Lon Fuller emphasized a natural law of means rather than ends.

Fuller was concerned that in a democracy where political parties disagree about the ends of law, that the government should respect a morality of means. As an example of a morality of means see his discussion of the Eight Ways to Fail to Make Law in L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 33-41 (rev. ed. 1969), where he argues for an internal morality of law, the morality which makes law possible. Fuller's concepts of the on-going purposive development of law, the internal morality of law, the principles of wise architecture in the universe, reciprocal relations between persons, and implicit law are all helpful in developing a personalist understanding of law.

http://www.law.syr.edu/faculty/donnelly/AppendixB.aspx Scrupulousness without Scruples: A Critique of Lon Fuller and His Defenders Matthew Kramer
It remains a singularly elaborate effort to show the inseparability of law and morality on largely content independent grounds.

Fuller held that law does not exist unless each of the following requirements is satisfied to some degree: (1) there must be general rules; (2) the rules must be promulgated to the people who are required to obey them; (3) the rules must not be retroactive; (4) the rules must be understandable; (5) the duties imposed by the rules must not conflict; (6) compliance with the rules must be possible; (7) the rules must not be changed with disorienting frequency; and (8) there must be a congruence between the rules as formulated and their implementation.

These do not determine whether the system is moral or not, rather outline a set of rules to be followed for any thing to be law
A complete failure in regard to any of the eight precepts will entail the non-existence of law within the society that is marked by the failure. A system's nature as a legal system-which necessarily involves its conformance to Fuller's principles of legality-is not a morally neutral fact. 'Government says to the citizen in effect, ''These are the rules we expect you to follow. If you follow them, you have our assurance that they are the rules that will be applied to your conduct" ' (Fuller, Morality, 3940). Now, Fuller plainly viewed this governmental com- mitment as a moral commitment, undertaken for moral reasons. Not only does the absence of such a commitment render obedience to the law imprudent for citizens (whose dutifulness will not spare them from punishment), but it also renders unfair the government's demand for obedience. A government that flouts the restraints imposed on it by law's reciprocity has assumed an overweeningly imperious role. A second way in which law gives expression to the dignity of the individual is that it holds each person responsible for his or her own deeds. Under the law, every sane adult is required to comply with legal norms and is therefore treated as a rational agent capable of controlling his or her own behaviour. By calling for conformity to various demands, the law presupposes the capacity of each of its addressees for self-determination. 'To embark on the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules involves of necessity a commitment to the view that man is, or can become, a responsible agent, capable of understanding and following rules, and answerable for his defaults' (Fuller, Morality, 162). Law's particular means of social control, the subjection of human conduct to the governance of rules, inevitably draws upon and acknowledges the autonomy of each individual. Without such autonomy and an attendant capacity for self-restraint, the governance of people by rules would not be feasible.

In other words, the essential features of law are features which tend to minimize the chance that any individual will be punished for violating a prohibition of which he could not have been aware or with which he could not have complied. As far as possible, the fundamental characteristics of law engender opportunities for individuals to orient their behaviour toward the duties that are incumbent on them. If a scheme of governance is grossly failing to satisfy one or more of Fuller's precepts, then it may well be punishing people for breaches of duties even when the people could not have known of the duties or could not possibly have avoided transgressions of their requirements. Only when all of Fuller's precepts are generally followed will the chances of such unfair punishments be reduced to a minimum. Hence, his precepts encapsulate the values of fair warning and fair opportunity, in .regard to the demands laid on people by the law. In short, the qualities of law which make it distinctively legal are morally significant; they prevent the unfairness that is involved in the laying down of unfollowable mandates.

Legal certainty v uncertainty in terms of individual autonomy (shoe lace example)

Let us assume for the moment that the only threats to autonomy stem from governmental action. In that case, we should observe that compliance with Fuller's principles not only tends to make plain where punitive measures will end, but also tends to make plain where such measures will begin. Whenever uncertainty about the likelihood of governmental intervention is pomayed as autonomyretarding, it is implicitly or explicitly contrasted with people's confidence that the government will forbear from intervening in some area(s) of their lives. Contrariwise, when the uncertainty about governmental intervention is contrasted with people's confidence that the government will indeed intervene in some area@) of their lives, the uncertainty should be seen as autonomy-promotive; it leaves people a measure of leeway that is denied to them when their government enforces restrictive mandates tirelessly. short, an assessment of Fuller's principles as autonomy-nurturing or autonomy-dampening must hinge on the nature of the baseline that is relied upon for the tacit or express comparison that underpins the assessment. An evaluation of those principles in abstracto is illusive

Violence, Law, and the Limits of Morality A. W. Cragg

law as an essentially purposive activity and understands the relationship of law and morality as governed by these purposes. approach the relationship of law and morality via an analysis of the purposive structure of law

He argues that "evil aims do not have the coherence of moral aims"." For Fuller, the idea of order and good order cannot be separated. Hence law, aiming as it does at order, must inevitably capture rules of good order which in turn imply moral foundations.

Violence has a disruptive impact on the moral context in which those affected acr, thus it tends to undermine the capacity of those affected to act as responsible moral agents. It also threatens the security of those affected. It has a tendency, therefore, to shift the attention of those affected ro a self-interested perspective. While morality does not ignore questions of self-interest, its focus is not the interests of the agent alone. Violence gives an urgency to self-interest that if it comes to dominate removes the agent

from the moral sphere. This view implies that those who use violence to achieve their goals both ignore and undermine the moral status of those on whom their violence impinges."' Finally, because of the har~n that violellce can do to individuals, it can be used to coerce changes in the structure of values that guide action. Violence and threats of violellce are frequently used in this way. Thus governments use the threat of violence to coerce the acceptance of political regimes, policies, actions, and so on. States use war and threats of war to coerce changes in the behaviour of other states. Torture is a tool of political repression. These uses of violence are designed to replace one set of values in a way that negates the moral status of those against whom these tactics are directed. When encountered in this extreme form, the anti-moral character of violence is explicit. Violence, then, has both an immoral and an anti-moral character. Avoiding violence is one of our fundamental moral obligations. But thls creates a serious dilemma. For morality itself contains within it the seeds of violence. First, there are disputes about what moral principles or values ought to govern in a particular situation. In the matter of euthanasia, for example, should moral principles emphasizing the quality of life or moral principles empha- sizing the sanctity of life dominate! Second, there are disputes about how particular ~rinciples or values ought to be interpreted in partic- ular situations. For example, is allowing someone to die as in passive euthanasia compatible with respect for the sanctity of life? Finally, there are disputes about what the facts are, which facts are relevant, and how the facts are to be interpreted in light of the principle(s), or value(s) that the parties have agreed to apply in a given situation. Second, it is widely assumed that individuals have a right to use force to resist actions on the part of others that they regard as seriously immoral. If this were not true, adopting a moral point of view would imply endorsing a pacifist outlook. But not only is pacifism widely rejected, it is argued by some to be incoherent. Thus Jan Narveson argues in 'Pacifism: A Philosophical Analysis' that individuals have a right to their own security. Furthermore, such a right is of no value if it is not combined with a right to intervene in defence of one's own security. For, "a right just is a status justifying preventive actionn." The right to self-defence, it is frequently argued, extends particularly to defence against violence. Thus Narveson goes on to ask: "What could that right to their own security which people ave, possibly consist in, if not a right at least to defend themselves from whatever violence might be offered them?" '? Violence is both immoral and anti-moral. Yet it would seem that morality can justify recourse to the use of force in defence of moral principle or of what moral values identify as being of deep moral significance, human life for example. And although the use of force does not inevitably cause violence, it often does particularly when it is resisted by those against whom it is directed a moral paradox. Might does not make right; yet individuals are justified in using force to resist force which is itself being used to resolve a dispute. When force is used, the side that prevails will be the side that can muster the strongest force, an outcome that appears to imply that in practice, at least, might makes right. To summarize, violence is a phenomenon that has a peculiar moral character. It is both immoral and anti-moral. Yet actions generating violence are apparently justifiable on moral grounds. It would seem that morality can be and frequently is used to justify a method of resolving disputes that not only is likely to have immoral consequences but is self defeating in as much as it undermines what it is designed to defend. This Law coo can be seen as a social mechanism for resolving disputes that might otherwise erupt in violence. Its central tool is adjudication. It generates binding solutions to disputes. Thus it offers a remedy to the defect that is built into morality. It offers a method of securing non-violent resolution of disputes. In this way, the law achieves what moral argument frequently cannot. But it does so at a cost.

But more important, coerced solutions raise doubts about the moral status of those on whom the solution is imposed. Coerced solutions remove from those on whom they are imposed the freedom to direct their own behaviour in accordance with the values and principles that seem to them the soundest. Creating social mechanisms for resolving disputes in non-violent ways is a fundamental moral objective for any society. There are profound moral and jurispruden- tial reasons for thinking this to be a fundamental function of legal systems. It is equally the case that the pursuit of this goal must inevitably shape the content and procedures of legal systems. morality. It also helps to understand why people might feel obligated to obey bad laws. Legal systems have a deep moral point or purpose. By their very nature they remove from individuals the right to decide what the law is, what interpretation of the law shall prevail when the law is applied to particular cases, and whether to do what the law requires. In all these respects, law is unlike morality. But it is unlike morality for reasons of a profound moral nature. To fail to respect the law is to be prepared to move from a legal back to a purely moral system of resolving disputes. But morality is from a moral perspective fundamentally defective in this regard. To challenge the legal order is to face these defects with all their concrete implications. If the account I have been outlining is sound, legal obligation in the end rests on moral foundations of a rather special sort. We have a moral obligation to defer to a system for resolving disputes that cannot be resolved through moral argument. The law offers itself as such a system. Thus legal systems provide a mechanism for avoiding violence. Deferring to the law under these circumstances must have a high moral claim on us. It is this high moral claim on which the moral force of legal obligation rests.