Appendix A AU/ACSC/7595/AY07

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE AIR UNIVERSITY

Back to the Future Americas Forgotten Lessons in Visual Reconnaissance

by Joseph W. Locke, Maj, USAF

A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements Advisor: Dr. James W. Forsyth

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama April 2007

Distribution A: Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited

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Disclaimer The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense. In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United States government.

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Abstract Americas experience in Vietnam provides many insights into tactical innovations that are directly applicable to current operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and future battlegrounds in the Global War on Terror (GWOT). The Vietnam experience, however, is littered with examples of high technology reconnaissance platforms that emerged, floundered, and died. Unlike the ill-suited technological solutions of the day, the Forward Air Controller (FAC) was a low-tech enigma that flourished in the Vietnam conflict. Lauded by the infantry and ridiculed by fighter jocks, FACs effectively bridged the gap between the ground and air war over South Vietnam like nothing seen since. Re-introducing a simple Forward Air Control aircraft into the Theater Air Control System will significantly enhance the Air Force contribution to military success in the Global War on Terrorism. The FACs ability to both live with the supported ground unit and utilize the aerial perspective to provide focused intelligence will be a force multiplier for the U.S. military in future low-intensity conflicts. Harnessing long loiter times and a broad field of view, FACs span of influence will increase to coincide with the ground units entire area of operations. FAC proximity to the local populace combined with one-year deployments would allow them to build the cultural awareness required to execute effective visual reconnaissance required to root out insurgents. The habitual knowledge of their area will be the crucial ingredient enabling FAC to simultaneously observe and evaluate subtle events to determine if they are normal or potential indicators of insurgent activity. Simple, reliable aircraft provide the best balance between cost and effectiveness by enabling FACs to forward base with minimal support while harnessing existing firepower to attack targets when needed. While this capability is directly applicable to the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, this will not be the end of their utility. Developing a standing forward air control capability to provide persistent visual reconnaissance is essential to future flexibility and success in the Global War on Terror.

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Table of Contents Disclaimer ................................................................................................................................................... i
Abstract...................................................................................................................................................... ii
Table of Contents ..................................................................................................................................... iii
Table of Figures........................................................................................................................................ iv
Introduction............................................................................................................................................... 1
Scope........................................................................................................................................................... 4
Evolution of the FAC Concept................................................................................................................. 5
FAC Organization..................................................................................................................................... 8
Visual Reconnaissance............................................................................................................................ 13
FAC Effectiveness and Results .............................................................................................................. 15
Capabilities, Limitations, and the Evolution of FAC Aircraft ........................................................... 20
Vietnam FAC Lessons Learned............................................................................................................. 23
Recommendations for the Future.......................................................................................................... 27
Bibliography ............................................................................................................................................ 31

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Table of Figures Figure 1 .................................................................................................................................................... 10
Figure 2 .................................................................................................................................................... 11
Figure 3 .................................................................................................................................................... 19

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Introduction Nearly six years after the invasion of Afghanistan, the Department of Defense is starting to realize counterinsurgency (COIN) requires a fundamentally different mindset than conventional military tasks. Insurgencies are by their very nature a personal struggle for the hearts and minds of the indigenous population. This is not to say that the military struggle is unimportant, rather it is the sideshow forcing residents to support one side or the other. Since the publics trust is the center of gravity, our entire effort must focus on community safety and government legitimacy. With personal, family, and community security at such a premium, harnessing the lessons of previous counterinsurgency efforts is essential to finding a road to success in Iraq and Afghanistan. Having borne the lions share of the effort in the Global War on Terror (GWOT), the U.S. Army and Marines are leading the push to rediscover Americas hard fought lessons of counterinsurgency. Correctly, the new Army Field Manual 3-24 envisions a ground centric focus for combating an insurgency and places airpower in a distinctively supporting role. It suggests airpower will have the greatest effect when used for strike, reconnaissance, and airlift.1 The Air Force, however, has remained largely aloof to the fundamentally different effects required for counterinsurgency operations. As a result, Air Force methodologies have remained strikingly similar to conventional operations in Kosovo or even Desert Storm. Fighters and bombers remain on station to kill targets, ISR assets orbit the battlefield focusing on high value targets or assessing battle damage, and airlift hauls men and material from one place to another. Effort, however, is not the key to success. Harnessing airpowers strengths for maximum effect against an irregular enemy will make the difference between victory and defeat. Thankfully, the tactical airlift mission fits naturally into counterinsurgency operations. As a result, C-130s and C-17s are working overtime to support the requirements of the Global War on Terror. In an effort to avoid the hazards posed by roadside bombs and incessant insurgent ambushes,

AU/ACSC/7595/AY07 commanders maximize the movement of supplies to forward operating bases using tactical airlift instead of the traditional surface convoys. This solution eliminates a lucrative target for insurgent attacks and forces them to alter their focus away from the vulnerable supply fleet. Other technological innovations, such as the joint precision airdrop system, have allowed the re-supply of small outposts without airfields by GPS guided parachutes. The monumental airlift successes supporting ground forces are only one part of a larger Air Force contribution. While not an Air Force doctrinal term, strike is the essence of what the combat arm of the Air Forces has focused upon since the inception of American airpower in World War I. Decades of visionary thought, however, did not predict the capabilities of our modern Air Force. With todays advances in technology, aircraft inflict discrete destruction against pinpoint targets at the time and place of our choosing. Weapons are even becoming so precise that smaller weapons are being used in an effort to decrease collateral damage. Some munitions even contain no explosive charges, relying instead on kinetic energy to kill their target. Despite the seemingly omnipotent ability of U.S. aircraft to hit virtually any target with little prior planning, the enemys ability to use propaganda and apparent civilian casualties can transform a rapid tactical victory into a strategic defeat. As a result, airpowers other inherent strengths must be harnessed to tip the war in our favor. While complete situational awareness will never be a reality on the battlefield, detailed intelligence can focus military operations on the most significant targets. The dispersed nature of an insurgency drives the focus of intelligence collection towards human sources combined and verified with other means. Cold war technologies, like JSTARS (Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System), worked extremely well against Saadams Republican Guard, but are struggling to find a niche in the current insurgency fight. Conversely, the Predator unmanned aerial system (UAS) is so vital for real-time video for immediate support of current operations that it can no longer spend time for its designed reconnaissance mission. Finally, with so little doctrinal emphasis on reconnaissance virtually 2

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all Air Force intelligence assets are low density, high demand. As a result, reconnaissance assets are sparingly parceled out to commanders to meet only the most critical needs. In an effort to augment the limited intelligence resources, fighters fill their time in an alternate role, known as non-traditional ISR. Using the latest targeting pod (TGP) technology, fighter crews attempt to locate improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or enemy activity by comparing their sensor footage with maps and satellite imagery. While the intention is great, there are huge problems that thwart even the most proficient pilots and weapons system operators. First, much like the Predator, the field of view of the targeting pod is narrow. Similar to a set of binoculars, the magnification provided aids in determining details about a specific point. This is a critical capability in the fleeting seconds before weapons release to ensure the surgical strike is in fact on the correct target. The same capability, however, poses a significant challenge when covering a large area to find the proverbial needle in a haystack. Adding to the difficulty, aircrews are tasked to areas across the AOR based on limited assets and a gigantic area to cover. Predictably, they usually find nothing. In the few occasions when anomalies are found, they are passed through intelligence channels and reach ground commanders too late to make a difference. In short, the Air Force reconnaissance efforts are focusing on working harder instead of smarter. Despite the obvious lack of tactical reconnaissance, finding a solution has remained on the back burner. The rapid proliferation of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) across the service components is evidence enough that the Air Force is not supplying enough aerial reconnaissance to support surface forces. The limited steps forward are focused entirely on technological solutions to gather more information for the Joint Force Commander and his staff. In order for the Air Force to become more effective in the counterinsurgency fight, successful methods of tactical reconnaissance must be established. They must directly provide ground forces with persistent, detailed, and tailored aerial

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reconnaissance dedicated to the individual ground commanders objectives and intent. This capability, however, is not new to COIN doctrine, nor is it revolutionary to the American military. Americas experience in Vietnam provides many insights into successful tactical innovations that are directly applicable to current operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and future battlegrounds in the Global War on Terror. The Vietnam experience, however, is littered with examples of high technology reconnaissance platforms that emerged, floundered, and died. Unlike the ill-suited technological solutions of the day, the Forward Air Controller (FAC) was a low-tech enigma that flourished in the Vietnam conflict. Lauded by the infantry and ridiculed by fighter jocks, FACs effectively bridged the gap between the ground and air war over South Vietnam like nothing seen since. Re-introducing a simple Forward Air Control aircraft into the Theater Air Control System will significantly enhance the Air Force contribution to military success in the Global War on Terrorism. Scope This paper will focus on the counterinsurgency effort of U.S Air Force and Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) FACs in South Vietnam between 1964 and 1969. Limiting its scope will serve several purposes. First by focusing on the conflict in South Vietnam, the scope of the conflict will be consistent with an insurgency instead of the larger conventional air war that raged in North Vietnam. This is not to suggest that North Vietnamese Army (NVA) troops never fought in South Vietnam, but rather their tactics and support mirrored insurgent methods until late in the war. Additionally, the anti-aircraft weapons used against American aircraft in the south were similar to those currently available to insurgents in the GWOT. Second, the missions, tactics, and manning of USAF and VNAF FACs were similar enough to use as a single entity for this analysis. The largest difference stemmed their area of responsibility. USAF, or Free World FACs, were attached directly to coalition ground units while VNAF FACs, also referred to as Sector FACs, were assigned specific geographic areas and supported

AU/ACSC/7595/AY07 local government officials.2 While their focus was slightly different, the specific elements of their tactical missions and reporting structure were virtually identical. The period of 1964-1969 was chosen to focus military structures, manning, and mindset as closely as possible to current GWOT realities and an American-centric coalition doctrine. Prior to 1964, U.S. military involvement was limited to advisors and covert units supporting South Vietnam. The lack of large American fielded forces during that time mitigates the current realities of Iraq and Afghanistan. While those early methods offer many lessons that could and should be harnessed in future conflicts, they are disconnected from todays situation and are therefore beyond the scope of this paper. Finally, after 1969 Vietnamization was in full swing, which resulted in structures evolving away from American primacy and toward South Vietnamese independent operations. Despite the obvious parallels with todays political debate over Iraq, the evolution of American tactics in South Vietnam atrophied significantly with the implementation of Vietnamization. The change in objective from winning the war to returning with honor resulted in tactical changes beyond the scope of this analysis. Evolution of the FAC Concept The concept of Forward Air Control was not new to the American military in Vietnam. In fact, its roots can be traced back to the earliest days of aviation and the aerial spotters of World War I. In those days, spotter aircraft circumvented gravitys barriers and allowed militaries to observe the movements of enemy troops and adjust artillery fire. By World War II, their role on the battlefield had fundamentally changed. With increasing weapons payloads, airpower eclipsed artillery as the preeminent source of firepower in war. Airpowers increasing range also allowed it to affect the enemy at the time and location of our choosing across the theater of operations. Additionally, the inherent speed and flexibility of fighter-bombers allowed them to keep pace with the rapid advances of armored units. The advantages of Close Air Support (CAS) however, did not come without a price.

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Rapid ground advances and the fog of war combined with the relative inaccuracy of World War II bombs created several early incidents of fratricide that decreased or negated the advantages airpower brought to the table. Realizing the advantages and inherent risks of CAS, visionaries such as Brigadier General Elwood Pete Quesada developed the basic framework to control and employ airpower in close proximity to ground troops. Major innovations like Air Liaison Officers stationed with ground commanders, ensured aircraft sorties focused on decisive points.3 Combining this synchronization with direct radio contact between pilots and ground-based forward air controllers produced a system that generated broad effects and yet could focus on a specific enemy tank when needed. This revolutionary capability had decisive consequences at the company and platoon level.4 Although there were no designated airborne FACs during World War II, dedicated tactical reconnaissance units worked in front of advancing troops. These assets conducted systematic visual reconnaissance (VR) locating targets for artillery strikes. If significant targets were located outside of artillery range, tactical reconnaissance aircraft coordinated attacks of opportunity and led strike aircraft to the objective.5 The tactical efficiency of harnessing airpowers potential in the close ground battle, however, did not survive the budget crunch of post-war demobilization. When the Korean War kicked off on 25 June 1950, the coordination and synchronization structures that allowed the Army and Air Force to effectively employ CAS during World War II no longer existed. As a result, many early tactical opportunities in Korea were missed while the Army and Air Force relearned how to work together. After discovering that radio jeeps developed in World War II were unable to reach useful locations in Koreas rugged terrain and persistent enemy fire, the ground based FACs of the Far East Air Forces (FEAF) attempted to take their mission into the air. 9 July 1950 saw the first planned use of American airborne FACs using borrowed U.S. Army L-5G liaison aircraft with modified radios to allow both air-to-air and air-to-ground communications. When accolades began pouring in from the 24th Infantry Division and the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army, the Air Force began 6

AU/ACSC/7595/AY07 pressing T-6 Mosquito aircraft in the FAC mission. The T-6s short takeoff and landing capability coupled with its low stall speed ensured FACs could operate directly at the front and get a good view of the battlefield. Their speed and agility also made them survivable despite the heavy anti-aircraft artillery and North Korean fighters near the front.6 While the Mosquitoes primary mission was controlling high performance aircraft for CAS, their special missions included visual reconnaissance, convoy escort, and distributing leaflets. Their effectiveness in the reconnaissance role was so decisive that within five months after their first missions, ground commanders insisted upon continuous FAC coverage from sunrise to sunset in front of their lines.7 The airborne perspective also enhanced the effectiveness of forward air controllers by allowing them to locate and attack enemy units beyond the visual range of ground troops. The Mosquito FACs were so effective at finding and engaging North Korean units that they controlled 93 percent of all CAS strikes in the first 18 months of the Korean conflict.8 Undoubtedly, the focused application of airpower before direct contact with ground forces reduced the ferocity of the North Korean and Chinese opposition. In spite of their stellar performance, FAC personnel and equipment again fell victim to the post war drawdown. Despite the lack of funds, the USAF established the Air Ground Operations School (AGOS) to formalize the methodology and instruction for its Forward Air Controllers. FAC airframes, however, were eliminated between 1954 and 1962 until U.S. participation in Vietnam again forced the Air Force to refocus on close air support. Starting afresh with AGOS institutional knowledge, a new cadre of FACs attempted to make a difference in South Vietnam. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, covert efforts inside Vietnam focused on helping the VNAF to become more effective. Relying on simple aircraft, such as T-28s, C-47, and B-26s, a covert unit referred to as Jungle Jim quietly applied low tech, rugged aircraft to help stem the tide of the Viet Cong insurgency.9 The first VNAF liaison squadron began to operate the O-1A as early as 1957 with initial duties that included artillery spotting, 7

AU/ACSC/7595/AY07 courier service, and border patrol. By 1962, with a full compliment of USAF advisors that role had significantly evolved to include airborne control of fighter strikes, visual and photographic reconnaissance, and aerial liaison service with the South Vietnamese Army.10 Hamstrung by tenuous rules of engagement and a limited number of aircraft, Jungle Jim was an insufficient force to produce significant results, but it proved successful at refining tactics for COIN. The role of the O-1 and the FAC, however, was set for the remainder of the war. With the deployment of U.S. Air Force F-100s, F-102s, and B-57s in August 1964, the role of the forward air controller took on a completely new meaning.11 Initially, American FACs attempted to operate from the ground in accordance with their training and the inter-service agreements of the time. Almost immediately, they realized that, much like Korea, their jeeps would be inadequate for the task. FACs were faced with a problem that required out of the box thinking. Their limited numbers did not allow FACs to operate with every unit where their ability to control CAS was needed. Additionally, the terrain was so problematic that even being close to the battle could not provide sufficient situational awareness to confidently employ ordnance in close proximity to friendly troops.12 The dense jungle, with visibility as low as 5 feet, required most patrols to proceed on foot.13 In a joint effort to enhance combat effectiveness, FACs coordinated to use U.S. Army L-19 liaison aircraft to increase their visibility and ability to help the dispersed small units. Their success eventually led to the Air Force purchasing the L-19 and designating it as the O-1 Birddog FAC aircraft in 1963.14 FAC Organization The mobility of the airborne FAC was only one small part of a larger system that made the tactical application of airpower lethal in Vietnam. The intimate knowledge of the ground scheme of maneuver and a dedicated process to bring weapons to the target was equally significant. Two parallel organizations existed to control tactical air operations against the Viet Cong and NVA within South

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Vietnam: Free World FACs worked in direct support of coalition fielded ground forces and Sector FACs performed Strike Control and Reconnaissance (SCAR) missions away from friendly troops.15 The 504th Tactical Air Support Group (TASG) was the single organization that controlled U.S. Tactical Air Control Parties (TACP) across South Vietnam, working both the CAS and SCAR missions. It was an immense organization, authorized 3,422 personnel, supporting operations at 6 Field/Corps Headquarters, 20 Divisions, 34 Brigades, 43 Provinces, 119 Battalions, and 63 Special Forces Camps (See Figure 1).16 The task of supplying and controlling such a diverse and geographically dispersed organization presented a significant challenge. However, providing a coherent method of requesting and coordinating the air effort would require most of the time and energy. The 7th Air Force Commanders Tactical Air Coordination Center, forerunner of todays Air Operations Center, orchestrated the daily allocation and tasking of tactical combat sorties across South Vietnam. The 504th TASG provided a Direct Air Support Center (DASC), the predecessor of todays Air Support Operations Center (ASOC), for each Corps or Field Army to choreograph the continuous flow of aircraft for CAS, tactical air reconnaissance, and tactical airlift in support of the ground commanders needs. The DASC possessed a robust communications structure that allowed continuous communications between TACPs, aircraft in flight, and other Theater Air Control System (TACS) elements.17 Below the DASC, a variable hierarchy was required to incorporate conventional, special operations and provincial requests for air support within the corps area of operations (See Figure 2). Tactical Air Control Parties were tailored specifically to meet the needs of each successive echelon to ensure both the liaison and control missions were met.

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Figure 118

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Figure 219

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The Air Liaison Officer (ALO) was primarily responsible for advising the Army commander on the capabilities, limitations, and employment of airpower. Additionally, the ALO commanded the TACP and managed local flying operations.20 Finally, the ALO maintained FAC currency, both on the ground and in the air, and could therefore control strikes as conditions required to support the ground commander. The remaining personnel of the TACP adjusted to fit the necessities of the supported unit. Often it included an appropriate number of FACs, enlisted ROMADs (Radio Maintainer, Operator, and Drivers), and occasionally a limited number of crew chiefs to perform basic maintenance on assigned aircraft. Typically, the brigade was the lowest echelon assigned a TACP, but FACs occasionally deployed for patrols at the battalion level or below. This level of fidelity was essential in order to gain a better perspective on the ground picture and the methods and constraints of maneuver. The deeper understanding carried over to FAC effectiveness in the air as indicated by Capt James A. Anderson, FAC with the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, After my six days, Capt Donald Washburn relieved me on station. Shortly thereafter, I was in the air in an O-1 as a FAC. My six-day experience on the ground with the Control Element of the Brigade and Battalions was valuable to me as I did the actual strike controlling. I knew the problems of the battalions intimately and I hope I communicated the urgency of the situation to the strike pilots.21 Capt Andersons experience did more than simply allow him to bond with his Army counterparts and understand the mission. His newfound perspective also ensured that his efforts in the air were truly focused on lending relevant help to the troops on the ground. Once back in the air, FACs repeatedly delivered precise support by escorting fighters directly to the critical point on the battlefield. One battalion commander reported, TACAIR is often looked upon as the panacea after the tactical situation has already become hopeless. With a little imagination and ingenuity, it can be the infantrymans Ace-in-the-Hole. It is the Tactical Arm that tips the scales of battle heavily in favor of the US combat soldier and should so be employed.22 The resulting trust 12

AU/ACSC/7595/AY07 established at the tactical level between the attached TACP and the ground unit resulted in the synergistic integration of airpower that allowed ground units to successfully carryout their mission. Visual Reconnaissance Much like in the Korean conflict, the FACs role was deeper than simply providing extra firepower for close ground combat. Visual reconnaissance in Vietnam became an essential part of the FACs mission that required dedication, training, persistence, and experience. With the electronic revolution in full swing, Vietnam witnessed several innovations in reconnaissance technology. Traditional methods like fighters modified with cameras transformed into side-looking airborne radar, infrared imaging, and even satellite images that provided new and exciting methods of collecting information on enemy activity. Unfortunately, both the terrain and enemy insurgent tactics made it difficult to detect enemy concentrations by these technological means. Some success was realized using infrared sensors to detect enemy campfires, but they were easily countered. Additionally, images were often processed too late to be of immediate significance. Unlike the technological innovations of the day, daily visual reconnaissance by Air Force and VNAF O-1 pilots proved to be both reliable and responsive. MACV (Military Assistance Command Vietnam) formalized the visual reconnaissance process on 2 June 1965 by issuing directive 381-1. The program codified FAC visual reconnaissance activities and attempted to coordinate not only USAF and VNAF activities, but also U.S. Army L-19/O-1 reconnaissance activity into a coherent web across South Vietnam.23 Covering nearly 66,000 square miles of terrain, visual reconnaissance activities were divided into 214 sectors, roughly correlating to established provincial boundaries and ground unit areas of operations. The sectors were then subdivided into search areas requiring approximately 2 hours for a systematic search.24 These boundaries allowed pilots to become intimately familiar with their assigned area of operations (AO). This habitual

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AU/ACSC/7595/AY07 knowledge of their respective AO became the crucial ingredient in the success of the visual reconnaissance program. Most accounts suggest that a new pilot required a minimum of one to two months flying missions in a specific AO to become truly productive. Col Whitehouse, after returning from his ALO tour in Vietnam, went even further by suggesting that even moving an experienced pilot to a new AO reduced his effectiveness for several weeks until he could acquire a feel for the specific environment25 Using their familiarity, FACs operated according to the priorities combining MACV Directive 95-11 (general priorities for O-1 and O-2 aircraft) and 381-1(visual reconnaissance): 1. Quick response missions necessary to tactical success at the sector level 2. Air strike control 3. Artillery and naval gunfire adjustment 4. Convoy/ship escort 5. Visual reconnaissance and surveillance a. FAC missions directly supporting ground or air operations. b. Daily surveillance of all areas of known Viet Cong activity and critical terrain such as national borders. c. Twice daily sampling of other areas 6. Radio Relay 7. Others With these priorities in mind, scheduling of assigned sectors for FAC visual reconnaissance missions was handled by the division ALO or below. Often VR missions were executed either before or after scheduled strike missions to maximize the efficiency of every sortie. Their effects were so highly regarded by ground units that 85% of O-1 and O-2 sorties were employed for FAC or VR missions at the expense of artillery adjustment and convoy escort. The programs decentralized nature provided great flexibility to meet ground commander needs at the tactical level. 26 This same flexibility led to some inefficiency as some sectors received repeated coverage, while others were potentially left neglected. While this apparent neglect may seem a significant shortcoming 14

AU/ACSC/7595/AY07 of the decentralized system, further analysis reveals the flexibility was necessary for the local counterinsurgency effort. The close association of the TACP with the ground units allowed sorties to be focused at critical points in the tactical environment. Had a larger institution centrally coordinated the requirements, the system would have suffered from the unnecessary dilution of effort simply to cover sectors on a map. Instead, decentralized control and execution allowed tactical commanders to make timely decisions about the location and tasking for their resources to match the local intelligence picture. Even more vital to mission success was the FACs detailed understanding of his environment and the subtleties that could indicate the presence of enemy forces. The 21st Tactical Air Support Squadrons forward air control manual reveals the subtleties FACs dealt with to locate enemy forces in Vietnams dense foliage. Not only does the manual recommend an in-depth study of the terrain and most current intelligence before launching on a mission, but it also emphasizes the importance of recognizing habit patterns of the local populace in order to detect subtle changes that could be indicators of activity. Social routines, harvesting and agricultural practices, and daily changes in dust from dry roads were all potential indications to focus the reconnaissance effort toward enemy concentrations.27 With nothing more than topographic maps of the area, FACs recorded their findings for debrief after the mission. Once back in the Army command post, intelligence personnel then collected and introduced the data into the traditional army and air force intelligence networks for further analysis. These consolidated observations developed patterns of potential enemy activity for further investigation. FAC Effectiveness and Results With the intelligence analysis complete, ground commanders then developed a plan of attack. Realizing his FAC had an unequaled feel for his AO; Battalion Commanders like LTC William Miller regularly used their knowledge and insight during mission analysis. I would say the FAC had the AO memorized better than anybody else. He knew that this stream crossing was a certain coordinate, he

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knew that this trail junction was a certain coordinate28 This level of detail was essential for accurate planning of large ground operations. Additionally, the trust between FAC and the ground commander ensured the synergistic coordination of ground and air capabilities during execution. While some instances required large conventional forces and the requisite close air support, many situations were best handled by airpower alone. In these instances, FACs were sent to specific locations of postulated enemy activity. Target coordinates often had significant errors that made the FACs job of finding a valid target all the more difficult. A comprehensive Air Force study of tactical airpower in Vietnam concluded that over 70 percent of the target coordinates for FAC investigation had at least 100 meters of target location error.29 Additionally, some target positions were completely wrong due to inaccurate navigation or misinterpreting terrain features. Although a known problem, little could be done to increase the accuracy of manual map and compass target location in Vietnams dense jungles. Unfortunately, these errors ensured FACs expended significant effort with little or no chance of finding their intended target. The triple canopy jungle and deep elephant grass added an additional level of difficulty, especially once the Viet Cong and NVA made a concerted effort to conceal and camouflage their assets. Enemy troops wisely became weary of any approaching aircraft and used a variety of methods to hide their position. In these instances, subtle indications of abnormality proved to be the deciding factor that allowed FACs to locate enemy forces. In one area, a fleeting wisp of smoke would indicate a recently doused cooking fire. In another area, obvious agricultural activity would appear normal without FAC knowledge that the adjacent village had been abandoned for the last 3 months.30 The observation of subtleties combined with current intelligence often proved to be the difference that allowed FACs to positively identify 40% of their tasked targets, which often included imprecise descriptions as Known Enemy Location.31 Obviously, 40% is a remarkable statistic given the difficult terrain and a mobile, elusive enemy. 16

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In addition to the FACs capability to confirm enemy troop locations derived from the synthesis of intelligence data, their ability to locate enemy forces during the mission was remarkable. In a sixtyday period between 29 May and 30 July 1968, the 20th TASS coordinated 1,128 O-1 and O-2 visual reconnaissance missions that produced 306 significant sightings. These sightings in support of I Corps were so significant they generated 1,186 tactical air sorties for immediate attacks.32 The tasking of an average of 18.8 sorties per day in the I Corps sector for visual reconnaissance netted 5.1 additional enemy targets. Regardless of the types of targets, it is difficult to argue against any reconnaissance platform capable enough to generate an additional 150 targets per month for a Corps Commander. Even against small targets, repeated harassment and an occasional significant strike took its toll on enemy resolve. With the target positively identified, the FAC started the coordination process for an air strike. The first step in the process included contacting the ground commander to ensure friendly deconfliction and the current commanders intent. Rules of engagement also required Vietnamese Province Chief approval to strike targets that were not actively engaging coalition forces.33 Once both the military and local political leadership approved the strike, the FAC coordinated with his DASC for air assets. The ASOC either scrambled ground alert fighters at a nearby base or diverted airborne assets from preplanned targets of lesser importance. This procedure proved extremely successful at providing timely and sufficient air support across the spectrum of insurgent targets. Responsiveness, however, is always a point of contention based on the perspective of the individual. Airborne alert aircraft generally have the fastest response times, but expend huge amounts of resources for limited usage. Ground alert aircraft ensure aircraft fuel and maintenance are generated to support only validated requests, but this system adds critical minutes to immediate requests for airpower when troops are in close contact with enemy forces. In an effort to minimize the response times and

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AU/ACSC/7595/AY07 maximize efficiency, the USAF developed a system of distributed fighter bases throughout South Vietnam with a constant ground alert posture. In a detailed analysis of ground alert CAS missions, 1795 scrambles were analyzed for timing, delays, and efficiency over the summer of 1969. Major findings indicated that ground alert scrambles resulted in median response times of 40 minutes or less from the request to bombs on target with times ranging between 20 and 80 minutes.34 The details of the report, however, highlight both the efficiency and limitations of the system. The study identified DASC coordination (median 3 minutes) and FAC coordination (median 5.5 minutes) as reasonably constant.35 A variety of delays, including FAC arrival, weather, lack of clearance, communication difficulties, and Army coordination problems all played some part in the immediate execution of the mission, but only added an average of 3.6 minutes to the FAC coordination time. The three previous factors culminate in a total of 11.1 minutes and should be relatively constant regardless of the alert posture of the aircraft. The remaining 28.9 minutes is accounted for by a combination of scramble and flight time to the target. Scramble median times ranged from 9.4 to 13.8 minutes. The timing variance was attributed primarily to base infrastructure characteristics such as proximity of alert facilities, aircraft alert pads and the runway as well as base loading and air traffic density.36 The base alert posture or the type of aircraft (F-100, F-4, or AT-37) could also have affected the timing, but was not cited in the report. By far the most significant amount of time identified in the study was the flight time to the rendezvous point with the FAC (See Figure 3). The study indicated a median time of 15 minutes but identified 5% of flights with flight times greater than 25 minutes. Flight times over 15 minutes usually resulted from either an indirect routing due to adverse weather, or the dispatch of fighters from bases outside of their 15-minute flight radius. These dispatch related issues were occasionally necessary to ensure proper ordnance for a specific target or because no aircraft were available at the nearest base.37

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Figure 338

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The timeliness of the system is of the utmost relevance to the ground forces needing additional firepower and every minute is significant. On the other hand, flying untasked missions significantly affects the logistics picture and potentially decreases the available sorties for other important missions. Striking a balance is essential to ensure the effective use of limited resources without adversely affecting the trust between the ground and air components. Realizing the need to shorten the response time, the Air Force had two potential options: either launch airborne alert aircraft for each sector or develop an armed FAC aircraft capable of employing ordnance until fighters arrived. Unable to significantly shorten ground alert response timing and unwilling to dedicate additional fighters for sorties without targets, the Air Force committed itself to the armed FAC concept. Capabilities, Limitations, and the Evolution of FAC Aircraft Three aircraft provided the forward air controller duties in South Vietnam: O-1, O-2, and the OV-10.39 Each aircraft had specific strengths and weaknesses that affected its use on the battlefield. All three types provided long on station times and stable platforms that allowed pilots and observers to identify potential targets on the ground. Each successive aircraft improved upon some of the shortcomings of its predecessor, but like most challenges in aviation, improvement did not come without a price. The performance tradeoffs combined with fiscal realities meant that despite the introduction of the OV-10 in 1968, the O-1 continued to serve through the end of the conflict. Highlighting the pros and cons of each aircraft will be useful to suggest an appropriate balance of capability for a future Air Force COIN aircraft. The O-1 was a civilian design by Cessna modified to enhance its capability in military operations. The O-1s small size, extreme simplicity, excellent ground visibility due to its high wing and narrow cockpit, combined with proven technology were its strongest suits. It had a cruise speed of about 100 knots and a range of 530 nautical miles. Most significantly, the O-1, with takeoff and landing rolls of

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600 feet, could operate easily from a simple grass strip.40 This capability meant that the O-1 could be forward based with little effort or preparation. Additionally, the O-1 was so reliable it averaged less than 1 hour of maintenance per hour of flight and could often operate for weeks without anything except fuel and oil. This rugged independence allowed the FAC to fuel and go without the need for a crew chief at austere locations. Despite its strengths, the O-1 had two severe weaknesses. First, it was equipped with a spartan navigation and communications system. This limited its ability to fly in adverse weather conditions, and the O-1 often had difficulty communicating efficiently with all of the units required to synchronize the mission. Second, it was plagued by its inability to protect itself.41 Its poor rate of climb and slow speed often provided the enemy anti-aircraft artillery an easy target. Realizing the shortcomings of the O-1, the USAF decided to develop the O-2, as an interim FAC aircraft, to fill the gap until the eventual development and arrival of the OV-10. The O-2 arrived on the scene as early as 1967 to address some of the O-1s weaknesses. It had increased speed (150 knots), double the rate of climb, a robust communications and navigation system, target marking capability, and twin-engine reliability. The additional systems were a definite step in the right direction, but they came at a price. The O-2s side-by-side seating resulted in less visibility than its predecessor, which decreased its effectiveness on solo visual reconnaissance missions. Additionally the O-2s robust avionics and radios, weak landing gear, and rear propeller prevented it from operating on short and unimproved airfields.42 These restrictions markedly decreased the FACs ability to liaise with ground units and the effectiveness of the visual reconnaissance mission. Finally, despite the O-2s higher performance and assumed twin-engine reliability, the O-2 was not rugged enough to handle battle damage. As a result, the O-2 loss rate was nearly twice the O-1 in 1967 and 1968.43 Luckily, the introduction of the OV-10 was less than 2 years away.

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AU/ACSC/7595/AY07 The introduction of the OV-10 to the theater in July of 1968 represented the pinnacle of technology in forward air control aircraft in Vietnam. The advantages of the OV-10 were a quantum leap above either the O-1 or the O-2. OV-10 capabilities included: 1. Excellent short take off and landing performance (takeoff 870 feet/land 500 feet) 2. 328 pounds of armor plating and ejection seats to protect the pilot and observer 3. Increased airspeed (dive @ 400 kts, cruise @ 150-180 kts) 4. Cargo bay with 3000lb load capacity (capable of delivering paratroopers) 5. Significant armament (4 M-60 machine guns and 5 stations for rockets, napalm, or CBU) 6. Self sealing fuel tanks 7. Smoke generating capability to assist in rendezvous with fighters44 These significant advantages ensured the OV-10s endearment by its pilots and the troops on the ground. With its combined ability to professionally execute the visual reconnaissance mission as well as employ ordnance, the OV-10 was able to significantly decrease response times for critical troops in contact situations. On several occasions, it was able to respond from a VR mission and employ ordnance to support ambushed ground forces in less than 5 minutes.45 From a forward air controller perspective the OV-10 had few weaknesses for complaint. Logistically, however, the OV-10 represented a significant increase in the level of required support. Its systems no longer were simple enough for a pilot to care for himself. Additionally, the ordnance used by the OV-10 needed to be stored, prepared, and loaded. Finally, the consumption of fuel reached an entirely new level. For example, the O-1 total fuel load was 42 gallons of aviation gasoline. This amount of fuel could easily be delivered and stored with the normal logistics train required to sustain the army post. The OV-10s turboprop engines, on the other hand, could consume nearly 400 gallons of JP-4 in the same sortie duration.46 In essence, the performance of the OV-10 required a more traditional Air Force footprint to operate, despite its ability to takeoff and land at austere locations. These additional considerations, while not prohibitive, decreased the flexibility of the OV-10 to work from nearly any location without significant planning like its predecessor the O-1. 22

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Vietnam FAC Lessons Learned At the core of the lessons learned to improve FAC efficiency in South Vietnam three main points consistently float to the top. First, FACs needed to be intimately familiar with the current position of troops on the ground and have a detailed understanding of the ground commanders needs and intent. This familiarity requires a significant investment of time and cannot be achieved without collating with the ground unit. Second, close air support must respond rapidly to ground commander requests. Timeliness can be the difference between life and death during an ambush, but dedicating enough air assets to respond immediately over a large geographic area can become untenable. Unfortunately, timeliness will be the measure that can strengthen or destroy the ground commanders trust in the air arm. Finally, persistent visual reconnaissance is an essential part of the counterinsurgency fight, requiring months of constant observation to become successful. FACs integrating current intelligence with a detailed familiarity of the local environment was one of the few tactically successful ways to root out enemy activity during Vietnam despite the difficult terrain and vegetation. On the first point, the Air Force preaches this party line by requiring FACs to have a habitual working relationship with Army units, but only enacts it in a limited sense. Ground FACs are still assigned to Army posts and maintain a daily interaction during war and peace, but their manning has been insufficient to meet wartime requirements. This trend has reversed in the last couple of years, but the time required to fully train ground FACs has prevented any immediate relief. Air FACs, however, are rarely located in any proximity to Army posts let alone aligned with specific units for training. Administratively, the air request system used in Vietnam survived the interwar period virtually unscathed. As noted earlier in this paper, many of the names have changed, but the mission of liaison and close air support is alive and well in todays Theater Air Control System. Except for a few minor squabbles early in the GWOT, ground based forward air controllers met or exceeded inter-service requirements for controlling close air support. 23

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The air arm also successfully provides an adequate number of sorties to respond to ground requests. This capability is a product of two elements unavailable during Vietnam. First, with no other air campaign underway, tankers are available to support CAS operations. This allows a continuous airborne alert posture capable of immediate response to ground requests. Second, precision munitions like the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) have allowed bombers to take a more active role in providing close air support. Their increased payload and loiter time provide a continuous supply of munitions. As long as a qualified controller is available, JDAMs can provide the firepower needed to turn the tide of battle, even in bad weather. As long as both of these capabilities are available in theater, armed FAC aircraft like the OV-10 will not be required. If future political or military needs reduce the conventional U.S. Air Force presence, the armed FAC concept will once again become essential and require a significant investment. Vietnams final major lesson requiring dedicated visual reconnaissance in counterinsurgency operations is the largest single element missing in current operations. Despite the fantastic capabilities of our modern fighters and UASs, neither is able to operate from locations or in the numbers required to execute the VR mission effectively. A simple platform capable of bridging the gap to provide U.S. ground forces persistent aerial observation must be found. Using Vietnam as a starting point, aircraft requirements are easily estimated. In 1966, Tactical Air Command (TAC) published a comprehensive Required Operational Capability study that determined the appropriate number of aircraft to support army operations. Each division would have two FACs continuously airborne in its AO either orchestrating CAS missions or performing visual reconnaissance. It resulted in a requirement for 15 aircraft per division to provide the 24-hour coverage across the division AO. Individual aircraft were required to fly an average of 3.24 hours per day or 96 hours per month, which accounted for neither maintenance loss nor combat attrition. Using 15 aircraft as the baseline, TAC determined each division required 24 FACs of various ranks to execute the required flights and the other ALO functions. Using 24

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TACs calculations to estimate todays requirements, with approximately five divisions active in Iraq and an extra division in Afghanistan the effort would require approximately 90 aircraft for combat operations. TAC also expected an additional 25% would be required for training; resulting in a total purchase of 112 aircraft. 47 There are many aircraft options to fill the void, but three examples will highlight a few of the possibilities. Many American companies offer acceptable examples of aircraft capable of meeting the intent, but their capability to handle the austere environment with high reliability will need to be thoroughly tested. Each of the examples would require some modifications like military specification radios and night vision goggle compatible cockpits. They are used merely to illustrate different approaches to filling the niche while highlighting their relative cost and capability. Using an off the shelf design ensures simplicity and minimal research and development costs. On one extreme is the O-1 model. With minimal frills, the Pacific Aerosystem Sky Arrow is the ultimate in simplicity with excellent visibility. It is a composite airframe capable of takeoff and landing distances of less than 800 feet. Additionally its four hour of loiter time is accomplished with only 18 gallons of fuel. Much like the O-1, the Sky Arrow is extremely slow, 104 knots, and offers little in the way of amenities. Another limitation is its 13,500 feet service ceiling. While that would easily be satisfactory in most places in the world, the mountains of Afghanistan would severely limit its effectiveness. The Sky Arrows price tag of approximately $125,000, however, makes it extremely affordable.48 The Sky Arrow is only one example of extremely simple off the shelf technology potentially capable of serving as a light observation aircraft. Similarly, the Cessna Stationair could easily fit the profile. It is designed for use as a bush plane and it regularly serves in Alaska and other austere environments around the world. It is larger than the Sky Arrow, but with a maximum speed of 178 knots and virtually identical takeoff and landing

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AU/ACSC/7595/AY07 performance, the Stationair is more conservative. Its service ceiling of over 20,000 feet would also allow flight over all but the highest peaks in the world. Unfortunately, the added performance comes with a cost. The Stationair will use nearly four and a half times (80 gallons) as much fuel as the Sky Arrow on the same sortie duration. Additionally, the side-by-side seating arrangement would limit visibility from both sides of the aircraft without an additional observer. With an online, unofficial price tag of approximately $500,000, the Stationair represents mid-level performance with proven reliability.49 A final approach uses the Korean War example of the T-6 Mosquito FACs to fill the FAC dilemma. Using todays USAF primary training aircraft, Raytheons T-6A, as a FAC platform would have several advantages. First, its added speed and agility would make it more survivable against known enemy threats. Additionally, its open architecture would allow for added growth towards the AT-6 if tankers or bomb dropping aircraft were unavailable in theater. Unfortunately, the T-6A requires a minimum of 1775 feet for takeoff and Raytheon suggests a 4,000-foot runway for operation with no mention of any rough field capability.50 Additionally, with an initial price of $5 million the added performance is completely outweighed by its cost. 51 With severe shortages in funding and the immediate need to recapitalize our existing airframes, every effort must be made to ensure the viability of the concept outside of history and academia. Using a synopsis of Vietnam era FAC techniques, tactics, and procedures, a comprehensive field test is the only way to prove FAC viability in the current insurgencies. Money and manning will be the primary obstacles to get this program initiated. Funding for the program will obviously be tight and require some sacrifices to balance what the Air Force wants and what is actually required to get the job done. The first two examples both show promise because of their simple designs and capability to operate in austere conditions. Evaluating these and other similar designs can identify a clear winner. Additionally, the acquisition price tag of $14-56 million is minimal and clearly worth the opportunity to enhance the Air Force contribution to the GWOT. 26

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Augmenting Air Support Operations Squadron manning to allow for simple FAC aircraft operations is the next hurdle. The TAC assumptions suggest 144 pilots for FAC duty and an additional 30 for instruction.52 Some of the pilots are easily found in the Air Support Operations Squadrons already attached with Army units. ALOs would continue to execute their current mission of advising the ground commander, but also return to their original mission of controlling close air support aircraft and providing visual reconnaissance. This, however, would only be a start. Additional support will be required to fill cockpits and will require creative sourcing to find the bodies. While sourcing the bodies is beyond the scope of this paper, applying the lessons of Vietnam is essential. Using excess pilots tasked to support the current AEF is appealing, but adhering to the 120-day cycle would negate the familiarity required for successful visual reconnaissance. Having FACs on station for extended periods in the same AO is the only way they will be able to identify the subtle differences indicating enemy activity. Deployment for 1-year remote tours to specific locations is the best solution to perpetuate lessons learned for the longest reasonable period. Recommendations for the Future The Global War on Terror will not end with Iraq or Afghanistan. The USAF must be ready to employ airpower across the spectrum of conflict without notice. The continuing cycle of ignoring close air support between wars, especially the tactical air control party, must be stopped. This core competency is essential from the first day American ground forces are employed against the enemy. Continually reinventing proven tactics at the expense of lives is unacceptable and should be avoided at all costs. Unfortunately, funds are limited and budget choices must be made. Therefore, maintenance of a functional FAC force needs to align itself with an eye to surviving the interwar budget crunch. With modern conventional air-land battle requiring a large fighter force capable of delivering precision munitions, it is difficult to justify the significant investment in research, development, and

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AU/ACSC/7595/AY07 fielding another OV-10 like platform for FAC duty. When faced with modern fielded forces with mobile surface-to-air defenses, FACs should operate from the ground to provide close air support. In other conflicts where the enemy chooses an irregular methodology, like the current situation in Iraq, FACs can utilize their aircraft to increase pressure on dispersed forces by locating, tracking, and attacking insurgents with aircraft, artillery, or ground ambush. The ability to both live with the supported ground unit and utilize the aerial perspective to provide focused intelligence will be a force multiplier for the U.S. military in future low-intensity conflicts. Not only would the FACs span of influence increase to coincide with the entire ground units AO, but the exponential rise in ground FAC requirements would decrease with airborne FAC ability to flow where needed. Additionally, FAC proximity to the local populace and longer deployments would allow them to build the requisite awareness of the local culture and conditions to execute effective visual reconnaissance in a manner similar to their Vietnam era predecessors. Simple, inexpensive aircraft provide the best balance between cost and effectiveness. More important to future flexibility in the GWOT is a standing capability to integrate forward air control duties with persistent visual reconnaissance as soon as the need arises.

Endnotes
1 2

FM 3-24. Counterinsurgency. 15 Dec 2006, E-1.

United States. Air Force. Pacific Air Forces. Directorate of Tactical Evaluation. CHECO Division., and
James B. Overton. FAC Operations in Close Air Support Role in SVN. S.l.: s.n., 1969, 2. 3 Hughes, Thomas Alexander. Over Lord: General Pete Quesada and the Triumph of Tactical Air Power in World War II. (New York: Free Press, 1995), 133. 4 United States. Air Force. Pacific Air Forces. Directorate of Tactical Evaluation. CHECO Division., and James B. Overton. FAC Operations in Close Air Support Role in SVN. S.l.: s.n., 1969, 1. 5 Lester, Gary Robert. Mosquitoes to Wolves : The Evolution of the Airborne Forward Air Controller. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, 1997, 12. 6 Ibid., 34-36. 7 Ibid., 49. 8 Ibid, 50. 9 Corum, James S., and Wray R. Johnson. Airpower in Small Wars : Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists, (Modern War Studies. Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 2003), 245. 28

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10

Krull, Larry D., and Air University (U.S.). Air Command and Staff College. VNAF 0-1 Operations : 1962-1968. Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1969, 10. 11 Tilford, Earl H. Setup : What the Air Force Did in Vietnam and Why. (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press ; Washington D.C., 1991), 81-82. 12 Cooling, B. Franklin, and United States. Air Force. Office of Air Force History. Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support. (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History U.S. Air Force, 1990), 431. 13 LTC William H Miller (USA), interview by Maj Samuel Riddlebarger (USAF), 21 January 1969, transcript, 4, Albert Simpson Historical Research Center (Air University), Montgomery, AL. 14 Lester, Gary Robert. Mosquitoes to Wolves : The Evolution of the Airborne Forward Air Controller. (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, 1997), 110. 15 United States. Air Force. Pacific Air Forces. Directorate of Tactical Evaluation. CHECO Division., and James B. Overton. FAC Operations in Close Air Support Role in SVN. S.l.: s.n., 1969, 2. 16 Ibid., 8-9. 17 Air Force Manual 2-7, Tactical Air Force Operations Tactical Air Control System (TACS). Washington D.C. 5 June 1967. pg 12-13. 18 United States. Air Force. Pacific Air Forces. Directorate of Tactical Evaluation. CHECO Division. Tactical Air in Support of Ground Forces in Vietnam. S.l.: s.n., 1970, 2. 19 Ibid., 4. 20 United States. Air Force. Tactical Air Support Squadron 21st. Forward Air Controller Tactics Manual. San Francisco: Headquarters 21st Tac Air Spt Sq (PACAF), 1972, 1-1. 21 Capt James A. Anderson, interview by unknown historian, 13 December 1968, transcript, Albert Simpson Historical Research Center (Air University), Montgomery, AL. 22 United States. Air Force. Pacific Air Forces. Directorate of Tactical Evaluation. CHECO Division. Tactical Air in Support of Ground Forces in Vietnam. S.l.: s.n., 1970, 28. 23 United States Air Force. Air University (U.S.). Air Command and Staff College. Reconnaissance. Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1968. 111. 24 United States Air Force. Air University (U.S.). Air Command and Staff College. Interdiction. Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1968. 52. 25 Whitehouse, Wendell H., and Air University (U.S.). Air War College. Air Force Forward Air Control and Visual Reconnaissance. (Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1969), 51. 26 United States Air Force. Air University (U.S.). Air Command and Staff College. Reconnaissance. Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1968.121-125. 27 United States. Air Force. Tactical Air Support Squadron 21st. Forward Air Controller Tactics Manual. San Francisco: Headquarters 21st Tac Air Spt Sq (PACAF), 1972, 2-4. 28 LTC William H Miller (USA), interview by Maj Samuel Riddlebarger (USAF), 21 January 1969, transcript, 13, Albert Simpson Historical Research Center (Air University), Montgomery, AL. 29 United States. Air Force. Pacific Air Forces. Directorate of Tactical Evaluation. CHECO Division. Tactical Air in Support of Ground Forces in Vietnam. S.l.: s.n., 1970, 20. 30 United States. Air Force. Tactical Air Support Squadron 21st. Forward Air Controller Tactics Manual. San Francisco: Headquarters 21st Tac Air Spt Sq (PACAF), 1972, 2-5. 31 United States. Air Force. Pacific Air Forces. Directorate of Tactical Evaluation. CHECO Division. Tactical Air in Support of Ground Forces in Vietnam. S.l.: s.n., 1970, 20. 32 United States. Air Force. Pacific Air Forces. Directorate of Tactical Evaluation. CHECO Division. Visual Reconnaissance in I Corps, 30 September 1968. S.l.: s.n., 1968, 25.

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United States Air Force. Air University (U.S.). Air Command and Staff College. Reconnaissance. Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1968, 125. 34 Sandborn, Richard T., and Lee E. Dolan. An Examination of Factors Affecting Tactical Air Response Time in South Vietnam. (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters USAF Operations Analysis, 1970), 7. 35 Ibid., 7,31. 36 Ibid., 10. 37 Ibid., 17. 38 Ibid., 14. 39 Some fighters such as the F-100 and F-4 were also labeled as FAC aircraft, but their utilization was focused on SCAR missions in North Vietnam to effectively defend themselves against NVA surface to air missiles and MIG fighters. Their added performance aided in survivability, but at the expense of slow speed visibility and loiter time. Additionally, their delicate systems and long runway requirements prohibited any actual close coordination with army units. As a result, despite their identification as FAC aircraft, their roles was fundamentally different than the mission previously discussed in this paper. 40 Krull, Larry D., and Air University (U.S.). Air Command and Staff College. VNAF 0-1 Operations : 1962-1968. Maxwell AFB, Ala.,, 1969. pg 19. 41 Reed, Lawrence L., and Air University (U.S.). Air Command and Staff College. The OV-10a: It Can Perform the Airborne FAC Mission. Maxwell AFB, Ala.,, 1968. pg 32-33. 42 United States. Air Force. Pacific Air Forces. Directorate of Tactical Evaluation. CHECO Division. Supporting Documents FAC Operations in Close Air Support Role in SVN. Vol II.: s.n. 898417, 1968. Doc 32 pg 2. 43 United States Air Force. Pacific Air Forces. Southeast Asia Air Operations, 1968, 12.
44 United States. Air Force. Pacific Air Forces. Directorate of Tactical Evaluation. CHECO Division.,
and Joseph V. Potter. OV-10 Operations in SEAsia : Special Report. S.l.: s.n., 1969, 16-17. 45 Ibid., 14. 46 Reed, Lawrence L., and Air University (U.S.). Air Command and Staff College. The OV-10A: It Can Perform the Airborne FAC Mission. Maxwell AFB, Ala.,, 1968. pg 62. 47 United States Air Force. Tactical Air Command. Directorate of Tactical Air Control Systems. Quantitative Forward Air Controller Aircraft Required Operational Capability. 1966, 7-8. 48 Pacific Aerosystems Inc. Skyarrow Downloadable Specs. http://www.skyarrowusa.com (accessed 16 April 2007). 49 Cessna Aircraft Company. Turbo Stationair Specification and Description. http://turbostationair.cessna.com (accessed 16 April 2007). 50 Global Security.org. T-6A JPATS. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/t-6.htm (accessed 16 April 2007. 51 Federation of American Scientists. T-6A JPATS. http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/t-6.htm (accessed 16 Apr 2007). 52 United States Air Force. Tactical Air Command. Directorate of Tactical Air Control Systems. Quantitative Forward Air Controller Aircraft Required Operational Capability. 1966, 7-8.

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Bibliography Air Force Manual 2-7, Tactical Air Force Operations Tactical Air Control System (TACS). 5 June 1967. Anderson, Capt James A. (USAF), interview by unknown historian, 13 December 1968, transcript, Albert Simpson Historical Research Center (Air University), Montgomery, AL. Army Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency. 15 Dec 2006. Cessna Aircraft Company. Turbo Stationair Specification and Description. http://turbostationair.cessna.com (accessed 16 April 2007). Cooling, B. Franklin, and United States. Air Force. Office of Air Force History. Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support. Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History U.S. Air Force, 1990. Corum, James S., and Wray R. Johnson. Airpower in Small Wars : Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists, Modern War Studies. Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 2003. Federation of American Scientists. T-6A JPATS. http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/t-6.htm (accessed 16 Apr 2007). Global Security.org. T-6A JPATS. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/t-6.htm (accessed 16 April 2007). Hughes, Thomas Alexander. Over Lord : General Pete Quesada and the Triumph of Tactical Air Power in World War II. New York: Free Press, 1995. Krull, Larry D., and Air University (U.S.). Air Command and Staff College. VNAF 0-1 Operations : 1962-1968. Maxwell AFB, Ala.,, 1969. Lester, Gary Robert. Mosquitoes to Wolves : The Evolution of the Airborne Forward Air Controller. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, 1997. Miller, LTC William H. (USA), interview by Maj Samuel Riddlebarger (USAF), 21 January 1969, transcript, 4, Albert Simpson Historical Research Center (Air University), Montgomery, AL. Minter, Rondel E., and Air University (U.S.). Air Command and Staff College. A Review of the Requirement for Airborne Forward Air Controllers in Close Air Support Operations. Maxwell AFB, Ala.,, 1966. Pacific Aerosystems Inc. Skyarrow Downloadable Specs. http://www.skyarrowusa.com (accessed 16 April 2007). Reed, Lawrence L., and Air University (U.S.). Air Command and Staff College. The OV-10A: It Can Perform the Airborne FAC Mission. Maxwell AFB, Ala.,, 1968. Sandborn, Richard T., and Lee E. Dolan. An Examination of Factors Affecting Tactical Air Response Time in South Vietnam. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters USAF Operations Analysis, 1970. Tilford, Earl H. Setup : What the Air Force Did in Vietnam and Why. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press ; Washington D.C. : For sale by the Supt. of Doc US GPO, 1991. United States Air Force. Air University (U.S.). Air Command and Staff College. Interdiction. Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1968. . Air University (U.S.). Air Command and Staff College. Reconnaissance. Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1968. . Combat Crew Training Squadron 4410th. The Airborne Forward Air Controller. Holley Field, Fla., 1967. . Tactical Air Command. Directorate of Tactical Air Control Systems. Quantitative Forward Air Controller Aircraft Required Operational Capability. 1966. . Tactical Air Support Squadron 21st. Forward Air Controller Tactics Manual 55-3. San Francisco: Headquarters 21st Tactical Air Support Squadron (PACAF), 1972. 31

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. Pacific Air Forces., and Lawrence J. Hickey. Night Close Air Support in RVN for 1961-1966. S.l.: s.n., 1967. . Pacific Air Forces. Southeast Asia Air Operations, 1968. . Pacific Air Forces. Directorate of Tactical Evaluation. CHECO Division. Tactical Air in Support of Ground Forces in Vietnam. S.l.: s.n., 1970. . Visual Reconnaissance in I Corps, 30 September 1968. S.l.: s.n., 1968. . Directorate of Tactical Evaluation. CHECO Division., and James B. Overton. FAC Operations in Close Air Support Role in SVN. S.l.: s.n., 1969. . Pacific Air Forces. Directorate of Tactical Evaluation. CHECO Division., and Joseph V. Potter. OV-10 Operations in SEAsia : Special Report. S.l.: s.n., 1969. Whitehouse, Wendell H., and Air University (U.S.). Air War College. Air Force Forward Air Control and Visual Reconnaissance. Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1969.

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