(DRAFT) Manifestation Ad Cautelam Superabundanti - 12 September 2012

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES SUPREME COURT MANILA EN BANC
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, - versus SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION), EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., ET AL., Respondents. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, - versus SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION), EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., ET AL., Respondents. x----------------------------x REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, - versus G.R. No. 180702 EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., ET AL., Respondents. x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x JOVITO R. SALONGA, WIGBERTO E. TAADA, OSCAR F. SANTOS, ET AL., Petitioners-Intervenors. G.R. No. 169203 G.R. No. 166859
MANIFESTATION
AD CAUTELAM SUPERABUNDANTI
WITH REQUEST FOR ADVISORY OPINION
RE: NULLITY OF JUDGMENT
MANIFESTATION AD CAUTELAM SUPERABUNDANTI WITH REQUEST FOR ADVISORY OPINION G.R. No. 166859, G.R. No. 169203 & G.R. No. 180702 x---------------------------------------------x
IN G.R. NOS. 166859, 169203, AND 180702, REPUBLIC V. SANDIGANBAYAN, EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., ET AL.
PETITIONERS-INTERVENORS JOVITO R. SALONGA, WIGBERTO E. TAADA, OSCAR F. SANTOS, ET AL., now joined by concerned partiescoconut farmer-groups, on behalf of their members and of all their coconut farmer-brethren, and their families who stand to be affected by the apparent lapse into finality of the DECISION (re: G.R. Nos. 166859, 169203, and 180702, otherwise known as Republic v. Sandiganbayan, Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., et al., rendered on 12 April 2011) and by citizens fully cognizant of considerations of substantial justice and issues of transcendental importance and far-reaching consequences, implications, and effects that underpin the said DECISIONon the stability, integrity, and reliability of the precedential value of the Courts jurisprudence, the Rule of Law, the very fabric of Philippine history, and the lives and welfare of a fourth of the countrys populationby themselves and by counsels, unto this Honorable Court, most respectfully avers: 1. That the filing of the instant MANIFESTATION is motivated and prompted solely by:
(a) their deep-seated concern for the welfare of the countrys 3.5 million coconut farmerswho, together with their families, number in the upwards of 20 million Filipinos; representing, a fourth of the countrys total populationwho stand to lose the fruits of their labors, i.e. the coconut levies that were imposed, exacted, and collected upon the sweat of their brow; and (b) their profound respect for the integrity of this most Honorable Supreme Court, and the immutability and stability of its judgments, and (c) their fear of the damaging and disastrous consequences of giving effect to and countenancing the execution of a null and void judgmentwell-placed fear that is founded upon and find justification in the reasons and circumstances set forth in this Manifestation; 2. That pursuant to Rule 3, Section 1 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court (hereinafter, INTERNAL RULES), this Manifestation is being filed, with full faith and confidence in the Supreme Court as a court of law and a court of equitywhich recognition brings with it, the promise that, owing to the special circumstances obtaining in this case, this Honorable Supreme Court may yet apply equity and relax and/or suspend its own
Rules in order to legitimately remedy the iniquitous situation that the enforcement of the above-referenced void judgment shall indubitably bring about; 3. That, whereas it has been traditionally regarded that the Supreme Court does not render advisory opinions, this Honorable Courts INTERNAL RULES, Rule 3, Section 3 has signaled a shift in this tradition by stating that: [the] Court cannot issue advisory opinions on the state and meaning of laws, or take cognizance of moot and academic questions, subject only to notable exceptions involving constitutional issues. [Emphasis added.] For the reasons set forth below and the circumstances that characterize and uniquely obtain in this case, this Manifestation, likewise, prays for an Advisory Opinion: for, indeed, the question remains, given the factual, legal, historical, and social context of the instant caseibi jus, ibi remedium; equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy: what remedy is there left for a people in search for social justice?
PREFATORY STATEMENT The truth is not always the same as the majority decision. - Blessed John Paul II
Ayon sa Desisyon ng Korte Suprema nung ika-12 ng Abril 2011, walang maliwanag na depinisyon ng nakaw na yaman, kung kayat simple lamang ang tanong: meron nga ba o wala? Dahil kung meron naman pala at sa halip nito, lumikha ang KataasTaasang Hukuman ng sarili nitong depinisyong kanyang pinagbatayan ng kanyang desisyonhindi bat paglabag ito sa alituntunin ng Saligang Batas na nagtatakdang maliwanag dapat na tinutukoy at ilinalahad ang pinagbabatayang tamang batas? At kung meron namang maliwanag na batas na siyang dapat gawing batayan, para saan at bakit babalangkas pa ng panibagong depinisyong nagtataas ng antas ng ebidensiyang kailangan upang patunayan ang mga reklamo sa kasong ito? Makatarungan bang dahil sa depinisyong itong nagtaas ng nibel ng pruwebang kailangan ay sabay sasabihing, hindi na ito kayang abutin? Itinaas ng isang kamay ang timbangan ng hustisya, at sa kabila namay ibinaba ang hatol, dapat pa bang ikagulat na hindi ito magpang-abotat sa gayung paghusga, hindi ba masakit sa tainga, kung saka sasabihing kulang at kulang pa? Tanong ng Taong-Bayan It is not everyday that the Supreme Court has the opportunity to decide a case whose resolution impacts the lives and welfare and very existence of a fourth of the countrys population. It is not everyday that the converse of the adagejustice delayed is justice deniedis proven true: as when the Court rushes to judgment. It is not everyday that denying the peoples prayer for
reconsideration is tantamount to a denial of the opportunity to be heard. It is not everyday such a denial would threaten to leave the Court in that state. It is not everyday that errors result, not from questions of lawthat is, from their interpretation, which is the sole jurisdiction of the Courtbut from questions of existence1that is, whether or not the law even exists: that duty and obligation to know is addressed to all citizens, as the Law itself excuses not ignorance from compliance. It is not everyday that partial summary judgments that result and emanate from the same caseCivil Case No. 33Fare in conflict with each other. It is not everyday that an anachronistic anomaly results in so much injustice: as when, failing to note the temporal dimension of stare decisis, the Court promulgates a decision 10 months later whose resolution is and would have been essential to an earlier decisionespecially considering that they are part and parcel of the same case. It is not everyday that a case is parted and its decisions are parceled out that partial summary judgments result in partial and incomplete justice. It is not everyday that the Courts latter

While one may concede that the Courts decisions may, at times, be philosophical, there are those better suited to provide answers to questions of existence and existential questions, such as the foremost Jesuit Filipino philosopher, Fr. Roque Ferriols, as when he writes in his opus, PAMBUNGAD SA METAPISIKA: xxx pagpasyang manatili sa meron: at iyan ang ibig sabihin ng manatili sa katotohanan. Ang taong nakadarama na katutubo sa kanya ang mabuhay sa meron, kapag kusang loob niyang inaangkin itong katutubong kalagayan na ito siya ay tutubuan ng paninindigan na hindi siya mangangahas magsalita ng labag sa meron, sa talagang totoo. Siya ay magiging taong makatotohanan.
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decision effectively overturns its own final judgmentby answering the essential issues that the Court itself had earlier deemed unproven, if not, inconclusivethereby changing the complexion and ratio decidendi of that earlier decision; rendering any attempt to execute such apparently final and executory judgment inequitable and unjust. When, in the span of 10 months, however, such days come and cohere around the same case, the resulting situation is not just unfortunate, but painfully tragicas it is the countrys poorest of the poor who are left to endure the errors of the past, all the days of their lives and for generations to come. Indeed, while it is in the interest of the Republic for all litigation to come to an endnot so, when the interests of the people and their quest for social justice do not meet their rightful end: Justice. When the Court denied the existence of a legal definition of ill-gotten wealth, it omitted to state the law in its Decision: that has been in existence since 1986 in Section 1(A) of the same PCGG Rules that it used to invalidate the Republics writs of sequestration; the same definition of ill-gotten wealth that was substantially replicated in 1991 in Republic Act No. 7080, Plunder Law; the same definition that became part of the law of the land, when it was adopted by the Court in the 2005 case of
Republic v. Estate of Hans Menzi; the same definition which the Court unanimously adopted in 2012, in the case of Republic v. COCOFED. The Courts denial of the existence of the law defining ill-gotten wealth is not a mistake upon a correct interpretation of the lawthat is, question of lawrather, it is a fatal error that offends Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution as that requires that the decisions of any court state, as its basis, the pertinent law. Lacking the pertinent basis in law, the judgment rendered therein is, thus, voidand shall, therefore, never become final and neither can it be a source of rights. The Republics duty and right to recover ill-gotten wealth is an effort of paramount and transcendental importanceand all the matters, issues, and cases relative to such efforts are sui generis. Nowhere is this truer than in this ill-gotten wealth case, particularly pertaining to the coco levy cases. And while, indeed, it is in the interest of the Republic for all litigation to come to an endnot so when it deprives the Republic of an opportunity to be heard, and denies 20 million Filipinos the answers and the justice they seek. In 2012, the Court itself issued a supervening ruling, Republic v. COCOFED, that answered the questions that it posited in the April 2011 DECISION: the existence of a
definition of ill-gotten wealth, and the legal nature and essence of the United Coconut Planters Bank and the CIIF Oil Mills as public corporations. Given these factual legal premises and circumstances, the DECISION being a patent nullity and there being supervening circumstances that have occurred since that DECISION had apparently become final (making its execution unjust and inequitable), it is but right for the Court to set aside and cast out its earlier rulingthis DECISION falling under the recognized exceptions to immutability. A country whose Court is without a sense of history will have a history devoid of sense. In many ways, these efforts are bound up with the struggle to right the wrongs of history. Rarely ever do the scales of Justice weigh: on the one hand, 3.5 million coconut farmers and their families, nearly 20 million Filipinos in all, and on the other, one individualand where the Courts choice is to stand with the former or to stand by its own error. As history itself is still being written, it is not yet too late for the Court to right its own history and write, too, the story of the Filipino coconut farmers nearly 4-decade long struggle.
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FACTUAL LEGAL PREMISES

I. THE JUDGMENT RENDERED IN G.R. NOS. 166859, 169203, AND 180702, REPUBLIC V. SANDIGANBAYAN, EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., ET AL. IS VOID, AS IT OFFENDS ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION, INSOFAR AS IT REQUIRES THAT NO DECISION SHALL BE RENDERED BY ANY COURT WITHOUT EXPRESSING CLEARLY AND DISTINCTLY THE FACTS AND THE LAW ON WHICH IT IS BASED. THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRRED WHEN IT DECLARED THAT THERE IS NO EXPLICIT DEFINITION OF ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH AND PROCEEDED UPON THAT ERROR TO DISCERN THE MEANING OF ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH, INEXPLICABLY PAYING NO MIND TO SECTION 1 OF THE PCGG RULES AND REGULATIONS DEFINING ILL-GOTTEN WEALTHWHEN, IN FACT: (i) THIS DEFINITION HAS BEEN IN EXISTENCE SINCE 11 APRIL 1986, WHEN THE PCGG RULES AND REGULATIONS (PCGG RULES) WAS PROMULGATED AND WHICH SAME PCGG RULES, THE COURT USED TO INVALIDATE THE PCGGS WRITS OF SEQUESTRATION (SECTION 3) IN ITS DECISION; THE FOREGOING DEFINITION IS SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR TO THE DEFINITION OF ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH UNDER R.A. 7080, PLUNDER LAW; ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH, AS DEFINED UNDER SECTION 1 OF THE PCGG RULES BECAME PART OF THE LAW OF THE
(ii)
(iii)
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(iv)
LAND, AS EARLY AS 2005, HAVING BEEN ADOPTED IN THE CASE OF REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ESTATE OF HANS MENZI, G.R. NO. 152578TO WHICH CASE, RESPONDENT COJUANGCO WAS A PARTY; AND THE DEFINITION OF ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH WAS AGAIN AFFIRMED AND ADOPTED BY THE COURT IN ITS 24 JANUARY 2012 RULING IN REPUBLIC V. COCOFEDCONCURRED IN, EVEN BY THE SAME MAGISTRATES WHO HAD DENIED ITS EXISTENCE 10 MONTHS EARLIER.
ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION IS PREMISED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE COURT APPLIES THE PERTINENT AND APPLICABLE LAW; THUS, WHERE ANY COURTTHAT IS, INCLUDING THE SUPREME COURTPROCEEDS UPON A GRAVELY MISTAKEN BELIEF THAT A LAW DOES NOT EXIST AND, WORSE, SUBSTITUTES ITS WISDOM FOR THE WISDOM OF THE LAW, THE COURT MAY BE SAID TO HAVE ACTED IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION AND ITS RESULTING JUDGMENT IS VOID. SUCH JUDGMENT BEING VOID, IT MAY NEVER BECOME FINAL AND NEITHER MAY IT BE A SOURCE OF RIGHTS. II. THIS HONORABLE COURTS REPEATED EXPUNCTIONS (AND NOT DENIAL) OF SUBSEQUENT AND SUCCESSIVE MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION AND/OR OMNIBUS MOTIONS, ON NO BASIS OTHER THAN ITS FIRST RESOLUTION PROHIBITING THE FILING OF FURTHER PLEADINGS VIOLATES DUE PROCESS AS IT PREJUDGES THE MERITS OF SUCH SUBSEQUENT PLEADINGS AND FORECLOSES THE POSSIBILITY THAT HIGHER
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INTERESTS OF JUSTICE MAY BE SERVED BY ALLOWING THE SAME, AS PROVIDED UNDER THE INTERNAL RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT, RULE 15, SECTION 3IN ADDITION TO THE UNIQUE, PECULIAR, AND SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT ATTENDED THEIR EXPUNCTION; CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH, ALL TAKEN TOGETHER, VIOLATES DUE PROCESS, THEREBY RENDERING VOID THE JUDGMENT IN G.R. NOS. 166859, 169203, AND 180702, REPUBLIC V. SANDIGANBAYAN, EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., ET AL. III. SUPERVENING EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCESINCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE FACT OF THE COURTS SUPERVENING UNANIMOUS RULING IN G.R. NOS. 177857-58 AND 178193, PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC. (COCOFED), ET AL. V. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL.ESSENTIALLY AND EFFECTIVELY SUPERSEDE AND OVERTURN THE APPARENTLY FINAL AND EXECUTORY JUDGMENT IN G.R. NOS. 166859, 169203, AND 180702, REPUBLIC V. SANDIGANBAYAN, EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., ET AL. THE SAME SUPERVENING EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES MAKE THE EXECUTION OF THE PURPORTEDLY FINAL JUDGMENT UNJUST AND INEQUITABLE, CONSIDERING THAT BOTH RULINGS PERTAIN TO AND ARISE FROM THE SAME CASE: CIVIL CASE NO. 33-F. IV. OTHER SUPERVENING EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SINCE THE JUDGMENT IN G.R. NOS. 166859, 169203, AND 180702, REPUBLIC V. SANDIGANBAYAN, EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., ET AL. PURPORTEDLY ATTAINED FINALITY
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WOULD MAKE ITS EXECUTION UNJUST AND INEQUITABLE. V. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THERE WAS GROSS NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF SOME OF THE REPUBLICS COUNSELS, THE DECISION OF APRIL 12, 2011 WOULD UNJUSTLY AND UNFAIRLY DEPRIVE THE REPUBLIC AND THE FILIPINO PEOPLE OF DUE PROCESS AND A REAL OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD. VI. MATTERS, ISSUES, AND CASES INVOLVING OR RELATING TO THE REPUBLICS DUTY AND RIGHT TO RECOVER ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH ARE SUI GENERIS; THUS, IN ORDER TO MEET THE SUBSTANTIAL ENDS OF JUSTICE AND, IN THIS CASE, A MATTER OF TRANSCENDENTAL IMPORTANCE, AS EQUITY DICTATES, A PRO HAC VICE DECISION MUST BE RENDERED IN FAVOR OF THE REPUBLICAND THE 3.5 MILLION FILIPINO COCONUT FARMERS AND THEIR FAMILIES WHO HAVE HAD TO ENDURE THE NEARLY FORTY YEAR QUEST FOR JUSTICE.
DISCUSSION
I. THE JUDGMENT RENDERED IN G.R. NOS. 166859, 169203, AND 180702, REPUBLIC V. SANDIGANBAYAN, EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., ET AL. IS VOID, AS IT OFFENDS ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION, INSOFAR AS IT REQUIRES THAT NO DECISION SHALL BE RENDERED BY ANY
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COURT WITHOUT EXPRESSING CLEARLY AND DISTINCTLY THE FACTS AND THE LAW ON WHICH IT IS BASED. THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT DECLARED THAT THERE IS NO EXPLICIT DEFINITION OF ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH AND PROCEEDED UPON THAT ERROR TO DISCERN THE MEANING OF ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH: INEXPLICABLY PAYING NO MIND TO SECTION 1 OF THE PCGG RULES AND REGULATIONS DEFINING ILL-GOTTEN WEALTHWHEN, IN FACT: (I) THIS DEFINITION HAS BEEN IN EXISTENCE SINCE 11 APRIL 1986, WHEN THE PCGG RULES WAS PROMULGATED AND WHICH SAME PCGG RULES, THE COURT USED TO INVALIDATE THE PCGGS WRITS OF SEQUESTRATION (SECTION 3) IN ITS DECISION; THE FOREGOING DEFINITION IS SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR TO THE DEFINITION OF ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH UNDER
(II)
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(III)
(IV)
R.A. 7080, PLUNDER LAW; ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH, AS DEFINED UNDER SECTION 1 OF THE PCGG RULES BECAME PART OF THE LAW OF THE LAND, AS EARLY AS 2005, HAVING BEEN ADOPTED IN THE CASE OF REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ESTATE OF HANS MENZI, G.R. NO. 152578TO WHICH CASE, RESPONDENT COJUANGCO WAS A PARTY; AND THE DEFINITION OF ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH WAS AGAIN AFFIRMED AND ADOPTED BY THE COURT IN ITS 24 JANUARY 2012 RULING IN REPUBLIC V. COCOFED CONCURRED IN, EVEN BY THE SAME MAGISTRATES WHO HAD DENIED ITS EXISTENCE 10 MONTHS EARLIER.
ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION IS PREMISED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE
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COURT APPLIES THE PERTINENT AND APPLICABLE LAW; THUS, WHERE ANY COURTTHAT IS, INCLUDING THE SUPREME COURT PROCEEDS UPON A GRAVELY MISTAKEN BELIEF THAT A LAW DOES NOT EXIST AND, WORSE, SUBSTITUTES ITS WISDOM FOR THE WISDOM OF THE LAW, THE COURT MAY BE SAID TO HAVE ACTED IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION AND ITS RESULTING JUDGMENT IS VOID. SUCH JUDGMENT BEING VOID, IT MAY NEVER BECOME FINAL AND NEITHER MAY IT BE A SOURCE OF RIGHTS. In his 2010 Dissenting Opinion in Apo Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank of the Philippines,2 Justice Bersamin conceded that the immutability doctrine admits several exceptions, such as: (a) the correction of clerical errors; (b) the nunc pro tunc entries that cause no prejudice to any party; (c) void judgments; and (d) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable. This DECISION is unfortunate as it falls under two of the latter exceptionsremoving it from the ambit of the immutability doctrine.
G.R. No. 164195. 12 October 2010, Dissenting Opinion.
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In Roberto Albaa, et al. v. Pio Judge S. Belo,3 the Supreme Court, speaking through J. Leonardo-De Castro, had the occasion to state that: [t]he purpose of Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution is to inform the person reading the decision, especially the parties, of how it was reached by the court after a consideration of the pertinent facts and an examination of the applicable laws. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to a higher court, if permitted, if he believes that the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is especially prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. Thus, a decision is adequate if a party desiring to appeal therefrom can assign errors to it. [Emphasis added.] The teleological purpose of Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution bears particular significance to the Supreme Court, as it is premised on the assumption that its decisions are reached after a consideration of the pertinent facts and an examination of the applicable laws4and because judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.5 The Supreme Courts power to settle questions of law presupposes that its determination is based on the applicable law; thus, the oftrepeated refrain that the law is what the Supreme Court says it

G.R. No. 158734. 2 October 2009. Ibid. 5 Article 8, Civil Code of the Philippines.
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is. When, however, the Supreme Court finds not the law and, rather, declares its absenceand decides, based on what it fills into that gapin clear contravention of the factual reality, then the resulting decision may be clear and distinct, but no less questionable. The Supreme Courts prerogative to pronounce the meaning of the laws does not exclude and wrest from the citizens duty to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat.6 While the Supreme Court has the final say on the interpretation and meaning of the laws, everyone can and should be able to say whether or not such laws exist. Absence of proof is not proof of absencemoreso, when there is proof of existence. In George Yao v. Court of Appeals,7 the Supreme Court spoke as to the imperative character of Article VIII, Section 14: Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is indisputably a paramount component of due process and fair play. It is likewise demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution. The parties to a litigation should be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y and just leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for its action. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to the higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that

Article 3 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides that [i]gnorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. Corollary to this is Article 7 which states that, [l]aws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary. [Emphasis added.] 7 G.R. No. 132428, 24 October 2000.
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does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from deciding ipse dixit. Vouchsafed neither the sword nor the purse by the Constitution but nonetheless vested with the sovereign prerogative of passing judgment on the life, liberty or property of his fellowmen, the judge must ultimately depend on the power of reason for sustained public confidence in the justness of his decision. Thus the Court has struck down as void, decisions of lower courts and even of the Court of Appeals whose careless disregard of the constitutional behest exposed their sometimes cavalier attitude not only to their magisterial responsibilities but likewise to their avowed fealty to the Constitution. Thus, we nullified or deemed to have failed to comply with Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, a decision, resolution or order which: contained no analysis of the evidence of the parties nor reference to any legal basis in reaching its conclusions; contained nothing more than a summary of the testimonies of the witnesses of both parties; convicted the accused of libel but failed to cite any legal authority or principle to support conclusions that the letter in question was libelous; consisted
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merely of one (1) paragraph with mostly sweeping generalizations and failed to support its conclusion of parricide; consisted of five (5) pages, three (3) pages of which were quotations from the labor arbiters decision including the dispositive portion and barely a page (two [2] short paragraphs of two [2] sentences each) of its own discussion or reasonings; was merely based on the findings of another court sans transcript of stenographic notes; or failed to explain the factual and legal bases for the award of moral damages. In seeking to justify and rationalize its additional requirement for the Republic to furnish to the Sandiganbayan in proper judicial proceedings the competent evidence proving who were the close associates of President Marcos who had amassed assets and properties that would be rightly considered as ill-gotten wealth, this Honorable Court resorted to an elaborate construction of the term ill-gotten wealth based upon the mistaken supposition that an explicit definition of ill-gotten wealth does not exist in the Executive Orders and other issuances, relating to the PCGG and its mandates. This Court, thus, stated that:
Although E.O. No. 1 and the other issuances dealing with ill-gotten wealth (i.e. E.O. No. 2, E.O. No. 14, and E.O. No. 14-A) only identified the subject matter of ill-gotten wealth and the persons who could amass ill-gotten wealth and did not include an explicit definition of ill-gotten wealth, we can still discern the meaning and concept of ill-gotten wealth from the WHEREAS Clauses themselves of E.O. No. 1, in
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that ill-gotten wealth consisted of the vast resources of the government amassed by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives and close associates both here and abroad. It is clear, therefore, that ill-gotten wealth would not include all the properties of President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates but only the part that originated from the vast resources of government.8 [Emphasis added.]
In its DECISION, while the Court, admittedly, took pains to justify and defend its elaborate construction of the term illgotten wealth, it did so only as an exercise of judicial legislation: in light of the fact that such a definition has been in existence since 11 April 1986, under the same PCGG Rules that it used to invalidate the Republics writs of sequestrationthe same definition that this Honorable Court would revert to in its January 2012 ruling in Republic v. COCOFED!
Contrary to the Courts foregoing disclaimer, the definition of ill-gotten wealth is already part of the law of the land, having been adopted by the Supreme Court En Banc, in the 2005 case of Republic of the Philippines v. Estate of Hans Menzi9, which case involved, among others, the Respondent Cojuangco:
These pieces of uncontradicted evidence suffice to establish that the 198 and 214 blocks are indeed ill-gotten wealth as defined under the Rules and Regulations of the PCGG, viz:

8 9
The Decision, pp. 45-46. G.R. No. 152578. 23 November 2005.
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Sec. 1. Definition.(A) Ill-gotten wealth is hereby defined as any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of persons within the purview of Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 2, acquired by them directly, or indirectly thru dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any of the following means or similar schemes: (1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury; (2) Through the receipt, directly or indirectly, of any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the official concerned; (3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or controlled corporations; (4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation in any business enterprise or undertaking; (5) Through the establishment of agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combination and/or by the issuance, promulgation and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; and (6) By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship or influence for personal gain or benefit.
This same definition of ill-gotten wealth is found in Republic Act No. 7080 (Plunder Law, as amended by R.A. 7659), Section 1(d):
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Ill-gotten wealth means any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes: 1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury; 2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer concerned; 3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; 4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking; 5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or 6) By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
Most tellingly, less than 10 months since the DECISION was promulgated, the Honorable Court promulgated its decision in the case of Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. v.
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Republic of the Philippines, on 24 January 2012 (JANUARY 2012 RULING), the Supreme Court En Banc, voted unanimously (11-0) and once more acknowledged and adopted the definition of illgotten wealththat is, those who concurred included the Ponente of the DECISION and the six (6) other Members of the Supreme Court who voted in favor of that DECISION that denied the existence of the definition of ill-gotten wealth. In that JANUARY 2012 RULING, the Court said: Correlatively, the PCGG Rules and Regulations defines the term Ill-Gotten Wealth as any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of persons within the purview of [E.O.] Nos. 1 and 2, acquired by them directly, or indirectly thru dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any of the following means or similar schemes: (1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury; (2) .; (3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or controlled corporations; (4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation in any business enterprise or undertaking;
25
(5) Through the establishment of agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combination and/or by the issuance, promulgation and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; and (6) By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship or influence for personal gain or benefit.[75] (Emphasis supplied) It boggles the mind, therefore, how the Court in its DECISION could deny the existence of ill-gotten wealth, under Section 1 of the PCGG RULESespecially since in that same DECISION it had used Section 3 of the same PCGG RULES to invalidate the PCGGs Writs of Sequestration! As such, when the Court attempted to discern the meaning and concept of ill-gotten wealth from the WHEREAS Clauses xxx and tried to divine and construe a definition from cases (it asserted to be defining ill-gotten wealth)it had acted in grave abuse of discretion and in excess of its constitutionallydefined authority and jurisdiction, as it substituted its wisdom for the wisdom of the law. In doing so, the Court did not merely resort to statutory construction, rather it engaged in judicial legislation by proposing a definition.
26
This Honorable Court has had numerous occasions10 to discuss the condition sine qua non before it may proceed to construe or interpret the law, as it once again did in the case of United Paracale Mining Company, Inc., and Coco Grove, Inc. v. Honorable Joselito Dela Rosa,11 when it explained that:
xxx. A condition sine qua non before the court may construe or interpret a statute is that there be doubt or ambiguity in its language. xxx. Time and again, it has been repeatedly declared by this Court that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation. There is only room for application. Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says and the court has no choice but to see to it that its mandate is obeyed. [Emphasis mine.]
Contrary to this Honorable Courts introductory discussion and rationale for the Courts statutory construction of the concept of ill-gotten wealthand without satisfying the immediately quoted condition sine qua non for resorting to statutory constructionthe ostensibly missing definition, in fact and in law, clearly exists and is plainly defined under the PCGG RULESand that definition is clear and unambiguous, on top of being extant.

Agpalo, Ruben, Statutory Construction (2009), p. 124, footnote number citing Banawa v. Mirano, G.R. No. 24750, May 16, 1980, 97 SCRA 517; Resins, Inc. v. Auditor General, G.R. No. 17888, October 29, 1968, 25 SCRA 754; Guevara v. Inocentes, G.R. No. 2557, March 15, 1966, 16 SCRA 379. 11 G.R. Nos. 63786-87, April 7, 1993.
10
27
Instead of serving the purposes of Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution, the fact that the DECISION made reference to Section 3 of the PCGG RULES as basis for invalidating PCGGs Writs of Sequestration in G.R. No. 166859 and, in the same breath, denied and completely omitted any reference to Section 1 of the same PCGG RULES, OR R.A. 7080, OR Republic v. Estate of Hans Menzi only makes clear and more tragic the fact of its fatal omission. Res ipsa loquitur. In that DECISION, building upon its earlier error, the Court concluded that: As a result, the Republic needed to establish its allegations with preponderant competent evidence, because, as earlier stated, the fact that property was ill-gotten could not be presumed but must be substantiated with competent proof adduced in proper judicial proceedings. The foregoing conclusion having been derived from the wrong, erroneous, and mistaken premisethat is from the Courts made-up definitionis, therefore, likewise wrong, erroneous, and mistaken. In fact, contrary to the foregoing conclusion, the PCGG RULES defines what may be deemed prima facie ill-gotten wealth:
SECTION 9. Prima facie evidence.Any accumulation of assets, properties, and other
28
material possessions of those persons covered by Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 2, whose value is out of proportion to their known lawful income is prima facie deemed ill-gotten wealth.
and it is to the PCGG, consistent with its quasi-judicial function,12 that the primary investigation and determination of what may be considered ill-gotten wealth is entrusted, as a plain reading of Section 7 of the PCGG RULES, on the Conduct of investigations clearly provides:
SECTION 7. Conduct of investigations.The Commission may conduct a hearing, after due notice to the party or parties concerned within the purview of Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 2, to ascertain whether any particular asset, property or enterprise constitutes ill-gotten wealth and to determine the appropriate action to be taken in order to carry out the purposes of said Executive Orders. xxx [Emphasis mine.]
Even assuming that resort to statutory construction was proper, it is respectfully submitted that this Honorable Court misappreciated, by taking out of context, the doctrinal values of the cases of Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co., Inc. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government (BASECO), Presidential Commission on Good
Government v. Lucio C. Tan (TAN), Francisco I. Chavez v. Presidential

12
Commission
on
Good
Government

That the PCGG is entrusted with this function has been settled in various decisions of the Court, and more recently in the case of Jesus T. Tanchanco v. The Honorable Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 141675-96, (November 25, 2005): xxx the PCGG was granted quasi-judicial functions encompassing special investigatory and prosecutorial powers, among them, the power to grant immunity.
29
(CHAVEZ), on the one hand, and the cases of Republic of the Philippines Roman v. Hon. Jr. v. Eutropio Migrino (MIGRINO), (CRUZ, JR.),
Cruz,
Sandiganbayan
Republic of the Philippines v. Major General Josephus Q. Ramas (REPUBLIC), on the otherto which cases this Honorable Court adverted to in construing its constricting definition of ill-gotten wealth. By the simple expedient of restoring the portions of the same paragraph that this Honorable Court opted to omit, and by underscoring the final sentence, the excerpted portion of Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co., Inc. v. Presidential
Commission on Good Government can then and finally be said to be properly contextualized, as follows:
a. Sequestration By the clear terms of the law, the power of the PCGG to sequester property claimed to be illgotten means to place or cause to be placed under its possession or control said property, or any building or office wherein any such property and any records pertaining thereto may be found, including business enterprises and entities,for the purpose of preventing the destruction, concealment or dissipation of, and otherwise conserving and preserving, the sameuntil it can be determined, through appropriate judicial proceedings, whether the property was in truth ill-gotten, i.e., acquired through or as a result of improper or illegal use of or the conversion of funds belonging to the Government or any of its branches, instrumentalities, enterprises, banks or financial institutions, or by taking undue advantage of official
30
position, authority, relationship, connection or influence, resulting in unjust enrichment of the ostensible owner and grave damage and prejudice to the State.44 And this, too, is the sense in which the term is commonly understood in other jurisdictions.45 [Emphasis mine.]
A plain reading of the restored (previously) omitted and emphasized portions leads to the following inescapable inferences: (a) The Court meant to define the adjective ill-gotten, and not the term ill-gotten wealth. In fact, the adjective illgotten was meant to describe propertyand nowhere in the paragraph does the word wealth appear. (b) The Courts so-called definition of ill-gotten (and not ill-gotten wealth) was propounded in the context of sequestration, and not as a definition of or in order to define ill-gotten wealth, as can be clearly seen from the fact that the afore-quoted excerpt is under the sub-topic a. Sequestration, AND from a reading of the following underscored and emphasized ever-important footnotes which footnotes were, tragically, omitted from the DECISIONs excerpt: (i) Footnote No. 44: Except for the statement as to the duration of the writ of sequestration, this is substantially the definition of sequestration set out in Section 1(B) of the Rules
31
and Regulations of the PCGG (Rollo, pp. 195-196). The term is used in the Revised Anti-Subversion Law, (P.D. No. 885, to mean the seizure of private property or assets in the hands of any person or entity in order to prevent the utilization, transfer or conveyance of the same for purposes inimical to national security, or when necessary to protect the interest of the Government or any of its instrumentalities. It shall include the taking over and assumption of the management, control and operation of the private property or assets seized (reiterated in P.D. No. 1835, the Anti-Subversion Law of 1981, repealed by P.D. No. 1975 prom. On May 2, 1985) (See Phil. Law Dictionary, Moreno, 1982 ed., pp. 568-569). (ii) Footnote No. 45: As employed under the statutory and code provisions of some states, the writ of sequestration is merely, but essentially, a conservatory measure, somewhat in the nature of a judicial deposit. It is a process which may be employed as a conservatory writ whenever the right of the property is involved, to preserve, pending litigation, specific property subject to conflicting claims of ownership or liens and privileges * * 79 C.J.S., 1047. In Louisiana. A mandate of the court, ordering the sheriff, in certain cases, to take in his possession, and to keep, a thing of which another person has the possession, until after the decision of a suit, in order that it be delivered to him who shall be adjudged entitled to have the property or possession of that thing. * *. Bouviers Law Dictionary, 3rd Rev., Vol. 2, p. 3046. Sequester means, according to Blacks Law Dictionary, to deposit a thing which is the subject of a controversy in the hands of a third person, to hold for the contending parties; to take a thing which the subject of a controversy out of the possession of the contending parties, and deposit it in the hands of a third person. [Emphasis added.] (c) If the Court wanted to define ill-gotten wealth, it could have simply back tracked, a few paragraphs prior, considering
32
that the term Sequestration was denominated as Section 1(B) while Ill-gotten wealth exists under Section 1(A) in the PCGG RULESthe existence of which Rules, one could safely assume that the Court then was well-aware of, having alluded to the same in Footnote No. 44. This Honorable Courts characterization of Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Lucio C. Tan, as a reiteration of [t]he BASECO definition of ill-gotten wealth; thus, requires ample clarification. First, as in BASECO, the Court in TAN, referred to the so-called definition, again, only in relation to sequestration. Second, based on the portions of TAN excerpted by this Honorable Court in its Decision, inasmuch as it was deemed relevant to define ill-gotten wealth, the Court in TAN characterized the so-called definition as a descriptionand not a definition. As such, it disclaimed in the following wise:
On this point, we find it relevant to define ill-gotten wealth. In Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Co., Inc., this Court described ill-gotten wealth as follows xxx [Emphasis mine.]
Finally, context is just as important in understanding the proper and real doctrinal value of the so-called identical definition of ill-gotten wealth that this Honorable Court
33
referenced in CHAVEZ. In CHAVEZ, the Courts discussion of The Nature of the Marcoses Alleged Ill-Gotten Wealth was made in the context of the subject of matters of public concern and imbued with public interest. The paragraph following that which this Honorable Court excerptedbut conveniently omitted to the Decisions unfortunate inconvenienceoffers the following illuminating exposition as to the purpose of its inquiry:
We believe that the foregoing disquisition settles the question of whether the petitioner has a right to respondents disclosure of any agreement that may be arrived at concerning the Marcoses purported illgotten wealth.
As the foregoing admits and contextualizes, it is not an announcement of an aim to proclaim a definition of illgotten wealth. As this Honorable Court wrestled to grapple with what it found to be the difficulty that is inherent in the process of identifying other persons who might be the close associates of former President Marcos, it referred to the cases of MIGRIO, CRUZ, JR., and RAMASalbeit needlessly and without legal justification, again, since the condition sina qua non for such excursion in statutory construction was not met and, thus, unnecessary. In doing so, this Honorable Court announced the following erroneous inference, [a]gain, through [the previously
34
enumerated rulings], the Court became the arbiter to determine who were the close associates within the coverage of E.O. No. 1. With all due respect to this Honorable Court, it is humbly submitted that a fuller and comprehensive reading of the foregoing trio of cases reveals the impropriety of deriving such a conclusion. Thus, the following survey: (a) A reading of the case of MIGRIO reveals that [t]he most important question [it] resolved xxx [was] whether or not private respondent may be investigated and caused to be prosecuted by the Board, an agency of the PCGG, for violation of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379. (b) In the case of CRUZ, JR. the Court found that [w]hat the petitioner is actually charged with is for a violation of Republic Act No. 3019. xxx (c) Finally, in the case of RAMAS, the Court, referring to the two other cases of CRUZ, JR. and MIGRIO, said that:
This case involves a revisiting of an old issue already decided by this Court in Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan and Republic v. Migrino. The primary issue for resolution is whether the PCGG has the jurisdiction to investigate and cause the filing of a forfeiture petition against Ramas and Dimaano for unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379.
As the foregoing survey clearly shows, quite contrary to this Honorable Courts conclusion that the Court became the
35
arbiter to determine who were the close associates within the coverage of E.O. No. 1, the trio of cases all involved as an issueNOT the determination of who the close associates were within the coverage of E.O. No. 1, but instead, the jurisdiction of the PCGG to investigate cases involving public officials and employees for violations of either R.A. No. 3019 or R.A. No. 1379. (The Courts answer to the old issue beingquite logically and plainly, that the PCGG has no such jurisdiction.) Unfortunately, in the process of furthering its construction of the concept of ill-gotten wealth, the Court once again relied upon BASECO to derive the [unavoidable requirement of] competent evidentiary substantiation made in appropriate
judicial proceedings to determine: (a) whether the assets or properties involved had come from the vast resources of government, and (b) whether the individuals owning or holding such assets or properties were close associates of President Marcos. The requirement of competent evidentiary substantiation made in appropriate proceedings was imposed because the factual premises for the reconveyance of the assets or properties in favor of the government due to their being ill-gotten wealth could not be simply assumed.
36
At this juncture, reference to the pertinent portions of BASECO must be made:

6. Governments Right and Duty to Recover All Ill-gotten Wealth There can be no debate about the validity and eminent propriety of the Governments plan to recover all ill-gotten wealth. Neither can there be any debate about the proposition that assuming the above described factual premises of the Executive Orders and Proclamation No. 3 to be true, to be demonstrable by competent evidence, the recovery from Marcos, his family and his minions of the assets and properties involved, is not only a right but a duty on the part of Government. But however plain and valid that right and duty may be, still a balance must be sought with the equally compelling necessity that a proper respect be accorded and adequate protection assured, the fundamental rights of private property and free enterprise which are deemed pillars of a free society such as ours, and to which all members of that society may without exception lay claim. xxx Democracy, as a way of life enshrined in the Constitution, embraces as its necessary components freedom of conscience, freedom of expression, and freedom in the pursuit of happiness. Along with these freedoms are included economic freedom and freedom of enterprise within reasonable bounds and under proper control. xxx Evincing much concern for the protection of property, the Constitution distinctly recognizes the preferred position which real estate has occupied in law for ages. Property is bound up with every aspect of social life in a democracy as democracy is conceived in the Constitution. The Constitution realizes the indispensable role which property, owned in reasonable quantities and used legitimately, plays in the stimulation to economic effort and the formation and growth of a solid social middle class that is said to be the bulwark of democracy and the backbone of every progressive and happy country. a. Need of Evidentiary Substantiation in Proper Suit Consequently, the factual premises of the Executive Orders cannot simply be assumed. They will have to be duly established by adequate proof in each case, in a
37
proper judicial proceeding, so that the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth may be validly and properly adjudged and consummated; although there are some who maintain that the fact that an immense fortune, and vast resources of the government have been amassed by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates both here and abroad, and they have resorted to all sorts of clever schemes and manipulations to disguise and hide their illicit acquisitions is within the realm of judicial notice, being of so extensive notoriety as to dispense with proof thereof. Be this as it may, the requirement of evidentiary substantiation has been expressly acknowledged, and the procedure to be followed explicitly laid down, in Executive Order No. 14. [Underscoring added.]
Indeed, as this Honorable Court emphasized in bold face, BASECO enunciates that the Republics right and duty to recover all ill-gotten wealth must be balanced with the respect for fundamental rights. In this regard, the Court in BASECO, referred to Executive Order No. 14 in the requirement of evidentiary substantiation as having been expressly
acknowledged and as explicitly [laying] down [the procedure to be followed]. Before referring to Executive Order No. 14that which BASECO declaims as the source for the acknowledgment of the requirement of evidentiary substantiation as well as explicitly laying down the procedure [to be followed]the following pertinent observations must be registered. (a) First, the above-excerpted portion of BASECO refers to the right and duty to recover ill-gotten wealth, this much
38
can be seen from the plain reading of the title of the sections discussion: 6. Governments Right and Duty to Recover All Illgotten Wealth and the above underscored portion that reads so that the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth may be validly and properly adjudged and consummated. (b) The two issues that this Honorable Court in its Decision of April 12, 2011 requires competent evidentiary substantiation made in appropriate judicial proceedings are matters relevant to the CHARACTERIZATION of any asset, property, business enterprise or material possessionor anything, for that matter AS ill-gotten wealth. As the foregoing reading of BASECO revealsand what BASECO refers to is the right and duty, that is, the ACT OF RECOVERING ill-gotten wealth. Contrary to what this Honorable Court alludes to as its basis for requiring the foregoing, the factual premises that BASECO refers to as that which cannot be assumed are NOT the factual premises for the reconveyance of the assets or properties in favor of the government due to their being ill-gotten wealth [Emphasis added] that this Honorable Court states, rather, as BASECO plainly writes: the factual premises of the Executive Ordersthat is, the factual premises of Executive Orders and Proclamation No. 3. BASECO clearly spells out and
39
identifies these premises, in the exhaustive discussion preceding that which this Honorable Court quoted:
4. The Governing Law a. Proclamation No. 3 The impugned executive orders are avowedly meant to carry out the explicit command of the Provisional Constitution, ordained by Proclamation No. 3,23 that the President-in the exercise of legislative power which she was authorized to continue to wield "(until a legislature is elected and convened under a new Constitution" "shall give priority to measures to achieve the mandate of the people," among others to (r)ecover ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime and protect the interest of the people through orders of sequestration or freezing of assets or accounts." 24 b. Executive Order No. 1 Executive Order No. 1 stresses the "urgent need to recover all ill-gotten wealth," and postulates that "vast resources of the government have been amassed by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates both here and abroad." 25 Upon these premises, the Presidential Commission on Good Government was created, 26 "charged with the task of assisting the President in regard to (certain specified) matters," among which was precisely* * The recovery of all in-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship. 27 In relation to the takeover or sequestration that it was authorized to undertake in the fulfillment of its mission, the PCGG was granted "power and authority" to do the following particular acts, to wit: 1. To sequester or place or cause to be placed under its control or possession any building or office wherein any ill-gotten wealth or properties may be found, and any records
40
pertaining thereto, in order to prevent their destruction, concealment or disappearance which would frustrate or hamper the investigation or otherwise prevent the Commission from accomplishing its task. 2. To provisionally take over in the public interest or to prevent the disposal or dissipation, business enterprises and properties taken over by the government of the Marcos Administration or by entities or persons close to former President Marcos, until the transactions leading to such acquisition by the latter can be disposed of by the appropriate authorities. 3. To enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of acts by any person or entity that may render moot and academic, or frustrate or otherwise make ineffectual the efforts of the Commission to carry out its task under this order. 28 So that it might ascertain the facts germane to its objectives, it was granted power to conduct investigations; require submission of evidence by subpoenae ad testificandum and duces tecum; administer oaths; punish for contempt. 29 It was given power also to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of * * (its creation). 30 c. Executive Order No. 2 Executive Order No. 2 gives additional and more specific data and directions respecting "the recovery of ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime." It declares that: 1) * * the Government of the Philippines is in possession of evidence showing that there are assets and properties purportedly pertaining to former Ferdinand E. Marcos, and/or his wife Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents or nominees which had been or were acquired by them directly or indirectly, through or as a result of the improper or illegal use of funds or properties owned by the government of the Philippines or any of its branches, instrumentalities, enterprises, banks or financial institutions, or by taking undue advantage of their office, authority, influence, connections or relationship, resulting in their unjust enrichment and causing grave damage and prejudice to the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines:" and 2) * * said assets and properties are in the form of bank accounts, deposits, trust accounts, shares of stocks,
41
buildings, shopping centers, condominiums, mansions, residences, estates, and other kinds of real and personal properties in the Philippines and in various countries of the world." 31 Upon these premises, the President1) froze "all assets and properties in the Philippines in which former President Marcos and/or his wife, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents, or nominees have any interest or participation; 2) prohibited former President Ferdinand Marcos and/or his wife * *, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, duties, agents, or nominees from transferring, conveying, encumbering, concealing or dissipating said assets or properties in the Philippines and abroad, pending the outcome of appropriate proceedings in the Philippines to determine whether any such assets or properties were acquired by them through or as a result of improper or illegal use of or the conversion of funds belonging to the Government of the Philippines or any of its branches, instrumentalities, enterprises, banks or financial institutions, or by taking undue advantage of their official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense and to the grave damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines; 3) prohibited "any person from transferring, conveying, encumbering or otherwise depleting or concealing such assets and properties or from assisting or taking part in their transfer, encumbrance, concealment or dissipation under pain of such penalties as are prescribed by law;" and 4) required "all persons in the Philippines holding such assets or properties, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, in their names as nominees, agents or trustees, to make full disclosure of the same to the Commission on Good Government within thirty (30) days from publication of * (the) Executive Order, * *. 32 d. Executive Order No. 14 A third executive order is relevant: Executive Order No. 14, 33 by which the PCGG is empowered, "with the assistance of the Office of the Solicitor General and other government agencies, * * to file and prosecute all cases investigated by it * * as may be warranted by its findings." 34 All such cases, whether civil or criminal, are to be filed "with the
42
Sandiganbayan which shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction thereof." 35 Executive Order No. 14 also pertinently provides that civil suits for restitution, reparation of damages, or indemnification for consequential damages, forfeiture proceedings provided for under Republic Act No. 1379, or any other civil actions under the Civil Code or other existing laws, in connection with * * (said Executive Orders Numbered 1 and 2) may be filed separately from and proceed independently of any criminal proceedings and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence;" and that, moreover, the "technical rules of procedure and evidence shall not be strictly applied to* * (said)civil cases." 36 5. Contemplated Situations The situations envisaged and sought to be governed are selfevident, these being: 1) that "(i)ll-gotten properties (were) amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime"; 37 a) more particularly, that ill-gotten wealth (was) accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, * * located in the Philippines or abroad, * * (and) business enterprises and entities (came to be) owned or controlled by them, during * * (the Marcos) administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence, Connections or relationship; 38 b) otherwise stated, that "there are assets and properties purportedly pertaining to former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, and/or his wife Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents or nominees which had been or were acquired by them directly or indirectly, through or as a result of the improper or illegal use of funds or properties owned by the Government of the Philippines or any of its branches, instrumentalities, enterprises, banks or financial institutions, or by taking undue advantage of their office, authority, influence, connections or relationship, resulting in their unjust enrichment and causing grave damage and prejudice to the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines"; 39 c) that "said assets and properties are in the form of bank accounts. deposits, trust. accounts, shares of stocks, buildings, shopping centers, condominiums, mansions, residences, estates, and other kinds of real and personal properties in the Philippines and in various countries of the world;" 40 and
43
2) that certain "business enterprises and properties (were) taken over by the government of the Marcos Administration or by entities or persons close to former President Marcos. 41 [Emphasis mine.]
(c) A careful reading of the foregoing discussion reveals that when the Court referred to the factual premises of the Executive Orders and Proclamation No. 3, it referred to the political questions pertaining to the Republics mandate, right and duty to recover ill-gotten wealthand NOT to the two factual issues that in its DECISION this Court would now seek the Republic to answer. In fact, in the foregoing discussion on the factual premises for Executive Order No. 2, the Court refers to evidence that is in the possession of the Government of the Philippines. The unmistakable inference is that these factual premises refer to the facts, events, and circumstances that led to the issuance of the Executive Orders and Proclamation No. 3, as an adjunct and in fulfillment of the Republics right and duty to recover all ill-gotten wealth. (d) As BASECO adverts to, it is Executive Order No. 14 that acknowledges the requirement for evidentiary substantiation and as explicitly laying down the
requisite procedure.
44
An exhaustive reading of Executive Order No. 14, as amended, reveals that the acknowledgment of the need for evidentiary substantiation, as well as the procedure to be followed in fulfilling the Republics duty and right to recover illgotten wealth is to be found in Section 3, insofar as it sets down the quantum of evidence required in proving the cases it contemplates:
SECTION 3. The civil suits to recover unlawfully acquired property under Republic Act No. 1379 or for restitution, reparation of damages, or indemnification for consequential and other damages or any other civil actions under the Civil Code or other existing laws filed with the Sandiganbayan against Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, members of their immediate family, close relatives, subordinates, close and/or business associates, dummies, agents and nominees, may proceed independently of any criminal proceedings and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
In light of the foregoing discussions, it is abundantly clear that this Honorable Courts definition, having been deduced from the wrong premise and without proper and legally sound basis, is erroneous, should be set aside, and should not be made the basis for defining, controlling, resolving, and settling the issues and matters in this case. Thus, the following implications are worth enumerating: (a) Firstly, this Honorable Courts DECISION to the effect of demanding two concurring elements to be present before assets
45
or properties can be considered as ill-gotten wealth, namely that: (a) they must have originated from the government itself and (b) they must have been taken by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates by illegal means is an improper and waylaid construction of the definition of ill-gotten wealth, and is void for having been created in contrast to that clearly defined by the PCGG RULES. (b) Secondly, this Honorable Courts DECISION needlessly and unfairly restricts, and severely constricts and constrains the definition of ill-gotten wealth, especially with regard to: (i) the persons and ways by which such persons may illegally acquire (ii) the ways by which wealth may be made acquired and (iii) the means or similar schemes by which wealth may become illgotten, considering that the Rules of the PCGG, Sec. 1 clearly identifies ill-gotten wealth to be, once again:
any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of persons within the purview of Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 2, acquired by them directly, or indirectly thru dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any of the following means or similar schemes: (1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury; (2) Through the receipt, indirectly, of any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or
46
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in the connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the official concerned. By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the government or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities or government-owned or controlled corporations; By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stocks, equity, or any other form of interest or participation in any business enterprise or undertaking; Through the establishment of agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combination and/or by the issuance, promulgation and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; and By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship or influence for personal gain or benefit. [Emphasis mine.]
(c) Thirdly, plainly put, the legal definition of ill-gotten wealth, contemplates the following: i. With regard to the ways by which ill-gotten wealth may be acquired, either: a. Directly: By the persons within the purview of Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 2, i.e. Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad (E.O. No. 1) or Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, and/or his wife, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents or nominees (E.O. No. 2); b. Indirectly: Through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates;
47
ii. With regard to the ways by which wealth may become ill-gotten, by any of the following means or similar schemes:
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury; (2) Through the receipt, indirectly, of any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in the connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the official concerned. (3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the government or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities or government-owned or controlled corporations; (4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stocks, equity, or any other form of interest or participation in any business enterprise or undertaking; (5) Through the establishment of agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combination and/or by the issuance, promulgation and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; and (6) By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship or influence for personal gain or benefit.
(d)
Fourthly,
the
unavoidable
requirement
of
providing competent evidentiary substantiation made in appropriate judicial proceedings to determine: (a) whether the assets or properties involved had come from the vast resources of government, and (b) whether the individuals owning or holding such assets or properties were close associates of
48
President Marcos is based on the wrong premise. It is NOT required, as in fact, Section 7 of the PCGG Rules empowers the PCGG to ascertain whether any particular asset, property or enterprise constitutes ill-gotten wealthwith the conduct of a hearing, to be made and had at its option. Further, the issues defined by this Honorable Court do not neatly coincide or accurately reflect the definition of ill-gotten wealth under the Rules of the PCGG. (e) As the same principle appliesthat is, according to Sec. 8 of the Rules of the PCGG, that the Commission, in the exercise of its powers to investigate or hear cases within its jurisdiction shall act according to the requirements of due process and fairness, and shall not be strictly bound by the technical rules of evidenceit bears underscoring that, as found by the Court in Republic of the Philippines v. The Honorable Sandiganbayan, G.R. 84895, May 4, 1989:
It is to be reiterated that paragraph 2 of Section 3, of Executive Order No. 14 reads: xxx xxx xxx The technical rules of procedure and evidence shag not be strictly applied to the civil cases filed hereunder.
19. Consistent with the principles of administrative law and the nature of the PCGG as an administrative body with quasi-
49
judicial functions, its findings of fact in ascertaining ill-gotten wealth must given due respect and accorded great weightas in the case of PCGGs determination of the fact that Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. is one of the closest and most powerful cronies of the late dictator, a historical fact and matter of general knowledge known to everyone. In the fulfillment of its duty and right to recover all ill-gotten wealth, through the PCGG, the Republics efforts must not be hampered or constrainedas the law clearly states, by technical rules of evidence and procedureor overly strict and constricting requirements that have no basis in law or jurisprudence. To recapitulate, while the DECISION purported to indicate the law on which it was based, in went through a needless circuitous route by offering its own definition of ill-gotten wealth, contrary the fact and essence of ill-gotten wealth as defined in the law: Section 1 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations, Section 1(d) of Republic Act No. 7080 (as amended by R.A. 7659), Republic of the Philippines v. Estate of Hans Menzi, and its subsequent decision on the other block of SMC shares in the 2012 Decision of COCOFED v. Republic. When this Honorable Court failed to express clearly and distinctly the clear and distinct definition of ill-gotten wealth
50
that is, when it failed to apply the pertinent and applicable law it essentially, effectively, and, in fact, promulgated a DECISION that was bereft of THE LAW on which it should have been based, an egregious error and fatal flaw that offends Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution. Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution is explicit in its command that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is basednowhere is this constitutional prescription more important than in the Supreme Court, as its decisions form part of the law of the land. As this Honorable Court ruled in David Lu v. Paterno Lu Ym, Sr. et al.,13 when a decision rendered by a Division of the Supreme Court ran afoul of the Constitution, such decision would be in excess of jurisdiction and, therefore, invalid14 and [a]ny entry of judgment may thus be said to be inefficacious since the decision is void for being unconstitutional.15 While that that decision pertained to a decision rendered by a Division that

G.R. No. 153690 & G.R. No. 157381. 15 February 2011. Ibid. 15 Ibid.
13 14
51
ran counter to Article VIII, Section 4(3),16 it is respectfully submitted that the same legal and logical reasoning underpins the effect and eventual characterization of any decision that offends the Constitution. When a Decision of the Supreme Court contravenes the Constitutionthough it may be its final interpreter, not so when it involves, not so much a question of law, but a question of the existence of a law. This can only be the case, as Article 3 of the Civil Code states that ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. And, as such, to insist on the absence of a definition of ill-gotten wealth, when any and all citizens can witness its existencethat is, perceive and in so perceiving, make known their perception to this Honorable Supreme Court: that, contrary to its findings in its DECISION, the definition of ill-gotten wealth exists. It has been in existence since 1986, 1991, 2005, and 2012and that DECISION serves as an anomaly, a singular instance that ruptures the fabric of the Courts jurisprudence and deviates from the Rule of Law. In the case of Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. v. Commission on Elections,17 the Supreme Court offered the

Particularly, the following relevant proviso: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc. 17 G.R. No. 190529. 29 April 2010.
16
52
following candid admission, in striking down and abandoning one of its rulings:
As our discussion above shows, the most compelling reason to abandon Minero exists; it was clearly an erroneous application of the law an application that the principle of stability or predictability of decisions alone cannot sustain. Minero did unnecessary violence to the language of the law, the intent of the legislature, and to the rule of law in general. Clearly, we cannot allow PGBI to be prejudiced by the continuing validity of an erroneous ruling. Thus, we now abandon Minero and strike it out from our ruling case law. [Emphasis added.]
In that case,18 the Supreme Court explained the rationale behind stare decisis: The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle things which are established) is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides, thus: ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines. The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts in a country to follow the rule established in a decision of its Supreme Court. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further

18
G.R. No. 190529. 29 April 2010.
53
argument. The doctrine is grounded on the necessity for securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions, thus: Time and again, the court has held that it is a very desirable and necessary judicial practice that when a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are substantially the same. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and disturb not what is settled. Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue. The doctrine though is not cast in stone for upon a showing that circumstances attendant in a particular case override the great benefits derived by our judicial system from the doctrine of stare decisis, the Court is justified in setting it aside. There must be rational basis for adhering to predecents. Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution is that which requires all decisions to have such a foundation in rationality and reason, by requiring decisions to explicitly and distinctly set out the facts
54
and the pertinent law. Already, the Republic is beginning to reap the ill-effects of the precedent set by this DECISION. In some ways, this DECISION could be characterized as an ex-post facto ruling: it varies the level of proof required for the Republic to establish its case, from the moment that ill-gotten wealth cases were filed and prosecuted to the moment that these cases have to be decided, post-DECISION. In June 2012, adverting to the DECISIONs definition of ill-gotten wealth, the Sandiganbayan dismissed the case against Mr. Lucio Tan. Allowing this DECISION to stand could only give rise to more of such dismissalsas, surely, the Republic could not have been expected to respond to the additional evidentiary issues that were tendered by the Court in its DECISION that were not availing, when these ill-gotten wealth cases were filed and prosecuted. After all, what has always been in existence, since 1986, has been the PCGG Rules, Section 1(A) defining ill-gotten wealth. The fact that the DECISION did not state the pertinent law, in essence, was tantamount to stating no law at allespecially since, contrary to the Courts findings, such a legal definition of ill-gotten wealth exists. Time and again, the Supreme Court has reprimanded lower courts for knowingly rendering unjust judgments or for gross ignorance of the lawvoiding judgments
55
that lack legal basis or reprimanding counsels for misleading courts through selective and malicious excerptingthere is no reason why this Honorable Court cannot now correct this error and remedy an injustice. After all, a decision that runs counter to the Constitution is void and [a] void judgment is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect.19 II. THIS HONORABLE COURTS REPEATED EXPUNCTIONS (AND NOT DENIAL) OF SUBSEQUENT AND SUCCESSIVE MOTIONS FOR RECONSDERATION AND/OR OMNIBUS MOTIONS, ON NO BASIS OTHER THAN ITS FIRST RESOLUTION PROHIBITING THE FILING OF FURTHER PLEADINGS VIOLATES DUE PROCESS AS IT PREJUDGES THE MERITS OF SUCH SUBSEQUENT PLEADINGS AND FORECLOSES THE POSSIBILITY THAT HIGHER INTERESTS OF JUSTICE MAY BE SERVED BY ALLOWING THE SAME, AS

19
Nilo Padre v. Fructosa Badillo, et al. G.R. No. 165423, 19 January 2011.
56
PROVIDED UNDER THE INTERNAL RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT, RULE 15, SECTION 3IN ADDITION TO THE UNIQUE, PECULIAR, AND SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT ATTENDED THEIR EXPUNCTION; CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH, ALL TAKEN TOGETHER, VIOLATES DUE PROCESS, THEREBY RENDERING VOID THE JUDGMENT IN G.R. NOS. 166859, 169203, AND 180702, REPUBLIC V. SANDIGANBAYAN, EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., ET AL. Article III, Section 16 of the Constitution states that [a]ll persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. However, while speedy disposition of cases is, indeed, the ideal, as aptly observed by Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. in his Commentary to the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, xxx what is beneficial speed for one could be harmful speed for another.20 Indeed, the haste and utmost dispatch with which this Honorable Court has resolved this case has been most

Bernas, Joaquin, S.J. The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996, p. 489.
20
57
damaging for the Republic and to the 20 million Filipinos who are left to grapple with the DECISIONs damning consequences. The DECISION propounded questions and issues which it claimed were not sufficiently proven with adequate evidence. However, when the various parties to this casethe Republic and other petitioners-intervenorssought to meet those
challenges, this Honorable Court resorted to the simple expedient of expunging such pleadings, with no rational basis other than its first Resolution dated 21 June 2011 stating that, no further pleadings or motions will be entertained. It is respectfully submitted that such a blanket prohibition, taken together with Rule 15, Section 3 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court (hereinafter IRSC), is tantamount to a denial of due process that would, thereby, make the DECISION void. Admittedly, Second Motions for Reconsideration are denominated as prohibited pleadings; however, such
denomination is misleadingsince, despite its prohibited nature, the same may, nonetheless, still be filed provided that (1) it is done so with leave of court, and (2) before judgment is entered. The same has been the practice, according to the jurisprudence, by which Second (or Subsequent) Motions for Reconsideration have been entertained by the Court.
58
With the promulgation, however, of the IRSC, the Supreme Court took the opportunity to clarify and harmonize the rulings on Second Motions for Reconsideration, under Rule 15, Section 3, which states that: The Court shall not entertain a second motion for reconsideration, and any exception to this rule can only be granted in the higher interest of justice by the Court en banc upon a vote of at least two-thirds of its actual membership. There is reconsideration in the higher interest of justice when the assailed decision is not only legally erroneous, but is likewise patently unjust and potentially capable of causing unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage to the parties. A second motion for reconsideration can only be entertained before the ruling sought to be reconsidered becomes final by operation of law or by the Courts declaration. Despite the clear provision of IRSC that contemplates the possibility of allowing a second motion for reconsideration, in the higher interest of justice, the Court in its succeeding Resolutions of 9 August 2011, 16 August 2011, and 17 January 2012, among others, expunged from the records all pleadings seeking the reconsideration of its DECISION and resolution of June 21, 2011, on no other basis than its resolution dated June 21, 2011 prohibiting the filing of further pleadings or motions in this case.
59
By expungingthat is, casting out and removing from the recordswithout denyingthat is, passing upon the arguments and issues tenderedthe subsequent pleadings that were filed in this case, this Honorable Court had effectively prejudged the merits of such pleadings and closed its ears to the possibility of allowing the same in the higher interest of justice. Never mind that, as set forth in the preceding discussion, the assailed decision is legally erroneous, and that it is patently unjust and potentially capable of causing
unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage to the 3.5 million coconut farmers/20 million Filipinos whose lives depend upon the just resolution of this case. Never mind, too, that in those successive pleadings, various parties tried to meet the new challenges that were posed by this Honorable Courtas, for example, proof of the respondents close association with Mr. Marcos.21 That the Court merely expunged these pleadings on the basis of its earlier blanket prohibition, despite the clear provisions of IRSC, Rule 15, Section 3 is violative of due process as it effectively prejudged the case and condemned the possibility

It was widely reported on 29 November 2011, for example, that the Presidential Commission on Good Government had various entries from the diaries of Mr. Marcos where, among others, the latter clearly identified and wrote about Mr. Cojuangco as one of the congressmen close to [him]. see http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/-depth/11/29/11/pcggquestions-anew-danding-shares-smc
21
60
of ever finding higher interests of justice, as early as its 21 June 2011 Resolution. In fact, the haste with which the Court rushed to judgment further bolsters the claim that the Republic and the countrys 3.5 million coconut farmers were deprived of due process. Because of its haste, this Honorable Court had to re-issue its Resolution, in order to attach the Dissenting Opinion of then Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Maria Lourdes P.A. Serenowhich re-issued Resolution was received nearly one month later, 19 June 2011, by the parties. The same haste could be observed in the Courts Resolution dated 16 August 2011. Notwithstanding the tight and
inconclusive vote of 7-4-4, the Court issued its Resolution expunging the Republics Omnibus Motion/Second Motion for Reconsideration on 16 August 2011: 1) on the day that two Associate Justices were on leave; 2) on the exact day that the vacancy left by the retirement of an Associate Justice was filled with the appointment of Associate Justice Bienvenido Reyesbut before he could assume office; and 3) one month prior to the appointment of Associate Justice Estela Bernabe-Reyes on 16 September 2011. Instead of waiting for such vacancies to be filledafter all, one could assume that Associate Justices are
61
worth the waitthe Court decided, despite the tight vote in this case to issue its Resolution on 16 August 2011. It is hornbook doctrine that due process means a law which hears before it condemns. When the IRSC itself allows Second Motions for Reconsideration in the higher interests of justice, expunging such pleadings, without passing upon the threshold issue of whether or not higher interests of justice may be served by allowing the same, is tantamount to a denial of due process. In this case, that is true, especially considering that the only basis for expunging the same was not that there were no higher interests of justice to be served, but that no further pleadings or motions would be entertainedas early as 21 June 2011, and even before such pleadings could be filed! It is respectfully submitted that the Court itself had violated Rule 15, Section 3 of its IRSC, when it expunged all subsequent motions for reconsideration, not on a finding that higher interests of justice do not exist, but on the basis of its 21 June 2011 Resolution effectively condemning and prejudging the case as bereft of higher interests of justice. Having violated Rule 15, Section 3 of its own IRSC, it is respectfully submitted that the resulting judgmentnot having been benefited from the facts and evidence
62
that could have been had, if only they had been heardis void, for being violative of due process. The act and fact that the Supreme Court, based on its own definition, required [that] the Republic should furnish to the Sandiganbayan in proper judicial proceedings the competent evidence proving who were the close associates of President Marcos who had amassed assets and properties that would be rightly considered as ill-gotten wealtha requirement which, as should be pointed out, based on existing jurisprudence and the existent true and legal definition of ill-gotten wealth, is unnecessaryonly to expunge such subsequent pleadings
offering such proof is, likewise, violative of due process. It was widely reported in various newspapers that the Presidential Commission on Good Government had unearthed diaries of the late dictatorwhere, in at least one entry, Mr. Marcos referred to Mr. Cojuangco as one of the congressmen close to [him].22 Earlier this year, Senator Ferdinand
Bongbong Marcos, in a television interview, talked about how his Tito Danding procured the passport that his return to the

PCGG questions anew Danding shares in SMC (see http://www.abscbnnews.com/-depth/11/29/11/pcgg-questions-anew-danding-shares-smc); PCGG vows to prove Cojuangco [sic] (see http://www.businessmirror.com.ph/component/content/article/24-companies/19994government-approves-selling-majority-stake-in-pnoc-ec-teves-says); PCGG to ask SC to reinstate MR vs SC ruling on SMC shares (1/2) (see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=74qpelBF-pM) and (2/2) (see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MvNtH_HVen0)
22
63
Philippines possibleand that it was his Tito Danding whom he visited immediately, upon his return.23 Just recently, Mr. Cojuangco himself had [opened] up on crises, love and Marcos, in an interview with Mr. Wilson Lee Flores. Noting that Danding left the Philippines for exile on Feb. 25, 1986 with then President Ferdinand E. Marcos after the Edsa uprising, Mr. Flores asked, Ilocos Norte Governor Imee R. Marcos told me you had lost your father when you were young, thats why her father then President Ferdinand Marcos considered you like a foster son. Is that true? Yes, I am very grateful to the late President Marcos for not treating me like other politicians, Mr. Cojuangco was quoted as replying.24 The Court asked what, to many, was a rhetorical question. And just when the question was humbly answeredwith proofs of Mr. Cojuangcos long-time association with Mr. Marcosthese pleadings were expunged. In fact, Mr. Cojuangcos recent public and candid admission is a supervening event in response to the Courts question! Having been treated like a foster son, Mr. Cojuangco falls squarely, in many respects, in the various

Pipol on ANC Sen. Bongbong Marcos: The Son Also Rises (see http://anc.abscbnnews.com/videos/215/sen-bongbong-marcos-the-son-also-rises/) 24 Eduardo Danding Cojuangco, Jr. opens up on crises, love and Marcos (see http://www.philstar.com/ArticlePrinterFriendly.aspx?articleid=837050&publicationSubCat egoryId=86)
23
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categories of persons contemplated under Executive Order Nos. 1 and 2: for being a close (quasi-)relative and subordinate, and business associate and dummy and agent and nominee!
III. SUPERVENING EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE FACT OF THE SUPERVENING UNANIMOUS RULING IN G.R. NOS. 177857-58 AND 178193, PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC. (COCOFED), ET AL. V. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL. ESSENTIALLY AND EFFECTIVELY SUPERSEDE AND OVERTURN THE APPARENTLY FINAL AND EXECUTORY JUDGMENT IN G.R. NOS. 166859, 169203, AND 180702, REPUBLIC V. SANDIGANBAYAN, EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., ET AL. THE SAME SUPERVENING EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES MAKE THE EXECUTION OF THE PURPORTEDLY FINAL JUDGMENT UNJUST AND INEQUITABLE, CONSIDERING THAT BOTH RULINGS
65
PERTAIN TO AND ARISE FROM THE SAME CASE: CIVIL CASE NO. 33-F. In its JANUARY 2012 RULING, the Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Velasco observed that: xxx the subject of [Civil Case No. 0033-F] are two (2) blocks of SMC shares of stock, the first referring to shares purchased through and registered in the name of the CIIF holding companies. The purported ownership of the second block of SMC shares is for the nonce irrelevant to the disposition of this case. The last sentence, bears restatement with modification, if only to set out the true factual and legal context, that is: the purported ownership of the second block of SMC shares is for the nonce irrelevant to the disposition of this case, but the converse is not true: for the JANUARY 2012 RULING supervenes the DECISION, as it, in fact, answers and dispels certain issues that were allegedly left unprovenbut which questions, the Court itself answered in its JANUARY 2012 RULING. Simply put, by its unanimous vote in and in light of its JANUARY 2012 RULING, the DECISION is effectively superseded and overturned. There can be no other conclusion. Despite the fact that both the JANUARY 2012 RULING and the DECISION stem from the same Civil Case No. 33-F, they differ on a very important and
66
crucial point: in its DECISION, the Supreme Court stated that there is no explicit definition of ill-gotten wealth, and proceeded to discern its meaning that resulted in a higher level of proof required in establishing cases for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth; on the other hand, its JANUARY 2012 RULING makes indubitable the fact that there is a definition of ill-gotten wealth. The latter JANUARY 2012 RULING being founded in law and the fact that such law exists defining ill-gotten wealth, debunks the earlier DECISIONand the latters conclusions having been founded upon its made-up definition, therefore, has no basis in law. The joke that then Associate Justice (now Ombudsperson) Carpio-Morales pointed out, is thus, made more tragic by the fact that the DECISION is wanting in basis, as much as it is wanting in humor: The argument that Cojuangco was not a subordinate or close associate of the Marcoses is the biggest joke to hit the century. In its DECISION, this Honorable Court lamented that the Republic would have the Sandiganbayan pronounce the block of SMC shares of stock acquired by Cojuangco, et al. as ill-gotten wealth even without the Republic first presenting preponderant evidence establishing that such block had been acquired illegally and with the use of coconut levy funds, the Court could not
67
heed the Republics pleas for the following reasonswhich reasons the Court itself, thankfully, supplied in its JANUARY 2012 RULING: 1. The DECISION states: [t]o begin with, it is notable that the decision of November 28, 2007 did not rule on whether coconut levy funds were public funds or not. To this, the JANUARY 2012 RULING answers categorically: Coconut levy funds are special public funds of the government. The JANUARY 2012 RULING is categorical and clear in its discussion: Plainly enough, the coconut levy funds are public funds. We have ruled in Republic v. COCOFED that the coconut levy funds are not only affected with public interest; they are prima facie public funds. In fact, this pronouncement that the levies are government funds was admitted and recognized by respondents, COCOFED, et al., in G.R. no. 147062-64. And more importantly, in the same decision, We clearly explained exactly what kind of government fund the coconut levies are. We were categorical in staying that coconut levies are treated as special funds by the very laws which created them:
Finally and tellingly, the very laws governing the coco levies recognize their public character. Thus, the third Whereas clause of PD No. 276 treats them as special funds for a special public purpose. Furthermore, PD No. 711 transferred to the general funds of the State all existing special and fiduciary funds including the CCSF. On the other hand, PD No. 1234 specially declared the CCSF as a special fund for a special purpose, which should be
68
treated as a special account in the National Treasury. (Emphasis Ours.)25
The
DECISION
conjectured
that
the
silence
of
the
Sandiganbayan on this matterthat is, on the nature of coco levy fundsas probably due to its not seeing the need for such rulinga stray thought, mere obiter, that has no basis in the facts or the records of the case. 2. The DECISION states that: Secondly, the ruling in Republic v. COCOFED determined only whether certain stockholders of the UCPB could vote in the stockholders meeting that had been called. The issue now before the Court could not be controlled by the ruling in Republic v. COCOFED, however, for even as that ruling determined the issue of voting, the Court was forthright enough about not thereby preempting the Sandiganbayans decisions on the merits on ill-gotten wealth in the several cases then pending, including this one, xxx. In addition, it stated, that, [t]hirdly, the Republics assertion that coconut levy funds had been used to source the payment for the Cojuangco block of SMC shares was premised on its allegation that the UCPB and the CIIF Oil Mills were public corporations. But the premise was grossly erroneous and overly presumptuous, because:

25
JANUARY 2012 RULING, p. 69.
69
(a) The fact of the UCPB and the CIIF Oil Mills being public corporations or government-owned or governmentcontrolled corporations precisely remained controverted by Cojuangco, et al. in light of the lack of any competent [sic] to that effect being in the records; (b) Cojuangco explicitly averred in paragraph 2.01.(b) of his Answer that the UCPB was a private corporation; and (c) The Republic did not competently identify or establish which ones of the Cojuangco corporations had supposedly received advances from the CIIF Oil Mills. In its JANUARY 2012 RULING, the Supreme Court effectively debunked the foregoing reasons it earlier gave in its DECISION when it stated that:
From the foregoing discussions, it is fairly established that the coconut levy funds are special public funds. Consequently, any property purchased by means of the coconut levy funds should likewise be treated as public funds or public property, subject to burdens and restrictions attached by law to such property. In this case, the 6 CIIF Oil Mills were acquired by the UCPB using coconut levy funds. On the other hand, the 14 CIIF holding companies are wholly owned subsidiaries of the CIIF Oil Mills. Conversely, these companies were acquired using or whose capitalization comes from the coconut levy funds. However, as in the case of UCPB, UCPB itself distributed a part of its investments in the CIIF oil mills
70
to coconut farmers, and retained a part thereof as administrator. The portion distributed to the supposed coconut farmers followed the procedure outlined in PCA Resolution No. 033-78. And as the administrator of the CIIF holding companies, the UCPB authorized the acquisition of the SMC shares. In fact, these companies were formed or organized solely for the purpose of holding the SMC shares. As found by the Sandiganbayan, the 14 CIIF holding companies used borrowed funds from the UCPB to acquire the SMC shares in the aggregate amount of P1.656 Billion. Since the CIIF companies and the CIIF block of SMC shares were acquired using coconut levy funds funds, which have been established to be public in character it goes without saying that these acquired corporations and assets ought to be regarded and treated as government assets. Being government properties, they are accordingly owned by the Government, for the coconut industry pursuant to currently existing laws. It may be conceded hypothetically, as COCOFED et al. urge, that the 14 CIIF holding companies acquired the SMC shares in question using advances from the CIIF companies and from UCPB loans. But there can be no gainsaying that the same advances and UCPB loans are public in character, constituting as they do assets of the 14 holding companies, which in turn are wholly-owned subsidiaries of the 6 CIIF Oil Mills. And these oil mills were organized, capitalized and/or financed using coconut levy funds. In net effect, the CIIF block of SMC shares are simply the fruits of the coconut levy funds acquired at
71
the expense of the coconut industry. In Republic v. COCOFED, the en banc Court, speaking through Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio Panganiban, stated: Because the subject UCPB shares were acquired with government funds, the government becomes their prima facie beneficial and true owner. By parity of reasoning, the adverted block of SMC shares, acquired as they were with government funds, belong to the government as, at the very least, their beneficial and true owner. We thus affirm the decision of the Sandiganbayan on this point. But as We have earlier discussed, reiterating our holding in Republic v. COCOFED, the States avowed policy or purpose in creating the coconut levy fund is for the development of the entire coconut industry, which is one of the major industries that promotes sustained economic stability, and not merely the livelihood of a significant segment of the population. Accordingly, We sustain the ruling of the Sandiganbayan in CC No. 0033-F that the CIIF companies and the CIIF block of SMC shares are public funds necessary owned by the Government. We, however, modify the same in the following wise: These shares shall belong to the Government, which shall be used only for the benefit of the coconut farmers and for the development of the coconut industry. Its reasons in its DECISION no longer hold water, in light of JANUARY 2012 RULING finding that the so-called Farmers UCPB shares covered by 64.98% of the UCPB shares of stock, which
72
formed part of the 72.2% of the shares of stock of the former FUB and now of the UCPB, the entire consideration of which was charged by PCA to the CCSF, are hereby declared conclusively owned by, the Plaintiff Republic of the Philippines and that the CIIF COMPANIES, namely: 1. Southern Luzon Coconut Oil Mills (SOLCOM); 2. Cagayan de Oro Oil Co., Inc. (CAGOIL); 3. Iligan Coconut Industries, Inc. (ILICOCO); 4. San Pablo Manufacturing Corp. (SPMC); 5. Granexport Manufacturing Corp. (GRANEX); and 6. Legaspi Oil Co., Inc. (LEGOIL), AS WELL AS THE 14 HOLDING COMPANIES, NAMELY: 1. Soriano Shares, Inc.; 2. ACS Investors, Inc.; 3. Roxas Shares, Inc.; 4. Arc Investors, Inc.; 5. Toda Holdings, Inc.; 6. AP Holdings, Inc.; 7. Fernandez Holdings, Inc.; 8. SMC Officers Corps, Inc.; 9. Te Deum Resources, Inc.; 10. Anglo Ventures, Inc.; 11. Randy Allied Ventures, Inc.; 12. Rock Steel Resources, Inc.; 13. Valhalla Properties Ltd., Inc.; and 14. First Meridian Development, Inc. AND THE CIIF BLOCK OF SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION (SMC) SHARES OF STOCK TOTALING 33,133,266
SHARES AS OF 1983 TOGETHER WITH ALL DIVIDENDS DECLARED, PAID AND ISSUED THEREON AS WELL AS ANY INCREMENTS THERETO ARISING FROM, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, EXERCISE OF PRE-EMPTIVE RIGHTS ARE
73
DECLARED OWNED BY THE GOVERNMENT TO BE USED ONLY FOR THE BENEFIT OF ALL COCONUT FARMERS AND FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COCNUT INDUSTRY, AND ORDERED RECONVEYED TO THE GOVERNMENT. Simply put, with its JANUARY 2012 RULING, the Court ruled debunked what it earlier found to be a grossly erroneous and overly presumptuous premise, by
answering plainly that UCPB was, in fact, a public corporation, and, so, too, were the 6 CIIF Oil Mills and 14 Holding Companies. 3. In its DECISION, the Court disputes what it dismisses as the Republics assertions that the contested block of shares had been paid for with borrowings from the UCPB and advances from the CIIF Oil Mills, by taking repose in Respondent Cojuangcos Answer. It found to be efficient specific denials what it deemed to be express qualifications made by Respondent Cojuangco in his Answer, to wit: a. That UCPB was a private corporation; b. That Respondent Cojuangcos being a member of the Board of Directors of the United Coconut Oil Mills, Inc. did not admit that he was a member of the Board of Directors of the CIIF
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Oil Mills because the United Coconut Oil Mills, Inc. was not one of the CIIF Oil Mills; and c. That his Answer nowhere contained any admission or statement that he had held the various positions in the government or in the private corporations at the same time and in 1983, the time when the contested acquisition of the SMC shares of stock took place. The Honorable Courts answers for Mr. Cojuangco bears clarification, based on facts, law, and prevailing jurisprudence. First, the Sandiganbayan recognized the director-officer positions held by respondent Cojuangco in UCPB, the Philippine Coconut Authority and the CIIF Oil Mills.
Second, the Sandiganbayan recognized the existence of fiduciary obligations in the positions held by respondent Cojuangco. Indeed, it is also a matter of law that UCPB (the bank acquired for the benefit of the coconut farmers under PD No. 755) was the repository of all the levies collected under PD No. 961, as well as entrusted with said funds, thus, the resulting fiduciary obligations of UCPBs directors, among whom was respondent Cojuangco who was also UCPBs President.
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The Honorable Court erred in its observation that there is no showing that respondent Cojuangco admitted being an officer of UCPB in 1983, conveniently ignoring basic rules of evidence.
Did respondent Cojuangco, in admitting the high public positions he held, deny the material dates thereof? Did he qualify his admission? All that the Honorable Court really observed was that respondent Cojuangco did not state 1983. Yet, the rule on admissions and denials is such that if a respondent or defendant fails to deny a material
allegation in a complaint, the same is deemed admitted by implication. Thus, in failing to specifically deny the material dates is respondent Cojuangco not deemed to have admitted the same by law and under the rules of evidence?
Be that as it may, in Republic vs. Desierto, et al., [G.R. No. 136506, 363 SCRA 591, August 23, 2001], notice was taken of the fact that Cojuangco, in 1983 (when Cojuangco admittedly acquired the shares through loans from UCPB), was a member of the Board of Directors of UCPB and was its President:
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xxx On April 19, 1983, the UCPB Board of Directors, composed of respondents Cojuangco, Jr., as President, Enrile as Chairman, Dela Cuesta, Zayco, Ursua and Pineda as members, adopted Resolution No. 111-83, resolving to "note" the decision of the Board of Arbitrators, allowing the arbitral award to lapse with finality. [Emphasis added.] Thus, contrary to the claim of Cojuangco and the Honorable Court, there is more than preponderant evidence, especially with his admissions and the rule on judicial notice,26 that he occupied a fiduciary position and had fiduciary obligations with UCPB at the time he took out said loans to purchase the subject SMC shares.
Strangely, the Honorable Court still plays ignorant of the law and jurisprudence when in its assailed DECISION, it stated that:
To say that a relationship is fiduciary when existing laws do not provide for such requires evidence that confidence is

26
See Bongato vs. Malvar, 387 SCRA 327 (2002).
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reposed by one party in another who exercises dominion and influence xxx27
But how can the Honorable Court say this when at the time the subject SMC shares were purchased in 1983 by funds from UCPB and advances from the CIIF Companies, respondent Cojuangco was its Director and President? As earlier stated, this is already a matter of judicial fact as found in Republic vs. Desierto, et al., (363 SCRA 591).
Further, is it not a matter of law and settled jurisprudence that corporate Directors and Presidents have fiduciary obligations and relations to their corporations? So how can the Honorable Court say that the law provides no fiduciary relationship between respondent Cojuangco and UCPB/CIIF Companies?
The fiduciary duties inhere in the positions occupied by respondent Cojuangco. As already discussed, respondent
Cojuangco admitted control of the borrowing corporations. He also admitted being a director and President of the lending

27
DECISION, p. 70.
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corporations, aside from the cited findings of the Honorable Court itself in the Desierto case.
The obligations and disqualifications, as well as the legal consequences of the violation of such obligations, are also the subject of law. The violation thereof is the abuse, and the burden then is on the director, respondent Cojuangco, to show that the questioned action falls under the exception and the requisites therefore, complied with something that respondent Cojuangco failed to do. Thus, Section 34 of the Corporation Code provides, for example: Sec. 34. Disloyalty of a director. Where a director, by virtue of his office, acquires for himself a business opportunity which should belong to the corporation, thereby obtaining profits to the prejudice of such corporation, he must account to the latter for all such profits by refunding the same, unless his act has been ratified by a vote of the stockholders, owning or representing at least two-thirds (2/3) of the outstanding capital stock. This provision shall be applicable, notwithstanding the fact that the director risked his own funds in the venture.
At the time (1983) that respondent Cojuangco and his claimed Companies obtained loans from UCPB/CIIF Oil Mills to purchase
79
the
subject
20%
SMC
shares,
he
was
admittedly
the
President/Director of UCPB and a Director of the CIIF Oil Mills: 2.01. Herein defendant admits paragraph 4 only insofar as it alleges the following: (a) That herein defendant has held the following positions in government: Governor of Tarlac, Congressman of the then First District of Tarlac, Ambassadorat-Large, Lieutenant Colonel in the Philippine Air Force and Director of the Philippine Coconut Authority. (b) That he held the following positions in private corporations: Member of the Board of Directors of the United Coconut Oil Mills, Inc.; President and member of the Board of Directors of the United Coconut Planters Bank, United Coconut Planters Life Assurance Corporation, and United Coconut Chemicals, Inc.; Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of San Miguel Corporation By virtue of said positions, as well as the applicable provisions of law relating to the use and investment of the coconut levy funds, and the law on corporations and trusts, respondent Cojuangco had fiduciary responsibilities in favor of UCPB and the CIIF Oil Mills (and, consequently, even the 14 Holding Companies funded by the CIIF Oil Mills):
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It is hornbook law that directors, while not strictly trustees, are fiduciaries, and bear a fiduciary relationship to the corporation, and to all the stockholders. They owe a duty to all stockholders, including the minority stockholders, and must administer their duties for the common benefit. xxx a director is a fiduciary. So is a dominant or controlling stockholder or group of stockholders. Their powers are powers in trust. [Remillard Brick Co. vs. Remillard-Dandini Co., 241 P.2d 66, 74, 75 (1952)] Indeed, Cary, in his work Cases and Materials on Corporations, 4th ed. (1970), quotes Justice Frankfurter in SEC vs. Chenery Corporation, 318 US 80:
To say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives direction to further inquiry. To whom is he a fiduciary? What obligation does he owe as a fiduciary? In what respect has he failed to discharge these obligations? [SEC vs. Chenery Corporation, supra at 86] Cary then submits that [a]s a general principle, it is immaterial whether fiduciary responsibility arises in connection with a small, closely-held firm or a public issue corporation. In this case, therefore, since the funds borrowed by respondent Cojuangco
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were public funds coming from a public bank and several public corporations, it is clear that he owed fiduciary obligations not only to the stockholders of UCPB/CIIF Oil Mills, but also to the government and the public, in general. Thus, as a fiduciary of public funds, respondent Cojuangco, as President/Director of UCPB and Director of the CIIF Oil Mills, cannot appropriate said funds for his personal use and benefit:
Since directors and other officers of a corporation, whatever their relation may be technically, occupy a fiduciary or quasi trust relation toward the corporation and the stockholders collectively, it is thoroughly well settled that they cannot, either directly or indirectly, in their dealings on behalf of the corporation with others, or in any other transaction in which they are under duty to guard the interests of the corporation, make a profit, or acquire any other personal benefit or advantage, not also enjoyed by the other stockholders, and, if they do so, they may be compelled to account therefor to the corporation in an appropriate action. [Fletcher Cyclopedia of Corporations, vol. 3 (1947), at pages 269270, cit. omit.] Thus, said fiduciary duty was violated by him when he obtained huge loans from UCPB and the CIIF Oil Mills to purchase the subject SMC shares. Considering that in 1983, UCPB and the CIIF Oil Mills had sufficient funds to purchase the 20% SMC
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shares, it should have been UCPB and the CIIF Oil Mills who should have purchased the 20% SMC shares, instead of respondent Cojuangco using said funds to buy the SMC shares for his own personal benefit.
Nothing in the records would even suggest, and none even alleged by respondent Cojuangco in his submissions before the court a quo, that collaterals or security for the loans obtained by him had been offered and put up. Simply, these were millions of unsecured exposure for UCPB and the CIIF Oil Mills. The risks were borne solely by the very corporations (public at that) the welfare of which were entrusted to respondent Cojuangco as a director and president thereof and as administrator of the coconut levy funds. This is the undeniable abuse plain and simple. The fact that these were unsecured loans is evident from the narration of the court a quo in the assailed Decision that respondent Cojuangco had to apply for permission to sell some of the very SMC shares bought from such funds to pay off the loans to UCPB:
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During the pendency of plaintiffs motion for execution, defendants Cojuangco, et al. filed a Motion for Authority to Sell San Miguel Corporation (SMC) shares and therein, prayed for leave to allow the sale of SMC shares to proceed Defendants Cojuangco, et al.s Motion for Authority to Sell San Miguel Corporation (SMC) shares was eventually granted by the Court. Thereafter, defendants Cojuangco, et al. manifested that the shares would be sold to the San Miguel Corporation Retirement Plan. The sale was subsequently consummated per manifestation of defendants Cojuangco, et al. with a report that the proceeds thereof were applied to the outstanding loan obligations of defendants Cojuangco, et al. x x x xxx Defendants Cojuangco, et al. thereafter rendered a report on the complete accounting of the proceeds from the sale of SMC shares of stock, informing the Court that in total, four billion three hundred eighty six million, one hundred seven thousand, four hundred twenty-eight pesos and thirty-four centavos (Php4,786,107,428.34) has been paid to United Coconut Planters Bank as loan payment. The ruse is simple. Respondent Cojuangco, despite his fiduciary obligations, by himself, and admittedly through his conduit corporations, borrowed money from UCPB and took advances
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from the CIIF Oil Mills, without any form of security or collateral. Said advances and loans were used to purchase the subject SMC shares. Part of the very same SMC shares bought with the loan proceeds and advances were sold to pay off the very same loans and advances. The court a quo, therefore, committed grave but reversible error in failing to appreciate the legal consequences of respondent Cojuangcos admitted acts as undeniable abuse of his fiduciary positions.
Undeniably, therefore, said borrowings by and for respondent Cojuangco violated the fiduciary relationship between him and UCPB/CIIF Oil Mills and constituted an abuse of the trust reposed upon him by said corporations, principally on the basis of the prohibition against self-dealing officers/directors and the doctrine on trusts and corporate opportunity prohibitions which are basically meant to avoid situations of conflict of personal interest vis--vis that of the corporation:
A director is a trustee for the entire body of stockholders, and both good morals and good law imperatively demand he shall manage all the business affairs of the company with a view to promote, not his own interests, but the common interests, and he cannot directly or
85
indirectly derive any personal profit or advantage by reason of his position, distinct from his co-shareholders: . . . And by assuming the office, he undertakes to give his best judgment in the interests of the corporation in all matters in which he acts for it, untrammeled by any hostile interest in himself or others. There is an inherent obligation on his part that he will in no manner use his position to advance his own interest as an individual as distinguished from that of the corporation. x x x A contract between an officer of a corporation and a third person is contrary to public policy, and therefore illegal and void, where it contemplates a fraud upon the corporation, or where, by giving the officer a secret profit or personal advantage, or otherwise, it places his private interests in conflict with his duty to the corporation... It is against public policy and so illegal for one owing to a corporation the duty of officer or director to hamper his action in corporate affairs by contracting in advance that such action shall be for the benefit of any individual or interest other than the corporation itself. [Fletcher Cyclopedia of Corporations, vol. 3 (1947), at pages 273274; 291-292: emphasis supplied] Undeniably, UCPB and the CIIF Oil Mills had sufficient funds to purchase the 20% SMC shares at that time since, as admitted by respondent Cojuangco, the funds came from advances and loans
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from these institutions. Thus, it should have been UCPB and the CIIF Oil Mills who should have purchased the 20% SMC shares. Instead, respondent Cojuangco using said funds belonging to said public corporations, and engaging in prohibited conflict-ofinterest transactions, bought the SMC shares for his own benefit placing his private interests in conflict with his duty to the corporation. That the corporate opportunity belonged to UCPB and/or the CIIF Oil Mills (even the 14 Holding Companies owned by the CIIF Oil Mills) was even recognized by the court a quo as inherent in the Presidential Decree Nos. 961 and 1468:
In this case, Section 2 (d) and Section 9 and 10, Article III, of P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468 mandated the UCPB to utilize the CIIF, an accumulation of a portion of the CCSF and the CIDF, for investment in the form of shares of stock in corporations organized for the purposes of engaging in the establishment and the operation of industries and commercial activities and other allied business undertakings relating to coconut and other palm oils industry in all its aspects. The investments made by UCPB in CIIF companies are required by the said Decrees to be equitably distributed for free by the said bank to the coconut farmers (Sec. 10, P.D. No. 961 and Sec. 10, P.D. No. 1468). (at page 61: Attachment F)
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Thus, it is settled that a self-dealing transaction may be undone and/or prevented from being consummated in the first place and, thus, a corporation may recover from the director property which the latter buys for himself. In this case, the government may recover from respondent Cojuangco the SMC shares bought by the public funds used by respondent Cojuangco in its purchase in breach of his fiduciary duties:
These are the cases, by no means exclusive, when the corporation may recover from the director property which the latter buys for himself: 1. Where the director uses the corporations money though later he repays it to purchase the property. The law considers the director a constructive trustee of the property. Thus in Bailey v. Jacobs, the president without authority borrowed money from the corporation and used it to purchase property for himself. He was held to be a constructive trustee, and it was considered immaterial that the money was subsequently returned. 2. Where the director is a special agent and was instructed to buy the property for the corporation. 3. Where the corporation has an interest, actual or in expectancy, in the property. 4. Where the corporation has wellformulated plans to acquire the property.
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5. Where the property is necessary for the purposes of the corporation. [Salonga, Philippine Law on Private Corporations, 3rd ed. (1968), at page 312: emphasis and underscoring supplied] Thus, in the cited case of Bailey vs. Jacobs, 189 Atl. 320 (1937), the State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ruled:
Directors and officers occupy toward stockholders what is commonly characterized as a fiduciary relationship. They must act in the utmost good faith, and cannot deal with the funds and property of the corporation, nor utilize the influence and advantage of their offices, for any but the common interest. xxx Nor will the law permit a fiduciary to place himself in a position which invites conflict between selfinterest and integrity. Both because defendant made profits from his personal use of the corporate funds, and because the patents and patent rights purchased by him were highly desirable for the Paper Companys purposes, he must account accordingly. [at pages 324-325: emphasis supplied] Thus, in the foregoing case, the court therein clearly ruled that the erring officers must account not only for the profits derived from the patent and patent rights purchased with company
89
property, but also for such patent and patent rights as belonging to the corporation under constructive trust.
Accordingly, the 20% SMC shares can also be considered owned by UCPB and the CIIF Oil Mills pursuant to a constructive trust and, thus, by virtue of Section 31 of the Corporation Code, the 20% SMC shares should be re-conveyed by respondent Cojuangco to UCPB/CIIF Oil Mills in trust for all coconut farmers.
What is more, the alleged loans obtained by respondent Cojuangco and/or his claimed Companies are clearly behest loans. Under Memorandum Order No. 61 (09 November 1992) on the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans, a matter of judicial notice, the presence of any of the following facts would characterize the transaction as a behest loan, to wit: The following criteria may be utilized as a frame of reference in determining a behest loan: a. b. c. It is under-collateralized; The borrower undercapitalized; corporation is
Direct or indirect endorsement by high government officials like presence of marginal notes;
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d.
Stockholders, officers or agents of the borrower corporation are identified as cronies; Deviation of use of loan proceeds from the purpose intended; Use of corporate layering; Non-feasibility of the project for which financing is being sought; and Extra-ordinary speed in which the loan release was made. [emphasis supplied]
e. f. g. h.
Respondent Cojuangco is undoubtedly an identified crony of the Marcoses. What is more, the use of corporate layering to spread the beneficial ownership of the shares is evident and likewise admitted by respondent Cojuangco. (See Answer dated 23 June 1999 and Pre-Trial Brief dated 11 February 2000) This even led the Honorable Court in Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 240 SCRA 376 (1995) to characterize said corporations as dummies and interlocking/common persons therein as bogus: In other words, according to the affidavits and documents allegedly executed by the parties concerned, there are two or more bogus stockholders in a number of the socalled Cojuangco Companies. [Underscoring supplied] 47. What is more, the affidavits of the lawyers or dummies who fronted for
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respondent Cojuangco in the holding companies invariably assert that they are but nominees and do not own stocks in the holding companies. In other words, according to the affidavits and documents allegedly executed by the parties concerned, there are two or more bogus stockholders in a number of the so-called Cojuangco 28 Companies,. The foregoing alone suffice to establish beyond doubt the behest nature of the loans claimed by respondent Cojuangco as having been used to purchase the subject SMC shares. 48. HOW THEN CAN THE HONORABLE COURT HAVE THE GALL TO RULE THAT RESPONDENT COJUANGCO OWES NO FIDUCIARY DUTY TO UCPB AND THE CIIF COMPANIES, ESPECIALLY IN THE USE OF ITS ASSETS, FUNDS AND RESOURCES!
In addition to the foregoing facts, supported by the pieces of evidence on record, laws and jurisprudence, and the findings and conclusions of this Honorable Court in its JANUARY 2012 RULING, the Dissenting Opinion of then Associate Justice Carpio-Morales is, likewise, instructive: On the exclusivity of the funds, it is not in the plaintiffs interest to prove the allegation that private funds partly

28
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 240 SCRA 376 (1995).
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financed the stock purchase. Conversely stated, the plaintiff-Republic may not be expected to prove the negative assertion that no other source of funding was utilized to buy the subject SMC shares. It need not go forward to prove that respondents did not use private funds. That the stock purchase was not exclusively funded by such loans and credit advances is a matter of defense on the part of respondents, upon which case the burden of evidence shifts.[78] Herrera v. Court of Appeals[79] teaches that it is not incumbent upon the plaintiff to adduce positive evidence to support a negative averment (i.e., acquired without using private funds) the truth of which is fairly indicated by established circumstances and which, if untrue, could readily be disproved by the production of documents or other evidence probably within the defendants possession or control. Even assuming arguendo that without using private funds is elemental to the cause of action of the plaintiff who must bear the burden of proof, Philippine Savings Bank v. Geronimo[80] instructs that negative allegations need not be proved even if essential to ones cause of action or defense if they constitute a denial of the existence of a document the custody of which belongs to the other party.[81] This category of relevant facts that need not be proven by evidence is identified as facts peculiarly within the knowledge of the opposite party.[82]
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Cojuangco, et al. could have simply presented in evidence documents under their custody, if any, to show that other financial resources were used to finance the stock purchase, which may have qualified, on allowable grounds, their earlier judicial admission and accordingly crumbled the plaintiffs case into fractions. Whichever way of looking at the matter of non-usage or usage of private funds either as a negative averment on the part of the Republic or an affirmative defense on the part of Cojuangco, et al. the bottom line remains the same: the burden of evidence that there were other loans that partly funded the purchase of the SMC shares was borne by Cojuangco, et al., failing which is fatal to them. It bears reiterating that this opportunity for Cojuangco, et al. to (i) disprove the Republics negative averment that no private funds were used, or (ii) otherwise prove the defenses affirmative allegation that private funds or partly private funds were used explains why it was proper to deny the Republics motion for summary judgment and go to trial. Cojuangco, et al. opted not to avail of that opportunity. Consequently, the negative averment stands and the affirmative defense fails. This same blunder was committed by Cojuangco in the case of Republic v. Estate of Hans Menzi[83] wherein he purposely skipped the presentation of his defense evidence and consequently failed to prove his affirmative allegations. The Court therein rejected Cojuangcos contention that his allegation that the shares were registered in his name as a
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nominee of Hans Menzi was not an affirmative defense but a specific denial, as such the allegation need not be proven unless the Republic presents adequate evidence to prove its case.
It is procedurally required for each party in a case to prove his own affirmative allegations by the degree of evidence required by law. In civil cases such as this one, the degree of evidence required of a party in order to support his claim is preponderance of evidence, or that evidence adduced by one party which is more conclusive and credible than that of the other party. It is therefore incumbent upon the plaintiff who is claiming a right to prove his case. Corollarily, the defendant must likewise prove its own allegations to buttress its claim that it is not liable. The party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. The burden of proof may be on the plaintiff or the defendant. It is on the defendant if he alleges an affirmative defense which is not a denial of an essential ingredient in the plaintiffs cause of action, but is one which, if established, will be a good defense i.e., an avoidance of the claim. In the instant case, Cojuangcos allegations are in the nature of affirmative defenses which should be adequately substantiated. He did not deny that Bulletin shares were registered in his name but alleged that he held these shares not as nominee of Marcos, as the Republic claimed, but as nominee of Menzi. He did not, however, present any evidence to support his claim and, in fact, filed a Manifestation dated July 20, 1999 stating that he sees no need to present any evidence in his behalf.[84] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the same manner, Cojuangco admitted in the present case that he purchased the SMC shares of stock but averred that he used the proceeds of certain loans to finance the purchase of the SMC shares. This defense by way of avoidance of the plaintiffs claim could have buttressed the defendants claim that not a
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single peso of public money was used in buying the shares. Cojuangco, however, took a similar route in the present case, despite the myriad of admissions, judicial notices, and prima facie circumstances that, absent any varying evidence, consequently fortified the Republics case. Indeed, in the final analysis, the party upon whom the ultimate burden lies is to be determined by the pleadings, not by who is the plaintiff or the defendant.[85] After the trial (or the lack thereof despite the trial settings), it became clear that the borrowings from CIIF Oil Mills and UCPB exclusively funded the purchase of the SMC shares. In fact, in her very strong dissent, then Associate Justice CarpioMorales took pains to cull and summarize the following evidentiary findings: BY WAY OF SUMMATION, the following relevant facts/circumstances that need not be proven by evidence, as gathered from the foregoing discussion which is anchored on the immediately-cited listing of legal bases for considering these facts as established, REBUT THE ARGUMENT THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE AT ALL TO SUPPORT THE REPUBLICS CAUSE OF ACTION.
1. The identity of the subject SMC shares, referring to a total of 27,198,545 shares of stocks (at the time of sequestration in 1989) representing approximately 20% of the outstanding shares. 2. The sale of the subject SMC shares was entered into in 1983.
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3. The sellers were Ayala Corporation and other corporations and individuals. 4. The lone buyer was Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. 5. In purchasing the SMC shares, Cojuangco used proceeds of loans 6. It was Cojuangco alone who obtained the loans. 7. The proceeds of loans refer to borrowings from CIIF Oil Mills and UCPB. 8. No private funds were shown to have been used to purchase the SMC shares. 9. The coconut levy funds are not only clearly affected with public interest but also, in fact, prima facie public funds. The same holds true with corporations formed and organized from coconut levy funds and all assets acquired therefrom, they being fruits of funds with public roots. 10. Absent any contrary evidence, the subject SMC shares remained public in character. 11. Circumstances indicate that the Cojuangco companies are dummies or manipulated instruments. 12. The SMC shares have been registered not only in Cojuangcos name but also in the name of defendant Cojuangco Companies. 13. Cojuangco is the owner of the SMC shares registered in the names of Primavera Farms, Inc., Silver Leaf Plantations, Inc., and Meadowlark Plantations, Inc., wherein 99.6% of the corporations shares were held in trust by Atty. Jose C. Concepcion under three separate Declarations of Trust and Assignment of Subscription. 14. Atty. Jose Concepcion of ACCRA Law Office and other registered stockholders of the three Cojuangco companies executed Voting Trust Agreements in favor of Cojuangco, representing almost half[139] of the total subject SMC shares. 15. The other Cojuangco companies, aside from
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the three earlier named, were incorporated in Cojuangcos behalf by the ACCRA Law Office.[140] 16. The other purportedly registered stockholders of the Cojuangco companies did not stake a claim over the SMC shares. 17. On February 25, 1986, Cojuangco left the Philippines in the company of former President Ferdinand Marcos. 18. The PCGG Rules and Regulations define "illgotten wealth" as any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of persons within the purview of Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 2, acquired by them directly, or indirectly thru dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any of the [various enumerated] means[141] or similar schemes. 19. The year 1983 forms part of the period of the Marcos administration. 20. Cojuangco was President and Member of the Board of Directors of the UCPB, and Director of the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA), inter alia, during the Marcos administration. 21. UCPB was a public corporation in 1983.[142] 22. The PCA Board of Directors had been expressly given vast authority in managing and disbursing the coconut levy funds including the corporations formed and organized therefrom and all assets acquired therefrom, such as all CIIF Oil Mills. 23. Case law provides that a director occupies a fiduciary relation as he cannot serve himself first and his cestuis second. He cannot use his power for his personal advantage and to the detriment of the stockholders and creditors.[143] 24. Sections 31 and 34 of the Corporation Code prohibit acts of self-dealing. 25. Section 9 of Presidential Decree No. 961 limits the authority to make UCPB investments only in the establishment and operation of industries and commercial activities and other allied business undertakings relating to the coconut and other
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palm oils industry in all its aspects and the establishment of research into the commercial and industrial uses of coconut and other palm oil industry. 26. Section 83 of the then General Banking Law provides the general rule that prohibits directors and officers of a banking institution from directly or indirectly borrowing any of the deposits of funds of such banks. 27. The exemption granted under Letter of Instructions No. 926 states that loans sourced from the coconut levy funds are extended only to corporate borrowings, not to individual borrowings. 28. The rule on constructive trust under Article 1455 of the Civil Code prohibits a trustee from acquiring for his own benefit the property under his management. Case law provides that fraud need not be shown.[144] 29. No evidence was shown to discharge the burden of Cojuangco, as a fiduciary, to demonstrate that the loan transactions were regularly entered into. 30. Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 3019 prohibits a public officer from becoming interested for personal gain, or having a material interest in any transaction or act requiring the approval of a board, panel or group of which he is a member, and which exercises discretion in such approval, even if he votes against the same or does not participate in the action of the board, committee, panel or group. 31. Article 216[145] of the Revised Penal Code prohibits public officers from directly or indirectly, becoming interested in any contract or business in which it is his official duty to intervene. IN SUM, since at the time of the purchase of the subject SMC shares, Cojuangco, a trusted close associate of Former President Marcos, was a director and corporate officer of the PCA and UCPB, hence, he was considered a fiduciary of the coconut levy funds, its derivatives and assets, which are public in character being administered by said entities. His use for his personal benefit of the
99
very same funds entrusted to him, which was released to him through illegal and improper machination of loan transactions, and his contravention of the then existing corporation laws and laws restricting a banks exposure to its director or officers indicate a clear violation of such fiduciary duty. These shares which respondents acquired using the proceeds from such loans do not thus pertain to them but to the UCPB and the CIIF Oil Mills pursuant to a constructive trust, and following Section 31 of the Corporation Code, said shares should be reconveyed to the Republic in trust for the coconut farmers.
In addition to the foregoing findings, the belatedly issued Dissenting Opinion of then Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Maria Lourdes Sereno, further found that: (a) Four groups or points of evidence prove that Cojuangco is a Close Associate of Marcos; (b) Respondent Cojuangco took advantage of his official position in order to obtain, directly and indirectly, shares of stock in SMC; As aptly observed in the aforementioned Dissenting Opinion: Respondent Cojuangco would not have received the same favorable treatment if his dummy corporations had applied for the loan in any other bank. No reasonable banking institution would allow a single entity to borrow funds not for the purpose of improving its business, but simply to acquire shares of stock in another unrelated business; much less, if no security or collateral was even offered. Even if it can be argued that investing in SMC was a risk-free and profitable enterprise, there was no reason why UCPB
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could not have exercised the option to purchase the said shares for itself and thus, directly enjoyed the benefits of ownership instead of passing on the opportunity to a third party. As stated by Justice Carpio Morales, respondent Cojuangcos self-dealing and ultimately self-serving scheme likewise constituted a violation of his fiduciary duty as a director of UCPB and some of the CIIF Oil Mills. Assuming that the investment in SMC was secure and lucrative, respondent as a fiduciary officer should have first offered the creditor bank the opportunity to exercise the option, before he acquired it for his own personal gain through the use of corporate funds (which are prima facie public funds), to the detriment of the corporation. Rather than work to further the banks interests, he robbed it of a business opportunity for his own advantage, maneuvered the public funds managed by them, and even diverted the funds towards his dummy corporations. Thus, in light of its own reasons and reasoning, in the interest of substantial justice, the rule of law, and as a matter of law and equity, juxtaposed with and bound by its own findings and conclusions in its JANUARY 2012 RULING, the Court should unbind the countrys 3.5 million coconut farmers from the unjust DECISION it had earlier promulgated. In summation, then Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Serenos closing are worth noting:
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The recovery of ill-gotten wealth and of the governments own properties involves, as a matter of public record and knowledge, the material and moral recovery of the nation, marked as the Marcos regime was by the obliteration of any line between private funds and the public treasury and abuse of unlimited power and elimination of any accountability in public office. For if there is a lesson that should be learned from the national trauma that was the rule of Marcos, it is that kleptocracy cannot pay. Under the scheme of our democratic government, the judiciary, in conjunction with its main task of dispensing justice, acts as an official repository of the countrys history through the decisions it renders. Lest the forces of martial law revisionism triumph in the future and crony capitalism be slowly erased from public memory, the present opinion is offered so that the people may be afforded the opportunity to judge for themselves now or in the future the weight of the reasoning propounded by both sides. Respondent Cojuangcos acquisition of a majority share in SMC during the Marcos regime was built on the sweat of coconut farmers. Through his positions in key public agencies and corporations directly collecting and managing the coco levy funds, he was able to convert public funds and take advantage of his position and close relationship with former President Marcos in order to gain considerable profits in a very lucrative business enterprise. Respondent Cojuangco employed a scheme of corporate layering and multi-level loan transactions to divert public funds in blatant disregard of his fiduciary duties. These series of anomalous transactions have left an indelible mark in the countrys
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history of recovering ill-gotten wealth. By awarding respondent Cojuangco with regained control of the SMC shares, the majority effectively impedes the gains accomplished by the PCGGs efforts to retrieve public funds misappropriated by Marcos cronies. Despite the setback to the efforts of the government and the coconut farmers to wrestle ownership over the Cojuangco block of SMC shares, prescription, laches or estoppel will not bar a subsequent action to recover unlawfully acquired property by public officials or their dummies. As public funds, coco levy funds, including its proceeds and whatever form they may have taken in the past or will take in the future, are to be held by public officers and their assigns or transferees under a continuing public trust in favor of the coconut farmers and the public at large. When the time comes that the legal impediment presented before the Court today is lifted (perhaps through newly discovered evidence or another justifiable reason), the opportunity to revisit the ruling of this Court may present itself, and Philippine history may have a chance to be redeemed in part. There is no better time than now, when the Supreme Court itself had ruled in January 2012 that coco levies are public funds and that UCPB and the CIIF Oil Mills are, in effect and in essence, public corporations. In light of the Honorable Courts reversion to the legal and factual definition of ill-gotten wealthwhich served as the basis for its earlier assertion that
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such relevant judicial pronouncements unavoidably required competent evidentiary substantiation made in appropriate
judicial proceedings to determine: (a) whether the assets or properties involved had come from the vast resources of government, and (b) whether the individuals owning or holding such assets or properties were close associates of President Marcossuch additional evidentiary requirements, having no basis in law, would return the quantum of proof required in illgotten wealth cases to what is really and legally required. In addition, in the reception of such evidence and in their appreciation, for the purposes of establishing a case for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth, technical rules of procedure and evidence should not be made to apply. Taken all together, therefore, the pieces of evidence on record in the DECISION and in the JANUARY 2012 RULING, clearly and preponderantly establish a claim for ill-gotten wealth, as defined under PCGG Rules, Section 1(A). As held by the Court in Annabelle Dela Pea v. Court of Appeals,29 where the Court, after declaring the nullity of the lower courts decision for not conforming with the requirements

29
G.R. No. 177828, 13 February 2009.
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of Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution and of the Rules of Court: As a rule, remand is avoided in the following instances: (a) where the ends of justice would not be subserved by a remand; or (b) where public interest demands an early disposition of the case; or (c) where the trial court had already received all the evidence presented by both parties, and the Supreme Court is in a position, based upon said evidence, to decide the case on its merits. The Court is not without power to undo the wrong that itself had countenanced when it ruled in 12 April 2011, in favor of Mr. Cojuangco, on the wrong legal basis that effectively raised the quantum of proof required for ill-gotten wealth cases. The countrys 3.5 million coconut farmers have waited too longand, in light of the grossly erroneous premises that underpinned its DECISION (foremost of which was its lamentable declaration that there is no legal definition of ill-gotten wealth, contrary to fact and law), and taken together with its conclusions of fact and law that it found in its JANUARY 2012 RULING, it but just for the Court to yield to the demands of the rule law, law, equity and social justice. As formulated in the classic case of Maximo Calalang v. A.D. Williams,30 in the words of Justice Laurel: Social justice is neither communism, nor

30
G.R. No. 47800, 2 December 1940.
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despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy, but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extraconstitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. chanroblespublishingcompany Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about the greatest good to the greatest number. When the scales of justice weigh, on the one hand, 3.5 million coconut farmers who, together with their families, number in the upwards of 20 million Filipinos and, on the other 1 very lucky individualwhen the records of history itself bear out how one such individuals luck was intimately bound up with the fate and
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fist of the countrys most powerful despotand when the Court itself recognizes the difficulty in prosecuting such cases for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth, and the law itself aids in this difficulty by declaring that technical rules of procedure and evidence to be inapplicable to such cases, then the Court is left with only one option. In the face of overwhelming facts and law, the Court cannot play blind, when the facts, evidence, and law are abundantly clear: rule, as it should that, being ill-gotten wealth, the same should be declared forfeited in favor of the Republic, to be used only for the entire coconut industry and for all coconut farmers. IV. OTHER SUPERVENING EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SINCE THE JUDGMENT IN G.R. NOS. 166859, 169203, AND 180702, REPUBLIC V. SANDIGANBAYAN, EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., ET AL. PURPORTEDLY ATTAINED FINALITY WOULD MAKE ITS EXECUTION UNJUST AND INEQUITABLE.
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In its 4 December 2009 En Banc Resolution in the case of Apo Fruits Corporation v. Court of Appeals,31 the Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Bersamin, gave the following survey of what it had previously deemed to be exceptional circumstances: A sampling of decided cases that illustrate what the Court has heretofore recognized as exceptional circumstances warranting the reopening of final and immutable judgments is proper to be made. xxx In De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan,[10] the Court had previously denied with finality the petitioners motion for reconsideration of its decision affirming his conviction by the Sandiganbayan of a violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. The petitioner nonetheless took a novel recourse by filing a so-called omnibus motion for leave to vacate first motion for reconsideration in the light of the present developments and to consider evidence presented herein and to set aside conviction. Citing a transcendental reason, that the accused was then about to lose his liberty simply because his former lawyers had pursued a carelessly contrived procedural strategy of insisting on what has already become an imprudent remedy that had forbade him from offering his evidence although all the while available for presentation, the Court used its pervasive and encompassing power to alter even that which it had already declared final, and directed the remand of the case to the Sandiganbayan, to allow the evidence of the accused to be received and appreciated,

31
G.R. No. 164195, 4 December 2009.
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holding that:
xxx To cling to the general rule in this case is only to condone rather than rectify a serious injustice to petitioner whose only fault was to repose his faith and entrust his innocence to his previous lawyers. xxx
In Barnes v. Padilla,[11] the Court reinstated the petition despite the judgment having become final and executory due to the counsels filing in the CA of a motion for extension of time to file motion for reconsideration (which was not allowed under the internal rules of the CA), instead of a timely motion for reconsideration. Aside from observing that the petitioner, although bound by the mistakes or neglect of his counsel, should not be allowed to suffer serious injustice from such mistakes or neglect of counsel, the Court decided to rescind the assailed decision of the CA, and to direct the Regional Trial Court to proceed with the hearing of the action for specific performance that had been erroneously dismissed on the ground of forum-shopping in view of a previously filed case for ejectment, considering that the ejectment action did not bar the action for specific performance. In Manotok IV v. Heirs of Homer L. Barque,[12] the Court set aside the entry of judgment to reopen the case on the merits, because the militating concern for the Court en banc in accepting these cases is not so much the particular fate of the parties, but the stability of the Torrens system of registration by ensuring clarity of jurisprudence on the field. In contrast, the matter involved herein concerns only the petitioners mere private
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claim for interest and attorneys fees, which cannot even be classified as unprecedented. Even worse is that the petitioners private claim does not qualify either as a substantial or transcendental matter, or as an issue of paramount public interest, for no special or compelling circumstance has been present to warrant the relaxation of the doctrine of immutability in favor of the petitioners. That the Third Division might have erred in deleting the award of interest is neither a special nor a compelling reason to have the Court en banc favor the petitioners with a modification of the resolution dated December 19, 2007, after it became final and immutable on May 16, 2008. There is no mistaking that what is at stake in this case are the very lives of 3.5 million coconut farmers who, together with their families, number in the upwards of 20 million Filipinos representing a fifth of the Philippine population, and the poorest of the poor. Some of the farmers who have contributed to these forced exactions have long since passed on, with nary a fruit of their labors in sight. This crusade is being waged by their brethren for those who have been felled by time, those who continue to suffer, and those whose suffering will be further aggravated by this injustice occasioned by an apparently innocent oversightof denying the existence of the legal definition of ill-gotten wealth, which paved the way for the
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Courts act of effectively raising the proof required to establish such cases. At stake in this case are the very efforts of the Republic, as regards the recovery of ill-gotten wealth. If the Decision is allowed to stand, one could reasonably foreseeas, in fact, it has been shown by the recent dismissal of the ill-gotten wealth against another known Marcos crony, Mr. Lucio Tan that ill-gotten wealth cases will be judged on the merits of the heightened standard offered by a misplaced definition of illgotten wealth. Further compounding this problem is the fact that, there also appears to be an alarming trend of gross negligence in the handling of these ill-gotten wealth cases. In the case of Republic v. Imelda Imee R. Marcos-Manotoc,32 the Supreme Court observed that: xxx given the particular context of this case, the failure of the prosecution to adhere to something as basic as the best evidence rule raises serious doubts on the level and quality of effort given to the governments cause. Thus, the Court ordered that a copy of [its] Decision be furnished to the Office of the President so that it may look into the circumstances of this case and determine the liability, if any, of the lawyers of the Office of the Solicitor General and the Presidential Commission

32
G.R. No. 171701, 8 February 2012.
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on Good Government in the manner by which this case was handled in the Sandiganbayan. As pointed out by Justice Brion in his Dissenting Opinion, and as observed by this Honorable Court, there was, too, much left to be desired from the handling of the Republics lawyer, Atty. Dennis M. Taningco, during the pre-trial on May 24, 2000. Referring to the Sandiganbayans observations, this Honorable Court offered the following discussion:
The pre-trial was actually held on May 24, 2000, during which the Sandiganbayan sought clarification from the parties, particularly the Republic, on their respective positions, but at the end, it found the clarifications inadequately enlightening. Nonetheless, the Sandiganbayan, not disposed to reset, terminated the pre-trial:
xxx primarily because the Court is given a very clear impression that the plaintiff does not know what documents will be or whether they are even available to prove the causes of action in the complaint. The Court has pursued and exerted every form of inquiry to see if there is a way by which the plaintiff could explain in any significant particularity the acts and the evidence which will support its claim of wrong-doing by the defendants. The plaintiff has failed to do so.
The following material portions of the pre-trial order are quoted to provide a proper perspective of what transpired during the pre-trial, to wit:
Upon oral inquiry from the Court, the issues which were being raised by plaintiff appear to have been made on a very generis character. Considering that any claim for violation or breach of trust or deception cannot be made on generic statements but rather by specific acts which would demonstrate fraud or breach of trust or deception, together with the evidence in support thereof, the same was not acceptable to the Court. The plaintiff through its designated counsel for this morning, Atty. Dennis Taningco, has represented to this Court that the annexes to its pre-trial brief, more particularly the findings of the COA in its various examinations, copies of which COA reports are attached to the pre-trial brief, would demonstrate the wrong, the act or omission attributed to the defendants or
MANIFESTATION AD CAUTELAM SUPERABUNDANTI WITH REQUEST FOR ADVISORY OPINION G.R. No. 166859, G.R. No. 169203 & G.R. No. 180702 x---------------------------------------------x to several of them and the basis, therefore, for the relief that plaintiff seeks in its complaint. It would appear, however, that the plaintiff through its counsel at this time is not prepared to go into the specifics of the identification of these wrongs or omissions attributed to plaintiff. The Court has reminded the plaintiff that a COA report proves itself only in proceedings where the issue arises from a review of the accountability of particular officers and, therefore, to show the existence of shortages or deficiencies in an examination conducted for that purpose, provided that such a report is accompanied by its own working papers and other supporting documents. In civil cases such as this, a COA report would not have the same independent probative value since it is not a review of the accountability of public officers for public property in their custody as accountable officers. It has been the stated view of this Court that a COA report, to be of significant evidence, may itself stand only on the basis of the supporting documents that upon which it is based and upon an analysis made by those who are competent to do so. The Court, therefore, sought a more specific statement from plaintiff as to what these documents were and which of them would prove a particular act or omission or a series of acts or omissions purportedly committed by any, by several or by all of the defendants in any particular stage of the chain of alleged wrong-doing in this case. The plaintiff was not in a position to do so. The Court has remonstrated with the plaintiff, insofar as its inadequacy is concerned, primarily because this case was set for pre-trial as far back as December and has been reset from its original setting, with the undertaking by the plaintiff to prepare itself for these proceedings. It appears to this Court at this time that the failure of the plaintiff to have available responses and specific data and documents at this stage is not because the matter has been the product of oversight or notes and papers left elsewhere; rather, the agitation of this Court arises from the fact that at this very stage, the plaintiff through its counsel does not know what these documents are, where these documents will be and is still anticipating a submission or a delivery thereof by COA at an undetermined time. The justification made by counsel for this stance is that this is only pre-trial and this information and the documents are not needed yet. The Court is not prepared to postpone the pre-trial anew primarily because the Court is given a very clear impression that the plaintiff does not know what documents will be or whether they are even available to prove the causes of action in the complaint. The Court has pursued and has exerted every form of inquiry to see if there is a way by which the plaintiff could explain in any significant particularity the acts and the evidence which will support its claim of wrong-doing by the defendants. The plaintiff has failed to do so. Defendants Cojuangco have come back and reiterated their previous inquiry as to the statement of the cause of action and the description thereof. While the Court acknowledges that
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MANIFESTATION AD CAUTELAM SUPERABUNDANTI WITH REQUEST FOR ADVISORY OPINION G.R. No. 166859, G.R. No. 169203 & G.R. No. 180702 x---------------------------------------------x logically, that statement along that line would be primary, the Court also recognizes that sometimes the phrasing of the issue may be determined or may arise after a statement of the evidence is determined by this Court because the Court can put itself in a position of more clearly and perhaps more accurately stating what the issues are. The Pre-Trial Order, after all, is not so much a reflection of merely separate submissions by all of the parties involved, witnesses by the Court, as to what the subject matter of litigation will be, including the determination of what matters of fact remain unresolved. At this time, the plaintiff has not taken the position on any factual statement or any piece of evidence which can be subject of admission or denial, nor any specifics of any act which could be disputed by the defendants; what plaintiff through counsel has stated are general conclusions, general statements of abuse and misuse and opportunism. After an extended break requested by some of the parties, the sessions were resumed and nothing anew arose from the plaintiff. The plaintiff sought fifteen (15) days to file a reply to the comments and observations made by defendant Cojuangco to the pre-trial brief of the plaintiff. This Court denied this Request since the submissions in preparation for pre-trial are not litigious or contentious matters. They are mere assertions or positions which may or may not be meritorious depending upon the view of the Court of the entire case and if useful at the pre-trial. At this stage, the plaintiff then reiterated its earlier request to consider the pre-trial terminated. The Court sought the positions of the other parties, whether or not they too were prepared to submit their respective positions on the basis of what was before the Court at pre-trial. All of the parties, in the end, have come to an agreement that they were submitting their own respective positions for purpose of pretrial on the basis of the submissions made of record. With all of the above, the pre-trial is now deemed terminated. This Order has been overly extended simply because there has been a need to put on record all of the events that have taken place leading to the conclusions which were drawn herein. The parties have indicated a desire to make their submissions outside of trial as a consequence of this terminated pre-trial, with the plea that the transcript of the proceedings this morning be made available to them, so that they may have the basis for whatever assertions they will have to make either before this Court or elsewhere. The Court deems the same reasonable and the Court now gives the parties fifteen (15) days after notice to them that the transcript of stenographic notes of the proceedings herein are complete and ready for them to be retrieved. Settings for trial or for any other proceeding hereafter will be fixed by this Court either upon request of the parties or when the Court itself shall have determined that nothing else has to be done. The Court has sought confirmation from the parties present as to the accuracy of the recapitulation herein of the proceedings this morning and the Court has gotten assent from all of the parties. xxx
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MANIFESTATION AD CAUTELAM SUPERABUNDANTI WITH REQUEST FOR ADVISORY OPINION G.R. No. 166859, G.R. No. 169203 & G.R. No. 180702 x---------------------------------------------x SO ORDERED.
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Despite this Honorable Courts generous reference to the pre-trial order to provide a proper perspective on the inadequacy of the Republics inadequately enlightening positions during the pre-trial, it is actually (the excerpts from) the transcripts (of the pre-trial hearing of May 24, 2000) that would serve as a clearer backdrop to what transpired that day. Soon after the appearances, when the late Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena started asking Atty. Taningco about specifics, the days session took a turn for the worse: ATTY. TANINGCO: There are specific allegations to that effect in the subdivided complaint, Your Honor. PRESIDING JUSTICE: Where is it? ATTY. TANINGCO: I dont have a copy of that, Your Honor. [Emphasis added.] PRESIDING JUSTICE: Why dont you have a copy of that? We are at pre-trial, what do you think were going to do here, brush our teeth? Look at your records now, Mr. Taningco. [Emphasis added.] ATTY. TANINGCO:
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I have here the Pre-Trial Brief. PRESIDING JUSTICE: Bring it out, whatever it is. ATTY. TANINGCO: But it is not indicated in the Pre-Trial Brief, Your Honor. PRESIDING JUSTICE: So, where is it indicated? ATTY. TANINGCO: It is indicated in the subdivided complaint, Your Honor. PRESIDING JUSTICE: Look at the subdivided complaint now. ATTY. TANINGCO: If I may be allowed to PRESIDING JUSTICE: You come to Court, Mr. Taningco, and not know where your Complaint is, for heavens sake. How come you have Pre-Trial Brief and not have your Complaint? [Emphasis added.] ATTY. TANINGCO: We overlooked that, Your Honor. [Emphasis added.] PRESIDING JUSTICE: Look for it now.
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ATTY. TANINGCO: Yes, Your Honor. xxx ATTY. TANINGCO: Under paragraph 14 at the last portion, page 17 of the subdivided complaint, Enrile and ACCRA 1.8% of the San Miguel Corporation shares of stock and then another 1.8% in the name of JAKA Investment Corporation, thats the one we are referring to, Your Honor. PRESIDING JUSTICE: Enrile-1.8, how much is that? ATTY. TANINGCO: 1.8% of the San Miguel Corporation, Your Honor. That would be roughly millions of pesos also. PRESIDING JUSTICE: Roughly millions of pesos is meaningless, counsel. Youve got to be a little bit more specific. How many shares of stock? Mr. Taningco, this is now particulars; this is now pre-trial. No more generalities here, Mr. Taningco. ATTY. TANINGCO: Yes, Your Honor. If San Miguel Corporation would have a capital stock of PRESIDING JUSTICE: Mr. Taningco, I know what 1.8% means. I want specifics, how many shares or how much par value?
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ATTY. TANINGCO: We do not have a record here to that effect, Your Honor PRESIDING JUSTICE: Son of a gun. [Emphasis added.] ATTY. TANINGCO: But it can be computed mathematically insofar as the percentage is concerned. PRESIDING JUSTICE: If you do not even know, how can you compute mathematically, Mr. Taningco. Never mind. xxx. [Emphasis added.] The late Justice Garchitorena, then, proceeded to press Atty. Taningco for more specifics, concerning the Republics causes of actions, as well as its supporting exhibits. At which point, the following exchange took place: ATTY. TANINGCO: Your Honor, there are several resolutions. PRESIDING JUSTICE: State them. What are they? Allowing private individuals to own SMC shares. What resolutions are they? ATTY. TANINGCO: We do not have it here right now, Your Honor. [Emphasis added.]
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PRESIDING JUSTICE: Son of a gun! This is your allegation of fraud because your basic statement in your Complaint is breach of trust by Cojuangco. Cojuangco put himself according to you in such a special position because of his crony relationship with Marcos so that he could do certain things. Now, in your complaint, you say Cojuangco as President of the UCPB, as PCA Officer and the like was able to maneuver things so that with the use of UCPB funds he could use all of the other instruments meaning the CIIF companies to acquire San Miguel shares and then through a voting trust agreement become the leading mover in San Miguel Corporation and thereby do whatever wrong things he did. So well divide, if you wish, your claim for misbehavior of Cojuangco in two parts, the mechanics and then what he actuallythe wrong things that he did. So, where is now the resolution with regard to individuals owning San Miguel shares? [Emphasis added.] ATTY. TANINGCO: Well, we merely referred to it from the COA Report. PRESIDING JUSTICE: Tell us now, where? ATTY. TANINGCO: And we are gathering those records PRESIDING JUSTICE: Not gathering. This is pre-trial. We can close the case this morning depending upon what you can show us. What do you think we are going to do this morning, Mr. Taningco? This is pre-trial; we can close this case on the basis of admissions and denials this morning, at this point of pre-trial, so that we can identify only
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the factual issues where you will present evidence. If Mr. Cojuangco admits that yes, because of his acts, 25 different people got shares of stock because it was necessary for them to sit in the UCPB Board, to sit in the San Miguel Board, to sit in the CIIF companies; there, you have an admission, so we can close that issue and then we can determine whatever evidence you have to show that Mr. Cojuangco was wrong and was violative of the trust vested upon him by his peculiar position and to the prejudice of the COCOFED, to the prejudice of the UCPB companies, whatever. What are the facts that we will nail down Cojuangco for? Give me one set of facts; dont give me generalities about what the COA Report says. Is the COA Report proof by itself? ATTY. TANINGCO: Not by itself. PRESIDING JUSTICE: Alright, what are the documents that are supporting the COA Report? Do you have an enumeration of the documents that support the COA Report? ATTY. TANINGCO: The resolutions, Your Honor, and the PRESIDING JUSTICE: This is recitation, Mr. Taningco, and this is enumeration; you should have records of that; under the COA Report, the following documents prove that Cojuangco did this; under the COA Report, the following acts of Cojuangco are demonstrated by whatever it is as a result of which he did that. What do we have here? Everybody has been accusing the Government of having generalities in its statement of claims against Ponce Enrile, against Cojuangco and against everybody else. What do you have now? [Emphasis added.]
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ATTY. TANINGCO: The COA Report and PRESIDING JUSTICE: Okay, where in the COA Report? Do you know the COA Report? Do you have an outline of the COA Report? ATTY. TANINGCO: Yes, Your Honor, in this COA Reprot there are findings there that coco levy funds PRESIDING JUSTICE: What are these findings, specifically? Look at them now and enumerate them; recite them to the Court because it will constitute part of the Pre-Trial Order. That is going to be the PreTrial Order. [Emphasis added.] ATTY. TANINGCO: Your Honor, to be candid about it, those specifics, we intend to do that during the presentation of our evidence. PRESIDING JUSTICE: Mr. Taningco, this is the period for specifics because we will identify now the things that Cojuangco will admit, the things that Mr. Ubano will admit for COCOFED, the things that Ms. Herbosa will admit for Ursua, the things that Mr. Marcelo will admit for Ponce Enrile; this is it, today is the day, the time is now. Show us your stuff. What have you got? This is pre-trial; show the world. How can we define the issues and how can we define the unresolved statement of facts if you do not know where they are?
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ATTY. TANINGCO: Well, to be honest, we are still gathering those pertinent documents, Your Honor. [Emphasis added.] PRESIDING JUSTICE: Son of a gun! [Emphasis added.] ATTY. TANINGCO: We are aware of the existence of those documents and we are gathering those documents, Your Honor. PRESIDING JUSTICE: At this stage? ATTY. TANINGCO: And we will be ready at the time of the trial. PRESIDING JUSTICE: Thats going to be too late because we can close this case and declare you guys unready for the case because you have no evidence at pre-trial. What do you think were doing here? [Emphasis added.] ATTY. TANINGCO: We have presented already, Your Honor, our proffer of exhibits consisting of PRESIDING JUSTICE: Okay, do you want your entire case to be rested on the basis of your proffer of documents, supposing you have the documents? ATTY. TANINGCO:
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No, Your Honor, because we have made reservation also there that we are adopting also the exhibits to be offered in the other subdivided complaint. PRESIDING JUSTICE: Bring them out now. Are you ready to bring them out now, so that we can close your case and say this is the evidence, then we can turn to Mr. Mendoza, we nailed you down now; you are supposed to be ready as we would want you to be; admit all of these documents or deny them. If you deny them, tell us why you deny them. We can nail down Mr. Mendoza on this. He has been making noises about you guys not being ready. The assumption is hes taking this grand position because he knows what he is going to do next. Alright, you complete your statement and were going to press Mr. Mendoza to make his statements, good? Wanna roll the dice on that one? [Emphasis added.] ATTY. TANINGCO: We cannot get it clearly, Your Honor. [Emphasis added.] PRESIDING JUSTICE: Ano, tataya ka na? Itaya mo na iyan kung iyan ang gusto mong sabihim [sic] para pigain din natin si Mr. Mendoza para umamin sya kung tatanggapin nya o hindi pagkatapos isara na natin ang kaso. [Emphasis added.] ATTY. TANINGCO: Your Honor, at this point in time we cannot yet rest our case on that premise. PRESIDING JUSTICE:
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What do you think were going to do at pretrial? [Emphasis added.] ATTY. TANINGCO: Because our purpose is only to show that we have a cause of action and we will establish that during the trial, Your Honor. [Emphasis added.] PRESIDING JUSTICE: Where did you ever get that idea? Where did the office of the Solicitor General get that idea of what the pre-trial is supposed to be? The idea of whether you have a cause of action or not is supposed to be determined at least on the surface of the pleadings at the time of the Motion to Dismiss. Tapos na yon. They have not filed a Motion to Dismiss; we will no longer entertain a Motion to Dismiss; theyve filed an answer, so now we are no longer on the determination of whether you have a cause of action; the assumption is that you have a cause of action and we are gathered here this morning to determine what is your statement of proof for those causes of action. If you cannot, then we can close the case on you for having no cause of action or no evidence to support your accusations. [Emphasis added.] ATTY. TANINGCO: We have sufficient evidence, Your Honor. PRESIDING JUSTICE: What is it? Enumerate them; tell us now.
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In the next minutes that followed, Atty. Taningco triedalbeit, in vainto respond to the questions of the late Presiding Justice. Exasperated, the following exchange, then, ensued: PRESIDING JUSTICE: xxx. Where were you when this case is being prepared? Dont laugh, this is a serious matter I mean I know youre embarrassed, I could see you but you dont know this case. [Emphasis added.] ATTY. TANINGCO: Im still studying [Emphasis added.] PRESIDING JUSTICE: Well, too late. [Emphasis added.] ATTY. TANINGCO: I was made to prepare the Pre-Trial Brief only three weeks ago. PRESIDING JUSTICE: So, Mr. Taningco, if you are not ready for pretrial, dont come. If you come for pre-trial, my God, study for 24 hours a day and get yourself ready when you come to this Court for the pretrial; this can be a high moment in your life to skin Cojuangco and get what you think the Government should get from him; to do that, you have to study but you cannot say its over and now Cojuangco should pay; it wont work that way. If the intent of the Government is that, then that overwise Mr. Cojuangco has no obligations to you, Mr. Cojuangco is not proven to have done anything wrong and therefore we the case, Your Honor.
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are wasting time here. Mr. Taningco, that is what its all about. Ive been losing my voice and making a fool of myself since December when we set these cases for pre-trial in all of these UCPB, in all of these Cojuangco, San Miguel cases in 0033 because we wanted to make sure that you have anything. Kung meron kang ipakikita, ipakita mo na. [Emphasis added.] ATTY. TANINGCO: Yes, Your Honor. PRESIDING JUSTICE: Asaan? ATTY. TANINGCO: The other documents, we are still gathering, Your Honor. PRESIDING JUSTICE: Okay, if you are only here three weeks ago, Mr. Nera, tell us what Mr. Taningco doesnt know. [Emphasis added.] ATTY. NERA: Well, Your Honor please, on the part of PCGG we would like to hasten the proceedings, so what we did was to divide this subdivided complaint among the several lawyers so that they can prepare for their briefs and their task regarding their[Emphasis added.] PRESIDING JUSTICE: Mr. Nera, Im not asking you how to make a watch, Im asking you, tell me the time; what the situation here? Why are we nailing down Cojuangco for anything? Long ago, Mr. Nera, in
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January, I recall or February, you came and you said you have all of these documents on top of your table and you were going to work through them. This morning you are here; Mr. Taningco says three weeks lang; you are here longer, Im assuming that you did not give this thing to eight lawyers and then go to sleep; Im assuming you gave this to eight lawyers and made sure that they reported to you so that you would know exactly what they have found out. What do you know, Mr. Nera? [Emphasis added.] ATTY. NERA: Well, as Ive said, Your Honor, we assigned these cases to different lawyers and we tasked these lawyers to gather the evidence and the documents needed in that particular case. As earlier said by Mr. Taningco, the documents that we need in this case is related to the documents to be gathered by the other lawyers. [Emphasis added.] PRESIDING JUSTICE: Mr. Nera, that is known as passing the back [sic], hindi ko po kasalanan, sya po e. Answer the question, please. [Emphasis added.] ATTY. NERA: The other lawyers are in the process of gathering the evidence, Your Honor. PRESIDING JUSTICE: In other words, you are not ready to make a statement as to the specific wrongs attributed to the defendants here. The Court is asking you now so that we can nail down exactly what the defendants are going to be held to account for. We are no longer talking about vague things; it is with the eight lawyers. Great! Bring the eight
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lawyers here; you should have brought the eight lawyers here. [Emphasis added.] ATTY. NERA: I always bring them in every pre-trial, Your Honor. PRESIDING JUSTICE: I mean, now is the pre-trial. Now is it. ATTY. NERA: Well, if Your Honor please, we have our evidence here, the COA Report and now this Honorable Court is asking for the documents which were the basis of the COA Report [Emphasis added.] PRESIDING JUSTICE: Is that wrong? [Emphasis added.] ATTY. NERA: We dont have it right now, Your Honor please. [Emphasis added.] PRESIDING JUSTICE: So, why do you come to pre-trial not having the documents with you? You dont even have a list of documents that support the COA Report. [Emphasis added.] ATTY. NERA: Its in the COA Report, Your Honor. PRESIDING JUSTICE: Wheres your document supporting the COA Report?
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ATTY. NERA: We dont have it today, Your Honor please. [Emphasis added.] PRESIDING JUSTICE: What else do you not have today? I mean, Gentlemen, the COA Report is nothing, the COA Report is no better than affidavit. Its nothing. Its a meaningless piece of paper. Do you want to close your case on the COA Report? [Emphasis added.] ATTY. NERA: No, Your Honor. PRESIDING JUSTICE: In other words you yourself concede that a mere statement, that is the COA Report, is not proof of anything. ATTY. NERA: Unless we present documents which were the basis of the report, Your Honor. PRESIDING JUSTICE: Right now the COA Report is a fairy tale unless you can present the documents upon which the COA Report is based. ATTY. NERA: We will do it, Your Honor please. PRESIDING JUSTICE:
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So, you are going to do that now. Now is pre-trial, now is it; now is before trial because at trial would you like me to read to you the purposes of pre-trial? ATTY. NERA: No more, Your Honor. PRESIDING JUSTICE: Fine. So, now we are here to find out what are the things that do not have to be proven, di ba? Is that correct, Mr. Nera? Youve been in the business longer than I am. At pre-trial, we are here to determine what things are self-proving because thats what the law is, judicial knowledge; what things do not have to be proven because they are admitted by everybody and those which are not admitted will be proven. [Emphasis added.] ATTY. NERA: Yes, Your Honor. PRESIDING JUSTICE: How can we expect Cojuangco and Ponce Enrile to admit documents that you do not have? How can you expect them to admit the documents which you do not even know? How do you think we can accomplish anything at pre-trial this morning? And in January or February when we reset this case, you swore, you promised that you would be ready for pretrial. I recall that Mr. Simon was complaining that and then suddenly he discovered hes going to be the counsel for all of the eight cases and you said, no, no, no, next time we will be ready; I have the papers on top of my desk. Well, now is next time. [Emphasis added.] ATTY. NERA:
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What I was referring to at that time, Your Honor, is the Report, a committee which investigated all of these. PRESIDING JUSTICE: Whatever it was that youre referring to, we are talking of now. We are wondering now, Gentlemen, please forgive us. We are wondering now what is incumbent upon us at this stage of the pre-trial considering the position of the plaintiff at this time. The Court doesnt know what to do because its like deciding on whether or not were going to ask a girl to marry you; what is she says, will you marry her? Thats a question of we dont know what to do now because we dont want to ask the question because if we ask any other question, were afraid of the answer. Mr. Taningco, is there anything you want to say? [Emphasis added.] ATTY. TANINGCO: Well, Your Honor, at this point in time we move that the pre-trial be terminated and that we be allowed to present our evidence during the trial. [Emphasis added.] PRESIDING JUSTICE: One what issues will you present evidence? Make that of record, please. On what facts, not issues anymore, no longer generalities, not conclusions, facts. What are the facts that you will present evidence at trial? Im writing it down, Mr. Taningco. Everything youve said is tape recorded and written down by the Stenographer. [Emphasis added.] ATTY. TANINGCO:
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On facts, No. 1) to prove the findings of the COA Report. PRESIDING JUSTICE: Thats a conclusion. What facts will you be proving insofar as the COA Report states? ATTY. TANINGCO: That there were disbursements of coco levy funds which are irregular and anomalous and were used in the purchase or acquisition of San Miguel shares to the detriment of the coconut farmers and the coconut levy funds and to the benefit or advantage of the defendants Cojuangco. PRESIDING JUSTICE: Okay, this is pre-trial, remember this is no longer just generalities; this is not talking to your clients; this is not taking to the Court [sic]. Now, to the detriment of coconut levy funds and coconut farmers, that is a conclusion. What are the facts that you will prove to show that the coconut levy funds were irregular and anomalous? What documents, what testimonies are you going to present? ATTY. TANINGCO: We intend to present the COA Auditors, Your Honor. PRESIDING JUSTICE: And what will they testify to? What specific acts, what specific documents will they testify to? ATTY. TANINGCO: They will testify on the fact that per their audit, the PRESIDING JUSTICE:
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We know that. What is the basis for the statement in the audit, thats what they will testify to? ATTY. TANINGCO: As to the basis of their findings and their audit PRESIDING JUSTICE: Its like saying nakita po naming, thats hearsay. Ano? What? Where is what you saw because the conclusions of the COA are not binding upon us, so we want to know what will they say, what documents will they present to make it binding upon us. ATTY. TANINGCO: They will have to show the PRESIDING JUSTICE: Not will have to, you know what they will show; you know what documents they will have to show. What are these documents? ATTY. TANINGCO: First, the PCA resolutions. PRESIDING JUSTICE: What specific PCA resolutions? ATTY. TANINGCO: Authorizing PRESIDING JUSTICE: Are they enumerated in your Pre-Trial Brief? ATTY. TANINGCO:
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Some are enumerated here, Your Honor. PRESIDING JUSTICE: Like what documents? What documents are enumerated in your Pre-Trial Brief? Wala ng bulahan dito, Mr. Taningco. Wala ng istiran dito; you are now going to give specific things. We are not being paid here to watch around and go through generalities anymore. Speak to us now in specifics because we can ask Mr. Mendoza to admit these documents. What are the documents? [Emphasis added.] ATTY. TANINGCO: First document is the PCA resolution allowing the transfer or deposit of the coco levy funds to the UCPB. PRESIDING JUSTICE: Is that enumerated? Is that mentioned in your PreTrial Brief? ATTY. TANINGCO: There are so many documents here PRESIDING JUSTICE: I know theres so many. Tell me, is it mentioned and which one is it? ATTY. TANINGCO: I think its mentioned here. PRESIDING JUSTICE: No, not what you think. You know this thing; you prepared this; you were hired three weeks ago and you really worked hard for it. Where is it?
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ATTY. TANINGCO: Yes, Your Honor, but I want to be sure. PRESIDING JUSTICE: You should have been sure when you came here. Will you look at Exh. B; thats the only resolution that you mentioned I mean its the only document other than an official enactments. ATTY. TANINGCO: We have the agreement for the acquisition of a commercial bank for the benefit of the coconut farmers of the Philippines. PRESIDING JUSTICE: Alright, that is not denied. Ponce Enrile admits that there was such a document and he says yes and that was a very valid point of investment. Its not binding yet. Mr. Marcelo, I think you are going to admit that such a document exists? ATTY. TANINGCO: Yes, Your Honor. PRESIDING JUSTICE: Mr. Mendoza, just very quickly, you will admit that document? ATTY. MENDOZA: Yes, Your Honor, but I would like to state that I cannot admit anything until I am told what the cause of action is. PRESIDING JUSTICE:
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Its not binding on you; just to nail them down. ATTY. MENDOZA: Actually, if Your Honor please, if they would only state categorically what their cause of action is, I would probably be prepared to make an admission as to all of these documents. [Emphasis added.] PRESIDING JUSTICE: Okay, there is a hamon. If you tell them what your causes of action are, he will admit all of your annexes. So, the Court is now the one that is tasked; it is just making sure that you got the right document. Back to you, what is our problem with Exh. B? Mr. Mendoza is prepared to concede the existence of that document and its just that if he makes an admission now its gonna be a waste of time unless he knows which way were going and Mr. Marcelo is more daring than Mr. Mendoza; he says yes, we will admit that it exists; in fact, in his pleadings he says that was for the benefit of PCA. What else? Everything else is Presidential Decrees and issuances, statement of assets and liabilities of Eduardo Cojuangco and his wife, great, but thats not what were going to do because we are not here on 1379, we are here on civil code like breach of trust and I supposed necessarily consequent corporate breach of trust etc. Fine. What other acts of the PCA? [Emphasis added.] ATTY. TANINGCO: Well, there are so many other acts of the PCA. [Emphasis added.] PRESIDING JUSTICE: What? What are these acts? [Emphasis added.]
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ATTY. TANINGCO: Well, at the moment, Your Honor, I cannot express it out immediately. I will have to review it again. [Emphasis added.] PRESIDING JUSTICE: What do you think you are supposed to do here this morning, Mr. Taningco? [Emphasis added.] ATTY. TANINGCO: Well, for the ordinary pre-trial [Emphasis added.] PRESIDING JUSTICE: This is ordinary pre-trial. I do not know whether youve attended pre-trial in other courts but in this neck of the wolves, this is ordinary pre-trial. I mean we think we understand the Rules very well. In fact, theres nothing else that we go for except the Rules, so what do you think were going to do this morning? Mr. Mendoza is correct; he would like to know why his client will be made to pay huge amounts of money, surrender huge amounts of property or whatever it is. What is your cause of action? Under what law or under what specific wrongs? A cause of action as I recall is a statement of acts or omissions which have caused harm to the plaintiff presumably the person from whom the plaintiff is initiating this suit and for which the defendants are called upon to make compensation. Thats more or less my understanding of cause of action. Will you agree, more or less, on that statement of a cause of action? [Emphasis added.] ATTY. TANINGCO: Yes, Your Honor.
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PRESIDING JUSTICE: Fine. Now, is he entitled to find out at pre-trial what in heavens name your cause of action against him is? ATTY. TANINGCO: Yes, Your Honor, we have stated that in our Pre-Trial Brief. PRESIDING JUSTICE: Good. Mr. Mendoza, please listen to this because he will tell us what their cause of action is against you. What is the cause of action? ATTY. TANINGCO: The cause of action is that they have taken advantage of their position to transfer the coco levy fund which is a public fund into the hands of private persons and for their own personal benefit and private gain, Your Honor, to the damage and prejudice of the coconut farmers and the Government or Filipino people. PRESIDING JUSTICE: Mr. Mendoza, I will no longer ask the question because I think Ive gone through this before. Are you satisfied with that cause of action? ATTY. MENDOZA: I would like to clarify whether that is the cause of action relating to these particular San Miguel shares, Your Honor, because this is not a general Complaint for damages. They are talking of specific properties, so generally what they have referred to as Cojuangco, San Miguel Corporation shares, the CIIF shares PRESIDING JUSTICE:
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Are you satisfied with that statement of a cause of action or would you like something more specific with regard to the shares of stock? ATTY. MENDOZA: Im not satisfied because that is incomprehensible, Your Honor. PRESIDING JUSTICE: In other words, what youre saying is you want a statement as to how that general statement relates now to the San Miguel shares? ATTY. MENDOZA: Yes, Your Honor. PRESIDING JUSTICE: Okay, how does it relate now? ATTY. TANINGCO: The money was used for the purchase of shares of stock of San Miguel shares which became PRESIDING JUSTICE: Which came from? The fraud is because it came from? ATTY. TANINGCO: It came from a public fund, coco levy funds then PRESIDING JUSTICE: Whether its public funds or not, is a question of law that is pending. You see, we are just questioning the coconut levy funds; whether its public or not, is a conclusion that we will draw despite the Presidential Decrees, so dont confuse the issue about public funds.
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What is now the relationship of those statements to the shares of stock of San Miguel Corporation being discussed here more particularly those in the name of Mr. Cojuangco for which Mr. Cojuangco is charged for whatever abuses he did? ATTY. TANINGCO: Well, the coco levy fund was used for the purchase or acquisition of the San Miguel shares. PRESIDING JUSTICE: In the name of Cojuangco? ATTY. TANINGCO: In the name of Cojuangco and the other PRESIDING JUSTICE: No, no, no, in the name of Cojuangco, okay. What is your proof that it was not Cojuangcos money but coconut levy funds that were used to buy the Soriano shares and the Ayala shares because you, the plaintiff, says this and Cojuangco does not deny that he acquired the Zobel shares or the Ayala shares whichever way you like it and the Soriano shares. Cojuangco used whatever documents you want to say he did in the process but the fact is he acquired it and Cojuangco asserts he owns these shares of stock and thats why in public statements he is willing to talk about CIIF shares, I mean the coconut levy shares and COCOFED or anything else but he doesnt want anything about his other shares because he has paid his money for it. Youre saying he paid it with the use of coconut levy funds. What proof do we have that he used not his own money but the coconut levy funds to buy his shares? ATTY. TANINGCO:
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Well, we have the Board Resolution of the Philippine Coconut Authority, the Board Resolution of the UCPB and the COA findings, Your Honor. PRESIDING JUSTICE: Okay, what do these resolutions say? ATTY. TANINGCO: To the effect authorizing the acquisition of that shares of stock of San Miguel Corporation and the profits of investment PRESIDING JUSTICE: Just a minute, which shares of stock? There are three shares of stock here, sets of shares. I keep repeating; you must listen to me because Ive read your pleadings. So, please pretend that I understand what Im talking about. ATTY. TANINGCO: Yes, Your Honor. PRESIDING JUSTICE: We have three sets of shares insofar as this case is concerned, Ayala shares, Soriano shares, CIIF shares. ATTY. MENDOZA: The CIIF shares are the Soriano shares, Your Honor. The Cojuangco shares were acquired from the Ayala Group and the CIIF shares were acquired from the Soriano shares. PRESIDING JUSTICE: We are being corrected by Mr. Mendoza, so never mind. The Ayala shares belong to Mr. Cojuangco, the Soriano shares belong to the CIIF companies. Now,
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these are the two blocks of shares. Did PCA authorized and used coconut levy money to buy the Ayala shares? ATTY. TANINGCO: Yes, Your Honor. PRESIDING JUSTICE: What is your proof? ATTY. TANINGCO: A Board Resolution to that effect. PRESIDING JUSTICE: Bring it out. Wheres the resolution? ATTY. TANINGCO: I do not have it right now, Your Honor. PRESIDING JUSTICE: So, if Mr. Mendoza can show that that is not the case, then were finished with the conversation, is that so? ATTY. TANINGCO: Not yet, Your Honor. PRESIDING JUSTICE: Teka muna. We are just talking about shares of stock here. 1) Soriano shares bought for CIIF companies. Do you want to call it Ayala shares or Zobel shares because you bought it from Zobel but they were from the Ayalas. Which one do you want to label them, the Zobel shares or the Ayala shares? Lets use your label. What
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label do you want? The Zobel shares or the Ayala shares? [Emphasis added.] ATTY. TANINGCO: I think thats the same as the thing Ayala shares, Your Honor. [Emphasis added.] PRESIDING JUSTICE: Enrique Zobel in your Complaint, in your PreTrial Brief, Enrique Zobel wanted to unload his own shares of stock; the Sorianos even if the Sorianos and the Ayalas are related, the Sorianos wanted to unload their own shares of stock. Dalawang bagay yun. [Emphasis added.] ATTY. TANINGCO: I got confused, Your Honor, Im sorry. [Emphasis added.] PRESIDING JUSTICE: Kaya tayo nagkakalintik-lintikan e di mo alam kung anong pinag-uusapan natin. So, do you want to call it Zobel shares or Ayala shares? [Emphasis added.] ATTY. TANINGCO: Ayala shares, Your Honor. PRESIDING JUSTICE: Now, the Soriano shares according to Mr. Mendoza were the ones acquired by the CIIF companies, is that correct or you do not know? ATTY. TANINGCO: Im confused now, Your Honor. Im getting mixed up. Im sorry. [Emphasis added.]
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PRESIDING JUSTICE: This is your moment of glory. ATTY. TANINGCO: But I got mixed up, Your Honor, Im sorry. have to [Emphasis added.] PRESIDING JUSTICE: After being sorry, what now? [Emphasis added.] ATTY. TANINGCO: Im asking if PRESIDING JUSTICE: What do we do now? Find out. ATTY. TANINGCO: Yes, Your Honor, Im asking my Compaeros here. [Emphasis added.] PRESIDING JUSTICE: Mr. Taningco, you are fighting a former Solicitor General; you are fighting the ACCRA; you are fighting very very substantial people and if you show them your galing, heaven, this is your moment of glory. Mr. Mendoza? [Emphasis added.] ATTY. MENDOZA: May I request, Your Honor please, that we declare a recess for 15 minutes or half an hour so that the plaintiffs counsel can look at their documents. PRESIDING JUSTICE: I
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Any objection? ATTY. CATAPANG: No objection, Your Honor. PRESIDING JUSTICE: When we come back, Mr. Taningco, you will know because Mr. Mendoza is now telling you he is okay. If you want to use ordinary language that means to say suck [sic] it to me, baby, lets see what youve got. [Emphasis added.] ATTY. MARCELO: Your Honor please, I could sense from the statements of the counsel for the Government that they are not prepared. Im even willing to request this Honorable Court to cancel this pretrial and reset it to another date. [Emphasis added.] ATTY. UBANO: At this time, I will object to that, Your Honor. Lets see after 30 minutes. PRESIDING JUSTICE: Suspend the proceedings. (SESSION SUSPENDED 10:00 oclock; RESUMED 11:00 oclock) PRESIDING JUSTICE: We took more than half an hour. Mr. Taningco, Mr. Mendoza, Mr. Marcelo, Ms. Herbosa, Mr. Ubano, is there anything that we should hear? Your last statement was to consider the pre-trial terminated
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insofar as the plaintiff is concerned. Is there any statement you want to make? ATTY. TANINGCO: Your Honor please, only this morning, I got a copy of the comments to the Pre-Trial Brief filed by plaintiff. PRESIDING JUSTICE: Comments by whom? ATTY. TANINGCO: By defendant Cojuangco, Your Honor, and I think some of the questions being propounded by this Honorable Court came from this comment of defendant Cojuangco. PRESIDING JUSTICE: Counsel, we are quite original in our own questions. We did not prepare it for them and they did not prepare it for us. ATTY. TANINGCO: Your Honor, we would like to file a reply to this comment and we would ask for 15 days for the office to file the reply to the comment of defendant Cojuangco. PRESIDING JUSTICE: Counsel, the comment of defendant Cojuangco is not a contentious pleading. The Pre-Trial Briefs and the comments thereon are not contentious pleadings; they are submissions in preparation for pre-trial and, if you wish, for them to make a statement on the one hand and as we have suggested, to aid the Court in conducting a proper pre-trial. It is not a subject matter of debate. If you see that, Mr. Taningco, the answer is no, you cannot be given time to file a reply
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to a comment, thats what theyre saying and thats what they are going to contest but you are not going to argue and debate with them in pleadings. The pretrial is now; you are supposed to respond to those questions, you have to respond to those observations; you are supposed to respond to these now by presenting your evidence by stating the law or the provisions of the law which you think Cojuangco has violated and for which Cojuangco is to be held liable; you dont file that pleading, Mr. Taningco, and if you think were going to go along with that meaning as a result of which we are going to postpone this pre-trial, no way. ATTY. TANINGCO: We just want to put the same in their proper perspective. PRESIDING JUSTICE: You can place it in proper perspective by doing it now. Mr. Taningco, please, I mean, dont play games with us, please dont. I mean we are now at this stage where we are wearing false teeth and receding hairlines, so dont, please. Weve gone through this; weve tried that ourselves before When we were on the other side of the bench. Please have a little respect for us and please assume that we have done things like that before and we know why it should not be done. [Emphasis added.] ATTY. TANINGCO: I withdraw that manifestation, Your Honor. PRESIDING JUSTICE: Fine. Now, what do we do now? ATTY. TANINGCO:
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May we request then, Your Honor, that the pretrial be deemed terminated in order that the plaintiff will be able to present its evidence at the trial of the case. [Emphasis added.] PRESIDING JUSTICE: We know that if you ask for the closure of pretrial, the other parties can make their motions or manifestations and they can file motions for us to make judgments on the pleadings, if necessary. Are you aware of that? Are you aware that the parties can file motions on the basis of what has happened at pre-trial? Are you aware of that? [Emphasis added.] ATTY. TANINGCO: Yes, Your Honor. PRESIDING JUSTICE: We cannot say that just because youve asked the pretrial to be deemed terminated, well now proceed to trial. Lets just make sure that we know what we are doing. ATTY. TANINGCO: Yes, Your Honor, thats why in our Pre-Trial Brief we have also made reservations as to the exhibits and evidence that were going to present. PRESIDING JUSTICE: Okay, we will make of record even in the Order that you have been duly warned about the consequences of your request to consider the pre-trial terminated on the basis of the allegations that you have made this morning. [Emphasis added.] ATTY. TANINGCO:
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On the basis of our Pre-Trial Brief, Your Honor. PRESIDING JUSTICE: All of the documents that you have submitted and on the basis of your averments in open court this morning. You will assume full responsibility for the consequences of the motion that you are going to make. Malinaw ang usapan. [Emphasis added.] ATTY. TANINGCO: In that case, I will consult first the PRESIDING JUSTICE: What do you think you were doing before we gave you this warning? That the words you utter will be of no consequence? If we did not tell you about the consequences of your submission, you would not have consulted Mr. Simon? ATTY. TANINGCO: No, just to be sure if the Solicitor would still PRESIDING JUSTICE: Okay, consult him. Fine. ATTY. SIMON: Yes, Your Honor, we are aware of that. PRESIDING JUSTICE: Mr. Mendoza, what do you have to say now at this stage of the proceedings, youre half of the pre-trial? [sic] ATTY. MENDOZA:
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Your Honor please, we assumed that plaintiff has asked that this pre-trial be terminated because they are unable firstly, to state more concretely and definitely their cause of action meaning to say the specific flow on the basis of which they asked for the reversion of the San Miguel Corporation shares subject of this suit by the plaintiff and the particular acts which were allegedly committed by the defendants, when I say defendants, those I represent, Your Honor, which have violated this law and on the basis of which the San Miguel Corporation shares particularly what we referred to as the Cojuangco shares be reverted to the Court. I would like to note, if Your Honors please, that before the recess, Atty. Taningco was starting to say or actually said that they take the position, that is the plaintiff takes the position, that the purchase price for the San Miguel Corporation shares of stock of the Cojuangco group particularly were paid with the use of coconut levy funds and when the Court as ked what evidence the plaintiff has to support their support their statement, Mr. Taningco started by referring to the COA Report and also PCA resolution authorizing the deposit of the coconut levy funds with the United Coconut Planters bank and beyond that he has said nothing more, so we are assuming that the plaintiff has asked for the termination of this pre-trial not because the purpose or the purposes of the pre-trial have already been achieved but simply because they can add nothing more to what they have thus far stated as to their cause of action and the evidence they intend to present. So, on that basis, if Your Honor please, we believe that pre-trial has not been achieved; plaintiff has not discharged its burden and consequently, we reserve and ask for time to make appropriate submissions in light of this, Your Honor. PRESIDING JUSTICE: Do you conform [sic] then that the pre-trial be deemed terminated insofar as defendants Cojuangco are concerned so that you yourself have nothing to
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add to what is now on the pleadings and on the submissions? ATTY. MENDOZA: Im thinking carefully, Your Honor, what termination would imply. As far as we are concerned, the basic position we have stated in our Pre-Trial Brief as well as in this comment we have filed incidentally we precisely filed this comment and served a copy by personal service on the plaintiff just so that they would respond to this; they would have time to prepare responses to this for todays pre-trial. PRESIDING JUSTICE: When did they receive it, counsel? ATTY. MENDOZA: On May 20, Your Honor. ATTY. TANINGCO: May 22, Your Honor. ATTY. MENDOZA: Or May 22. So, if Your Honors please, normally in a pre-trial first, you define the issues and the most basic issue is the cause of action. As we have stated, the plaintiff has failed to identify the issues. As far as we are concerned, the plaintiff has not stated what its cause of action is. They failed to identify the acts which the defendants have allegedly committed in violation of whatever law the cause of action is based and the plaintiff has also not done that, then plaintiff is required in pre-trial to state their evidence. So, on this basis, Your Honors please, on our part, on the basis of what plaintiff has done, we will be filing we would request for 20 days to file an appropriate motion in light of the motion of the plaintiff to terminate the pre-trial but we would request that the
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20-day period be counted from a reasonable, from the time the Stenographers transcribed the notes. It is very important that we do so on the basis of the record of the proceedings not only of this mornings pre-trial but all of those before. PRESIDING JUSTICE: Mr. Mendoza, thats fine. xxx ATTY. MENDOZA: Yes, your Honor, I will agree to consider the case terminated on the basis of the proceedings thus far held and I make it clear that we do so because as Ive emphasized repeatedly, in a civil complaint, the burden of proof, the burden of allegation is on the plaintiff, not to us. The plaintiff has not discharged that burden but has completely negated the existence of a cause of action and of evidence on the basis of what has happened in this pre-trial, Your Honor. As the transcript of the proceedings on the date of the scheduled pre-trial evince (Annex A), it is not difficult to commiserate with the late Presiding Justice Garchitorena and his palpable misery brought about by the Republics lawyers insufficient preparations. When asked to be more specific about the Republics cause of actions, Atty. Taningco did not quite know how to respond. Inasmuch as Atty. Taningco was reprimanded for not having a copy of his Complaint, worse still was the fact that he did not even know the specifics and details of the Complaint. In fact, it was only through the help of the
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other counsels that Atty. Taningco managed to locate the required pleadingor through the motion of one of the counsels that the Sandiganbayan broke for recess, giving Atty. Taningco some time to gather his bearings. Finally, after the break, perhaps the most exasperating point33 for the late Presiding Justice was Atty. Taningcos sudden motion to terminate the pre-trial. It was only upon the stern warning of the serious consequences of terminating the pre-trial that Atty. Taningco decided to consult Atty. Simon. Just as the termination of pre-trial has serious
consequences, so, too, does the pre-trial itself. The pre-trial hearing is the opportunity to thresh out, among others, the issues that would be taken up and settled by the Court, as well as the admissions and disputed facts relating to the case. As can be seen from the foregoing exchange, due to Atty. Taningcos gross negligence and insufficient preparations, the Republic failed to seize the opportunities afforded by the pre-trial to bolster its contention and fight for its case. Even more mind-boggling is the fact that, Atty. Dennis M. Taningco was a former Solicitor at the Office of the Solicitor General. (To be clear, however, at the time that he represented

This speaks volumes, considering the fact that the Presiding Justice expressed his exasperation, a number of times, by passionately exclaiming son of a gun!
33
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the Republic, he was no longer with the OSG, and was appearing thus, as one of the PCGGs private counsels.) In fact, early in the proceedings of that day, as Atty. Taningco entered his appearance, the Presiding Justice had to clarify whether or not Atty. Taningco was appearing as part of the OSG, because of the Presiding Justices acquaintance with Atty. Taningco. The Republics lawyers lackluster performance is made more tragic by the fact that he must have been sufficiently acquainted with the caliber of his main opposing counsel that day, Atty. Estelito Mendoza. This is based on the fact that, in at least three cases that reached the Supreme Court, Atty. Taningco was the Solicitor, assisting then Solicitor General Mendoza.34 Knowing that he was going up against the former Solicitor General, with whom, as one could surmise, he had ample opportunity to work with, Atty. Taningco certainly could have prepared more diligently and, thus, performed better during the pre-trial hearing: in order to ensure that the subsequent pre-trial order would reflect and define accurately the issues and matters raised in the Republics Complaint and Pre-Trial Brief, and to

In the cases of Confederation of Citizens Labor Unions (CCLU) v. Hon. Carmelo C. Noriel, G.R. No. L-56902, September 21, 1982; Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Union Industries, Inc. v. Director Carmlo Noriel, G.R. No. L50874, October 23, 1981; and PASUDECO Workers Union Officers v. Bureau of Labor Relations, G.R. No. L-50241, December 19, 1980, Atty. Dennis M. Taningco was one of the Solicitors who assisted then Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza.
34
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propose matters and subjects for admission that might no longer require the further reception of evidence. The foregoing exchange during the pre-trial, however embarrassing it might be for Atty. Taningco, is fully documented on the record. This, however, is in stark contrast to this Honorable Courts statements regarding the ensuing
proceedings, with words to the following effect:

It appears that the trial concerning the disputed block of shares was not scheduled because the consideration and resolution of the aforecited motions for summary judgment occupied much of the ensuing proceedings. [Emphasis mine.]
Bereft of any footnotes, the foregoing inference, however apparent as this Honorable Court might claim, is not supported by evidence or the record. Just as the following observation, too, is not supported by evidence or the record:
To begin with, it is notable that the decision of November 28, 2007 did not rule on whether coconut levy funds were public funds or not. The silence of the Sandiganbayan on the matter was probably due to its not seeing the need for such ruling following its conclusion that the Republic had not preponderantly established the source of the funds used to pay the purchase price of the concerned SMC shares, and whether the shares had been acquired with the use of coconut levy funds. [Emphasis mine.]
It is respectfully submitted that such observations are misplaced and unfounded, especially for a Court that took no part in the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan. These
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observations read into the psychological frame of mind of the Sandiganbayan and its members, which mental conjectures are not reflected in the records of this caseand which, thus, cannot be supported by the all-too-important referencing footnote. Contrary to this Honorable Courts observation, it is not the Sandiganbayan [that] became completely deprived of the means to know the necessary but crucial details of the transactions on the acquisition of the contested block of shares. Quite unfortunately, it is the Republic that was not afforded an actual and real opportunity to present the full merits of its case; thus, effectively depriving the Republic of due process. As such, considering that there was gross negligence on the part of the Republics counseleven assuming that there was insufficient evidencesuch mistakes should not bind the Republic,
especially as it deprives the Republic of an opportunity to be heard. Be that as it may, soon after it introduced the Court declared In Kilosbayan v. Morato,35 the Supreme Court said that a change in the composition of the Court could prove the means of undoing an erroneous decisionmoreso in this case where the

35
G.R. 118910, 16 November 1995.
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Courts peculiar circumstances in its historical juncture would hardly support the inconclusive vote that was taken on 12 April 2011. It is not everyday that a case that is purportedly for the Supreme Court En Banc can only be decided by 11 of its membersthere being four who are constrained not to participate: two being former members of the Sandiganbayan that rendered the assailed decision, another being the Peoples Tribune that fought for the case, and yet, another being an advocate for the coconut farmers plight months prior to donning his judicial robe. Simply put, while it was an En Banc Decision, it was not with the full composition of the Courtas there could only have been 11 members who could have voted to sustain the Republics position. While the foregoing is specious, there is no disputing the fact that, since then, the compositionand the contextof the Court has tremendously changed. 1) Of the seven Justices who concurred with the DECISION, only six remain, after the impeachment and conviction of then Chief Justice Renato Corona. The fact that a Chief Justice of the Supreme Court was impeached and convicted is unprecedented in the history of the Court. This
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fact has set off 2012 as a significant marker, a turning point in the Courts historywhere impeachment as an accountability mechanism, enshrined in the Constitution was tried and tested, as an option for the people to hold even the highest magistrate of the land accountable; 2) Of the four Justices who dissented from the DECISION, only three remain, with the retirement of Associate Justice Carpio Morales; a. The appointment of Associate Justice Sereno to the position of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, there is, as yet, a vacancy in the Court; 3) Of the four Justices who inhibited from the DECISION, only three remain, with the retirement of Associate Justice Nachuraand of the three, pursuant to IRSC, Rule 8, Section 1, only two remain with grounds for inhibition; a. In the DECISION, Justice Carpio took no part for being one of [the] petitioners in a petition to declare the coco levy funds public funds. b. Indeed, Justice Carpio was a petitioner in G.R. No. 147036-37, Pambansang Koalisyon ng Mga
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amahang Magsasaka at Manggagawa sa Niyugan (PKSMMN), et al. v. Executive Secretary (re: Petition to Declare the Unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 312, Executive Order No. 313, Section 5, Article II of Presidential Decree no. 1468); c. Arguably, Justice Carpios inhibition does not fall under the mandatory grounds for inhibitionthe closest approximation being IRSC, Rule 8, Section 1(c), i.e. the Member of the Court or his or her spouse, parent or child is pecuniarily interested in the case, as the good Magistrate had no pecuniary interest in seeking the declaration of null and void acts of the Executive. In fact, his involvement as a petitioner-individual as a [taxpayer and long-time advocate] of the rights of the coconut farmers and farm workers.; d. Since the filing of that Petition dated 1 March 2001 and after his appointment to the Supreme Court, Justice Carpios voluntary offer to inhibit himself was addressed by the Court in a
Resolution dated 26 February 2002, in G.R. Nos.
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147062-64, Republic of the Philippines, etc., v. COCOFED, et al., to wit: i. xxx Similarly, during the Courts deliberations on this case, Justice Carpio already raised the matters alleged in Respondent Cojuangcos Motion and offered to inhibit himself. However, the Court resolved to turn down the offer because the main issue here namely, Who may vote the sequestered UCPB shares while the main case for their reversion to the State is pending in the Sandiganbayan? is not at issue in GR No. 147036. Moreover, the constitutionality of EO 312 and 313 and Article III, Section 5 of PD 1468 is not involved in this case. Neither was it discussed in our Decision. The mere fact that, as a former columnist, Justice Carpio has written on the coconut levy will not disqualify him, in the same manner that jurists will not be disqualified just because they may have given their opinions as textbook writers on the question involved in a case. Nor are we persuaded that merely being legal adviser to the President who issued EO 277 is decisive of disqualification. Indeed, [v]oluntary inhibitions are addressed to the sound discretion of the justice concerned, however, in that other coco levy case, the magistrates concerned believe in good faith that, notwithstanding the allegations in the three Motions, they can render justice fairly and in good faith in the present
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proceedings. The Court does not doubt this. In summation, the Court observed, Being
collegiate in nature, the Supreme Court allows greater leeway to its members in applying the rule on inhibition/disqualification. In case of doubts, it defers to the sound judgment of the individual members magistrate, of the believing are that capable all of
Court
discharging their sacred duty to administer justice without fear or favor. It is for him alone, therefore, to determine his disqualification. e. While Justice Carpios position to voluntarily inhibit himself from this case is respected and respectable, it is just as respectfully and humbly submitted that the circumstances and the issues raised herein, being of transcendental importance, should not preclude an upstanding Member of the Court to take part. f. The grounds on mandatory inhibition are founded upon the belief that a Judge should not be put in a situation where his or her sacred duties may be put to the test or placed in conflict with his or her
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personal interests. The grounds for voluntary inhibition are the necessary corollary of Judges, not just rendering just judgments, but of being perceived as being cold, impartial, and neutral. g. That being said, Rule 8, Section 3(C) of the IRSC, states that: [i]n any event, the mandatory inhibition shall cease after the lapse of ten years from the resignation or withdrawal of the Member from the law firm, unless the Member personally handled the case when he or she was a partner or member of the law firm. h. It has been 11 years since Justice Carpio signed that petition which which he co-filed with other his
advocatesfor
reason,
arguably,
inhibition was not mandatorily compelled, but one that he volunteered to do so, on a matter of personal principleand which petition has
already been decided by the Court on 10 April 2012; i. Because of the peculiar and unique circumstances of this case, the inhibition of any Memberother than those who are compulsorily mandated to do
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sowould greatly diminish the chances of the countrys 3.5 million coconut farmers from having the justice they desire. After all, unlike cases heard by Divisions, when a Magistrate inhibits from a case decided by the Court En Banc, there are no other Justices who may replace him or her. j. Finally, it is respectfully submittedand so, it is urgedthat the Rules on inhibition should not unduly constrain and restrict a Justice from speaking in order to correct an injustice. Between the choice of doing justice and perceived to be just, there is a middle way where the two meet: for in the end, the Filipino people will know, by the Courts actions, reasoning, and decisions how just it truly and actually has been. V. Matters, issues, and cases involving or relating to the Republics duty and right to recover ill-gotten wealth are sui generis; thus, in order to meet the substantial ends of justice and, in this case, a matter of transcendental importance, as equity dictates, a pro hac vice decision must be
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rendered in favor of the Republicand the 3.5 million Filipino coconut farmers and their families who have had to endure the nearly forty year quest for justice. x------------------------------------x And so law in the land died. I grieve for it but I do not despair over it. I know, with a certainty no argument can turn, no wind can shake, that from its dust will rise a new and better law: more just, more human and more humane. When that will happen, I know not. That it will happen, I know. Chief Justice Teehankee quoting Jose W. Diokno in Juan Dizon v. Brig. Gen. Vicente Eduardo Barely one year ago, in his dissenting opinion in the case of Jesus P. Disini v. The Honorable Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 180564, Justice Bersamin lamented how [t]he decision inflicts a severe blow to the faltering effort of the Government to recover ill-gotten wealth from Herminio and his companies. [He insisted] that the States effort to recover ill-gotten wealth from whoever holds or hides it should not be obstructed or stymied. If there is going to be any double cross, the victims will be the Government and the long-suffering Filipino people xxx. One could only assume that it was, then, with a heavy heart that Justice Bersamin found himself writing the words that would
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inflict the mortal blow to the quest for justice of the victims of the elaborate evil exactions called coconut leviesall 3.5 million Filipino coconut farmers who, counted together with their families, number in the upwards of 20 million Filipinos. In many ways, the quest of the Republic is an effort to right the wrongs of historyand by Justice Bersamins ponencia, history is writ. Perhaps, then, before the ink dries and sets, this page could sit a little while longer, and a happier epilogue would close this unfortunate section in the Marcos chapter of Philippine history. Justice Bersamins lament would have been misplaced twenty five years ago, when the efforts of the Republic to recover all ill-gotten wealth, through the PCGG, was not only not faltering, it was praised and cheered. The Court has, on numerous occasions, affirmed and accepted as true what is borne out by Philippine historythe factual premises that motivated and compelled the Republic to embark on the path to recover all ill-gotten wealth. The efforts of the Republic to rise from the ashes of the Marcosian razing and pillaging of public coffers were lauded to be historicaland history in the making. Without much strain, the Court has never shirked from its prerogative to take judicial notice of matters that, at the time, were already
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historical and of general knowledge. In light of these historically factual circumstances, in the landmark case of Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Hon. Emmanuel G. Pea, G.R. No. 77663, 12 April 1988, the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Teehankee, wrote:
Having been charged with the herculean task of bailing the country-out of the financial bankruptcy and morass of the previous regime and returning to the people what is rightfully theirs, the Commission could ill-afford to be impeded or restrained in the performance of its functions by writs or injunctions emanating from tribunals co-equal to it and inferior to this Court. Public policy dictates that the Commission be not embroiled in and swamped by legal suits before inferior courts all over the land, since the loss of time and energy required to defend against such suits would defeat the very purpose of its creation. Hence, section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 1 has expressly accorded the Commission and its members immunity from suit for damages in that: "No civil action shall lie against the Commission or any member thereof for anything done or omitted in the discharge of the task contemplated by this order." xxx xxx xxx
The rationale of the exclusivity of such jurisdiction is readily understood. Given the magnitude of the past regime's "organized pillage" and the ingenuity of the plunderers and pillagers with the assistance of the experts and best legal minds available in the market, it is a matter of sheer necessity to restrict access to the lower courts, which would have tied into knots and made impossible the Commission's gigantic task of recovering the plundered wealth of the nation, whom the past regime in the process had saddled and laid prostrate with a huge $27 billion foreign debt that has since ballooned to $28.5 billion. xxx xxx xxx
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Hence, the imperative need for the Government of the restored Republic as its first official act to create the Commission as an administrative and quasijudicial commission to recover the ill-gotten wealth "amassed from vast resources of the government by the former President, his immediate family, relatives and close associates." 14 What has not been appreciated by respondents and others similarly situated is that the provisional remedies (including the encompassing and rarely availed of remedy of provisional takeover) granted to the Commission in pursuing its life-and-death mission to recover from a well-entrenched plundering regime of twenty years, the ill-gotten wealth which rightfully belongs to the Republic although pillaged and plundered in the name of dummy or front companies, in several known instances carried out with the bold and mercenary, if not reckless, cooperation and assistance of members of the bar as supposed nominees, the full extent of which has yet to be uncovered, are rooted in the police power of the State, the most pervasive and the least limitable of the powers of Government since it represents "the power of sovereignty, the power to govern men and things within the limits of its domain." 21 Police power has been defined as the power inherent in the State "to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people." 22 Police power rests upon public necessity and upon the right of the State and of the public to self-protection. 23 " Salus populi suprema est lex" the welfare of the people is the supreme law. For this reason, it is coextensive with the necessities of the case and the safeguards of public interest. Its scope expands and contracts with changing needs. 24 "It may be said in a general way that the police power extends to all the great public needs. It may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing morality or strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to the public welfare." 25 That the public interest and the general welfare are subserved by sequestering the purported ill-gotten assets and properties and taking over stolen properties of the government channeled to dummy or front companies is stating the obvious. The recovery of these ill-gotten assets and properties
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would greatly aid our financially crippled government and hasten our national economic recovery, not to mention the fact that they rightfully belong to the people. While as a measure of selfprotection, if, in the interest of general welfare, police power, may be exercised to protect citizens and their businesses in financial and economic matters, it may similarly be exercised to protect the government itself against potential financial loss and the possible disruption of governmental functions. Police power as the power of selfprotection on the part of the community that the principle of self-defense bears to the individual. 26 Truly, it may be said that even more than selfdefense, the recovery of ill-gotten wealth and of the government's own properties involves the material and moral survival of the nation, marked as the past regime was by the obliteration of any line between private funds and the public treasury and abuse of unlimited power and elimination of any accountability in public office, as is a matter of public record and knowledge. xxx xxx xxx
A final word about the alleged misdeeds of the OIC which the Solicitor General has denounced as false and unfounded. 27 Such alleged misdeeds, even if taken as true for the nonce, do not and cannot detract from the Commission's accomplishments in the unselfish service of the nation, rendered with integrity and honor and without the least taint of scandal and self-interest (in welcome contrast to the past regime's rape and plunder sub-silentio of the nation!). In our free and democratic space now, with full restoration of a free press and the people's liberties, it should be acknowledged with some sort of appreciation that any such misdeeds on the part of the Commission's representative or agents have been subjected to full public exposure and the erring parties dismissed and replaced.
An excursion into the historical facts and circumstances that led to the creation of the PCGG reveals the context in which the Republic has had to begin its long uphill climb to recover
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from the Marcosian plunder. The story of the Republics efforts to recover all ill-gotten wealth, through the PCGG, has since been inextricably bound up with the Honorable Courts learned and lucid disquisitions on the matter. During such critical junctures, this Honorable Courts decisions have been, not only historical, but history-making. This Courts factual findings and
discussions, insofar as they coincided with the historical reality they sought to describe were, in many ways, historiography. The Courts imprimatur, being the last bulwark of democracy, often determined the point upon which the Republics efforts turned elevating the Courts narrative accounts from being the mere writing of history, i.e. historiography, into something more transcendent, the making (or unmaking of history). That the Court has been mindful of its place and power in charting the countrys history is apparent from the discussions in the landmark case of Ferdinand E. Marcos v. Honorable Raul M. Manglapus, penned by the late Justice Cortes:
Before the Court is a controversy of grave national importance. While ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Courts decision in this case would undeniably have a profound effect on the political, economic and other aspects of national life. We recall that in February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent people power revolution and forced into exile. In his stead, Corazon C. Aquino was
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declared President of the revolutionary government. xxx xxx
Republic xxx
under
Nor are the woes of the Republic purely political. The accumulated foreign debt and the plunder of the nation attributed to Mr. Marcos and his cronies left the economy devastated. The efforts at economic recovery, three years after Mrs. Aquino assumed office, have yet to show concrete results in alleviating the poverty of the masses, while the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses has remained elusive. xxx xxx xxx
This case is unique. It should not create a precedent, for the case of a dictator forced out of office and into exile after causing twenty years of political, economic and social havoc in the country and who within the short space of three years seeks to return, is in a class by itself. xxx xxx xxx
We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only now beginning to recover from the hardships brought about by the plunder of the economy attributed to the Marcoses and their close associates and relatives, many of whom are still here in the Philippines in a position to destabilize the country, while the Government has barely scratched the surface, so to speak, in its efforts to recover the enormous wealth stashed away by the Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions. Then, We cannot ignore the continually increasing burden imposed on the economy by the excessive foreign borrowing during the Marcos regime, which stifles and stagnates development and is one of the root causes of widespread poverty and all its attendant ills. The resulting precarious state of our economy is of common knowledge and is easily within the ambit of judicial notice.
As the foregoing passage reveals, the Courts appreciation of history determined its characterization and its resolution of
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the case. Not pragmatism, but justice dictated the Court. It was not the passage of time that established the events that were then recent as, nonetheless, historical and within common knowledgeand thus, easily within the ambit of judicial noticerather, it was the notoriety of the pestilence that the late dictator wreaked and left in his wake. Time might dull a persons senses, but not his or her sensibilities: moreso, in remembering episodes in Philippine history, mucked and mired in Marcosian mockery, much to the misery of many. One could only hope that the passage of time has left these mattersof the late dictator, his family, and croniesas self-evident truths, calcified by the common experience of the Filipino peoplefor, certainly, if they have yet to be written in the history books, there is no doubt that they are historical. To those too young to know first-hand the Marcosian ordeal, they can always turn to their elders for guidance. To those old enough to know and for whom forgetting is an all-too-late option, they can only turn to aspire to eternityin humble supplication for a glimpse of heavenand heed its consequent advice for fear that they, too, might fall on the wrong side of history. Failing which, as the history of this Court reveals (for this institution was not spared from the corruption wrought upon it by the late dictator), upon
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the Court and its members was heaped the maligning moniker of being a Marcos Court. Thankfully, from the dust did rise, a new and better law: more just, more human and more humane. Barely seven months after the People People Revolution of 1986, on 12 September 1986, in the case of Saturnina Galman, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, the Court had occasion to write:
xxx. There has been the long dark night of authoritarian regime, since the fake ambush in September, 1972 of then Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile (as now admitted by Enrile himself) was staged to trigger the imposition of martial law and authoritarian one-man rule, with the padlocking of Congress and the abolition of the office of the VicePresident. As recently retired Senior Justice Vicente Abad Santos recalled in his valedictory to the new members of the Bar last May, In the past few years, the judiciary was under heavy attack by an extremely power executive. During this state of judicial siege, lawyers both in and outside the judiciary perceptively surrendered to the animus of technicality. In the end, morality was overwhelmed by technicality, so that the latter emerged ugly and naked in its true manifestation. Now that the light is emerging, the Supreme Court faces the task of restoring public faith and confidence in the courts. The Supreme Court enjoys neither the power of the sword nor of the purse. Its strength lies mainly in public confidence, based on the truth and moral force of its judgments. This has been built on its cherished traditions of objectivity and impartiality, integrity and fairness and unswerving loyalty to the Constitution and the rule of law which compels acceptance as well by the leadership as by the people. The lower courts draw their bearings from the Supreme Court. With this Courts judgment today declaring the nullity of the questioned judgment or acquittal and directing a new trial, there must be a rejection of the temptation of becoming instruments of injustice as vigorously as we rejected becoming its victims. The end of one form of injustice should not
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become simply the beginning of another. This simply means that the respondents accused must now face trial for the crimes charged against them before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor with all due process. What the past regime had denied the people and the aggrieved parties in the sham trial must now be assured as much to the accused as to the aggrieved parties. The people will assuredly have a way of knowing when justice has prevailed as well as when it has failed. The notion nurtured under the past regime that those appointed to public office owe their primary allegiance to the appointing authority and are accountable to him alone and not to the people or the Constitution must be discarded. The function of the appointing authority with the mandate of the people, under our system of government, is to fill the public posts. While the appointee may acknowledge with gratitude the opportunity thus given of rendering public service, the appointing authority becomes functus officio and the primary loyalty of the appointed must be rendered to the Constitution and the sovereign people in accordance with his sacred oath of office. To paraphrase the late Chief Justice Earl Warren of the United States Supreme Court, the Justices and judges must ever realize that they have no constituency, serve no majority nor minority but serve only the public interest as they see it in accordance with their oath of office, guided only, the Constitution and their own conscience and honor.
Knowing history has made this Court mindful of its place in history, as Chief Justice Teehankee wrote in the case of Juan Dizon v. Brig. Gen. Vicente Eduardo, G.R. No. L59118, March 3, 1988:
What is not found in the proceedings or opinions and which should now be made part of the record for the sake of historical truth is that what precipitated the sudden order releasing Diokno on September 11, 1974 was that Mme. Justice Cecilia Munoz-Palma, who had been appointed to the Court with two others on October 21, 1973, had submitted a dissent with her separate opinion assailing Diokno's
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continued detention for two years without charges as a violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This promptly reached the big ears of Mr. Marcos and he forthwith issued the release order and aborted Justice Palma's dissent. The Court's 11-member 4 opinion-resolution dismissing all petitions and upholding the validity of the proclamation of martial law with eight separate opinions was ultimately released on September 17, 1974. 5
Minding not that, nowhere in the Rules of Court did Chief Justice Teehankees making part of the record for the sake of historical truth appearit was a procedure that was dictated, true to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.s advice, the life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience. After all, just as it is more procedurally sound to amend pleadings to conform to the evidence, the experience and logic of life commands that even this Courts decisions should conform to historylest its account and narrative of it be left wanting, and the Court, then, said to be mistaken. It is within these circumstances that the fate of the Court and the efforts of the Republic are intermarried. For just as the Republic vigorously fights for the rights and welfare of the people, the Courtthe peoples conscience and sensibilities made manifeststands, not idly by, but with them. In the case of Heirs of Gregorio Licaros v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 157438, this Court stated that:
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This Court is as interested as the government in recovering ill-gotten wealth. We commend the present leadership of both the PCGG and the OSG for their demonstrated zeal in prosecuting this case. xxx xxx xxx xxx
After nearly twenty years, the commitment to exorcise the specter of the bygone dictatorship, a resolve that was forged on the streets of EDSA in 1986, may have sadly been lost to memory. Those who are tasked to undo past wrongs and transgressions are exhorted to tenaciously and steadfastly keep the resolve alive, so that our people could at last put a closure to this dark chapter in our history, avoid the same thorny path, and move forward in the quest for our nations destiny.
That the Republics continuing efforts arose out of the foregoing extraordinary factual historical circumstances is but one aspect of what makes its cases and actions involving and relating to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth sui generis. In the case of Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 113420, this Court disclaimed that:
In all cases involving alleged ill-gotten wealth brought by or against the Presidential Commission on Good Government, it is the policy of this Court to set aside technicalities and formalities that serve merely to delay or impede their judicious resolution. xxx
The foregoing discussion was, once echoed once more, in the case of Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 159275, a decision penned by Justice Villarama, Jr. who, mindful of the legal basis of such a pronouncement, noted that:
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Executive Order No. 14, series of 1986, issued by former President Corazon C. Aquino, provided that technical rules of procedure and evidence shall not be strictly applied to cases involving ill-gotten wealth. xxx.
Aside from the express legal direction provided by Executive Order No. 14, in that cases involving ill-gotten wealth shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence, the same is, likewise, consistent with the nature of the PCGG as an administrative agency with quasi-judicial functions. As such, as with any other quasi-judicial and administrative agency, the PCGG, too, in the conduct of its hearings are not bound by technical rules of procedure. Beyond the curious historical extraordinary circumstances that engendered and prompted its genesis, and the laws and jurisprudence that support the contention of setting matters and cases involving or relating to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth apart, an examination of what this Court has deemed to be sui generis invariably suggests a mold from which this cast has been drawn. By and because of the very nature of sui generis cases, the Court has yet to make a definitive settlement and
pronouncement, that is, guidelines and doctrinal rulings on what sets a class of cases apart as a class of their own. This is not to
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say, however, that one cannot intuit, by adverting to a survey of such cases and matters that the Court has declared to be sui generis. After all, while, at this juncture, the Court has yet to define the essence of what makes cases and matters sui generis, the Court has done so often enough that a narration of them could hint at their quintessence. (a) EXTRADITION. In the case of Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v. Hon. Felixberto T. Olalia, G.R. No. 153675, the Court held that:
Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the demanding state. It is not a criminal proceeding. Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though such punishment may follow extradition. It is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between different nations. It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character. Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment.
(b) CONTEMPT. In the case of Dr. Jaime O. Sevilla v. Judge Abraham B. Borreta, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1836, this Court discussed, as follows:
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Indeed, contempt is in the nature of a criminal action, but only with regard to its procedural aspect. A contempt proceeding is sui generis. While it has elements of both a civil and a criminal proceeding, it is not a criminal proceeding even though the contemptuous act involved could be a crime. It is remedial and civil in nature. It is for the enforcement of a duty. It is auxiliary to the main case as it proceeds out of the original case. It is essentially a new and independent proceeding in that it involves new issues and must be initiated by the issuance and service of a new process. Contempt under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court is a special civil action that cannot be converted into a criminal action.
(c) SURVEY. In the case of Mario Z. Titong v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111141, the Court explained that:
A survey is the act by which the quantity of a parcel of land is ascertained and also a paper containing a statement of courses, distances, and quantity of land. A survey under a proprietary title is not a conveyance. It is an instrument sui generis in the nature of a partition; a customary mode in which a proprietor has set off to himself in severalty a part of the common estate. Therefore, a survey, not being a conveyance, is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A fortiori, petitioner cannot found his claim on the survey plan reflecting a subdivision of land because it is not conclusive as to ownership as it may refer only to a delineation of possession.
(d) MILITARY LAW. In the case of LT. (SG) EUGENE GONZALES, et al. v. GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, G.R. No. 164007, the Court elaborated by saying that:
Military law is sui generis (Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184 [1975]), applicable only to military personnel because the military constitutes an armed organization requiring a system of discipline
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separate from that of civilians (see Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 [1953]). Military personnel carry high-powered arms and other lethal weapons not allowed to civilians. History, experience, and the nature of a military organization dictate that military personnel must be subjected to a separate disciplinary system not applicable to unarmed civilians or unarmed government personnel.
(e)
FINANCING
LEASE.
In
the CO.
case v.
of
CEBU OF
CONTRACTORS
CONSORTIUM,
COURT
APPEALS, G.R. No. 107199, citing the case of Beltran v. PAIC Finance Corporation, the Court held that:
A financing lease may be seen to be a contract sui generis, possessing some but not necessarily all the elements of an ordinary or civil law lease. Thus, legal title to the equipment leased is lodged in the financial lessor. The financial lessee is entitled to the possession and use of the leased equipment. At the same time, the financial lessee is obligated to make periodic payments denominated as lease rentals, which enable the financial lessor to recover the purchase price of the equipment which had been paid to the supplier thereof.
(f) CITIZENSHIP. In the case of CARLOS T. GO, SR. v. LUIS T. RAMOS, G.R. 167569, the Court held that:
Carlos and Jimmys claim that the cause of action of the Bureau has prescribed is untenable. Cases involving issues on citizenship are sui generis. Once the citizenship of an individual is put into question, it necessarily has to be threshed out and decided upon. In the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections,36[48] we said that decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a persons future status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that matter, lose his citizenship under any of the modes

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recognized by law for the purpose.37[49] Indeed, if the issue of ones citizenship, after it has been passed upon by the courts, leaves it still open to future adjudication, then there is more reason why the government should not be precluded from questioning ones claim to Philippine citizenship, especially so when the same has never been threshed out by any tribunal.
(g) IMPEACHMENT. Justice Corona, citing Fr. Joaquin Bernas, SJ, in his separate opinion in the case of ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, G.R. Nos. 160261-63 wrote:
Impeachment has been described as sui generis and an exceptional method of removing exceptional public officials (that must be) exercised by the Congress with exceptional caution.38[5] Thus, it is directed only at an exclusive list of officials, providing for complex procedures, exclusive grounds and very stringent limitations. The implied constitutional caveat on impeachment is that Congress should use that awesome power only for protecting the welfare of the state and the people, and not merely the personal interests of a few.
(h) DISBARMENT CASES. In RAMON C. GONZALEZ v. ATTY. ARNEL C. ALCARAZ, A.C. 5321, the Court held that:
Well-established is the rule that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. These cases are distinct from and proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. In Re Almacen, the Court discoursed on this point thus:
x x x [D]isciplinary proceedings [against lawyers] are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, x x x [they do] not involve x x x a trial of an action or a suit, but [are] rather investigation[s] by the Court into the
MANIFESTATION AD CAUTELAM SUPERABUNDANTI WITH REQUEST FOR ADVISORY OPINION G.R. No. 166859, G.R. No. 169203 & G.R. No. 180702 x---------------------------------------------x conduct of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. x x x.39
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(i) PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RED CROSS. Most lucidly, Justice Abad, in his concurring opinion in the case of DANTE V. LIBAN v. RICHARD J. GORDON, G.R. No. 175352, made the following illuminating discussion on the ramifications of being sui generis:
Finally, the sui generis character of the PNRC does not necessarily overturn the rulings of the Court in Camporedondo and Baluyot. The PNRCs exceptional nature admits of the conclusions reached in those cases that the PNRC is a GOCC for the purpose of enforcement of labor laws and penal statutes. The PNRCs sui generis character compels us to approach controversies involving the PNRC on a case-to-case basis, bearing in mind its distinct nature, purposes and special functions. Rules that govern traditional private or public entities may thus be adjusted in relation to the PNRC and in accordance with the circumstances of each case. [Emphasis mine.]
The foregoing survey does not, by any means, represent a comprehensive and complete listing of jurisprudence relating to matters and issues that are sui generis. Having stated the

181
foregoing disclaimer, the proceeding prayer neither rises nor falls on the completeness of such listing. After all, while on the matter of what makes certain cases or subjects a class of their own there is, as yet, no definitive pronouncement, a careful scrutiny of the foregoing survey regarding sui generis cases as a category of cases would inevitably lead to the observation that, so, too must this present case be deemed to be sui generis. In so doing, and in light of the previous discussions, it is humbly submitted and urged that this Honorable Court definitively declare and pronounce cases, matters, and issues relating to the recovery of ill-gotten wealthsuch as this whose reconsideration is presently soughtas sui generis. On parallel lines of thought, from such characterization could flow the optimism and hope that Justice Abads enlightened view that these cases, too, could be approached on a case-to-case basis, bearing in mind the nature, purposes, and special functionsand the peculiar and unique circumstances of these cases and matters relating to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth. Excepting does not offend the rule of law, rather, it is consistent with it. After all, no system of laws makes any pretensions of being so perfect as to foresee and contemplate the myriad possibilities that human experience can engender and
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birth. For this reason, exceptionsand the possibility of carving them outare made part of every rule. In the case of Roberto Brillante v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 118757 & 121571, for example, this Honorable Court, in a Resolution penned by Justice Tinga made the following pronouncements:
We believe, however, that the penalty of imprisonment imposed against Brillante should be re-examined and reconsidered. Although this matter was neither raised in Brillantes petition nor in the instant motion, we advert to the well-established rule that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review of all its aspects, including those not raised by the parties. [Emphasis mine.]
In numerous instances, the Court has, likewise, relaxed or suspended its own Rules in order to serve the ends of justice. In the case of LOURDES DELA CRUZ v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 139442, Justice Velasco, Jr., speaking for the Court, wrote:
The case of Barnes v. Padilla elucidates the rationale behind the exercise by this Court of the power to relax, or even suspend, the application of the rules of procedure:
Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself has already declared to be final x x x. The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest opportunity for
MANIFESTATION AD CAUTELAM SUPERABUNDANTI WITH REQUEST FOR ADVISORY OPINION G.R. No. 166859, G.R. No. 169203 & G.R. No. 180702 x---------------------------------------------x the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. Time and again, this Court has consistently held that rules must not be applied rigidly so as not to override substantial justice.
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In
other
instances,
matters
of
paramount
and
transcendental importance have been settled by the Court in the following wise:
So it was that in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not even be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. Even assuming the absence of a categorical legal provision specifically prodding petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the men and women representing them cannot escape their obligation to future generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly as possible. Anything less would be a betrayal of the trust reposed in them.
More emphatically, in the 5 April 2011 decision in APO FRUITS CORPORATION v. LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 164195, the Court, emphasized that the characterization of issues as matters of transcendental importance can be significant in emphasizing the overriding public interest:
In a last ditch attempt to muddle the issues, the LBP focuses on our use of the phrase transcendental importance, and asserts that we erred in applying this doctrine, applicable only to legal standing questions, to negate the doctrine of immutability of judgment. This is a very myopic reading of our ruling as the context clearly shows
184
that the phrase transcendental importance was used only to emphasize the overriding public interest involved in this case. Thus, we said:
That the issues posed by this case are of transcendental importance is not hard to discern from these discussions. A constitutional limitation, guaranteed under no less than the all-important Bill of Rights, is at stake in this case: how can compensation in an eminent domain case be just when the payment for the compensation for property already taken has been unreasonably delayed? To claim, as the assailed Resolution does, that only private interest is involved in this case is to forget that an expropriation involves the government as a necessary actor. It forgets, too, that under eminent domain, the constitutional limits or standards apply to government who carries the burden of showing that these standards have been met. Thus, to simply dismiss the case as a private interest matter is an extremely shortsighted view that this Court should not leave uncorrected. xxxx More than the stability of our jurisprudence, the matter before us is of transcendental importance to the nation because of the subject matter involved agrarian reform, a societal objective of that the government has unceasingly sought to achieve in the past half century.
From this perspective, our Resolution of October 12, 2010 only had to demonstrate, as it did, that the higher interests of justice are duly served. xxx.
Finally, with this Honorable Courts resolution to approve A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC, otherwise known as The Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, all doubts were settled as to the place and propriety of equity, in the Courts exercise of its judicial function. Rule 3, on the The Exercise of Judicial Function, thus, states: SECTION 1. The Supreme Court a court of law. The Court is a court of law. Its primary task is to resolve and decide cases and issues presented by litigants according to law. However, it may apply equity where the court is unable to arrive at a conclusion
185
or judgment strictly on the basis of law due to a gap, silence, obscurity or vagueness of the law that the Court can still legitimately remedy, and the special circumstances of the case. The special circumstances of this caseand all other cases and matters relating to or involving the recovery of ill-gotten wealthmake this (and these matters and cases) sui generis. That the present case is sui generis provides, among others, equity as an avenue for serving the substantial ends of justice in resolving a matter, such as this, involving issues and concerns of paramount and transcendental importance and impressed with overriding public interest. That the foregoing statement is compounded to the full is a necessary reiteration and
underscoring of the peculiar circumstances of this case that an overly strict, legalistic, and formalistic resolution would work a great injustice to the 3.5 million Filipino coconut farmers who, counting together with their families, number upwards of 20 million. Worse still, reaching a contrary resolutionthat is, to the defeat and detriment of the Republic and the interests of the long-suffering Filipino coconut farmers and their families would risk a re-writing of history. Already, history books and
186
scholarly publications are in existence that detail of and study the crony capitalism that marked and marred the Marcos dictatorship. On these matters, they have gone to discuss the dictatorial decrees, machinations, and schemes that were worked upon the coconut farmersto serve the benefit of Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. These numerous sources pointing to the same factual claims meet at the intersection of probabilities. After all, how could so many people be so wrong about what they all collectively had to endure? Never forget that everything Hitler did in Germany was legal, the late Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. once famously uttered. It was widely perceived that it was with the imprimatur of this Court that, during the dictatorship, it had countenanced far too many and too much of the dictators wrongdoing. It is to the credit of the gains of EDSA that, two and a half decades since our Republics democracy, rule of law, and moral order was restored by The Revolution, one can utter the foregoing statement without fear of contempt or reprisal. Just as this Honorable Court then, in the case of JUAN DIZON v. BRIG. GEN. VICENTE EDUARDO boldly and justly made part of its ponencia an account for the sake of reflecting historical truth, it behooves this Honorable Court to
187
rise to the challenge of standing its ground firmly on the right side of history. Evidence is offered in support of and to substantiate facts and claims. It is the Courts province and duty, in the interests of justice, to appreciate facts and string together pieces of evidence in order to ferret out the truth and render what is just. Assuming without conceding that, as this Court has found, evidence is allegedly left wanting, then it is to the credit of the great crime that was perpetrated upon our Filipino farmers and our people that this wicked web would work its deceit. Just as the Republic would seek every recourse and exhaust all efforts to gather all the pieces of evidence available, so, too, would those who seek to do wrong avail of all avenues to hide their wrongdoing. And so, just as evidence speaks to support the purposes for which they are offered, so, too, does their unavailability speak volumes as to the deviousness of the evil conceit. This Court cannot, in the name of justice and equity, close its eyes to the truths that have become self-evident by virtue of the passage of time. To disturb these facts that have been calcified by timeand whose ill-effects continue to be felt to the present daywould risk rupturing the very fabric of historical
188
reality. Lady Justices blindfold should not preclude her from resorting to her other faculties and sensibilities. Having been squeezed dry and levied out of their blood, sweat, and tears, our farmers would have to endure the injustice of being left with nothing. There can be no greater tragedyor travesty. For then, the question that has paupered our farmers, still begs to be asked: where is their money?
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, Concerned Parties the and Petitioners-Intervenors, Citizensrecognizing that and the
designation or caption of pleading is not controlling and that the Court may relax or suspend its own Rules in the interests of substantial justicerequests this Honorable Court to render an Advisory Opinion, pursuant to Rule 3, Section 3 of the IRSC, given the important constitutional issues raised in this Manifestation, as to: 1. definition Whether or not there is a of ill-gotten wealth, under
Section 1(A) of the PCGG Rules, contrary to what it earlier indicated in its DECISION;
189
2.
Whether or not the DECISION,
founded on a made-up definitionwhich was conjured on the factually
demonstrable erroneous premise that no such legal definition of ill-gotten wealth existsruns afoul of Article VIII, Section 14, inasmuch as when the Constitution requires that the decisions of any court that is, including the Supreme Court should indicate clearly and distinctly the facts and the laws on which they are based, it is assumed that, at the very least, the Court applies the pertinent,
prevailing, and existing law. 3. Bearing in mind that the
DECISION and the supervening JANUARY 2012 RULING emanate and concern the same caseCivil Case No.33-Fwhether or not they can stand together, considering their diametrically opposed legal
foundationswherein the former denied the existence of an explicit definition of ill-
190
gotten wealth, whereas the latter adopted the definition that has been in existence since the PCGG promulgated its Rules in 1986, which definition was replicated in the Plunder Law of 1991, the same definition that became part of the law of the land in the 2005 case of Republic of the Philippines v. Estate of Hans Menziand which was inexplicably beyond the Courts perception in its DECISION. 4. Whether or not, applying the
real and legal definition of ill-gotten wealth, and the facts and evidence on record, as well as the principle that technical rules of procedure and evidence do not apply to these cases, the subject SMC shares of stock, having been
purchased with public funds, borrowed by a public official from public corporations, in contravention of the duties entrusted to him, can be deemed forfeited in favor of the governmentto be used solely for the
191
benefit of all coconut farmers and for the entire coconut industry; 5. Whether or not all issues,
matters, and cases relating or relevant to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth may be said to be sui generis, considering all the other issues, matters, and cases that this Honorable Court has declared and found to be sui generis; 6. Whether or not, this Honorable
Court, being both a court of law and a court of equity, may resolve in a pro hac vice Decision the instant case in favor of the countrys 3.5 million coconut farmers who, together with their families, comprise a fifth of the countrys total population: 20 million Filipinos in allin the interest of substantial justice and considering that this matter and its outcome is of
transcendental importance.
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It is, likewise, prayed that petitioner be granted such other reliefs as are just and equitable under the premises, and as this Honorable Court, being a court of law and a court of equity, may sanction, in the higher interests of social justice.
Pasig City for City of Manila, Metro Manila, 12 September 2012.

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(DRAFT) Manifestation Ad Cautelam Superabundanti - 12 September 2012

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES SUPREME COURT MANILA EN BANC

RE: NULLITY OF JUDGMENT

FACTUAL LEGAL PREMISES

G.R. No. 164195. 12 October 2010, Dissenting Opinion.

The Decision, pp. 45-46. G.R. No. 152578. 23 November 2005.

Government v. Lucio C. Tan (TAN), Francisco I. Chavez v. Presidential

At this juncture, reference to the pertinent portions of BASECO must be made:

G.R. No. 190529. 29 April 2010.

treated as a special account in the National Treasury. (Emphasis Ours.)25

JANUARY 2012 RULING, p. 69.

See Bongato vs. Malvar, 387 SCRA 327 (2002).

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 240 SCRA 376 (1995).

G.R. No. 177828, 13 February 2009.

G.R. No. 47800, 2 December 1940.

G.R. No. 164195, 4 December 2009.

G.R. No. 171701, 8 February 2012.

proceedings, with words to the following effect:

G.R. 118910, 16 November 1995.

Resolution dated 26 February 2002, in G.R. Nos.

declared President of the revolutionary government. xxx xxx

Whether or not the DECISION,

founded on a made-up definitionwhich was conjured on the factually

prevailing, and existing law. 3. Bearing in mind that the

foundationswherein the former denied the existence of an explicit definition of ill-

Pasig City for City of Manila, Metro Manila, 12 September 2012.

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