IRSE Professional Examination

MODULE 3 SAMPLE ANSWERS 2011

IRSE Professional Examination

Module 3: Sample Answers 2011

Introduction The sample questions on the following pages are based on genuine candidate answers with minor alterations such as spelling corrections and clarifications. They are not perfect but it is hoped that these will go some way towards helping future candidates to understand what is expected of them. Any candidate submitting three answers of a similar standard could be reasonably confident of achieving a good pass mark in Module 3. The commentary section after each question gives some observations and tips for future candidates but does not attempt to list all possible errors, omissions or alternative solutions. Students should thus be wary of assuming that all information is entirely correct or appropriate the aim is to show the overall approach and level of detail, not a definitive technical answer.

Page 2 of 9

IRSE Professional Examination

Module 3: Sample Answers 2011

Question 2

In an area without continuous track circuits, what are the risks which need to be managed after engineering works utilising rail mounted machinery? [5 marks] Describe different means of ensuring these risks are managed for areas of axle counters or where other forms of block working are in use. Your answer should include advantages and disadvantages, the impact on performance and the balancing of risk. [20 marks]

Candidates answer: Axle Counters Risks 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) Track may be missing (work not completed and Rail may be missing). Vehicles may be still in section not removed after completion. Staff may be still present and working. Tools could be lying close to or foul of track. Section may still show occupied after completion of work - miscount 1) numbers in not equal to out 2) tools in vicinity of axle count heads may inadvertently create a count 3) trolleys may activate or cause miscount. Tamping may damage heads. Tamping may damage cables. Risks 1-4 should be mitigated by rule book possession procedures. The PICOP should ensure all his equipment and staff have left the site (signing in and out procedure) and the section is safe for the passage of trains. This has the advantage of removing the signaller from the assurance process but has the disadvantage of one person needing to ensure all these are complete it may be a very long section with a number of worksites. The PICOP could be under pressure to hand back on time and may not carry out all the assurances needed. This is vital should the signaller have activated his Engineering Possession reminder which will allow him to Reset and Restore the section without any degraded running of trains. If the Engineers Possession Reminder has not been applied before the works and the section shows occupied due to miscount or activation of heads, he may have a choice of means of Resetting (Restore axle count to 0) and Restoring (Normal signalling). Conditional This can be used if the last count was out and reset restores the normal signalling. Preparatory If above does not apply a first train may be set into section with full interlocking detection (route set) although red aspect displayed. If

6) 7)

Page 3 of 9

IRSE Professional Examination

Module 3: Sample Answers 2011

after the passing of this train the count in equals count out normal signalling can be resumed. The advantage of unconditional reset allows a quick return to normal service but the disadvantage being it relies heavily on rules and procedures being properly applied. Human error could lead to an accident. Conditional reset affords same amount of protection but may cause significant delays should the section be extremely long. The risk with this is less than unconditional but the operational delay is a lot more. Risks 6) & 7) are always present during engineering works, damage to either should produce a failed indication, but if the damage is minor the damage may not be noticed until the next maintenance visit or alternatively intermittent failures may occur. Proper marking of cables within engineering and testing of equipment after should reduce this. Risk 5 caused by tools may be reduced by educating other departments of the dangers and ensure they are aware.

Commentary This candidate (and most others) chose to focus on axle counters, one valid option for answering this question; answers could instead have covered Absolute Block or other systems as long as candidates recognised the lack of continuous track circuiting in their description. The candidate has written an answer based on UK Network Rail practice, although has not specifically stated this. PICOP is Person In Charge Of Possession, who has overall responsibility for the safe control and handback of the railway to the signaller after major engineering works. The candidate listed several key risks likely to arise, demonstrating important wider knowledge of railway operation. The description of differing types of Reset and Restoration was a sensible response to the issues raised in the first part of the question, and gave sufficient detail/accuracy for the purposes of this question. Some items of detail were inaccurate, such as the effect of Engineers Possession Reminder upon choice of reset; also in that section the use of the phrase he may have a choice was ambiguous: he could mean signaller or PICOP here, which affects the validity of the answer. The comparison of different Reset & Restoration types could have been presented in a table rather than a narrative, which is often quicker and clearer. The comments regarding tools and damage of cables/heads again demonstrated wider understanding.

Page 4 of 9

IRSE Professional Examination

Module 3: Sample Answers 2011

Question 3 Automatic Train Protection (ATP) requires the system to contain an accurate braking model for the train. List the factors you consider the ATP system should take into account. [7 marks] Describe the impact the braking model might have on the drivers reliance on route knowledge and driving technique. [10 marks] Discuss the potential operational issues that need to be considered when implementing ATP. [8 marks]

Candidates answer: The ATP system should take into account the following factors:1. The braking effort and braking characteristics of the trains braking system. These will affect the braking model of the system. For example, the use of regenerative and rheostatic braking will affect the braking characteristics. 2. The gradients of the route that the train is on. The gradient will affect the braking distance. For example, a downward slope will result in a longer braking distance. 3. The wheel slip or slide protection. Wheel slip or slide may occur during braking. The ATP system needs to take account of the likely impact of these systems to achieve accurate braking. 4. The response time of the braking system. The braking system will take a certain period of time after receiving the brake command before applying the brakes. 5. The efficiency of the braking system. The brake pads may be more effective when they are new but become less effective as they wear. 6. The wheel/rail interface. The achievable adhesion between the rail and the wheel will affect the braking model. 7. The curvature of the track. The curvature of the track may affect the braking distance and hence affect the accuracy of the model. 8. The reaction time of the driver. The driver will take a certain time to react to changes in the displayed permitted speed and warnings from the ATP system. This reaction time needs to be factored into the model. For drivers with a rich experience, they have good knowledge of the usual braking characteristics and hence when to apply the brakes. This may allow them to delay braking in order to make up time using their knowledge of the system and the distances between cautionary aspects and stop aspects. They may also choose to apply more gentle brakes or a full service brake later in the approach. The drivers rely on their knowledge of the route and personal driving techniques. If the ATP braking model is changed, due to new or modified systems, with a resultant longer braking distance, drivers may find that their driving techniques are changed. For drivers who rely on their route knowledge, they may be so familiar with the route that they can anticipate the aspect of the next signal. For instance, experience may have taught a driver that a signal is designed to approach release from red at a certain point. In such cases the driver may not apply the brakes when he observes

Page 5 of 9

IRSE Professional Examination

Module 3: Sample Answers 2011

the red aspect and delay braking until the expected clearance point. The braking model may not support such a driving technique causing a change in behaviour. When implementing ATP, the following operational issues have to be considered:i) The display of the cab signalling information to the driver. In ATP systems with cab signalling, the display of the information, particularly the current speed and permissible speed, should be clear and accurate. Any ambiguities should be avoided. If there are locations where the permissible speed drops quickly, then the driver may observe a current speed greater than the permissible speed. The speed profile needs special consideration. ii) The warnings given to the driver should be timely and clear. When the train speed gets above the permissible speed and the ATP system gives a warning to the driver, the driver and train systems may take some time to react leading to the speed continuing to rise before it reduces. The warning needs to be early enough to reduce the risk of the emergency brake being applied by the system. iii) The effects of wheel slip/slide, possibly due to changing weather conditions, e.g. rain or snow, need to be taken into account. Traction controllers should be allowed to modify suitable parameters within the ATP system for such scenarios. iv) The training of the drivers in the use of the ATP system should be taken into account. The drivers should be trained so they have a better knowledge of the ATP system and its behaviours, but also not to place too much reliance on the system. v) The degraded operation when the ATP system is not available should be considered. Train controllers and drivers should have speed knowledge of the degraded operation and instigation measures when the ATP is not available.

Commentary The candidate firstly responded to the question List the factors with a series of simple titles or phrases, with a short sentence to explain them as appropriate. This is good exam technique it helps the examiner to see that the terms are genuinely understood (and reduces scope for confusion in terminology or language), without wasting valuable time for a list worth only 7 marks. The list itself covered the main issues, despite some duplication and errors (e.g. item 7 re curvature). In an ideal answer the candidate might also have explained the overall requirement to know the guaranteed emergency braking rate, which is governed ny many of the factors listed and is what determines the point at which the ATP system will intervene to apply the brakes. On the second part, the candidate gave a good description of the impact. The candidate stated that ATP systems result in longer braking distances; they could have also explained why this is typically the case (because ATP has to assume worst case tolerances on the items listed previously). The answer to the final part is particularly strong. The candidate has generally focused on the impact for individual trains, they could have also mentioned wider operational issues such as throughput/capacity and reliability.

Page 6 of 9

IRSE Professional Examination

Module 3: Sample Answers 2011

Question 7 A 16 km single line leads from a junction with a double track railway to a single platform terminus and is operated by a system to prove one train on the single line at a time. Describe a suitable means of controlling the line with minimal equipment along the line. [17 marks] It is proposed to connect a heritage steam railway at the terminus with occasional through movements to/from the single line. Discuss the issues to be considered and propose two options for safely managing the movements and the single line. [8 marks]

[On this occasion the candidates answer has been edited to remove some confusing language and duplication, the original answer was rather longer. The candidate also supplied a diagram which has been drawn up and attached at the end; information from route boxes has been instead included in the text]. Candidates answer: At the moment, as only one train can occupy the single line at a time, to keep equipment to a minimum, I would suggest using a Token Instrument (see diagram). When a driver is signalled to signal 51, they would be stopped at the red signal. The noticeboard will instruct the driver to obtain the token. With this token removed from the instrument, 51 can now be released, to allow the train driver up the bi-directional line to the station. The interlocking of the token instrument will allow the train onto the single line and ensure that no other train is on the single line. On return, the train will stop at 53 and the driver will replace the token in the instrument. 53 will not clear until the token is replaced. To manage the short section of single line up to 51 signal, sequential track circuit operation will be used. The route from 49 signal towards the single line would not clear unless the token was in the machine and the sequential operation was complete. The limit of the signalling equipment is G track circuit on the approach to 53 signal, which means even less on-track equipment.

Part 2 Issues Again referring to the diagram, the sharing of the platform between the steam railway and mainline leads to issues with availability of the single line. The introduction of a new set of points needs control. There are two options: To provide a ground frame which requires operation by the train driver or guard. This means stopping the train, driver getting out, moving the points to required position, back in cab to start journey again, which may be unacceptable, To provide a point machine which would require some track circuiting and interlocking with signals. It would also require more maintenance, the provision of power and control systems.

Page 7 of 9

IRSE Professional Examination

Module 3: Sample Answers 2011

Cost issues always arise, also safety should be considered, safety cases, risk assessments should be carried out. My first proposal is to provide a second token instrument at the interface with the steam railway connected to the initial instrument. A token removed from either instrument would prevent a second train being routed onto the single line. The token could also be used to release the ground frame to enable steam trains to enter and leave the platform. Removal of the token from the ground frame would only be possible with the points normal. My second proposal is to provide some simple 2 aspect signals to interlock the two routes. Once a main line train has left the station then a steam train could be routed into the platform from signal 1. Similarly once the steam train has departed, a main line train could be routed in from signal 3. The points would need to be power operated and the whole arrangement under the control of the signaller.

Commentary As stated above, this answer has already been reworded by the examiners to be read more easily by others, however no new technical content has been added. For the first part, there are several other options such as one train working using track circuits and treadles or an axle counter. In this instance the candidate has, sensibly, read the whole question and chosen a solution which facilitates the second part of the question. Although no diagram was specifically requested in the question, drawing one enabled the candidate to show their proposal without having to write much description. This saves time and makes it clearer to examiners what is intended. The diagram includes some features that only relate to the second part of the question such as the steam railway connection; this was reasonably obvious from the written sections. The diagram is far from perfect, for example there are distant boards missing, and signals reading into the terminal station would not have green aspects (assuming it was a UK example - although not stated anywhere). In other situations this might have resulted in low marks, however the aim of this question was to choose and describe an appropriate system of control for the branch line (rather than more expensive solutions), hence the detail was less critical. The candidate chose to connect the heritage railway via a turnout, which added some interesting complexity; other candidates interpreted through running to mean a straight-through connection beyond the terminus either layout was acceptable. Care needs to be taken with the proportion of marks per section: for the second part the candidate wrote several paragraphs and added to the drawing even though this was only worth 7 marks. This might have cost valuable exam time on other questions. Overall the candidate presented valid options and reasons in the time available, despite some errors in the detail.

Page 8 of 9

1 Steam railway

51

49
A B

53
C

48