion from the hospital. Furthermore, a defense of state of necessity requires that the injury expected is not brought about by negligence, imprudence, and the willful inaction of the actor. In this case, the issuance of bouncing checks was brought about by Tys own failure to pay her mothers hospital bills. BP 22 does not make any distinction as to whether the checks within its contemplation are issued in payment of an obligation or to merely guarantee an obligation. The Thrust of the law (BP. 22) is to

prohibit the making of worthless checks and putting them into circulation. The law itself creates a prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds. Deceit is not an essential element of an offense penalized by BP. 22. People v. Ricohermoso Nature of the case: Appeal from the decision of the Circuit Criminal Court convicting appellants

of murder, Facts: Geminiano de Leon (deceased), together with his common-law wife, son Marianito de Leon and one Rizal Rosales, chanced upon Pio Ricohermoso. Owning a parcel of land, which Ricohermoso cultivated as kaingin, Geminiano asked about his share of palay harvest and added that she should be allowed to taste the palay harvested from his land. Ricohermoso said Geminiano could collect the palay anytime. Upon returning from his trip to Barrio Bagobasin, Geminiano dropped by Ricohermosos house and asked him about the palay, to which the latter answered defiantly that he will not give him the palay, whatever happens. Geminiano remonstrated and that point (as if by prearrangement), Ricohermoso unsheathed his bolo, while his father-in-law Severo Padernal got an axe, and attacked Geminiano. At the same time and place, Ricohermosos brother-in-law Juan Padernal (accused subject of this appeal) suddenly embraced Marianito. They grappled and rolled down the hill, at which point Marianito passed out. When Marianito regained consciousness, he discovered that the rifle he carried beforehand was gone and that his father (Germiniano) was mortally wounded. The defendants (Severo and Juan Padernal) fashioned their version in such a way as to shift the responsibility for the killing to Ricohermoso, a fugitive from justice who has not been tried. They also tried to exculpate Severo Padernal and to prove that Ricohermoso acted in selfdefense. (Note: Severo Padernal withdrew his appeal, thus, in effect, accepted the prosecutions version of the case and trial courts finding of guilt.) The issue left is Juan Padernals liability. Issue: 1. Can Juan Padernal invoke the justifying circumstance of avoidance of a greater evil or injury? (added issue) 2. Juan Padernal contends that he was not a co-principal because he did not take any direct part in the killing of Geminiano, that he did not force or induce Ricohermoso to stab Geminiano and that he allegedly did not cooperate in its commission. Is he correct? Held: 1. No. The act of Juan Padernal in preventing Marianito de Leon from shooting Ricohermoso and Severo Padernal, who were the aggressors, was designed to insure the killing of Geminiano de Leon without any risk to his assailants. Juan Padernal was not avoiding any evil when he sought to disable Marianito. Padernal's malicious intention was to forestall any interference in the felonious assault made by his father and brother-in-law on Geminiano. That situation is unarguably not the case envisaged in paragraph 4 of article 11.

2. No. when Geminiano reappeared at Ricohermoso's place in the afternoon, Severo Padernal, Ricohermoso Juan Padernal, like actors in a well-rehearsed play, performed their assigned roles with dramatic precision. Severo Padernal and Ricohermoso, one armed with an axe and the other with a bolo, in a pincer movement, confronted Geminiano de Leon. Simultaneously with that maneuver, the thirty-five-year old Juan Padernal embraced Marianito de Leon and prevented him from firing at Severo Padernal and Ricohermoso or from helping his father. Considering the trio's behavior and appellant Juan Padernal's close relationship to Ricohermoso and Severo Padernal, the ineluctable conclusion is that he acted in conspiracy with them. He coordinated and timed his seizure of Marianito with the assault of Ricohermoso and Severo Padernal on Geminiano. It is doubtful if the assailants could have consummated the killing of Geminiano, without their suffering any injury, if Marianito had not been rendered helpless by appellant Juan Padernal. The circumstances surrounding the killing of Geminiano de Leon alevosia or treachery. His hands were raised and he was pleading for mercy with Severo Padernal, when Ricohermoso struck him on the neck with a bolo. The fact that an exchange of words preceded the assault would not negate the treacherous character of the attack. Geminiano did not expect that Ricohermoso would renege on his promise to give him palay and that he would adopt a bellicose attitude. Juan Padernal's role of weakening the defense, by disabling Marianito de Leon, was part and parcel of the means of execution deliberately resorted to by the assailants to insure the assassination of Geminiano de Leon without any risk to themselves (Par. 16, Article 14, Revised Penal Code). Treachery was appreciated in a case where the accused fired at the victim who, with hands upraised, pleaded in a loud voice: "Do not shoot me; investigate first what was my fault"

The trial court convicted the appellants with lesiones leves, from an attempted murder charge with respect to Marianito de Leon. Inasmuch as Juan Padernal did not touch upon the lesiones leves case in his brief, he, like his father Severo, seems to have acquiesced in the correctness of the trial court's decision. Judgment as to Juan Padernal affirmed.
[FULFILLMENT OF DUTY] RUFINO S. MAMANGUN, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. FACTS:

On July 31, 1992, at about 8:00 in the evening, in Brgy. Calvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan a certain Liberty Contreras was heard shouting, "MagnanakawMagnanakaw." Several residents responded and thereupon chased the suspect who entered the yard of Antonio Abacan and proceeded to the rooftop of Abacans house. At about 9:00 oclock that same evening, the desk officer of the Meycauayan PNP Police Station, upon receiving a telephone call that a robbery-holdup was in progress in Brgy. Calvario, immediately contacted and dispatched to the scene the crew of Patrol Car No. 601 composed of Team Leader SPO1 Andres Legaspi, with PO2 Eugenio Aminas and herein petitioner PO2 Rufino S. Mamangun; and Patrol Car No. 602 composed of Team Leader PO3 Sandiego San Gabriel, with PO2 Carlito Cruz and PO2 Hobert Diaz. With the permission of Abacan, petitioner Mamangun, PO2 Diaz and PO2 Cruz went to the rooftop of the house whereat the suspect was allegedly taking refuge. The three policemen, i.e., petitioner, Diaz and Cruz, each armed with a drawn handgun, searched the rooftop. There, they saw a man whom they thought was the robbery suspect. At that instance, petitioner Mamangun, who was walking ahead of the group, fired his handgun once, hitting the man. The man turned out to be Gener Contreras (Contreras) who was not the robbery suspect. Contreras died from the gunshot wound. (you may or may not include the italicized paragraphs:) From the foregoing admitted or undisputed facts, the prosecution and the defense presented conflicting versions as to how the fatal shooting of Contreras by petitioner Mamangun actually happened. According to Ayson, the lone eyewitness for the prosecution, he accompanied the three policemen (Mamangun, Diaz and Cruz) to the rooftop of Abacans house. He was following petitioner Mamangun who was ahead of the group. They passed through the second-floor door of the house to the rooftop. The roof was lighted by an incandescent bulb from an adjacent house. He was beside Mamangun when they saw, some four to five arms-length away, a man whom he (witness) recognized as Gener Contreras. Mamangun pointed his .45 cal. pistol at the man, who instantly exclaimed, "Hindi ako, hindi ako!," to which Mamangun replied, "Anong hindi ako?" Before he (Ayson) could say anything, Mamangun fired his gun, hitting the man who turned out to be Contreras. He (witness) approached the victim who was then lying on his left side unconscious. He brought down the victim and they rushed him to the hospital where he died at about 10:00 oclock that same evening. The defense has its own account of what purportedly actually transpired. PO2 Mamangun, along with PO2 Cruz and PO2Diaz, denied the presence of Ayson at the rooftop during the shooting incident. Corroborating one another, the three testified that they were the only ones at the scene of the shooting, and that it was dark. They claimed that each of them, with Mamangun on the lead, went on separate directions around a water tank. As they met each other at the other side of the tank, PO2 Cruz pointed to a person crouching at the edge of the roof of the garage. Thinking that the person was the suspect they were looking for, Mamangun chased said person. They announced that they were police officers but the person continued to run in a crouching position until Mamangun caught up with him and shouted, "Pulis. Tigil," whereupon the person suddenly stopped, turned around, faced Mamangun, and raised a stainless steel pipe towards the latters head but Mamangun was able to evade the attack. This prompted Mamangun to shoot the person on the left arm. All three claimed that it was only at this point that PO2 Cruz and Diaz approached Contreras who told them, "Hindi ako. Hindi ako." Mamangun went near Contreras and asked, "Why did you go to the rooftop? You know there are policemen here." On January 19, 2001, after due proceedings, the Sandiganbayan came out with its decision finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of only the crime of Homicide. In so finding, the Sandiganbayan did not appreciate the presence of the aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength to qualify the killing to Murder. But even as the said court rejected the petitioners claim that the shooting was justified by self-defense, it nonetheless ruled that the crime of Homicide was attended by an incomplete justifying circumstance of the petitioner having acted in the performance of his duty as a policeman, and also appreciated in his favor the generic mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. ISSUE:
4

WON the Sandiganbayan committed reversible error in failing to apply paragraph 5, Article 11, of the Revised Penal Code, which would have absolved him from criminal liability on the basis of his submission that the shooting in question was done in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. DECISION: We are not persuaded. The justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty under paragraph 5, Article II, of the Revised Penal Code may be invoked only after the defense successfully proves that: (1) the accused acted in the performance of a duty; and (2) the injury inflicted or offense committed is the necessary consequence of the due performance or lawful exercise of 7 such duty. Concededly, the first requisite is present in this case. Petitioner, a police officer, was responding to a robbery-holdup incident. His presence at the situs of the crime was in accordance with the performance of his duty. However, proof that the shooting and ultimate death of Contreras was a necessary consequence of the due performance of his duty as a policeman is essential to exempt him from criminal liability. As we see it, petitioners posturing that he shot Contreras because the latter tried to strike him with a steel pipe was a mere afterthought to exempt him from criminal liability. We see no plausible basis to depart from the Sandiganbayans findings that there was no reason for the petitioner to shoot Contreras. The latter was unarmed and had already uttered, "Hindi po ako, Hindi po ako" before the petitioner fatally shot him on the left arm. Prosecution witness Ayson, who was then behind the petitioner when the latter shot Contreras, testified that to the victims utterances, the petitioner even responded, "Anong hindi ako," and immediately 8 shot Contreras. As correctly observed by the Sandiganbayan: Besides being self-serving (with respect to the accused) and biased (with respect to his co-policemen-witnesses), We find (1) the claim of the accused and his co-policemen-witnesses that the victim (Contreras) attacked the said accused and (2) their seemingly "positive" identification of the stainless steel pipe (more of a rod) as his weapon, to be of doubtful credibility, for the following reasons: (1) We have no doubt that, as claimed by PO2 Carlito Cruz and PO2 Hobert Diaz, the three policemen appropriately identified themselves as police officers as they started chasing the man they saw "crouching," and, as claimed by accused PO2 Rufino Mamangun, that, as he was about to catch up with said man, he shouted, "Pulis! Tigil!" With all these introductions and forewarnings, it is utterly incredible and contrary to human experience that, that man, later identified to be Gener Contreras and admittedly not the person they were looking for, purportedly armed only with a stainless steel "lead" pipe (more of a rod) would suddenly stop, turn around and attack one of the three policemen who were chasing him, one after the other, with drawn guns. (2) When the victim (Gener Contreras) fell down after being shot by accused PO2 Mamangun, and as the latter went near the fallen victim, said accused asked, "Why did you go to the rooftop. You know there are policemen here." He admits that he did not ask the victim, "Why did you try to hit me, if you are not the one?" This admission clearly belies the claim of the police-witnesses that Gener Contreras attacked the accused policeman with an iron pipe when he was shot, for the accused should have asked the latter question. (3) The location of the entry of the bullet fired by accused Mamangun which is at the outer left arm at about the bicep of the victim and its trajectory as it penetrated his body hitting his vital organs along the way belies the claim of the accused that the victim was facing him and had just missed his head with an iron pipe, as instead the victim must have instinctively shielded his body with his left arm. Moreover, petitioners pretense that Contreras struck him with a steel pipe is intriguing. As it is, petitioner did not report the same to Police Investigator Banez when he reported back to the police station after the shooting incident. It was only when a lead pipe was recovered from the scene and brought to the police station that petitioner conveniently remembered Contreras trying to hit him with a pipe. Such a vital information could not have escaped the petitioners mind. We are thus inclined to believe that the alleged actuation of Contreras, which could have justified petitioners shooting him, was nothing but a concocted story to evade criminal liability. Indeed, knowing that he shot

Contreras, the least that the petitioner should have done was to bring with him to the police station the very pipe with which Contreras tried to attack him. As borne by the evidence, however, it was only after a police investigator referred to the scene that the lead pipe surfaced. Self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, cannot be appreciated as a valid justifying circumstance in this case. For, from the above admitted, uncontroverted or established facts, the most important element of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim to justify a claim of self defense was absent. Lacking this essential and primary element of unlawful aggression, petitioners plea of self-defense, complete or incomplete, must have to fail. To be sure, acts in the fulfillment of a duty, without more, do not completely justify the petitioners firing the fatal gunshot at the victim. True, petitioner, as one of the policemen responding to a reported robbery then in progress, was performing his duty as a police officer as well as when he was trying to effect the arrest of the suspected robber and in the process, fatally shoot said suspect, albeit the wrong man. However, in the absence of the equally necessary justifying circumstance that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty, there can only be incomplete justification, a privileged mitigating circumstance under Articles 13 and 69 of the Revised Penal Code.

[FULFILLMENT OF DUTY] EDUARDO L. BAXINELA, Petitioner-Appellant, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent-Appellee. FACTS: The defense alleges that Baxinela proceeded to the Superstar Disco Pub in response to the information given by Manuba that there was an armed drunken man accosting several people inside the pub. Once they arrived, they saw Lajo with a handgun visibly tucked behind his waist. When Baxinela introduced himself as a policeman and asked why he had a handgun, Lajo suddenly drew on him prompting Baxinela to pull out his gun and fire upon Lajo, critically wounding him. Thereafter, the defense claims that Regimen ordered the security guards to bring Lajo to the hospital while they proceed to the police station to report the incident. The prosecution, on the other hand, contends that Baxinela was already in the pub drinking with Regimen and Legarda for more than a couple of hours prior to the shooting incident. After witnessing an altercation between Lajo and another customer, Baxinela decided to confront Lajo on why he had a gun with him. Baxinela approached Lajo from behind and held the latter on the left shoulder with one hand while holding on to his .45 caliber service firearm with the other. As Lajo was turning around, to see who was confronting him, Baxinela shot him. Baxinela then got Lajos wallet and fled the scene with Regimen. The RTC found the version of the prosecution, that Baxinela shot Lajo as the latter was turning around and without having drawn his gun, more convincing, and rendered a decision convicting Baxinela. The RTC, however, considered in favor of Baxinela the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and provocation. The dispositive portion of 16 the decision is as follows: WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused SPO2 EDUARDO BAXINELA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, and considering the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and provocation, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of 4 years of prision correccional medium as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor medium as maximum. On appeal, the CA modified Baxinelas conviction by disallowing the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation. ISSUES: Baxinela filed the present petition for review on certiorari citing the following grounds: A. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE VERSION OF THE PROSECUTION. B. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES OF SELF DEFENSE OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE THE LAWFUL PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTY UNDER ARTICLE 11 PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 5, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE. C. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS AND REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED. D. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS AND REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE QUALIFIED MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED. RULING: The Court now proceeds to determine if, following the prosecutions version of what happened, Baxinela can claim the justifying circumstances of self-defense and fulfillment of a duty or lawful exercise of a right or office.

The requisites for self-defense are: 1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; 2) lack of sufficient provocation 22 on the part of the accused; and 3) employment of reasonable means to prevent and repel and aggression. By invoking self-defense, Baxinela, in effect, admits killing Lajo, thus shifting upon him the burden of the evidence on these elements. The first requisite is an indispensable requirement of self-defense. It is a condition sine qua non, without which there 23 can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete. On this requisite alone, Baxinelas defense fails. Unlawful aggression contemplates an actual, sudden and unexpected attack on the life and limb of a person or an imminent 24 danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. The attack must be real, or at least imminent. Mere belief by a person of an impending attack would not be sufficient. As the evidence shows, there was no imminent threat that necessitated shooting Lajo at that moment. Just before Baxinela shot Lajo, the former was safely behind the victim and holding his arm. It was Lajo who was at a disadvantage. In fact, it was Baxinela who was the aggressor when he grabbed Lajos shoulder and started questioning him. And when Lajo was shot, it appears that he was just turning around to face Baxinela and, quite possibly, reaching for his wallet. None of these acts could conceivably be deemed as unlawful aggression on the part of Lajo. Next, we consider the alternative defense of fulfillment of a duty. In order to avail of this justifying circumstance it must be shown that: 1) the accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office; and 2) the injury caused or the offense committed is the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or 25 the lawful exercise of a right or office. While the first condition is present, the second is clearly lacking. Baxinelas duty was to investigate the reason why Lajo had a gun tucked behind his waist in a public place. This was what Baxinela was doing when he confronted Lajo at the entrance, but perhaps through anxiety, edginess or the desire to take no chances, Baxinela exceeded his duty by firing upon Lajo who was not at all resisting. The shooting of Lajo cannot be considered due performance of a duty if at that time Lajo posed no serious threat or harm to Baxinela or to the civilians in the pub. Essentially, Baxinela is trying to convince the Court that he should be absolved of criminal liability by reason of a 26 mistake of fact, a doctrine first enunciated in United States v. Ah Chong. It was held in that case that a mistake of fact will exempt a person from criminal liability so long as the alleged ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith. In examining the circumstances attendant in the present case, the Court finds that there was negligence on the part of Baxinela. Lajo, when he was shot, was simply turning around to see who was accosting him. Moreover, he identified himself saying "I am MIG." These circumstances alone would not lead a reasonable and prudent person to believe that Baxinelas life was in peril. Thus, his act of shooting Lajo, to the mind of this Court, constitutes clear negligence. But even if the Court assumes that Lajos actions were aggressive enough to appear that he was going for his gun, there were a number of procedures that could have been followed in order to avoid a confrontation and take control of the situation. Baxinela, whom the Court assumes not to be a rookie policeman, could have taken precautionary measures by simply maintaining his hold on to Lajos shoulders, keeping Lajo facing away from him, forcing Lajo to raise his hands and then take Lajos weapon. There was also Regimen who should have assisted Baxinela in disabling and disarming Lajo. The events inside the disco pub that unnecessarily cost the life of Lajo did not have to happen had Baxinela not been negligent in performing his duty as a police officer. The Court will, however, attribute to Baxinela the incomplete defense of fulfillment of a duty as a privileged mitigating 27 circumstance. In Lacanilao v. Court of Appeals, it was held that if the first condition is fulfilled but the second is wanting, Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code is applicable so that the penalty lower than one or two degrees than 28 that prescribed by law shall be imposed. Accordingly, the Court grants in favor of Baxinela a privileged mitigating circumstance and lower his penalty by one degree. His entitlement to the ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender is also recognized, thereby further reducing his penalty to its minimum.

FULFILLMENT OF DUTY Pomoy vs. People 439 SCRA 439 FACTS

Tomas Balboa was a teacher in Concepcion College of Science and Fisheries in Iloilo. On January 4, 1990, about 7:30 in the morning, some policemen arrived at and arrested Balboa, allegedly in connection with a robbery which took place in the municipality in December 1989. Balboa was taken to the Headquarters of the already defunct 321st Philippine Constabulary Company at Camp Jalandoni, Sara, Iloilo. He was detained along with another suspect, Edgar Samudio. At about 2 oclock in the afternoon, petitioner, a police sergeant, directed Balboa to come out from the jail where he is detained, purportedly for tactical interrogation at the investigation room. At that time, petitioner had a gun, a .45 caliber pistol, tucked in a holster which was hanging by the side of his belt. When petitioner and Balboa were near the investigation room, two (2) gunshots were heard. When the source of the shots was verified, petitioner was seen still holding a .45 caliber pistol, facing Balboa, who was lying in a pool of blood, about two (2) feet away. Certain Dr. Palma, who happened to be at the crime scene as he was visiting his brother in the Philippine Constabulary, examined Balboa, he (Dr. Palma) said that it was unnecessary to bring Balboa to the hospital for he was dead. ISSUES Whether or not the act of the accused was committed in the course of the lawful performance of his duties as an enforcer of the law. HELD Yes. The act of the petitioner to prevent the snatching of his service weapon by anyone, especially by a detained person in his custody, is a lawful performance of his duty as a law enforcer. RULING Aside from the fact that all the elements of accident as an Exempting Circumstance under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code were present in this case, which exonerate the accused from criminal liability, the accused was also in the lawful performance of his duties as investigating officer at that time of the incident. He was a member, specifically one of the investigators of the PNP stationed at the Iloilo Provincial Mobile Force Company, and that under the instructions of his superior, he fetched the victim from the latters cell for a routine interrogation. It was in the lawful performance of his duty as a law enforcer that petitioner tried to defend his possession of the weapon when the victim suddenly tried to remove it from his holster. He was duty-bound to prevent the snatching of his service weapon by anyone, especially by a detained person in his custody. Such weapon was likely to be used to facilitate escape and to kill or maim persons in the vicinity, including petitioner himself. The participation of petitioner, if any, in the victims death was limited only to acts committed in the course of the lawful performance of his duties as an enforcer of the law. The removal of the gun from its holster, the release of the safety lock, and the firing of the two successive shots -- all of which led to the death of the victim -- were sufficiently demonstrated to have been consequences of circumstances beyond the control of petitioner.

Angcaco vs. People 378 SCRA 297 FACTS This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the CA which affirmed with modification the decision of the RTC finding petitioner John Angcaco guilty of murder and sentencing him accordingly. Petitioner John Angcaco and his co-accused namely, Ramon Decosto, Protacio Edep, Lydio Lota, and Mario Felizarte, were members of the Integrated National Police of Taytay, Palawan. At the time of the incident, they were serving a warrant of arrest on Restituto Bergante, who was wanted in connection with a robbery case. Edep was acting station commander, while Restituto Bergante was the barangay captain of Bato, Taytay, Palawan. At around 4 oclock in the morning of September 25, 1980, brothers Noe Bergante and Noel Bergante and their cousin Freddie Ganancial were awakened by the sound of gunfire while they were asleep in their house. Protacio Edep outside fire his carbine, as he shouted, Kapitan, you come down, this is a peace officer. He was apparently referring to Restituto Bergante. Noel answered that his father was not in the house, having gone to Puerto Princesa. Edep then ordered the men in the house to come out. Noel accordingly went to the gate and later called Noe to also come out of the house. Noe and his cousin, Freddie Ganancial, did as bidden. Once they were outside the house, Noe and Freddie were flanked by petitioner Angcaco on the right side and accused Ramon Decosto on the left side. Decosto pointed an armalite at the two and warned them not to run. Noe and Freddie joined Noel Bergante. Protacio Edep approached Freddie saying, You are tough, and pushed him. Then, shots rang out from the armalite and short firearm of Decosto and Edep, as a result of which Freddie Ganancial died. The trial court found John Angcaco, guilty of the crime of Murder with the presence of the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong. Co-accused Protacio Edep, Ramon Decosto, Lydio Lota and Mario Felizarte are ordered acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. Angcaco appealed. CA affirmed the trial courts decision but with modification as to appreciation of the mitigating circumstance. Incomplete fulfillment of a lawful duty is appreciated and not lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong. ISSUE Whether or not the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty is applicable in this case? HELD

No. the petitioners claim that the killing was done in fulfillment of a lawful duty cannot be sustained. RULING For this justifying circumstance to be appreciated, the following must be established: (1) That the offender acted in the lawful exercise of a right or a duty; and (2)That the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such right or office. In this case, the mission of petitioner and his colleagues was to effect the arrest of Restituto Bergante. The standard procedure in making an arrest was, first, to identify themselves as police officers and to show the warrant to the arrestee and to inform him of the charge against him, and, second, to take the arrestee under custody. The killing of Ganancial was not shown to be in furtherance of such duty. No evidence was presented by the defense to prove that Ganancial attempted to prevent petitioner and his fellow officers from arresting Restituto Bergante. Indeed, as already stated, any attempt by the accused to arrest the wanted person was pointless as Restituto Bergante was not in his house. As regards the second requisite, there can be no question that the killing of Freddie Ganancial was not a necessary consequence of the arrest to be made on Restituto Bergante.

OBEDIENCE TO AN ORDER TABUENA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN Through their separate petitions for review, Luis A. Tabuena and Adolfo M. Peralta appeal the Sandiganbayan decision dated October 12, 1990, as well as the Resolution dated December 20. 1991 denying reconsideration, convicting them of malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. FACTS There were three (3) criminal cases filed (nos. 11758, 11759 and 11760) since the total amount of P55 Million was taken on three (3) separate dates of January, 1986. Tabuena appears as the principal accused he being charged in all three (3) cases. Gathered from the documentary and testimonial evidence are the following essential antecedents: Then President Marcos instructed Tabuena over the phone to pay directly to the president's office and in cash what the MIAA owes the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), to which Tabuena replied, "Yes, sir, I will do it." About a week later, Tabuena received from Mrs. Fe Roa-Gimenez, then private secretary of Marcos, a Presidential Memorandum dated January 8, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as MARCOS Memorandum) reiterating in black and white such verbal instruction.

In obedience to President Marcos' verbal instruction and memorandum, Tabuena, with the help of Dabao and Peralta, caused the release of P55 Million of MIAA funds by means of three (3) withdrawals (January 10, 16 and 31, 1986). The disbursement of the P55 Million was, as described by Tabuena and Peralta themselves, "out of the ordinary" and "not based on the normal procedure". With the rejection by the Sandiganbayan of their claim of good faith which ultimately led to their conviction, Tabuena and Peralta now set forth a total of ten (10) errors committed by the Sandiganbayan for this Court's consideration.

ISSUE WON the justifying circumstance of obedience to a lawful order be appreciated in absolving the appellants in the crime charged?

RULING: The Court reversed the ruling of the Sandiganbayan. Accused Tabuena and Peralta are ACQUITTED. RATIO: It is settled that good faith is a valid defense in a prosecution for malversation for it would negate criminal intent on the part of the accused. Tabuena had no other choice but to make the withdrawals, for that was what the MARCOS Memorandum required him to do. He could not be faulted if he had to obey and strictly comply with the presidential directive, and to argue otherwise is something easier said than done. Marcos was undeniably Tabuena's superior the former being then the President of the Republic who unquestionably exercised control over government agencies such as the MIAA and PNCC. Tabuena therefore is entitled to the justifying circumstance of "Any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose." Tabuena had reasonable ground to believe that the President was entitled to receive the P55 Million since he was certainly aware that Marcos, as Chief Executive, exercised supervision and control over government agencies. And the good faith of Tabuena in having delivered the money to the President's office (thru Mrs. Gimenez), in strict compliance with the MARCOS

Memorandum, was not at all affected even if it later turned out that PNCC never received the money. Thus, it has been said that: Good faith in the payment of public funds relieves a public officer from the crime of malversation. The principles underlying all that has been said above in exculpation of Tabuena equally apply to Peralta in relation to the P5 Million for which he is being held accountable, i.e., he acted in good faith when he, upon the directive of Tabuena, helped facilitate the withdrawal of P5 Million of the P55 Million of the MIAA funds. In the case at bench, the order emanated from the Office of the President and bears the signature of the President himself, the highest official of the land. It carries with it the presumption that it was regularly issued. And on its face, the memorandum is patently lawful for no law makes the payment of an obligation illegal. This fact, coupled with the urgent tenor for its execution constrains one to act swiftly without question. Obedientia est legis essentia.

PEOPLE VS. BERONILLA This is an appeal by accused Manuel Beronilla, Policarpio Paculdo, Filipino Velasco, and Jacinto Adriatico from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Abra convicting them for murder. FACTS Arsenio Borjal was the elected mayor of La Paz, Abra, at the outbreak of war, and continued to serve as Mayor during the Japanese occupation, until March 10, 1943, when he moved to Bangued because of an attempt upon his life by unknown persons. On December 18, 1944, appellant Manuel Beronilla was appointed Military Mayor of La Paz by Lt. Col. R. H. Arnold, regimental commander of the 15th Infantry, Philippine Army, operating as a guerrilla unit in the province of Abra. Simultaneously with his appointment as Military Mayor, Beronilla received copy of a memorandum issued by Lt. Col. Arnold to all Military Mayors in Northern Luzon, authorizing them "to appoint a jury of 12 bolomen to try persons accused of treason, espionage, or the aiding and abetting the enemy" . He also received from the Headquarters of the 15th Infantry a list of all puppet government officials of the province of Abra (which included Arsenio Borjal, puppet mayor of La Paz), with a memorandum instructing all Military Mayors to investigate said persons and gather against them complaints from people of the municipality for collaboration with the enemy. Sometime in March, 1945, while the operations for the liberation of the province of Abra were in progress, Arsenio Borjal returned to La Paz with his family in order to escape the bombing of

Bangued. Beronilla, pursuant to his instructions, placed Borjal under custody and asked the residents of La Paz to file complaints against him. In no time, charges of espionage, aiding the enemy, and abuse of authority were filed against Borjal; a 12-man jury was appointed by Beronilla. The trial lasted 19 days up to April 10, 1945; the jury found Borjal guilty on all accounts and imposed upon him instruction from his superiors. Mayor Beronilla forwarded the records of the case to the Headquarters of the 15th Infantry for review. On the night of the same day, April 18, 1945, Beronilla ordered the execution of Borjal. Jacinto Adriatico acted as executioner and Antonio Palope as grave digger. Father Luding of the Roman Catholic Church was asked to administer the last confession to the prisoner, while Father Filipino Velasco of the Aglipayan Church performed the last rites over Borjal's remains. Immediately after the execution, Beronilla reported the matter to Col. Arnold. Two years thereafter, Manuel Beronilla, the prosecutors, the members of the jury, the executioner, the grave digger, and Father Filipino Velasco as an alleged conspirator, were indicted in the Court of First Instance of Abra for murder, for allegedly conspiring and confederating in the execution of Arsenio Borjal. Soon thereafter, the late President Manuel A. Roxas issued Executive Proclamation No. 8, granting amnesty to all persons who committed acts penalized under the Revised Penal Code in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy. Defendant Jesus Labuguen, then a master sergeant in the Philippine Army, applied for and was granted amnesty by the Amnesty Commission, Armed Forces of the Philippines (Records, pp. 618-20). The rest of the dAefendant filed their application for amnesty with the Second Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, who denied their application on the ground that the crime had been inspired by purely personal motives, and remanded the case to the Court of First Instance of Abra for trial on the merits. The case against defendant Jesus Labuguen, who had been granted amnesty was ordered provisionally dismissed. Juan Balmaceda was discharged from the information so that he might be utilized as state witness, although actually he was not called to testify; while the case against defendants Antonio Palope (the grave digger) and Demetrio Afos( a boloman) was dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence. Trial proceeded against the rest of the defendants; and on July 10, 1950, the Court below rendered judgment, acquitting the members of the jury and the grave digger Antonio Palope on the ground that they did not participated in the killing of Arsenio Borjal; acquitting defendants Jesus Labuguen, Felix Alverne, Severo Afos, and Lauro Parado upon insufficiency of evidence to establish their participation in the crime; but convicting defendants Manuel Beronilla, Policarpio Paculdo, Filipino Velasco, and Jacinto Adriatico as conspirator and co-principals of the crime of murder. In convicting said defendants the Court a quo found that while the crime committed by them fell within the provisions of the Amnesty Proclamation, they were not

entitled to the benefits thereof because the crime was committed after the expiration of the time limit fixed by the amnesty proclamation;: i.e., that the deceased Arsenio Borjal was executed after the liberation of La Paz, Abra. In view of the sentence meted by the Court below, the accused Beronilla, Paculdo, Velasco and Adriatico appealed to this Court.

ISSUE WON the justifying circumstance of obedience to a lawful order be appreciated in absolving the appellants in the crime charged?

RULING No. The appellaThe Court reversed the decision and acquit the appellants. RATIO The records are ample to sustain the claim of the defense that the arrest, prosecution and trial of the late Arsenio Borjal were done pursuant to express orders of the 15th Infantry Headquarters. In truth, the prosecution does not seriously dispute that the trial and sentencing of Borjal was done in accordance with instructions of superior military authorities, although it point to irregularities that were due more to ignorance of legal processes than personal animosity against Borjal. The state, however, predicates its case principally on the existence of the radiogram Exhibit H from Col. Volckmann, overall area commander, to Lt. Col. Arnold, specifically calling attention to the illegality of Borjal's conviction and sentence, and which the prosecution claims was known to the accused Beronilla. No satisfactory proof that Beronilla did actually receive the radiogram Exhibit H or any copy thereof. The accused roundly denied it. The messenger, or "runner", Pedro Molina could not state what papers were enclosed in the package he delivered to Beronilla on that morning in question, nor could Francisco Bayquen (or Bayken), who claimed to have been present at the delivery of the message, state the contents thereof. The only witness who asserted that Beronilla received and read the Volckmann message, Exhibit H, was Rafael Balmaceda, a relative of Borjal, who claimed to have been, as Beronilla's bodyguard, present at the receipt of the message and to have read it over Beronilla's shoulder. This testimony, however, can not be accorded credence, for the reason that in the affidavit

executed by this witness before Fiscal Antonio of Abra, Balmaceda failed to make any mention of the reading, or even the receipt, of the message. Upon the other hand, Beronilla's conduct belies his receipt of the Volckmann message. Had he executed Borjal in violation of superior orders, he would not have dared to report it to Arnold's headquarters on the very same day, April 18th, 1945, as he did, half an hour after the execution. And what is even more important, if Borjal was executed contrary to instructions, how could Lt. Colonel Arnold on April 21, 1945, write in reply "I can only compliment you for your impartial but independent way of handling the whole case" instead of berating Beronilla and ordering his court martial for disobedience? Our conclusion is that Lt. Col. Arnold, for some reason that can not now be ascertained, failed to transmit the Volckmann message to Beronilla. And this being so, the charge of criminal conspiracy to do away with Borjal must be rejected, because the accused had no need to conspire against a man who was, to their knowledge, duly sentenced to death. But even assuming that the accused-appellant did commit crime with they are charged, the Court below should not have denied their claim to the benefits of the Guerrilla Amnesty Proclamation No. 8 (42 Off. Gaz., 2072)on the ground that the slaying of Arsenio Borjal took place after actual liberation of the area from enemy control and occupation.

--------------------- people vs. robinos

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ENRICO A. VALLEDOR, accused-appellant FACTS: On March 6, 1991, at around 6:00 in the morning, accused-appellant was seen swimming across the river of Barangay Caruray, San Vicente, Palawan. Barangay Captain Rufino Nuez and Barangay Councilman Antonio Sibunga took accusedappellant out of the water and took him on board a pump boat. Inside the boat, accused-appellant kept on crying and uttering words to the effect that his family will be killed. Suspecting that accused-appellant was mentally ill, Barangay Captain Nuez, asked Councilman Sibunga to accompany accused-appellant to Puerto Princesa City. Sibunga acceded and thereafter took a jeepney with accused-appellant at Barangay Bahile. At about 1:00 in the afternoon, they reached Junction I at the intersection of the National Highway and Rizal Avenue, Puerto Princesa City. Suddenly, accused-appellant jumped off the jeepney. Sibunga tried but failed to

chase accused-appellant, who immediately boarded a tricycle. Later that day, he learned that accused-appellant killed and harmed somebody. Meanwhile, at around 2:00 in the afternoon of March 6, 1991, Pacita Valledor was awakened by her daughter who told her that accused-appellant has returned. She rushed out of the house and saw him standing in the middle of the road, dusty and dirty. She asked him where he came from but his answer was Pinatay niya kayong lahat. Pacita dragged him inside the house and later learned that he killed and wounded their neighbors. Thirty minutes later, accused-appellant was arrested and detained at the city jail ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in convicting the accused despite the fact that when he allegedly committed the offense charged he was mentally ill.

HELD: In the case at bar, accused-appellant failed to discharge the burden of overcoming the presumption of sanity at the time of the commission of the crime. The following circumstances clearly and unmistakably show that accusedappellant was not legally insane when he perpetrated the acts for which he was charged: 1) Simplicio Yayen was positioned nearest to accusedappellant but the latter chose to stab Roger and Elsa; 2) Accused-appellant called out the nickname of Roger before stabbing him; 3) Simplicio Yayen and Antonio Magbanua who were likewise inside the room were left unharmed; 4) Accusedappellant, a spurned suitor of Elsa, uttered the words, Ako akabales den, Elsa. (I had my revenge, Elsa) after stabbing her; and 5) Accused-appellant hurriedly left the room after stabbing the victims. Evidently, the foregoing acts could hardly be said to be performed by one who was in a state of a complete absence of the power to discern. Judging from his acts, accused-appellant was clearly aware and in control of what he was doing as he in fact purposely chose to stab only the two victims. Two other people were also inside the room, one of them was nearest to the door where accused-appellant emerged, but the latter went for the victims. His obvious motive of revenge against the victims was accentuated by calling out their names and uttering the words, I had my revenge after stabbing them. Finally, his act of immediately fleeing from the scene after the incident indicates that he was aware of the wrong he has done and the consequence thereof. Accused-appellants acts prior to the stabbing incident to wit: crying; swimming in the river with his clothes on; and jumping off the jeepney; were not sufficient to prove that he was indeed insane at the time of the commission of the crime. As consistently held by this Court, A man may act crazy but it does not necessarily and conclusively prove that he is legally so. Then, too, the medical findings showing that accusedappellant was suffering from a mental disorder after the commission of the crime, has no bearing on his liability. What is decisive is his mental condition at the time of the

perpetration of the offense. Failing to discharge the burden of proving that he was legally insane when he stabbed the victims, he should be held liable for his felonious acts.

INSANITY/IMBECILITY November 29, 1950 G.R. No. L-3246 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ABELARDO FORMIGONES, defendant-appellant. Luis Contreras for appellant. Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Solicitor Felix V. Makasiar for appellee. NATURE: Appeal from the decision of the CFI of Camarines Sur finding Abelardo Formigones guilty of parricide & sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P2K, and to pay costs. FACTS: In the month of Nov. 1946, Abelardo was living on his farm in Camarines Sur with his wife, Julia Agricola and their fivechildren. From there they transferred in the house of his half-brother, Zacarias Formigones in the same municipality to find employment as harvesters of palay. After a month, while Julia was sitting at the head of the stairs of the house Abelardo, without previous quarrel or provocation whatsoever, took his bolo from the wall of the house and stabbed his wife Julia, in the back, the blade penetrating the right lung and causing a severe hemorrhage resulting in her death. Abelardo then took his dead wife and laid her on the floor of the living room and then lay down beside her. In this position, he was found by the people who came in response to the shouts made by his eldest daughter, Irene Formigones. The motive was admittedly that of jealousy because according to his statement, he used to have quarrels with his wife for reason that he often saw her in the company of his brother, Zacarias; that he suspected the two were maintaining illicit relations because he noticed that his wife had become indifferent to him. During the preliminary investigation, the accused pleaded guilty. At the case in the CFI, he also pleaded guilty but didnt testify. His counsel presented the testimony of two guards of the provincial jail where Abelardo was confined to the effect that his conduct was rather strange and that he behaved like an insane person, at times he would remain silent, walk around stark naked, refuse to take a bath and wash his clothes. The appeal is based merely on the theory that the appellant is an imbecile and therefore exempt from criminal liability under Art.12 of the RPC. ISSUE: Whether or not Abelardo Formigones is an imbecile at the time of the commission of the crime, thus exempted from criminal liability

HELD: No. He is not an imbecile. According Dr. Francisco Gomez, Abelardo was suffering from feeblemindedness and not imbecility and that he could distinguish right from wrong.

In order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of RPC Art. 12 so as to be exempt from criminal liability, he must be deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom of will at the time of committing the crime. The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting circumstances may be taken into account, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the accused be deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his own acts; that he acts without the least discernment;that there be a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the will. For this reason, it was held that the imbecility or insanity at the time of the commission of the act should absolutely deprive a person of intelligence or freedom of will, because mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability As to the strange behavior of the accused during his confinement, assuming it was not feigned to stimulate insanity, it may be attributed either to his being feebleminded or eccentric, or to a morbid mental condition produced by remorse at having killed his wife. A man who could feel the pangs of jealousy & take violent measures to the extent of killing his wife who he suspected of being unfaithful to him, in the belief that in doing so, he was vindicating his honor, could hardly be regarded as an imbecile. Appellant is not an imbecile. According to the evidence, during his marriage of about 16 years, he has not done anything or conducted himself in anyway so as to warrant an opinion that he was or is an imbecile. He regularly and dutifully cultivated his farm, raised five children, and supported his family and even maintained in school his children of school age, with the fruits of his work. Occasionally, as a side line he made copra. And a man who could feel the pangs of jealousy to take violent measure to the extent of killing his wife whom he suspected of being unfaithful to him, in the belief that in doing so he was vindicating his honor, could hardly be regarded as an imbecile. Whether or not his suspicions were justified, is of little or no import. The fact is that he believed her faithless. Furthermore, in his written statement, he readily admitted that he killed his wife, and at the trial he made no effort to deny of repudiate said written statements, thus saving the government all the trouble & expense of catching him & securing his conviction. However, two mitigating circumstances are present: passion or obfuscation (having killed his wife in a jealous rage) & feeblemindedness. Judgment: In conclusion, appellant is found guilty of parricide & the lower courts judgment is hereby affirmed w/ the modification that appellant will be credited with half of any preventive imprisonment he has undergone (because of the 2 mitigating circumstances).

MINORITY

NIEL F. LLAVE, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. NATURE: Petition for Review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in affirming, with modification, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Criminal Case No. 02-1779 convicting Petitioner Neil F. Llave of rape. FACTS: On September 27, 2002, an Information charging petitioner (then only 12 years old) with rape was filed with the RTC of Pasay City. The spouses Domingo and Marilou Santos were residents of Pasay City. One of their children, Debbielyn, was born on December 8, 1994. In 2002, she was a Grade II student at the Villamor Air Base Elementary School in Pasay City and attended classes from 12:00 noon to 6:00 p.m. Domingo eked out a living as a jeepney driver, while Marilou sold quail eggs at a nearby church. Debbielyn testified that on September 24, 2002, she arrived home at past 6:00 p.m. She changed her clothes and proceeded to her mothers store. Marilou asked her daughter to bring home the container with the unsold quail eggs. Debbielyn did as told and went on her way. As she neared the vacant house, she saw petitioner, who suddenly pulled her behind a pile of hollow blocks which was in front of the vacant house. There was a little light from the lamp post.She resisted to no avail.1Petitioner ordered her to lie down on the cement. Petrified, she complied. He removed her shorts and underwear then removed his own. He got on top of her. She felt his penis being inserted into her vagina. He kissed her. She felt pain and cried. She was sure there were passersby on the street near the vacant house at the time. It was then that Teofisto, a barbeque vendor, came out of their house and heard the girls cries. He rushed to the place and saw petitioner on top of Debbielyn, naked from the waist down. Teofisto shouted at petitioner, and the latter fled from the scene. Teofisto told Debbielyn to inform her parents about what happened. She told her father about the incident.1 Her parents later reported what happened to the police authorities. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner, who was a minor above 9 years but below 15 years of age at the time of the crime, acted with discernment. HELD: YES. Petitioner acted with discernment before, during and after the rape incident. Discernment, as used in Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal Code is defined as follows: "the discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor under fifteen (15) years of age but over nine (9), who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong". Professor Ambrocio Padilla, in his annotation of Criminal Law (p. 375, 1998 Ed.), writes that "discernment is more than the mere understanding between right and wrong. Rather, it means the mental capacity of a minor between 9 and 15 years of age to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act" (People v. Navarro, [CA] [51 O.G. 4062]). Hence, in judging whether a minor accused acted with discernment, his mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong, which may be known and should be determined by considering

all the circumstances disclosed by the record of the case, his appearance, his attitude and his behavior and conduct, not only before and during the commission of the act, but also after and even during the trial should be taken into consideration. The fact appears undisputed that immediately after being discovered by the prosecutions witness, Teofisto Bucud, petitioner immediately stood up and ran away. Shortly thereafter, when his parents became aware of the charges against him and that private complainants father was looking for him, petitioner went into hiding. It was not until the Barangay Tanod came to arrest him in his grandmothers house that petitioner came out in the open to face the charges against him. His flight as well as his act of going into hiding clearly conveys the idea that he was fully aware of the moral depravity of his act and that he knew he committed something wrong. Petitioner submitted documentary evidence to show that he was a consistent honor student. This allegation further bolstered that he acted with discernment, with full knowledge and intelligence. The fact that petitioner was a recipient of several academic awards and was an honor student further reinforces the finding that he was possessed of intelligence well beyond his years and thus was able to distinguish, better than other minors of his age could, which conduct is right and which is morally reprehensible Hence, although appellant was still a minor of twelve years of age, he possessed intelligence far beyond his age. It cannot then be denied that he had the mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong. This is important in cases where the accused is minor. It is worthy to note that the basic reason behind the enactment of the exempting circumstances under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code is the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent on the part of the accused. In expounding on intelligence as the second element of dolus, the Supreme Court has stated: "The second element of dolus is intelligence; without this power, necessary to determine the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act, no crime can exist, and because the infant has no intelligence, the law exempts (him) from criminal liability". The petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals in is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that the award of exemplary damages is DELETED.

-------------------- jose vs. people -------------------- declarador vs. gubaton


EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES (ART. 12) 8.3 G.R. No. 151978. July 14, 2004 NOE TOLEDO vs. PEOPLE (HOMICIDE) Facts: Late in the afternoon of September 16, 1995, Toledo was on his way home to Tuburan, Romblon when he passed by the group of Lani Tamero, Michael Fosana , Rex Cortez and Ricky Guarte drinking gin at the house Sps. Guarte (Rickys parents). Appellant requested the group of Ricky to refrain from making noise. Thereupon, Toledo went home to sleep. Minutes after 9 PM, the group of Ricky went to sleep at Guartes house. They had not laid down for long when they heard stones being hurled at the roof of the house. The stoning was made three (3) times. Ricky rose from bed, peeped through the window and saw Toledo stoning their house. Ricky then proceeded to petitioners house and asked why he was stoning Rickys house. Petitioner did not answer but met Ricky at the doorstep and without any

warning stabbed Ricky on the abdomen with a bolo. Elisa had followed his son, Ricky and upon seeing him stabbed the same shouted for help. Ricky was brought to hospital but died while being operated. The following day petitioner surrendered to barangay captain. RTC as AFFIRMED BY CA The trial court discounted petitioner's story and found him guilty as charged. Accused goes to the SC wherein this time, he claims that his actions were purely for self-defense. That it was done when the victim attacked him and in trying to defend himself, he accidentally killed Duarte. Issue: Should the Court find his actions exempting and/or justifying? HELD: There is no defense as accidental self defense. The theory adopted in the trial court cannot be changed on appeal. The petitioner is proscribed from changing his defense of self defense in RTC and CA by claiming on appeal before SC that he stabbed and killed the victim in complete self-defense but adopted 2 divergent theories: 1. 2. That he killed the victim in complete self defense against unlawful aggression. That the bolo accidentally hit the victim.

The testimony of petitioner negates his claim that his bolo accidentally hit the victim and that he acted in self defense. Petitioner claims that the force of struggle bet him and the victim have caused the door to fall on petitioner. However, petitioner failed to adduce real evidence that the door was destroyed. If the door fell, the victim must have fallen on top of the floor. It is incredible that the bolo could have hit the stomach of the victim and belies petitioners claim of accidentally hitting the stomach of the victim. The two defenses perpetuated by the accused are totally inconsistent with each other. Although in the justifying circumstance of self-defense, an accused is excused because of DELIBERATELY trying to repel an unlawful aggression which could have killed or injure him. And so, such acts are not in tune with ACCIDENT which presupposes an act which was not even contemplated or planned but purely accidental.

8.3 G.R. No. 136844. August 1, 2002. People v. Concepcion (386 SCRA 74) Appellant seeks the reversal of the decision Facts:
[1]

of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac finding him guilty of murder

The accused Concepcion is a police officer charged with murder for the killing of one Lorenzo Galang. According to testimonies of both parties witnesses, Lorenzo Galang was brought to the barangay hall because he was so drunk and unruly at the town plaza and was continually disturbing the peace.

The prosecution relied mainly on the eyewitnesses Maximo Sison, Jr., an employee of Hacienda Luisita, and Arturo Yarte, a tricycle driver. Lorenzo Galang, a resident of their barangay, got involved in a quarrel at the town plaza. He was brought to the barangay hall for questioning by Barangay Captain Remigio Capitli. Shortly after, appellant Rodolfo Concepcion arrived and fired his rifle twice or thrice past the ears of Lorenzo, who was then sitting, but without injuring him. After that, however, appellant thrust the barrel of the gun against the abdomen of Lorenzo. Then there was an explosion. Lorenzo was shot in the thigh. At least three more shots were fired, hitting Lorenzo in the chest. According to Sison and Yarte, appellant shot Lorenzo deliberately and Lorenzo died instantly.

In his defense, appellant RODOLFO CONCEPCION claimed that the shooting was only accidental. According to him, he was investigating Lorenzo for the latters disorderly behavior at the town plaza when it happened. He said Lorenzo appeared drunk and unruly, and even verbally challenged him to fight. At this juncture, according to appellant, he fired two shots in the air, but Lorenzo grabbed the barrel of his gun. The gun accidentally fired and Lorenzo was hit.

The trial court found Concepcion guilty.

Issue:

Should the accused be exempted from criminal liability due to accident?

Held: The rule in criminal cases is that the prosecution has the burden of proof to establish the guilt of the accused. However, once the defendant admits the commission of the offense charged, but raises an exempting circumstance as a defense, the burden of proof is shifted to him. By invoking mere accident as a defense, appellant now has the burden of proving that he is entitled to that exempting circumstance under Article 12 (4) of the Code.

For this to be properly appreciated in appellants favor, the following requisites must concur: (1) that the accused was performing a lawful act with due care; (2) that the injury is caused by mere accident; and (3) that there was no fault or intent on his part to cause the injury.

Appellant must convincingly prove the presence of these elements in order to benefit from the exempting circumstance of accident. However, his defense utterly failed to discharge this burden. Thus, we find no reversible error in the judgment of the trial court. By appellants own testimony, the victim was unarmed. In contrast, appellant had an armalite and a handgun. It is highly inconceivable that an unarmed man could pose bodily harm to another who is heavily armed. We note that appellants gun discharged several shots that hit vital parts of the victims body. Was the discharge purely accidental? As observed by the trial court, recklessly appellant had put his finger on the trigger of his ] cocked and loaded rifle. In that state, with the slightest movement of his finger, the rifle would fire readily. And it did not just once but several fires.

Furthermore, Concepcion claims that when the victim tried to grab his gun, said rifle was hanging on his shoulder on a swivel. But then he claimed that Galang tried to rest the rifle away by grabbing the BARREL OF THE GUN. This was very inconceivable. Furthermore, it was not believable that a person so drunk would try to take away a rifle from a police officer who also had a handgun tucked by his waist.

TREACHERY The trial court found that treachery attended the commission of the crime. As hereafter explained, however, in this case treachery is only an aggravating and not a qualifying circumstance. To constitute treachery (alevosia), two conditions must be present: (1) the employment of means of execution that give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. Here, treachery was clearly present considering that the victim was totally unprepared for the barrage of gunshots made by appellant. It was undisputed that the victim was brought to the barangay hall for questioning. He had submitted himself to the authority of the barangay officials and to the police authorities. He was seated, thereby excluding any insinuation that he was violent and unruly. He was weak from drinking at the time so that he had very little physical ability to cause harm to anyone, more so in the presence of the barangay captain, barangay tanod and a police officer in the person of appellant. From the circumstances of the case, the Court agrees with the prosecution that appellant consciously and purposely adopted the means of attack to insure the execution of the crime without risk to himself. However, we note that treachery, though stated in the information, was not alleged with specificity as qualifying the killing to murder. Following People vs. Alba, G.R. No. 130523, January 29, 2002, the information should state not only the designation of the offense and the acts and omissions constituting it, but should also specify the qualifying and aggravating circumstances. Since the information in this case failed to specify treachery as a circumstance [ qualifying the killing to murder, under the present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, treachery has to be considered a generic aggravating circumstance only. Consequently, the crime committed by appellant is homicide and not murder. Further, we find that the trial court misappreciated as an aggravating circumstance the fact that appellant was a policeman on duty at the time of the killing. The information charging appellant bears no mention of this aggravating circumstance. Pursuant to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure that took effect on December 1, 2000, every complaint or information must state not only the qualifying but also the aggravating circumstances. The aggravating circumstance of abuse of official position, not having been alleged in the information, could thus not be appreciated to increase appellants liability. At any rate, appellants immediate surrender to police authorities after the shooting should be credited in his favor as a mitigating circumstance, pursuant to Article 13 (7) of the Revised Penal Code. In sum, appellant is guilty of homicide

---------------- ty vs. people --------------- people vs. borja -------------- people vs. sta. maria -------------- chang vs. people

People v. Pacis (G.R. No. 146309) Facts: On April 6, 1998, Atty. Yap supervising agent of the Dangeroud Drugs Division of the NBI, received an information that certain Roberto Pacis was offering to sell kilo of shabu for the amount

of P950 per gram or a total of P475,000.00. The NBI Chief of Dangerous Drugs Division approved the buy-bust operation. Atty. Yap and Sr. Agent Congzon, Jr. were assigned to handle the case. The two officer and an informant went to the house of the appellant at 375 Caimito Ville, Caimito Street, Valle Verde II, Pasig City. They negotiated the sale of kilo of shabu. The total price was reduced to P450,000.00. It was agreed that the payment and delivery of shabu would be made the next day at same place. On April 17, 1998, NBI agents and the informant went to appellants house. Appellant handed to Atty. Yap a paper bag, the latter saw a transparent plastic with white crystalline substance inside. Appellant asked for the payment. Atty. Yap introduced Congzon to get the money from the car. When Congzon returned, he gave the boodle money to Atty. Yap who handed to the appellant. Upon receipt of payment, the officers identified themselves as NBI agents and arrested him. The trial court gave full credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and debunked appellants defense of frame-up. Hence, this appeal. Issue: Whether or not the buy-bust operation that led to the appellants arrest was valid? Held: In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. In instigation on the other hand, instigators practically induce the would- be defendant into the commission of the offense and become coprincipals themselves. It has been held in numerous cases by this Court that entrapment is sanctioned by law as legitimate method of apprehending criminal elements engage in the sale and distribution of illegal drugs. The records show that the operation that led to the arrest of the appellant was indeed an entrapment, not instigation. Courts generally give full faith and credit to officers of the law, for they are presumed to have performed their duties in the regular manner. In entrapment cases, credence is given to the narration of an incident by the prosecution witnesses who are officers of the law. Jurisprudence has firmly entrenched the following as elements in the crime of illegal sale of prohibited drugs: (1) the accused sold and delivered a prohibited drug to another, and (2) he knew that what he had sold was a dangerous drug. The elements were duly proven in the case herein. The record shows that the appellant sold and delivered the shabu to NBI agents posing as buyers.

People v. Callet (G.R. No. 135701) Facts: In a flea market, Alfredo Senador, his 12-year old son, Lecpoy Senador, and Eduardo Perater, watching a cara y cruz game.

Out of nowhere, the accused, Elbert Callet, appeared behind Alfredo and stabbed the latter on the left shoulder near the base of the neck with a 9-inch hunting knife. Instinctively, Alfredo stood up and managed to walk a few meters. When he fell on the ground, Lecpoy and Eduardo rushed to help him but to no avail. Manuel Gabonales was also at the flea market at that time. He saw people running away from the place where there was a cara y cruz game. Next, he saw Alfredo and the accused. Alfredo was soaked in blood while the accused was running towards the basketball court. He asked Alfredo what happened to him. Alfredo replied that the accused stabbed him. The accused was then standing at the basketball court. Manuel helped Lecpoy and Eduardo carry Alfredo under a mango tree. He thought of bringing Alfredo to the hospital when he saw blood oozing from his mouth. After a moment, Alfredo died. Elbert S. Callet was charged and found guilty of the crime of Murder in the death of Alfredo Senador. Callet appealed his conviction claiming that the Regional Trial Court gravely erred in failing to consider the mitigating circumstance of the fact that he had no intention to commit so grave a wrong. Therefore, his liability should be mitigated. Issue: Whether or not the criminal liability of Callet should be mitigated in that he had no intention to commit so grave a wrong? Decision: The Supreme Court affirmed the accused-appellants conviction. Two witnesses positively identified the person of the accused who stabbed the victim. The lack of intent to commit a wrong so grave is an internal state. It is weighed based on the weapon used, the part of the body injured, the injury inflicted and the manner it is inflicted. The fact that the accused used a 9-inch hunting knife in attacking the victim from behind, without giving him an opportunity to defend himself, clearly shows that he intended to do what he actually did, and he must be held responsible therefore, without the benefit of this mitigating circumstance.

PROVOCATION OR THREATS G.R. No. 151978. July 14, 2004 ARTURO ROMERA vs. PEOPLE (Frustrated Homicide) Facts: In the afternoon of October 4, 1998, Arturo Romera was with the victim, Roy Mangaya-ay, and five other men ("Beboy" Acenas, "Bobong" Mangaya-ay, Ric Mangaya-ay, Bebing Zulueta and Franklin Generol). They were all headed for Biasong (in Misamis Oriental) to play volleyball. When they reached Biasong, it was raining, so they decided to while away time at the house of Ciriaca Capil. Franklin Generol hung a string made of cigarette foil on Bebing Zulueta's pants and said, "There's a monkey among us." Everybody laughed except Roy Mangaya-ay, who got angry and chided Franklin Generol to stop lest he make enemies. Bebing Zulueta also got angry and pointed a finger at Franklin Generol and said, "Even if you are stronger and older, if you will be hit by my fist, you will crawl." Petitioner then

stood up and warned everyone, "You all watch out in Balaguan." He pulled Franklin Generol to join him and said, "Let's go, there are many boastful people here." Thereafter Romera and Franklin left the group. At 6 PM, Roy and his companions arrived in Balaguan. On their way home, they passed by the house of one Antonio Mangaya-ay. In said house, which is about one kilometer away, they saw Romera already carrying a bolo waiting for them. Suddenly, raising the bolo with his right hand, accused uttered, "Here are the brave ones." Roy and his companions ran away but Roy slipped on the muddy ground. Petitioner approached Roy and said, "Come here, brave one." He held Roy up by the collar and stabbed him in the stomach. Roy fell unconscious. When he woke up, he found himself at the provincial hospital where he underwent surgery and stayed for more than three weeks. After the stabbing incident, petitioner voluntarily surrendered to a certain Tibo Ramoso of the Citizen's Armed Force Geographical Unit (CAFGU). Ramoso accompanied petitioner to the Balingasay police station. For his part, Accused testified on what happened as follows: Petitioner and his family were having dinner in their house at around seven o'clock in the evening. Thereafter, they went to bed. While lying in bed, they heard Roy call petitioner and his wife, asking if they had beer and a fighter for sale. He did not answer Roy because he knew that Roy was already drunk. Roy asked for petitioner but when the latter's wife told him that petitioner was already asleep, he told her to wake her husband up. Petitioner went down the house and asked who was at the door. Just as he opened the door for Roy, Roy thrust his bolo at him. He successfully parried the bolo and asked Roy what it was all about. Roy answered he would kill petitioner. Petitioner tried to prevent Roy from entering, so he pushed the door shut. As Roy was hacking at the wall, petitioner's wife held the door to allow petitioner to exit in another door to face Roy. He hurled a stone at Roy, who dodged it. Roy rushed to him and hacked him, but he parried the blow. Petitioner grappled for the bolo and stabbed Roy in the stomach. Wounded, Roy begged petitioner for forgiveness. According to petitioner, he ceased harming Roy for fear he might kill him. RTC The trial court discounted petitioner's story of self-defense. It found that when petitioner got hold of the bolo, there was no more danger to his life. Petitioner was convicted of frustrated homicide. CA

Affirmed the RTC. It pointed out that assuming arguendo that it was the victim who was the aggressor at the start, the unlawful aggression ceased to exist when petitioner took possession of the bolo from the victim. Absent unlawful aggression, the justifying circumstance of self-defense becomes unavailing. Issue: Are the mitigating circumstances of provocation and passion or obfuscation present in this case? (YES.) HELD: Thrusting his bolo at petitioner, threatening to kill him, and hacking the bamboo walls of his house are is sufficient provocation to enrage any man, or stir his rage and obfuscate his thinking, more so when the lives of his wife and children are in danger. Romera stabbed the victim as a result of those provocations, and while he was still in a fit of rage. In our view, there was sufficient provocation and the circumstance of passion or obfuscation attended the commission of the offense. However, the SC said that provocation and passion or obfuscation are not two separate mitigating circumstances. Well-settled is the rule that if these two circumstances are based on the same facts, they should be treated together as one mitigating circumstance. From the facts established in this case, it is clear that both circumstances arose from the same set of facts aforementioned. Hence, they should not be treated as two separate mitigating circumstances. Nonetheless, we hold that since the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender is also present, Article 64(5) of the Revised Penal Code should be applied. The decision was modified only as to the penalty concerned. Accused is still guilty of the crime committed. ********* PROVOCATION OR THREATS G.R. No. 138984. June 4, 2004 PEOPLE vs. DENNIS E. TORPIO (murder; drinking binge case) FACTS: On October 11, 1997 in Camp Downes, Ormoc City, Torpio was having supper with his family of seven and a visitor. Afterwards, Anthony Rapas (the alleged murder victim) invited the accused for a drinking session at a nearby store for Red Horse, and then to a seaside cottage, and then to another cottage for gin. Since the accused did not drink gin, the victim allegedly bathed him with the same and mauled him several times. The accused tried to crawl under the table but the victim tried to stab him with a 22 inch Batangas Knife (balisong), but was not hit.

The accused ran towards home, got a knife which alarmed his parents. His father tried to stop him but was wounded on his hand. He went back to the seaside cottage where he found the victim and another drinking buddy still there; Upon seeing the accused, the victim allegedly avoided him and ran by passing the shore towards the creek. A drinking buddy of the two guys shouted nearby and said meet him 'Den,' alluding to Anthony and to Dennis, respectively. The accused did meet him, virtually blocked him and stabbed him. When he was hit, the victim ran but then he got entangled with a fishing net beside the creek and Anthony fell on his back, and Dennis mounted on (sic) him and continued stabbing him. Afterwards, Dennis left and went to the grassy meadow at Camp Downes and slept there. At about 7:00 in the morning, he went to a known police officer named Boy Estrera in San Pedro Street, Ormoc City and to whom he voluntarily surrendered. He was later turned over to the police headquarters. RTC The trial court convicting the accused of murder qualified by treachery or evident premeditation and appreciating in his favor the following mitigating circumstances: (a) sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party (the deceased Anthony) preceded the act; (b) the accused acted to vindicate immediately a grave offense committed by the victim; and, (c) voluntary surrender. ISSUES: Was there evident premeditation and treachery? (no) Should all of the mitigating circumstances be considered? (no, only voluntary surrender and immediate vindication) Held: There was no evidence adduced proving that there was treachery and evident premeditation attendant in the offense. Accused acted to avenge Anthony's felonious acts of mauling and stabbing him. Although the appellant bled from his stab wound, he ran home, armed himself with a knife and confronted Anthony intentionally. When the latter fled, the appellant ran after him and managed to stab and kill the victim. To warrant a finding of evident premeditation, the prosecution must establish the confluence of the following requisites: (a) The time when the offender [was] determined to commit the crime; (b) An act manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his determination; and

(c) A sufficient interval of time between the determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. The qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation requires that the execution of the criminal act by the accused be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon a resolution to carry out the criminal intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. Evident premeditation needs proof of the time when the intent to commit the crime is engendered in the mind of the accused, the motive which gives rise to it, and the means which are beforehand selected to carry out that intent. All such facts and antecedents which make notorious the pre-existing design to accomplish the criminal purpose must be proven to the satisfaction of the court. Nothing in the records supports the trial court's conclusion that evident premeditation attended the commission of the crime in this case. It was not shown by the prosecution that, in killing Anthony, the appellant had definitely resolved to commit the offense and had reflected on the means to bring about the execution following an appreciable length of time. According to Manuel, the father of the appellant, the latter told him, I have to kill somebody, 'Tay, because I was boxed. To the Court's mind, this utterance is not sufficient to show that the crime was a product of serious and determined reflection. The interval between the time when the appellant made this statement and when he actually stabbed Anthony was not sufficient or considerable enough as to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. There was no sufficient interregnum from the time the appellant was stabbed by the victim, when the appellant fled to their house and his arming himself with a knife, and when he stabbed the victim. In a case of fairly recent vintage, we ruled that there is no evident premeditation when the fracas was the result, not of a deliberate plan but of rising tempers, or when the attack was made in the heat of anger. Without any proof of any circumstance that would qualify it, the killing could not amount to murder. The appellant should, thus, be held liable only for homicide for the death of Anthony.

(On the Mitigating Circumstances) The SC agrees with the trial court that mitigating circumstances should be considered in the appellant's favor. However, only two out of the three mitigating circumstances considered by the trial court can be credited to the appellant. The trial court properly appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender as it had been established that the appellant, after he killed Anthony, lost no time in submitting himself to the authorities by going to Boy Estrera, a police officer.

The mitigating circumstance of having acted in the immediate vindication of a grave offense was, likewise, properly appreciated. The appellant was humiliated, mauled and almost stabbed by the deceased. Although the unlawful aggression had ceased when the appellant stabbed Anthony, it was nonetheless a grave offense for which the appellant may be given the benefit of a mitigating circumstance. But the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation cannot be considered apart from the circumstance of vindication of a grave offense. These two circumstances arose from one and the same incident, i.e., the attack on the appellant by Anthony, so that they should be considered as only one mitigating circumstance -------------------- people vs. malejana ------------------- people vs. genosa

G.R. No. 139907 March 28, 2003 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARCELO BATES, accused-appellant. MARCELO BATES, JR. (At-Large), accused. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: FACTS November 1995, Edgar Fuentes (EF), Simon Fuentes (SF) and Jose Boholst (JB) left Esperanza Ormoc to deliver copra to Rodado. After the delivery, when the three were on their way home, Carlito Bates suddenly attacked them aiming his firearm at JB. The latter grabbed Carlitos right hand and tried to wrest the possession of the firearm. While the two were grappling, the gun fired and hit Carlito. At that instant, Marcelo Bates and Marcelo Bates Jr (brother and nephew of Carlito) emerged and attacked JB. The latter fell to the ground and rolled but Marcelo and his son kept on hacking him. Marcelo then turned to SF and EF. Macelo then again JB. Accused-appellant contended that he acted only in self-defense. He said that it was JB who was the aggressor since he was the first one to attack and inflicted injury. Trial Court: convicted of murder ISSUES 1. Whether the accused acted in self defense 2. Whether there was treachery HELD 1. NO. the accused did not act in self-defense The SC gave more credence to the version of facts of the prosecution than the version of the accused. Because of the witnesses and their positive testimony pointing that the accused killed JB, self-defense was absent. The accused failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he acted in self defense; and as the burden of evidence is thus shifted to him, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the ground of the prosecution.

Even assuming that the accused acted in defense, the undisputed facts will show that there will be no self-defense because of the absence of unlawful aggression which is indispensable. In the case at the bar, accused testified that he initially inflicted only a single hack wound on the neck of JB causing the latter to fall to the ground. He then went to Carlito but upon finding than he was already dead, HE WENT BACK TO WHERE JB FELL AND AT THAT TIME JB WAS STILL ALIVE BUT HARDLY MOVING. DESPITE JBS CONDITION, THE ACCUSED REPEATEDLY HACKED HIM. Granting that JB was the one who first committed unlawful aggression, MARCELO WAS NO LONGER JUSTIFIED IN FURTHER INFLICTING WOUNDS UPON JB BECAUSE AT THAT TIME THE LATTER WAS ALREADY LYING HELPLESS ON THE GROUND. The rule is, when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender has no longer any right to kill or wound the former aggressor, otherwise, retaliation and not self-defense is committed The fact that unlawfull aggression on the part of JB already ceased when Marcelo repeatedly hacked him rules out the possibility of self-defense whether complete or incomplete.

2. No, there was no treachery. In effect, for failure of the prosecution to prove treachery or any other circumstance which would qualify the killing of Jose to murder, appellant should only be held liable for the crime of homicide Requisites of Treachery 1. the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and 2. the means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted. In the case at the bar, there is nothing to indicate from the testimony of the witnesses that Marcelo and his son employed means and methods to insure that they will be able to attack JB without risk to themselves arising from any defense that JB might make. - that there is no evidence to show that they purposely remained hidden in the thick banana plantation awaiting for the opportune time to attack JB with impunity. Passion and obfuscation cannot be considered. To be considered as a mitigating circumstance, passion or obfuscation must arise from lawful sentiments and not from a spirit of lawlessness or revenge or from anger and resentment. In the present case, clearly, Marcelo was infuriated upon seeing his brother, Carlito, shot by Jose. However, a distinction must be made between the first time that Marcelo hacked Jose and the second time that the former hacked the latter. When Marcelo hacked Jose right after seeing the latter shoot at Carlito, and if appellant refrained from doing anything else after that, he could have validly invoked the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation. But when, upon seeing his brother Carlito dead, Marcelo went back to Jose, who by then was already prostrate on the ground and hardly moving, hacking Jose again was a clear case of someone acting out of anger in the spirit of revenge.

G.R. No. 168051 September 27, 2006

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. HONORATO C. BELTRAN, JR., accused-appellant. CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: FACTS November 1999, Beltram was indicted in an information for Murder for killing Norman Concepcion. During the arraignment, he pleaded NOT GUILTY. He contended that he acted in self-defense and claimed that he was on his way to Bauan City to surrender to the police when he was apprehended by the barangay officers in Lipa City. RTC: convicted - guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. CA: affirmed ISSUE Whether Beltran is entitled to mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender HELD No, he is not entitled to mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender Requisites 1. offender had not been actually arrested or apprehended 2. the surrender was voluntary and spontaneous 3. he surrendered himself to the person in authority or his agent In the case at the bar, appellant was already apprehended for the hacking incident by the barangay officials of Lipa City just before he was turned over to rhe police by certain Tomas. Assuming that appellant had indeed surrendered to the authorities, the same was not spontaneous. Immediately after the hacking incident, appellant, instead of proceeding to the barangay or police, went to his brother in Batngas and then to Lipa. It took him three days to surrender to the police authorities. The flight of appellant and his acts of hiding until he was apprehended by the barangay officials are circumstances highly inconsistent with the spontaneity that characterizes the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

-------------------- andrada vs. people -------------------- people vs. de la cruz

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