tl,l^Rx

llcoton ic a n d

Plt /osopli

M t ascl'ip ( I 844 )

We have lesolvcd alienated labor into rwo parts which mutually determine each otlgr or rarlgr are only different cxpressions of one and he same rclationslrip, Apptvpation appears as alien|iox, extrnalixafh ; ^s exferntlizoI s a|)tv/"iatiott; alielation as the tr\e nataulizoti|n. We considered rhe one side, te/' alize l^bor, in relation to the aoer himself, that is, ha relatiou of extemlzed lator to itse/f. We have found the pruert! tekttion of tlte uon-uorer to thc w)ot*t'and labor to be the prodrrct, the nocossary resulc, of rhis relationship, P/ioate rort! as the material, summarized expression of exrernalized labor embraces borh relationships*the rclationsltip o;f aorler ta hbot; t/ toluct of ltis aor, anrl
t/te

tor-aorier, and the relacionship of the non-oorler o tie aoter and t/te

1:roduct of ltis labor,

As we lrave seen rhar in relation to thc workor who aropates trc through his labor the appropriarion appcars as alienation self-acrivir y as acciviry lbr another and of another, living as rhe sacrifce of Iife, production of tlre object as loss of i t to an alien power, an liet ma-we now consider the relationship of this alien man ro rle worker, to labor and its object. It shoulcl be noecl first rhar everything which appears with the worker 's an acivily o extelualization anrl an actoit1 0f alieftatior appears wirh the non-worker s a ^onr,lition of externa/zation, a cotditiofi oJ alienaton, Secondly, rhat rhe actual, pttcical attiude of the worker in production and to his product (as a condirion of mind) appeals as t/tlt?ical attitude ^ n the non-worker confronting him. I'lird/1, the non-worler does everything against the worker which the worker does againsr himself, but he does not do against his own selfwhat he does againsr rhe workerT Let us consider more closely thesc threo relarionships, [Here the manuscript breahs off, unfinished.l

PRIVATE PROPERTY AID COMMUNISM

The antthesis between prcqertyless ss ar\d proet!, however, still remains indiffcrent, not grasped i tts aive co ection with its intenal relationship as canradiction, so long as it is noc understood as the antithesis of lal,or and npital. Tbis ntithesis can be expressed in thefrsl form even without the adyanced development of prvate property as in ancienr lome, in Turkey, etc. It does nor yet apa as institured by privare property itself, But labor, the subjectivo essence of private property as exclusion of property, and capital, objective labol as rhe exclusion of labor, \s iaale pnrry as its dcveloped relarion of contradiction, hence a dynamic relation driving roward resolution. The overcoming [Auflebuxg] of self-alienation follows the same courso as self-alienacion. Priptte nert! is frst considered only in irs objective

aspect-but scill wirh labor as its essence, Its form ofexistence is cherelbre upita/ alic/t is to 1 ouel;ottte "as suc/t" (Prourlic,u). Or tfu particular forn of labor-levsled down, parcclcd, and thus unhee labor-is taken as che soLtrce of rhe pernicousruss o[ private property and its humanly alienatcd exiscence. :'ourier agreeing with che physiocrars, thus regards agiculnLa/ laor as being at lei.st evt 2la/y,while Sahtt-Sintt on rhe otler han(l holds indual lor as svch co be dre essence of labor and thus seeks tho extlusiae preclominance of the inclustrialists and thc improvemenc of the worlrers' condition .8 Connunisl is ultimarely the -ofll,?yxpression of private property as ovorcomo laufu/tol'rl. tmrneclirrly it is rtttiuusa/ ptivte properry. In calting this relation in its uniaettality comrnunism is: ( l) In ics frrsr form only a rnirersalization and cornpletion of this relationship. As such ic appears in a double pacrern: On rhe one hancl the dominrion ol nateal property bulks so large rhat ic wanrs to clesvoy eoerytlng wbicll cannot be possessecl by everyone as pri'o1r ptopen!. It wants to absrrac from talent, ctc., by .foru. Immecliace, physical possession s for it rhe sole aiur of life and existence. Thc condition of the la|orcr is not overcome but exrended to all men. The relationship of private property remeins the relationship of tho communiry to rhe world of things. Ultimarely is movement which contrasts universal private property to private propcrty is expressed in cho animalistic fo rn thar tnarriage (strely a.fot n on exclusiae pioae prcert!) is counterposed to rhe corunu1 of aoncn where rbey become contnunal and conntln property. We might say rhar dris idea of tbe ntnnunitl ofaon rs thc ope ssclz of this srill very crude, unthinhing comlrutrism, As rvomen go from marriage into universal prostittion, so the whole world of wcalth-ha is, dre objeccive essence of man-passes frorr dre relationship of exclusive marriage wirh the private ownc into rhe relationship of universal prostitution wrh the community, This communism-in tlrat it negates mtn's petsonality everylvhere-is only rhe logical expression ofthe private propercy which is chis negarion, [Jnivesal ezuy esrablislring itself as a power s only the disguised form in which g verl reestablishes and satisfios itself in r otler wty. '1'he thought of evcry piccc of privatc proporty as sttcb is nt tlte aety leost trrned agairct ricier privxc propcrty as envy and rhe desire to level so that onyy and the clesire ro level in facr constitute the essence of competition. Crude communism is only tlre ftrlllrrrent of this envy and lcvcling on tl\e b^sis ol t?coacie ninimrrm, lt h^s a 1/6tfe delimlll mersure. I'low linle rhis overcorring of privto property is u rcLual appropriation is shown precisely by the
abstract ncgation of rhe endre world ofcLrlcure and civilizatioo, tho roversiolr to tl\e ut ttalal simplicity ofthe2ooland wancless man who has notgone

beyoncl private property, las not yot even achievecl it,

is only a community of lobor ancl an etpality of ,ages which the communal capical, the ntntruni4 as universal cpitlist, pays out, Botlr sides of the relationship are rised to a su1)qosed univcrsality *

'Ihe commnnity

54

Eaonit atd Plihsop/tic Mau.utiqts

(tt44)

55

labor as chc condirion in which cveryone is p1tt, capikt/ the recognized ^s universrliry and power rrf rhc communiry. In rhe relationship with aonan, as tho spoil and hanclmaid ofcomrunal Iust, is exprcsse'd the infinire degradacion in which man exists for himself since the secrec of his relationship has its uuambigtous, clecisive, plafu, and revealed expression in thc relarionship of mat co r,lonan ancl in the way in which the innedidte, toturul species-relationship of human being to human being is the telatonslip of nan to aouan, In rhis naturul species-

relationship man's relationship to nature is immediarely his relationship ro man, as his relarionship ro man is immediarely his relationship to narure, to his own nthual condition, In rhis relationship tl.e exront ro which the human essence has become nature for man or nature has become the human essence of man is sensuonsly nani,fesfzd, reduced ro a percepttble fact. From this relationship one can rhus judge rhe enire level of rnankind's dev-lopmnr. From rhe chrracrer of his relitionihip follws the exrent to wbich nan has become and comprehended himself as a ganeic l,eing, as t ar, the relationship of man ro women is the most naurul relationship of human being to human being. It rhus indicaes the extent to which mad s /taurl behayior has become /tuman or .ho extent to which his Lann essence has become a natufti! esselce for him, the exrent to whch his ltuttar thue has become naktre to him. In this relationship is also apparent tlre exrent to wh\ch man's need has become ltunan, thus the extcnt ro which the lte/.brman being, as human being, has become a need for him, rhe exrent to which he in his most inclividual exsrence is at tle sme rime a social being, The first posirive ovcrcoming of private propercy-uude communismis thus only a, appawtt flnn of the vileness of privare property trying to set irsclf up ts thc positivc rontnutit. (?) Communism (a) still of polirical naturc, democratic or dcsporic; (b) with the ovecoming of the srarc, but srill incornplcte ,rnd inffutnced by private property, rhat is, by the alienation of man. In both forms communism alrcady knows irself as the reintegration ot eturn of man to himself, as the overcoming of human self-alienation, but since it has nor yet undersrood rhe positive ossence of priyato property and just as little the al a natus of needs, ir still remains captiye to and infected by prvate property. Ir has, indeed, grasped irs concept but still nor irs
essence.

bctwccn man ancl man; i is he cnre resolution of rhe conflicr between existence and essence, objecrification and self-aflrmaion, freedom and necessity, individual and speces, ft is the iddle of history solved and knows itself as this solution. 'I'he encire movemenr of hisrory s therefore both \ts acturzl genesis -the birth of its empirical existence-ancl also for irs chinking awareness the nnniud ancl wnsciots moyement of its ltecoming wheeas rhe other yot undeveloped communism sccks in cerain historical folms opposed ro private property a lisorical proof, a proof in what explicitly exists. It tbercby tcars particular momenrs out of rhe movement (Cabet, Villegardellce ccc., particularly ridc rhis horse) and marks them as proofs of irs historical pedigree. J'hus ir makes clear that the fa greater part of rhis r.ovemen! contradicts its claims and tht if it once existed, its past cxiscence refirces rhe pretension of ic essence, It is easy to see the necessty that the whole revolurionary movemenr finds both its empirical as well as theorecical basis in the development of pt'iutt npe!-in the economy, to be exacr. 'fhis rnatetial, rnmediately percetible private ploperry is the material, sensuotrs expression of alienatel /twnz life. Its movcmont* producrion and consumption-s the sexsuous manifestarion of the movcment of all ./ prevous production, rhat is, rhe realizaton or actuality of man.-RsljCio-!".

;.f1!ily st,xe,-law, moralir-y, !.9i9.19q.,-e.q,_-_!_..,-.y.9.91y.1stJiq4(tJ-f.oulof '/[ production and full under tr gcncral lrw. Thc posirive overcorninq of priaarc rqp41,1;1e3pp9grion of iutir fi. ir ,r,t"'n. n".fi"C

"erco;n of rll alienrion and rreJerurri of man from rjligion. family. Stai, etc., \o_ltjs Jll!-ta!,tt, rhrt is,-s27l existence. ReligiouC-li s sfi cuis only in the sphere of the innr human constiousness, bur ecoaspecrs.

nomic alienation be\ongs to actunl l-its overcoming thus includes both It is obvious that rl'e moyemont has irs :/ beginnng among different peoples depending on wheche their rrue acnoaledgerl life proceeds more in consciousness or in the exrerndl world, is more ideal or real. Communsm thus begins (Ooenlo) w\tlt arheism, buc atheism ir r the beginning still far from being comnuuism since ic is ntostly an abstruction.a -The philanthropy of aheism is at first rherefore only a pilosopltica/, abstract philanthropy; that of communism is at once teal a\d im-

(3) Catnnunisrn 0,s positiae overcoming of riaate roprt! as unan selfalierution, and thus as the actual tpproriatiox of tie unan essence thro ugh and for man; therefore as the complere and conscious resroration of man ro bimself within the total weahh ofprevious development, the restorarion of man as a social, that is, human being, 'I'his communism as complered naturalism is humanism, as completed humanism it is naturalism. It is the g naifte resolution of the anragonism between man and nature and

medirrcly bet towal uclion, On the assumprion that private property has been positively ovcrcome wr: have seen how man produces man, himself, and othor mcn; how the object, the immediate activity of lis individualiry, is at the same time his
own existence for othcr mon, their existence, and thei existence for him,
Prostitution is only a ,artio ar expression of dre geaa,rzl prosdrurion of rhe /a/rzr, and sincc prostirtior is a relarionshp which includes nor only rhe prosrjrured bur lso rhe p.ostiartior-*hose vilcncss is still grcater-so rlso dre capiralisr, erc. flls;n rhis crgory IMarx's footnote].

56

rl1-11n.\

It)con o n ic a n

d Plt losopl M a,

usl

its ( /844 )

57

Similarly, howcver, both the material of labor ancl man as subjccc are equally rhe result and beginning of the rovcment (and tho hisrorical ncessi4 ol private property lies precisely in dre fact that they must be rhis begnry), Thus is the soial cbracter dre gcncral character of rhe whole movemenc; as society irsclf procluces Dtn as / or1 so it is producerl by him. .ctivity and sarisfaccion lGuutssl, borh in their contcnt ',rcl tttode of mistente, are sodal, socia/ activity arl sacial satisfaction, ^fhe /tuttt essence of natrrre primarily exists <>nly fot sotia/ nllLrr, becausc only here is nntrrre a ln wih nn, as his oxistcnce for othels and chcir oxiscence for him, as the life-element of human actuality-only he re is nature thc fourtt/tion of man's own iuna existence, Only here has tbe natutal axistence of man llecome his /ttuuan existene and natLtre become human, Thtrs societ is the competed, essencial unity of man with nzrture, the true resurrection of nalure, the fulfrlletl naluralism of man ancl humanism of nature. Social activity and satisfction by no meirns exist merc in the folm of an iunediate communal activity and immediate rcmtnuual stisfction, Neverrheless such activity and satisfacton, expressed ancl confirmed imme<liarely i actual rssocttian widr ocher men, will occur wherevcr that
irutterliate expression of sociality is esscntially grounded in its content and adcquatc to its nature, Even as I am scientifical nctive, etc. -an activity I can selclorn pursue in direc community with others-l am socilly rctive bccause I am active t a , Not only is the matcrial of my activity-such as the language ^s which the drinl<er is active-given to me as a social product, but my ^ in oron existence zi social acriviry; what I make from myself I mahe for society, conscior.rs of my nature as social, Nly genera/ consciousness is only rhe ticotzicl form of dtat whose lir.ting form is the zrl community, the social essence, afthough at presenr genetal consciousness is an abstracton fiom actual life and antagonistically opposed to it. Consequently tha actioi1 of my general consciousness is thus, as activicy, my tluoreic.tl existence as a social being.

as a

rlrinking being. Thougli rnan is clrerefore

a2

rticutar inclivitlual_and

precisely his parcicuarity makcs him an indiviclual, an actual intliairhtal comn.runal being-he is equally rlte tat/it1', the ideal totality, the subjecrive exstence of society explicitly thoughr and experienccd. Likewise he also exisrs in acrualry both as perception and actual satisfacton of social existence and as a totality of human expression of life. Thinking and being, to be sure, are tus disinct but at the samc cime i^ unilf,..yttl1 one anorher

aDral cms to bc

I hlrsh vicrory of rhc specics

over the plrriculrr

idviual and to cnriirdii the seces' uniry, but rhe particular individmonri, url is only t'attirular gcnnir l,eing and as "uch - (( (4) Juii as piaat /oert! s only rhe sensuous expression of rhe fact lhat man becomes ollectiue for himself and ar rhe same time becomes an alien and jnhuman object for himself, that his expression of life is his ex[ernalization of life and his realization a loss of reaity, an alien actual\ty, so rhe positve overcoming of private proporty-rhat is, the snsuouj appopriacion of the human essence-and life, of objective man and of luman

@ is by a(l for man-is not to be graspcd only as imrnediate, exclusiye sdtisfail ot ossessiott, as laaing. Man appropriares to himself his ^s mnifold essence in an all-sided way, thus as a whole man. Every one of
his

luman rclatiois

r.

rhc world.--:!eeing, he-ring, smelling, iasting, fcl-

ing' thiqking;' percgiyin,.sensing;. wishing, acting,, lovin- in,,shorr, alt

hc gan,of his individualiry,.whihrr irirmeditety commni in form, ie an appipriario l rhiibjr in'their eiAi. rclaticin lV.hati41 ar. ieif lls|in to jL This appropriation of h.tma.. acttality arid its reltion tothe object is the nnfinnatoa ofha iatt'tadit!..It is rheefoe as varied as are the deterninations of the human essence and actir,tities, It is human y'Jrn1 and human suffering, for suffer\r.g, humanly conceived, is a satisfaction of thc self in man, Privare property has made us so snrpid and one-sided rhat an objecr is ors only if we have it, if ic exisrs.for us s eapital or is mmecliately .- osiiessd, by: uC, in;..di;rik; orn, lived .in,.,e., in shoft, used; but piivat proprty giasps ail.these immdar os of pssssion ony as neans f.liiig, and rhe life thy serve is the life ol prhnte property, labor,
.

avoicled above all is establishing "society" once again as an -lhe inclividual is the socia bettg. absrrction over irgzrinst the indiviclual. The expression of his life-even if it does not appear immediately in the lorm of a cotttlunal expression carried out together with orhers-is rherefore an expression nd assertior ol social /fe. The individual and gcncric life of man are not dsti c|, however much-and necessarily so-the mode of existence of individual life is either a more particular or more generu/ mode of generic life, or generic life a morc particulnr or univet'sal moJe

'b be

..il,capirtlization.,
Hence

all the physicl ad spiritdl senles

of indivldual lil.
As generc cottsciottsur.r. man asser his real social life and merely repeats his actual existence in thoLrght just as, conversely, generic existence asserts itself in gcneric consciousness and in its universality exists explicidy

laaing. Human nture had to be reduced to rhis absolute poverry so rlar ir could give birth ro its inner weqlrh, (On rhc caregory of iaai4, scc flss in lioury-ow ,is.\ overcoming of privare propercy means therefore the complete 'fiThe ondtli notallhumansensesand aptjtrdesf0ige scltaftenl, bur \t meats
this emancipation prccisely because rhese senses and aptiturJes have become lrutnan botlr subjectively and objectively, The eye has become a ianan eye, just as ics object |tas becomc a social, lutnan object derived

- simle aliation .of:ih,m"t/, ,tl1e setse of

have been ieplacecl by: the

rylITARX
nzxa D
/

Plt lo.toltt

lla n ustripts

(I

814 )

59

-(

oi his oratr capaccjes-thnt all ollects become for hin the ojectifratioa of himself, ""ornl o-i"cr, wi" confrm and realize his inclividurJiry rs /zi objccts, rltar is, ii /tins"lf be_ comcs rhc ohjcct, Hoa rhey becomc his depcnds on the t,tutv ol the oty(l and rle narure of the cssenial capaa corresponcling to for it is precisely the deeminateness of rhis rclalionship wlict slails rhe parricu_ lar, actua/ modc of affrrmation. For the ey nn object ls Oiiterenr tnan for the a,, and the object of the eye i anorher object than ai'ot the ut: "fhe peculiarity of each essential capacity is pr.ci""ty i,ts ,lorort ,*tl, essence and dtus also rhe characrerisdc mode of its objcdfcation, of its 01)./eL'tiae/! a*ua/, riving being. Thus mrn is affirmecr rn ti" urri""irue *o nor only in rhoughr brrt with // his scnses.
On the other hand and from the subjective poinr of vie.w, rs music alone awakens man's musical sense ancl the most beautiful music has z mean_ ing for thc unmusical ear-is qo objecr for ir, bccause ut.", onfy be rhe confirmation of one of my es$cnrial capaciries -y ""n rl","ior" only be so for me insofar as my ossonral capiciry exisrs "in "n explicitly as a

humnn actrrality, and thus the-acruality

becomcs for man in socicry rhc acturlicy of erscnrirl humnn'c"p,rciri..,

essenrial for him in this object. On the one hand, therefore, ir is only when objcctivc actuality generally

or objecrive man, is he nor iosr in ic. T'his is possible only when rhe object lecomes social and he himself becomcs social jusr rs'sociery bccomes

lost its merc u,i/i! by l\c l)ccoming ltun,ti tt:c. Srmilarly rhe senses and sarisfactions of otlrcr men have Ltccome my out appropration lesides rhcse immcdite organs, soal organs are therofore developed in the font ofsociecy; for example, acriviry in direct associarion with others, etc., hls bccc,me org.n uf, lile_eq)/ys.tiolr a\d "n r way ol rpproprilting lanan lfc. It is obvious tha the lru ey,e appreciares differently from the cnlde, inhurran eye, rhe human ear <lifcritly fro- r1l" ",,,,1" Only if man's object, we have seen, becomes for him"n "t", a ltuntan oblect

nntter [Saz:le] for its own sake, but rhe subject mattcr icself is an objectioe lttunru relation to itself and to man,1, ancl u"" u"rrn, NeeJ or saistaction Irave rhus lost theu eeoisti: naruro, ancl nature has

fr"T. und f,rr mrn. ''hc.,:s havc therefore tecorrc tlorcticians immeorrrcty rn rhclr y'/z/,/.r. Thcy tr.y ro relate themselvas to thcir sujec

ear, an eye fol dre beauty of Iorm, in short, rezses capable of human sarisfaction, confirming chemselves as cssatial ltuna capaciries. For not only rbc fve senses rur also the so-called spillluS!.qnd moral senses (w-i, a word, lanar seni i 1q .hq raa1y,gf .r!e .senses come . lovc, etc. ), in

'"/unrizu/.

'inro being only thror.rgii the cxistcnce of tltir ohjccr. through nrrrure T" 4!ydqltfyl:!- 9l.-he five senses is r labor of the whole previous. h rs;iv q f 9 yglcl s/ ;b;tef l ii, pii need iias unly a ratto@) mcanir1,tl For the srarving mrn food does nor cxis in irs human form but only in its bstract characer as foocl, It could be available in its crudcst form and one could not say wherein the starving
mn's eating diffors from rha of anintls.

no mincl for the most beautiful play. The dealer

f-9..9gr9--.-1,a..{qg, n_eetly.,man has

in minerals

sees

ily

ihcir m,rrl<et vrlue bttt not their hcluty lnd specill nlrurc; irc hls no
Fiieiigical sensirivity. Hene ihe objcti6cation f ih' human -escnce,

borli thcoreric:rlly and prrctir.ally, is necessrry to

dd also create -1(jLrsr

lalliz,e..n'r rlrr"s lutuan s se corasponding to the entire wlih l humrn-

'iry and nrture.

as rhe

comig socicry finds ar hand all thc material for this tultuul

deuelapnu flJiltlungJ through dre movement of prLate rcrt!, its wealth as well as its poverry boch material and spiritual, sa the filly co slitued society produccs man in dris entire \ryealtl of his being, plgfLu,.g^9j the.l./, decp. and tit?/))-setitia? man as irs cnduring lcrualiry,i

- ft is appcrenr

how subjectivism and objecrivism, spirirualism and

marerialism, activity and passivity lose their opposition and thus their existcnce as antithesss only in the social situation; ((it is appalent how the resolution of lotvtical ancirhoses is possible o 1t in a pnoical way, only through man's practical energy, and rence rheir resolution is in no way merely a problem of knowledge but a rcal problem of life which ltiksalry could not solve because it grasped the problem as ot theoret-

rough the objecrively unfoided wealh of human natu,.e is the wealth of the subjecrive I unan scnsbility eirher c'livated o, _uri.ot

subjecrive capacity, because the meaning of an objct for " 0.n", unly a,s.far rs rzJ senses go (onJy makes ,"nr" ib, coiresponding sense)_fbr tnrs rcason rhe srr of socil man diJfer lrom"those of the unsocial.

((lt is apparent how the history of industty, industry as oltjetively cxisring, is the oe book of nau\ essential pla)rs, tbe observably present hLrman psyciolog, which has not been thus far grasped in its connecrion with rnan's essmtial narure but only in an exrernal utilitarian way becuse in the perspecrive of alieoation only the general existeDce of man-religion or history in its absrract-general character as polirics, art, literature,
etc. -was grasped as the actualiry of man's essential powe rs and his lumatt gewc adion. We have before n the objectifed ess tia pool:s of man in

ical, ))

Only

rlrc form of snsuous, alien, useftl zbjecr'-in rhe fom of alienation-in

"r"oiJ_n

/'IcanpracricallyelaretyselfrorhesLrbjecrntartcrinhumnrynyonlvilirisitself
hLrm,rnly retr(cJ ro m.rn

[\lari r foorxrrel.

nateia/ industty (w\ich can be conceived as a part of that general movement just as rhat movon.tent can be grasped as a particu/ar pan on induslry since all human activity up ro rhe present has been labor, industry, activiry alienated fom itsellfi, A, pslcolog, for which rhis book, that is, the mosr observably presenr and accessible parr of history, remains
ordinary

60

1,T /I

RX

Eatt o t c lt t

Pl i /osol r l a n tscripts ( I 844 )

closed canlrot becomc an actual, substantial, and rutl science.)) What indeed should one think of a science which ruitrar abstracts from this large area of ltuman labor and is unaware of its own incompleteness while such an extended wealth of human activity means no mofe to it than can be express-ed-in" on- e w o rcl-" n evtl, " " co nno n ned " I ^lh{n'ru/ have become enormously acrive ancl have accumu-scien}x growing subject-matter. llut philosophy has remrinecl as latecl a.v alien to them as they have to it. Their momentary unity was only a "l'he will was tlare, btlt lhe means were missing Hisfaatostic il/tsion. tself only occasionally takes account of narural science as a roriography moment of enlightsnment, utility, some particular great discoveries, llut natural science has penetrated and transibrmed human life all the more ptucicall! through indr.rstry, preparing for human emancipation however muclr it immediacely hacl to accontuate dehumanization. Itdustty is the actual historlcal relarionship of nature, ancl thus ofnatural science, to man. If it is graspecl s rlte exott'ic manifesation of man's wsental po'!t)/:s, rl\a /nuat essan of nature oL the nal. ral essence of man can also be understood. I-lence, natr.ral scicnce will lose its abstract matcrial-or rather idealistic - rendcncy and become the basis of lttunat science as it has alrcady become, though in an alienated form, the basis of actual human life. One basis for life and anotler for sdence is in itself a lie. ((Natule developing in human history-the creation of human society-is the nctul ature of man; hence nature as it develops through industry, thor.rgh in an alienatetl form, is true altrLrcalagical nature.)) Sense ercton (see Feuerbach) must be tle basis of all science. Scicnce is only actual when it proceeds ftom sense perception in che twofold form ol borh sensuous awareness ad sensuous need, that is, from nature, The whole ofhistory is a prepararion fot " nar" to become he objectof setsuous wareness and for he needs of "man as man" to become sensuous needs. History itself is at aclual patt on nural iistoty, of nature's development inro man. Natural science will in time inclucle the science of man as tl'e

((lr is apparenr how the l,icl nu ncl wicle iutnari neecl appear in place ljch man is simulcaneously one who of cconomic reall ^id o,ott!,'I'he a totality of human manifesrations of lif and in whom his own letds realization exists as inner nccessicy, as uerl, Not only tbe eltlt but also rbe 7aet'ly of man eqLrally zrcquire-under rhe premise of socialism-a /tunan and thus social mcaning. It is rhe passivc bond wllich lers man experiencc the greatest wealth, the otler human being, as need. 'l'he domination of rhe objcctive essence within mo, the sensuors enrption of my essencial activity, is vnotion wh\ch rhereby bccomes the actiait! of my
narure ))
(5) 1\ being only regards himself as independent when he srancls on his own feet, antl he stands on his own feet only when he owes his exisel"e

to himself, A man who lives by the favor of another considers himself dependent, Ilut I live entirely by tre favor of anorhor if I owe him nor orrly the maintenance of my life but also is t:/.eoion, its source, My lirfe
necessarily has such an cxret.ttal ground if it is not my own crcation, T'he notiol of uvatiott \s thus very diffrculc to expel from populaL consciousness. For suclr consciousness tle self-subsistence of nrture an d man is innuceiu^ lble bccause it contradics all the ala/e facts of pr.actical life. The crea_rion 9f he e44./1has been severely shaken by geogtosl [rather: by'ggo ll, the science which presents rhe formadon ancl clevelopmenr

of the earth as a self-generative process. Generatio aequivoca is the only prctical rcfutation of the theory of creation. It is easy indeed ro tell a pnrticular individual whar Aristorle said: you were begotten by your farher and mother, so in you rhc maring of two
human beings, a generic act of mankind, produced anothor, You see tlerefore hlt rln ows cven hjs physical existencq to.nother, Flere you mrLst nor kecp in view only ate of the rwo aspecrs, the itfnitircgression, ancl ask further, Who begot my farher? Who his grandfarherl erc. You must also keep in mind the circular noeme sensibly apparent in thar process whereby man reproduces hmself in procreaton; thus lzaz always remains the subjecc. But you will answer: I grant this circular movemenr but you must allow the progression which leads even further until I ask, Who created the first man and nature as a wholel I can only answer: you question is itself a product of abstrction. Ask yourself how you arrive at

will include natual science: There will be r science Man is the immediatc objecr of natural science because immediately pecelil)h nat re s fot man, immediately, human sense perception (an identical statement) as r\e ot/ter man immcdiately perceptible for him His own sense percepdon only exists as human sense perccption for himself through the otir mt't. Brt Elal'e is the direct objecr of the scince of nar.'lhe first objecc for man-man himself-is nalure, sense petception; ancl the palticular, perceptible, and essential powers of man can attain self-knowledge only in nauLal sciencc because they are objectivcly developed orJty in taal objects. The element of thought itself, the elemenr of the life-cxpression of thougltt, language, is perceptible narure 'l|rc soial actuality of nature and lunat natural science or lte natutu/ srince of nan are idcnrical expressions.
science of man

that question, whether

cannot reply because

it does not arise from a srandpoint to which I it is twisted. 3.k.y,o-.Lut9lf .yq"lllgr t l progression
[f .y.9u-1!{.
U1r

-9$93.+-l.,s.tt-c,h-fq..-a!io.[?.! U-o..!ght.

and mln. you thus absrrsct from man and nanrre. You assert them as n|n-? isk t tnd yct want me to provc rhcm to you n exstittg.I say rtr yr.ru: Urve up your absrrcrion and yoLr will also give ui'.iirL quesrion. Or if yoLl want ro mainrain your abstraction, be consistent and if you rhnk of man and natufe as nofl-xistent, think of yourself as non-exisrent au ycru coo are nature and man. l)o not think, do nor quesdon me, foL as soon

rhe creation of oarure

62

,t

AIi

you tlink and question, your alstuction from the existence of nactre antl man makes no sense. Or are you such an egoist that yorr assett everything as norhing and yet want yourself to exisr?
as

You may reply to me: I do not want ro assert rhe nothingness of narure, erc, I only ash about its gzzerls as I ask the anaromist abort the formarion of bones, erc. fol.-t9"14!! man, however, the entitz so-t:a//e/ aorld /tistory is_..only "9in"9. th rc.arion of man through lrurnan labo a the i_ivelirii 1nnn,r" for man, he hrs cvidcnr rncl incon trov rrihlc proof of hiiszf nulox, his own jolynatioft ror,ss. Since the aseati/ depenr/eta of man in'nanrie * man fo man as the existence of natre and nature for man as rhe existence of man-has become practical, sensuous and perceptible, the quesrion about an alin being beyoncl man and natrrs (a question which implies the unreality of nature and man) has become impossible in practice, ,At/teisn as a denial of this unreality no longer makes sense because ir is a ' iigaiion of Gorl and rhrough chis negation irr"r,s rh. existuce oi na,/t. Brt socialism as such no longer neecls such mediarion. It bcgins with rhe senst,us 2erceplion, tlteorcicalll and taOica//y, of marL arlcJ \atlurc as ssentie/ l,eings, It is man's asitiae self-consciousness, no longer attained through the overcoming of religon, just as actua/ life is posttive actualiry no longer attained through the overcoming of priyare proporry, through rl nnutisn, The position of communsm is che ncgacion of the negarion and hence, for the next scage of historical development. the neccss ry arrrul plase of man's emancipation and rehabilitarion, Connutisn is the neccssary form and dynamic principle of the immediate lirue but no as such rhe goal of human developmenr-the form of human society.

CRITIQUD OF HEGELIAN DIALDCTIC AND PHILOSOPTIY IN CENDRAL

This is perhaps rhe place at which to make some commenrs explaining and justifying what has been said about Hegel's dialectic in general, particularly its exposition in rhe Plenonenolag tof Spirirl and Logic, and, finally about its relation to rhe modern citical movement. Moden German criticism has been so much preoccupied with the pasc, so much resrricted by rhe developmcnt of its subject matter, tlat ir has had a completely uncitcal atrirude roward merhods of criticism ancl has been completely oblivous to rhe seening fonnal but actlLally assential question: How do we now srand in relation ro the llegelian dialectc? This lack of awareness concerning the rejation of modern criticism to Hegel's philosophy in general and his dialectic in particular has been so great that critics like Strauss atd Btuno Baur have been completely cncrappecl in