Hume and the Causal Theory of Taste Author(s): Roger A.

Shiner Source: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 54, No. 3 (Summer, 1996), pp. 237249 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The American Society for Aesthetics Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/431625 . Accessed: 02/09/2011 11:50
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ROGER A. SHINER

Hume and the CausalTheory of Taste

This paperhas two aims. The first is the purely philosophical aim of exposing as untenablethe CausalTheory of Taste.The second is the interpretiveaim of readingDavid Hume'sfamousessay "On the Standardof Taste" as defending a version of such a causal theory. The two aims are pursuedin parallel, in that the main source of raw materialfor criticizing the causal theory of taste will be passages drawnfrom Hume'sessay. Before we reach the text of the essay, however, some stage-setting is needed. Consider the following two lines of thought which might occur in philosophical reflection about aesthetic taste. First, in thinking about judgmentsof taste, one may be struckby the elusiveness of the propertieswhich are the targets of judgments of taste, in comparison with the steadfastness of many other kinds of property and objects. This elusiveness is well expressed thus:"no sentimentof taste represents whatis really in the object ... beauty is no quality in things

in themselves:it exists merely in the mind which contemplates them."1We might think that the impression we have of elegance-that slice of our mentallife-reveals to us the propertyof an object. But, this first line of thought says, we would be wrong in so thinking.There is no such property;there is only our impression. Second, in thinking aboutjudgmentsof taste, one may also be struckboth by the fact thatpersons seem to differ in the degree to which they possess the capacityto makejudgmentsof taste, and moreoverthat among those who seemingly are more experienced and skilled at judgments of taste there is some convergence at a fairly general level in such judgments.For instance, if at first I do not see the elegance my friend sees in a sculpture or a dance, my friend can say, "Look at this line; see how these lines comple-

menteach other;see how the piece would be different if this curve were more concave or more convex. Look at how this variationin the armor leg movementwould change the characterof the dance altogether." thusI come to see thatthe And sculptureor the dance is indeed elegant. These thoughts are well summarizedthus: "amidstall the varietyand capriceof taste, thereare certain general principles of approbationor blame.... Persons of taste may be distinguished by the soundnessof their understanding" 243). (p. Much of philosophical interest in judgments of taste has to do with a tension between these two lines of thoughtand with possibilities for its resolution. Let us first investigatethe tension. The first line of thought seems to locate the groundof judgmentsof taste, not in some object which is the target of the judgment, but in the maker of the judgment. If someone says that he finds a dance elegant and powerful, or a soloist's musical interpretationfractured, this first line of thoughtimplies that ground for the judgment of elegance is to be found, not in the dance, but in the speaker.As Hume puts it, in describingthis line of thought,"sentimenthas a referenceto nothingbeyonditself ... no sentiment representswhat is really in the object"(p. 230). This line of thought Hume associates with the maxim de gustibus non est disputandum, and is his first "species of common sense" thinking abouttaste. Let us call it the InternalistTheory. The second line of thought, Hume's second species of common sense about taste, is quite different. It affirms a genuine difference between "Ogilby and Milton, or Bunyan and Addison. ... The principleof the naturalequality of tastes is totally forgot" (pp. 230-231). Some judgments of taste are rejected out of hand as "absurdand ridiculous"(p. 231). Although in

The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism54:3 Summer 1996

238 the next paragraph, Hume is at pains to point out that "none of the rules of composition are fixed by reasonings a priori, or can be esteemed abstractconclusions of the understanding," nonetheless, in discussing Ariosto, Hume displays the fact thathis judgmentsdo have a referenceto Ariosto's oeuvre-"he charms by the force and clearness of his expression,by the readinessand varietyof his inventions,and by his naturalpicture of the passions" (p. 231). The inventions are in the oeuvre, not in Hume's mind; the same is true of the force and clarity of the expression, and of the pictureof the passions. Let us call this line of thought,for reasonswhich will be clearer later,the Criterial Theory. It is clear that there is a tension between these two lines of thought.A judgmentof taste cannot both make reference to something outside the mind and make no referenceto something outside the mind. Yet the difficulties in resolving the tension seem deep. Both lines of thought have intuitionon their side, as Hume is aware.
I. THE CAUSAL THEORY OF TASTE

The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism tion."3 Exactly what it is to give the essential characterof X for purposes of a philosophical appreciationof X I leave unspecified. Analytic philosophers of a traditionalsort will say that one has to give the necessary and sufficient conditions for the applicationof the term "X." Othermethodologieswill give differentanswers. A causal theory of taste, therefore,will argue that the nature of taste, and of judgments expressingtaste, are best understoodas essentially partsof a causalprocesslinkingthe artwork(s) or otherobject of taste and the criticor appreciator. In short, the causal theory of taste is reductionist. The artworkhas some featureor combination of featureswhich cause a certain feeling or combinationof feelings to arise in the critic. The judgment that an artworkpossesses a certain aesthetic propertyis groundedin the existence of this causal process. If in judging the sculptureto be elegant, I am genuinely displaying taste, then what it is for this to be so is just this: I contemplatethe sculpture,and the sculpturecauses to arise in me a particularsentiment of beauty.That is all. I believe that the causal theory of taste gains much attractivenessfrom the fact that it seems to make an end runroundthe intractable conflict of intuitionoutlinedjust above. It seems to preservethe best of both kinds of naive theorywhile dispensingwith what is most controversial. The supposed merging of the two intuitive theories into one sound theory seems to arise in the following way.Whatis counterintuitive about the first species of common sense, the internalist theory, is that it makes the referentor target of judgments of taste exactly what on the surface of the language it does not appearto be: a feeling inside the critic ratherthan a propertyof the artwork.The causal theory does not do that. It makes the targetof judgmentsof taste not the critic, but the causal process in which the critic is an element. Whatis counterintuitive aboutthe second species of common sense, the criterial theory, is that it seems to imply that artworks havethe propertiesthatthey have independently of the reactions of persons to them. The causal theory does not do that, either; it includes a reference to humanreactionas partof the construal of judgments of taste. The strengthof the first species is to drawattentionto the role of human reactions in the appreciation of art, and the strengthof the second species is to draw atten-

Causal theories of X, for different kinds of X, have been prominentin recent philosophy. Defendersexist of the causal theory of referenceor of names; the causal theory of perception, and of knowledge; the causal theory of action; and the causal theory of expression. There are differentversionsof each theory.It is impossible to extract from all of them one single distinguishing characteristicof causal theories as a philosophical kind. There is, for instance,2 a crucial difference between theories of understanding (the correct analysis of the concept of action, e.g.) and theories of explanation (accounts of what will serve as an adequateexplanationof an action, e.g.). My focus here is on theories of understanding-the causal theorist of X is one who claims that the best way to understandthe nature of X or Xes or Xing is to see it/them essentially as an element in, or as consisting in, a causal process of some sort. GarethEvans, for instance, characterizes Saul Kripke's Causal Theory of Names as maintainingthat"aspeaker, using a name 'NN' on a particularoccasion will denote some item X if there is a causal chain of links leading back from his reference-preserving use on that occasion ultimately to the item X itself being involvedin a name-acquiringtransac-

Shiner Hume and the Causal Theoryof Taste tion to the role of featuresof the artworkin the appreciationof art. The causal theory gives both of these elements an indispensablerole. Moreover, it seems just true, in the vast majorityof cases, that but for a person reading a novel or poem, seeing a dance, movie, or painting, or hearing a piece of music, the person is in no legitimate position to appreciate the artwork in question. If thereis no appreciationwithoutsentiment, then the thought that the sentiment is has causally relatedto the appreciation a grip on reality.I shall try to show, nonetheless, that the impression of a successful reconciliation given by the causal theory is illusory. There is a crucial distinction between giving a causal explanation for a certain thing, and giving a criteriallybasedjustificationfor a candidate descriptionof a certain thing,or criterial justification for short. To respond to "What is that pain in my thigh?" by saying "Remember that hard tackle late in the first half?" is to give a causal explanation, in this case of the pain in the thigh. To respondto "Whatis that animal?" by saying "Ithas whiskers,stripes,and stalksby night; so it is a tiger" is to give a criterial justification-to justify the description"tiger"by deploying the criteriafor what it is to be a tiger. I assume the distinction between causal explanation and criterialjustification to be a primitive logical distinction. That is, I do not defend it beyond putting it to work in this paper. The second species of common sense aesthetics implies thatjudgmentsof taste invite (in my terms) criterial justification, not causal explanation. I hope to show, nonnaively, that common sense aesthetics (at least this versionof it) is correct on this point. When a critic supportsa claim of cardboardcharacters,dynamicallegro movement, or excessively foreshortenedperspective by pointing to featuresof an artwork,common sense aesthetics says she is engaged in criterial justification, but not in causal explanation. For this reason,the second species of common sense aesthetics is appropriatelycalled the Criterial Theory, and I hope to show that on this point at least it is the preferabletheory. The conflict betweenthe causaltheoryandthe criterialtheory lies precisely in that the causal theoryrepresents judgmentsof taste as to be vindicated by accounts of causal relations and processes,not as to be vindicatedby referenceto featuresof the artworkafterthe mannerof criter-

239 ial justification.The causal theory is committed to art criticism being like causal explanation. Sentimentsarisein thejudge as a resultof the experienceof the apparent targetsof judgmentsof taste. The task of a theoryof taste is to developa sophisticatedaccount of what propertiesin the targetsof judgmentof tastecause whatresponses in thejudger.The causaltheorycannot,and does not, representarightthe feature of the logic of judgmentsof taste to which the criterialtheory drawsattention. The causaltheoryof tastecannot thereforebe correctas a theory of taste.
II. HUME AND THE CAUSAL THEORY

By the (admittedly generous) standardsstated above, Hume's account of taste in his essay qualifies it as a causal theory. His aim here, as elsewhere in his writings, is to expose the "general and establishedprinciples" the "motion" for of the "internalsprings"(all p. 232) of the mind as regards the acquisition and expression of taste. It might seem perverseto attribute causal a theory of anything to one well known for his skepticismaboutcausality.But the soundnessof Hume's account of causality is a quite separate issue. The fact remains that in his resolutionof the conflict between the two species of common sense, and in his defense of a standardof taste, Hume gives a definitive role to what are in common sense terms causal processes and relations-never mind the associational terminology which he chooses in his study to deploy. These are but considerationsof a very general kind for attributinga causal theory of taste to Hume. A more textual and tailored argumentis needed, and I will now give one. I have suggested already that the causal theory of taste representsitself as a reconciliationof the two intuitively conflicting species of common sense, and that the reconciliation fails. I shall now show through a reading of the language of Hume'sessay both how Hume'ssubstantivetheory of taste fails to reconcile the conflict, and how the failure is related to the theory being a causal theory. The fact that the passages discussed are all from Hume's essay supportsthe interpretiveaim of this paper.The commentary on the passages supportsthe philosophicalaim. The passage whereHumegives his accountof the standardof taste is well known:

240 [S]trongsense, united to delicate sentiment,imand provedby practice,perfectedby comparison, can clearedof prejudice, aloneentitlecriticsto this valuablecharacter: the joint verdictof such, and of wherever areto be found,is thetruestandard they taste.4 Implicit in the above five-fold criteria indeed being our criteriafor the person of good aesthetic taste are certain assumptions about the epistemology and logic of judgments of aesthetic taste, namely,those assumptionsfound in Hume's second version of common sense aesthetics, the criterialtheory.We will go on to consider a more detailed account which might be given of these five differentcriteria.Such an account appeals to causal theorists because they think it representsall thatthe criterialtheorycan legitimately claim. I will show that, in orderto interpretthe five criteriafor the possession of taste in a way which makes them consistent with its own picture, the causal theory has to transmogrify the criteria, from what I believe are their real selves in their role in the projectof criterialjustification, into spuriousanaloguesin the project of causal explanation. The causal theory's view makes art criticism far more like the diagnosis and cure of pain, for example, than in fact it is. Such a transmogrification thus the deeply misrepresents activity of artcriticism and the making of judgmentsof aesthetic taste. I shallproceedby discussingin turneach of the above five criteriafor being the person of good taste,5and then presentsome generalremarks.
III. DELICACY JUDGMENTS OF TASTE IN OF TASTE

The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism at the same time so exact as to perceiveevery ingredient in the composition, this we call delicacy of taste, whetherwe employ these terms in the literal or metaphorical[namely gustatoryor aesthetic] sense."6Nonetheless, as in the previous case of good sense with regardto mattersof taste, the proprietyof a certain general formula to cover both the causal accountand the criterial account disguises very substantial differences between the two accounts. One gets a very good sense of what the model of gustatorytaste is supposedto show aboutaesthetic taste from consideringa story from Don Quixote.7The story is well known. Sancho pretends to delicacy of taste as regardswine, and claims it is hereditary.Two of his kinsmen, he relates, each pronounceda certain hogsheadexcellent. One, though, qualified the claim of excellence by noting a slight taste of leather,while the other qualified it by noting a slight taste of iron. When the hogsheadwas emptiedtherewas found at its bottom an old iron key with a leathern thong attached.That story,for the purposes of the causal theory,purportsto illustratehow it is thata persongets establishedas a possessor of delicacy of taste, so thathis pronouncements become a standardof taste, using an example of gustatory taste as a model. The story indeed does illustrateprecisely that point. But how the story illustratesit must be set out carefully. Hume in fact misrepresents case as origithe nally told by Cervantes.8The two kinsmen do not "pronouncethe wine to be good." One simply says it has a flavor of iron; the other,merely smelling it, says it has the flavor of leather.No evaluationis made. The misrepresentation inis structive.To see this, let us begin with a simpler case yet. Suppose a numberof people are asked to discriminatebetween two very similar wines. No matterhow we mix up the samples, Gabriel gets them right every time, and the others are less successful. Even if we can not distinguish the wines ourselves,we now do know enough to conclude that Gabrielhas a more delicate palate than any of us. He is able to make discriminations we cannot make. So in the future we take Gabriel's word on the differences between wines. This case, though, is not a matterof applying a taste-predicateto the wines, butjust of saying they are different. With actual tastepredicates,the business is trickier. will be reWe luctant to take Gabriel'sword that the wine is

Hume begins his actual discussion of the standard of taste with what will turn out to be a deeply misleading analogy-that between aesthetic taste and gustatorytaste. In regardingdelicacy of taste as essential to the person of good taste, Hume has common sense on his side. Part of whatwe mean by aesthetictaste is exactly the ability to make finer, subtler,more delicate discriminations in the aesthetic qualities of artworks, just as by gustatory taste we mean that same ability with regard to flavors, textures, aromas, and so forth. The following language puts this point very well: "when the organs are so fine as to allow nothing to escape them, and

Shiner Hume and the Causal Theoryof Taste flinty, or impertinent, or has a slight taste of leatheror iron, if no one else ever pronouncesit to be flinty or ferric, althoughwe would be perfectly within our logical rights to do so.9 But if several people also so pronounce,then, even if we can not taste those qualities ourselves, we might well believe Gabriel.If key and thong are produced, of course, or if oenologists correlate tasted flintiness with a certain chemical structureand the wine is shownto have thatstructure, then Gabriel'sreputationas a person of delicacy of taste is made, and is rightly so made. Why, however, is it necessary to go through all of these complicatedroutines in orderto establish Gabriel's credentials as a possessor of delicacy of taste? Here is anothercase. Suppose Uri claims to have X-ray eyes. He tells us what is inside all kinds of closed boxes and what is behind brickwalls. We do all we can to rule out fraud,and Uri still keeps on telling us what is in those boxes and behind those walls. Here, the crucial step in the business is our own ability to see independently what is in the boxes-because a claim about what is in the boxes is a claim aboutwhat is in the boxes, not aboutwhat is in Uri's head or in ours. This crucial featureis absent in the wine case. There is no way of independentlychecking on someone else's claims aboutthe wine's flintiness except by exercising that ability which ex hypothesi in the Gabriel cases we the others do not have-the ability to taste the flintiness of wines. This absence of an independent check is part of what inclines philosophers to say that the flintiness of the wine, unlike the toy-containingnessof the box, is a matterof what is inside our heads, not what is inside the bottles-that it is, in otherwords, a secondary quality.10We find out that the wine tastes flinty as we find out thatthe box contains toys-by the testimony of our senses. But for a wine to yield a certain testimony to our senses seems plausiblyjust what it is for that wine to taste flinty. For a certainbox to yield on its being opened a certaintestimonyto our senses is not at all what it is for that box to contain toys-what it is for the box to satisfy the criteriafor toy-containingness-even though it is by the testimony of our senses that we see the box to satisfy the criterionof what it is for a box to contain toys. judgNow, the crucialissue for understanding ments of aesthetic taste, and so for philosophical aesthetics, is this: is the possession of an aes-

241 thetic quality by an artworkin this respect like the possession of sweetness or flintiness by a wine, or like the possession of toy-containingness by a box? Is the vindication of a judgment of aesthetic taste like the vindication of a judgment of flintiness or like the vindication of a The causalthejudgmentof toy-containingness? ory in fact opts unambiguouslyfor its own version of the wine model:"thoughit be certainthat beautyand deformity,more than sweet or bitter, are not qualities in the object, but belong entirely to the sentiment ..."; "to produce these general rules [namely, general rules of beauty] or avowed patternsof composition, is like finding the key with the leathernthong, which justified the verdict of Sancho's kinsmen, and confounded those pretended judges who had condemnedthem"(p. 235.10-11, 30-34). But to opt for the wine model in this way is a mistake. Suppose there is a general rule that dynamic tautnessas a qualityof pieces of music is a function of a range of structural propertiesof pieces of music. Suppose too one critic who claims to have the complex response of sensing dynamic tautness after hearing Beethoven's Late Quartets but not afterhearinga set of Sousa marches. Suppose anothercritic who claims to have exactly the same non-complex sentiments after hearingthe Late Quartetsas after hearing a set of Sousa marches, and to sense no dynamic tautnessin the Late Quartets.Then, the discovery of the relevant structuralproperties in the Late Quartets vindicates the judgment of the first criticoverthejudgmentof the second critic, and does somethingto forwardthe claims of the first critic to possess delicacy of taste. The process of vindication Hume himself characterizes with perfect accuracy: princiButwhenwe show[thebadcritic]an avowed by this ple of art;whenwe illustrate principle examfromhis ownparticular taste, ples,whoseoperation, to to he acknowledges be conformable theprinciple; maybe apwhenwe prove,thatthe sameprinciple or case,where didnotperceive he pliedto thepresent
feel its influence: He must conclude ... that he wants

thedelicacy, whichis requisite makehim sensible to of everybeautyandeveryblemish,in anycompositionor discourse. 236.9-18) (p. There are two stages in bringingout how the procedureof vindicating aesthetic taste is mis-

242 representedby the likening of it to the vindication of Sancho's kinsmen's judgments in the wine case. First, note that the judgment about the Late Quartets is vindicated by pointing to propertiesof the Late Quartets,not by pointing to properties of the critic's sentiment. As the above quotationindicates, it is the artworkand not the sentimentwhich conforms to the principle. In that way, the aesthetic case is like the case where one points out the stuffed bear, nerf ball, and jumping jack to vindicate the claim about the toy-containingness of the box. There is, by contrast, no property of the taste other than its flintiness to which one can point in order to vindicate a claim about its flintiness. One can only again presentthatpropertythe existence of which is in dispute-its flintiness.1 It will be said, however, second, that I have failed to grasp the point of the story about Sancho's kinsmen. The point of thatstory is to bring out how indeed we are no more helpless when faced with the task of vindicating a judgmentof gustatorytaste than we are when faced with the task of vindicatinga judgmentof aesthetictaste. In either case there are generalrules and principles. The general rule that an old key with a leathern thong tied to it produces a ferric and leatherntaste in wine is a prettyunsophisticated general rule. Modern oenology with its understandingof the chemical structureof wine has a repertoire of suitably more sophisticated general rules of the same kind. Likewise, there are generalrules connectingcertainharmonicstructures, meters, and rhythms with dynamic tautness in pieces of music. The vindication of delicacy of taste in either context proceeds by the applicationto particularcases of generalrules. All this is true, of course.But it is quitebeside the point. The fact thatwe may at a high level of abstractnessdescribe two processes of vindication as each proceeding by the application to particularcases of general rules is quite compatible with significant differences in underlying logic between the two processes. We may vindicate the claim that two particulartriangles are congruentby applying general rules for the congruency of triangles. We may vindicate the claim that a substance will relieve pain by applying generalrules for the reductionof pain. It does not follow from that similaritythat geometry as a discipline has the same logical form as In microbiology. the geometrycase, one is apply-

The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism ing generalrules of criterial justification, and in the microbiology case one is applying general rules of causal explanation. So also, gustatory taste and aesthetic taste differ in thatthe general rules appealed to in the search for vindication are in the formercase generalrules of causal explanation and in the latter case generalrules of criterial justification. The causal theory obscures this fact. It does so in partbecause in the things it says aboutdelicacy of taste it conflates differentsenses of the key term "composition."In the passage quoted above (p. 236.9-18), we find reference to beauty and blemishes in compositions, and talk of qualities "in a continued composition," and "avowedpatternsof composition."12There are four different candidates in these different remarks for being a "composition"-the tastesentiment, the wine, the aesthetic sentiment, and the artwork. The causal theory regards these as logically interchangeable; that is a but mistake. The wine is a "composition"of molecules of this, that, and the other; science, rather than delicacy of taste, will fill out the story.The taste-sentiment may be a "composition" of flinty, ferric, and leathern elements, and delicacy of gustatorytaste indeed is what it takes to differentiate the elements in this "composition."13 Moreover,the two "compositions"are quite different entities, and one may perfectly well be able to perceive every ingredientin the "composition"that is the taste without having the first idea about, or even the first idea about how to acquirethe first idea about,the "ingredients" in the "composition"that is the wine. In the aesthetic case, however,it only makes sense to speak of the possessor of aesthetic taste as perceiving every "ingredient"in the "composition" that is the artwork. Dynamic tautness or feeble sentimentalityare propertiesof artworks, not of sentimentsarising in the critic. The critic is claiming to find dynamic tautnessin the Late Quartets, and not in a sentiment in her head. There are no aesthetic taste-sentiments which are in the same way as gustatory taste-sentiments "compositions"in their own right, independently of (or, rather,having only causal dependence on) that of which they are sentiments. It is not that there are no aesthetic taste-sentiments. There are; by having them we find out that artworkshave aesthetic properties. But in developing and exhibiting delicacy of aesthetic

Shiner Hume and the Causal Theoryof Taste that taste, we are discriminating"compositions" are artworks,not sentiments.The causal theory of judgments of aesthetic taste gets a foothold only because of an illicit parallelism with judgments of gustatorytaste.
IV. PRACTICE OF JUDGMENT OF TASTE

243 of sophical interpretations these plain facts. On the causal theory's view, in the first case one is learning to discriminatesentimentsthat arise in one as a result of tasting different wines. The model here is the way that a cook might learn to discriminatethe taste caused by the inclusion of nutmeg or cumin in sauces. So also, then, in the second case, surveyinga species of beautyis on this same view a matter of examining sentiments that arise in one as a result of listening to modernEasternEuropeanstringquartets.However, as part of a line of thoughtwhich pretends to respect the intuitionsbehind the criterialtheory, the causal theory claims thatpractice so understoodenables one to "perceivethe severalexcellences of the performance,"14 and the merits or defects of the objects. This way lies a fundamental inconsistency.The first type of language deployed by the causal theory can only say that these merits and excellences are other sentiments. But if they are other sentiments, then they are not properties of the object or of the performance.The causal theory borrows from the criterial theoryclaims thatwe intuitivelywant to make, forgettingthatits deferenceto the internalist view makes these claims unintelligible. We may also talk aboutthe feeling becoming "moreexact and nice" (p. 237.21-22). This too is equivocal. The feeling itself might become more exact and nice, in the sense thatone is able to sense and characterizethe feeling itself more nicely and exactly-the pleasureone is now experiencing, one learns to realize, is exquisite in not quite just the same way as the pleasureone experiencedfive minutesago. Think how the art of making love is learnt. But the causal theory does not mean only and precisely that. It also wants the feeling to be "moreexact and nice" in this furthersense, that it is a more exactly and of nicely faithful representation the qualities of that which caused the feeling. As a resultof this "more exact and nice" feeling, the theory believes, one will now be able to perceive "the beauties and defects of each part,"not just diffusedly perceive the whole object, and to perceive also "the distinguishing species of each quality"(p. 237.22-23). But nothing entitles the causal theory to imply in this way thatbeautyis something thatbelongs to an object. We may also speak in terms of "the very degree and kind of approbation or displeasure which each part is naturallyfitted to produce"

Hume believes, as indicated,that practicein the making of judgments of taste is relevant to whethera personcan be said to be a possessor of good taste and an exemplifierof the standardof taste. The view is intuitively plausible, and unquestionablya partof common sense aboutjudgmentsof aesthetictaste. It is well worthinquiring into how such a view might arise. There is of course an importantdistinction between an obscureand confusedsentimentand a clearanddistinct sentiment.The more one is presentedwith a certain artwork or kind of artwork, the more one's sentimentswill in all likelihoodcease to be obscureand confused and change to being clear and distinct.Trueaestheticappreciation requires clear and distinct sentiments, and not obscure and confusedones. To none of these observations can one really,fromeithera commonsensical a or philosophicalpoint of view, take exception. But the same problem arises here as has arisen in other cases of the supposed distinguishing criteriaof the person of taste-at first sight all that epistemic terminology (and note that it is epistemic terminology) belongs to the criterialtheory.To put forwardits own view, the causal theory has to take the terminology over and reconstructit in its own terms. To see the difficulties that are thereby produced for the causal theory, look again at the terminological shifts. "Practice" may be glossed as the "frequent of surveyor contemplation a particular species of beauty,"and the inexperiencedmind thoughtof as "obscure confused,"and incapableof proand nouncing concerning merits and defects (p. 237.9-12). These thoughtsare innocentenough, butthey mustbe properlyunderstood. The causal them. theory does not properlyunderstand The following are plain facts. One will not learn to discriminatebetween clarets unless one tastes a lot of different clarets. Moreover,one will not learn to discriminatemodern Eastern Europeanstring quartetsunless one listens to a lot of modern EasternEuropeanstringquartets. There are, however, different possible philo-

244 (p. 237.26-27). This thoughtis on one reading perfectly consistent with the causal theory. "Naturallyfitted" does not have to be taken as denoting a criterialrelationbetween the properties of an object and the judgmentof its artistic merit. The phrase may be taken as referringto an instantiationof laws in what was once called "moralscience"; but then such laws must concern what sentimentsare causedby whatkind of object. The causal theory now however makes the same kind of illegitimate move as it has made before. It follows up such talk with talk about the mist hanging over the object dissipating, and the organ being able to "pronounce, withoutdangerof mistake, concerningthe merits of every performance"(p. 237.30-31). On the causal theory's view, however, performances, as objects, do not have properties or meritsto be accuratelydiscerned.
V. COMPARISONS IN JUDGMENTS OF TASTE

The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism the painting-by-numbers-adorned living-roomof one's neighbor.One may find arisingin one different sentiments in the first case from those which arise in the second case, and that the sentiments in the first case are more satisfyingly pleasurablethan the sentiments in the second case. In each case, one would not have the firstnamedsentiments,and thereforewouldnot know what one now knows about what pleasurescan arisein one as a causalresultof the experienceof objects, unless one has experiencedthe two differentkinds of object. So comparisons an imare portantpartof whatproducesgood criticalsense. This psychologistic, causal account is all the causaltheory is allowed to claim aboutthe value of comparisonsin the developmentof taste. One already moves beyond what one is allowed by the causal theory to claim if one offers, as a descriptionof whatis happening,thatwe havehere a case of the comparisonof objects ratherthan a comparisonof the pleasures caused by objects. The causal theory is wont to make such a slide. It slides from saying thata personcomparesdifferent kinds of beauty construed as different sentimentscaused to arise inside that person, to saying that in makingjudgmentsof taste one is seeing, examining, and weighing artistic performances, not sentiments(p. 238.33-37). But such a slide is illegitimate.The sentimentcaused to arise in a personand the artworkaretwo quite differentkinds of things, and the relevantcomparisonsmustbe betweeneitherinstancesof one kind or instances of the other kind. There is no way of consistentlymaintainingthatthey are instances of both kinds.
VI. PREJUDICE IN JUDGMENTS OF TASTE

Hume quite properly notes that being able to carry out and having carriedout comparisonsis relevantto the possession or otherwise of good taste: "a [person] who has had no opportunityof comparing the different kinds of beauty, is indeed totally unqualified to pronouncean opinion with regardto any object presentedto him" (p. 238.17-19). The criterialtheory explains the relevance very easily by saying that in art criticism one is comparing one artwork with another. The causal theory cannot avail itself of this answer.The causal theory must tell instead the following story about the kind of comparison involved in good art criticism. A good critic is one who has discovered empirically that the results of using a comparative procedureproduce in one a differentrange of sentiments,and that these afford to one differentand ultimately more satisfying pleasures. For example, in the realmof gustatorytaste, one may vary one's diet between hamburgersand nouvelle cuisine. One finds that different sentiments occur in one while eating at Chez Panisse from those which occur in one while eating under the Golden Arches, and one finds that the former sentiments are more pleasurable than the latter. If one had not undergone the two sets of gastronomic experiences,one would not be able to discriminate the resultant pleasures. So also, one may go to MOMA or the Uffizzi as well as to

Another claim that Hume makes is that prejudice can disqualify a person from being a possessor of taste. Again, the criterialtheory will not disagree. The intuitively correct core of the way that the thoughtmay be spelled out is twofold: (a) "allownothing to enterinto [one's]consideration,but the very object which is submitted to [one's] examination." That is, do not allow the fact that one was thrownfrom a horse at the age of six to blind one to the merits of a Stubbs painting; do not allow the fact that a poem seems to describe exactly how one felt when one's cat died to blind one to the feeble sentimentalityof the lines. (b) Do not use the

Shiner Hume and the Causal Theoryof Taste standards of the twentieth-century post-war New Yorkartworldto judge the merits of Attic vase painting, fourteenth-centuryaltar pieces, or Cape Dorset prints: do not rashly condemn what seemed admirable in the eyes of those for whom alone the discourse was calculated (pp. 239-240, esp. 239.3-4 and 239.28-33). The causal theory, however,is defending not merely the truthof these truisms.It is defending a particular theoretical account of aesthetic taste. Bearingthat in mind, let us ask why, intuitively, one shouldnot do the things the previous paragraphpicks out? Why are these pieces of advice to the critic indeed examples of good advice from the point of view of normative aesthetics? The causal theory unsurprisinglygives the answer that its deference to the internalist view requires: "every work of art, in order to produceits due effect on the mind, must be surveyed in a certain point of view" (p. 239.5-6). But note the kind of case outside aesthetics to which such words most properly apply. Hume himself mentions such cases: as A manin a feverwouldnotinsiston hispalate able nor to decide concerning flavours; wouldone, affected with the jaundice,pretendto give a verdict thereis a with regardto colours.In each creature,
sound and a defective state .... (p. 233)

245 that"bythis means [namely,not being in the correct position] [one's] sentimentsare perverted." either in These expressionscould be interpreted terms of the causal theory or the criterialtheory opposed to it (pp. 232.29-31; 239.36-240.2; 239.8-9; 239.27-28; and 239.35-36). Yet other expressions, which seem to emerge naturally from the foregoing, make sense as proper characterizationsof aesthetic appreciation only on the criterialtheory,a view which is not compatiblewith the internalisttheory or the causal theory. Such would be talk about "either throwinga false light on objectsor hinderingthe true from conveying to the imagination the propersentimentand perception."Or the comment that the critic of an orator'sperformance "mustplace himself in the same situationas the audience,in orderto form a truejudgmentof the oration." Without doing this, the critic's taste "evidentlydeparts from the true standard,and of consequence loses all credit and authority" (pp. 234.15-18; 239.19-20; and 240.2-4). The oratorneeds to attunethe speech to the context of the particularaudience in order to be a successful orator.The critic of the speech needs to know the same facts about the audience and about how to cause differentkinds of effects in differentkinds of audiencesin orderto be a successful critic-that is, one who can judge correctly the quality of a speech. All these latterremarksshow very well what is wrong with a prejudicedjudgment: it is not objective; it is not a response to things as they are. The prejudiced judgmentsturnout to be not true; they do not conform to the true standard, the standardset by those whose judgments are true. These commonplaces,however,have epistemological presuppositions. The presuppositions are that for a set of judgmentsto be capable of being prejudiced,they must be judgments about the nature of some object; they may be prejudicedor not just in case they arejudgments answerableto and corrigibleby facts aboutfeatures of the object. If a judgment to the effect that a vase is beautiful, for example, satisfies these epistemologicalpresuppositions, then such a judgment cannot be simply an expression of the fact that there is caused to arise in the speakera certain sentiment.If a judgmentabout beauty can really be prejudiced, then beauty cannot be simply an internal sentiment merely causally connected to a certain object. In short,

The cases worklike this. Every drug, in orderto produce its due effect on the body, must be ingested in a certain condition of the body-my mother, for example, was not allowed to eat cheese because it interfered with the effective operation of certain antidepressantdrugs she was taking. Some forms of words make a commitment to the mechanical model clear: "the least exteriorhindranceto such small springs,or the least internaldisorder,disturbstheir motion, and confounds the operationof the whole machine." In this vein, one may also say: "norhave the same beautiesand blemishesthe same influence upon [a personinflamed by prejudice]as if he had imposed a properviolence on his imagination, and had forgotten himself for a moment."This terminologyis unabashedlycausal. Thereis also availableterminologywhich is theory-neutral:the language of a situationfor surveying "not conformable to that which is requiredby the performance,""the point of view which the performancesupposes,"and the idea

246 certain perfectly correct intuitions about how prejudiceis a fault in art criticismcannotbe reconciled with the causal theory.Whenjudgments of beautyare reconstructedto make them fit this view, "prejudice"turns out to be analogous to not following propermedical advice. But that is not an availableconceptualmodel for prejudice in judgments of aesthetic taste, nor does that model explain why prejudiceis normativelyundesirablein art criticism.
VII. GOOD SENSE IN JUDGMENTS OF TASTE

The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism if [R]eason, not an essentialpartof taste,is at least requisite the operation this latterfaculty. all to of In thenobler of productions genius,there a mutual is relationandcorrespondence parts; caneither of nor the beautiesor blemishesbe perceived him whose by is thought not capacious all enoughto comprehend those partsand compare them with each other,in orderto perceivethe consistency uniformity and of thewhole.(p. 240.11-18) This deployment good sensein artcriticism, of unlike in science for instance,is not an end in itself, however: Everyworkof arthas also a certainend or purpose for whichit is calculated; is deemed be more and to orlessperfect, it is moreor less fittedto attain as this
end. The object ... of poetry [is] to please, by means

"Good sense" most plausibly means15 a sound general awareness of how the world is and works-a sound general awareness of, as it might be put, relations of ideas and matters of fact. The requirementof "good sense" in fact embodies an importantinsight, thoughone must take care in recoveringit. The specific reasons Hume is inclined to give for the claim thatgood sense is a prerequisitefor the good critic are expressiveof eighteenth-century sensibilities,those very sensibilities of propriety,form, and order to which the romantic sensibilities of the nineteenth century are so much a reaction-"every kind of composition, even the most practical,is nothing but a chain of propositionsand reasonings"; "the persons introduced in tragedy and epic poetry must be representedas reasoning, and thinking, and concluding, and acting, suitably to their character and circumstances" (p. 240.26-28, 30-33). However, contra the eighteenthcentury,one may now from the point of view of art criticism, as of art itself, wish to acknowledge the legitimate place of the irrational, the erotic, the romantic,and so on in art. Nonetheless, these acknowledgments do not imply letting go of the insight in these expressions of eighteenth-century sensibilities. The insight is two-fold: (a) the worldof an artworkhas to be to a good degree like our world if the artwork is to be appreciatedat all, let alone appreciated aright;(b) appreciationof this likeness is essential to appreciationof the artwork,and appreciationof this likeness is not in itself only a matterof aesthetic appreciation. Considersome of Hume'smore detailed musings about the notion of good sense, expressed again in the languageof eighteenth-century sensibilities:

of the passionsandthe imagination. Theseendswe mustcarryconstantly our view whenwe peruse in anyperformance; we mustbe ableto judgehow and far the meansemployed adapted theirrespecare to tivepurposes. 240.18-26) (p. These comments are intuitively very reasonable and commonsensical.It might seem therefore that, in making them, one must be simply presentingthe criterialview. Such an impression would be a mistake.Thereis an ambiguityin the last clause, an ambiguitypresentalso in otherremarksone may feel drawnto make in characterizing good sense about matters of taste: talk about "due attention to the object," "a natural fittedness to excite agreeable sentiments,""authority over the minds of men," and the like (pp. 232.36; 233.23-26). The ambiguityis the following. If the purposeof some substanceis to cause a feeling to arise in its consumer-a drug to relieve pain or blow the mind, for instancethen, if one is to "be able to judge how far the means employed are adaptedto their respective purposes," there are things that one needs to know and to which one should duly attendnamely, the composition of the substance in question and of other substances, and the powers of substancesso composed. If the purposeof presentinga certain fact is to illustrateor refute or confirm a certain hypothesis or knowledgeclaim, then, if one is to "be able to judge how far the means employed are adaptedto theirrespective purposes,"thereare likewise things thatone needs to know and to which one should duly at-

Shiner Hume and the Causal Theoryof Taste tend-namely, criterialrules and implications. One needs to know thatthe hypothesisor knowledge-claim is logically open to illustration or refutationor confirmationby a case of a certain kind, as well as whetherthe case offered is indeed of thatkind. Considerthe role played in the appreciation of certain kinds of paintings by iconographicalknowledge; or of certain kinds of poetry by the ability to discern allusions.16It is true that it is not a misuse of certain expressions in our languageto offer them as characterizations coveringeach of these two differentsets of purposes and judgments about means to achieve those purposestaken in themselves and Nonetheless,the two sets are very independently. differentin their logic. The relationbetween an effect and its cause is very differentfrom the relation between a concept and its criteria. In thinking about good sense in matters of taste, these differences are fundamental and must not be blurred. If, as the internalistview implies, a thesis aboutthe aesthetic qualityof an artworkis primarilya thesis aboutthe existence of a certain sentiment and derivativelya thesis about the capacity of the work to produce that sentimentin people, then such a thesis cannot at the very same time be a thesis aboutthe criterial appropriatenessof a given characterizationof that artwork. The logic of judgments of taste cannotboth be as the internalistview has it and respect the very analogies between appreciation and reason which the criterialview implies. To think that the causal account represents aright all the featuresof the epistemology and logic of judgmentsof aesthetictaste to which the criterial theory directs attention is just a mistake. The same language is used in the statementof each accountlittle more than homonymously.Insofar as the causal theory denies an inconsistencybetweenthe two lines of thoughtbecauseof the similarityof language,the causaltheory is in error.
VIII. CONCLUSION

247 story to be told about that connection between the sentiment and the artwork as a result of which the aestheticjudgmentis made. But neither of these causal stories have anything to do with the vindication of these judgments as sensory and as aesthetic judgments respectively. The causal story may lead to the defeat of either judgmentin otherways "too darkto see properly"; "too drunk to notice"; "does not speak Russian"17-but these ways of defeating aestheticjudgmentshave nothingto do with criterial vindication. The difference between gustatory and taste-discrimination aesthetictaste-discrimination which the causal theory obscuresis that gustatory taste-discriminationis only open to this latterkind of defeat, and moreover,for such discriminationsuch a defeat really is the defeat of a claimed vindication.There is no defeat of a criterial claim, for taste-properties are, as it might be put, simple and unanalyzable:they have no criteria.To defeat a claim aboutthe taste of a wine, we can only show that the conditions for the existence of, or for sufficient evidence of the existence of, the propercausalconnectionare not met. With judgments of aesthetic taste, as with sensory judgments, we can show that and more-that the artworkeither has or does not have certain aesthetic properties-and this ''more"is really what aesthetictaste is all about. The causal theory is committed to beauty being a sentimentor feeling internalto the critic which is causedby the artworkratherthanbeing a propertyof the artworkexternal to the critic. The theory correctly sees that any plausibletheory of aesthetic taste must assert a connection betweenthe contentof the judgmentof taste and the properties of the artwork. It also correctly sees that the natureof this connection must be such as to underwrite idea thatthereare genthe uine standardsof taste. It also sees that,given its deferenceto the internalistview, the only option there is for a plausibletheory of that connection is to say thatit is a causal one. The theory therefore defends a causal accountof the judgmentof taste. However,the causaltheory also thinksthat in defendinga view of the standardof taste consistentwith and thus deferentialto the internalist theory,it is also meeting the demandsof the criterialtheory for an explanationof why some critical norms and subtendedjudgments are better than others.The causal theory is, I have argued, fundamentallymistakenin thinkingthis.

Let me now try to summarizethe results of my examination of the original five criteriafor the possession of aesthetic taste. It must be conceded to the causal theory that there is a causal story to be told about that connection between the sensory experience and the box as a result of which the judgment of toycontainingnessis made. So also thereis a causal

248 Why does the causal theory fail to see the error of its ways? I suggest that there are two reasons. First, the theory is misled by the language it intuitivelyuses. There are certainforms of words which are neutral as between the causal theory and the criterial theory. These words characterizeelements of both the causal theory and the criterialtheory. So it is easy to move from there to thinking that given these words apply to elements of both views, then the same conclusions that follow from their applicability to the common sense view also follow from them on the causal theory.That is simply a mistake. Second, the causal theory is led deeply astrayby the wine-tasting analogy.In wine-tasting as in art criticism, tasteful appreciationis a matter of sensing finely discriminated differences. In wine-tasting, as in love-making, a central place is occupied by the sensing of finely discriminateddifferences in the qualities of experiences. The vindication of such judgments, which in turnvindicates claims to possess taste, is based on known causal explanations of the origins of the experience.The causal theory sees the above-mentioned similarity between aesthetic and gustatorytaste. It sees also the appropriateness of a certain story about the vindication of gustatorytaste. It sees also thatif its view of aesthetic taste were to stand even the slightest chance of compatibilitywith the criterialtheory, some story about what it is to vindicate judgmentsof aesthetic taste will have to be told. It sees that the story will have to be one which likens the vindication of aesthetic taste to the vindication of gustatorytaste as so interpreted. The causal theory slides from these insights into thinking both that the vindication of aesthetic taste is indeed as the theory requiresit to be, and that by such a story the legitimate demands of the criterial theory are met. Again, the causal theory is simply mistaken.18
ROGER A. SHINER

The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism

1. Unless otherwise specified, the source of the quotations in this paperis the edition of David Hume's essay "On the Standardof Taste"in Essays Moral,Political and Literary, ed. Eugene F. Miller (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, cf. 1967). For the words in this paragraph, pp. 230, 233. 2. See FrederickStoutland, "The Causal Theory of AcStudies tion," in Essays on Explanationand Understanding: in the Foundationsof Humanitiesand Social Sciences, eds. Juha Manninen and Raimo Tuomela (Boston: D. Reidel, 1976), p. 272. 3. Gareth Evans, "The Causal Theory of Names," Proceedings of the AristotelianSociety: Supplementary Volume 47 (1973): 187-208; p. 191, Evans's italics. He is referring to Kripke's"Naming and Necessity," in Semantics of Natural Language,eds. D. Davidson and G. Harman(Boston: D. Reidel, 1972), pp. 253-355. 4. Cf. Hume, p. 241; the words are Hume's summary at the end of the business part of his discussion. 5. I follow the orderin which Hume actuallytreatsthe criteria, ratherthan in the order in which they appear in his summary. 6. Cf. Hume, p. 235, lines 20-24 (I shall henceforthcite such referencesparenthetically the form "p.235.20-24"). in 7. Cf. Hume, pp. 234-235. 8. I am gratefulto DabneyTownsendfor pointing this out to me. 9. Hume himself remarkson the difficulty of provingdelicacy of taste under such circumstances, though he insists the delicacy would still have been there. Cf. pp. 235.34236.1. 10. I do not mean to imply by this that tastes are what philosophers have been calling "secondary qualities"qualitiesexisting only in the mind. I mean to imply only that the featureof their logic which I refer to is genuinely a feature of their logic. For a fuller statement of my view, see "Sense-experience,Colours, and Tastes,"Mind 88 (1979): 161-178. 11. This too is part of what inclines philosophersto call flintiness a secondary quality,and the same disclaimers as in note 10 apply. 12. Cf. Hume, p. 235.26-27, 30. Cf. also the comment about "perceiv[ing]every ingredientin the composition"in the passage on p. 235.20-24, and p. 236.23-25, "a mixture of small ingredients, where we still are sensible of each part." 13. Wine buffs do after all talk aboutthe "complexity" of wines as tasted;differentelements of the taste are correlated with differentparts of the palate. 14. Cf. Hume, p. 237.13-14; my emphasis. 15. Cf. Hume, pp. 240-241. Hume refers to the capacity in the body of the discussion as "strongsense," and in the summaryas "good sense." 16. If it is well established that a certain animal symbolizes the Virgin Mary,then interpretations implying a different referentare refuted. Certain lines cannot be an allusion to Milton'sParadiseLost if the poem contains no lines with any such comparablecontent. 17."Supposethata Russianwho does not know English is overwhelmed by a sonnet admitted to be good. We would say that he doesn't know what is in it at all." Ludwig Wittgenstein, Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, and Religious Belief (University of California Press, 1967), p. 6.

Departmentof Philosophy 4-108 HumanitiesCentre Universityof Alberta Edmonton,Alberta CanadaT6G 2E5

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Shiner Hume and the Causal Theoryof Taste

18. There have been a numberof earlier versions of this paper,presentedto the CanadianPhilosophicalAssociation, and the WesternC. P. A.; to the AmericanSociety for Aesthetics national meeting and to its Pacific Division; and to the Universities of Glasgow, Houston, Hull, and TexasAustin. Invaluablecriticism on these occasions and others has been received from Jack Bricke, Allen Carlson, Noel

249
Carroll,TedCohen, GarryHagberg,PeterJones,PeterKivy, Alex Neill, David Raynor,the late Eva Schaper,the late Flint Schier, Fred van de Pitte, and Jan Zwicky. I would also like to thanktwo anonymousrefereesfor TheJournalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism. I take complete responsibility for everything said in the paperin its presentform.