YAPTINCHAY vs. TORRES GR No.

L-26462, June 9, 1969

FACTS: In her petition for appointment as Special Administrator, subsequently as a regular administrator, of Isidro Yaptinchays estate, Teresita Yaptinchay alleged that she and deceased Isidro Yaptinchay had lived continuously, openly and publicly as husband and wife for 19 years (1946-1951). The deceased died without a will and left an estate consisting of personal and real properties situated in the Philippines, Hong Kong and other places. Petitioner likewise alleged that certain parties took away from the residences certain personal properties belonging to the deceased together with others exlusively owned by her. Upon the foregoing allegations, the court issued an order appointing Teresita as special administrator of the estate. An opposition was subsequently registered by Josefina Yaptinchay, allegedly the legitimate wife, and Ernesto Yaptinchay and other children of the deceased upon the ground that Teresita, not being an heir, had no right to institute the proceeding for the settlement of Isidros estate, much less to procure appointment as administrator thereof. They likewise prayed for the appointment of Virginia Yaptinchay, daughter of the deceased, as special administrator and Josefina as regular administrator. The probate court granted the counter-petitioners prayer and named Virginia as special administrator. Included among the properties in the preliminary inventory of assets was a residential house at North Forbes Park, Makati. Petitioner then filed in another CFI branch an action for replevin and for liquidation of the partnership supposedly formed during the period of her cohabitation with Isidro and for damages. Pending hearing on the question of the issuance of the writs of replevin and preliminary injunction prayed for, respondent judge Guillermo E. Torres issued an order temporarily restraining defendants therein (private respondents here) and their agents from disposing any of the properties listed in the complaint and from interfering with plaintiff's (herein petitioner's) rights to, and possession over, amongst others, "the house now standing at North Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal." The CFI held that: While the Court is still considering the merits of the application and counter-application for provisional relief, the Court believes that for the protection of the properties and considering the Forbes Park property is really under the responsibility of defendant Virginia Y. Yaptinchay, by virtue of her being appointed Special Administratrix of the estate of the deceased Isidro Yaptinchay, the Court denies the petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction of the plaintiff with respect to the Forbes Park property and the restraining order issued by this Court is lifted. The Court also orders the plaintiff to cease and desist from disturbing in any manner whatsoever the defendant Virginia Y. Yaptinchay in the possession of said property. Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the said order was denied. ISSUE: Whether or not grave abuse of discretion attended the respondent judges order issuing an injunctive writ transferring possession of said property to respondent Virginia Yaptinchay HELD: NO. A rule of long standing echoed and reechoed in jurisprudence is that injunction is not to be granted for the purpose of taking property out of possession and/or control of a party and placing it in that of another 3 whose title thereto has not been clearly established. With this as guidepost, petitioner would have been

correct if she were lawfully in possession of the house in controversy and if respondent special administratrix, to whom the possession thereof was transferred, were without right thereto. It is beyond debate that with the institution on July 13, 1965 of Special Proceedings 1944-P, properties belonging not only to the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay but also to the conjugal partnership of said deceased and his 4 legitimate wife, Josefina Y. Yaptinchay, were brought under the jurisdiction of the probate court, properly 5 6 to be placed under administration. One such property is the lot at North Forbes Park. It is quite true that, in support of the allegation that the house in North Forbes Park was her exclusive property, petitioner presented proof in the form of loans that she had contracted during the period when said house was under construction. But evidence is wanting which would correlate such loans to the construction work. On the contrary, there is much to the documentary proof presented by petitioner which would tend to indicate that the loans she obtained from the Republic Bank were for purposes other than the construction of the North Forbes Park home. It is in the context just recited that the unsupported assertion that the North Forbes Park house is petitioner's exclusive property may not be permitted to override the prima facie presumption that house, having been constructed on the lot of Isidro Y. Yaptinchay (or of the conjugal partnership) at his instance, and during the existence of his marriage with respondent Josefina Y. Yaptinchay, is part of the estate that should be under the control of the special administratrix. Nor can petitioner's claim of ownership presumably based on the provisions of Article 144 of the Civil Code be decisive. Said Article 144 says that: "When man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership." But stock must be taken of the fact that the creation of the civil relationship envisaged in Article 144 is circumscribed by conditions, the existence of which must first be shown before rights provided thereunder 13 may be deemed to accrue. One such condition is that there must be a clear showing that the petitioner had, during cohabitation, really contributed to the acquisition of the property involved. Until such right to co-ownership is duly established, petitioner's interests in the property in controversy cannot be considered the "present right" or title that would make available the protection or aid afforded by a writ of 14 injunction. For, the existence of a clear positive right especially calling for judicial protection is wanting. 15 Injunction indeed, is not to protect contingent or future rights; nor is it a remedy to enforce an abstract 16 right.

*N.B. According to the outline, this is under the topic of effect of nullity and under Articles 50-54 of the Family Code. Pero hindi ko ma-gets yung connection, sorry.