International Journal of Emerging Technology and Advanced Engineering

Website: www.ijetae.com (ISSN 2250-2459, Volume 2, Issue 7, July 2012)

A frame Work for the Integrity Analysis of Instrument Landing System

Ch Mahesh1, Dr. K Ravindra2, Prof. V Kamakshiprasad3
1

Manager (CNS), Airports Authority of India, RGI Airport , Hyderabad 2 Principal, Malla Reddy Institute of Technology, Hyderabad 3 Professor, SIT, JNTU Hyderabad So that, the ILS signal in space (SIS) will be within the specified tolerances. Flight checks verify the correctness of the setting by correlating the ground monitoring and the airborne measurements. II. ILS INTEGRITY REQUIREMENTS Integrity has been defined as the probability that a system will not radiate incorrect navigation guidance information. It is an assurance provided to the user for corrective information supplied by the facility. Integrity requirements are based on the requirements of safe navigation and ability to overcome the potential hazardous situations. Integrity is needed to ensure that an aircraft on approach will have a low probability of receiving false guidance [1, 2]. The acceptable probability of hazardous event and allowed time delay before warning is issued are the key integrity parameters. The integrity requirements are expressed as risk In any one Landing. The risk is the probability to lose integrity over the time interval appropriate to the failure mode the time interval is depends on failure mode being considered and one of the component for measuring the integrity. It is generally accepted that the average rate of fatal accident during landing, due to failure or shortcomings in the whole system, the aircraft and the pilot should not exceeds 1107 .This criterion is called Global Risk factor
TABLE I Integrity and continuity of service objectives Level Up to 200 ft 1 Up to 100 ft 2 Touch down 3 Integrity Continuity MTBO (Hours)

Abstract As per International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Annex 10 Standards And Recommended Practices (SARPs) the Instrument Landing System (ILS) shall meet the stringent requirement for Integrity and Continuity services for adequate assurance against failures. The guidance provided by ILS must be high Integrity to ensure that each landing has a very high probability of success. The analysis of transmitter Integrity and Continuity are the fundamental values for determining the overall Integrity and Continuity provided by the ILS. This paper demonstrates the Integrity requirements, considerations and analysis of ILS of Hyderabad International Airport Limited(HIAL). Finally, a method of calculation has been proposed here which is very much useful for analysis of ILS Integrity. Keywords Instrument Landing System, Integrity, MTBF.

I. INTRODUCTION The ILS provides precision guidance to an aircraft during the final stages of the approach. The radiated signals either can be interpreted by the pilot from the onboard equipment or input to the flight management system and Autopilot system. For safe landing of an aircraft, the available signal in space (SIS) must be accurate. The ICAO Annex 10 SARPS and DOC 8071 Guidance Material provide the necessary requirement to be followed [1]. The radio navigational aid used by the aircraft shall be subject of periodic ground and flight check. It is required that the service a provider has to demonstrate their system operation services will comply the ICAO laid requirements. Further, the service provider has to demonstrate the four primary areas: Integrity, Continuity, Availability and Accuracy. Even though all parameters are critical, here we analyzed Integrity of ILS only. Integrity is the quality which is relates to the trust which can be placed in the correctness of the information supplied by the facility. The level of integrity of the localizer or the glide path is expressed in terms of the probability of not radiating false guidance signals. To ensure the operational integrity of the ILS facility, it is required continuous monitoring, ground testing and proper maintenance of the equipment. 186

Not demonstrated, or less than required for level 2 1 1 x 10-7 in any one landing 1 0.5 x 10-9 in any one landing 1 4 x 10-6 in any period of 15 seconds 1 2 x 10-6 in any period of 15

1000

2000

International Journal of Emerging Technology and Advanced Engineering

Website: www.ijetae.com (ISSN 2250-2459, Volume 2, Issue 7, July 2012)
seconds 1 2 x 10-6 in any period of 30 seconds (LOC) 15 seconds (GS)

Touchdown & Roll out 4

1 0.5 x 10-9 in any one landing

4000 (LOC) 2000 (GS)

Table 1 shows the required level of integrity and continuity of the ILS given by ICAO for different levels [2]. III. INTEGRITY CONSIDERATIONS An integrity fails can occur if radiate signal is outside tolerances and which is unrecognized by the monitoring equipment or the control circuit fails to take the action [3]. The probability to transmit such false information to the user is the product of the probability to generate such information and probability to not detect by monitor and associated control system. Neverthlessly we can say, the ability to achieve high integrity depends on the monitoring system that receives radiated signals as well as the action taken by the associated control system. ICAO Annex 10, SARPS given firm guidelines for monitoring of specific parameters for both the Localizer and Glide Path of the ILS. The service providers of contracting states should follow the guidelines given by the ICAO for monitoring the specific parameters of the system. There is no unique way to design a system to achieve the integrity of service as per ICAO. But there are few factors can be considered for calculations of integrity. They are : 1) failure rate of the transmitter, 2) failure rate of the monitor and associated control system, 3) period of time between checks on the monitor and associated control systems. Even though the failure of transmitter is one of the component for calculation of integrity, but very less remote chance of failure of ground equipment. Due to this, the important elements are the monitor and associated control systems which plays important role for the measure of integrity. IV. ILS MONITORING PARAMETERS

The specifications and tolerances for the localizer are: a) The lateral alignment accuracy required for localizer is 10.5m (35ft) for Category (CAT) I, 7.5m (25ft) for CAT II and 6m (10ft) for CAT III. This requirement for the mean course line radiated beam which represent the runway centerline. b) The required accuracy of Displacement Sensitivity will be 0.155 DDM with 17% tolerance c) The output power is not less than 80% for two frequency system where as the minimum 50% for single frequency system. If any deviation will occur in the above specified limit, the total period of radiation that can be tolerated outside the performance limit is 10 seconds, 5 seconds and 2 seconds for the CAT I,II and III respectively . Figure 2 shows the specified tolerances of the localizer of the ILS.

Figure 2 coverage area of Localizer

To provide high level of integrity it is necessary to check the transmitted information in space as well as inside the equipment. In order that the integrity of the radiated beams are maintained in operation, the ILS include comprehensive monitors that alert operational staff when any changes occurred in monitored parameters.

.
Figure 3 Glide Path coverage Area

Figure 2 and figure 3 are shows the typical coverage of localizer and Glide Path [2].

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International Journal of Emerging Technology and Advanced Engineering

Website: www.ijetae.com (ISSN 2250-2459, Volume 2, Issue 7, July 2012) The elevation guidance accuracy required for glide slope is for CAT I, II and III respectively are: a) The mean glide path angle is 0.075 b) The minimum output power is 50% for single frequency system and 80% for dual frequency system c) The required Displacement Sensitivity for Glide Path is 0.175 with tolerance of 25%. If any fault will occur, the total period shall not exceeds 6 seconds for CAT I, 2 seconds for CAT II and III as shown in figure 3. The ILS signals are monitored by Integral (Built-In), near and Far field monitors. Integral and near field monitors are used for CAT I, II and III of ILS. Far field monitor located at the far end of the runway to monitor the localizer signals for CAT III of ILS [4]. The continuously operating automatic monitor system receives radiated signals from different sensors and compares the detected information. If any parameter is outside the specified tolerance, the automatic monitor system will provide warnings and take the following actions: a) Termination of the radiated signal b) Removal of Navigation and Identification components from the signal c) Reversions to a lower category in the case of CAT II and III. Normally, the monitor limits of the ground equipment will set based on the available signal in space (SOS) which is carried by the Flight check. V. INTEGRITY CALCULATIONS The level of integrity of the system in any landing can be calculated from the following formula [5]

M 1 =Transmitter Mean Time between Failure (MTBF) M 2 = MTBF of the monitor and associated control system
1/1 = Ratio of the rate of failure in the transmitter resulting in the radiation of an erroneous signal to the rate of all transmitter failures 1/2 = Ratio of the rate of failure in the monitoring and associated control system resulting in inability to detect an erroneous signal to the rate of all monitoring and associated control system failures T1= Period of time (in hours) between transmitter checks T2= Period of time (in hours) between checks on the monitoring and associated control system

T1 T2 the monitor system check may also be considered a transmitter check. In our analysis, T1 T2
When therefore the equation 2 will be more appropriate and used here . Mean Time between Failure (MTBF) is calculated by dividing the total facility uptime by the number of unanticipated operational outages during the same period. VI. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS The required experimental data has been collected from ILS 09 and 27 for last four years operational period in tabular form given in annexure-1. Later the data is categorized based on nature of fault and time of occurrence. It has been segregated based on the fault and the cause as shown in annexure-2. Indeed, the total failures shown in annexure-2 will not cause total outage of facility only few of them caused an outage and remaining will cause a changeover of transmitter. In this analysis, we found that the failure of monitor and associated control system is only one and the value of 2 as unity. Even though, the monitor consists of inbuilt integrity test, during this analysis, we initiated a fault to check the performance of the monitor and associated control system. It has been observed that the monitor recognizing the fault and the associated control system is ceasing the radiation. The time period between checks for both transmitter and monitor is considered is one hour. In this analysis we found that the integrity of ILS -27 and 09 of Hyderabad International Airport limited (HIAL) is high and the values are 0.9999999344 & 0.9999998713 which are greater than the required value 1 1107 .

I 1 P (1) T1T2 P For T1 < T2 1 2 M 1M 2

2

..(2)

T2 P For T1 T2 T ..(3) 1 2 M 1M 2
Where

I = Integrity
P = Probability of concurrent failure in Transmitter and monitor system resulting in erroneous undetected radiation

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International Journal of Emerging Technology and Advanced Engineering

Website: www.ijetae.com (ISSN 2250-2459, Volume 2, Issue 7, July 2012) VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE SCOPE In this paper, we analyzed the integrity of the ILS -27 and 09 of the HIAL, Hyderabad, India based on to the table shown in annexure-1 and demonstrated that the provided equipment is high and achieved the required level of integrity as per ICAO shown in table 1. The results are shown in annexure-3. The effect of time period between checks and the integrity of the system is examined. It has been found that time duration between checks highly effect the integrity and that the failure of the equipment increases exponentially over a time .The figure 4 shows a relation between time and probability of failure. In this analysis we found that, even though, the required integrity level of the system is mainly depends on the design of the equipment, it is also required an appropriate checks i.e. Monitor verification checks, maintenance checks. However, there are distinct parameters are not taken consideration. Those are the effect of interference and noise in integration. Further studies and analysis is needed to understand this.
1.4 x 10
-6

REFERENCES
[1 ] ICAO Doc. 8071, Manual on the Testing of Radio Navigation Aids. [2 ] ICAO:Annex10,VolumeIAeronautical Telecommunications, Radio Navigation Aids, Montreal, 1996. [3 ] ICAO EURO DOC 016, European guidance material on integrity Demonstration in support of certification Of ILS and MLS systems. [4 ] NORMAC ILS, ILS theory and Installation Procedure, Norway, 1991. [5 ] ICAO: Annex-10,Volume-I,"Aeronautical Telecommunications", Radio Navigation Aids, attachment C to part I

Time vs probability of failure

1.2

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The author, Ch.Mahesh, expresses heartfelt acknowledgments to Mr. I. N. Murthy., Airport Director, Hyderabad International Airport, Mr. N.R Das., General Manager (CNS) for their support and guidance, Mr. G.Rambabu., DGM(CNS) , Mr. N.Prasad., Senior Manager (CNS) For their full support and active involvement during accomplishments of hard core realities of this project. Mr.S.Naha., Senior manager (CNS) for his time to time support and valuable suggestions. I am indeed very much indebted to Mr.S.Perumal, GM (CNS) for his reviewing my research work time to time. I also express my sincere regards to Mr. Ramesh Kumar., Joint GM (CNS), Mr. Raj Kishore., Joint GM (CNS), Mr. T. Chandrasekhar Joint GM (CNS) and also the whole CNS staff of Hyderabad International Airport who supported me whole heartedly for accomplishing the deadlines of this project in all respects and making it a grand success to the appreciation of the society for better safety and security of tomorrow.

Probability of failure

1.5

2.5

3.5 time

4.5

5.5

Figure 4 Time vs. Probability of failure

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International Journal of Emerging Technology and Advanced Engineering

Website: www.ijetae.com (ISSN 2250-2459, Volume 2, Issue 7, July 2012) Data required for calculating ILS Integrity and continuity is being collected using the following tabular forms. ANNEXURE-1 AIRPORTS AUTHORITY OF INDIA HIAL, HYDERABAD DAILY STATISTICS OF TRANSMITTER MTBF (M1) = (A - B) / C
Non Operating Time (B) Shutdown of Tx. due any other Reason From To

Date

ILS Runway selected

Eqpt. in operation

Scheduled Operating Time (A)

Scheduled Shutdown of Tx.

Actual Operating Time(AOT) (A - B)

No. of failures (C )

Signature

LLZ / GP

From

To

From

To

Hrs.

Mins.

Transmitter MTBF= AOT / No. of failures

AIRPORTS AUTHORITY OF INDIA HIAL, HYDEARBAD Calculation for MTBF of the Monitoring and Associated Control System (M2) = A - B / C
Non Operating Time (B) Scheduled Operating Time (A) Failure of operating Channel due Monitor / LCU From To Actual Operating Time (AOT) (A - B)

Date

ILS Runway selected

Eqpt. in operation

Scheduled Shutdown

No. of failures (C )

Signature

LLZ / GP

From

To

From

To

Hrs.

Mins.

M2 = AOT / No. of failures

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International Journal of Emerging Technology and Advanced Engineering

Website: www.ijetae.com (ISSN 2250-2459, Volume 2, Issue 7, July 2012) AIRPORTS AUTHORITY OF INDIA HIAL, HYDERABAD Calculation for 1 / 1= C1 / D1
(B1) Failure of Transmitter due all reasons (from user point of view) Refer Ground Safety Indicator Monthly Report From To

Date

ILS Runway selected

Eqpt. in operation

Operating Time

(A1) Failure of Transmitter due Radiation of Erroneous Signal (Refer to RMS Log Alarms)

(C1 ) Rate of Failure of A1

(D1) Rate of Failure of B1

Signature

LLZ / GP

From

To

From

To

AIRPORTS AUTHORITY OF INDIA HIAL, HYDERABAD Calculation for 1 / 2= C 2/ D2

(A2) Failure of Monitor / Associated Control Unit due inability to detect an erroneous Signal (Monitor self certification activated) To From To

Date

ILS Runway selected

Eqpt. in operation

Operating Time

(B2) Failure of Monitor / Associated Control Unit due all reasons

(C 2) Rate of Failure of A2

(D2) Rate of Failure of B2

Signature

LLZ / GP

From

From

To

Remarks:

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International Journal of Emerging Technology and Advanced Engineering

Website: www.ijetae.com (ISSN 2250-2459, Volume 2, Issue 7, July 2012) ANNEX-2 S.No 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Nature of Fault and number of events Nature of Fault Failure Due to lightning Failure due to dry soldier,wire and component etc Software problem of PMDT Remote status indication failure due to OFC cable Obstruction and passage of vehicle and men at NFM Module problem Antenna and Antenna Cable faults Changeover of runway 09 to 27 and vice versa Failure of facility due to power supply problem Failure of facility with unknown cause Number of Events

ANNEXUER-3:
facility

Results
Failure time(Hrs) Actual operating time(Hrs)
1.127548

Total operating Time(Hrs)

M1

M2

I (1 p)

ILS-09

12960

2.433

12957.56

810.24

12957.56

0.9999999344

>
3.25 21597.15 2160.11 1.330915

1 1107

ILS-27

21600

21597.15

0.9999998713

> 1 1107

192