JIP 06 4 Apoha

Journal of Indian Philosophy (2006) 34: 303366 DOI 10.
1007/s10781-005-5739-4
Springer 2006
LAWRENCE J. MCCREA AND PARIMAL G. PATIL
TRADITIONALISM AND INNOVATION: PHILOSOPHY, EXEGESIS, AND INTELLECTUAL HISTORY IN IMITRAS APOHAPRAKARANA " JNANASR" :
INTRODUCTION
Among the most salient features of Sanskrit philosophical literature is its commentarial orientation. This orientation is reected not only in texts that comment explicitly on other texts, but also in those independent works that do not present themselves as doing so. Even in such independent works philosophical problems are typically framed and their solutions are presented with reference to foundational texts in their respective traditions.1 Due to this commentarial orientation, Sanskrit philosophers often have two objectives: To demonstrate that their arguments are philosophically sound and to show that their conclusions are sanctioned by, and in fact implicit in, these foundational texts.2 This second objective is so important that even radically innovative philosophers often go to great lengths to portray themselves as unoriginal, presenting new ideas and arguments as if they were merely drawing out the implications of the foundational texts of their tradition.3 As a result of this, scholars have tended not to view the broader commentarial tradition as a locus of real innovation.
1 By the term foundational texts we mean whatever texts a tradition takes to be canonical and authoritative e.g., the works of Dign"ga and Dharmak" for the a rti " " u Buddhist epistemological tradition; the Astadhyayi for Grammar; the Nyayas"tras : :" for Ny"ya; the Brahmas"tras for Ved"nta etc. a u a 2 This imperative to conform to established positions within ones philosophical " tradition is reected in the generally accepted notion of an apasiddhanta (deviant conclusion). It is generally accepted in the theory of debate that adopting a position that is contrary to the established tenets of ones philosophical tradition is grounds for losing a debate even if ones argument is otherwise sound. See, for example, the _ anonymous Tarkaastra (which is sometimes attributed to Asanga or Vasubandhu) s" in Vidy"bh": ana (1921: 269), Tucci (1929: 1316), and the NS corpus ad NS 5.2.23. a us 3 There are, of course, exceptions to this. For example, the commentarial genre of " varttika, in which a commentator both explains and selectively critiques the text " " upon which he is commenting. Examples of such varttikas include the Slokavarttika " ": " and Tantravarttika of Kum"rilabhatta, the Pramanavarttika of Dharmak" a rti, the :: " " Nyayavarttika of Uddyotakara etc.
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Commentarial and quasi-commentarial literature4 are generally overlooked, and often are treated as tools for exegesis rather than as important works in their own right. This tendency can be seen even in modern scholarship on the Buddhist epistemological tradition which has been studied more carefully than most Sanskrit philosophy. In this paper, we want to examine the dynamic between traditionalism and innovation as it is reected in a late work of the Buddhist epistemological tradition, the Apohaprakarana (Monograph : mitra (c. 975), one of the famed on Exclusion) of Jn"nasr" a " gate-keepers (dvarapandita) at the Buddhist university of Vikra:: mitra was one of the last great Buddhist philosoma" 5 Jn"nasr" sla. a phers working in India and his Apohaprakarana is a work that builds : on centuries of debate about the meaning of words and the formation of concepts. While a great deal of attention has been paid to the theory of exclusion (apoha) and its importance to Buddhist epistemology, most of it has been directed towards the foundational works of Dign"ga (c. 480540) and Dharmak" a rti (c. 600660).6 When scholars have attended to later material, they have tended to view it as merely footnotes to Dign"ga and Dharmak" a rti. Consider, for example, the ground-breaking work of Shoryu Katsura who, in one mitras theory of of the few papers to focus specically on Jn"nasr" a exclusion, writes as follows:
mitras Apohaprakarana, I had an impression that After reading through Jn"nasr" a : there was nothing radically new about his theory of apoha in comparison with mitra quotes extensively from the works of Dharmak" As a matter of fact, Jn"nasr" rti. a Dharmak" in order to justify his understanding of Dharmak" When examined rti rti. very closely, most of his arguments stem from Dharmak" at least in germ. rti mitra actually brought a new phase in theory Therefore, I do not believe that Jn"nasr" a
4 By quasi-commentarial literature we are referring to texts that do not comment on a single text from beginning to end, but that largely consist in the interpretation and elaboration of statements that are drawn from foundational or " canonical texts of a particular tradition. Examples include the Nyayabh"sana, u: : " " Naiskarmyasiddhi, Tattvabindu, Ratnak"rtinibandhavali, J~anar"mitranibandhavali, i n" s i : etc. 5 Thakur (1987: 1). For an account of his extant work see Thakur (1987), and for " his Vrttamalastuti, which is not included in Thakur (1987), see Hahn (1971, 1989). : See Lasic (2000) and Kyuma (2005) for editions and annotated translations of the " " _ " " " " Vyapticarca and Ksanabhangadhyaya 1: Paksadharmatadhikara. For a very useful list : : : of philosophers in the Buddhist epistemological tradition, their various works, and some of the existing secondary scholarship see Steinkellner and Much (1995). 6 See Ganeri (2001), Hattori (1980, 2000), Hayes (1986, 1988), and Katsura (1979) for a discussion of Dign"gas theory. For a discussion of Dharmak" a rtis theory see Dunne (2004), Katsura (1991), Pind (1999), and Siderits (1991).
TRADITIONALISM AND INNOVATION
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mitra merely rearranged and systematized the of apoha. It seems to me that Jn"nasr" a arguments of Dharmak" ...7 rti
In what follows, we hope to show that the apparent traditionalism mitras treatment of that Katsura correctly notices in Jn"nasr" a Dharmak" rtis works actually masks substantive and dramatic innovation in the theory of exclusion. In scholastic traditions, rearrangement and systematization are often precisely the mechanisms through which innovation occurs.8 As we intend to show, in rearranging and systematizing elements of Dharmak" rtis mitra draws conclusions that Dharmak" rti arguments, Jn"nasr" a himself did not make and almost certainly would not have endorsed. Our discussion will begin with a preliminary sketch of the problem of mitras reliance on the pivotal concept of exclusion and Jn"nasr" a " determination (adhyavasaya) in explaining it. We then provide a selective history of the development of this concept within in the Buddhist epistemological tradition in the work of Dharmak" and his rti mitras successor Dharmottara (c.740800). We then turn to Jn"nasr" a own account of exclusion and determination. We will argue that while mitras work builds upon and extends the theories of Jn"nasr" a Dharmak" and Dharmottara, it nevertheless subverts some of their rti basic principles, by relativizing their central categories through a theory " of conditionally adopted positions (vyavastha). Our paper concludes by briey considering the implications of this case study for understanding the intellectual history of Dharmak" and his successors. rti
THE PROBLEM OF EXCLUSION
The theory of exclusion was rst explicitly formulated by Dharmak" rtis predecessor Dign"ga in order to explain how, in a world a
7 Katsura (1986: 171). Also see Ogawa (1999: 267268) n. 2: As Katsura (1986: mitra makes no original contribution to the theory of 171) pointed out, Jn"nasr" a apoha. Rather, he seems to wish to restore, if not Dign"gas apoha theory, then a Dharmak" rtis theory, which had been modied within the Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition itself by Dharmottara and criticized by the non-Buddhist " (Trilocana, V"caspatimira). Therefore, I take the present verse [see JNA 203 quoted a s below] as faithfully reecting Dharmak" rtis apoha-theory. 8 Katsura is well aware of this possibility. See, for example, his discussion of the dierences between Dign"ga and his commentator Dharmak" a rtis account of apoha. Katsura (1991: 129146). Dharmottaras innovations in his commentaries on ": " Dharmak" rtis Pramanavinicaya and Nyayabindu have also been noticed. See, for s example, Dreyfus (1997: Chapter 21). For a general discussion of this issue see Dunne (2004: 312). For a more specic discussion of the complex relationship between Dharmak" and Dharmottaras teacher Subhagupta see Eltschinger (1999). rti
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without real universals, it is still possible to successfully make infera ences and use language.9 Dign"ga bases his entire philosophy on a radical disjunction between perception (pratyaksa) and inference : " (anumana)for him, the only possible modes of knowingand a corresponding disjunction between their respective objectsparticulars (svalaksana), which are exclusively the objects of perception, and : : " " universals (samanya), which are exclusively the objects of inferential a reasoning and language.10 According to Dign"ga, however, universals are unreal in that they are conceptually constructed on the basis of particulars and are not ontologically independent of them.11 It is through the theory of exclusion that Dign"ga explains how, while a functioning in terms of conceptually constructed universals, inferential reasoning and language enable us to reliably pick out particulars. A generic concept such as cow, for example, is able to refer to particular cows not because it designates any real property that all cows share, but rather, because in excluding all non-cows, it negatively denes a domain whose members can be reliably picked out by a the concept cow.12 Although Dign"ga insists that inferential reasoning and language only function in terms of these conceptually constructed universals, he does not provide a clear and satisfying account of how they can reliably guide us in our dealings with particulars.13 Specifying precisely how an awareness of conceptually constructed universals enables us to act successfully towards particulars thus became a major concern for later Buddhist philosophers.14 a Jn"nar" a s mitra, writing nearly 500 years after Dign"ga, develops an account of exclusion that addresses this issue. According to Jn"nar" a s mitra, words relate us to both of the kinds of objects discussed by Dign"ga, but do so in two very dierent ways. They a make universals manifest to us, yet they refer to and enable us to act reliably with respect to particulars, through a process that
9 For the pre-history of this theory see Bronkhorst (1999), Hattori (1977), and Raja (1986). For the philosophical context in which this theory was developed see Dravid (1972), Dunne (1998), Hayes (1988), and Scharf (1996). 10 For an overview of Dign"gas thought see Frauwallner (1959), Ganeri (2001), a Hattori (1968), and Hayes (1988). 11 Hattori (1968: 7980). Also see Hayes (1980, 1988) for a discussion of Dign"gas a views on inference and exclusion. 12 On the unreality of universals in Dign"gas thought see Pind (1991: 271272) a and Hayes (1980: 257). For a more general discussion of this issue in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism see Dreyfus (1997), Dunne (1998), and Mookerjee (1935). 13 For a discussion of this as a problem see Dreyfus (1997) and Katsura (1984). 14 For a discussion of Dharmak" rtis views see, for example, Dreyfus (1996), Dunne (2004), and Hayes (1997). For Ratnak" rtis view see Patil (2003).
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" Jn"nar" " s mi a s mitra calls determination (adhyavasaya). For Jnanar" tra, determination is a capacity that conceptual states of awareness, such as inferential/verbal states of awareness,15 have that enables us to act with respect to particulars even though those particulars are not present to our awareness. For example, when a competent user of language hears the command Bring a cow what is brought to mind " " is a generalized image (akara), cow.16 Yet, obeying this command requires that one bring a cow and not an image. Thus, the cow that is brought to mind in understanding the command is not the same as the cow that we actually bring. Inferential/verbal states of awareness involve two dierent sorts of objects, the images that are manifest in our awareness and the particulars which, though not present to our awareness, become the objects of our activity through the process of determination. Thus, it is the process of determination that is the key to Jn"nar" a s mitras theory of exclusion since it serves as the link between the universals that are apparent to us and the particulars that we act upon. Although it plays a uniquely prominent role in Jn"nar" a s mitras theory of exclusion, and in fact in his entire philosophy, the concept of determination is not original to him. In order to better make sense of how and why Jn"nar" a s mitra uses this concept, it will therefore be helpful to rst reconstruct parts of the history of determination.
DHARMAK" IRTI ON DETERMINATION
As a technical term in Buddhist epistemology, determination " (adhyavasaya) appears to have been rst used by Dharmak" 17 For rti. Dharmak" rti, determination is the process that enables us to act towards particulars on the basis of the universals that appear in inferential/verbal states of awareness. For Dharmak" rti, as for Dign"ga, there are only two modes of valid awareness, perception a
15 For the Buddhist epistemologists, verbal awareness is a subset of inferential awareness since any valid awareness that we have on the basis of another persons utterance can only be inferential. For a general discussion of why this is so see "" Kajiyamas translation of Moks"karaguptas Tarkabhasa in Kajiyama (1998: 3235). :a : 16 " " Here the term image (akara) refers to mental content, both conceptual and nonconceptual. 17 For references to Dharmak" rtis use of this concept and term, see Katsura (1984, 1993), Dunne (2004), and the passages from Dharmak" rtis works cited in this paper.
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and inference.18 Each has its own distinct kind of object: Particulars, in the case of perception, and universals in the case of inferential/ verbal states of awareness. According to Dharmak" the validity of rti, these states of awareness is linked to their pragmatic eectiveness ": " (arthakriya).19 A state of awareness is valid (pramana) in so far as any activity that we undertake on the basis of it could, in principle, lead us to results that are consistent with the expectations that we may form on the basis of it.20 This does not mean that our expectations will be met in every case, but only that the objects towards which we are prompted to act will function within the parameters of these expectations.21 For example, suppose that upon seeing a pool of water in the distance we walk towards it with the expectation of quenching our thirst. In such a case, it is possible that, due to some obstacle, we may not succeed in reaching the pool. This lack of success, however, does not invalidate our awareness of the pool of water. But, if we reach the place where we saw the pool of water and discover only sand, our awareness of the pool (which we now conclude to have been a mirage) was actually invalid. Valid states of awareness must direct us towards objects that are capable of meeting our expectations, i.e. towards objects that have the capacity to be pragmatically eective, regardless of whether our expectations are actually met in any specic case. Since, for Dharmak" rti, it is only
18
For an accessible discussion of this see Dreyfus (1997) and Dunne (2004), and the references contained therein. Also see Franco (1997). 19 For a discussion of this concept in Dharmak" rtis work see Nagatomi (1967), Mikogami (1979), Katsura (1984), Franco (1997), and Dunne (2004). 20 " See PV2.1 on arthakriyasthitih. For translations see Nagatomi (1967), Vetter : (1964), Kellner (1984), Van Biljert (1989), Franco (1997), Kellner (2001: 507), and Dunne (2004). Dharmak" rtis use of the word sthitih in this much discussed passage is : signicant. It does not simply mean the existence of pragmatic ecacy, but its persistence or consistency. Also see PV 3.13.3. The test for the validity of awareness is that its object continues to behave within the expected parameters, as dened by our interests. This is not limited to cases in which we actually want this object and successfully obtain it. It also includes cases in which we wish to avoid a particular object or, according to some, cases in which we are indierent. This is recognized by authors " " in the tradition who take arthakriya to include avoidance (hana) as well as obtaining " " (upadana). An awareness is said to be valid, therefore, if the object that we come to know on the basis of it behaves in conformity with the expectations that we form on the basis of that awareness. It is worth noting that others in the tradition such as Vin" tadeva, NBT (Vi) :39.4, but not Dharmottara, NBT: 30.2, add to avoidance : : and obtaining/acquisition, neglect/indierence (upeksa/upeksan"ya). See : " : :i Krasser (1997), and Kellner (2001: 511) n. 32 for a short, but interesting, discussion of this point. 21 Dunne (2004).
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particulars that are capable of being pragmatically eective, it follows that in order to be valid, states of awareness must direct us towards particulars.22 This is the case for both perception and inferential/verbal states of awareness. However, as mentioned above, inferential/verbal states of awareness can only have universals as their objects. What Dharmak" must account for then rti is how such states of awareness can lead us to pragmatically eective particulars: For him, it is determination that provides the answer.23 Thus, in inferential/verbal states of awareness there is, for Dharmak" a disjunction between the object that appears to us and the rti, object that we act upon. For example, when we see smoke rising over a mountain and infer the presence of re there, the re that is presented to us in that state of awareness is not a real, pragmatically eective particular, but rather a conceptual construct. However, it is our awareness of this re that prompts us to go to the mountain and discover a particular re. Dharmak" explains this process as rti one of systematic misidentication.24 It is only because we erroneously take the re that we are aware of through inferential reasoning to be pragmatically eective that we act as we do. In explaining how it is that inferential/verbal states of awareness are both erroneous and valid, he says,
Even an error can be valid because, in virtue of being connected with the object, it does not deviate from it. Since, even though its own appearance is not a [real] object, there is activity through the determination of an object.25
To better explain this, Dharmak" oers the following analogy: rti

Someone runs with the thought gem [upon seeing ] the [indirect ] light either of a gem or a lamp. Even though there is no dierence, in so far as [in both cases] the awareness is false, nevertheless, there is a distinction with respect to their pragmatic
22 See HB 2*153*16 (discussed below) and the passages cited in Dunne (2004), Katsura (1993), Kellner (2004). 23 In perception, since the object of our awareness is a particular, this problem does not arise. This issue is discussed extensively in what follows. 24 For discussions of Dharmak" rtis theory of error see Dunne (2004), Katsura (1984), the very helpful discussion in Kellner (2004), and Tillemans (1999: 209210). For a discussion of error-theories more generally see Schmithausen (1965). 25 " " " " svapratibhase narthe rthadhyavasayena pravartan" bhrantir apy arthasambandhad ": ena tadavyabhic" at pramanam. PVin 2.810 in Steinkellner (1973), cited in PVV 25.10ar " 12, NBh" 140.2526. u
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eect. In the same way, even though both inference and the false appearance thereof26 are not in accordance with their object, nevertheless, validity is distributed between them27 in conformity with their pragmatic eect.28
From a distance, a person sees a glowing light and, taking it to be a precious stone, runs towards it. Unbeknownst to him, however, what he sees is not a precious stone but merely the light that is reected or refracted from some nearby source such as a precious stone or a lamp.29 Since in neither case is what he sees a real gemstone, his awareness gem is false. But if the indirect light is coming from a real gem then as he approaches he will discover a real gem. So his initial awareness gem, though false, indirectly leads him to a pragmatically eective object that is consistent with his expectations. Similarly, inferential/verbal states of awareness present us with an object that is not real, yet they lead us, indirectly, to real pragmatically eective objects that meet our expectations. The process through which we get from unrealthat is, not pragmatically eectiveobjects that appear in inferential/verbal states of awareness to real pragmatically eective objects is what Dharmak" calls deterrti mination. When he refers to determination, Dharmak" generally highlights rti that it is itself a kind of error, as in the following passage from his ": " auto-commentary to his Pramanavarttika:
Language [ruti] produces a false awareness which arises through imposing s " [adhyaropya] a [uniform appearance]30 onto objects that lack a single nature. [This false awareness] determines [that uniform appearance] to be capable of producing the eect of those [objects] even though it is not capable of producing that eect
26 By false appearance thereof, Dharmak" means an awareness that appears rti to be properly inferential but in fact is not. For example, the inference of re when one sees steam rising from a mountain and mistakes it for smoke. 27 By distributed between them (vyavasthita)literally, dierentially establishedDharmak" means that one is labeled as valid and the other as invalid rti based on whether or not they lead us to a pragmatic eect that is in accordance with our expectations. 28 " " maniprad"paprabhayor manibuddhyabhidhavatoh | i : : : " n" " s : mithyaj~anaviese pi vieso rthakr"yam prati || PVin 2.5 (=PV3.57) s: i ": " " " " " yatha tathayatharthatve py anumanatadabhayoh | : ": arthakr"yanurodhena pramanatvam vyavasthitam || PVin 2.6 (=PV3.58) i " : This example is referred to in Katsura (1984: 231). 29 Commentators on this verse, and many recent interpreters, have explained this example as being about light shining through a key-hole which is then mistaken for a gem. However, Dharmak" never mentions a keyhole in either his PVin 2.52.6 (in rti Steinkellner (1973: 26, 1979: 28)), or in PV 3.573.58. 30 See PV1.107, Gnoli (1960: 5455).
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because it is a false appearance. [The false awareness] has as its source just the separate natures of the real things, [nevertheless] it contains a determination which is common [to those things]. Even though this is the case, we do not say that [language] leads us astray [visamvadika] with respect to the objects that are really distinct : " " from that [appearance] because it aids [us] in avoiding what is dierent from those [objects]31
For Dharmak" and his followers, particulars are uniquethey rti do not share anything with one another and therefore there can be no real similarity between them.32 Yet, a word such as cow (or an inferential reason on the basis of which one could infer the presence of a cow) produces a single generalized/generic image (cow) that is superimposed onto a number of absolutely distinct particulars.33 The only thing that these absolutely distinct particulars can be properly said to share is a propensity to produce in us the generalized image cow. When we hear the word cow, it produces in us a generalized image cow that we mistakenly treat as a real characteristic present in particular cows. We use the word cow as if it picked out one or more members of a naturally occurring class whose members share a real similarity, even though there can be no such similarity among absolutely distinct particulars. For this reason, inferential/verbal states of awareness are false by their very naturethey necessarily posit a real similarity between particulars which are in fact absolutely distinct. The determination that we make in these cases is precisely a misidentication of our internal and generalized image as something that actually exists in particular cows. A few lines later, in further developing his argument that words refer to their objects only through the exclusion of what is other ": [anyavyavrtti], Dharmak" oers an account of how a person learns rti the use of new words, and again, he relies on the concept of determination to explain the false ascription of similarity to absolutely distinct particulars.
PVSV ad PV 111112ab, Gnoli (1960: 58). ekasvabh" avarahitesv arthesu tam : : " ": " ad " " : " " : adhy" aropyotpadyamanam mithy" apratibhasitv" akaryakarinam api tatkaryakarinam " " " " " " ": ivadhyavasyant"m vastuprthagbhavamatrab"jam samanadhyavasayam mithy" i: i ": abuddhim : : " "_ " srutir janayanty api tadanyapariharangabh" at paramarthatas tadvyatirekisu pad" : u av " arthes : na visamvadikety ucyate |. : " 32 For much more on the nature of particulars in Dharmak" rtis thought, see Dunne (2004) and Keyt (1980). 33 PV1.109 in Gnoli (1960: 5657). This passage, which Dunne suggests is referring back to PVSV ad PV1.6875, is discussed and translated in Dunne (2004: 122124).
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There is continuity among [i.e., a recurring feature in ] those [particular ] things [e.g., trees] in so far as they are, by their very nature, [and merely] in virtue of being perceived, the causes of such a conceptual awareness. Therefore, the cognizer [who has just been told that the things that he is looking at are trees], in accordance with his awareness These are trees, takes those things [i.e., trees] which are present to the awareness of the person who sees them [i.e., the person who just said to him These are trees] to have the same appearance in his own and the other persons conceptual awareness. These things, which are not really so [i.e., do not really have the same appearance in his own and the other persons conceptual awareness] are determined to be so, without regard for the distinction between external and internal. [This determination is made] in virtue of their being the causes of that conceptual awareness, and in virtue of the exclusion of what is other than them [i.e., what does not cause that conceptual awareness]. [The cognizer,] relying upon conceptual awareness, is able to apprehend the causes of that awareness by means of a dierentiation [from things that are not the cause of that conceptual awareness]. Thus, one employs an utterance to indicate a dierence [of the causes of the conceptual awareness these are trees] from things that are not a cause of that [conceptual awareness]. The conceptual awareness which apprehends that [dierence] on the basis of that [utterance] seems to grasp a single thing [i.e., some common element really present in the individual trees] only because of error. But there is no one thing that is visible there [in the individual trees], through the observation and non-observation of which one could distinguish between trees and non-trees even in another instance of observation.34
Again, Dharmak" makes clear that determination is a kind of rti misidentication. When a person points to certain objects and says These are trees, the person who hears this falsely takes the generalized image that is the content of his own conceptual awareness (i.e., tree) as belonging to each individual tree, and also as being the content of the conceptual awareness of the speaker. In other words, he falsely identies his generalized image with the absolutely distinct tree-particulars and with the equally distinct generalized image of the other person. In so doing, he ignores the distinction between what is internal to awarenessthe generalized imagesand what is externalthe trees. As in the previous passage, determination is specically said to consist in the misidentication of ones own generalized image with what is not present to ones awareness
PVSV ad PV 120121, Gnoli (1960: 60.2361.05). tesam prakrtyaiva pratyay: " : " u " :" " " " " avaat tathabh"tavikalpakarananam anvayat taddrastur buddhau viparivartamanan s" :: " ": " " " u " " " tajj~anahetutaya tadanyavyavrttya catathabh"tan api tathadhyavasitan avibhakn" " " " " " tabahyadhyatmikabhedan pratipatta pratipattim anusrtyaite vrksa iti svaparavikalpesv : : : : " "" " s ekapratibhasan adarya vikalpavij~ane vyavasthitas tadvij~anahet"n bhedena pratin" n" u _ ": " " padyetety uktim ataddhetubhyo bhede niyunkte | tam tasyah pratipadyamana buddhir : " " " vikalpika bhrantivaad evaikavastugrahin"va pratibhati | na punar ekam vastu tatra s" :i : " : drsyam asti yasya daranadaranabhyam bhinnadarane py esa vrksavrksavibhagam s" " s : " ": s : : : : ": : kurv"ta |. i
34
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at allin this case, the generalized images in the awareness of the other person.35 While this particular feature of determination has not been clearly recognized in the secondary literature, we contend that it is a necessary and constitutive feature of determination as it is understood by Dharmak" rti. Dharmak" does not use the term rti determination to refer to conceptual awareness in general (vikalpa), but, specically, to refer to the misidentication of our own conceptual images with objects that are not perceptually available to us at all.36 It is for just this reason that determination, although a form of error, is capable of leading us to real things of which we have no direct awareness (as in the example of the gem discussed above). It is precisely because we misidentify the purely internal contents of our conceptual awareness as something external that this awareness prompts us to externally directed activity. And since, for Dharmak" rti, states of awareness are valid only in so far as they direct us toward pragmatically eective particulars, it is only through determination that conceptual awareness can be valid. While inferential/verbal states of awareness, like all conceptual states of awareness, are erroneous, they are (in some cases) nevertheless taken to be valid since, through determination, they lead us to real things of which we had no prior awareness. The distinction between conceptual states of awareness that direct us to real particulars through determination, and are therefore valid, and those that do not do so, and are therefore not valid, is clearly presented in the following passage from Dharmak" rtis Hetubindu (A Drop of Reason). This passage is a
35 Despite the fact that in this example a person sees trees before him and learns to apply the label trees to them, it is, nevertheless, not a case of what Dharmak" rti calls conceptual judgment that follows immediately upon perception (pratyaksapr:stalabdhanicaya), as when one sees a blue object and then applies the s : : : label blue to it. What is important to note is that in the blue example, the labeling is epistemically redundant in that the application of the label does not provide one with any new information about what one is seeing. In the trees example, however, the conceptual awareness that arises upon hearing the other persons statement These are trees does provide new information about an object that is not perceptually available to us, namely, the conceptual awareness (and/or conceptual image in the awareness of) the speaker. What we learn from his statement is not a fact about the trees, but a fact about the speaker and how he, and presumably other users of the language, use the term tree. This new information about how the speaker uses the label tree is not perceptual, but is, in fact, arrived at inferentially. 36 For our argument as to why this is the case see below.
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part of Dharmak" rtis account of how one moves from perceptual to inferential awareness.37 One infers, for example, the presence of re on a mountain after seeing smoke rising from it. Dharmak" rti explains that in this inferential process one rst sees something rising from a mountain and through conceptual awareness recognizes it to be smoke. One then recalls that wherever there is smoke there is re and, on the basis of this, infers that there is re on that mountain. Dharmak" argues that only the rst and last rti steps in this processthe initial non-conceptual awareness of smoke and the nal inference of re on that mountainare valid. Neither the recognition of what one sees as smoke nor the recollection of the relation between smoke and re is taken to be valid, since neither of them presents any new information about a real thing. He begins his explanation as follows:
" " " :" For someone who perceives, in its uniqueness [asadharanatmana], a smoky place that is separate [vivikta] from other things,38 there arises a recollective awareness of the inferential reason [smoke] which has as its object the particular [i.e., smoke] as it was seen.39
The distinction that Dharmak" is drawing here is between the rti non-conceptual and conceptual awareness of a single object. At rst, we perceive the particular, smoke, but do not yet recognize it as smoke. It is only in a subsequent moment of awareness that this recognition takes place. Dharmak" describes this recognition as rti recollective awareness because it involves remembering previously perceived instances of smoke and associating the newly perceived particular with them. This subsequent conceptual awareness thus apprehends (and is about) the same real thing as the preceding non-conceptual awareness: It just adds to it the remembered instances of smoke and the grouping of them all into the class smoke.
There, [in this process], only the rst, visual awareness, which has as its object a " " : distinct thing [asadharanai.e., a particular] is valid. When that thing, of that [distinct] sort, has been seen, a memory arises due to the power of perception, which
HB 2*9. " " " :" In our view, the term asadharanatmana [it its uniqueness] is adverbial in that it describes the manner in which the person is perceiving, whereas the term " arthantaraviviktar"pam [separate from other things] refers to the uniqueness of u what it is that is being perceived. See HBT: 24. : 39 " " " HB 2*152*17. sadh"mam hi pradeam arthantaraviviktar"pam asadharu : s u " : : ": : " : _ anatmana dr:stavatah pratyaksena yathadr:stabhedavisayam smartam lingavij~anam n" :" : : : : : utpadyate. Also translated in Dunne (2004: 412).
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declares the distinctiveness [of that thing] from one or another [set of things] from which it is distinct i.e., its dierence from that [set], and [therefore] this [memory] has as its object the exclusion of what is not that. And because this [memory] grasps the image of [the thing] as it was seen before,40 it is not valid.41
Dharmak" here elaborates on his account of recollective awarerti ness by explaining that it necessarily entails a process of exclusion. It is precisely through the exclusion of what is dissimilar that the class smoke is constructed. Recollective awareness is not considered to be valid, however, because it does not present to us a real particular that we have not already apprehended:
[This is so] since, when one has rst seen the distinct thing, the [recollective awareness] which proclaims it as [something] distinct does not present a new thing [artha], because that which accomplishes a pragmatic eect [i.e., the particular smoke] has already been seen. And furthermore, it [the recollective awareness] does not apprehend, conceptually, a thing, as yet unseen, which accomplishes a [pragmatic eect], in the way that inference does.42
The conceptual awareness that follows upon perception (i.e., the recognition of smoke as smoke) is invalid not because it is misleading, but because it is epistemically redundant. In this regard, it diers from another form of conceptual awareness, namely inference. Inferential (including verbal) states of awareness are similar to the conceptual states of awareness that follow upon perception in that they have as their objects class-forming exclusions. They are, however, not epistemically redundant since they lead us to particulars that have not been apprehended previously.
40 That is to say, nothing new is presented in the second awareness about that thing which was perceived non-conceptually in the rst awareness. The content of the second awareness is dierent from that of the rst in that it includes the memory of previously perceived instances and the grouping of them with the newly perceived instance as a class. But these newly included elements are not features of the perceived thing. Thus, the second conceptual awareness does not present to us anything about the real object that we are perceiving that was not already presented in the rst awareness. 41 " " " : : HB 2*182*23. tatra yad adyam asadharanavisayam daranam tad eva s : : ": " u "" " : " " : ": pramanam. tasmin tathabh"te dr:ste sati sa yena yenasadharanas tadasadharanatam : : ": " tato bhedam abhilapanty atadvyavrttivisaya smrtir utpanna pratyaksabalena : " : : " : :" " ": yathadr:stakaragrahanan na pramanam. Also translated in Dunne (2004: 412). :" 42 " " " : : : : "" " : HB 2*233*1. prag asadharanam dr:stvasadharana ity abhilapato p"rvarthadhiu " " " " " "" " " gamabhavad arthakriyasadhanasya daranad adr:stasya punas tatsadhanasvabhavasya s " : : " " vikalpenapratipatte canumanavat. Also translated in Dunne (2004: 412). s "
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For, every rational person seeks [to ascertain] what is valid and what is not [in so far as] he seeks a pragmatic eect. And the universal that is grasped by a conceptual awareness which arises after, and in virtue of, the apprehension of the particular does not lead to any pragmatic eect. Just as in the awareness blue when one has seen blue. For it is just the blue particular that produces the pragmatic eect that is achieved by a thing of that [blue] sort. And that [particular thing] has already been seen with that [blue] characteristic through perception. And the pragmatic eect that is achieved by blue is not produced by the object of the conceptual awareness blue, which arises subsequent to grasping that [blue] particular. Therefore, even the statement a valid awareness has as its object a thing not already apprehended must be qualied [by the phrase] when the thing not already apprehended is a particular.43
In this section, Dharmak" builds upon his argument that conceprti tual states of awareness which apprehend objects that have already been apprehended non-conceptually are not valid. Validity, for Dharmak" rti, is indexed to pragmatic ecacy, and it is only particulars that can be pragmatically eective. What is necessary for a state of awareness to be valid is that it puts us in touch with a particular with which we were not already in touch. And, as explained above, the content of the recollective awareness that arises immediately after perceiving an object is just that same object as classied through exclusion. Thus, it does not put us in touch with any new particular and so cannot be valid.
But, when the particular has already been apprehended, the conceptual awareness that arises from and imitates it is just memory because, in being an eect [of it], it has that [particular] as its object. It is not valid, because it does not apprehend the form of a thing that has not already been apprehended. For the discrimination of valid [from invalid] awareness rests upon [real] things, since those who seek [to dierentiate them] act, having [in mind] an object which is capable of pragmatic ecacyfor a thing is dened as that which is capable of pragmatic ecacy. This is so, since, even when a person acts on the basis of that conceptual awareness [i.e., in inferential/ verbal awareness], [he acts] only with respect to a [real] thing by determining it.
": ": : " : HB 3*13*9. arthakr"yarth" hi sarvah pramanam apramanam vanvesate prei " i : " " " ksavan, na ca samanyam kamcid arthakriyam upakalpayati svalaksanapratipatter : " " : " : : " " " i : : : " i " urdhvam tatsamarthyotpannavikalpavij~anagrahyam yatha n"lam dr:stva n"lam iti n" : : " " " " " " " j~ane. tad eva hi n"lasvalaksanam tathavidhasadhyarthakriyakari. tac ca tenatmana n" i : : : " " i dr:stam eva pratyaksena. na ca tatsvalaksanagrahanottarakalabhavin"lavikalpasya : : : : : : : " " " " ": visayena n"larthasadhyarthakr"ya kriyate. tasmad anadhigatarthavisayam pramanam i" i " : : : ity apy anadhigate svalaksana iti viesan"yam. Dharmak" seems to be referring here s : :i rti : : to a pre-existing denition of valid awareness, but the quotation, if it is a quotation, has not been identied, and it is not clear whether this denition is one provided by the M" ams" philosopher Kum"rilabhatta, as the commentator Arcata believes, or m" : a a :: : some other source. Also translated in Dunne (2004: 413).
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Because, with respect to activity, the success [ksema] of application [yoga]44 of : conceptual awareness is no dierent from perception.45
Here it is important to keep in mind Dharmak" rtis distinction between the conceptual awareness that follows immediately upon perception and apprehends the same real object [e.g., the recognition of smoke as smoke], and inferential/verbal awareness which apprehend[s], conceptually, a thingas yet unseenthat accomplishes a [pragmatic eect]. In defending his argument that the rst of these types of conceptual awareness is not valid, Dharmak" makes a rti general point about the nature of validity: Valid states of awareness must put us in touch with real things. The only reason that we care whether or not a state of awareness is valid is that we seek to act upon real things, which alone are capable of pragmatic ecacy. And valid states of awareness are just those states of awareness that put us in touch with such things. Perception does this directly, by presenting us with real particulars. Conceptual states of awareness, while not directly presenting us with real particulars, can, in some cases, put us in touch with real particulars indirectly through determination. And, in so far as they do so, they are valid. Such states of conceptual awareness are classied as inference (which includes verbal states of awareness). Conceptual states of awareness that do not put us in touch with real particulars in this way are not valid. Therefore, Dharmak" concludes (see above) that the conceptual awareness rti that follows immediately upon perception is not valid: Unlike inference, it does not put us in touch with a real particular, since we have already been put in touch with it by the immediately preceding perception. Putting us in touch with real particulars, then, is the dening characteristic of valid awareness. While perception and valid conceptual states of awareness (i.e., inference) function in dierent ways, they nevertheless have the same resultthey put us in touch with real
Against the commentator Arcatas interpretation (HBT: 36)of yoga-ksema as : : : a dvandva [i.e, application and success], we think that it should be taken as a tatpurusa [i.e., the success of application]. Nearly all of the occurrences of the : compound cited in dictionaries treat the compound as a tatpurusa, and there is : nothing in Dharmak" rtis usage, here or elsewhere, to suggest that for him yoga-ksema refers to a pair of characteristics. For a dierent interpretation and : translation of Arcatas comments see Dunne (2004: 414 n. 7). : 45 " " "i HB 3*103*16. adhigate tu svalaksane tatsamarthyajanma vikalpas tadanukar" : : " " ": karyatas tadvisayatvat smrtir eva na pramanam, anadhigatavastur"panadhigateh, u " : : : " ": " ": " " ": vastvadhisthanatvat pramanavyavasthayah, arthakriyayogyavisayatvat tadarthinam :: " : " " pravrtteh, arthakriyayogyalaksanam hi vastu; tato pi vikalpad vastuny eva tadadhy: : : : : " " avasayena pravrtteh, pravrttau vikalpasya pratyaksenabhinnayogaksematvat. Also : " : : : : translated in Dunne (2004: 413414).
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particulars and thereby make them pragmatically available to us. But, in so far as conceptual awareness puts us in touch with real things in this way, it can only do so indirectly through determination. Thus, this passage also shows that Dharmak" rti uses the term determination specically to refer to the misidentication of our own conceptual images with objects that are not perceptually available to us at all.
DETERMINATION AND
PERCEPTUAL
JUDGMENT
In oering this account of determination as it appears in Dharmak" rtis work, we are departing in several key respects from what has been the standard account among modern scholars. Beginning with the ground-breaking work of Stcherbatsky, modern scholars have tended to treat as synonymous, and virtually interchangeable, a broad range of terms that Dharmak" uses to refer to conceptual rti " awareness e.g., adhyavasaya (determination), nicaya (judgment), s ekapratyavamaraj~ana (a single reective awareness [that creates a s n" grouping of individuals]), pratyaksapr:sthalabdhanicaya (judgment s : : : " : n" that follows immediately upon perception), samvrtaj~ana (conventional awareness), pratyabhij~a (recognition), smrti (recollection), n" : vikalpa (conceptualiziation).46 Most of these terms are treated by Stcherbatsky under the single heading of perceptual judgment, to which he devotes an entire chapter.47 Subsequent scholars have generally followed him in treating these terms as essentially equivalent. While there is considerable overlap in the semantic range of these terms, more attention needs to be paid to distinguishing the dierent ways and contexts in which Dharmak" himself uses them. rti Although all of these terms are used to refer to some sort of conceptual awareness, they seem to mark o specic functional roles in dierent mental processes. Conceptual states of awareness can group an individual with others into a class; call to mind an invariable association that serves as the basis for an inference; and associate one or more individuals with a particular word. However, they need not always do all of these things.
46 Stcherbatsky (1984: Vol 1, 204). Also see the discussion of these terms in Dunne (2004), Katsura (1984, 1991, 1993: 138 n. 40, 144). 47 Stcherbatsky (1984: Vol 1), Part II, Chapter 1 Judgement and his summary on pp. 554555.
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Our survey of Dharmak" rtis use of the term determination " (adhyavasaya) suggests that, for him, it is not just a synonym for conceptual awareness (vikalpa), judgment (nicaya), etc., but is used s specically to refer to those states of conceptual awareness in which an internal objecta generalized imageis falsely identied with an external object that is, in fact, not at all present to our awareness. Thus, on our reading, determination is, for Dharmak" restricted to rti, inferential/verbal states of awareness. It does not occur in the conceptual states of awareness that follow immediately upon perception since, in such cases, the external object is already present to awareness. In taking this position, we dier from both Stcherbatsky and Katsura, who take determination to be a necessary feature of all conceptual states of awarenessinferential/verbal states of awareness as well as those that follow immediately upon perception (which they label as perceptual judgment).48 Stcherbatsky, the rst modern scholar to discuss the role of perceptual judgment in the Buddhist epistemological tradition, " explicitly equates determination (adhyavasaya), conceptual awareness (vikalpa), and judgment (nicaya).49 In making this equation he relies s primarily, not on Dharmak" rtis own work, but on that of Dhar" mottara, whose commentary on Dharmak" rtis Nyayabindu (Drop of Rational Methodology) forms the basis of Stcherbatskys study of the tradition. In the most serious and inuential study of perceptual judgment to date, Katsura, recognizing that this equation is too simplistic, attempts to distinguish between determination and perceptual judgment. However, he still takes determination to be a necessary feature of all conceptual states of awarenessthose that follow immediately upon the perception of an object as well as those that are inferential and verbal. As Katsura says:
Here50 perceptual judgment is characterized as conceptual knowledge (vikalpa) " produced by perception (pratyaksabalena utpanna-) which imitates (tadanukarin) the : image of a particular object. It takes as its object universal characteristic in the form ": of exclusion of others (atadvyavrtti ) and expresses it as dierentiation (bheda) " from others. Perceptual judgment produces determination (adhyavasaya), which further induces us to an action (pravrtti) towards a particular real entity (vastu). : Thus, seen from the point of view of a human activity, perceptual judgment, as well as determination, can be said to share the same object with the preceding perception.
48 Dunne (2004) also seems sympathetic to this. See, for example, Dunne (2004): Chapter 4, especially p. 287. 49 Stcherbatsky (1984 Vol. 1: 554555). 50 That is, in the same passage of the HB (2*15.) that we translated above.
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Perceptual judgment is called recollection (smrti) because it grasps what has been : " : :" " ": grasped by perception (yathadr:stakaragrahana). Therefore, it is not pramana. : It may be important to note in passing that Dharmak" seems to distinguish in rti Source 6 [the Hetubindu passage translated above] perceptual judgment from " adhyavasaya which was identied by Stcherbatsky with the former. Now it is " adhyavasaya which actually prompts a man to start acting towards an object. " Dharmak" states that without adhyavasaya (determination) one can neither prorti ceed nor stop.13 The term comes to play a very important role in post-Dharmak" rti Buddhist epistemology. For instance, Dharmottara declares that perception can be ": " pramana only when it is followed by adhyavasaya14.51
13 See Dharmak" 1967(a): 25*: ayam analam payann apy analo yam na salilamity rti s : " anadhyavasyan na tisten napi pratistheteti dustaram vyasanam pratipannah syat. :: :: : : : " 14 " : ": See Dharmottara, 1955: 84: adhyavasayam kurvad eva pratyaksam pramanam : : bhavati.
As Katsura recognizes, the term perceptual judgment does not correspond to any single Sanskrit term. Like Stcherbatsky, he uses it to translate a variety of Sanskrit terms including conceptualization (vikalpa). While Katsura is well aware that conceptualization is not limited to what he calls perceptual judgmentbecause it also occurs in inferential/verbal awarenesshe nevertheless chooses to translate the term as perceptual judgment when he feels it is contextually appropriate, as in this passage. Most of Katsuras argument here (beginning with the words Perceptual judgment produces determination) hinges on his interpretation of a single phrase: " " tato pi vikalpad vastuny eva tadadhyavasayena pravrtteh which we : : translated above as since even when a person acts on the basis of that conceptual awareness [i.e., inferential/verbal awareness], [he acts] only with respect to a [real] thing, by determining it. Katsura takes the term vikalpa (conceptualization) in this phrase to refer specifically and exclusively to perceptual judgment, as it clearly did earlier in the same passage.52 As our translation indicates, however, we believe that in this phrase the term vikalpa must refer to conceptualization in general and not specically to perceptual judgment. When quoting this passage (along with Steinkellners German translation), Katsura chooses to omit a large section of it,53 including the section in which Dharmak" draws a distinction between the rti conceptualization (vikalpa) that occurs in inferencea conceptuali51 52 53
Katsura (1993: 71). HB 3*4 and 3*10 but not 2*25 where it includes inference. Katsura omits 2*233*9 and a portion of 3*1011.
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zation that leads us to a real thing that has not been grasped previously and is therefore considered to be validand the conceptualization (vikalpa) that occurs immediately following perceptiona conceptualization that does not apprehend a real thing other than that which was already grasped through perception and so is not " considered to be valid. The phrase under disputetato pi vikalpad " vastuny eva tadadhyavasayena pravrttehforms a part of an argu: : ment about the criteria for validity in general: The conceptualization (vikalpa) that follows from perception is said to be memory (smrti), : and is not valid since it does not put us in touch with a new real thing. The criterion for the validity of awareness is its ability to put us in touch with a new real thing, since people concerned with validity always seek some pragmatically eective object and pragmatic ecacy is the dening feature of real things (vastu). The phrase under dispute is given in support of this general thesis regarding the criterion for validity: Even when one acts on the basis of a conceptual state of awareness (which does not directly put one in touch with a new real thing, as perception does), one still acts with some pragmatically eective objectthat is, a real thingin mind. Given the context of Dharmak" rtis argument, it is clear that, here, the term vikalpa refers only to valid conceptual states of awarenessthose that put us in touch with new real things. And, as is well known, and is clear from the passages discussed above, according to Dharmak" rti, inferential/verbal awareness is the only kind of conceptual awareness that meets this criterion. Thus, this must be what is referred to here. " In this phrase, therefore, the term determination (adhyavasaya) is used specically with reference to inferential/verbal states of awareness and not to conceptual states of awareness more generally (including perceptual judgment).54 Katsura correctly notes that in this passage Dharmak" distinrti guishes between conceptualization (vikalpa) and determination. In order to account for this distinction in a manner that is consistent with his view that it is specically perceptual judgment that is being discussed, Katsura suggests that conceptualization (vikalpa, which he here translates as perceptual judgment), produces determination, which then serves to prompt [one] to start acting towards an object. There is, however, nothing in the passage itself to suggest that determination is specically linked to motivation. In support of his
54 It is for just this reason that his phrasing here parallels his description of inference in PVin 2.8 quoted earlier.
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position that determination is specically linked to motivation, Katsura cites two other passages; one from Dharmak" rtis Hetubindu " and one from Dharmottaras Nyayabindut"ka (Commentary on the i : Drop of Rational Methodology). The additional passage from the Hetubindu that Katsura cites, but does not translate, is as follows: This person, although seeing re, would neither act nor refrain from acting without determining that This is re, not water. Thus, he would meet with an intractable dilemma.55 Katsura takes this passage to show that determination is produced by, yet distinct from, perceptual judgment, and that it is a necessary pre-condition for any activity. In context, however, it is clear that the passage is not oered as an account of activity-in-general or even of activity-in-general that follows upon perception, and furthermore that the determination in question is part of an inferential, rather than a perceptual, process. The passage referred to by Katsura forms a part of the section of the Hetubindu that deals with non-apprehension (anupalabdhi)the " inferential basis for our ability to know absences (abhava) and act appropriately with respect to them.56 The part of the passage that Katsura quotes is not about activity-in-general, but is specically " about activity that is based upon knowledge of absence (abhava).
For, even one who sees re does not see re to the exclusion of all other things57 such that, if he desired water, he would not act [with respect to that object]. If one were to argue that the absence of water is known [merely] by not perceiving it, then [we would ask] How can an absence [of perception] be an awareness, or a cause for the awareness, of anything? And furthermore, how can there be the awareness of this [absence of perception]? If there is the apprehension of the absence [of water] even without the apprehension of that [non-perception of water] or of anything else, then why is the absence [of water] not known in states of sleep, intoxication, delirium, or in conditions where there is something blocking ones view or ones back is turned? ": s This is analyzed further in the Pramanavicaya. Therefore, this person [i.e., the one desirous of water], although seeing re, would neither act nor refrain from acting
55 HB 25*: ayam analam payann apy analo yam na salilam iti anadhyavasyan na s : tisten napi pratistheteti dustaram vyasanam pratipannah syat. : 56 " : :: : : : " For discussions of non-apprehension, with helpful references, see Katsura (1992), Kellner (1997a, 1999, 2001), and Steinkellner (1991). For a translation of some of the relevant sections from Dharmak" rtis PV, PVin, and PVSV see Kellner (2003), Yaita (1985a, b). 57 What this means is that this person sees re but in doing so does not also see that the re is not, e.g., water.
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without determining that This is re, not water. Thus, he would meet with an intractable dilemma.58
What is being discussed here is how we come to know and respond to the absence of something. If what we want is water, yet we see re in front of us, how do we know that there is only re there and not water?59 That is, how do we come to know that water is absent there? Not perceiving water is not itself a sucient condition for an awareness of the absence of water. If it were, then we would be aware of the absence of water whenever and wherever we do not perceive it, such as when we are in a state of dreamless sleep, or when something blocks our view. According to Dharmak" rti, our failure to perceive something can serve as a basis for inferring that thing is absent, but only under such conditions that we would perceive it if it were rti, our awareness of the absence of an present.60 For Dharmak" object not present before us is necessarily inferential.61 Therefore, the determination that is referred to in the line quoted by Katsura is part of an inferential process rather than a perceptual one. The fact that this passage is about someone who seeks water and not re is not incidental to the example, but is essential to it. For someone seeking water, perceiving re in a particular place is not itself sucient for that person to decide whether or not to approach that place. One must rst conclude that there is only re there and no water. This conclusion can only be arrived at inferentially. Thus, because it deals with inference and not with perceptual judgment, this passage does " not support Katsuras reading of the sentence tato pi vikalpad " vastuny eva tadadhyavasayena pravrtteh, which we translated above : : as even when a person acts on the basis of that conceptual awareness
58 HB 25*925*19. na hi ayam analam payann api kevalam analam eva payati, s s : " i " " : yena salilarth" na pravarteta. anupalambhena salilabhavah prat"yata iti cet, ko yam i " " " " : anupalambho nama. yadi salilopalambhabhava iti, katham so bhavah kasyacit pra: " " " tipattih partipattihetur va; tasyapi katham pratipattih. tasya tato vanyasya kasyacid : : : " " ": " " : : apy apratipattav apy abhavapratipattau satyam svapamadam"rchavyavadhanapr:stu " " " : " ": h"bhavadyavasthasv apy abhavah kim na prat"yate. bh"yo pi vicaritam pramanavini " " i u : : " icaye. tasmad ayam analam payann apy analo yam na salilam ity anadhyavasyan na s s : " tisthen napi pratistheteti dustaram vyasanam pratipannah syat. : 59 : :: : : : " For a subtle discussion of the implications of this problem see Kellner (1999: 498503, 507508). 60 See Kellner (1997a, b, 1999, 2001, 2003)and the primary sources discussed thereinon the role of non-cognition (anupalabdhi) in the work of Dharmak" rti and Dharmottara. 61 See Kellner (2001: 496497). For interesting discussions of this issue in the work of Dharmottara and Jn"nar" a s mitra, see Tani (1984) and Kellner (1997b).
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[i.e., in inferential/verbal awareness], [he acts] only with respect to a [real] thing, by determining it. Taken in context, this passage, like the previous passage from the Hetubindu, supports the account of determination that we provided earlier: That, for Dharmak" determination is the misidentication rti, of the contents of our inferential/verbal states of awareness as objects that are not perceptually available to us at all. Just as, in the inference of re from smoke, the re that we infer is the content of our own inferential awareness treated as an external object, in the same way, the absence of water that we infer on basis of the non-apprehension of water is just the content of our own inferential awareness treated as an external object. In both cases, what we come to know is something not at all perceptually available to us, namely, re on that mountain and the absence of water. And it is just this that distinguishes inferential/verbal states of awareness from perceptual ones. In perception, the real, pragmatically eective object that we become aware of and act upon is manifest to us while in inference (including the inference of absences) the real pragmatically eective object that we become aware of and act upon is not manifest to us. Thus, as noted above, in inference there is a gap between that which is manifest to us and that which we act upon (whereas in perception there is no such gapthe real pragmatically eective particular is manifest to us and we act upon it). Determination is the process that bridges this gap. The second passage that Katsura cites in support of his interpretation of the sentence from the Hetubindu discussed earlier clearly does support the position that even in perception, determination is necessary for activity: Perception is valid only in so far as it pro" : duces determination (adhyavsayam kurvad eva pratyaksam : : ": : pramanam bhavati).62 As Katsura himself points out, however, this passage is not from the work of Dharmak" himself but from that of rti his commentator Dharmottara. This raises the question of how commentaries should be used in determining the meaning of a passage. We are committed to the position that a commentators statement about the meaning of a passage should not be taken to have independent probative value for the correct interpretation of the passage. While a commentary may serve as a useful guide in interpreting a work, ultimately ones interpretation should be grounded in the work itself. Katsura, of course, realizes this, and does not rely
62
Katsura (1993: 73 n. 14).
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solely on the passage from Dharmottara to support his position. But, if we are correct in our interpretation of the passage this person, although seeing re..., then Dharmottaras statement provides the only remaining support for Katsuras reading. And, in our view, this is not sucient for concluding that Dharmak" himself took this rti position. Katsura is surely right that Dharmottara does take determination to be a necessary feature of perceptual judgment, but, as we will argue, this is not simply a clarication of Dharmak" rtis theory, but an important innovation in the theory of determination.
DHARMOTTARA ON DETERMINATION
While Dharmottara presents himself as a faithful follower and interpreter of Dharmak" rtis works, his account of the two modes of valid awareness, and of validity in general, is strikingly dierent from that of Dharmak" 63 As we will argue, the dierence in their rti. accounts turns precisely on the role of determination. Dharmottaras understanding of the two modes of valid awareness is succinctly presented in his commentary on NB 1.12, where Dharmak" rti describes the object of perception as follows: Its [i.e., perceptions] object is a particular (svalaksana). Dharmottara comments: : :
The object of this four-fold perceptionthat is, the thing that is cognizedis a particular. A particular (sva-laksana) is a property (laksana)i.e., a charac: : : : terwhich is its own (sva) i.e., unique. For a thing has both a unique character and a general character. And of these, that which is unique is what is grasped by perception. For the object of valid awareness is two-fold: A grasped object whose image is produced, and an attainable object that one determines. For the grasped object is one thing and the determined is something else, since, for perception, what is grasped is a single moment, but what is determinedthrough a judgment that arises by the force of perceptioncan only be a continuum. And only a continuum can be the attainable object of perception because a moment cannot be attained.64 For a discussion of Dharmottaras views on validity see his LPrP, edited and translated in Krasser (1991). For an excellent summary and analysis of this text see Krasser (1995). See Steinkellner and Krasser (1989) for Dharmottaras discussion of validity in his PVin. Also see Dreyfus (1997) for a general discussion of his views, and Kellner (1997b, 1999, 2004) for more focused work on specic aspects of Dharmottaras thought. 64 It is worth highlighting just how radical Dharmottaras position is here. Never before has anyone connected with the Buddhist epistemological tradition even suggested that perception has more than one object. What Dharmak" himself says is rti simply that the object of perception is a particular. By importing the term grasped " (grahya) into his gloss on Dharmak" rtis text, without any clear basis in either the " Nyayabindu or any of Dharmak" rtis other works, Dharmottara has introduced into his account of perception precisely what Dharmak" sought to avoida bifurcation rti
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So too for inference: It grasps a non-entity, because, even though its own appearance is not a [real] object, there is activity through the determination of an object.65 But, since this imposed thing [i.e., the non-entity], which is grasped, is determined to be a particular, in inference, a determined particular [avasitam svalaksanam] is the object : : of activity. But what is grasped is a non-entity. So here, showing the grasped object of this mode of valid awareness, he says that a particular is the object of perception.66
For Dharmottara, an episode of valid awareness, whether perceptual or inferential, is not a single event, but a process made up of two stages. In the rst stage, an object is graspedthat is, its image is directly presented to awareness. In the second stage, we determine a second and distinct object that can be attainedthat is, an object upon which we may act.
(Footnote 64 Continued). between two dierent kinds of objects which creates a gap between them that needs to be bridged by determination. Both of the extant Sanskrit commentaries on Dharmottaras text try to minimize his break with Dharmak" by suggesting that he does rti not mean to literally claim that perception itself has both a grasped and determined object. The author of the anonymous Tippana (NBTT: 3) comments as follows: : :: [Objector:] But how is the continuum an object of perception since it is [in fact] the object of conceptualization? [Reply] We say that it is due to gurative usage. Because it is made into an object in such a way that it is determined by that conceptualization " " which is the functional output [vyapara] of perception, it is called the object of perception on the basis of gurative usagethus there is no problem. nanu ca " " "" katham pratyaksasya santano visayah, yato vikalpasyasau visayah? ucyate, upacarat | : : : : : : " " : " " : i : " pratyaksavyaparena vikalpenadhavaseyataya visay"krtatvat pratyaksavisaya ity ucyate : : : "" upacarad ity adosah | And Durveka Mira [DhPr (1955: 71.21)], in his commentary, s : : says: Since the judgment that follows perception functions only with respect to what was grasped in perception, adding nothing to it, therefore, what is determined by that [judgment] is [said to be] determined by perception itselfthis is the idea. prat" " s " " yaksapr:sthabhavino nicayasya pratyaksagrh"ta eva pravrttatayanatiayadhanena yat s : : : : : i : " " : tenadhyavasitam tatpratyaksenaivavasitam iti bhavah |. : : : " 65 Here Dharmottaras phrasing closely parallels Dharmak" rtis description of inference in PVin 2.810 and HB 3*1415 (both passages are quoted and discussed above). 66 NBT 1955: 7072. NB 1.12: tasya visayah svalaksanam. NBT ad NB 1.12: tasya : : : : : : : " " : : caturvidhasya pratyaksasya visayo boddhavyah svalaksanam | svam asadharanam : : : : : " " : : " " laksanam tattvam svalaksanam | vastuno hy asadharanam ca tattvam asti samanyam : : : : : : " " : " ": ca| tatra yadasadharanam tatpratyaksasya grahyam | dvividho hi visayah pramanasya : : : " s " " " :i s " grahya ca yadakaram utpadyate, prapan"ya ca yam adhyavasyati | anyo hi grahyo " : nya cadhyavaseyah | pratyaksasya hi ksana eko grahyah | adhyavaseyas tu prats " : : : : " " " :i : yaksabalotpannena nicayena santana eva | santana eva ca pratyaksasya prapan"yah | s : : " " " " " " ksanasya prapayitum aakyatvat | tathanumanam api svapratibhase narthe arthas : : " " " " : dhyavasayena pravrtter anarthagrahi | sa punar aropito rtho grhyamanah svalaksan: : : : " i " atvenavas"yate yatah, tatah svalaksanam avasitam pravrttivisayo numanasya | : : : : : : : " : ": " " anarthas tu grahyah | tad atra pramanasya grahyam visayam darayata pratyaksasya s : : : : svalaksanam visaya uktah |. : : : : :
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It is clear that what Dharmottara says about inference in this passage is based on Dharmak" rtis account, as outlined above. For both Dharmak" and Dharmottara, what is directly presented to rti inferential awareness is not a real particular upon which we can act, but a generalized mental image. Through determination, we treat this generalized mental image as if it were a real particular. What is most striking about this passage, however, is that Dharmottara, unlike Dharmak" recognizes a parallel process at work in perception. For rti, Dharmottara, the gap between the object that is presented to awareness and the object that we act upon is equally present in both perception and inference. This is a dramatic departure from both Dign"ga and Dharmak" for whom the gap between the presented a rti, object and the object acted upon is just what distinguishes inference from perception. In his discussion of perception, Dharmottara raises a problem arising from Dharmak" rtis theory that all existing things are momentary. According to Dharmak" real, pragmatically eective rti, objects cannot exist for more than a single moment.67 What appear to us as temporally extended objects are in fact continua of discrete but
67 The standard Buddhist argument for momentariness is based on a particular understanding of causality. Briey: Experience tells us that, after some time, a seed that has been planted and properly cared for will produce a sprout. Buddhists argue that the seed, at the moment of producing a sprout, has to be dierent, in some way, from the seed in previous moments, since the seed at just that moment produces a sprout while the seed in previous moments did not. But, if this is the case, one must also admit that the seed that existed just prior to (and therefore produced) the sprout-producing seed is itself dierent, in some way, from the seeds in each of the moments that preceded it: It produced the sprout-producing seed and they did not. A similar argument can be made about the seed at the moment prior to that (i.e., the seed that produced the seed that produced the sprout producing seed), and the moment before that, etc. Thus, the single observed eventthe production of the sprout from the seedrequires that we accept that each moment in the history of the seed is dierent from any other. If the seed were the same at each and every moment, then it would produce its eect, the sprout, in each and every moment of its existence. Thus, the continuity of the seed over time is not based on the persistence of a single entity. The continuity is only apparent. And it is this appearance of con" tinuity over time that Buddhists designated by the term continuum (santana). By analogy, all pragmatically eective objects must be momentary in this way. For more on this see Stcherbatsky (1984: Vol 1, 79118), Steinkellner (1969), von Rospatt (1995)for a discussion of the early history of this idea; Yoshimizu (1999), and " " Oetke (1993)for a discussion of Dharmak" rtis famous sattvanumanathe inferential proof of momentariness from existence; Dunne (2004: 9197); Frauwallner (1935), for an edition and German translation from the Tibetan of Dharmottaras _ Ksanabhangasiddhi (Proof of Momentariness); Tani (1997), for an analysis of this : : text; and Mimaki (1976), Woo (1999), and Tani (1999), for a discussion of this theory in the work of later Buddhist epistemologists.
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causally related moments. These continua are not, however, " ultimately real (paramartha-sat). Rather, they are conceptually constructed. It is only the individual moments that are pragmatically eective and therefore ultimately real. And herein lies the problem for Dharmottara: What directly appears to us in perception must be a real particularthat is, a single momentyet, this is not the object towards which our activity is directed. For example, suppose that we see water in front of us. If we are thirsty, we will walk towards it. Assuming that it is not a mirage, we will eventually be able to take a drink and satisfy our thirst. Yet, the water that we seek to obtain cannot be the single moment that initially appeared to us, since our action presupposes that the water will remain there long enough for us to reach and drink it. Thus, the object towards which we direct our activity is not a single moment, but a continuumthe determined object (adhyavaseya-visaya) of perception. While the water that ulti: mately satises our thirst is a pragmatically eective particular, it is not the same pragmatically eective particular that appeared to us in our initial moment of perception. According to Dharmottara, then, there is, in perception, just as in inference, a disjunction between the object that initially appears to us and the object towards which we direct our activity (and, similarly, the object that we ultimately obtain). For him, the process whereby this gap is bridged is exactly the same as the process that Dharmak" saw at work only in rti inference, namely, determination. For Dharmottara, then, there is a close parallelism between the processes of perception and inference. In both cases an object is graspedthat is, directly presented to our awareness. Yet, in both cases, this object is not something that we can either act upon or even intend to act upon. Grasping can lead to successful activity (which is the test of validity) only when, on the basis of it, we construct a second object towards which we can direct our activity. In perception, this second object is a continuum, while in inference it is a particular. According to Dharmottara, it is precisely through determination that we construct this second object: In both perception and inference, the object that appears to us is taken to be something other than what it is. This parallelism between the processes of perception and inference seems to contradict Dharmak" rtis position as described above, and Dharmottara is clearly aware of the tension between his own explanation of these processes and that of Dharmak" rti. In concluding Chapter 1 of his commentary on Dharmak" rtis " Nyayabindu, Dharmottara presents the position of a critic who
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suggests that his view contradicts Dharmak" rtis. In his response, Dharmottara seeks to show that Dharmak" rtis statements about perception are consistent with his own theory. In the rst part of this passage he says:
[Dharmottara:] Therefore, perception is valid awareness only in so far as it produces a determination.68 But, if a determination were not made, then [our] awareness would not be established as being an awareness of [an object, e.g.] blue. And therefore, the result of valid awarenessthe attainment of the objectwould not be achieved. And so, since that awareness would not be the most proximate cause [of our knowledge of that object], it would not be valid awareness...69 [Objection]: If this were so, then perception would be a mode of valid awareness only in conjunction with determination, and not by itself.70
Dharmottaras position is that without determination we could not take our non-conceptual awareness to be awareness of an object at all. And so, without determination, there would be no possibility of successful activity with respect to that objectwhich, for Dharmottara and Dharmak" is the test of validity. Such a position leads rti, to the following objection: Dharmak" took great pains to argue rti that, in perception, it is only the initial non-conceptual awareness that is valid, and that any subsequent conceptualization of the object of that non-conceptual awareness is redundant and hence invalid. Yet, here, Dharmottara insists that the conceptualization that follows non-conceptual awarenesswhich he, unlike Dharmak" rti, labels as determinationis necessary for perception to be valid. This objection is motivated by exegetical rather than philosophical considerations: The objection is not that Dharmottaras position is philosophically indefensible, but rather that it seems to be incompatible with Dharmak" rtis own statements. In his response, Dharmottara tries to have his cake and eat it too by insisting, on the one hand, that determination is necessary for
This is the same passage quoted by Katsura. ": The term pramana (valid awareness) is, on the basis of its grammatical derivation, understood to refer to the instrument (karana), dened by the Sanskrit : " grammarians as the most proximate cause (sadhakatama), of our being aware of "i something (P"nini Astadhyay" 1.4.42) . See Hattori (1968: 28, 97100) n. 5557 and a: : :" Dunne (2004: Chapter 1) for a helpful discussion of this, and related issues. 70 " " : ": : NBT:8485. tasmad adhyavasayam kurvad eva pratyaksam pramanam bhavati | : : : " " " " akrte tv adhyavasaye n"labodhar"patvenavyavasthapitam bhavati vij~anam | tatha ca i u n" : : : ": " " " " pramanaphalam arthadhigamar"pam anispannam | atah sadhakatamatvabhavat u : : : " " : " n" " pramanam eva na syaj j~anam | yady evam adhyavasayasahitam eva pratyaksam : : : ": : " pramanam syat na kevalam iti cet |.
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perception to be valid and, on the other, that it is still legitimate to speak of non-conceptual awareness alone as being valid:
[Dharmottara:] This is not so, since the determination produced by the force of perception determines the object as something seen, and not as something imagined. And seeing, namely, the direct presentation of an object, is the function of perception, while imagining is the function of conceptualization. That is to say, when people conceptualize an object that is beyond the range of their senses, they, on the basis of their felt experience, determine that this [experience] is the function of conceptualization, namely, imagining. [They think,] we are imagining but not, we are seeing. And therefore, [in cases of conceptualization immediately following perception] it [conceptualization], setting aside its own function [that is, imagining], displays the function of perception, [with the thought that] When, with respect to a certain object, there is a determination preceded by perception, there perception alone is the mode of valid awareness.71 " " " NBT 8586. naitad evam | yasmat pratyaksabalotpannenadhyavasayena drsyat : : : " venartho vas"yate notpreksitatvena | daraya~a carthas" : atkaranakhyam pratyaksai s n " aks " : :" : : " " : " vy" arah | utpreksanam tu vikalpavyaparah | tatha hi paroksam artham vikalpayanta ap " : : : : : : " " " utpreksamahe na tu payama iti utpreksatmakam vikalpavyaparam anubhavad adhys " : " : " : " " " " " " s " avasyanti | tasmat svavyaparam tiraskrtya pratyaksavyaparam adarayati yatrarthe : : " ": pratyaksap"rvako dhyavasayas tatra pratyaksam kevalam eva pramanam iti | For : u : : another translation see Dreyfus (1996: 216). We take the clause beginning with " yatrarthe (When, with respect to a certain object) predicatively with the " s verb adarayati (shows). Given its context, this seems to be the best way to read this clause. The only alternative would be to take it as a separate sentence expressing Dharmottaras own nal position. If this were the case here, however, there should be a clear indication of the relation of this statement to the earlier argument e.g., by " using the word tasmat etc. Furthermore, Dharmottaras response to the objector only makes sense if we take him to be describing the way that conceptualization appears to us rather than the way that it, in fact, is. If Dharmottara were to believe that conceptualization literally shows, rather than constructs, an object, he would be directly contradicting what he said earlier in the passage quoted above, namely, that the determination that follows upon perception constructs an object that is not present in ones awareness. This means that despite the subjective dierence in the ways that the two kinds of conceptualization i.e., imagining and seeing, feel to us, they are doing precisely the same thingthey are constructing an object that is not directly present to our awareness. Nor can Dharmottaras argument here be understood as pointing out the redundancy of the conceptualization that follows upon perception, as Krasser, (1995: 253) appears to believe on the basis of the parallel passage in Dharmottaras LPrP (for an edition and translation of this parallel passage, see Krasser (1991: 4950, n. 77)). In both passages, the word dr:sta: : tvena has to be taken predicatively as expressing what the object is determined to be (i.e., as something seen) but not as expressing the manner in which it is determined (i.e., as it was seen Krasser, 1995: 253 and as it has been seen, Krasser, 1995: 261). This is so regardless of whether one takes the correct reading of the NBT to be : dryatvena, as printed in DhPr 1955: 85, or accepts the variant reading dr:stat: : :s vena. This way of taking the term matches the way in which both we and Krasser " take the parallel term utpreksitatvena/ vicaritatvena (i.e., as something imagined, : as having been investigated Krasser, 1995: 253). Dharmottaras point is not that the conceptualization that immediately follows upon perception determines its object as that object was already seen by the preceding non-conceptual awareness
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Dharmottara begins his response by drawing a distinction between our phenomenal experiences of seeing an object that is present before us, and imagining one that is remote. As Dharmottara has already explained, when we see an object such as a pot there are necessarily two distinct stages in our awareness, each with its own distinct object. In the rst stage we grasp a real, momentary particular, while in the second we construct, through determination, an object that is not directly present to our awarenessi.e., a continuum. This two-stage process feels to us, however, like a single eventthe direct presentation of a single, spatially and temporally extended object to our awareness. Yet, when we imagine an object that is not present to us, we do not have this feeling of directness. In both cases, however, conceptualization/determination really serves the same functionit makes available to us constructed objects which are not directly presented to our awareness. It is just the phenomenal dierence between seeing and imagining that allows us to speak as if we apprehend ordinary objects by perception alone, and not perception in conjunction with conceptualization. The implication of this is that for Dharmottara, when a Buddhist epistemologist, including Dharmak" rti, says that perception alone is the mode of valid awareness through which we come to know objects that are present before us, he does not, strictly speaking, mean what he says. As Dharmottara sees it, when one says this, one is reporting a psychological fact about how the perceptual process feels to us. One is not providing a philosophically rigorous account of how this process in fact works. Taking this position allows Dharmottara to maintain both that determination is a necessary part of all valid awareness and that Dharmak" rtis insistence that only the rst non-conceptual seeing is valid is not inconsistent with this stance.
(Footnote 71 Continued). (and therefore is redundant and hence invalid). Rather, he is saying that the conceptualization that immediately follows upon perception takes its own determined object to be something seen rather than something imagined. And since this statement does not have anything to do with the redundancy of the conceptualization that follows upon perception, Dharmottaras concluding statement that when, with respect to a certain object, there is a determination preceded by perception, there perception alone is the mode of valid awareness, would not follow from his argument. Furthermore, taking Dharmottaras argument to be about the redundancy of conceptual awareness seems to contradict what he said earlier about the two objects of perceptionthat in cases of perception we rst grasp a single moment and subsequently conceptually construct a second, dierent object, a continuum.
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DHARMOTTARA ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PERCEPTION AND INFERENCE
Since, as we have seen, Dharmottaras account of valid awareness takes the processes of perception and inference to be nearly identical, the question naturally arises as to how they are, nevertheless, to be dierentiated. While, for Dharmak" rti, there is a clear dierence in the kinds of mental processes that constitute perception and inference, for Dharmottara the dierence does not have to do with mental processes (which are the same for both) but with the ontological status of the objects that they bear upon. Both perception and inference consist of two stages: One rst grasps an object that is directly present to ones awareness, and then determines a second object towards which one acts. In perception, what one grasps is an ultimately real external particular, and what one determines is a continuum, which is conceptually constructed and therefore not ultimately real.72 In inference, however, what is grasped is not a real particular but a non-entity (avastu). The determined object that one acts upon is what Dharmottara calls a determined particular (avasitam svalaksanam). At rst glance this appears to be a simple : : inversion of the two objects of perception: The grasped object of one becomes the determined object of the other, and vice versa. Yet, the inversion is not quite as simple as it appears from the passage quoted above. While Dharmottara does not comment further on the nature " of this determined particular in his Nyayabindut"ka, he does :i "
72 While there has been some disagreement about whether Dharmottara is a Sautr"ntika, in the sense that he accepts the ultimate reality of external objects a a (cf. Hattori, 1968) or a Yogac"rin/Vijn"nav"din, in the sense that he does not a a accept the ultimate reality of external objects (cf. Matsumoto, 1981), we think that there are good reasons to believe that Dharmottara believed in the reality of external, mind-independent objects. Both V"caspatimira and Moks"karagupta, for example, a s :a treat Dharmottara as a Sautr"ntika and quote his texts in support of a Sautr"ntika a a position. See V"caspatimiras remarks in his NKan 1907: 256257, translated in a s : Stcherbatsky (1984, Vol II: 360), and Moks"karaguptas remarks in his TBh 1944: :a 66.18f, translated in Kajiyama (1966: 144). Apparently, Dharmottara was the pupil of Subhagupta, who seems to have been the classical exponent of a realist position in post-Dharmak" rtian Buddhist philosophy in India. See Frauwallner (1961: 147), Steinkellner and Much (1995), and Krasser (1991): Introduction n.1, quoting from PVinT 3.209b1. Furthermore, Abhinavagupta tells us that Dharmottara was the : " " author of a text called the Bahyarthasiddhi (Proof of External Objects) in which he defended a Buddhist realist position. This text is not referred to elsewhere, as far as we know, and its existence seems to have passed unnoticed in contemporary secondary literature. See the " IPVV: Vol II: 128, 394.
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describe it in more detail in his Apohaprakarana.73 There, in : describing the objects of verbal (and by implication, inferential) awareness, Dharmottara remarks as follows: That which is grasped and that which is determined are both exclusions-of-what-is-other ": (anyavyavrtti) and not real things (vastu).74 Thus, the particular that we determine in inferential and verbal awareness is not a real particular at all, but an exclusion, which is nothing other than a conceptual construct. As V"caspatimira says in explaining a s Dharmottaras postition: Even the particular that is being determined is not ultimately real. Instead, it too is conceptually constructed.75 So, for Dharmottara, out of all of the objects of perception and inference, only the grasped object of perception is ultimately real. What really dierentiates perception from inference is that perception begins with the appearance of a real particular in awareness, while inference has no real particular as its object, either through grasping or determination. Dharmottara thus introduces a radical change into Dharmak" rtis system through his four-object model and the parallel role that he assigns to determination in both perception and inference. This is so despite the fact that Dharmottara presents himself, and is presented by his commentators, as if he is merely explaining what Dharmak" rti said. Yet, in spite of its radically innovative character, Dharmottaras new picture of valid awareness and its objects quickly became the standard account for Buddhist epistemologists.
IMITRA ON THE OBJECTS OF AWARENESS " JNANASR"
Even though Jn"nar" a s mitra is often portrayed as a rival of Dharmottara, and does criticize him on several key points,76 he fully endorses Dharmottaras basic model of the two modes of valid awareness. Like Dharmottara, he repeatedly makes the claim that
For an edition and German translation of the Tibetan text see Frauwallner (1937: 233287). For one of the few secondary articles see Steinkellner (1976). 74 " ": i yac ca grhyate yac cadhyavas"yate te dve apy anyavyavrtt" na vastun". Sanskrit i i : " fragment quoted in the NVTT 444.22 and JNA 332.1416. Frauwallner (1937: 277). : 75 " " NVTT 444.1819: adhyavas"yamanam api svalaksanam na paramarthasat | api tu i : : : : tad api kalpitam. 76 " " See, for example, JNA 205, on the issue of implicative negation (paryudasa); " " " " " " : " JNA 228, on imposition (aropa); JNA 332, on causality (karyakaranabhava); JNA 332 on supernormal perception (yogipratyaksa); the references in Woo (2001) to : _ " " Jn"nar" a s mitras Ksanabhangadhyaya; and the references in Kellner (1997b) to his : : Anupalabdhirahasya.
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each mode of valid awareness must have two objects, one grasped " " and one determined. In his Vyapticarca (Analysis of Pervasion), in a debate over the nature of the object of perception, Jn"nar" a s mitra makes the following remark:
Now, for us, both modes of valid awareness have both objects [a universal and a particular] because of the division between what is grasped and what is determined. For that which appears in an episode of awareness is what is grasped, but that [object] with respect to which this [episode of awareness] operates, is what is determined. Now, for perception, what is grasped is a particular and what is determined is a universal. But for inference, it is the reverse.77
Here, Jn"nar" a s mitra basically recapitulates Dharmottaras model and diers in only one signicant respect: He makes it explicit that the continuum that Dharmottara identied as the determined object of perception must be regarded as a universal, since it is not a real particular.78 The most signicant dierence between Jn"nar" a s mitra and Dharmottara, however, is their attitude towards the ontological status of these objects. For Dharmottara, the grasped object of perception is a real external particular, while in inference there is
77 " JNA (VC:166.1315) and Lasic (2000:13*213*6). Note that Lasic (2000: 13*5) " " : " corrects Thakuradhyavaseya for adhyavasaya. asmakam tavad ubhayam api ": " " pramanam ubhayavisayam, grahyadhyavaseyabhedena. yad dhi yatra j~ane pran" : " " tibhasate, tad grahyam. yatra tu tad pravartate, tad adhyavaseyam. tatra pratyaksasya : " " " " svalaksanam grahyam, adhyavaseyam ca samanyam. anumanasya tu viparyayah. Also : : : : : " (AP: 225.17): dvidha visayavyavaharah pratibhasad adhyavasayac ca. There " : " : "" " " see JNA are two ways of talking about objects: On the basis of appearance and on the basis of determination. 78 Jn"nar" a s mitra, unlike Dharmottara, explicitly identies the determined object of " " perception as a universal (samanya) in order to provide a basis for distinguishing between the two dierent sorts of universals that can be constructed from the grasped moment in the perceptual process: In explaining how we come to know that " there is pervasion (vyapti) between an inferential reason and a property to be proved, Jn"nar" a s mitra points out that when we come to know the pervasion of, e.g., smoke " by re, we construct, not simply a single smoke-continuum (santana)as in the typical cases of perception discussed by Dharmottara (see above)but the entire class of smoke-continua, in order to arrive at the determination that Wherever there is smoke there is re. Thus, while we always construct a universal as the determined object of perception, we sometimes construct what post-Dharmottaran Buddhist and " " Jaina philosophers call a vertical universal ("rdhva-samanya) i.e., an individual u object-continuum, and other times we construct a horizontal universal (tiryak" " " samanya) i.e., the class comprising all, e.g., individual smoke-continua. See JNA " (VC: 166.14166.21) and Lasic (2000: 13*614). JNA (VC: 166.1619) is also discussed and translated in Balcerowicz (1999: 212). For more on these two kinds of " universals and the explicit use of the terms urdhva and tiryak in Buddhist philosophical texts see Balcerowicz (1999), Balcerowicz (2001: 180182) n. 158, and Patil (2003).
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neither the grasping nor determining of such a particular. For Jn"nar" a s mitra, however, there are no external, mind-independent particulars. Throughout his work, he consistently maintains that no mind-independent particulars can exist and that, as he says, This entire triple-world is established to be nothing but consciousness " (vij~aptimatra).79 Thus, Jn"nar" n a s mitra cannot, like Dharmottara, appeal to the distinction between real and conceptually constructed objects in order to distinguish perception from inference. For Dharmottara, the dierence between the two modes of valid awareness hinges on an asymmetrical mapping of two dierent sets of paired concepts. In the passages discussed above, Dharmottara " classies the objects of awareness as those that are grasped (grahya) and those that are determined, and also as those that are free from conceptual construction (nirvikalpaka)and therefore real (vastu/ " paramartha)and those that are conceptually constructed (kalpita/ ": " anyavyavrtta/aropita)and therefore unreal (anartha).80 While all determined objects are, for him, conceptually constructed, not all grasped objects are real: The grasped object of inference is a conceptual construct, and unlike the grasped object of perception, it is not a real thing (it is a non-entity, avastu). Jn"narimitra, however, a s alters this conceptual map by indexing these two pairs of concepts to each other. For him, all grasped objects are free from conceptual construction and all determined objects are the products of conceptual construction. In fact, Jn"nar" a s mitra takes determination and conceptual construction to be essentially the same:
the terms conceptualization and determination refer to the same thing. Its just that [the use of] the word conceptualization is occasioned by connection with words and the like while determination is occasioned by suitability for activity even with respect to [an object] that is not grasped [by awareness].81
Thus, whatever is determined is conceptual and whatever is not determined is non-conceptual. It follows from this that the grasped (and, by denition, not determined) object of inference is, contrary to Dharmottaras claim, non-conceptual. For Jn"nar" a s mitra, then, the
79 " " JNA (SSS:367.09): vij~aptimatram akhilam sthitam etaj jagattrayam. Also see n : " JNA (SSS:365.16). 80 See NBT 52.06, (nirvikalpaka); Apohaprakarana (in Frauwallner, 1937: 277), : : ": " " (anyavyavrtti); PVin (in Steinkellner and Krasser, 1989: 31), (aropita, paramartha); NBT 7172, (anartha). : 81 " " " " JNA (AP:226.01226.03). satyam ekarthau vikalpadhyavasayau kevalam : " " " vikalpaabdah sabdadiyojananimittakah | adhyavasayas tv agrh"te pi pravartas : : : i " nayogyatanimittah | This passage is also quoted, in context, below. :
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objects of awareness fall into two neatly dened and mutually exclusive categoriesthose that are grasped, and therefore free from conceptualization, and those that are determined, and therefore conceptualized. Dharmottaras two ways of classifying objects are thus reduced to one.
RELATIVIZATION OF BASIC CATEGORIES
This position seems to put Jnanar" " s mitra at odds with his predecessors in the Buddhist epistemological tradition. Beginning with Dign"ga, this tradition relied upon an ontological distinction a between real particulars (svalaksana) and constructed universals : : " " (samanya) which were, respectively, taken to be the objects of perception and inference. Yet, Jn"nar" a s mitras re-conceptualization of the objects of valid awareness eectively obliterates any ontological distinction between them by relativizing the concepts of particular " " (svalaksana) and universal (samanya). For Jn"nar" a s mitra, the : : objects that appear to us are neither particulars nor universals, in and of themselves. It is only in relation to subsequent acts of determination that they can be properly classied as one or the other.82 In his explanation of the nature of universals, for example, he says:
From the word cow in the sentence There are cows grazing on the far bank of the river, dewlap, horn, tail, etc. appearaccompanied by the form of the letters [which make up the word cow]in eect, lumped together because of inattention to dierences between things belonging to the same class. But, that [conglomeration of dewlap, horn, etc.] is not itself a universal...83
And again, with reference to the universal, re, he says:

For, one and the same bare imageblazing and radiantalthough it is utterly distinct from every particular, when it is being made one with a particular [through conceptualization, is called a universal. But that [image] is not itself a universal belonging to those particulars because it [the bare image] recurs elsewhere as a mental image.84
82 See Dunne (2004: 275) for a similar sort of relativization in the work of Dharmak" rti. 83 " " " " JNA (AP:220.2220.4) tatha hi uttarat"re sarita caranti gava iti vakye i s " s " " "sr _ " _ u " ": "i " " gavadiabdat sasna: ngalang"ladayo ksarakaraparikarah sajat"yabhedaparamarat s" : " " " ": " " " sampinditaprayah pratibhasante, na ca tad eva samanyam . : :: 84 " " " " " JNA (AP: 220.7220.9) tad eva hi jvaladbhasurakaramatram akhilavyaktav ": : " " atyantavilaksanam api svalaksanena ek"kriyamanam samanyam ity ucyate | na tu tat i : : : : " " "" " " " " " samanyam eva tasam, buddhyakaratvenanyatranugamat |.
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For Jn"nar" a s mitra, what we call a universal is simply an image that appears in awareness (just as, for example, the image, blue, appears). Our calling it a universal is not occasioned by its ontological status, but by the fact that we subsequently relate it to one or more putative particulars, whether real or unreal. Yet, this subsequent relating of the image to particulars need not occur at all. When we reect upon this mental image as a mental image, for example, we are perceiving it. And relative to this act of perception, the image is not a universal, but a particular (since it is a grasped object of perception). When we reect upon a mental image, becoming aware of it as a mental image, we do so by assigning it to a class. For example, when we think, The mental image, re, just appeared in my awareness, we are taking the unique, momentary image that appeared to us to be a member of the class, mental images of re. This is exactly like the more familiar example of perception in which blue appears in awareness and is subsequently conceptualized as blue. From this it follows that the very same image could become either a particular or a universal depending on the kind of mental operation that follows it. If we relate the image to one or more putative particulars, it becomes a universal in relation to those particulars. But if, by reecting upon the image as an image, we relate it to a class of which it is a member, it then becomes a particular in relation to that class. Thus, in claiming that ...for perception, what is grasped is a particular and what is determined is a universal. But for inference, it is the reverse,85 Jn"nar" a s mitra is making a statement that is, for him, true by denition. The image that appears in the rst stage of the perceptual process is not a grasped object of perception because it is a particular, but rather, it is a particular because it is the grasped object of perception. In the same way, the image that appears in the rst stage of the inferential process is not a grasped object of inference because it is a universal, but rather, it is a universal because it is the grasped object of inference. Images are labeled as particulars or universals only in relation to a subsequent determination. Thus, for Jn"nr" a s mitra, particular and universal are not really ontological categories at all. Instead, they are dened contextually. Images are categorized as either one or the other depending on the role that they are made to play by subsequent acts of conceptualization.
85
Quoted earlier.
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RELATIVIZATION OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL
A similar relativization of basic conceptual categories in the Buddhist epistemological tradition can be seen in Jn"nar" a s mitras treatment of internal and external. For him, internal and external are not ontological categories either. Rather, we will argue that they are dened relative to the activity (pravrtti) of an agent. : An important element in Jn"nar" a s mitras discussion of activity is the familiar three-fold division into bodily, verbal, and mental.86 According to him, activity is not limited to physical activity involving putatively extra-mental objects, but also includes verbal and mental activity that can be directed towards mental images, as well as towards putatively extra-mental objects. While mental images cannot be acted upon physically, they can be the objects of verbal and mental activity, since we do talk and think about them. And, in Jn"nar" a s mitras account, in so far as such mental objects become the objects of activity, they are external. That this is Jn"nar" a s mitras position is evident from his discussion of semantic value, that is, what it is that we are talking about when we use language. In his discussion, Jn"nar" a s mitra makes use of the familiar distinction between what is ultimately true (descriptions that can withstand the most rigorous philosophical analysis) and what is conventionally true (convenient ctions that can help us to function successfully in the world, but nevertheless cannot withstand the most rigorous philosophical analysis).87 Jn"nar" a s mitra argues that, ultimately, given the most rigorous philosophical analysis, our statements cannot refer to anything at all. He argues further that, even conventionally, when we make positive or negative statements what we are arming or denying the existence of is always some external thing. As he says:
There is no way of really arming either the mental image or the external object. Conventionally [there is armation] only of externals, whereas even conventionally there is no [armation] of the mental image. " " " " " i JNA (AP: 226227): sa cagnir atreti vyavasayo yatha kayik"m pravrttim pras"te, u : " " " i " "" " u ": " i : tathagnir maya prat"ta iti vacik"m api pras"te. etadakaranuvyavasayar"pam manas"m i u prasavati. And just as the determination There is re here produces bodily activity, in the same way it produces verbal [activity] as well: Fire has been apprehended by me. It also produces mental activity i.e., a reective awareness having the same form [as the verbal statement]. 87 For a general discussion of these concepts see Eckel (1987) and Newland (1999), and for a specic discussion of these concepts in the Buddhist epistemological tradition see the references in Dunne (2004) and Dreyfus (1997).
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For this mental image, which is indubitable and an object of reexive awareness, cannot be what is armed or denied by means of words etc., since this would be useless [in the case of armation] and impossible [in the case of denial].88
When one arms the existence of a tree by saying, There is a tree here or denies it by saying There is no tree here, the word tree cannot be taken to refer to the mental image tree. Since the mental image tree is present whenever one hears and understands the word tree, it would be redundant, and therefore useless, to arm its existence. On the other hand, it would be contradictory, and therefore impossible, to meaningfully deny its existence. Jn"nar" a s mitra continues:
Neither can the external object, which does not appear in conceptual awareness, [really be armed or denied]. Since this object is not cognized, what could be armed or denied?89
Since the external object does not itself appear in awareness (given that what appears in awareness is only an image), it too cannot really be armed or denied. After all, one cannot arm or deny what one is not even aware of. Jn"nar" a s mitra now concludes:
Therefore, just as, on the basis of determination, an external tree is conditionally " adopted [vyavasthapita] as what is denoted by the word tree, in the same way, it is only on the basis of determination that one talks about arming or denying [any] external object. Even when, due to certain circumstances, one examines a mental image, having brought it to mind by means of another conceptualization, then too there is armation and denial of what is external to this conceptualization.90
Jn"nar" a s mitras position is that, even conventionally, one can only arm or deny external objects. Yet one can arm or deny mental images, as Jn"nar" a s mitra clearly recognizes. Thus, mental images, in so far as we arm or deny them, must be, for Jn"nar" a s mitra, external. The application of the label external, like the labels particular and universal, does not depend on the ontological status of an object, but rather on the way that our awareness relates us to it. Objects are considered to be external if and only if they are
" " " " " JNA (AP: 229.0306). nakarasya na bahyasya tattvato vidhisadhanam| ": : bahir eva hi samvrttya samvrtyapi tu nakrteh || na hy asandehasya visayasya : : " : : " : " " " " " " " " svasamvedyasyakarasya abdadina vidhinisedhayogah vaiyarthyad asamarthyac ca |. s : : : 89 " " " " " JNA (AP: 229.0607) napi vikalpapratibhasino bahyasya | visayapratipatter hi : " " " kasya vidhir nisedho va syat? : 90 " " " : : s " " " JNA (AP: 229.0710) tasmad yatha vrksaabdena bahyo vrkso dhyavasayad : : " " " " " " abhidheyo vyavasthapitah, tathadhyavasayad eva bahyasya vidhir nisedho va : : " " " : " vyavahriyate | yadapi kutacit prakaranad buddhyakaram ka~cid vikalpantarenadaya s n :" :" " " " " par"ksa, tadapi tadvikalpad bahya eva vidhinisedhau |. i: " :
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determinedthat is, not directly presented by the awareness that puts us in touch with them.
CONDITIONALLY ADOPTED POSITIONS
In the above passage, Jn"nar" a s mitra makes use of a concept, con" ditionally adopted position (vyavastha), which proves to be central to his own account of what it is that words do (and do not) refer to and, as we shall see, to his understanding of traditional Buddhist claims about exclusion (apoha). What follows is an analysis of Jn"nar" a s mitras use of this concept, specically in relation to his discussion of exclusion. Jn"nar" a s mitra begins his Apohaprakarana with a powerful attack : on the generally accepted view of the Buddhist epistemologists that words do not refer to real objects but express the exclusion of what is " other (anyapoha). Speaking in the voice of a hypothetical opponent, Jn"nar" a s mitra raises two objections against the traditional understanding of exclusion. The rst is phenomenological: The claim that what we understand from words, or from an inference, is merely the exclusion of others, namely, a type of negation, is directly contradicted by our experience. In both language and inference we become aware of what seem to us to be positive entities (vidhi) and it is argued that this would not be possible if the actual content of our awareness were simply a negation (nisedha).91 The second objection is : exegetical: Dharmak" divides inferences into three categories, those rti " based on identity (svabhava) and eectcause relations " " : " (karya-karana-bhava), which establish the existence of positive entities, and those based on non-apprehension (anupalabdhi), which " establish the absence of something (abhava).92 However, if one argues that what we understand on the basis of inference, and therefore language, is nothing but a negationi.e., an absencethen the basis for this division would collapse, since all inferences would establish absences.93 In the light of these two objections the opponent asks:
" See JNA (AP: 201.08202.04). The secondary literature on the types of inferential reasons is extensive. For a discussion of inferences based on eectcause relations see Kajiyama (1989), Gillon (1991), Steinkellner (1991), Lasic (1999, 2003). For a discussion of inferences based on identity see Hayes (1987), Steinkellner (1974, 1991, 1996) and Iwata (2003). For those based on non-apprehension see the references to Kellner, cited earlier. For a more general discussion see the references in Dunne (2004) and Oetke (1991). 93 " See JNA (AP: 202.12202.23).
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How can you say that exclusion is what is revealed by words and inferential reasons?94 In answering this question, Jn"nar" a s mitra says the following:
It is for this reason that [in the introductory verse of the Apohaprakarana], he [i.e., I, : the author] says This is [our] position [sthitih]. This [claim that exclusion is what is : revealed by words and inferential reasons] is just a conditionally adopted position " " [vyavasthamatram]. What this means is that it is not really the case [vastutattvam] that exclusion is primarily the object of words etc. If you say, So then what really is the case here?, [we say]: First of all, it is the [external] object that is primarily expressed by words. This being the case, exclusion is understood as a qualier of that [external object]. One [of thesethe external object] is [conditionally] adopted as an object, because of determination; the other [the exclusion is conditionally adopted as an object] " because of appearance [bhasatah]. But really, nothing at all is expressed [by words]. : This is the summation of the meaning of this text.95
Jn"nar" a s mitras response to the objections mentioned above is to concede that they are substantially correct: It is not convincing to argue that the content of our inferential and verbal awareness is simply a negation, and moreover, arguing in this manner would undermine the threefold division of inferential reasons, just as the opponent argues. Jn"nar" a s mitra insists, however, that what the opponent is attacking is not the real Buddhist position, but simply a conditionally adopted position. Buddhists do sometimes speak as if exclusion alone were what is understood from words and inferential reasons, but this, Jn"nar" a s mitra argues, is not what Buddhists take to be really the case. The real Buddhist position, as Jn"nar" a s mitra understands it, is summarized in the above verse: There are two sorts of things that we might conventionally take to be the semantic value of a wordthe (putative) external object, and the mental image that appears to us upon hearing the word. The rst of these is taken to be the semantic value on the basis of determination, in that it is an actionable objectthat is, it is the object towards which our actions are directed even though it does not appear in our awareness.
" JNA (AP: 202.2021), quoting from the introductory verse of the Apohapra_ " ": "s karana: katham apohah abdalingabhyam prakayate iti. : : s 95 " " " " JNA (AP: 202.21203.05) ata aha, sthitir iti | vyavasthamatram etat | muk" " hyatayapohah abdader visaya iti nedam vastutattvam ity arthah | kim punar atra : : : : : s " " " " vastuttvam iti cet? sabdais tavan mukhyam akhyayate rthas tatrapohas tadgunatvena : " " " " gamyah | artha caiko dhyasato bhasato nyah sthapyo vacyas tattvato naiva kacit || s s : : " " iti prakaranarthasamgrahah| Instead of the printed bhasate, we read bhasato :" : : following the reading of the verse as cited in Ms. N1, N2, and N3 of Ratnak" rtis Apohasiddhi, and the printed version in Shastri (1910).
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The second is taken to be the semantic value in that it appears in our awareness even though it is not actionable. Thus one may, under certain circumstances, conventionally adopt the position that one or the other of these objects is the meaning of a word. Ultimately however (for reasons to be discussed below) neither of these can be properly regarded as the meaning of word, and thus the real position of the Buddhists is that nothing at all is expressed. Despite his ultimate view that nothing at all is expressed, Jn"nar" a s mitra still provides a conditionally adopted position of his own in order to explain how it is that we are able, even in the absence of any real object, to engage in pragmatically successful linguistic a s mitra main(and also inferential and conceptual) activity.96 Jn"nar" tains, conventionally, that the content of our verbal (and also inferential and conceptual) awareness must be taken to be a complex object consisting of both a positive and a negative element. In accordance with our everyday linguistic experience, a positive object must be taken to be what is primarily expressed by language. But, an additional negative element, exclusion, must be taken to be a qualier of that positive object. While we can act only towards positive entities, it is only through exclusion that we can pick out the appropriate objects for that activity by distinguishing them from those that are inappropriate.97 This position has often been described as a synthesist view of exclusion.98 Yet, this modied version of the theory of exclusion elicits a further objection:
Why dont you just talk in terms of the positive entity alone [when describing the semantic value of a word]? Or, alternatively, why wouldnt you be left with the
96 While the verse only mentions what is expressed by words, in explaining it, a s mitra makes clear that the verse applies equally well to inference and conJn"nar" " ceptual awareness in general. JNA (AP: 203.08203.09): sabdair iti copalaksanam. : : " lingaih pratipadyate vikalpair visay"kriyata ity api drastavyam. And the expression : : : i :: by words is a metonym: What is made known by inferential reasons and what is made into an object by conceptual awarenesses, should also be seen [to be included]. For a discussion of this complex object in the work of Jn"nar" a s mitras student Ratnak" see Patil (2003). rti 97 " " " JNA (AP: 206.13206.14). yadi ca sabdarutikale kalito na parapohah katham s : " : " " anyapariharena pravrttih? tato gam badhaneti codito vad"n api badhn"yat. And if, at s "i i " : : the time of hearing the word, the exclusion of others was not apparent, how could one act by avoiding what is other? And therefore, having been told Tie up the cow, one would also tie up horses etc. 98 For the classication of exclusion theorists as negativists, positivists, and synthesists see Mookerjee (1975: 132). For discussions of this typology see Katsura (1986), Siderits (1986, 1991), and Patil (2003).
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unwanted consequence that one should speak of perception too as having exclusionof-what-is-other as its object?99
Here again, the distinction between perceptual and inferential/ verbal awareness is seen to be problematic. We have already noted that, for Dharmak" rti, our non-conceptual awareness of a perceived object is typically followed by a conceptual awareness with a class-forming exclusion as its object (e.g., the awareness of blue as blue). And, at least for Dharmottara and Jn"nar" a s mitra, this second awareness is a necessary part of the perceptual process in that it constructs one of the two objects of perceptionthe second, determined object. When we act on the basis of perception, the object towards which we act is understood to be a positive entity, dierentiated from other objects through conceptualization (which necessarily takes the form of an exclusion). Here, the opponent implies that Jn"nar" a s mitras theory of exclusion makes the operation of language/inference and perception essentially parallel. In each case, the object of awareness consists of a positive element that is necessarily coupled with an exclusion. In the light of this, the opponent argues that there is no basis for talking about the objects of perception and language/inference dierently by asserting that perception deals with positive objects and language/inference only with exclusions. If it is correct to say that one perceives a real, positive object (vastu), then one could just as well say that what one refers to or infers is a real, positive object. Alternatively, if it is correct to say that, because language and inference can put us in touch with objects only through the exclusion-of-what-is-other, we should say that they have exclusions as their objects, then one should also say that perception has an exclusion as its object. Jn"nar" a s mitra replies:
In response to this, we say: By relying on a little bit of the truth [tattvalea], a certain s conditionally adopted position is, for a specic purpose, constructed [by us], in one way, even though the actual state of aairs is dierent, just as in examples such as the self or the arising of a thing. For arising can only be a property of an existing object qualied by a prior absence. By relying on a little bit of the truth, namely, the prior absence, we conditionally adopt the position that [There is arising] of a non-existent thing, in order to foreclose any worries about the doctrine that eects pre-exist in their cause. Or, by relying on the conceptual construction of a single continuum, [we conventionally say]: Who else will experience [the result] of an action done by this very person?, in order to frustrate the deceptive view that there
99 " " JNA (AP: 204.24204.25) kevalam kim na vidhinaiva vyapadeah prayaksasyapi s : : : : " " " _ va parapohavisayatvavyavaharaprasanga ity avaisyate |. s: :
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is the passing away of what has been done and the onset of what has not been done.100
In this passage, Jn"nar" a s mitra develops the theory of conditionally adopted positions. A conditionally adopted position is, as he sees it, a kind of white liea statement which is not strictly speaking true, but contains at least an element of truth, and whose use is indexed to an appropriate purpose. He claries this by oering two examples: While it is not strictly speaking true that non-existent objects can arise, it is legitimate to make such a claim as a corrective against the erroneous S"mkhya position that all eects pre-exist in their a: causes. Arising can only be a property of an existent thing. But the thing in question must be qualied by a prior absence: E.g., when we say that a pot arises what we mean is that a pot, which did not exist previously, now exists. The prior absence of the pot is the little bit of the truth that we rely upon in claiming that non-existent objects arise. And this claim, although not really true, may be legitimately oered to disabuse people of the false notion that nothing can arise that did not exist previously. In the same way, in explaining the theory of karma, one may legitimately say that a person will, in the future, experience the karmic results of actions that he now performs. Yet, this too is not strictly speaking true, since there is no person that endures through time. The statement is based on a little bit of the truth, namely, that we, in fact, conceptually construct a mental continuum that we take to be an enduring self. It is a white lie in that we use it to expose the falsity of the view that our current actions will not have karmic consequences, and that what we experience in this life is not at all the result of previous actions. Jn"nar" a s mitra now applies this theory of conventionally adopted positions to the present case:
Here too, [the idea that] linguistic expression takes a positive entity as its object is just the same [in that it too is a conditionally adopted position]. Here, we conditionally adopt the position that exclusion, even though it is [really just] a necessarily attendant awareness, is the object of conceptual [including inferential/verbal] awareness, in order to set aside any suspicion that we accept [the position] pushed by " " " "s JNA (AP: 204.26205.03) atra br"mah | iha kacid vyavastha tattvaleam aritya u : s " " " " " " prayojanaviesad anyatha sthitav apy anyatha kriyate, yathatmatadutpada iti | utpado s: " " " hi pragabhavaviistasya vastunah sata eva dharmah | atha ca s: : : : " " "s " pragabhavalaksanatattvaleam aritya asata iti vyavasthapyate s : : " " s _ " _ " " " satkaryavadaankasankocaya | yatha vanenaiva krtam karma ko nyah : : : " "s pratyanubhavisyat"ty ekasantanapraj~aptim aritya i n : "s " : " " " " krtanaakrtabhyagamava~canavimohaya. n :
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[our] opponents that it is only the positive entity that is really expressed. And therefore, we dont just talk in terms of the positive entity [when describing the semantic value of a word]. But, when [someone] pushes the position that Exclusion alone is the primary meaning of a word, then we put forth the positive entity as well. As stated, First of all, it is the [external] object that is primarily expressed by words. But, in perception, because there is no disagreement [of this sort], it is proper that one should not conditionally adopt this position.101
What is generally taken to be the traditional Buddhist position that exclusion is what is revealed by words and inferential reasons is not really the Buddhist position at all. It is just another white lie. The partial truth on which this white lie is based is the fact that, as discussed above, language and inference cannot eectively direct us towards the proper objects of our activities without relying on exclusion. And the purpose that makes this lie a white lie is that it serves as a corrective to the mistaken view that positive entities alone are expressed or inferred. Yet, if someone were to mistakenly take this conditionally adopted position to be really the case, then, one could adopt a new conditionally adopted position that positive entities are also expressed and inferred, but only as qualied by exclusions. This is exactly the position that Jn"nar" a s mitra sets forth in the rst half of the summary verse quoted above. Jn"nar" a s mitra understands perception to be dierent from language/inference, not because the latter takes exclusion as its object and the former does not, but because, for reasons to be discussed below, there is no parallel need to put forth the conditionally adopted position that exclusion alone is the object of perception. Here again, Jn"nar" a s mitras response to the opponents argument is to concede that it is substantially correct. Perception and language/inference are alike in that they both have as their content a positive component and a negative component, i.e., exclusion. The dierence in the way that we talk about them is based not on a dierence in their content, but on a dierence in the kinds of rhetorical contexts that motivate our discussions of them.
" JNA (AP: 205.03205.09). We are emending the text by inserting a sentence " " " " : break after the word abhidhanam. tathadyapi vidhivisayabhidhanam. vastuto vas: " " " " i " s _ " " " tuna eva pararopitavacyatasv"karaankanirakaranaya nantart"yakaprat"tir apy apoha i i :" " " : " eva vikalpavisaya iti vyavasthapyate | ato na vidhinaiva vyavaharah | yada tv apoha : " " " eva mukhyarthah abdasyety aropah, tada vidhir api puraskr"yate | yathoktam, abdais i : s : : s " " " " " " " tavan mukhyam akhyayate rtha iti | pratyakse tu vivadabhavan naivam vyavastheti : yuktam |.
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This tendency to explain distinctions between basic terms in the Buddhist epistemological tradition, not in terms of real dierences in their referents, but in terms of the dierent discursive contexts in which they are used, can also be seen in Jn"nar" a s mitras treatment of the terms conceptualization (vikalpa) and determination (adhy" avasaya). When an objector points out that while Dharmak" uses rti these terms contrastively,102 Jn"nar" a s mitra does not oer any way to explain the dierence between them, Jn"nar" a s mitra responds:
True, conceptualization and determination refer to the same thing. Its just that the [use of the] word conceptualization is occasioned by connection with words and the like, while determination is occasioned by suitability for activity even with respect to [an object] that is not grasped [by awareness].103
According to Jn"nar" a s mitra, the word conceptualization is generally used to designate situations in which our mental image of an object is inextricably bound up with the form of the word that is used to refer to it: For example, for a competent speaker of English, thinking of an object as a cow is typically bound up with the recollection of the word cow. The word determination, however, is generally applied to cases in which one treats a mental image as if it were an object that one could act upon. But, as Jn"nar" a s mitra goes on to explain, since thinking of is just a kind of activity, conceptualization is really nothing but determination. He continues:
This being the case, [just] as one concludes that an object has been apprehended through conceptualization, likewise [one concludes that it has been apprehended] bound up with the word [that refers to it]. This is because, like the partial image of a thing,104 the image of the word also appears [in this awareness]. Therefore, the " conditionally adopted dierentiation [vyavastha]105 of conceptualization [from determination] is not based in reality [tattvatah], but is only [accepted] in conformity : " See JNA (AP: 225.19) and Katsura (1993). " " " " JNA (AP: 226.01226.03) satyam ekarthau vikalpadhyavasayau kevalam : " " " vikalpaabdah sabdadiyojananimittakah | adhyavasayas tv agrh"te pi pravas : : : i " rtanayogyatanimittah |. : 104 The conceptual awareness that immediately follows perception classies the grasped object by picking out one aspect of it. Thus, in conceptualizing the smoke that one sees as smoke rather than as grey or wispy, the awareness contains just an aspect or part of what was grasped by the preceding non-conceptual awareness (in conjunction with the memory of prior instances of smoke, the word smoke, etc.). For a discussion of selectivity in conceptualization see Dunne (2004), Kellner (2004), and Patil (2003). 105 " While we usually translate the term vyavastha as conditionally adopted p " position, it could be more literally rendered as setting something ( stha) down (ava) as distinct (vi). In adopting the position that something is a certain way, one always implicitly adopts the position that it is distinct from what is not that way.
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with the [conditional] determination that In so far as a person conceives of himself as apprehending a thing, to that extent, he likewise conceives of himself as apprehending it together with its name.106
For Jn"nar" a s mitra, the terminological distinction between conceptualization and determination is not based on a real dierence in the mental processes to which they refer, but is a contextually governed ction that is indexed to particular purposes. It is because, for people who have learned a language, the object that one conceptually apprehends is almost always associated with the word that is used to refer to it that they mistakenly believe that conceptually apprehending an object and associating it with its name are one and the same thing. And it is as a way of accommodating this widespread but mistaken belief that Dharmak" and others in the Buddhist episterti mological tradition speak as if conceptualizing an object (i.e., apprehending it in association with a word that may be used to refer to it) and determining it (i.e., apprehending it as an object of activity in generalbodily, verbal, or mental) are distinct processes, even though they are one and the same. Jn"nar" a s mitra now explicitly relates this conditionally adopted positionthat conceptualization can be distinguished from determination in virtue of its being bound up with languageto his earlier discussion of the distinction between perception and inference.
And it is for the very same reason that, with a view towards the practically oriented person whose mind has worn itself out due to the conceit [that conceptualizing a thing and apprehending its name are the same], the qualier free from conceptual construction is included in the denition of perception [by Dign"ga and Dhara mak" rti], and that, in the foundational text [Dharmak" rtis Hetubindu], there is separate mention [of conceptualization and determination with the words] on the basis of conceptual awareness... by determining.107
This passage asserts, rather shockingly, that the claim that perception is free from conceptual constructionarguably the most fundamental and characteristic tenet of the Buddhist epistemological
106 " " JNA (AP: 227.01227.04) evam sati yatha vikalpena ayam artho grh"ta iti : : i " " " s " " " nicayas tatha sabdena samyojyety api, arthakaraleavac chabdakarasyapi sphuranat | s : :" " " " " " " " tasmad yavad arthagrahanabhidhanavan manavah tavad abhidhanasamyukta:" : : " " " " " " grahanabhimanavan ap"ty avasayanurodhad eva vikalpavyavastha na tattvatah |. i :" : 107 " " JNA (AP: 227.10227.11). The reference is to HB 3*1415, quoted in JNA (AP: " " " " " 225.18225.19). ata eva ca tadabhimanamlanamanasam vyavaharikam prati prat: : " : "i " " yaksalaksane kalpanapodhaviesanam upad"yate, s"trato pi vikalpad adhyavasayeneti s: : u : : : bhedanirdeah |. s :
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traditionis itself nothing but another white-lie.108 For Jn"nar" a s mitra, it is not really the case that the perceptual process is free from conceptual construction, since perception and inference each have both a non-conceptual and a conceptual object. Yet, underlying this strictly speaking falsestatement is a bit of the truth, namely that perception does, in fact, have a non-conceptual object that is grasped in the rst moment of the perceptual process. Jn"nar" a s mitra seems to believe that the reason Dign"ga and Dharmak" state this partial a rti truththat perception is free from conceptual constructionis that, of the four possible objects of awareness (the grasped and determined objects of both perception and inference), it is only the grasped object of perception that can be dierentiated from the other three objects without breaking down the false equation of conceptualization and language. The determined object of perception is conceptual but not necessarily linguistic; the grasped object of inference/language is, as discussed above, non-conceptual, but is, at least typically, bound up with language, while the determined object of inference/language is necessarily conceptual and (at least typically) also bound up with language. So, for the practically oriented person, who takes conceptualization and verbalization to be the same, these three objects cannot be dierentiated from one another. Recognizing that it is too much to expect such a person to give up this deeply engrained equivalence, Dign"ga and Dharmak" work around it by formua rti lating a denition of perception that takes the rst step towards clearly dierentiating the objects of awareness. Accepting even this little bit of the truth marks a signicant advance in philosophical understanding for the pragmatically oriented person who is already worn out by the eort of accepting even this much. Jn"nar" a s mitras theory of the conditionally adopted position thus provides a new and powerful tool for satisfying the dual objectives demanded by the commentarial orientation discussed abovethe need to be both philosophically correct and exegetically faithful to the foundational texts of the tradition. This theory enables Jn"nar" a rtis statements a s mitra to legitimate Dign"ga and Dharmak" while at the same time taking a philosophical position that is at odds with what they appear, and have been generally taken, to mean.
For a brief, but useful, discussion of this tenet see Hattori (1968: 8285) n. 1.251.27. For more detailed analysis see Funayama (1992) and the discussion in Franco (1987).
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In the concluding passage of his work, Jn"nar" a s mitra more fully explains how conditionally adopted positions have functioned in the Buddhist epistemological tradition and, more specically, how this theory accounts for the traditions dierential treatment of perception and inference in relation to the question of exclusion. He sums up his conditionally adopted account of the objects of language (and inference) as follows:
It is established that what is expressed by a word is an external object, by way of determination, but a mental image, by way of appearance.109
In response to this, Jn"nar" a s mitra raises another hypothetical objection, and again responds to it by appealing to his theory of conditionally adopted positions:
[Objection:] But, if you explain things in this way then you have accepted that the entire collection of both sorts of objects is expressible. So, how is it that this [theory of exclusion] has been introduced in order to establish the inexpressibility of all attributes (dharma)?110 [Response:] To this he [i.e., I, Jn"nar" a s mitra] says, This [dual-object position outlined above] is conditionally adopted.111 The idea that things can be expressed either merely by determination or merely by appearance is just a conditionally adopted position made with another purpose in mind. And so, in order to rule out112 the mass of conditioning factors [e.g., a generic propertywhich might be imagined to occasion the use of particular terms], someone who accepts that there are external objects merely as a conditionally adopted position on what is ultimately real says that Only the particular that is excluded from others is the object [of language and inference]. Similarly, in order to rule out all external objects, one says that The image that is excluded from what is otherwhich is what a conceptual awareness consists ofis the object. But neither of these [is said] for the purpose of nally settling upon the position that there is objecthood in [either the external object or the image] itselfThus, there is no contradiction. [Objection:] But how is it that even when you say there is objecthood in one or the other, what is intended is not to settle [upon one or the other as the object], but rather, the intention [in ascribing objecthood to either one] is only to reject the other? [Response:] Thus, he [i.e., I, Jn"nar" a s mitra] says, But really, nothing at all is expressed [by words].113 As far as the practically oriented person is concerned, [in language and inference] it is the appearance that is excluded [from what is other], together with determination, that leads us to the belief that a really knowable object
" " " JNA (AP: 230.07230.08) sthitam etad adhyavasayena bahyasya bud" " " " dhyakarasya tu pratibhasena abdavacyatvam ucyate iti. s 110 As Jn"nar" a s mitra argues earlier in both the introductory verse and the summary verse translated above. 111 " See JNA (AP: 203.04). 112 We are emending niraana to nirasana, as below. s 113 " JNA (AP: 203.04).
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is the object of awareness, just as in the case of perception. For a mere appearance, which is either devoid of determination, or whose functional role has been interfered with by a contrary determination, is not capable of establishing for the person desirous of activity that something is an objectlike the touch of grass to one who is moving through it114 [in the rst case], or like the superimposition of water onto the rays of the sun [in a mirage, in the latter case]. Nor is mere determination detached from an appearance [capable of establishing, for the person desirous of activity, that something is an object], again, like the superimposition of water. Therefore, given that the establishment of an object requires suitability for activity, it is vitiated by the absence of a requisite factor if either [appearance or determination] is absent. Since it is necessarily connected with the presence of both, it is merely conventional to accept it [the establishment of an object] when just one is singled out.115
114 " " " " " See Syadvadaratnakara 1.1415, Vol 1, p. 146. [S"tra] kim ity alocanamatram u " " " anadhyavasaya iti ||14|| [Commentary] kim ity alocanamatram : " " " aspastaviistaviesaj~anamatram | kim ity aha | anadhyavasayas trt"yah : : s: : s : n" : i : " " " s: " " samaropabhedo dhyavasayad viesollekhij~anad anya iti krtva | udaharanam aha n" " : : " " [S"tra] yatha gacchattrnasparaj~anam iti ||15|| [Commentary] gacchato vrajatah u s n" : :: " " " satah pramatus trnasparavisayam j~anam trnasparaj~anam anyatrasaktacittatvad s : s n" : : n" : : : :: " s: " " evamjat"yakam evamnamakam idam vastv ity adiviesanullekhi kimapi maya : "i : " : " " spr:stam ity alocanamatram ity arthah | [S"tra] Without determination [which is u : : : " the third variety of superimposition (samaropa), SVR 1.81.9 in SVR: 102)] is the mere sensation something. [Commentary] The mere sensation something is the mere awareness of a specic thing which is not clearly specied. What is this? He says: This is Without determination, the third type of superimposition. After taking it to be dierent from a determination i.e., an awareness which delineates a specic thing, he gives an example: [S"tra] Like the awareness of the touch of grass u for one who is moving through it. [Commentary] For a knower, who is moving, i.e., walking, the awareness of the touch of grass, i.e., the awareness which has the touch of grass as its object,that is to say, the mere sensation that I have touched something, which does not pick out any specic features such as this thing is of this sort and has such a name, because ones attention is directed elsewhereis just sensation [without determination]this is the meaning [of the s"tra]. u 115 " " "s " : ": JNA (AP: 230.08230.24). nanv evam vyacaksanena bhavatobhayartharaer : " " i : " " " " aesasya vacyata sv"krteti katham sarvadharmanabhilapyatasamarthanartham idam s: : " " " " " " avataritam ity aha, sthapyate iti prayojanantaram uddiya vyavasthamatram etat s " " : " " : " " " kriyate, adhyavasayamatrena pratibhasamatrena va vacyatvam iti | tatha ca " " : : : " : : bahirvisay"karanam tattvavyavasthanamatram grhnatah tavad anyapodham : i : : : " " "s " : " " svalaksanam eva visaya ity ucyate upadhirainirasanaparam, evam anyapodhakaro : : : " " : " vikalpasyatma visaya iti samastabahyanirasanaparam, na tu svasmin visayatvasya : : " " viramayeti na virodhah | kutah punar etat? tatra tatra visayatapratipadane pi na s " " : : : " " " viramo vivaksitah, kim tv anyanirasane tatparyam ity aha, vacyas tattvato naiva s " : : : " " " : ": " " : " kacid arthah | iti adhyavasayasahapohipratibhasah samvyavaharikapeksaya tattvato s : " " " j~eyasya j~anavisayatam upanayati pratyaksavat | na hi pratibhasamatram n n" : : " s" " " " " " " : " " " avasayaunyam anyavasayakrantavyaparam va pravrttikamasya visayavyavastham : : " " " " arthe ksamate, gacchattrnasparavat, mar"cav udakaropavat | napy avasayamatram s i " : :: " " " " " : apetapratibhasam udakaropavad eva | tasmat pravrttiyogyataya vyaptam : " " " " " " visayavyavasthanam ubhayabhave* vyapakabhavena paribh"yamanam u : ": : " : : ubhayasambhavapratibaddham ekaviveke sv"kriyamanam samvrtam eva | *We are i : " " " " emending ubhayabhavo to ubhayabhave.
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For Jn"nar" a s mitra, in the case of both perception and inference, objecthood, strictly speaking, requires both appearance and determination. Appearance without determination does not present us with an object upon which we can successfully act. For example, when one is walking through a eld of grass, but is thinking about something else, the tactile sensation of the grass, although it is felt, does not lead to the determination there is grass, on the basis of which one could undertake an action with grass as its object. Likewise, as in the example of the mirage, when one has a sensation that leads to a determination that is not appropriatein the sense that if one were to undertake an action on the basis of it, that action would not produce a result that is consistent with ones expectationsit does not present us with an object upon which we can successfully act. In the same way, determination without an appropriate appearance does not present us with such an object. The example of the mirage illustrates this as well. In such a case, there is the appearance of light-rays reected o hot sand, but it leads to the determination There is water. Because the appearance and the determination do not properly correspond to one another, they cannot present us with an object upon which we can successfully act, as the appearance of light-rays together with the determination There are light-rays, or the appearance of water together with the determination There is water would do.116 Yet, even in these latter two cases, where an ordinary person would assert that either light-rays or water were the objects of their awareness, they are, for Jn"nar" a s mitra, as we will see, still not objects in the strictest sense, although they may be conventionally described as such. Jn"nar" a s mitra now provides a formal inference to support this position:
Whatever does not appear in a certain episode of awareness or is not determined by it is not the object of that awareness, just as a horse [is not the object] of the awareness cow. And a particular does not appear in verbal awareness, and a mental image is not determined by it. Thus, [in each case] a requisite factor is missing. Since a necessary relation has been established [between being both manifest
116 When Jn"nar" a s mitra speaks of the superimposition of water onto the rays of the sun he does not mean to imply that this sort of mistake is due to conceptualizing water when what is really there are rays of the sun. For Jn"nar" a s mitra, there is nothing really there other than a grasped image which is not in the strictest sense an image of anything. The superimposition of water in this case is erroneous only in the sense that if one were to act on the basis of this conceptualization the results would not correspond to ones expectations as they would if one conceptualized the grasped image as rays of the sun.
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in appearance and determined, and being an object of awareness], [this inferential reason] is not inconclusive.117
Since, in order for something to be an object, it must both appear in and be determined by awareness, anything that fails to satisfy either of these two conditions cannot properly be called an object. Thus, a horse, which neither appears in nor is determined by the awareness cow, cannot be its object. And in inferential/verbal awareness, as has already been established, what appears is a mental image, but what is determined is a particular. Because each of these fails to satisfy one of the two conditions stated abovethe mental image is not determined and the particular does not appearneither can, strictly speaking, be an object.
And even if, in the case of completely habitual behavior, things are seen to be objects of activity merely by appearance [and without any accompanying determination], nevertheless, that very habituation could not exist without determination. Thus, this [fact that when we act habitually we do so on the basis of appearance alone] is itself [due to] the power of [previous] determination. Therefore, this qualication [to the criterion given above] is required, whatever is not determined by it when there is no habituation [is not the object of an episode of awareness].118
Even when we act habitually, our action always depends upon both appearance and determination. For example, when we act to deect something that has been thrown at us, we may do so spontaneously on the basis of an appearance alone and without any intervening determination. Yet such behavior is possible, according to Jn"nar" a s mitra, only because of previous determinations. The habit that governs our actions in such cases must be the product of previous conditioning in which we were presented with such appearances and formed appropriate determinations on the basis of them. Thus, there may be instances of purely habitual action in which we respond to an appearance without any intervening determination (and thus the condition for objecthood given above must be qualied), but this habituation itself can only be the product of previous determinations. Thus, it is still the case that nothing can be an object without both appearing and being determined.
117 " " " JNA (AP: 230.24230.27). yatra j~ane yan na pratibhasate yena va yan n" " i " "s : " " navas"yate sa na tasya visayo yatha goj~anasyavah | na pratibhasate ca sabdaj~ane n" n" : " i " " " " " svalaksanam, navas"yate canena buddhyakara iti vyapakanupalabdhih | pratiban: : : " " " " dhasadhanat nanaikantikah |. : 118 " " " " " " :" JNA (AP: 230.27231.02). yady api catyantabhyase pratibhasamatrenapi " " " " " " " pravrttir visayatvam ca dr:stam, tathapi sa evabhyaso navasayad vinety avasayasyaiva : : : : : " i " tat paurusam, tato yena yan navas"yate saty abhyasa iti viesanam apeksyam | Also s: : : : see PVA 218.07.
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At this point, the opponent objects that Jn"nar" a s mitras criterion for objecthood is so restrictive that nothing at all could count as an object of any mode of awareness:
[Objection] But even in perception there is no determination of the grasped moment but rather, of the continuum, and there is no appearance of this [continuum].119 So how can even this [perception] have an object, since there is the absence of the pair [appearance and determination] in the moment and in the continuum. And this very investigation [of exclusion] is about inference [as well as about language]. And there is no other instrument of valid awareness of which there could be any object in virtue of there being both appearance and determination. Thus, your denition [of being an object] is impossible (asambhava). Therefore, [awareness] can be established to have a xed object only if something can be made [an object] by either one or the other [of these two, namely, appearance and determination]. And so everything, whether external or internal, can be expressed.120
Again, the opponent draws attention to the parallelism between perception and inference that is implied by Jn"nr" a s mitras argument. As in linguistic awareness, in perception there is both something that appears to usthe grasped momentand something that we determinethe putatively external object towards which we direct our activity. But there is nothing that both appears and is determined. Therefore, the opponent argues that perception too could have no object as dened by Jn"nar" a s mitra. Since linguistic awareness is just a special case of inferential awareness, inference too, on Jn"nar" a s mitras view, could have no object. And since perception and inference are the only two modes of valid awareness, the opponent argues that on Jn"nar" a s mitras denition nothing at all could be an object of any valid awareness, and hence nothing at all could be known. In order to avoid this problem, the opponent suggests an alternative, namely, that anything that either appears or is determined should be considered to be an object. Thus, from the opponents perspective, it is incorrect for Jn"nar" a s mitra to claim that nothing at all is really expressed: rather, both mental images and putative external objects are objects of both perception and inference.
[Response] About this we say: He [i.e., I, Jn"nar" a s mitra, in the rst part of my summary verse] is stating a conditionally adopted position about the way things " really are [tattvavyavastha]. [In fact] there is objecthood only in virtue of the See Dharmottara NBT: 71, cited above. : " " " : JNA (AP: 231.03231.06). nanu pratyakse pi na grh"taksanasyavasayah, kimtu : : : i : : " ": " " " santateh na casyah pratibhasa iti kenasyapi savisayatvam, ksane santatau cob: : : : : " " " " " ": hayabhavat | anumane tu par"ksaiva vartate | na canyat pramanam asti, yasyobhai: yasambhavena visayah kacid ity asambhavam etat | tad ekaikena vidheyatve s : : : : " " " " sthitavisayakasthitir akhilasya bahyasyantarasya va vacyatvam iti ||. :
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existence of both [appearance and determination]. It is just that the convention, [that there can be objecthood in virtue of either appearance or determination, separately,] is said to be the way things really are, relative to a lower-order convention [adharasamvrti], with a view towards the practically oriented person. : This is because for the practically oriented person things are not destroyed at each moment, since pragmatic activity breaks down when one gets down to the division between moments. Even with perception there is really no possibility of both. Thus, there is no problem.121
Once again, Jn"nar" a s mitra responds by granting that much of what the opponent has to say is correct. He agrees that given his denition, perception, just like language and inference, cannot really have an object. He does not agree, however, that because of this it would be better to adopt a less restrictive criterion for objecthood such that there could really be objects of perception, inference, and language. In order for a denition to be useful, and therefore appropriate, it is not necessary that it dene something that really exists or even something that could really exist. Talk of real objects can be justied, for Jn"nar" a s mitra, even if one takes the position that ultimately there are no such objects. When speaking to an ordinary person who believes that the (momentary) object that appears to him and the (temporally extended) object that he takes to be the object of his subsequent activity are one and the same, it may be useful to say that perception really has two objects, a non-conceptual one (the grasped moment) and a conceptually constructed one (the determined continuum), even if ones ultimate position is that perception does not have any object at all. The two-object model of perception, while still conventional and adopted only conditionally is, nevertheless, for philosophical reasons, an improvement upon the lower-order convention of the ordinary person.
Now if you say, For an ordinary person, there is surely a failure to grasp even the dierence between what is seen and what is conceptualized, such that [for him] the determined re is the very same one that appeared, we say, No. This is because it is due to the recollection of other appearances [of re] that [people] fall into the error that there is the appearance of that [determined re]. And since in perception it is possible to show an appearance of the thing [that is present before one], which is denitely dierent from the conceptual appearance, and likewise that this [conceptual appearance] is dierent from the perceptual appearance, thereforebecause it is only there [, in perception] that one can settle on the appearance of a thingfor [modes of awareness that are] dierent from that " " " JNA (AP: 231.07231.10). atrocyate | tattvavyavastham aha, ubhayasambha: " " : " " venaiva visayatvam, kevalam samvyavaharikapeksaya samvrter evadharasamvrtim : : : ": : : : : " " " " " " apeksya tattvam iti vyavahriyate, ksanabhedavatare samvyavaharavilopat vyavahar: : : : " " " " : ikam prati pratiksanaks"nataya abhavat, tattvatah pratyaksenobhayasambhavabhavah, : : : : i: " " : : : : iti na dosah. : :
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[perceptioni.e., language and inference], it is better to deny that [anythingeither " the grasped or determined object] is the appearance of a thing (vastupratibhasa). Therefore, it was rightly said that [This is] conditionally adopted. But really, nothing at all is expressed [by words].122
The opponent objects that this ordinary person could not even apprehend the distinction between the grasped and determined objects of perception and thus could not be brought to accept even the little bit of truth contained in Jn"nr" a s mitras supposedly higherorder convention. While acknowledging that ordinary people do not usually distinguish between grasped and determined objects of perception, Jn"nar" a s mitra nevertheless argues that it not dicult to show such a person that there is a clear dierence between the visual image of a perceived object, e.g., the re that is present before one, and the conceptual image that appears when one recalls or imagines re.123 Furthermore, one can show that many properties that one takes to belong to the re that one sees, e.g., its capacity to cook food, are not presented in the visual image, but rather are derived from our memory of previous experiences of res. Therefore, it can be clearly demonstrated that the re that we take ourselves to see is actually an amalgam of what is visually present to us and what we conceptually construct on the basis of previous experiences. Thus, in perception one can point to a clear phenomenal distinction between the grasped and determined objects. And because of this clear phenomenal distinction, it is relatively easy to speak of one of these objects as the thing (vastu) that we perceive, in contrast to the conceptually constructed elements of our awareness. In language and inference, however, there is no such clear phenomenal distinction between the grasped and determined objects of our awareness and therefore Jn"nar" a s mitra does not see any point in speaking of either of these objects as being the thing that we infer or refer to. So, while accepting the substance of the opponents claimthat what Jn"nar" a s mitra says about language and inference should, according to his own line of reasoning, also apply to perceptionhe
" " JNA (AP: 231.10231.16), quoting JNA (AP: 203.04). atha prthagjanasya : " drsyavikalpyayor apy abhedagraho niyata evety avasito vahnih pratibhasita eveti cet. : : " " "" " na, pratibhasantarasmaranena tatpratibhasabhramabhramsasya krtatvat | yatha ca : : : "" " " vikalpapratibhasad anya eva vastupratibhaso darayitum adhyakse sakyah, tatha s : : " "" " s " " "i *cadhyaksapratibhasad anyo t"ti tatraiva vastupratibhasaviramat tadvijat"yasya si : " " " : s " " " " vastupratibhasatavyudasah reyan | tasmad yuktam uktam, sthapyo vacyas tattvato naiva kacit | iti | *We are emending na to ca. s 123 See Krasser (1995), and our earlier discussion, for parallels in the work of Dharmottara.
122
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nevertheless provides an account of why it is that Buddhist epistemologists have historically spoken of perception as if it had a real (non-conceptually grasped) object. And since this rationale for speaking of a real object does not apply in the case of language and inference, it is appropriate for Buddhist epistemologists to say that language and inference do not have a real object, without necessarily making a comparable claim for perception. But, despite his defense of the divergent ways in which Buddhist epistemologists talk about perception and language/inference, Jn"nar" a s mitras argumentas the opponent rightly claimsis equally applicable to both. At the end of the day, everything that Jn"nar" a s mitra says about inference and language in the summary verse of the Apohaprakarana is, for him, : also true of perception. The determined object of perception is the putatively external object towards which we direct our action. But what is actually present to our awareness is not an external object, but rather a mental image. Perception, and the actions that we undertake on the basis of it, presuppose an object that is both availablethat is, present to our awarenessand actionable. And since only mental images can be available and only putatively external objects can be actionable, there is really no object of perception just as there is really no object of language and inference.
CONCLUSION
" Jn"nar" a s mitras theory of conditionally adopted positions (vyavastha) is his primary conceptual resource for resolving the tension between the dual objectives of exegetical and philosophical correctness discussed in the Introduction. It allows him to maintain that he is being faithful to the Dharmak" rtian text tradition, and at the same time arrive at philosophical conclusions that have not been presented in any of the foundational works of the tradition, and may even seem to contradict some of its central claims. This theory gives him the exibility to reshape and rethink the accepted conclusions of the Dharmak" rtian tradition in a manner that is consistent with his own, quite innovative, philosophical views. It allows him, in eect, to take the position that Dharmak" was right to say everything that he rti said, but that not everything that he said was right. But in so doing, it also problematizes his relationship to the textual tradition which he ostensibly builds upon in developing his own system. Once the theory
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" of conditionally adopted positions (vyavastha) is on the table, it forces upon the interpreter a new set of questions: In interpreting any particular passage one must determine whether the claims being made represent what the author ultimately believes, or whether they are just positions that are conditionally adopted. And if the latter, one must ask what little bit of truth they contain, and to whom they are addressed, and for what purpose. For Jn"nar" a s mitra, it is not enough to simply understand what a text literally says or to ask if its arguments are correct. One must also ask why particular arguments and claims are made use of in specic contexts, and with what interlocutors in mind. Jn"nar" a s mitras method, then, requires that one approach texts of the Buddhist epistemological tradition not merely as an exegete or as a philosopher, but also as an intellectual historian. By combining these three ways of approaching texts from the Buddhist epistemological tradition, Jn"nar" a s mitra is able to develop a position which is both self-consciously traditionalist and self-consciously innovative. Thus, he is able to formulate a theory of exclusion in terms that are derived from Dharmak" and to justify it rti, with abundant citations from his works, while reaching conclusions that are radically dierent from, and in some ways contradictory to, those of Dharmak" rti. This means that in assessing the extent to which Jn"nar" a s mitras theory of exclusion is derivative from Dharmak" rtis, it is not enough to simply consider his use of Dharmak" rtis terminology or the frequency with which he quotes Dharmak" in support of his own position. Rather, in each case, one rti must try to understand Jn"nar" a s mitras specic motives and objectives in using Dharamk" rtis words as he does. More generally, it is essential that in reading Jn"nar" a s mitra we ask, at every step, not merely what he is saying, but what he is doing. It should be clear, moreover, that such considerations do not only apply to interpreting Jn"nar" a s mitras work but should be extended to the Buddhist epistemological tradition more generally, and to Sanskrit philosophy as a whole. If we are really to understand how and why Sanskrit philosophical texts were written as they were, it is essential that we not limit ourselves to a surface analysis. In interpreting any statement, we must not only attend to what the author is saying but to: why he says it, why he says it in the way that he does, and why at just this point in the text; to what audience the statement is addressed; and what he hopes to achieve in saying it. This approach enables us to engage with the thought and intellectual practice of individual authors as individuals. Even when individual authors position themselves as
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followers of a well dened textual and philosophical tradition, it cannot be assumed that they are simply recapitulating or stating more explicitly what was already implicit in earlier works of the tradition, even when they claim that this is all that they are doing. An overtly traditionalist posture may be, and often is, coupled with substantive and even radical innovation, as we have seen. This has important methodological implications for our eld, particularly for the way in which we think about and use commentaries. We must move away from the approach to commentaries and quasi-commentarial literature that treats them either as exegetically reliable and therefore philosophically uncreative guides to the real meaning of the root text, or as exegetically wrong and therefore of limited interest. Authors such as Dharmottara, Prajn"karagupta, and Jn"nar" a s mitra are, a whatever else they may be, innovative philosophers in their own right and their work must be read and thought of in this light.124
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ABBREVIATIONS
AP BKNCT DhPr HB HBT : HBTA :"
" Apohaprakarana (Jn"nar" a s mitra) in JNA. : Bulletin of Kochi National College of Technology. Dharmottaraprad"pa (Durvekamira) in Malvania (1971). i s Hetubindu (Dharmak" rti) in Steinkellner (1967). Hetubindut"ka (Arcata) in Sanghavi and Jinavijayji :i " : (1949). Hetubindut"kaloka (Durvekamira) in Sanghavi s :i " (and Jinavijayji) (1949).
365
" IPPV
"svarapratyabhijn"vivrtivimarini (Abhinavagupta) in s I a : Shastri (19381943). " ~" s i " JNA Jnanar"mitranibandhavali (Jn"nar" a s mitra) in Thakur (1987). " ": LPrP Laghupramanyapar"ksa (Dharmottara) in Krasser (1991). i : " N1 Apohasiddhi (Ratnak" rti), Manuscript # 5256 from the National Archives of Nepal. N2 Apohasiddhi (Ratnak" rti), Manuscript # 3696 from the National Archives of Nepal. N3 Apohasiddhi (Ratnak" rti), Manuscript # 764d (running number) from the National Archives of Nepal. " NBT Nyayabindut"ka (Dharmottara) in DhPr. : :i " " NBTT Nyayabindut"katippana in Shastri (1984). :i ": : :: " NBT (Vi) Nyayabindut"ka (Vin" tadeva) in Shastri (1984). : :i " " NBh" u Nyayabh":sana (Bh"sarvajna) in Yogindrananda (1968). u : a " " a NKan Nyayakanika (V"caspatimira) in Stern (1988). s : : a NKan (1907) Ny"yakanik", in S"str" (1907). a a : : " u NS" u Nyayas"tra (Gautama) in Thakur (1997). " " " s NVTT Nyayavarttikatatparyat"ka (V"caspatimira) in Thakur :i " a : (1996). ": " PV 1 Pramanavarttika, Sv"rth"num"na (Dharmak" a a a rti) in Gnoli (1960). ": " PV 2 Pramanavarttika, Pr"m"nasiddhi (Dharmak" a a: rti) in Miyaksaka (1971/2). ": " PV 3 Pramanavarttika, Pratyaksa (Dharmak" rti) in : Miyasaka (1971/2), Tosaki (1995). ": " PV 4 Pramanavarttika, Par"rth"num"na (Dharmak" a a a rti) in Miyasaka (1971/2), Tillemans (2004). " _ " ": " PVA Pramanavarttikalankara (Prajn"karagupta) in a S"mkrty"yana (1953). a: a ": PVin 1 Pramanavinicaya 1 (Dharmak" s rti) in Vetter (1966). ": PVin 2 Pramanavinicaya 2 (Dharmak" s rti) in Steinkellner (1973). ": PVinT Pramanavinicayat"ka (Dharmottara) in Steinkellner s i " : : and Krasser (1989). ": " PVV Pramanavarttikavrtti (Manorathanandin) in : S"mkrty"yana (19381940). a: a ": " rti) in Gnoli (1960). PVSV Pramanavarttikasvavrtti (Dharmak" : " " " SSS Sakarasiddhiastra (Jn"nar" s" a s mitra) in JNA. " " " SVR Syadvadaratnakara (V"didevas"ri) in Motilal a u (19261930).
366 VC WSTB WZKS WZKSO
" " " a s mitra) in JNA. Vyapticarca (Jn"nar" Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde. Wiener Zeitschrift fu die Kunde Sudasiens. r Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde Sud- und Ostasiens.
FAS Department of Sanskrit Harvard University Room # 313, 1 Bow Street Cambridge, MA 02138 USA E-mail: ljmccrea@fas.harvard.edu

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Journal of Indian Philosophy (2006) 34: 303366 DOI 10.

LAWRENCE J. MCCREA AND PARIMAL G. PATIL

LAWRENCE J. MCCREA AND PARIMAL G. PATIL

TRADITIONALISM AND INNOVATION

LAWRENCE J. MCCREA AND PARIMAL G. PATIL

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LAWRENCE J. MCCREA AND PARIMAL G. PATIL

TRADITIONALISM AND INNOVATION

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LAWRENCE J. MCCREA AND PARIMAL G. PATIL

TRADITIONALISM AND INNOVATION

LAWRENCE J. MCCREA AND PARIMAL G. PATIL

TRADITIONALISM AND INNOVATION

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Katsura (1993: 73 n. 14).

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DHARMOTTARA ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PERCEPTION AND INFERENCE

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And again, with reference to the universal, re, he says:

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LAWRENCE J. MCCREA AND PARIMAL G. PATIL

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LAWRENCE J. MCCREA AND PARIMAL G. PATIL

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LAWRENCE J. MCCREA AND PARIMAL G. PATIL

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LAWRENCE J. MCCREA AND PARIMAL G. PATIL

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LAWRENCE J. MCCREA AND PARIMAL G. PATIL

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LAWRENCE J. MCCREA AND PARIMAL G. PATIL

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LAWRENCE J. MCCREA AND PARIMAL G. PATIL

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LAWRENCE J. MCCREA AND PARIMAL G. PATIL

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LAWRENCE J. MCCREA AND PARIMAL G. PATIL

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LAWRENCE J. MCCREA AND PARIMAL G. PATIL

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LAWRENCE J. MCCREA AND PARIMAL G. PATIL

To better explain this, Dharmak" oers the following analogy: rti