IRAN: IS ISLAMIC STATE COMPATIBLE WITH LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

IRAN: IS ISLAMIC STATE COMPATIBLE WITH LIBERAL DEMOCRACY The form of government of Iran is that of an Islamic Republic, endorsed by the people of Iran... (From Article 1 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran 1) The very first sentence in the constitution of Iran seems to have responded positively to the question whether the principles of the Islamic state are compatible with democracy, by combining the notions of endorsement of the people and Islamic Republic in the same sentence. In this sense, it represents the middle position, at least verbally, in Hasan Hanefi's tripartite classification of positions towards civil society and other Western values among the contemporary Muslims, where he talks of two extreme positions which reject either the Islamic tradition or the Western values, and a middle position which argues for the possibility of combining the two. 2 I say at least verbally, because being 'endorsed by the people' takes more then claiming, and it certainly takes more than claiming to be considered 'Islamic'. In other words, if we want to discuss whether the principles of the Islamic state and liberal democracy are compatible, with reference to the political experiences of Iran since the revolution of 1978-79, the first thing we need to do is to problematize both claims of the first sentence of the Islamic Republic of Iran: that the Republic is Islamic, and that it is democratic (endorsed by the people). Assuming one while questioning the other would at best be unfair. We can, however, for the purposes of this essay, take the claim that the state in Iran is Islamic at its face value, but we should be aware of the limitations that this places on our analysis. The conclusions we reach would always be vulnerable to the criticism that the Islamic Republic of Iran is not Islamic at all, either because it does not conform to the principles of the Islamic state, or
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English translation from the website http://www.iranonline.com One of the extremes in Hanafi's classification is the radical fundamentalist position, which reject[s] the very idea of civil society as alien to Islam. The other extreme is the secular, Westernized position, which affirm[s] the concept of civil society as a universal concept, a global ideal irrespective of its Western origins and sees Islamic tradition as an expression of bygone values reflective of their own peculiar historical conditions. Finally, there is the reformist or modernist alternative, which represents the moderate position in the face of two extreme positions. The reformist position argue[s] for the possibility of developing the ingredients of classical Islam to reflect modern social needs. Although this classification is mainly about positions towards the civil society among the Muslims, it reflects, in a wider sense, positions towards other Western values as well, and not only in Islamic societies, but in other traditional societies too. See Hasan Hanafi, Alternative conceptions of civil society: a reflective Islamic approach, in Simone Chambers and Will Kymlicka, ed., Alternative Conceptions of Civil Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002) p. 171.

because, more fundamentally, there is no such thing defined in the religious sources as an Islamic state. Indeed, Franz Rosenthal argues that Muslim piety never gave much thought to the possibility that an ideal state can be set up in this world because the Qur'an is not concerned with developing any sort of ideal political model to be adopted by all Muslims. 3 What Parvez Manzoor calls the immanentization of political consciousness, in other words, is a thing of modern times: the Virtuous Polity of Al-Farabi had no resemblance with any actual city: it was beyond the world of time and place. Today, the 'Islamic state' is conceptualized as an immanent entity struggling for world supremacy4 Even if we were to accept that there is such a thing as the principles of the Islamic state, and that Iran conforms to these principles, there is one more limitation arising from the nature of our analysis: This is not a purely theoretical discussion of whether the principles of the Islamic state and liberal democracy are compatible, but in part an empirical one that uses a sepecific example, Iran, to assess the opposing views. Since we have only one observation, with reference to which we are trying to evaluate the principles, another limitation is placed on the kind of conclusions we can draw: We can only falsify the proposition that the principles of the Islamic state and liberal democracy are incompatible. We cannot verify incompatibility in an empirical study, that is, unless we study all actual and possible cases of Islamic state and find all to be incompatible, the classical Popperian insight.5 Verifying compatibility, on the other hand, is relatively easy: If we can find one example of Islamic state that is compatible with the principles of liberal democracy, then compatibility we have. The problem with verifying compatibility, however, is the need for a properly limited working definition of democracy. If democracy is used to mean anything and everyting that is desirable about a political system, then verifying compatibility is not possible either. The word
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Franz Rosenthal: 'Political Justice and the Just Ruler', in Joel L. Kraemer & Ilai Alon ed., Religion and Government in the World of Islam (Tel Aviv, 1983) p. 93. Quoted in Parvez Manzoor, City and Salvation: Confronting the Secularist Myth, upcoming. p. 7. 4 Manzoor, Ibid. p. 6. 5 A 1962 article by Popper, Science, Pseudo-Science, and Falsifiability, which was not the first presentation of the idea of falsifiability but discusses the issue, is available at the following address: http://karws.gso.uri.edu/JFK/critical_thinking/Science_pseudo_falsifiability.html

democacy being such a loaded normative concept, there have been many attempts at defining democracy. Among the more successful attempts, we can count Joseph Schumpeter's minimalist theory of democracy6 and Robert Dahl's criteria by which no existing nation qualifies to be called a standard democracy.7 A more recent definition, also a more convenient one for the purposes of this paper, distingusihes between liberalism and democracy, and argues for the separate existence of the two in different contemporary states. Fareed Zakaria, in his seminal Foreign Affairs article The Rise of Illiberal Democracy8 states that we have come to see the two as the same because in the West they have co-existed, whereas in other parts of the world, we see democracies -defined as free and fair elections- without liberalism -defined as rule of law and limitations placed on the exercise of state power- and liberal regimes that are not democratic. An example to the latter is British ruled Hong Kong, and to the former, Pakistan. Although there are different aspects to constitiutional liberalism, such as protection of human rights, right of free speech and assembly, and private property rights, the gist of it is the existence of checks and balances in the system and the limitations placed on the exercise of state power. Limitation of state power, even in democratic states, is very important. Quoting John Stuart Mill's fear in the opening of On Liberty, that as countries became democratic, people tended to believe that "too much importance had been attached to the limitation of power itself", 9 Zakaria calls attention to the recent examples of the realization of this fear from Belarus to Pakistan to Central African Republic and calls American policy makers to place more emphasis on liberalization, rather than having an exclusive focus on democracy. If we take the main principle and working definition of liberal democracy -in line with Zakaria's suggestion- to be free and fair elections plus limitations on state power, then the Islamic Republic of Iran constitutes, I argue in what follows, an example demonstrating the compatibility of the principles of the Islamic state and liberal democracy.
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See Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (Harper Perennial, 1950) See Robert Dahl, Democracy and its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press., 1989) 8 Fareed Zakaria, The Rise of Illberal Democracy, Foreign Affairs (Nov/Dec 1997). Available at http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19971101faessay3809/fareed-zakaria/the-rise-of-illiberal-democracy.html 9 Zakaria, Ibid.

Limitations on State Power in Islam Both in classical theories of khilafa/imama, and historical practices of the Islamic states, the rulers are bound by the orders and prohibitions contained in the original sources of Islam, by Quran and hadith. The ruler stops being legitimate if his behavior contradicts what is written in Quran, and it was a point of much heated debate among the classical jurists just at what point it was legitimate to revolt against the ruler. As an historical example, the Ottoman Empire was also far from being subject to the random personal wishes and whims of the sultan. 10 The Shaikh al-Islam may have been a puppet of the sultan or got embroiled in the internal power politics of the palace at times, but at least in theory, and sometimes in practice, it acted as a check within the system. What matters, in a theoretical discussion of principles, is that the notion of limitations on the exercise of state power does exist in Islamic thinking, much like the European tradition of liberalism in content. What is more, the Shia, constituting the minority sect within Islam, were always on the less authority to the ruler side of the debate among Islamic jurists. Shia Islam being such a dominant part of the post-Revolution Iran, this principle reflected itself in the sharing of power within the Islamic Republic of Iran, as defined in the constitution. Surely, the religious thought of the cadre of the revolution also reflected a departure from the classical Shiite doctrine in certain respects, especially in the innovation of the position and doctrine of velayet-i faqih. But limitations on the use of state power doesn't seem to be one of them. The current Iranian constitution, in Chapter Five, states that absolute sovereignty belongs to God, but recognizes that God has made man self-sovereign and that this divine right cannot be wrested from him. 11 It provides for separation of powers between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the state12. The Parliament has the power to dissolve the cabinet, but the reverse is not the case.13 Chapter three provides social, economoic, human, political and cultural rights for

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Hakan Erdem, lecture delivered as part of the Sabanc University graduate course Hist 561, Sources and Methods for Ottoman History, 1450-1600, Fall 2005. 11 Sepehr Zabih, Iran Since The Revolution (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982). p. 36. 12 Ibid., p.36. 13 Ibid., p.37

all men and women, irrespective of race and colour.14 One of the most important points of criticism about the post-Revolution political system in Iran, is the status of the Council of Custodians, who have judicial review powers regarding the Parliament's legislation15. As regulated by the Article 91 of the Constitution, half the Council consists of theologians appointed by the Supreme Leader, and has the right to review the legislation in terms of its religious legitimacy. The other half of the Council, nominated by supreme judicial council and elected by the Parliament, is responsible, together with the first half, for constitutional review. The criticism of constitutional review, so long as it fails to compare it with similar mechanisms in other political systems, is bound to remain ineffective, since the constitutional review as it is, constitutes an important part of the liberal element -in the sense of placing limitations on the use of government power- in post-Revolutionary political system in Iran. One proposed difference from other review mechanisms is that in addition to constitutionality, there is also a religiosity review, which aims to find whether the enacted legislation contradicts God's wishes. But what becomes of popular sovereignty when God is the sole legislator in the body politic? ask Ladan Boroumand and Roya Boroumand and answer Either the people are excluded from sovereignty or the concept of the people mutates.16 The claim that people lose their empirical sovereignty as a result of the principle of absolute sovereignty belonging to God is not tenable, neither for the believer, nor the non-believer. For the believer of Islam, and especially Shiite Islam which accepts Justice of God as one of the five pillars, it is not tenable because human beings have to have free choice to be justly rewarded or punished on the day of resurrection. So, the declaration that God has absolute sovereignty either has metaphysical meanings, in the sense that on the day of resurrection, only God's will will prevail, or it is a sentence expressing a wish, not an actual fact. To the non-believer, God also is a human

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Ibid., p.37 For example, Ladan Boroumand and Roya Boroumand describe the overseeing functions of the Council of Custodians as the Council having veto power over all legislation. See Ladan Boroumand and Roya Boroumand, Is Iran Democratizing? Reform at an Impasse, in Islam and Democracy in the Middle East (The Johns Hopkins University Press: 2003). p.133. 16 Ladan Boroumand and Roya Boroumand, Ibid., p. 136.

product, so sovereignty belonging to God ultimately means sovereignty belonging to humans. This latter point, in fact, is recognized, in a different form, by Ladan Boroumand and Roya Boroumand too. Though canon law (fiqh) is a compilation of juridical prescriptions that organize the daily life of believers, like the Koran it does not prescribe any specific form of political organization. [...] This indeterminacy gives rise to pluralism within the clerical oligarchy, engenders political tension, and creates the conditions for genuine political rivalry. Such pluralism has been present within the oligarchy ever since the advent of the Islamic regime. 17 If pluralism within the clerical oligarchy is possible in spite of the fact that The theocratic nature of the regime requires all laws and political decisions be in conformity with Islamic precepts and canon law 18, the criticism brought to the institution of Velayet-e Faqih and to the Council of Custodians is little more than what the elite theory woud bring to any political system. In other words, the regime being theocratic or claiming to be theocratic adds nothing to the criticism of elite theory, and there is always rivalry within the elite. So far, this analysis was a textual/constitutional one.What happens in practice is, if not more important, just as important as what is written in the constitution. Here too, we see that the regime being a self-professed theocray did not prevent regular elections taking place, and what is more, government changes. The reformist mullah Mohamad Khatami won the Presidency twice 1997 and 2001. Surely, there was electoral fraud and conservative institutional resistance to the reformists in Parliamentary elections of 2000 and 2004, and this prevented the reformists from gaining as many seats as they deserve, but this has very little to do with the professed Islamic nature of the regime, and a lot to do with inter-elite rivalry, and thus, has no bearing on the question of compatibility of the principles of Islamic state and liberal democracy.

17 18

Ibid., p. 141. Ibid., p.133.

Bibliography Boroumand, Ladan and Roya Boroumand, Is Iran Democratizing? Reform at an Impasse, in Islam and Democracy in the Middle East. The Johns Hopkins University Press: 2003. Dahl, Robert, Democracy and its Critics. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989. Erdem, Y. Hakan, lecture delivered as part of the Sabanc University graduate course Hist 561, Sources and Methods for Ottoman History, 1450-1600, Fall 2005. Hanafi, Hasan, Alternative conceptions of civil society: a reflective Islamic approach, in Simone Chambers and Will Kymlicka, ed., Alternative Conceptions of Civil Society. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002. Islamic Republic of Iran Constitution http://www.iranonline.com/iran/iraninfo/Government/constitution.html Manzoor, Parvez, City and Salvation: Confronting the Secularist Myth, upcoming. Popper, Karl, Science, Pseudo-Science, and Falsifiability http://karws.gso.uri.edu/JFK/critical_thinking/Science_pseudo_falsifiability.html Schumpeter, Joseph, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. Harper Perennial, 1950. Rosenthal, Franz, Political Justice and the Just Ruler, in Joel L. Kraemer & Ilai Alon ed., Religion and Government in the World of Islam. Tel Aviv, 1983. Zabih, Sepehr, Iran Since The Revolution. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982. Zakaria, Fareed, The Rise of Illberal Democracy, Foreign Affairs (Nov/Dec 1997). http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19971101faessay3809/fareed-zakaria/the-rise-of-illiberaldemocracy.html