Q: What is Article I of the Articles of Impeachment against Chief Justice Renato Corona?

A: Respondent betrayed the public trust through his track record marked by partiality and subservience in cases involving the Arroyo Administration from the time of his appointment as Supreme Court Justice which continued to his dubious appointment as a midnight chief justice and up to the present. Q: What is the Constitutional ground upon which Article I is based? A: Betrayal of Public Trust (Sec. 2, Art. XI, 1987 Constitution) Q: What is betrayal of public trust? A: Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions did not include betrayal of public trust as a ground for impeachment. It is only during the deliberations of the members of the 1986 Constitutional Commission when the broad concept of betrayal of public trust was added. The phrase was intended to be a catch-all phrase to cover any violation of the oath of office. Commissioner Rustico de los Reyes, Jr., the one responsible for the inclusion of the phrase, explained that it referred to all acts which are not punishable by statutes as penal offenses but, nonetheless, render the officer unfit to continue in office. He further said that it includes betrayal of public interest, inexcusable negligence of duty, tyrannical abuse of power, breach of official duty by malfeasance or misfeasance, cronyism, favoritism, etc. to the prejudice of public interest and which tend to bring the office into disrepute..." Commissioner Ricardo Romulo added obstruction of justice to the aforementioned enumeration. Moreover, in the leading case of Francisco, Jr. vs. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. (2003), the Supreme Court ruled that the definition of "betrayal of public trust" is a "a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power" under the Constitution. In the said case, the Court does not seem to prescribe which branch of government has the power to define it, but implies that Congress, which handles impeachment cases, has the power and authority to do so. Q: Why is Coronas appointment as midnight chief justice dubious? A: It is dubious because it is unconstitutional. Q: Why is it unconstitutional? A: Coronas appointment is in violation of Sec. 15, Art. VII of the present Constitution which says, two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. Coronas appointment was made by PGMA at the last minute or within two months immediately preceding the elections, thus, the title midnight chief justice. While in the case of De Castro vs. JBC (2010) the Supreme Court ruled that the prohibition in Sec. 15, Art. VII does not apply to appointments made to the Judiciary, it is arguably clear that the members of the 1986 Constitutional Commission had intended otherwise. It is the case of Aytona vs. Castillo (1962) where the prohibition on midnight appointments traces its history. Because of said case, the 1986 ConCom saw the need to provide for a comprehensive ban on midnight appointments. According to then Commissioner Hilario Davide, the idea of the proposal is that about the end of the term of the President, he may prolong his rule indirectly

by appointing people to these sensitive positions, like the commissions, the Ombudsman, the Judiciary, so he could perpetuate himself in power even beyond his term of office; therefore foreclosing the right of his successor to make appointments to these positions. We should realize that the term of the President is six years and under what we had voted on, there is no re-election for him. Yet he can continue to rule the country through appointments made about the end of his term to these sensitive positions. It is therefore clear that the real intention of the framers of the Constitution was to prohibit appointments of such nature which necessarily includes Coronas. An argument against the ban on midnight appointments is Sec. 4 (1), Art. VIII of the Constitution, which says that any vacancy in the Supreme Court shall be filled within 90 days from the occurrence thereof. However, Sec. 15, Art. VII is an express limitation on the Presidents power of appointment, thus, the running of the 90-day period is considered suspended during the period of the ban, taking into account the fact that such period only takes place once every six years. In fact, in the case of In Re: Appointments of Hon. Valenzuela and Hon. Vallarta (1998), the Supreme Court ruled, while the filling of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify the making of the appointments during the period of the ban. On the other hand, as already discussed, there is a strong public policy for the prohibition against appointments made within the period of the ban. Contrary to the main decision in De Castro vs. JBC, there is no doubt that the ban on midnight appointments, as ruled in the Valenzuela case, applies to all members of the Judiciary, not only to lower court judges. Therefore, the ban certainly applies to Coronas appointment. Q: In which cases did Corona allegedly side with PGMA even before he became Chief Justice? A: In a press release made by Sen. Franklin Drilon in November of last year, he said that Corona sided with PGMA in a total of 19 cases. Most of these cases were decided by the Supreme Court even before Corona became Chief Justice. These cases include: Romualdez vs. Sandiganbayan (2009) In this case, Corona concurred in reversing the Supreme Courts previous ruling ordering the Sandiganbayan to proceed with the trial of former Rep. Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez, whose son is an ally of Arroyo Nicolas vs. Romulo (2009) In this case, Corona concurred to uphold the validity of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Philippines and the United States and ordering the transfer of American rape convict Daniel Smith to a Philippine detention facility. Akbayan vs. Aquino (2008) In this particular case, Corona concurred in declaring that communications in the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) signed by President Arroyo and former Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi on September 2006 were covered by executive privilege and not subject to public disclosure. Gudani vs. Senga (2006) In this case, Corona concurred in declaring as valid President Arroyo's gag order that prohibited executive and military officials from appearing before congressional investigations without the consent of the Chief Executive. Kilusang Mayo Uno vs. Director-General (2006) In this case, Corona concurred to declare valid President Arroyo's Executive Order No. 420 involving the establishment of a national identification card policy.

Pimentel vs. Ermita (2005) In this particular case, Corona concurred in declaring that President Arroyo can make appointments "in an acting capacity" without seeking confirmation from the Commission on Appointments. ABAKADA Guro Party List vs. Ermita (2005) In this case, Corona concurred in declaring Republic Act 9337, also known as the VAT Reform Act, as constitutional. Sanlakas vs. Reyes (2004) In this case, Corona concurred in deciding that President Arroyo did not exceed her powers in issuing Proclamation Nos. 427 and 435 and General Order No. 4 declaring a state of rebellion during the infamous Oakwood Mutiny. Q: In which cases did Corona allegedly side with PGMA during his term as Chief Justice? A: Corona allegedly sided with Arroyo in the following three cases: Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth Commission (2010) In this case, Corona concurred in declaring President Noynoy Aquinos Executive Order (EO No. 1) creating the Philippine Truth Commission unconstitutional. Bai Omera D. Dianalan-Lucman v. Executive Secretary (2010) In this case, Corona concurred in stopping the Aquino administration from revoking the appointment of alleged midnight appointees made by Arroyo. Aquino vs. COMELEC (2010) In this case, Corona concurred to uphold the validity of Republic Act No. 9716 creating the first and second districts of Camarines Sur. Q: What issues arise from Article I? A:

(1) Whether or not Coronas involvement/concurrence in the abovementioned cases is (2) (3)
compelling evidence of his partiality and subservience, notwithstanding the fact that in none of these cases was he ever the ponente. Whether or not Coronas act of favoring PGMA in the cases mentioned above amounts to betrayal of public trust, for it to be considered a ground for impeachment. Whether or not Coronas appointment as midnight Chief Justice is indeed unconstitutional.

Q: What are the facts that need to be ascertained in relation to the issues identified above? A:

(1) The fact of partiality and subservience on the part of Corona based on the mentioned
cases which he allegedly concurred in

(2) The facts attending the act of betrayal of public trust such as inexcusable negligence
of duty, tyrannical abuse of power, breach of official duty by malfeasance or misfeasance, cronyism, favoritism etc. on the part of Corona (3) The fact of the exact date of Coronas appointment (date of submission of nominees by the JBC and date of approval and selection by PGMA) (4) The fact of PGMAs intention to appoint Corona for self-serving reasons (5) The fact of the corresponding intention of Corona to consistently side with PGMA in order to return the favor for appointing him as Chief Justice