A Puzzle with Many Pieces Missing A Proposal for a National and International Security Information Project

Digital Proofer

A Puzzle with Many P...

Authored by Steve McCrea 8.5" x 11.0" (21.59 x 27.94 cm) Black & White on White paper 42 pages ISBN-13: 9781479273249 ISBN-10: 1479273244
Please carefully review your Digital Proof download for formatting, grammar, and design issues that may need to be corrected. We recommend that you review your book three times, with each time focusing on a different aspect.

1 2 3

Check the format, including headers, footers, page numbers, spacing, table of contents, and index. Review any images or graphics and captions if applicable. Read the book for grammatical errors and typos.

Once you are satisfied with your review, you can approve your proof and move forward to the next step in the publishing process. To print this proof we recommend that you scale the PDF to fit the size of your printer paper.

A non-partisan project funded by supporters of BuildingInternationalBridges.org

Introduction
The mission of Building International Bridges is to remove obstacles that block communication between cultures. BIB has encouraged the development of resources to aid discussions, including the Space Education Fund. The fund provides grants to commentators and programs that assist schools and non-profit organizations in presenting information to teenagers and the general public about the development of space. With the reduction of support of NASA, the USA finds itself in need of new private-sector initiatives to meet future challenges. Today's students will be tomorrow's taxpayers: will today's teenagers have accurate information to make choices and to defend those choices to people who live in other countries? Unsettling information from a 2010 poll conducted by the Pew Research Foundation. Special topics include the link between satellite transmissions and child abuse; anticipated transfer of not-yet-invented space-based technology that could benefit terrestrial concerns (parallels found in the Renaissance where military technology benefited the arts). A new direction: Security One of our advisors, Taylor Dinerman, has proposed a non-partisan look at the complex area of security, both nationally and internationally. Most experts focus in areas. Taylor looks at space economics and the space programs of various countries. He reads space journals and keeps up with the industry's news. It's an expensive choice of work. A year's subscription to a leading trade journal for space industry costs $200. But Taylor goes farther. Since funding for space projects is usually low on the list of priorities for most countries, space economics is affected by so many forces. Taylor has developed the ability to detect the impact of an incident in Kazakhstan and see how a car bombing of a government official can affect funding for a research satellite.

Copyright 2012 by Building International Bridges, Inc., a 501-c-3 educational charity. Commentaries are copyrighted by Taylor Dinerman. The format of this document is copyrighted by Building International Bridges with the aim of sharing information freely with concerned people. ISBN-13: 978-1479273249 ISBN-10: 1479273244 Graphics that appear in this document are intended to inform the reader of the type of information that needs to be synthesized. The use of these images is covered by the educational intent of the Fair Use doctrine, part of the Copyright Laws of the USA.

Supporters of the NISI project will provide Taylor and his colleagues with resources to create a website that makes the links between disparate issues and incidents. Things that don't concern you (but might in the future) are the focus of this project. It's up to us Somebody paid for Leonardo's paint brush, canvas and paints. Somebody gave the artist-scientist-researcher from da Vinci enough money for food. The NISI project is an opportunity for you to be a patron of the art of investigative speculative and futurist research. Your support can let taylor do what he does best: read, write, ponder, make a telephone call, ask questions that you and I would not know how to ask, and then report it back to us. This collection of articles, selected by Taylor, is just the first part: Support for NISI will let him make links between these issues and hire an artist to depict those links graphically so that the media, in its obsession with 10-second sound bites, can report on the surface details of the complex future that researchers like Taylor live in. The articles appear in no particular order because the mosaic is like a Jackson Pollack painting: It's hard to know where the painter started the mess or how it can be unravelled to be understood. It's not easy doing big picture analysis How to think like Taylor (well, it's more complex, but you'll see what difficulties there are): - Start by scanning one of the topics and then - Move to another article. - See if you can find a link between the two issues

- Perhaps a third article will show a common precedent for the first two articles. Oh, look, here's a fourth article that ties two of the issues together but raises a fourth and fifth issue. So the challenge of the NISI project is to show the pattern, describe many of the pieces and point out what pieces are missing. You can contact Taylor through Building International Bridges at BuildingInternationalBridges@gmail.com. NOTE: These articles that form the bulk of this document are the work of Taylor Dinerman and he holds the copyright. Please distribute this ebook, PDF, email, etc. in whatever manner you decide that respects the ownership of these words. If you can suggest an artist or illustrator who can build a graphic representation of these connections, the NISI project will aim to support the generation of graphics that reduce misunderstanding.

This collage might help to show what Taylor Dinerman juggles in an hour...

A proposal for a Public Education Campaign The project will include setting up a website which will include several essays on US National Security in 2012 and on how the US situation interacts with the global international security environment. The web site will include several easy-to-read charts and illustrations covering cuts to the defense budget, the so-called pivot to Asia, the Middle East military balance and the dramatic collapse of European military power and its impact of global security. Given sufficient funding, we will also produce a series of short, simple internet videos covering the main elements of the problem. This Public Education campaign should begin as soon as possible. Its scope and effectiveness will depend largely on how much funding is available.

Obama Asks Russia for "Space"

by Taylor Dinerman April 10, 2012 at 3:30 am For the men in the Kremlin, nuclear weapons are the last shred of superpower status they have left, and anything that even slightly reduces the threat of their missile force is a menace to be fought with every tool available. The Undersecretary of State for Arms Control recently offered to provide Russia with classified data on US missile defenses to show America's good faith. The very fact that this offer was proposed shows the public where the senior administration officials' hearts are. At an international summit on nuclear security held in Seoul South Korea, President Obama told Russia's outgoing President Medvedev that on Missile Defense he needed "space" until after the election. What he said was, "On all these issues, but particularly on missile defense, this, this can be solved but it's important for him (Vladimir Putin) to give me space." Obama added that, "After my election I'll have more flexibility." He did not realize that the microphone was on, and in spite of the efforts of his supporters, the resulting political firestorm is not going to die down any time soon. In the area of strategic policy, defense budgets and actual hardware, the Obama administration's record of supporting effective defense against ballistic missiles for America and for America's allies, is dismal. The President's appointees have dramatically reduced the budget for National Missile Defense and have decided to cut back on essential sensors such as the large sea-based X Band Radar, which is used to track incoming enemy missiles. The administration has also made major cuts in the number of interceptor missiles that are protecting the US homeland. One of the first substantive military decisions made by this administration in 2009 was to cancel the planned deployment of ten modified GroundBased Interceptor (GBI) ballistic missile defense missiles in Poland, and also the accompanying radar system system that was to be built in the Czech Republic. The GBIs that were to be based in Central Europe were adapted versions of the ones devoted to America's National Missile Defense system now deployed in Alaska and California.

The George W. Bush administration said that this deployment was aimed at preventing new long-range Iranian missiles from hitting targets in Europe and the US. This plan was determined by a US Intelligence estimate; it was still valid as of June 2011 that Iran would be capable of deploying an ICBM in 2015. Iran' s recent launch of a small satellite into orbit would tend to confirm that estimate. The technology needed to put a satellite into orbit and the technology needed to build an ICBM, are basically identical. Russia had been trying for years to bully these Central European nations into refusing to install the American missile defense system, claiming that it was a threat to Moscow. The pressure the Kremlin brought to bear against Poland and the Czech republic was intense, and was supported by the same political elements in western Europe who had tried unsuccessfully to stop President Reagan and his allies from installing NATO's Cruise and Pershing missiles in the early 1980s. The political leaders in central Europe stood up to the bullies in Moscow and agreed to the American plan. The political impact of the Obama administrations' 2009 decision to cancel the Central European GBI deployment was devastating. Czech and Polish leaders who had courageously supported the American plan found themselves publicly abandoned and humiliated by Washington. Old memories of the way the West failed to save them from Stalin's empire in 1945 were revived. While the administration never acknowledged openly that it had blundered, it tried to repair some of the damage. The US promised to deploy something it called the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) centered around the Navy's SM-3 missile, guided by the Aegis radar and based on ships at sea. This capability against medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles had been successfully tested on countless occasions and has been purchased by Japan as part of their defense against North Korean and Chinese ballistic missiles. The first phase of the PAA uses ships with the SM-3 1A missile, cruising in European waters. In 2015 the plan is to deploy ships and a single site with an Aegis ashore system using the SM-3 1B missile. The one ground-based site is planned to be located in Romania. By 2020 the PAA plan, if carried out in its entirety, will deploy improved versions of the SM-3 which will, it is hoped, be able to hit Iran's ICBMs on their way from Persia to the continental US. By deploying these missiles on destroyers and cruisers in European waters in 2011, the Obama administration claimed that it could protect Europe, but

not the US, from Iranian missiles at a low cost and without upsetting the Russians. Medvedev and Putin choose to be upset nevertheless, and are still publicly unhappy with any sort of US missile defense program in Europe or even on US soil. Russia is not going to give up or change its opposition to any sort of US missile defense. For the men in the Kremlin, nuclear weapons are the last shred of superpower status they have left and anything that even slightly reduces the threatening nature of their missile force is a menace to Russia's military power and therefore is something to be fought against with every tool available. President Obama has repeatedly proclaimed his belief in Arms Control as something the desirability of which is beyond doubt. Ellen Tauscher, this administration's Undersecretary of State for Arms Control, recently offered to provide Russia with classified data on US missile defenses to show America's good faith. She backed off this offer in the face of considerable criticism from Capitol Hill, but the very fact that this offer was proposed shows the public where the senior administration officials hearts are. For the Obama administration, asking for "space" on subject of missile defense and by implication the PAA, indicates that the ships that are now deployed as part of the current missile defense plan could be with drawn from European waters and the rest of the program could be cancelled or delayed. This would be easier and less visibly humiliating than withdrawing a missile system that had been deployed on land. So, will a newly reelected Obama administration repeat itself and cancel its planned missile defense program to please the Russians? To judge by the President's own words in Seoul, that is a very real possibility.

China's Middle East Calculations and Miscalculations

by Taylor Dinerman February 28, 2012 at 3:45 am

Perhaps China's position is shakier than it appears. China's most dramatic 21st century Middle Eastern political move so far was its decision on February 4, 2012, to join Russia in vetoing an exceptionally mild and toothless UN Security Council resolution condemning Syria's Assad regime for its ongoing repression of the Syrian people. It was an action made China look like a weak follower of Putin's Russia. The veto aroused the hostility of a growing alliance of traditional Arab regimes, led by Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and the Islamist regimes that emerged from the so-called "Arab spring" revolutions of 2011, and confirmed the Western image of the Beijing government as a friend and supporter of some of the worst regimes on the planet. It is inevitable that a rising world power such as China will find itself embroiled in the Middle East: not only does China need access to Persian Gulf oil, but due to its commercial and geopolitical stature, China should pay attention to the world's most volatile region. While the chances of a major war beginning in the Middle East are possibly not as high as they were during the Cold War with the former Soviet Union -- when it often seemed that a single incident between the US Navy and the Soviet Navy in the Straight of Hormuz or the Red Sea might ignite a global nuclear war -the area cannot exactly be described as peaceful. The Middle East as the heartland of Islam is China's far west -- Xinjiang province, sometimes known as East Turkistan, is home to the large Muslim Uigur population which includes an extremely disgruntled minority. Political and ethnic violence has been slowly increasing. China's drive for regional influence in Central Asia is mostly motivated by Beijing's perceived need to insure that none these states provides support or tolerates a base for Uigur insurgents. Last November in "American Foreign Policy Interests" magazine, Stephen Blank wrote, "Therefore many, if not most, analysts observe that suppressing the threat of Islamic unrest, whether it manifests itself as terrorism (as Beijing see it), agitation for reforms in the heavily Muslim border province of Xinjiang, expressions of religious or ethno-national protest (which though different seem to be the same thing to Chinese

http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/3000/obama-russia-space

analysts) is the foundation of China's external policies towards Central Asia." In spite of China's successful efforts in building powerful political and economic networks in Central Asia, this may not be enough to tamp down the ongoing unrest in Xinjiang. China's problems with the Uigurs are not dissimilar to Russia's problems with the Chechen's and with other Muslim ethnicities in the Caucasus region. The Chechens can draw on a worldwide network of Islamist supporters mostly based near the Persian Gulf, who provide cash and volunteers to keep the Jihad alive. China, like Russia, has a strong interest in pushing nations such as Saudi Arabia to stop their citizens from providing aid to these Muslim insurgencies. As long as China is seen as supporting Iran and Syria, whom the Saudis see as a threat to their Kingdom, however, the Saudis, and the rest of the informal anti-Iranian coalition, have no motivation to pressure their own citizens on China's behalf. China sees the pressure for regime change in the Middle East (or anywhere else) as a long-term threat to the supremacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The leadership in Beijing also sees the tribal fracturing of places such as Libya, Yemen and Syria as setting a bad example for Uigurs, Tibetans and other ethnic minorities. Compared to the failed and failing nation states of the Middle East, China has integrated its minorities into its national life in a far better, though still unsatisfactory, fashion. Imperial China had centuries of experience in absorbing and pacifying the powerful tribal coalitions that roamed Central Asia. Sometimes these tribal coalitions, like the Mongols and the Manchus, were able to take control of the empire, but in the end they were always transformed and tamed by China. Does the Beijing leader's current nervousness about instability in the Middle East indicate a lack of confidence in China's traditional ability to cope with its ethnic and religious minorities? Chinese civilization has long had a power to attract and fascinate foreigners. This aspect of China's "Soft Power" should not be underestimated, but if, by their behavior, Beijing's leaders show that they doubt their nation's ability to exercise this power, then perhaps China's position is shakier than it appears. It will be difficult for China's diplomats to reconcile their desire for good relations with the Arab Gulf states, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the Emirates and the rest, with the policy of providing support for Syria and Iran. Whatever

the political strategy, China will inevitably choose to engage with the Middle East independently of the West. From Washington's point of view this is neither a positive nor a negative development, it is merely a fact of life. China's diplomatic dance in the Middle East may be delicate, but not impossible. After all, US diplomats have managed to force both the Israelis and the Arabs to accept that America has interests and obligations on both sides of that conflict. China's leaders may be able to force Syria and Iran, as well as Saudi Arabia and its friends, to live with its policy of 'friendship' with all sides. As Americans know all too well, however,reconciling contradictory national interests is not easy, especially in the Middle East.

http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/2882/china-middle-east

America's Suicidal Space Diplomacy

by Taylor Dinerman January 12, 2012 at 4:50 am It looks as if Obama appointees may be attempting to make an end run around the US Senate's constitutional duty to ratify treaties and to impose a arms control treaty on the US military in the guise of a "space code of conduct. " Given the choice between arms control agreements and US military superiority, some political appointees at the Defense and State departments may decide to go go for an agreement. Can this administration, then, be trusted to protect America's military space systems in an era when space is where the next great war will in all likelihood be fought? America, more than any other nation, depends on satellites. Our military depends on the Global Positioning Systems [GPS], where troops and materiel are and where they are going. It needs satellites for communication, and satellites of various kinds to see what is happening on the surface of the Earth. The civilian economy depends on communications satellites, on GPS and on remote sensors for almost everything: electronic funds transfers, weather forecasting, pollution monitoring and most importantly to keep hundreds of millions of Americans connected with each other wherever they are. The European Union has proposed a space code of conduct, officially called, "The Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities." Although It is an agreement that the EU claims will solve the space debris problem [footnote 1.] A large proportion of this debris is the result of the Chinese Anti-Satellite [ASAT] weapons test of February 2007, when a Chinese space weapon hit an old Chinese weather satellite and blew it to pieces. ]footnote 2.] The debris from this test has been falling out of orbit since then, but, as with all forms of space debris, it is a slow process, and if a piece were to hit a satellite or another piece of debris, more "space junk" would be created. The proposed EU Code of Conduct would add little or nothing to ongoing international efforts to handle the space debris problem. It would, however, have the effect of banning all "space weapons" or at least ones that create debris or space weapons whose use will result in an out of control

spacecraft that is the functional equivalent of a piece of debris. It is reasonable to suspect that some of the the governments and NGOs which are promoting the code of conduct, are exaggerating the danger in order to achieve other, non-military, solutions that they prefer. What this Code would in fact ban is what the Europeans, the Russian and the Chinese see as American " space weapons." The Code is designed to prevent the United States and other liberal democracies from deploying systems actively to defend their own satellites, while it would allow Russia, China and just about anyone else to continue their space weapons programs, probably with only minimal cosmetic changes. The proposed Code is a prime example of the way some nations and NGOs are using the tools of what is loosely called "lawfare" to undermine US national security. By providing a way to stop America from actively protecting its military and civilian satellites, and by surreptitiously opening the door for other nations to build space weapons aimed at US space targets, supporters of the Code are jeopardizing America's military superiority. Some of the promoters of the Code may be motivated by the best intentions, but history sadly shows that good intentions, even when wrapped in the concept of international law, are no substitute for military force. There is an inherent contradiction in the assertion that states have a right of self defense but that they also have the right to safe and interferencefree, space operations: How can a state have the right to self defense in space if it cannot interfere with enemy space activities? Jamming transmissions from a communications satellite in self defense could, in some potential interpretations of the Code, be a violation, as would the jamming of satellite navigation signals such as those transmitted by America's GPS satellites.

Iran has been jamming satellite signals -- without any negative repercussions -- in defiance of international agreements. The Code of Conduct would, in fact, encourage minor attacks, such as jamming American and allied satellites. States that conducted such attacks will safely assume that the US would be reluctant to retaliate, especially as the ability to prove who committed the attacks would be of a highly technical nature. The part of the Code that allows for self-defense could easily be interpreted as forbidding any retaliation. If the US did retaliate, it could be accused of "violating international law." It is also possible that a rogue nation could launch an attack on a US satellite and then deny that it did so. Nations have also been known to sign arms control agreements with the deliberate goal of using them as camouflage while they built exactly the weapons they supposedly agreed not to build. North Korea's nuclear weapons are a monument to the success of this tactic. As a result of the Chinese 2007 anti-satellite weapons test for example, we know just how easy it is to develop a space weapons program, either under the guise of a civilian research project or as a secret military venture. Experience shows that any state can mislead international inspectors. Some international inspectors can be bribed to look the other way, and will even modify or falsify their reports based on their ideological affinities. Former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mohamed ElBaradei, is suspected of softening his reports on the Iranian nuclear program possibly due to his hostility to Israel. An example of this weakness was also on display in 2004 when the IAEA claimed that Iran was in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but refused to recommend sanctions against it. Even in the United States, the summary of the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate Report, which stated that Iran had stopped producing nuclear weapons several years earlier, has recently been shown to have been deliberately inaccurate, thanks to the wishes of its authors who apparently wanted to advance their wishes for a non-military, diplomatic, agenda rather than objectively to report the facts. Lawyers at the State and Defense Departments, and representatives of pro-arms-control NGOs, would advocate shutting down any US space activities that might be seen as contradicting the Code. Even if the US had refused to sign on the grounds that the programs violate the norms of international customary law, these organizations would attempt to abolish suspect military space programs.

Rogue nations would then feel free to interfere with American or Western space systems by filing lawsuits against any US space programs that some NGO deemed might violate the Code. Lawyers at the State and Defense Departments, and representatives of pro-arms-control NGOs would advocate shutting down any US space activities that might be seen as contradicting the code. They would attempt to abolish suspect military space programs, even if the US had refused to sign on the grounds that the programs violate the norms of customary international law . It is easy to imagine that rogue nations would be free to interfere with American or western space systems by filing lawsuits against any US space programs that some NGO deemed might violate the code. Soft power, such as lawsuits, diplomacy and threats of being hauled up before unaccountable international courts, has become a means preventing nations from defending themselves. The Stimson Center, in its pamphlet, "Space Security, " which supports the European Code of Conduct, asks, "But won't bad actors break the rules ?" -- and then answers its own question: "Laws are broken," it states. "That doesn't make the laws irrelevant, or unimportant. Rules still matter. Agreed rules also make it easier to identify and build coalitions against rule breakers." On a totally theoretical level this might be true, but unfortunately experience has shown that international law and coalitions based on it are never effective in constraining the behavior of truly powerful states that flaunt International Law, and are certainly never used against states that combine real military power with an aggressive foreign policy. Experience also shows that International Law only constrains those who voluntarily abide by it. This is partly due to a lack of enforcement mechanisms -- as is evident not only in space law, but in humanitarian law as well. There is no controlling body that is empowered to enforce the law and punish those who break it; therefore such treaties and agreements only constrain those nations who choose to conform to them. Accordingly, any such treaty or agreement that constrains US military power should be viewed with caution. According to one of the most passionate promoters of the Code of Conduct, Michael Krepon of the Stimson Center, the rights under the Code of spacefaring states include, "The right of access to space for exploration and other peaceful purposes, the right of safe and interference free space operations, including military support functions. The right of self defense as enumerated in the charter of the United Nations, The right to be informed

on matter pertaining to this Code of Conduct, the Right of Consultation on matters of concern and the proper implementation of this Code of Conduct." In the September12, 2011 issue of "Space News," however, Michael Krepon makes the point that "Space diplomacy offers the Obama administration, a welcome reprieve from trench warfare, since executive agreements like the space Code of Conduct are not treaties, do not require the approval of two-thirds of the Senate and are a clear presidential prerogative." As the Code may have effects on the US military that are indistinguishable from an arms control treaty, this assertion should be carefully examined -- certainly by members of the US Senate, whose constitutional rights may be undermined if the President does agree to sign an agreement implementing the code. If the US were to abide fully by a restrictive interpretation of the Code of Conduct, the use of anti-satellite weapons by China against US satellites would give it a major advantage that might last for weeks or months -enough time comfortably to invade and occupy Taiwan and to change the balance of military power in the Far East. The US would have to decide if it wanted to fight a major war to restore its military superiority and to liberate Taiwan, or to accept defeat. The use of Earth-based lasers to degrade the performance of spacecraft optics, which the US claims the Chinese have done against America's spy satellites on several occasions, would supposedly be a violation of the Code. Yet the US has done nothing in retaliation for this except to complain through diplomatic channels. It is hard to see how the Code would make much of a difference. It is difficult to imagine the EU or Japan imposing meaningful sanctions on China in response to a Chinese laser attack on a US soy satellite. On Capitol Hill, Senator William Sessions (R Ala) expressed his reluctance to sign on to such a Code, telling Gregory Schulte of the Defense Department, who was testifying in favor of the Code, that he thought, "Our military is fundamentally configured so it depends on space capabilities. So I would be a bit nervous -- and am a bit nervous --- and want to examine carefully whether or not through some agreement we have constricted our ability to to effectively defend out interests." Schulte dodged the question by bringing up the Chinese-Russian proposed ban on space weapons. Sessions pointed out that, like the Bush administration, the Obama administration finds that the proposed Chinese-Russian ban on space weapons is not verifiable, and "It does not capture many of the Chinese

counterspace systems that worry us." A counterspace system is a polite way of referring to ASATs, or Chinese anti-satellite weapons. Schute claimed, however, that the Code of Conduct will not constrain any US development of kinetic anti satellite weapons or space-based ballistic missile interceptors. One is entitled to be skeptical of his claims: the administration is full of people who have long and very public records of opposing any kind of US national missile defense system. Former Congresswoman Ellen Tauscher, now the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control was a ferocious opponent of the plan to station a small force of ten interceptor missiles in Poland. Accepting constraints on US military capabilities in space is also implied in the administration's "National Security Space Strategy," published in January 2011. The document says, "We believe that it is in the interests of all space-faring nations to avoid hostilities in space. In spite of this some actors may still believe counterspace actions could provide military advantage." The Space Strategy document claims that "We will improve the ability of the US military and intelligence agencies to operate in a denied or degraded space environment through focused education, training and exercises and through new doctrine, tactics techniques and procedures." This leaves out the option of forcibly protecting US satellites with active defensive systems Another part of the policy states that, " With our allies, we will explore the development of combined space doctrine with principals, goals and objectives, that, in particular endorse and enable the collaborative sharing of space capabilities in crisis and conflict." The Space Strategy is deeply ambiguous when it states that, "We will use force in a manner that is consistent with longstanding principals of international law, treaties to which the United States is a party and the inherent right of self defense." Unfortunately the relevant principals of international law are in dispute, as is the interpretation of the ban on weapons of mass destruction clause of the Outer Space Treaty. Problematically, nowhere does the US Space Strategy statement make it clear that the US reserves the right forcibly to react to an attack on a US spacecraft. Instead, the policy will be to restore capabilities or to "fight through" the loss of one or more critical space assets. This means that the US military will have to accept the loss of one or more of its satellites and

continue to function. The statement does not anywhere assert that America will inevitably and powerfully retaliate if attacked in space. Some see this language as nothing more than what the late Congresswoman Clare Booth Luce called "Globaloney" -- the kind feelgood rhetoric that disguises attacks on America's national interests in the name of an imagined global "good". Others see this kind of language as opening the door to the cancellation of major US military space programs, such as the next generation of GPS satellites or new military communications satellites, in the name of both cost-savings and international cooperation. After all, if the Europeans are building their own satellite navigation system, or if we can buy communications services from commercial sources, why buy expensive US systems? Of course this would give the foreign states which control these systems veto power over US operations if they felt that US actions somehow were in violation of their interpretation of the code of conduct. The Code's promoters envisage that it will, at some point become a part of customary international law. If the EU were to embody the Code of Conduct in an EU regulation, member states would be obligated to make it part of their national law, thus arguably fulfilling the requirements of customary international law. In practice this would dangerously tie America's hands. According to the textbook "Public International Law" by Thomas Buergenthal and Harold Maier, however, " A practice does not become a rule of customary international law merely because it is widely followed. It must, in addition, be deemed by states to be obligatory as a matter of law." *** Footnote 1. There are currently about 20.000 pieces of debris cluttering up Earth's orbit and which could possibly inflict serious damage to satellites or to the International Space Station. Space debris threatens to demolish expensive satellites as when a supposedly out-of-control piece of Russian space junk ran into an American owned communications satellite over Siberia in 2009. Space debris is without doubt a problem, but just how big a danger it represents is a legitimate matter for debate. footnote 2. Technically this Chinese space weapon is an example of what is known as a "Direct Ascent" ASAT. That is to say that it was launched

directly at its target, rather than having been launched into orbit and only making its attack after it reached orbit; but any nation with the capability of launching a satellite into orbit also has the theoretical capability of building a Direct Ascent ASAT. Other types of "space weapons" include the socalled "co-orbital ASAT," which is launched into orbit and then approaches and attacks its target while both the weapon and the target orbit together around the Earth. This type of weapon can be developed, based on any satellite that can maneuver in orbit.

http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/2751/america-suicidal-space-diplomacy

Light Squared's GPS Request Jeopardizes National Security

by Taylor Dinerman September 29, 2011 at 4:30 am It appears that members of the current administration have put the reliability and safety of the GPS signal at risk to support an ambitious commercial communications project largely owned by one of the President's major campaign contributors. The LightSquared proposal for a $7- $8 billion mobile broadband system is, according to the Coalition to save GPS who are quoted in the June 20 2011 edition of Space News saying that "all testing done so far shows that LightSquared cannot operate as planned without devastating GPS." The American government's Federal Communications Commission (FCC), which controls frequency use in the US, has, it seems, come under pressure from the White House to approve LightSquared's application to use frequencies that may interfere with the GPS signal. If the Administration tried to tamper with the testimony of US Air Force Space Command's commander General Shelton to facilitate the LightSquared project, it would show an unimaginable level of recklessness. Over the last thirty years the US has spent more than $100 billion building and operating the GPS system. To put this investment at risk -- especially to please a campaign contributor -- will have lasting effects on both US national security and America's international position. Since it came into use in 1990, the US Air Force's GPS system has excited admiration and envy throughout the world. Former President Chirac of France complained that it was making the Europeans into "Technological vassals of the Americans." Keeping the system healthy and safe has been a major policy priority of the George H. W. Bush, Clinton and George W, Bush administrations. The Obama administration's own National Space Policy, published in June 2010, says that "The United States must maintain its leadership in the service, provision and the use of global navigation satellite systems [GPSs]. Although it is not often mentioned, the GPS is also an essential part of out nuclear deterrent. The guidance system on missiles, bombers and

submarines all use the GPS, as well as its backup systems, to maintain the capacity for precision targeting of US nuclear warheads. It is no wonder that the opponents of global civilization, and of America in particular, have sought ways to jam, or knock out the system. The North Koreans recently launched a major jamming attack on the GPS signal that interfered with the system's operation to the extent that a US intelligence-gathering aircraft was forced to land with its mission uncompleted. In 1991, US Air Force officers were happy to explain that Saddam's attempt to transmit a jamming signal against the GP S system failed. The USAF simply destroyed the transmitter using a GPS guided bomb. In 2004 the US government forced the European Union to agree to change its plans to transmit a radio frequency signal that would have endangered the smooth operation of one of the GPS signals from its Galileo satellite navigation system. The uneven history of the development of the Galileo system, and the failure of the Europeans to find a workable "commercial" model for its development, is a sign of just how expensive and difficult it is to make a system like GPS work reliably and safely. The frequencies used to transmit the GPS signals are assigned to the US government by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) based in Geneva, Switzerland. The main frequencies, and others nearby on the electromagnetic spectrum whose use can interfere with the GPS signal, are highly coveted by America's rivals, such as the European Union and China. Keeping US control of these frequencies is a constant political struggle. America's diplomats have so far been successful, thanks in large part to the internationally recognized reliability and utility of the GPS system. As this scandal unfolds, the ITU and those who seek to break America's hold on the GPS signal frequencies will be watching carefully. If they see that the White House was prepared to endanger the integrity and reliability of the GPS signal to satisfy a campaign contributor, the effects could be disastrous. The next time a nation or group of nations try and convince the ITU to allow them to transmit signals that may harm the effectiveness of the GPS signal, the international bureaucrats in Geneva may decide to go along with the request. After all, they might reason, if the US President doesn't care to protect the safety and integrity of the GPS signals, why should they?

The GPS system consists of a constellation of 31 satellites and two ground control stations,with the main one in Colorado and a back-up one in Maryland. Each satellite contains a highly accurate atomic clock and a set of transmitters. The satellites send a set of signals down to Earth where receivers measure the difference in the timing of the reception of each signal, known as the "Time Offset." As the Air Force "Space Primer says, " Based on the time offset, the distance between the satellite and the receiver can be determined. This process is followed for at least four satellites. The cumulative information is entered into the position equations and calculated." The receiver then shows where the receiver is on Earth, helps one to navigate and also gives us access to an amazingly accurate time measuring device. The GPS has made possible, for example, an agricultural revolution called "Precision Farming," whereby farmers, by combining their knowledge of their fields' geology and the GPS signal, have been able to reduce radically the amounts of fertilizer, pesticides and herbicides they need to grow their crops. Other uses include banking, and of course the GPS receivers that the public uses for everything from hiking to getting to the grocery store. America's GPS has gone from being considered an expensive military luxury in the 1980s, to being a war-winning technology in the 1991 Gulf War, and now to being an essential part of 21st century civilized life If someone inside the White House tried to get Shelton to say that "he hoped the necessary testing for LightSquared could be completed within 90 days." This is particularly problematic, as General Shelton obviously knows that the Defense Department cannot order a new screwdriver in less than six months, let alone test and certify as safe a major potential modification to way the US government uses radio frequencies.

How the End of NASA Affects US National Security

by Taylor Dinerman August 1, 2011 at 4:00 am

Space exploration is not only critical in refusing to surrender the battlefield of space our next serious theater of war -- to our present and future adversaries; it also necessary in retaining US technological superiority and being able to utilize the energy and mineral resources of the Solar system essential for future global prosperity. The major problem is that It is not just NASA but the whole of the US space industry that is in trouble. It is laying off men and women by the thousand; their skills and experience will be lost forever. Reconstituting the ability to build complex and reliable space systems without these people will be an even more expensive and time consuming process. Meanwhile, this strategically vital industry will see its overseas competitors, such as China, grow and develop. America's edge in space is endangered, and if it disappears, a large proportion of America's global power will disappear along with it. Presidents have traditionally used NASA for both diplomatic and military purposes. During the Eisenhower administration the President's advisors wrote that "The novel nature of space exploration offers opportunities for international cooperation in it's peaceful aspects. " Nixon did not hesitate to use the success of the Apollo Moon mission to enhance America's global position, the Astronauts traveled around the world as living symbols of US technological superiority. Bill Clinton sought to cement a positive relationship with post communist Russia by giving them a major role in the Space Station project. NASA has also been useful in developing and preserving technologies with important military applications. The sensors used on interplanetary probes are similar and sometimes identical to the ones used on the most advanced spy satellites. Life support technologies developed for the shuttle find their way into the flight suits worn by pilots who fly high altitude military jets. And while America has not built a new ICBM or submarine launched nuclear missile for decades, NASA, by keeping the solid rocket motor industry alive has insured that if the decision were made to build a new type of missile for the US nuclear deterrent force, the Defense

http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/2459/lightsquared-gps-national-security

Department could do so without having to rebuild the nation's solid fueled rocket making expertise from nothing. By keeping America's space industry alive and healthy NASA has in the past directly contributed to overall US global power. As the agency succumbs to confusion and a lack of clear direction its ability to help keep America secure and prosperous will inevitably diminish. So, too, with the rest of the US aerospace industry. Boeing's effort to set up a second production line for its new 787 airliner has been declared illegal by the National Labor Relations Board on the grounds that it was going to be built in South Carolina, a "right to work" state. The courts seem to have thought that this was supposedly Boeing's way of illegally punishing the unionized workers in Washington state, who, by the way, will not suffer from a single layoff or lose a single hour's pay due to this increase in 787 production. The F-22 manufacturing program is also shutting down. The administration claimed that it only needs 187 of these air superiority fighters. Those parts of the F-35 program that are not "on probation" are under attack for what are perceived as massive cost overruns. It looks as if the Defense budget will be cut by more than $500 billion; and there is serious talk of shutting down America's ability to build nuclear powered aircraft carriers As America's space shuttle program comes to an end, NASA faces an uncertain and probably painful future. With a smaller budget and without a mission that has broad national support, the space agency has been floundering amid what the Washington Post calls "Rancor". If NASA was in "disarray" in January 2009, as the current NASA leaders claim, then every single agency of the federal government that tries to accomplish or build anything was, and still is, in equal disarray. NOAA, the FAA, the Coast Guard, The Departments of Agricultural, Energy and Education, to name a few, have all proven incapable of meeting their goals or building hardware on time or within budget. Only those parts of the Government that are dedicated to stopping people from doing things,or regulating human activity, are not in "disarray." They may not be doing anything useful, but they are not in disarray.

To say, as Newt Gingrich did recently, that the problem at NASA is "Bureaucracy" is too miss the point. It was not NASA's employees who got America into this humiliating mess; it was America's politicians. Admittedly, NASA's Administrator and his Deputy worked hard, along with the President's science advisor and the rest of the White House team, to alienate a critical mass of members of Congress by ignoring their concerns, rejecting their advice and blindsiding them with critical space policy decisions. . The Obama administration then wrecked the previous program on the grounds that it was underfunded and behind schedule, and replaced it with a new program that looks as if it is now underfund and behind schedule. Congressmen and women being human, and under massive pressure to cut spending, have now cut the guts out of the space agency's proposed budget. One of the more irony-laden recent press releases, at a time when this nation is saturated with them, is from the American Astronomical Society (AAS), protesting the House Appropriations committee's cancellation of the James Webb Space Telescope. What did the astronomers expect? Did they really believe that the US Government would demolish the human spaceflight program and leave their precious "science" programs untouched? The House Appropriations Committee has cut deeply into NASA's overall budget, leaving it with $1.9 billion less than the President requested. Its members slashed the Commercial Crew Development program, and agreed to increase support only for the new Space Launch System, sometimes referred to as the Congressional Rocket. To say that NASA is "screwed up" is to put it kindly. Sometimes destabilizing an institution may be necessary to revive it, but more often the destabilizing is simply destructive. NASA's leadership seems honestly to believe that everything is A-OK. In a Washington Post article on July 2nd, the agency's Deputy Administrator, Lori Garver, is quoted as saying, "We have a Program. We have a Budget. We have Bipartisan Support. We have a Destination." Unpacking that statement is an interesting exercise: it will show that while NASA is losing support for its budget on Capitol Hill, NASA's leaders do not seem to understand why this is happening. NASA has rejected the policy that the Bush administration had carefully crafted in cooperation with Members of Congress from both parties and

which had been accepted with overwhelming bipartisan support. It was a policy that not only would get America back to the Moon sometime in the middle of the next decade, but would do so with a minimum of job losses. Of course NASA has a program; that is the easy part. Turning the program into reality is hard, and there is no sign that NASA's current leadership can convince Congress to fund the Program. Traditionally NASA has undertaken the job of opening up the frontier and without the assurance that NASA can create it is hard to imagine that investors will be willing to risk providing the financing that the economic expansion of the US into the Solar system. NASA plays a role similar to one the US cavalry played when America moved west: it provides the settlers and business people with enough security to risk building a new economy. The House Appropriations Committee has given NASA a budget. It Is hard to imagine how that budget can be made compatible with Lori Garver's and the administration's program. Congress is funding its priorities: a new rocket and the new exploration vehicle that the new rocket will launch. Congress is cutting the budget for the things that the administration wants such as the budget for unfocused technology development The NASA program that the administration wants is one based on the idea that a new kind of 'commercial' space industry can provide access to orbit, while NASA invents new technologies that can explore the solar system at a lower cost than current technology would allow. The Congress disagrees and has ordered NASA to build a new heavy-lift rocket using existing technology. With this rocket, the US will be able to send human missions to the Moon or to Mars or, as the administration wants, to visit an asteroid. The administration says that it wants to go to an asteroid because it wants to gather information about the formation of the Solar system; that it believes that the experience of going to an asteroid will help develop the technology and expertise needed to go to Mars. Last year, Congress passed the NASA Authorization Bill with bipartisan support, but it lacked the overwhelming bipartisan support that previous NASA authorization bills had received in 2005 and 2007. Sadly, the space agency has lost much of its traditional base of Congressional support and has not been able to find much of a new one.

People at NASA say that they have a destination:a so-far unidentified asteroid.They say this will provide better scientific information about the early development of the Solar System and that the operation will be a lowcost way to develop technologies that will be needed if NASA is someday to send people to Mars. But NASA lacks a serious plan to get there and also is having a real problem finding other nations ready to cooperate. As long as the US cannot maintain a space policy for more than several years at a time, few countries will dare to invest their time and efforts in cooperating with it. Last February, America's premier space policy expert, John Logsdon, pointed out that, "Today, there most certainly is no pressing national security question for which the answer is: "go to an asteroid." In an era of tight budgets and angry partisanship, it may be foolish to imagine that any national leader could convince a large majority of Congress to fund an ambitious national program, let alone the kind of transnational "feel good" project -- such as the 1975 Apollo-Soyuz mission that was supposed to symbolize US- Soviet "dtente"-- that some people in this administration seem to believe is desirable. The expectation that the "New Space" commercial human spaceflight industry -- which can be described as a collection of small entrepreneurial firms that have been building small rockets and have been trying to find low cost ways to get into space -- will be able to replace NASA may not be realistic. Considering how things are going in Washington,however, it may be more realistic than any other part of the space agency's current program. Congress seems ready to cut more than two thirds of the proposed budget for commercial human spaceflight --from the proposed roughly $900 million, down to about $300 million. That cut, however, will just slow the industry down rather than stop it. This will mean that for many years there will be no way for Americans to get into orbit other than to buy a seat on a Soyuz capsule from the Russians. As long as NASA depends on Russia for access to the ISS, Russia will be able to shut down that access at any moment and take full control of a station that America spent more than $80 billion dollars building. There is also the ongoing international image of America's astronauts dependent on Russia for their professional existence.

If NASA chooses to spread tiny -- by government standards -- sums of this $300 million around to all of the current recipients of "commercial" space contracts, the country will end up with a collection of undercapitalized, nearly bankrupt "New Space" companies that are totally dependent on government funding. There is also the possibility that regulatory actions by the Federal Aviation Administration, or by some other part of the government, could bring the whole effort to build the "New Space" industry to an a loud halt, in which event the US would lose an important body of technical and business knowledge,as well as the drive, enthusiasm and imagination that these bring to the whole aerospace industry. The problem is that the "New Space" industry is a valuable source of ideas and often pushes NASA and the large aerospace companies to innovate, to abandon their old procedures in favor of better new ones;but the industry lacks the capital to accomplish any really big projects such as building a rocket that can actually reach orbit. If America is going to be able to obtain access to the minerals and energy resources in the Solar System that it needs to thrive in the second half of the 21st century. We shall have to have both the large, old fashioned aerospace firms and the small, nimble "New Space" firms. SpaceX based in Hawthorne California, seems to stand by itself. The firm has the deep pockets of its founder, Elon Musk, co-inventor of PayPal, and it also has been developing its rockets and other space hardware for more than a decade. The company has so far successfully launched its Falcon 9 rocket twice . Sometime in the late fall of this year, it hopes to launch it again, carrying the company's Dragon capsule. The Dragon will fly past the International Space Station (ISS), demonstrating that SpaceX can safely operate its maneuvering thrusters and its communications gear near that$100 billion orbital facility. If all goes well, next year the SpaceX Dragon capsule will dock with the station, proving that the firm can fulfill its obligations to fly supplies to the space station under the Commercial Orbital Transportation Services contract it signed in 2008. Once this happens, SpaceX will assume the mission of sending US cargo, consisting of food, water oxygen, and equipment,to keep the station running and to support the scientific experiments that are performed there.

At some later time, SpaceX hopes to show that it can fly people, as well as cargo, to the ISS. Under the best of circumstances, NASA's future access to orbit for people will depend on the success of a single firm's launchsystem. Based on past experience with space systems' delays and cost overruns, this dependence on a single company will last until the end of the decade, if not longer. The Air Force learned that when it relied exclusively on a single rocket to launch its vital satellites into orbit, if something went wrong with America's ability to keep its array of military satellites working and in orbit, it would not be able to monitor what was going on in important parts of the world. This happened in the late 1980s and early 1990s after a series of accidents grounded both the Space Shuttle and the Titan rockets. None of the other "New Space" firms that NASA has been supporting has any real chance of sending people into orbit within the next five years or more. If America's wants to have assured, low cost access to space, both for military reasons and to take advantage of the economic opportunities that are out there in the Solar System, it will have to have multiple ways of getting people and payloads in orbit. The current Delta and Atlas rockets may be reliable but they are not low cost. Just as the Constellation Return-to-the-Moon program that the administration destroyed was constantly forced to adapt to funding shortfalls,the commercial human spaceflight program is also learning to adjust to constantly changing levels of government funding. If the next administration wanted to, it could cancel the whole commercial program and base the cancellation on the same grounds that were used to kill Constellation: that it is behind schedule and underfunded. It looks as if keeping a strong and prosperous aerospace industry and America is nowhere near at the top of the President's priorities.

http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/2299/nasa-us-national-security

Pakistan's China Problem

by Taylor Dinerman July 29, 2011 at 4:00 am In the aftermath of America's successful attack on Osama Bin Laden's hideout in Abbottabad near Pakistan's capital, Islamabad, there was speculation from both Americans and Pakistanis that Pakistan would abandon its relationship with the US for an exclusive one with China. One rumor out of Pakistan indicated that China was going to "give" the Pakistani air force 50 new JF-17 fighters. It was later clarified that China was selling the aircraft on terms that had been worked out long before. There was also a report that the Pakistani government had offered to allow China to build a Naval base at the new Chinese-built port of Gwadar, on the Arabian Sea. The same reports said that the Chinese firmly rejected the offer. As relations between Washington and Islamabad spiral ever lower, we hear that China stands ready to replace America as Pakistan's main ally and supporter. Beijing's relationship with Islamabad is an old one; and unlike the US, Beijing is not a preferred scapegoat for the ills of that society. Timothy Hoyt of the Naval War College recently pointed out that, "forced to choose between the United States and China, Pakistan would probably opt to align itself more closely with China." For China, however, as Dr. Hoyt also points out, "the costs of a closer relationship with Pakistan may outweigh the benefits." Not only does China have no reason to complicate its relations with the US, India, and the central Asian states of Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and the rest --- all of which feel victimized or threatened to one degree of another by Pakistan's support for aggressive Islamism. China itself has been the target of Islamists in its far western province of Sinkiang. Also problematic from China's point of view is Pakistan's economic mess. Francis Fukuyama describes the Pakistani society as characterized by "... high levels of social stratification and quasi-feudal institutions." Unlike China or India, it is not an 'emerging' economic power, but is large, unstable and mostly impoverished.

Given Pakistan's Muslim identity, it is ironic that the more that 50 percent leap in the price of pork in China could have a greater impact on its geopolitical position than all of their complicating maneuvering with Islamist terror groups. For Beijing, properly feeding the Chinese people comes first, everything else comes second. China's refusal to support North Korea, which is culturally and politically much closer to it than Pakistan, should be a warning to Islamabad of what to expect if it completely breaks with Washington. Pakistan and the rest of the Indian subcontinent are outside of China's traditional sphere of influence. A bold move to reach beyond its traditional hegemonic zone would set off alarms throughout Asia, Europe and Africa. America provides Pakistan with vital economic support, not just the $1.4 billion in bilateral development aid -- not to mention the roughly $1,5 billion in military assistance. At least as important is the fact that the US has long helped Pakistan obtain favorable treatment by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The US also has made considerable efforts over the years to integrate Pakistan into the global economy. Perhaps in ten or twenty years, China will have both the will and the capacity to help Pakistan graduate into the ranks of the "emerging" economies. For the moment, however, Beijing has other priorities. To import energy, China might prefer pipelines that moved through central Asia, where there would be fewer problems with local governments and where the pipelines would be less vulnerable to terrorist or bandits. Further, if China were to import, for example, minerals from Africa and other nations by way of Pakistan, there would be a "cost" question. For China to unload them in Pakistan and then send them back to China by truck or rail could add enormously to their "landed" cost. It would be much less expensive for China to have goods delivered directly to China by ship. China nevertheless agreed to upgrade the trans-Himalaya Karakorum Highway that connects China's Xinjiang province with Pakistan. At the moment, the highway is a prestige project that attracts tourists and helps both countries integrate government institutions into these isolated mountain regions. The road may be both a strategic asset for China and a way to bind Pakistan ever more tightly to China's economically depressed far western area. It is doubtful that it will ever carry significant food or other aid from China into Pakistan.

In spite of all the anger and frustration on both sides, therefore, the US and Pakistan might just have to make the best of a bad situation. Of course, things would be a lot easier for everyone if the elites in Islamabad, Karachi and the Punjab could find someone else to blame for Pakistan's problems.

America, Israel and the Next Stage of the Revolution in Military Affairs
by Taylor Dinerman June 23, 2011 at 4:40 am A laser-guided anti-tank missile fired from Gaza hit an Israeli school bus on April 7, killing one teenager. We then waited for worldwide condemnations against Hamas that the firing on a school bus constituted Hamas exercising a '"disproportionate' use of force," and "collective punishment," but none were forthcoming. But that just leaves open the question: Against a school bus, what exactly does constitute a "proportionate" use of force? The proliferation of precision guided weapons such as the Russian "Koronet" missile used against the Israeli school bus is happening now, and America and Israel are both trying to adapt to this new reality. The use of a laser-guided weapon by Hamas, which the U.S. and other governments have designated a terrorist organization, marks a new development in 21st century warfare. Precision guided weaponry is no longer the monopoly of ordinary military organizations; it is now in the hands of non-state actors. In a recent paper on the "Maturing Revolution in Military Affairs," published by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, Barry Watts wrote "... it appears to be simply a matter of time before American forces will be confronted with short range precision weapons." Watts also points out that the U.S. is facing a new generation of Chinese and Russian weapons designed to counteract U.S. strengths, such as anti-radar stealth technology and large aircraft carriers. They are doing so, in part, by developing both new offensive and defensive weapons, as well as supporting sensors and command and control systems. Defensive weapons will be "game changers," reducing friendly casualties by protecting tank and vehicle crews and troops, both in bases and in the field, and civilians. This capability will increase the military, economic and political price that America and Israel's foes must pay for their attacks. They will be increasingly frustrated when their costly weaponry fails to kill or injure

http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/2305/pakistan-china-problem

troops or civilians. Firing rockets and missiles without killing, injuring or even seriously inconveniencing anyone will only expose them to counterfire, increasing their own casualty rate. It will also expose them to ridicule. On March 1, an Israeli Merkava Mark IV tank patrolling outside Gaza used its "active" Trophy system to defeat a missile attack. The system detected the incoming weapon and fired a small interceptor at it, destroying the missile before it hit the tank. Other "active protection systems" are under development in the U.S., Israel and elsewhere, but the Israeli Trophy is the first one to be proven effective on the battlefield. The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), shorthand for the impact of advanced information technology on war and military affairs, became apparent to the world after the 1991 Gulf War. Before that, the RMA was the subject of a specialized debate among military experts and a few politicians. During the Gulf War, U.S. Air Force F-117 and F-111F fighters used laserguided bombs to knock out Iraqi headquarters, air bases and tanks. Other guided weapons, such as the Tomahawk cruise missiles, the Hellfire laserguided missile and even the French laser-guided AS-30 were also used. These systems not only quickly defeated Saddam's army; their effectiveness shocked the world. A senior Russian officer was quoted as saying "My God, they could have done that to us!" Since 1991, the U.S. and its allies have repeatedly used their precision weapons in the Middle East, Central Asia and the Balkans. The weapons have improved and so have the tactics involved in using them. Targeting no longer requires complex plans and orders, or conversations between controllers on the ground with a radio trying to imagine what targets a pilot flying three or four hundred miles an hour several thousand feet above him can and cannot see. Now, a few clicks on a laptop, or just touching a screen, can send a bomb or missile accurately onto its intended target. The best defense the adversaries have has against precision weapons is to surround themselves with women and children. The use of human shields, voluntary or otherwise, may be against the laws of war, but this does not seem to have stopped Hezbollah, the Taliban or al-Qaeda from hiding among them in schools, hospitals and mosques, and even next to UN buildings -- not only as deterrents, but as photogenic propaganda tools if they are deliberately or inadvertent hit.

Watts points out that "The conflicts the U.S. military has fought in Afghanistan and Iraq have not been against major adversaries with comparable military capabilities." America's potential major foes are building new and sophisticated systems, the goal of which is to negate the advantages that precision weapons and other technologies, such as radarevading stealth aircraft, ships and missiles, give to U.S. forces. Looking ahead 20 years or more, Watt sees the potential for a world in which China, Russia or another so-called "near peer" nation or alliance can effectively challenge America's military superiority. Watt points out that "as precision strike capabilities proliferate, it will become less and less feasible for U.S. military services to continue simply using precision strike to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of traditional ways of projecting conventional military power and fighting." As always, the U.S. defense establishment should adjust as soon as possible to this new reality. It will take a significant investment and much hard thinking, but the U.S. has an advantage that may not be obvious as seen from inside the beltway: its alliance with Israel. The Israelis also face a shifting alliance of politically well-connected, adaptable enemies, equipped with a variety of modern precision-guided weapons. The Israelis are now changing the way they fight, they are finding ways to combine precision strikes and other offensive tactics against an enemy, like Hamas or Hezbollah which has embedded its forces in civilian areas with, active defenses against rockets and missiles and with a renewed effort to improve its civil defenses largely consisting of old air raid shelters that were mostly built before 1967. The systems and tactics they are developing today will soon available to U.S. forces. In the 2006 Second Lebanon war against Hezbollah, Israel was not only bombarded by thousands of unguided Katyusha types of rockets, its tanks and infantry were hit by dozens of laser-guided weapons; and one of its Navy's Sa'ar V corvettes was hit, but not sunk, by an antiship cruise missile. On its northern border, Israel is facing an Area Denial, Anti-Access dilemma that somewhat replicates, in miniature, what the U.S may face if it ever has to engage with China in the Asia/Pacific region. The tactics that Hezbollah used in 2006 included a large scale use of laser guided anti-tank missiles, and mines that made it difficult for Israel's tanks and armored personal carriers to freely maneuver in the area of

operations. The Israelis were forced to move slowly and carefully. Deprived of their traditional advantage of being able to move fast the Area Denial/Anti-Access tactics of Hezbollah were, at least in the early stages of the war, a success. China has hundreds of ballistic missiles aimed at both U.S. carriers and other large surface warships, and at its airbases in Japan, South Korea and Guam. These weapons might be able to deprive the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Air Force of their ability to maneuver, at will in broad stretches of the Pacific. Protecting these ships and bases, as well as U.S. forward deployed forces, should be a high priority for the U.S. military in the next decade and beyond. No one doubts that if hostilities flare up again between Israel and Lebanon, Hezbollah will try to use its extensive missile force to shut down Israel's air bases, especially those in the north. To counter this, the Israelis have developed, with American support, the "Iron Dome" defense system that was successful in stopping rockets fired from Gaza, and the "David's Sling" system that is supposed to be ready for use sometime in 2012. The David's Sling system is a missile defense system that includes radars, command and control electronics and launchers for interceptor missiles designed to hit attacking missiles with ranges of roughly 70 to 250 kilometers. With that performance it should be able to protect Israel's major cities and military bases from the kind of medium range missiles that Hezbollah and Syria have been deploying in recent years. For use against long range missiles from Iran, Israel has the Arrow 2 system, and has begun work on the Arrow 3. The Arrow was developed to destroy missiles and their warheads-in-flight hundreds of kilometers from the targets in the Israeli homeland. These defensive systems "Trophy," "Iron Dome," "David's Sling" and "Arrow" -- are either in use, or will be soon. Over the years these weapons will be continually improved and adapted to handle new challenges. The experience that Israel gains under actual wartime conditions gives America access to invaluable information that will help it develop and refine the tools needed to maintain its technological military superiority. In some situations, such as in South Korea, it would be in America's interest to deploy Israeli systems. "Iron Dome" and "David's Sling" are obvious choices. North Korea has tens of thousands of rockets and

missiles dug in near the cease-fire line. These weapons are a constant threat to the South Korean capital of Seoul and its civilian population, as well as to U.S. and allied troops and bases throughout the country. As important is the experience of being able constantly to improve weapons and defense systems using ideas that come from sharing different scientific and engineering cultures. Both Israel and the U.S. have a common interest in being able to defeat the new generation of precision strike weapons that threaten them. Working together would ensure that neither the U.S. nor the Israeli defense establishments become complacently isolated from real world experience. The U.S. House of Representative's Appropriations Committee decision to increase funding for these joint ventures is a wise and necessary investment in America's future military strength.

http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/2221/america-israel-revolution-military-affairs

Contact
For more information, contact Taylor Dinerman by sending an email to BuildingInternationalbridges@gmail.com and we'll pass it along to him. This ebook was compiled by Building International Bridges as a service to people who want to reduce obstacles to intercultural communication. The type size of 15 points will help make the reading easier. If there is another format for this document (perhaps in Kindle?) that you would prefer, please contact Steve at (954) 646 8246 or at TheEbookman@gmail.com to recommend the additional format. My head hurts after reading (well, scanning) these articles. If you would like to help support the NISI Project to trace the links and distill the essential critical issues into language that the media (and ordinary people like me) can consume, please send a check to Building International Bridges and note NISI Project 2314 Desota Drive Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301 This is an on-going, non-partisan effort. Funds will be used to cover the cost of magazine subscriptions, web services and research support. BuildingInternationalBridges.org is a 501(c)(3) organization that supports educational efforts. Donations are tax-deductible.

Proof

Digital Proofer

Printed By Createspace