An exploration of a disagreement between two of the most significant thinkers of the 20th century

Martin Bubers Critique of Heideggers Being-with: Andrew Olesh Loyola College in Maryland

Undoubtedly Martin Heideggers Being and Time changed the face and future of philosophy even unto the present day. Heidegger proposes an exploration of the question of Being the like of which had not been considered in quite the same way in the entire history of philosophy. In this exploration of Being, Heidegger mentions Mitsein, or Being-with, a component of his philosophy with which Martin Buber, one of the most significant of Heideggers contemporaries, takes considerable issue. Perhaps it was because Heidegger was a Nazi and Buber a Jew, perhaps because they had the same first name, or maybe simply the traditional issue of ideological difference set them at odds. Whatever the reason, Bubers critique of Heidegger is one of the most comprehensive. He offers a compelling argument for the essence of man, but in the end he has not quite nailed Heidegger down on the issue of relation as the essence of Dasein. Buber was not able to refute Heidegger completely because he did not correctly interpret the way that Heidegger understood interpersonal relation. Heideggers conception of Being-with or Mitsein In Being and Time, Heidegger discusses how Dasein recognizes objects of consciousness in-the-world first according to two paradigms of presence at hand and readiness to hand. These paradigms describe the difference between things that the subject observes and then things that the subject uses as tools. However, after this discussion Heidegger moves into a special case of certain objects of consciousness in the world. He recognizes that Dasein can indeed distinguish between things and tools but also between these and Others, as they come to be called. Beginning from the perspective of Everydayness, which is characteristic of Heidegger, he

2 discusses how all three of these kinds of Being are encountered in the Everyday. However, Heidegger explains, The Others who are thus encountered in a ready-to-hand, environmental context of equipment, are not somehow added on in thought to some Thing which is proximally just present-at-hand.1 While Others are encountered in the same kind of everyday environment as tools and things by that Dasein which is in each case ones own,2 the kind of Being which belongs to the Dasein of Others, as we encounter it within-the-world, differs from readiness-tohand and presence-at-hand.3 So here is some kind of third type of Being that is unlike that of tools and things even though it is the same Dasein that frees them all, for which Heidegger thinks that therefore one would have to say that Dasein too is world.4 Now these Others cannot be understood like tools or things because they are like the very Dasein which frees them, in that they are there too, and there with it,5 which would imply a certain objectivity which is appropriate to use in relating to this Being. The with is especially significant, as Heidegger goes on to explain, in the case of Being with Others. First, he identifies just who these Others are in the sense of how they are to be understood. He writes that by Others we do not mean everyone else but me---those over against whom the I stands out. They are rather those from whom, for the most part, one does not distinguish oneself---those among whom one is too.6 Here, Heidegger wants to make clear that a difference or separation between the self and the Others is not nearly as important as the fact that they are here (Da) with us in what seems to be the sense of here besides us. Charmingly, the world has now become one shared. Other Dasein is here with us, and the with is something of the character of Dasein.7 From this point, Heidegger makes an important identification, which is, because of the with character of Dasein, whose Being is

3 Being-in-the-world, the world is always the one that I share with Others. The world of Dasein is a with-world. [And] Being-in is Being-with Others.8 The explanation here is momentous because it completely reorients the character of Dasein as Being-in-the-world as we have come to know it thus far. Due to the Dasein of Others, to Be-in is always to Be-with. As long as Dasein is in-the-world, it is with Others. This is Being-with is as essential and ontological as Being-in because they are synonymous. This Being-with Others defines the existence of Man. In Heideggers terms, now we know that for Dasein there is no Being without Being-in, and there is no Being-in without Being-with. But what does it mean exactly to be with Others? Is it the case that Dasein is there alongside in a completely objective, emotionless relationality to the rest of the world, or really there-in those meaningful kinds of relatedness that characterize the human existence, like friendship, hate, love, etc.? Martin Buber will critique Heidegger in favor of the latter position, and he will accuse Heidegger of missing entirely the essential relationality of human being. Bubers Critique of Heidegger Martin Buber wrote his careful critique of Heidegger in his What is Man? which was published in English in the volume entitled Between Man and Man. Buber criticizes Heidegger on ten points, the themes of which include the inter-personal relationship that Heidegger leaves somewhat undeveloped in his discussion of Being-with. The critique begins with Bubers thoughts on Heideggers actual task itself, which concerns his choice of beginning with Man in order to explore Being. Heidegger goes through such pains at the beginning of Being and Time to express his task in such a way that even a cursory reading of the initial chapters of Being and Time would yield that Heidegger seeks to work out an adequate way of forming9 the question of Being. He admits that if we are to

4 arrive at the basic concept of Beingwe need a clue that is concrete.10 So he chooses the one known entity for which its own Being is an issue, and this entity is the human. It is from here that Heidegger arrives at Dasein as the place from which he will begin his task. So Heideggers exploration of the question of Being will therefore be an exploration of the question of Man, which Buber identifies as the question addressed by anthropology. Even though Heidegger neither intends his philosophy to be nor wishes it to be understood as any kind of anthropology, Buber contensts that in philosophical fashion it draws upon concrete human life, which is the subject of philosophical anthropology.11 Bubers problem with Heidegger here is not just his perceived dishonesty with himself and the rest of the world but also Heideggers perspective of what Mans existence truly is. Buber writes, Heidegger abstracts from the reality of human life the categories which originate and are valid in the relation of the individual to what is not himself, and applies them to existence in the narrower sense, that is, to the relation of the individual to his own being.12 Buber sees Heidegger as limiting the human experience of truth as being disclosed only in the realm of the individuals relation to himself13 in a way that cheapens the human life. He says that Heideggers approach to the question of the Being of man or the understanding of Dasein disclose[s] a curious partial sphere of life, not a piece of the whole life as it is actually lived.14 For the first time, Buber identified the issue that will be the thrust of his argument, namely that Heideggers focus on understanding Dasein by exploring his own Being in relation to himself does not and cannot give an accurate picture of the human Being because the human experience is not limited only to the way that the self relates with the self. Buber also addresses the factor that Heideggers understanding of guilt plays. He writes that real guilt, according to Heidegger, consists in the fact that the existence itself is guilty.15

5 Existence is guilty because Dasein is not itself. And Dasein is not itself because Dasein is not aware of itself, that is, its existence. This would seem to be a good excuse to focus on the self as the center of existence, but this statement, for Buber, requires a certain qualification. For him, this centralization is one of Heideggers major mistakes because from Bubers perspective, the human existence is central, and there is more to the human existence than just the self. Heideggers philosophy misses the whole existence, to which relations to things other than the self comprise a major part. Buber explains that in order to understand our respective existences, we are not able to do this by isolating a part of life, the part where the existence is related to itself and to its own being, but by becoming aware of the whole life without reduction.16 We must take the whole human life into consideration if we are to understand what it is to Be. Buber expresses that an individuals relation to itself is only perhaps one part of an existence which is comprised of relations and that any individual, in fact, is essentially related to something other than himself.17 This idea that relations are of the essence of human Being is one that Buber will go on further to qualify and discuss, as he sees this as one of the areas in which Heidegger most seriously falls short. Buber finally moves into discussion of the human experience of Others. Buber explains that for Heidegger Others are objects of consciousness to which the relation is that of solicitude. Buber continues, Moreover, they are this by nature, existentially, even when he [the subject] passes them by and does not trouble about them. So any instance of other Dasein is by nature a case for which the individual is solicitous. Even if he treats a person as an object and does not care about him/her at all, this relation is one of solicitude simply because a person is a case of like Being and as such can never be related to simply as a thing or as a tool. Buber criticizes that Heideggers notion of solicitude cannot as such be an essential relation, since it

6 does not set a mans life in direct relation with the life of another.18 In order for relations to be essential, they must make up our essences, the very life material that makes us up. Again Buber, Such a relation can share in essential life only when it derives its significance from being the effect of a relation which is essential in itself.19 We have to be able to say that without relation X, I would not be who I am. Only those relations that relate two (or more) whole lives directly can ever rise to the level of essential. Buber clarifies, In its essence, solicitude does not come from mere co-existence with others, as Heidegger thinks, but from essential, direct, whole relations between man and man.20 Simply existing with others (and with here is taken to mean alongside) means more than recognizing that a certain object of our consciousness is Dasein and not something else. Essential relations require more than that. Such relation via the solicitude that Buber attributes to Heidegger can never become a part of us because we never really relate; we just identify in the sense of recognition, help at most, and move on. We never leave ourselves. Buber continues, In mere solicitude man remains essentially with himself, even if he is moved with extreme pity; in action and help he inclines towards the other, but the barriers of his own being are not thereby breached.21 From Bubers perspective, this is the only kind of relation that Heideggers solicitude provides for, and this he sees as extremely deficient. Buber, he [the individual] makes his assistance, not his self, accessible to the other; nor does he expect any real mutualityhe is concerned with the other, but he is not anxious for the other to be concerned with him.22 This idea of mutuality is key in Bubers own understanding of essential relations between persons. Not only is it possible for a self to care for and want the best for and even love another, but that same self can expect such things from the object to which it is

7 relating, because it, too, is also its own self. This mutuality is necessary in order that a relation to become part of the essence of a person. Buber further explains essential relations: In an essential relationthe barriers of the individual being are in fact breached and a new phenomenon appears which can appear only in this way: one life open to another.23 If the barriers of individual being were not breached or could never be breached, the essence could never change, for indeed Buber understands that with each essential relation the individual is further developed. In allowing essential relations, we are able to make relation with another person a part of ourselves such that one experiences the mystery of the other being in the mystery of ones own. The two participate in one anothers lives in very fact,ontically,24 and a kind of, even if just slightly, new and different Being is developed every time. The human could be said to mature or develop, but the point is that gaining an essential relation causes one to never be the same again. A relation is essential when one is not oneself without it. In this way, we can understand essential relations as a kind of transforming or transfiguring force in our lives that lead us along the way to real existence or completion. Concerning breaching ones Being, Buber points out that Heideggers philosophy has also lost touch with the possibility for what might be the most essential of relations, that to God, who is the Absolute Other who is always beyond Man and his existence. Buber places Heideggers position at the end of a tradition that has reached the conclusion (with Neitzsche) that God is dead. It is no wonder, then, that man perceives himself so tragically and in a very final sense alone. Buber simply follows the line of thinking in stating that apparently nothing more remains now to the solitary man but to seek an intimate communication with himself. This is the basic situation from which Heideggers philosophy arises.25 The point is that this fact of

8 the absence of God or an Absolute Other completely removes a possibility for relation that is characteristic of the Being of man. Where can be found a better opportunity to breach the barriers of existence than in relation to an Absolute Other? Buber indicates that he understands the meaning of human existence to lie in this transcendence: Human life possesses absolute meaning through transcending in practice its own conditioned nature, that is, through mans seeing that which he confronts, and with which he can enter into a real relation of being to being, as not less real than himself, and through taking it not less seriously than himself.26 In other words, human life has absolute meaning in a real transcendence of itself. A human must realize that everything that he encounters in-the-world is something which has real Being, just like his own in the sense that it is just as real as his own, and therefore he must take it not less seriously than himself because this is the only way to establish an essential relation of being to being, which will be, for Buber, paramount in any understanding of the human experience. Additionally, to have lost this sense of God might well be considered to have lost the chance for an ultimate transcendence of ones own Being. Buber then addresses that relation to self that he claims has taken such primacy in Heidegger to illiustrate some of the deficiencies in his thinking. He begins speaking in terms of the Absolute: The Absolute has its place in Heideggers philosophy only in the sphere to which the self penetrates in its relation to itself, that is, where the question about the entry into a connexion with it ceases to be asked.27 Far from even approaching conceptions of an Absolutely Transcendent God, Buber accuses Heidegger of turning a blind eye to this problem and instead substituting the selfs relation to essential selfness as the only absolute. This is Bubers major criticism restated, that Heideggers philosophy fails to breach the barriers of the self and to come out from ourselves to meet with essential otherness.28 Buber posits, rather,

9 that what is essential is otherness, and he does not even consider the relation to the self essential, for this relation, however, unlike the other [kinds] cannot be regarded as one that is real as such, since the necessary presupposition of a real duality is lacking.29 Otherness is necessary in order for any essential relation to be possible. Bubers evidence for this is the fact that every kind of essential relation has some kind of fruit that indicates its essential quality. He states, Every essentialrelation has reached its completion and transfiguration, that to things in art, that to men in love, that to the mystery [God] in religious manifestation, while mans relation to his own life and his own self has not reached, and obviously cannot reach, such a completion and transfiguration.30 This beautiful conclusion can be stated even more simply in that essential relation is possible with everything in the world except for the self because ones own Being is never truly Other. Perhaps this is why Daseins own Being is at issue for it; it cannot exactly relate to itself in light of all the other possibilities of relation because the relations of the essence of Dasein are relations to Others, not ones directed toward the self. Is this a legitimate critique of Heidegger? Does Buber correctly identify what Heidegger attempts to accomplish in his philosophy of Being? Is he really the intellectual equal fit to criticize the greatest minds in recent philosophy? Buber seems to have skipped over some important passages in order to make his points which, while compelling, do not correctly identify Heideggers position concerning relation to Others in-the-world. Some Objections to Buber A first objection could be to point out that Bubers accusing Heidegger of trying at anthropology falls into exactly the trap that Buber attests that Heidegger had himself set and fallen into. Anthropology cannot be understood as the proper place for a study of the Being of

10 man because it involves man studying or thinking about man, that is, himself. At some point, it would have to be understood as man studying himself, trying to force a relation to himself that Buber identifies as impossible. Therefore, it is proper that Heidegger not use such a discipline to study Being, even if it is human Being, because such an attempt at a relation to the self can never be a true one, according to Bubers own explanation. According to these terms, anthropology can never be a legitimate exploration of Being because mans study of himself will never form an essential relation to Being. For this reason, Buber cannot consider Heideggers task in Being and Time to be anthropology. Next, it seems that Buber has taken Heideggers philosophy too far without having understood it completely. Being-with must be of the essence of Dasein because without it any kind of relation to Others, even one of love, would not be possible, let alone essential itself. Being-with is not what Heidegger would call the relation between man and man; rather, it is the essential character of Dasein that makes such relations possible. Heidegger writes that Dasein as Being-with lets the Dasein of Others be encountered in its worldDasein-with characterizes the Dasein of Others to the extent that it is freed by its world for a Being-with.31 Being-with is that characteristic of Dasein that allows any kind of relation to Others to be possible. For Heidegger, there has to be Being-with before there can be any relation, and this general orientation towards Others is what Heidegger claims must be of the essence of Dasein because without it Bubers own philosophy could not be true. If Dasein existed in such a way that it were not essentially open to relation with other Dasein, it would be something other than Dasein. Furthermore, Heidegger allows for a situation of love to be possible, but because such relations are not necessarily of the essence of Dasein, he does not choose to explore these possibilities, as he says to describe these and classify them would take us beyond the limits of

11 this investigation.32 He begins by saying that Being with one another is based proximally and often exclusively upon what is a matter of common concern in such Being.33 That is, a relationship between two persons is based on something that both instances of Dasein care about. This could be some ideal, such as belonging to a political party, or working with someone on a common task; the important part is that the same object is of concern for both Dasein. What happens when the other Dasein becomes the issue of concern for each Dasein? A relationship of love or friendship would be based in the care of each Dasein for the other Dasein. Thus, for each Dasein, the good of the other Dasein becomes an issue of concern, and certainly we would call this none other than love. Here, the common issue for both instances of Dasein is their togetherness, their relationship. Heidegger says of two persons, When they devote themselves to the same affair in common, their doing so is determined by the manner in which their Dasein, each in its own way, has been taken hold of.34 In the first example, what has taken hold of each Dasein is the ideal or common task, but in the example of love, what has taken hold of each Dasein is the state of Being-with-one-another, which is only possible if each Dasein is concerned with the other one. Heidegger says that in this way they become authentically bound together, and this makes possible the right kind of objectivity, which frees the Other in his freedom for himself.35 Heideggers Dasein is not the closed system that Buber so confidently accuses him of creating. Quite the contrary, Being with Others belongs to the Being of Dasein, which is an issue for Dasein in its very Being. Thus as Being-with, Dasein is essentially for the sake of Others.36 Dasein is what it is so as to enter into relations with Others. This brings us back to Heideggers fundamental question about Daseins understanding of its own Being, which is our task here because we each are Dasein.

12 Because Daseins Being is Being-with, its understanding of Being already implies the understanding of Others. This understanding, like any understanding, is not an acquaintance derived from knowledge about them, but a primordially existential kind of Being, which, more than anything else, makes such knowledge and acquaintance possible. Knowing oneself is grounded in Being-with.37 Just as we cannot know ourselves without Being-with, we cannot enter into relationships with other Dasein without first understanding ourselves as being essentially with them in the world and that their Being in part makes up our Being. Because Dasein is for-the-sake-of, we are all necessarily here for each other, and not to form relations, even in the negative sense, would be contrary to our Being. One justified criticism against Heidegger might be that for the sake of word economy he did not extend the name of the kind of Being-with to include the Other at all times. Speaking in terms of intentionality, Being-with is always the same as Being-with-some-Other. Dasein in its Being-with is always with some other, even if it is more than one other. It follows then that our Being could be understood as Ourselves-Being-with-each-other. But perhaps the best understanding of the concept of Being-with came long before either Heidegger or Buber, even though they would both doubtless have heard of it. This instance occurs in the book of Isaiah, where the prophet foreshadows the Incarnation, in which God in the person of Christ assumes the human Being with us and for us, in order to Be-with and form a relation with the whole of humanity. He becomes Immanuel, God-with-us.38 Notes
Heidegger, Martin. trans. John MacQuarrie and Edward Robinson. Being and Time. HarperSanFrancisco (1962). p. 154. This work will be further referred to as Heidegger in the rest of the notes. 2 Ibid. 3 Heidegger 154. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid.
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Heidegger 24. Heidegger 63. 11 Buber, Martin. trans. Ronald Gregor Smith. Between Man and Man. Lund-Humphries: London. (1954). p. 164. Further referred to as Buber in the rest of the notes. 12 Buber 164-5. 13 Buber 165. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. 16 Buber 166. 17 Ibid. 18 Buber 169. 19 Ibid. 20 Buber 169. 21 Buber 170. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid. 25 Buber 167. 26 Ibid. 27 Buber 179. 28 Buber 179. 29 Buber 179-80. 30 Buber 180. 31 Heidegger 157. 32 Heidegger 159. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid. 36 Heidegger 160. 37 Ibid. 38 Is 7:14. The New American Bible. St. Joseph Edition. Catholic Book Publishing Co.: New York. (1992).
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Copyright April 2008 For presentation at the Thirteenth Annual SUNY Oneonta Undergraduate Philosophy Conference, Oneonta, New York