GMA Network Inc. vs. Movie and Television Review and classification board G.R. No.

148579 CORONA, J.: February 5, 2007

Code of 1987, particularly Section 3 thereof, expressly requires each agency to file with the Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR) of the University of the Philippines Law Center three certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Administrative issuances which are not published or filed with the ONAR are ineffective and may not be enforced.9 Memorandum Circular No. 98-17, which provides for the penalties for the first, second and third offenses for exhibiting programs without valid permit to exhibit, has not been registered with the ONAR as of January 27, 2000.10 Hence, the same is yet to be effective.11 It is thus unenforceable since it has not been filed in the ONAR.12 Consequently, petitioner was not bound by said circular and should not have been meted the sanction provided thereunder. GONZAGA-REYES; MAY 19, 1999 NATURE Appeal by certiorari from RTC order FACTS - Petitioners China Banking Corp. (CBC) and CBC Properties and Computer Center Inc. (CBC-PCCI) are both employers who were granted by the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF) waiver certificates for having a Superior Retirement Plan pursuant to Sec. 19 of PD 1752 (Home Development Mutual Fund Law of 1980) which provides: employers who have their own existing provident AND/OR employees-housing plans may register for annual certification for waiver or suspension from coverage or participation in the Home Development Mutual Fund. - In June 1994, RA 7742 amending PD 1752 was approved. In Sept. 1995, respondent HDMF Board issued an amendment to the Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 7742 (The Amendment), and pursuant to said amendment, the Board issued a circular entitled Revised Guidelines and Procedure for filing Application for Waiver or Suspension of Fund Coverage under PD 1752 (Guidelines). Under the Amendment and the Guidelines, a company must have a provident/retirement AND housing plan superior to that provided under the Pag-IBIG Fund to be

Facts: Petitioner GMA Network, Inc. operates and manages the UHF television station, EMC Channel 27. On January 7, 2000, respondent MTRCB issued an order of suspension against petitioner for airing "Muro Ami: The Making" without first securing a permit from it as provided in Section 7 of PD 1986.3 The penalty of suspension was based on Memorandum Circular 9817 dated December 15, 19984 which provided for the penalties for exhibiting a program without a valid permit from the MTRCB. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the suspension order and, at the same time, informed MTRCB that Channel 27 had complied with the suspension order by going off the air since midnight of January 11, 2000. It also filed a letter-protest which was merely "noted" by the MTRCB thereby, in effect, denying both the motion for reconsideration and letter-protest. Petitioner then filed with the CA a petition for certiorari which was dismissed in the now assailed June 18, 2001 decision. The January 7, 2000 suspension order issued by MTRCB was affirmed in toto. Hence, this recourse. Issue: Whether or not Memorandum Circular No. 98-17 was enforceable and binding on petitioner Held: The court held that while MTRCB had jurisdiction over the subject program, Memorandum Circular 98-17, which was the basis of the suspension order, was not binding on petitioner. The Administrative

entitled to exemption/waiver from fund coverage. - CBC and CBC-PCCI applied for renewal of waiver of coverage from the fund for the year 1996, but the applications were disapproved after a finding that their retirement plan is not superior to PagIBIG Fund. The other reason is that under the amended IRR of RA 7742, to qualify for waiver, a company must have retirement/provident and housing plans which are both superior to Pag-IBIG funds. - Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the RTC seeking to annul and declare void the Amendment and the Guidelines for having been issued in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners claimed that the HDMF Board exceeded its rule-making power in requiring the employer to have both a retirement/provident plan and an employee housing plan in order to be entitled to a certificate of waiver or suspension of coverage from the HDMF. - Respondent Board filed motion to dismiss which was granted by the RTC. The petition for certiorari was dismissed by the RTC on the grounds (1) that the denial or grant of an application for waiver/coverage is within the power and authority of the HDMF Board, and the said Board did not exceed its jurisdiction or act with grave abuse of discretion in denying the applications; and (2) the petitioners have lost their right to appeal by failure to appeal within the periods provided in the Rules for appealing from the order of denial to the HDMF Board of Trustees, and thereafter, to the CA. RTC stated that certiorari will not lie as a substitute for a lost remedy of appeal. - Petitioners filed a MFR which was denied. They then filed this appeal contending that it does not question the power of respondent HDMF, as an administrative agency to issue rules and regulations to implement PD 1752 and Sec.5 of RA 7742; however, the Amendment and Guidelines issued by it should be set aside and declared null and void for being inconsistent with the enabling

law, PD 1752, as amended by RA 7742, which merely requires as a pre-condition for exemption for coverage, the existence of either a superior provident (retirement) plan or a superior housing plan, and not the concurrence of both plans. - Respondents contend that there is no question of law involved. The interpretation of the phrase "and/or" is not purely a legal question and it is susceptible of administrative determination. In denying petitioners application for waiver of coverage, respondent Board was exercising its quasi-judicial function and its findings are generally accorded not only respect but even finality. Moreover, the Amendment and the Guidelines are consistent with the enabling law, which is a piece of social legislation intended to provide both a savings generation and a house building program. ISSUE WON respondent Board acted in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the Amendment and Guidelines insofar as they impose as a requirement for exemption from coverage or participation in the HMDF Fund the existence of both a superior housing plan and a provident plan. HELD YES. The assailed Amendment to the Rules and Regulations and the Revised Guidelines suffer from a legal infirmity and should be set aside. Ratio The rules and regulations which are the product of a delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the Administrative agency. - Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. - The rule making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to

carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. Reasoning Sec. 19 of PD 1752 provides: An employer and/or employee-group who, at the time this Decree becomes effective have their own provident and/or employee-housing plans, may register with the Fund, for any of the following purposes. - On June 17, 1994, RA 7742, amending certain sections of PD 1752 was approved. Sec. 5 of the said statute provides that within sixty (60) days from the approval of the Act, the Board of Trustees of the Home Development Mutual Fund shall promulgate the rules and regulations necessary for the effective implementation of (this) Act. - Pursuant to the above authority the Home Development Mutual Fund Board of Trustees promulgated The Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 7742 amending PD 1752, Rule VII Sec.1 thereof reads: SECTION 1. Waiver or Suspension-Existing Provident or Retirement Plan. An employer and/or employee group who has an existing provident or retirement plan as of the effectivity of RA 7742, qualified under RA 4917 and actuarially determined to be sound and reasonable by an independent actuary duly accredited by the Insurance Commission, may apply with the Fund for waiver or suspension of coverage. - Subsequently, the HDMF Board adopted in a Special Board Meeting, Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 7742. As a mended, Rule VII on "Waiver or Suspension" now reads: RULE VII. WAIVER OF SUSPENSION SEC1 Waiver or Suspension Because of Existing Provident/Retirement and Housing Plan. Any employer with a plan providing both for a provident/retirement and housing benefits for

all his employees and existing as of Dec. 14, 1980, the effectivity date of Presidential Decree No. 1752, may apply with the Fund for waiver or suspension of coverage. - On Oct.23, 1995, HDMF Circular No. 124-B entitled Revised Guidelines and Procedure for Filing Applications for Waiver or Suspension of Fund Coverage under PD 1752, as amended by RA 7742, was promulgated. The Circular pertinently provides: I. GROUNDS FOR WAIVER OR SUSPENSION OF FUND COVERAGE: A. SUPERIOR PROVIDENT/RETIREMENT PLAN AND HOUSING PLAN ANY EMPLOYER WHO HAS A PROVIDENT, RETIREMENT, GRATUITY OR PENSION PLAN AND A HOUSING PLAN, EXISTING AS OF DECEMBER 14, 1980, THE EFFECTIVITY OF P.D. NO. 1752, may file an application for waiver or suspension from Fund coverage, provided: - In the instant case, the legal meaning of the words and/or should be taken in its ordinary signification, i.e., either and or; e.g. butter and/or eggs means butter and eggs or butter or eggs. It is accordingly ordinarily held that the intention of the legislature in using the term and/or is that the word and and the word or are to be used interchangeably. - It is seems to us clear from the language of the enabling law that Sec.19 of PD 1752, intended that an employer with a provident plan or an employee housing plan superior to that of the fund may obtain exemption from coverage. If the law had intended that the employee should have both a superior provident plan and a housing plan in order to qualify for exemption, it would have used the words and instead of and/or. The law obviously contemplates that the existence of either plan is considered as sufficient basis for the grant of an exemption; needless to state, the concurrence of both plans is more than sufficient. To require the existence of both plans would radically impose a more stringent condition for

waiver which was not clearly envisioned by the basic law. By removing the disjunctive word or in the implementing rules the respondent Board has exceeded its authority. Disposition petition is given due course and the assailed Orders of the court a quo are SET ASIDE. The Amendment and the Guideline, insofar as they require that an employer should have both a provident/retirement plan superior to the retirement/provident benefits offered by the Fund and a housing plan superior to the Pag-IBIG housing loan program in order to qualify for waiver or suspension of fund coverage, are hereby declared null and void

petition.
a. both Smart and Globe were equally blameworthy for their lack of cooperation in the submission of the documentation required for interconnection and for having unduly maneuvered the situation into the present impasse b. NTC held that since SMS falls squarely within the definition of value-added service or enhanced-service given in NTC Memorandum Circular No. 8-9-95 (MC No. 8-9-95) the implementation of SMS interconnection is mandatory c. The NTC also declared that both Smart and Globe have been providing SMS without authority from it

4. Globe filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition25 to nullify and set aside the Order and to prohibit NTC from taking any further action in the case. Globe

Globe Telecoms v NTC G.R. No. 143964 July 26, 2004 FACTS: 1. On 4 June 1999, Smart filed a Complaint with public respondent NTC, praying that NTC order the immediate interconnection of Smarts and Globes GSM networks. Smart alleged that Globe, with evident bad faith and malice, refused to grant Smarts request for the interconnection of SMS. 2. Globe filed its Answer with Motion to Dismiss on 7 June 1999, interposing grounds that the Complaint was premature, Smarts failure to comply with the conditions precedent required in Section 6 of NTC Memorandum Circular 9-7-93,19 and its omission of the mandatory Certification of NonForum Shopping. 3. On 19 July 1999, NTC issued the Order now subject of the present

a. reiterated its previous arguments that the complaint should have been dismissed for failure to comply with conditions precedent and the non-forum shopping rule. b. claimed that NTC acted without jurisdiction in declaring that it had no authority to render SMS, pointing out that the matter was not raised as an issue before it at all. c. alleged that the Order is a patent nullity as it imposed an administrative penalty for an offense for which neither it nor Smart was sufficiently charged nor heard on in violation of their right to due process

5. The CA issued a TRO on 31 Aug 1999. 6. In its Memorandum, Globe called the attention of the CA in an earlier NTC decision regarding Islacom, holding that SMS is a deregulated special feature and does not require the prior approval of the NTC. Globe that its departure from its ruling in the Islacom case constitutes a denial of equal protection of the law. 7. On 22 Nov 1999, the CA affirmed in toto the NTC Order. 8. On 21 December 1999, Globe filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, seeking to reconsider only the portion of the Decision that upheld NTCs finding that Globe lacked the authority to provide SMS and its

imposition of a fine. After the Court of Appeals denied the Motion , Globe elevated the controversy to this Court ISSUES: 1. Whether NTC may legally require Globe to secure NTC approval before it continues providing SMS; 2. Whether SMS is a VAS under the PTA, or special feature under NTC MC No. 14-11-97; and 3. Whether NTC acted with due process in levying the fine against Globe RULING: 1. The petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 22 November 1999, as well as its Resolution dated 29 July 2000, and the assailed Order of the NTC dated 19 July 1999 are hereby SET ASIDE. 2. The assailed NTC Decision invokes the NTC Implementing Rules of the PTA (MC No. 8-9-95) to justify its claim that Globe and Smart need to secure prior authority from the NTC before offering SMS. a. The statutory basis for the NTCs determination must be thoroughly examined. b. Next, the regulatory framework devised by NTC in dealing with VAS should be examined. In short, the legal basis invoked by NTC in claiming that SMS is VAS has not been duly established. The fault falls squarely on NTC. 4. NTC violated several of these cardinal rights due Globe in the promulgation of the assailed Order. a. The NTC Order is not supported by substantial evidence. Neither

does it sufficiently explain the reasons for the decision rendered. b. Globe and Smart were denied opportunity to present evidence on the issues relating to the nature of VAS and the prior approval. Another disturbing circumstance attending this petition is that until the promulgation of the assailed Order Globe and Smart were never informed of the fact that their operation of SMS without prior authority was at all an issue for consideration. c. The imposition of fine is void for violation of due process. The matter of whether NTC could have imposed the fine on Globe in the assailed Order is necessarily related to due process considerations 5. In summary: a. there is no legal basis under the PTA or the memorandum circulars promulgated by the NTC to denominate SMS as VAS, and any subsequent determination by the NTC on whether SMS is VAS should be made with proper regard for due process and in conformity with the PTA; b. the assailed Order violates due process for failure to sufficiently explain the reason for the decision rendered, for being unsupported by substantial evidence, and for imputing violation to, and issuing a corresponding fine on, Globe despite the absence of due notice and hearing which would have afforded Globe the right to present evidence on its behalf

DOMINGO B. TEOXON vs. MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF

ADMINISTRATORS, PHILIPPINE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION FACTS: The petitioner sustained physical injuries in line of duty as a former member of a recognized guerilla organization which participated actively in the resistance movement against the enemy, and as a result of which petitioner suffered a permanent, physical disability. For having been permanently incapacitated from work, he filed his claim for disablility pension with the Philippine Veterans Administration under the Veterans' Bill of Rights, Republic Act No. 65. However, respondents in turn would limit the amount of pension received by him in accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated by them. Petitioner filed his suit for mandamus before the CFI of Manila alleging that he filed his claim for disability pension under the Veterans' Bill of Rights, Republic Act No. 65, for having been permanently incapacitated from work and that he was first awarded only P25.00 monthly, thereafter increased to P50.00 a month contrary to the terms of the basic law as thereafter amended. 3 His claim, therefore, was for a pension effective May 10, 1955 at the rate of P50.00 a month up to June 21, 1957 and at the rate of P100.00 a month, plus P10.00 a month, for each of his unmarried minor children below 18 years of age from June 22, 1957 up to June 30, 1963; and the

difference of P50.00 a month, plus P10.00 a month for each of his four unmarried minor children below 18 years of age from July 1, 1963. He would likewise seek for the payment of moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees. Respondent, while admitting, with qualification, the facts as alleged in the petition, would rely primarily in its special and affirmative defenses, on petitioner not having exhausted its administrative remedies and his suit being in effect one against the government, which cannot prosper without its consent. The CFI found for respondents. Hence this petition. ISSUE: W.O.N. rules and regulations promulgated by administrative agencies can prevail over a statue. HELD: Petition is affirmed. CFI is reversed. The Court cited the case of Begosa v. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration, promulgated just a month before the case at bar, where it categorically held that a veteran suffering from permanent disability is not to be denied what has been granted him specifically by legislative enactment, which certainly is superior to any regulation that may be promulgated by the Philippine Veterans Administration, presumably in the implementation thereof.

It added that the decision of the CFI where it held that the respondent Board has authority under the Pension law to process applications for pension, using as guide the rules and regulations that it adopted under the law and their decisions, unless shown clearly to be in error or against the law or against the general policy of the Board, should be maintained" is clearly erroneous. The Court also cited United States v. Tupasi Molina, which held that "Of course the regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended. So long, however, as the regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the provisions of the law, they are valid." As well as its ruling in People v. Santos, wherein it held that an administrative order betrays inconsistency or repugnancy to the provisions of the Act, "the mandate of the Act must prevail and must be followed." Finally, the Court said there must be strict compliance with the legislative enactment. Its terms must be followed. The statute requires adherence to, not departure from, its provisions. No deviation is allowable. In the terse language of the present Chief Justice, an administrative agency "cannot amend an

act of Congress." Respondents can be sustained, therefore, only if it could be shown that the rules and regulations promulgated by them were in accordance with what the Veterans' Bill of Rights provides.

Lupangco vs Court of Appeals Issue: Can the Professional Regulation Commission lawfully prohibit the examiness from attending review classes, receiving handout materials, tips, or the like 3 days before the date of the examination? Facts: PRC issued Resolution No. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions to Examiness," to all those applying for admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy. Petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in accountancy, filed with the RTC a complaint for injunction with a prayer with the issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to declare the same unconstitutional. Rule: We realize that the questioned resolution was adopted for a commendable purpose

which is "to preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations." However, its good aim cannot be a cloak to conceal its constitutional infirmities. On its face, it can be readily seen that it is unreasonable in that an examinee cannot even attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like, or receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor, official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar institutions. The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even without any ill motives will be barred from taking future examinations conducted by the respondent PRC. Furthermore, it is inconceivable how the Commission can manage to have a watchful eye on each and every examinee during the three days before the examination period. It is an aixiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they are authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid. Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also

infringes on the examinees' right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained from taking all the lawful steps needed to assure the fulfillment of their ambition to become public accountants. They have every right to make use of their faculties in attaining success in their endeavors FEDERICO S. SANDOVAL vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent herein were candidates for the congressional seat for the Malabon-Navotas legislative district during the elections held on May 11, 1998. After canvassing the municipal certificates of canvass, the district board of canvassers proclaimed petitioner the duly elected congressman. The petitioner took his oath of office on the same day. Private respondent filed with the Comelec a petition, which sought the annulment of petitioner's proclamation. He alleged that there was a verbal order from the Comelec Chairman to suspend the canvass and proclamation of the winning candidate, but the district board of canvassers proceeded with the canvass and proclamation despite the said verbal order. He also alleged that there was non-inclusion of 19 election

returns in the canvass, which would result in an incomplete canvass of the election returns. The Comelec en banc issued an order setting aside the proclamation of petitioner and ruled the proclamation as void. Hence, this petition for certiorari seeking the annulment and reversal of the Comelec order. ISSUES: 1. whether the COMELEC has the power to take cognizance of SPC No. 98-143 and SPC No. 98- 206 SPC No. 98-143 an "Urgent Appeal from the Decision of the Legislative District Board of Canvassers for Malabon and Navotas with Prayer for the Nullification of the Proclamation of Federico S. Sandoval as Congressman." SPC No. 98-206. The petition sought the annulment of petitioner's proclamation as congressman. 2. whether the COMELEC's order to set aside petitioner's proclamation was valid. RULING: On the first issue, we uphold the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over the petitions filed by private respondent. The COMELEC has exclusive jurisdiction over all pre-proclamation controversies. As an exception, however, to the general rule, Section 15 of Republic Act (RA) 7166 prohibits candidates in the presidential, vice-presidential, senatorial and congressional elections from filing preproclamation cases. It states: "Sec. 15. Pre-proclamation cases Not Allowed in Elections for

President, Vice-President, Senator, and Members of the House of Representatives. For purposes of the elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns or the certificates of canvass, as the case may be. However, this does not preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing body motu propio or upon written complaint of an interested person to correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns before it." The prohibition aims to avoid delay in the proclamation of the winner in the election, which delay might result in a vacuum in these sensitive posts. The law, nonetheless, provides an exception to the exception. The second sentence of Section 15 allows the filing of petitions for correction of manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns even in elections for president, vicepresident and members of the House of Representatives for the simple reason that the correction of manifest error will not prolong the process of canvassing nor delay the proclamation of the winner in the election. This rule is consistent with and complements the authority of the COMELEC under the Constitution to "enforce and administer all laws and

regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall" and its power to "decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections." We now go to the second issue. Although the COMELEC is clothed with jurisdiction over the subject matter and issue of SPC No. 98-143 and SPC No. 98-206, we find the exercise of its jurisdiction tainted with illegality. We hold that its order to set aside the proclamation of petitioner is invalid for having been rendered without due process of law. Procedural due process demands prior notice and hearing. The facts show that COMELEC set aside the proclamation of petitioner without the benefit of prior notice and hearing and it rendered the questioned order based solely on private respondent's allegations. Public respondent submits that procedural due process need not be observed in this case because it was merely exercising its administrative power to review, revise and reverse the actions of the board of canvassers. We cannot accept public respondent's argument. Taking cognizance of private respondent's petitions for annulment of petitioner's proclamation, COMELEC was not merely performing an administrative function. The administrative powers of the COMELEC include the power to determine the number and location of

polling places, appoint election officials and inspectors, conduct registration of voters, deputize law enforcement agencies and government instrumentalities to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections, register political parties, organizations or coalitions, accredit citizens' arms of the Commission, prosecute election offenses, and recommend to the President the removal of or imposition of any other disciplinary action upon any officer or employee it has deputized for violation or disregard of its directive, order or decision. In addition, the Commission also has direct control and supervision over all personnel involved in the conduct of election. However, the resolution of the adverse claims of private respondent and petitioner as regards the existence of a manifest error in the questioned certificate of canvass requires the COMELEC to act as an arbiter. It behooves the Commission to hear both parties to determine the veracity of their allegations and to decide whether the alleged error is a manifest error. Hence, the resolution of this issue calls for the exercise by the COMELEC of its quasi-judicial power. It has been said that where a power rests in judgment or discretion, so that it is of judicial nature or character, but does not involve the exercise of functions of a judge, or is conferred upon an officer other than a judicial officer, it is deemed quasijudicial.

The COMELEC therefore, acting as quasi-judicial tribunal, cannot ignore the requirements of procedural due process in resolving the petitions filed by private respondent. The COMELEC order dated June 2, 1998 in SPC No. 98-143 and SPC No. 98-206 is ANNULLED.
Philhealth vs. Chinese Gen. Hospital G.R. No. 163123, April 15, 2005 FACTS: Prior to the enactment of R.A. 7875, otherwise known as An Act Instituting a National Health Insurance Program for all Filipinos and Establishing the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation for the Purpose, Chinese General Hospital (CGH) had been an accredited health care provider under the Philippine Medical Care Commission (PMCC), more popularly known as Medicare. CGH filed its Medicare claims which PHILHEALTH, successor of the PMCC, only gave P 1, 365, 556.32 instead of P 8, 102, 782.10 for years 1989 to 1992. CGH again filed its claims for years 1998 to 1999, amounting to P 7, 554, 342.93 but was denied for being allegedly filed beyond the 60 day period allowed by the implementing rules and regulations. Thus, upon the review of the court, petitioner Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth) to pay the claims in the amount of P 14, 291, 568.71, principally on the ground of liberal application of the 60-day rule under Section 52 of RA 7875s Implementing Rules and Regulations. ISSUES:

What state policy is RA 7875 pursuing? In case of conflict between RA 7875 and Section 52 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations, which one shall prevail? RULING: The state policy adopted in RA 7875 sought to: a) provide all citizens of the Philippines with the mechanism to gain financial access to health services; b) create the National Health Insurance Program to serve as the means to help the people pay for the health services; c)prioritize and accelerate the provision of health services to all Filipinos, especially that segment of the population who cannot afford such services; and d) establish the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation that will administer the program at central and local levels. The court ruled that RA 7875 shows that the law itself does not provide for any specific period within which to file claims. It can safely be presumed that the period for filing was not per se the principal concern of the legislature. The fact is that it was not RA 7875 itself but Section 52 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations which established the 60-day cut-off for the filing of claims. While it is doctrinal in administrative law that the rules and regulations of administrative bodies interpreting the law they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law, these issuances are by no means iron-clad norms. Administrative bodies themselves can and have in fact bent the rules for reasons of public interest. Thus, RA 7875 prevails over Section 52 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations.