A.B.cook - The Metaphysical Basis of Plato's Ethics, 1895

VICTORIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARY
TORONTO, ONTARIO
THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS
PLATO S ETHICS
THE
METAPHYSICAL BASIS
OF
PLATO S ETHICS
BY
ARTHUR BERNARD COOK M.A.

FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE CAMBRIDGE
"Quis ille primus, cuius ex imagine

Natura solers finxit humanum genus,
Aeternus, incorruptus, aequaevus polo,
Unusque et universus, exemplar Dei?"
MILTON
DEIGHTON BELL & CO.

LONDON GEORGE BELL & SONS
1895
V
B
392
CAMBRIDGE
PRINTED BY JONATHAN PALMER
ALEXANDRA STREET
CONTENTS
PAGE
PREFACE . ix
PART I. THE PLATONIC THEORY OF MIND i
i. The Parmenides I
2. The Sophist . . ... . . . .

17
3. Aristotle s Psychology . . . . .
.23
PART II. HIGHER AND LOWER MENTALITY . .
54
i.
Purpose and Necessity 55
2. Identity and Difference 68
3. Theology 85
PART III. METAPHYSICAL DESCENT AND MORAL ASCENT. 113
INDEX LOCORUM 153

PREFACE
Ti ovv TjfMf is 4pov/j.fv firl roffovrois Kal TOIOVTOIS
UKarwvos ; Kal ri TrpoffQôo^v e/e TT
PROKLOS in Farm. ed. Cousin vi. 30.
THE following essay is neither a systematic account
of Plato s metaphysics, nor an adequate exposition

of Plato s ethics. Its scope is a narrower one. It
aims at clearing up the connection between the two.

And, if the attempt has led me to reinterpret the
metaphysical scheme that underlay the ethics of

matured Platonism, my purpose throughout has been
to show how intimately and indeed vitally the
latter was connected with the former. Thus far at
least I find myself in accordance with the general
tendency of modern Platonic criticism. For the sup

posed independence, not to say antagonism, of the
several parts of Plato s philosophy, which still mars
the work of certain exponents, is nowadays falling
into disrepute. We are beginning to look askance on
all constructions involving the philosopher in incon
gruous positions. And this is due partly, I think, to

PREFACE.
a growing appreciation of the artistic side of his
thought, partly to special efforts that have been made

to determine from theoretical content or linguistic
style the true order of the Platonic writings. The

former movement postulates that here, if anywhere, a
speculative system must mean a harmonious whole ;
the latter has shown that sundry seeming inconsis

tencies are but tide-marks of a progressive develop
ment. But, whatever be the precise causes which

have of recent times tended to discredit the patch
work Platonism of the past, it will fairly be demanded
of any fresh endeavour to articulate the Idealist
doctrine that it represent that doctrine as an organic
unity.
This being admitted, the only safe course is to
regard the Platonic philosophy from the standpoint of

some opo? 6pto-#ei? /êyas for which Plato is himself
responsible. Now of all such opoi that which is most
constantly affirmed and most jealously guarded is
the reality of the Ideal world. The late Dr. Maguire

has somewhere said that "the
objectivity of the Idea
is the corner-stone of Platonism." I should prefer to
substitute the term "reality"
as a translation of ovala.
because the cardinal dogma of the Timaeus asserts
that the nature of ovaia is to be at once ravrov and
PREFACE. xi
Odrepov, i.e. not only objective but also subjective.

And here it
may conduce to clearness if, by way of
preamble, I sketch the main drift of my essay, in
dicating in the briefest possible manner how this
theory of objective and subjective ova ia furnished a

satisfactory foundation for the superstructure of
morality.
Plato conceived the universe to be a VOTYTOV ,wov
containing within itself a series of voyra wa. Every

such oW, whether supreme or subordinate, if it is
to make good its claim to real being must (he says)

pass from the objective phase of self-identity into the
subjective phase of self-differentiation. The former
state consists in the intuitional exercise of pure
thought ;
the latter comprises the emotive presenta
tions of
knowledge, opinion, sensation. But the
passage from the one to the other is a necessary
feature of each and every VOIJTGV %wov. As regards
nomenclature, the supreme %wov in its higher con
dition is the sovereign Mind ;
in its lower condition
it is the 6eol Oewv. The subordinate coa in their
higher condition are the Ideas ;

in their lower con
dition they are particular specimens of the natural
kinds. And since the higher mentality must be

deemed superhuman, Plato calls the sovereign Mind
xii PREFACE.
0eo? and the Ideas ai&ioi Oeoi, in contradistinction to
particulars which are at best only $ai/j,oves.
The significance of these remarks will be at

once
apparent if we consider the case of a single vorpov
f<y
j, sa y that of Man. Man being one of the sub
ordinate fwa expresses one aspect, viz. the humanity,
of the supreme %wov. He is endowed with four
faculties, named respectively vovs, and eVicrr^/xT;, Sofa,
aiaOrja-^. As possessed of vovs he is the Idea of
Man, an immutable entity correlating with, i.e. think

ing and thought by, all entities of the same order.
As possessed of eVtcrr/jyUT;, Sofa, aio-Orjcns, Man lapses
from permanent thought into transient knowledge,
opinion, sensation, no longer functioning as a unitary

Ideal Mind, but as an indefinite plurality of particular
minds. These particulars in their turn correlate with,

i.e.
apprehend and are apprehended by, particulars of
all the vorjra wa : as actively apprehensive we call
them ijrinât, as passively apprehensible we call them
Further, the world of absolute being (the sovereign

Mind + the Ideal Minds) is termed a Trapd$6iyiJ,a,
whose elittov is the world of relative becoming (the
starry gods + all specimens of the natural kinds).

And just as metaphysics insists that the former must
PREFACE. xiii
pass into the latter, so morality demands that the

latter to the best of their ability must return
towards the former. But since the Ideal Minds are
partial and serial determinations of the sovereign
Mind, this demand of conformity to their appropriate
Ideas implies the desirability of attaining, so far as
may be, to the condition of the sovereign Mind itself.
Such attainment in the present life is perforce meagre

*
and limited ;
but the theory of transmigration here-
after opens up possibilities beyond compute. In fine,
the ethical end for particulars as determined by
Plato s ontology is to minimise the difference between
their own psychosis and that of the supreme 0eo?
a quest which leads them through the successive
stages of the Ideal series.

The discussion of the system here summarised
has fallen into three divisions. The first educes the
main outlines from a consideration of certain passages
of importance in the Dialogues and elsewhere. The
second emphasises the distinction between the realm
of objective being and the realm of subjective
becoming. The third states the metaphysical view
of the latter as a copy of the former, and en

deavours to show how that view impliedly incul
cates the rational treatment of individual souls and
xiv PREFACE.
bodies in accordance with the ethical end above
mentioned.
It will be seen from this statement that my

obligations to Cambridge teaching are not slight. Dr.
Jackson s papers in the Journal of Philology (vols.
x xv) have, to my thinking, established beyond

reasonable doubt the chronology of the more im
Dialogues. Any attempt to reconstruct

portant
Plato s mature Idealism must henceforward be based
mainly upon the P/iilebus, the Parmenides, the 77^-
actetus, the Sophist, the Politicus, the Timaeus, and
the Laivs. And those who set about it may spare

themselves the burden of proving "(i)
a revision of
the list of Ideas, whereby relations, negations, and
products ceased to be regarded as Ideas

artificial
proper (aura KCL& avra eiBrj) and (2) a modification ;
of the conception of the relation subsisting between

the Idea and its particulars, whereby for participa
tion (fjueOegis) of the latter in the former was sub
stituted imitation (/u/^cri?)." Again, Mr. Archer-
Hind s interpretation of the Timaeus proves to all
who have ears to hear that, according to Plato s
the one universal Thought evolves

"
esoteric meaning,
itself into a multitude of finite intelligences, which

are so constituted as to apprehend not only by pure
PREFACE. xv
reason, but also by what we call the senses, with

all their attendant subjective phenomena of time and
space."
If in some points of moment I have ventured to

dissent from those who propounded these weighty
opinions, it is because I cannot but pursue to the end
the principle that the Ideal world is composed of
6Vra, understanding by the word ova-la in every case
a combination of objective with
subjective thought.
One great outcome of that principle has, I believe,
been hitherto overlooked : I mean the fact that for
Plato the unit of metaphysical and ethical measure
ment is neither the Idea nor the individual, but the
vorf-rov %wov a personal being whose intellectual
comprises the two essentials of

"
activity reality,"
namely the unitary vbya-is of the Idea and the

diffracted yvaxri^ of its particulars. To press the
consequences of this fundamental doctrine seemed

to me not only legitimate, but necessary.
TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE,
July SM, 1895.

ERRATUM.
Page 141, line II, for T& Kvpros read rb KVTOS.

PART I.
THE PLATONIC THEORY OF MIND.
Before the ethical bearings of Plato s Idealism can

be appreciated, it is of primary importance to deter
mine the relation in which the Ideas themselves stand
towards Mind. This relation essential as it is to
a sound understanding of the Platonic system is
nowhere explicitly set forth in the extant dialogues.
Their author has more suo left it to be inferred either
from the necessary presuppositions of certain broad
from a few incidental passages of
tenets, or pregnant
meaning. The former, among which may be men
tioned the doctrines of Metempsychosis and Anam
nesis, will be more conveniently dealt with at a later
stage of the present argument. The latter call for
immediate analysis, as enabling us to formulate
simply and directly the connection which we seek
to ascertain.
I. The Parmenides.
In Farm. 132 B the Platonic Sokrates, wishing
seq.
to. secure the of the Idea against the criticism
unity
of the Platonic Parmenides, suggests that perhaps

each Idea is a thought (v6r)/jLa) existent only in souls
(ev Tfrvxaty-
To this suggestion Parmenides retorts :
(i)
That a voiâ must have a content, an ov n ;
and that the content which vo^pa voel will be this
the Idea as previously described and therefore as
previously refuted.
(ii)
That if on the one hand each Idea is a voiâ,
and on the other hand particulars are related to Ideas
by participation
then particulars as aggre
(/Ae 0efi<?),
gates of immanent Ideas may be said to consist

CK vorjfjLciTwv, in fact to be themselves votjfjLara, objects
of pure thought. Hence follows one of two alterna
tives : either (a) all particulars are voovvra, or (b) some
in spite of their being
particulars are not voovvra,
1
I understand vo-fj/mara ovra, avorjra elvai (Parm. 132 c) as spoken
of particulars ; for, if a thing e/c voriô- ruv eVrtV, it is to borrow a
phrase of Aristotle s ffvvOea-is ris i)5tj vorjfjLaTwv tio-irep ev t>vr<av,
and
may justly be described as Another logically correct
itself a v6rj/j.a.
interpretation of the second limb of the dilemma would be "or there :
are some Ideal j/oTj/uara which are not contained in minds." But this
seems to me inadmissible on two grammatical grounds (i) It involves :
a somewhat awkward change of subject from TrdvTa particulars to =

iW/jucn-a
=
Ideas ; (2) the word o.v6i}ros is elsewhere used in a passive
sense only when passivity is distinctly suggested by the context (e.g.
h. horn. Merc. 80 #</>pa(rr 7/8 avdrjra Si7rA.6K6 Qavnarh epya, Farm. ed.
R. and P. v. 73 rV êv cai/ ai/6-rjTov, avfavvfjiov, Plat. Phaedo 80 B r<$
juei/ . . .
vof]T(f Kal /j.ovoei5e? Kal o.Sia\vrcf . . . T 8e . . .
avo^Tcp KCL\
Kal 8ia\vT$, Dionys. Areop. de div. nom. c. I

inrepovtrios
OF PLATO S ETHICS.
To
put the dilemma in other words. If we choose
the horn (a), we assume that voijfj,ara (i.e.
first
par
ticulars, regarded as aggregates of Ideas) must in
every case possess the power of thinking ;

and
thereby we contradict common sense, which affirms
that e.g. a palm-tree cannot think. If we choose the
second horn (b), we hold that common sense is
right
in declaring e.g. a palm-tree to be dvorjrov and ;
thereby we deny the assumption that would equate

all vor)para (i.e. particulars,
regarded as aggregates of
Ideas) with voovvra.
Now this argument as a whole turns on the
acceptance of the equation between vorjâ and voovv.
For the wording of the first alternative 77 Bo/celv aou
K voriiJLdTtov 6/cacTTOp elvcii Kal "jravra voelv clearly
implies that irdvia voelv is the natural consequence of
etc vorjfjudr&v e/cao-rov elvat,. And the second alterna
tive offers no difficulty at all, unless we are convinced
that every voâ must be a voovv that it does offer :
J
is shown
difficulty by Sokrates answer A\\ ovSe
rovroj (frdvai, eâ \6yov. Again, it is noteworthy that
in Parmenides first retort the same postulate was
oiicria Kal vovs avSr^ros ical \6yos and not always then
Uppriros), (e.g.
[Alex.] in Arist. Met. ed. Hayduck p. 670, 27 rfc yhp vof\T\]v Kal Be iav
iro\\ol /A^ flvai a.i/oT)Tcas aire<f>-f>vavTo).
In view of these objections I
have followed a simpler syntax, and given to av6tiros a
meaning that
"
frequentissimum et passim obvium (e.g. Plat. Tim.

"
Stephanus calls
30 B, where, as in Gorg. 514 c, av6rjros is opposed to vovv
tacitly made by the words Ov% evbs TWOS, o eVi
/celvorb vorjfia ITTOV voelj piav iiva ovaav loeav ;
In short, both the language of the first retort and

the fact that the second is couched in the form of
a dilemma lead us tosuppose that the Platonic
Sokrates and his critic were alike prepared to main
tain that every vbrjâ must be a voovv.
Whether this assumption is an axiom or a paradox
willdepend upon the exact significance that we attri
bute to vorjua. As with our own word thought," so in
"
the case of vorjâ it is possible to distinguish a variety

of allied meanings. Proklos in Farm. ed. Cousin v.
147 observes \eyerai <yap vorj/jia KOI rb voyrbv avrb TO
vorjOev KOL TO evepyrjiia KCLI TO ryvwcrTMCov TOV VOOVVTOS.

i.e. the term votâ is applied (i) to the actual object
of thought, the thing thought of; (2) to the process

of thinking, or more strictly to that process as exem
plified on any definite occasion ; (3) to the cognitive
faculty of the thinker. If in the passage with which

we are concerned vorjfia bears this third sense, then
the statement vorj/jia voel is self-evident, and further
enquiry is futile. But the usage of i/oâ to denote
the "cognitive faculty" is poetical, as may be seen
from the lexiccP\ and at this juncture, where much
may hinge on the right selection of a single word, a
2
e.g. Horn. Od. 215, Hes. Op. 129, Theog. 656, Empedocl. ed.
Karsten vv. 313, 316, 317.
OF PLATO S ETHICS.
poet s licence would be utterly out of place. Had

Plato meant the thinker or the thinking faculty,"
"
" "
he would assuredly have used TO voovv or 6 vovs. Can

it be then that vorjâ here bears its second
meaning,
and denotes process of thinking"? Two objec
"a
tions at once suggest themselvds. In the first place,

if A thinks B, it is fair to describe A or A s mind as
thinking ;
it may also be fair to presume that B or
.Z? s mind has a similar faculty for thought; but is it
fair to say that A s thinking thinks ? Has the express

ion vorjpa voei thus interpreted any intelligible mean
ing ? And in the second place, if we grant that by
a laxity of phraseology such a statement might be
made 3 it must be admitted that vQj]â thus becomes
,
the equivalent of But it is difficult to believe v6rj<ri<;.
that for a common and straightforward term Plato

would have substituted a comparatively rare and
ambiguous one.
4
A glance at Ast s Lexicon will
3
The English language tolerates the following sen
elasticity of the
tence :
passing thought be the directly verifiable existent,
"
If the
which no school has hitherto doubted it to be, then that thought is itself
the thinker, and psychology need not look beyond" (W. James, The
Principles of Psychology, i. 401, cp. 369). The nearest approach to this

that I know of in Greek is a clause quoted by Stephanus s.v. vocp6s :
"Mire cum j/Jrjyua conjungit Niceph. Callist. H. E. vol. i.
p. SB, (v rj
ffoi jjifv KOI 6 vovs . . .

ad6\ti)Tos, fipvuv voepa. KCU 0eTa j/o^/xaro." But
Byzantine bombast is foreign to the Parmenides.
4
It might be argued, on the strength of Arist. Psych. A. 3. 13.
407 a 7 TJ 8e v6ri(ris ra j/oTjjuaro, that i/oTj/uara is used as the plural of
v6fi<ris. But (i) in that passage "thought is thoughts"

means that the
show that, as compared with vor)cr^ y voijfui occurs but

seldom in the Platonic writings. Discounting Meno
95 E, Soph. 237 A, 2580, as quotations and Symp. 197 E,
an avowedly poetical passage in Agathon s speech,
we meet with it again only in Politicus 260 D, where
heralds as a class are said to issue commands
a\\nrpia voiâra Trapaêôfievov. The word is appos
ite there just because it has not a subjective but an
objective value the king entrusts his vorjâ to the

herald, as the manufacturer hands over his wares to
the retail dealer. It appears to me certain, therefore,
that in the present passage also v6vj(j,a is used in the
first of the three senses enumerated by Proklos. It
denotes "the actual object of thought, the thing
thought of."
still, We may however, raise the ques
tionwhether voTjpa means (a) the object thought of,
as it is
independently of the thinking subject, or
(b) the object thought of, as represented by the
thinking subject to his own mind. The former, to

speak with all accuracy, is TO vorjrov or TO voovnevov,
that which can
"
or that which actually

"
be" is appre-
mental activity of the thinking subject consists in representations of

objects thought, not merely in repeated exhibitions of itself: where the
process of thinking is entirely self-contained, etrrii/ r? voTjcris vo-fifffus
v6f)<rts, not vo^âros or vo-nndruv v6i)(ris
; (2) the plural wf)<rcis was
available. To Arist. Probl. Iff. 7. 91 7 a 39 (quoted by L. & S.) and
Plut. Mor. 6910, 1 1 20 A (quoted by Stephanus) add Porphyr. Op. ed.
Holsten p. 66 ciy 5e cavrV irpbs rbv vovv ev TOLLS vo^ffea-t
tVtoC<ro
yiyvcrtu (sc. TJ ^VXT]} . . . /coi a! vofofis OVK &vev

OF PLATO S ETHICS.
bended by thought." The latter is TO vorjfia. Thus

Plutarch de placit. phil. iv. 1 1 says eWt 8e vorjâ <f>dv-
5
Tao>a Siavoias \OJIKOV faov a definition elsewhere
used to elucidate the Stoic term \efcr6v, which also
was the mental representation of TO d^âivo^vov.
This distinction between (a) TO voovpevov and (b) TO
voovpevov y voovpevov would be important enough if
we were dealing with objects sensibly perceived. But
in the case of the Platonic Ideas it does not trouble
us, because as Proklos, ibid. 140, puts it o ^Wpcm;?
Q
v vor)iLacn Tidlv ovcn&crdai ras t Sea? v7re\a/3v. The
Idea and Mind s thought of the Idea are one. The
former has no existence apart from the latter. We
have mounted to a where the word âvraa-â^
level
in so far as it implies the low ground of sense-

perception, is not applicable, a level where less
venturesome theorists are not likely to linger Arist. :
Psych. I\ 3. 8. 432 # 12 TO. Se Trpwra vorj/jbara tivi

Siolffei rov fMrj (f)avrd(7fjiara elvai ; rj
ovbe Ta\\a <$>av-
T(i(Tfj,aTa, aXX OVK avev âvraff/jidrcov. I conclude,
5
Cp. Alex, de anini. ed. Bruns p. 85, 20 tyylvvrtu 5e TJ
efts T<
vif r^v apxV faro. airb TTJS irepl ra ot
/j.(Ta.&a<Tti>
Sxnrep otyiv Tiva cnr avruv \afJL0dvovros rov Kado\ov 0eeop7j-
/car ap%as /J.fv v6r]fj.a /cal tvvoia /caAelrat, TrAeovorrai Se na.1
Kal iroXvrpoiTov yiv6iJ.svov, us SvvcurOai Kal

roieiv TOVTO, vovs ^5rj.
6 *V
Cp. Alex, in Arist. Met. ed. Hayduck p. 92, 19, 22,
t Se ats T\ inr6<na.<Tis and rb fivai OLVTUV cV T$ voeiffQai.
then, that the meaning of voâ as it occurs in this

section of the Parmenides may be satisfactorily
defined as "the
object of thought" without further
qualification. And it is of such a vbrjpa that the
interlocutors assume what by no means a
is truism,
viz. that it possesses the power of thinking.
We set out, then,impressed with the belief that
a vorjfjia has a capacity for vorjaw, and furnished with
Sokrates suggestion that each Idea is a vo^/ma. We
are, however, hampered by the difficulty which
Parmenides urged in the first horn of the dilemma,
viz., that if the Idea is a i/oâ, and if particulars
may be saidrwv elSwv /uereê^, particulars too consist

e/c vorj/udrcov in fact, are vorj/jiara and therefore ;
particulars ought always to be voovvra a result
which disproved by experience.

is difficulty This
vanishes with the surrender of the immanence of the
Ideas. Sokrates now declares that the peOegis is ov/c
a\\7j ri? TI eltcaaOrjvai, avrols (Farm. 132 D). Hence

particulars are no longer made up of voâra in such
a way as to be themselves the objects of pure thought ;
rather they should be described as o/jLoico/jLara or
jAijjirj/jLaTa of the Ideas. It follows or would follow,

if the conversation did not take another turn that a
particular as such is incapable of vbr)(n<s,

and we escape
the paradoxical conclusion that e.g. a palm-tree has
the faculty of thought indeed, we confine these
;
voijfjicna voovvra to the world of Ideas.

OF PLATO S ETHICS.
Having surmounted this obstacle, we reconnoitre

our position. Two principles of importance have been
deliberately admitted :
Firstly, in every instance of vbrjvis the voovêvov

must be a single real existence, an 6v TL.
Secondly, all voâra have a capacity for vorja^.

The Idea, then, on this
showing (i) is a really
existent unit. Consequently it will be possessed of
such properties and subject to such conditions as
may hereafter be proved essential to ovoria. (ii)
It is
a thought that thinks. Now to the question, "What

does it think ? we can but reply, Thoughts." And
"
"
since every vorjfj.a is a voovv, our answer means

"
Thoughts that think." Moreover, as we have

confined "Thoughts that think" to the world of
Ideas, we are now asserting that any given Idea
thinks Ideas. Thus the Ideal series, as at present
conceived, consists in certain voâra voovvra which
think themselves 7 and one another,8 the range of
7
Note that, when Sokrates answers in the affirmative the question,
Oi>x
fv6s Tii/os, & 7rl iraviv ^/celVo rb v6r)/j.a tirbv voe?, /j.iav Tiva oixroiv
I8fav; (Farm. 1320), it is not to the conception of the Idea thinking

itself that Parmenides demurs, but to the reappearance of the Idea as
previously defined with all its former disabilities.
8
In Phaedrus 247 C, D, soul is described as an ovrws . . ov<ria .
fj.6vtf 6tar^ v$. Of this intelligible entity it is said Ka6opa pey avr^v :
Sutaioffwrii , KaQopa 5e (Tw(ppo(rvvTjv, KaOopif, 5e firia T f]HTjv 1 yevtcris oi>x "?)
irp6cre<rTiv
. . . oAAo r^v eV T$ 6 Iffnv ttv tivrus firio-T^fjL rjv olffav Kal
r&\\a wo-avTws TO. ovra ovrtas Qfa<ra.^4vt] K.T.A.. Mutatis mutandis this
passage is applicable to the Idea as it is portrayed in the Parmenides.
io THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS
this mental activity being exclusively restricted to

the domain of Ideal truth :
Parm. 134 A OVKOVV Kal eiricrTrjfJM], fydvat,, avrrj
fjiev o eariv eTricmjiJir), rfjs o ecrrtv aX ndeia^ aim)?

av e/eeo^s eirj eTTLcrr^jjirj ; Haw ye. Efcdo-rf] Se
av TWV eTTio T rj/jLwv ?} <TTIV,
efcdo rov TWV OVTMV^ o
elrj av eVicrTrJyLt?y ^ ov ; Nal.
Let us here pause to enquire from what sources

these fundamental doctrines derive. The conviction
that every vorîa must be a voovv might primd facie
be ranged under the general belief that like is known "
by like," appeal being made to Plato s earlier utter

ance : Phaedo 80 A, B. rae rjfuv jfvaftaivei,, TW fjêv
6eiw /cal dOavdrw /cal vorjra) . . .

o/jLoiorarov elvai ^rv^v.
For if the soul resembles intelligibles, intelligibles
presumably resemble the soul. But it is one thing
to assert that the object of thought is incorporeal
(even the Stoics went thus far), and another thing

to hold that the thoughts of the thinking soul must
be themselves capable of thinking. This latter creed
was apparently based on the authority of the historical
Parmenides, from whose poem two passages may be
cited as illustrative of the point. The first of these
(ed. R. and P. vv. 39 40) is
yap av yvoirjs TO ye /ur) eov, ov yap awarov,

ovre <j>pdo-aw
TO yap avro voelv C&TIV r Kal elvai.
OF PLATO S ETHICS. n
The 9
general sense of the last clause is can think "
We
only of what exists and the argument
;
shows
"
that,
if we can think of nothing but TO 6V, TO fj,rj ov will be
both unknowable and unspeakable. In fact, Par-

menides held that every thought has a truly existent
content, inasmuch as TO voovpevov must ever be TO 6V,
And this is just what the Platonic Parmenides urges
in his first retort to Sokrates tentative reconstruction :
Farm. 132 B TI ovv, $avai, ev etcaarov ea-Ti rwv
L7reiv. *A\\a TWO? ; Nal. "Ovros f) OVK 6Wo<? /
The second passage to which I allude is (ed. R.

and P. vv. 94 96)
TWVTOV 8 earl voelv re Kal ovveicev eari
ov yap avev rov eoiro?, Iv a>
TrecfraTiafjLei
evpijaeis TO voelv.
The argument here may be thus paraphrased,

You do not find thought apart from TO 6V, wherein
thought finds its expression :
[You do not find thought s object apart from TO

6V:]
9
Literally, the words may be rendered "The same thing exists
both and (Datival Infinitive) : or possibly, giving

"
for thinking for being

to fffnv its technical meaning = "// we should translate // is the
is,"
"
same both for thinking and for being.

"
Ergo thought and thought s object are co-exten

sive 10 both are TO ov.
It be observed that the two passages are

will
complementary. The minor premiss, which is wanting

in the second, is exactly supplied by the first. The
argument as a whole, led to the simple corollary that,
if thought coincides with thought s object, that object
may be said to think. 11 And this, as we have seen,

was the substantial assumption of the Platonic Par-
menides in his second retort.
It is clear therefore, that, when
Farm. 132 B
in
seq. Plato puts into the mouth of the Eleate the two
weighty principles enunciated above, he is adducing

the actual tenets of the historical Parmenides as
10
It matters little whether we follow Simplicius (in Phys. A, ed.
Diels p. 87, 17) and translate "Thought is coincident with thought s
object,"
or adopt Mr. Burnet s version (Early Gr. Philos. p. 186) : "
It
is the same
thing that can be thought and for the sake of which the
thought exists." In the former case we identify the subject with the
object ofv6i]ffis, in the the latter the object with the subject. Whichever
rendering we choose, the argument will be the same, viz. x = =
z, and_y z,
therefore x =y.
11
I do not mean
to imply that Parmenides himself expressly drew
this inference, or spoke of rb %v as a vovs. We have no better authority
for such an assertion than Plotinus Enn. v. i. 8, and Simplicius in Phys.
A. ed. Diels p. 143, i8ff. Moreover, there is the negative evidence
of Plato, who, in Soph. 244 B, c, states that the Eleatics called their
principle by the two names ev and &v, but makes no mention of vovs
as a recognised appellation. My point is merely that the historical
Parmenides identification of voovêvov and voovv paved the way for the
Platonic Parmenides postulate of vo-fiftara voovvra.
OF PLATO S ETHICS. 13
corrective of his own unrevised Idealism. And we

begin appreciate the dramatic propriety which
to
caused him, at the expense of an obvious anachronism,
to choose Parmenides as his critic.
But the significance of that choice has not yet

full
been sounded. If Parmenides held that the object
thought was also the subject thinking, he did so only

because he identified both alike with TO ov. And
similarly Plato, who assumes that every vo^pa. voel,
must base assumption on the belief that in any

his
process of vorjcris the subject and the object are alike
referable to a single underlying entity. That entity

is described by him elsewhere in terms which corres
pond to the active and passive functions of the Ideal
Minds. As they are z/oâra, so It is a vorjrov :
Tim. 37 A ifrv%r}, ra)V voqrwv del re ovrwv VTTO rov
dpiarov dpicmy <yevofj,evrj yevvrjdevrayv. rwv

As they are voovvra, so It is a vovs :
Phileb. 30 C ea-rw, a 7roX\a/9 epi?*a/fcei>, aTreipov

re ev ra> iravrl TTO\V Kal Trepas Ircavbv /cai Tt9 ?r
aurot? atria ov <j>av\r} KOfffjiovcrd re real avvrdr-
rovca . . .
<70(f)la
teal vovs \eyofj,evrj SiKaiorar av.
Laws 897 C rj gvfjiTrao-a ovpavov 6809 apa Kal (f>opa
Kal rwv ev avrco ovr&v aTravrcov vov Kivijeei Kal
7repi<f)opa
Kal \o^La-îol^ Ofjioiav <f>v(Ti,
This conception of a vorjrbs vovs and of

voovvra may well have been the source of Aristotle s
statements concerning ra avev v\r)<$ vorjrd :

I 4 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS
Met. A. 7. 1072 b 2O eavrov Be voel 6 vovs /cara

rov vorjrov" vorjrbs yap ylyverai 0iy-
tea vowv, ware ravrbv vovs KOI vorjrov.
Ibid. A. 9. 1075 a
ov% erepov ovv
3 6Wo<? rov voov-
jjLevov
/cal rov vov, ova /JLTJ vXrjv eêt, TO avro-
earau KOI f) voxels TO) voovpevu) /juia.
Psych. T. 4. 12. 430^ 2 oVep av^âivei eVl TOU zôO.
/tat avro? 8e vorjros ecmv waTrep ra voTjrd. eVl
yuef 7p TWZ/ aêu ;X?;9 TO auTo eo-Tt TO voovv /cal

TO VOOV/JLVOV.
Porph. /
Categ. ed. Busse p. 91, 14 Xe7a>
6Vt
aljiw[iai avrbv (Aristotle) on, KVpLcorara Kara

avrbv /cal fjud\t,(TTa real TrpcoTft)? \eyoêvwv TrpooTwv
OVGIWV TMV vorjrcov olov TOV vorjTov Oeov /cal rov
vov /cat, eiirep elcrlv t 8eat, KOI TWV ISewv,
TrpcoTa? ovala? e^rj Ta? eV Tot?
may, unlocked for results have

But, be that as it
been reached. When Sokrates threw out his sug

gestion that the Idea might be a yoâ, he probably
meant no more than a human thought or concept.
By the aid of Parmenides questions we have now
come to see that the Ideas are beyond the reach of
particular cognition :
Farm. 134 B Ov/c apa VTTO ye TJ/JLWV ryiyvtocnce-Tai

elo*ct)v ovSev, eVetS^ avrfjs iTriavf)^^ ov
We must in fact conceive them to be a plurality

of Minds into which one supreme Mind has multiplied

itself, reproducing in them its own essential features
of thinking and being thought. Hence, if they are
called vofaaTa, primarily because they are the
it is
thoughts of that Intelligence which is their under

lying cause :
Plut. de placit. phil. i. 10 IlXarwv ^copto-ras rf)$
oucr/a? ra? t Sea? v7ro\afA{3dvei, eV rot?

Kal eV rat? <j>avTaa-iais
TOV Oeov, rov-
T6(7Tt, TOV VOV, V(f)(TTC0<TaS.
Stob. Eel. i6a (Aetios), ed. Wachsmuth i. p.

I. x.
127, 19 nâTcov Apto-TO) vos ISea 8e ovcria . . .
ao-(*)fj,aTO<; ev TO?? vorjfjiacn Kal rat?

rov Oeov.
Proklos in Farm. ed. Cousin v. 148
apa aXX^Xot? o re iôO? Kal ra et&q* Kal e/5 TTJV
Gvyyeveiav TavTrjVj a>?

efjuol SoKel, d7ro/3\e7T(i)v Kal
6 2(0KpdTr)s TCL iSrj vorj/jiaTa a<pa)plcaTO.
secondarily because they mentally regard themselves

and one another.
A scrutiny of Farm. 132 B scq. has brought us,
then, to the following conclusion. Plato, at the time
when he reconstituted his early theory of Ideas, held
on the one hand that the object of any process of
pure thought must be a single real existence, and on
the other that such an object must itself possess the
power of pure thinking. These two articles of belief

he had adopted from the writings of Parmenides, a
16 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS
philosopher for whom he entertained the deepest

reverence.
12
And further, he had adopted them on
the original ground of their validity, namely the
recognition of one underlying entity :
Farm. 128 A Mav0dva>, etVew/ TOV Zcofcpdrrj, o>
IIapiJ,evi&r], . . . &v pev yap ev rot?
ev <$9
elvai TO irdv, Kal TOVTWV TKjjLrjpia
/caXto<? re /cal ev.
As applied to his own Idealism, their immediate

result was to warrant him in positing a single really
existent Mind and conditioning cause of a
as basis
series of really existent Minds called the Ideas, the
object of thought for any given Mind being itself or
any other Mind. The relation thus formulated may

be denoted, at any rate provisionally, by the accom
panying diagram :
vovs = The Supreme Mind.
voovvra. The Series of Ideas.
12
Cp. Theaet. 183 E riopêvi Sr/y 5e p.oi Qaiverai, rb TOV
al5o"i6sre /j.01 ?yat o/ta Seivds re ... KOI pot ft ados <f>dvr)
n
ytvvcuov, Soph. 237 A rbv TOV iraTpbs Hapnevtiov \6yov
II. The Sop /list.

Thus far the components of the Platonic scheme
have been characterised as oWa and as voovvra
voovpeva. It may now be shown that these charac
teristics involve certain further properties, without
which any account of real and phenomenal nature
would be altogether inadequate.
In Soph. 248 A the el8&v draw a distinction </\ot
between yevea-Ls and ovcria the changeable nature of :
the former we apprehend through our body by means

of sense-perception ;
the changeless nature of the latter
we apprehend through our soul by means of reasoning.
Again, in 248 C these same adherents of vorjra teal
dcroofjiaTa ei&rj declare that yeveo-is lies within, true

cvcrla without, the domain of iroielv KOL Trdaêtv.
While passing these opinions in review, the Eleate s
remarks are supplementary rather than destructive.

He points out that, if the Idealists hold, on the one
hand that ovaia yiyvtocriceTai,, and on the other hand
that ovaia is a-Tratfrj?, then to avoid inconsistency
they must by the process which they describe as TO

<yi<yv(ixTKeiv rf
TO <yi<yvto(TKe(TQ(u
mean something totally
different from a 7roir)/j,a rj TrdOos. If, however, TO
<yL<yv(ti<rtceiv
is point of fact Troielv
in TI and the
Stranger s words hint that such is the case then
they will allow that its correlative TO yiyvwo-KeaOcu
must be Trao-êw Tt, and, still holding to their doctrine
2
that ovffia is yiyvcoa-Ko/jLevrj VTTO TTJ? 7^c6cre&)?,they will

admit that icaO* oaov yiyvaya-fteTai, Kara TOGOVTOV tcivelrai
Sta TO irdo-êiv.
In this paragraph the Eleate s critique of Idealism
brings before us two conceptions :
That ovffia is aTraBrfs, if truly known

and
(i)
must be known in some sense of the word know "
ledge which transcends the

"
71-0/77^,0, f) trdBos properly
attached to any process of yiyvcaaKeiv rj yiyvaMTKecrOai.

What higher intellectual state may be we are
this
not yet told, but bearing in mind the ovra of the

Parmenides, which were further determined as voovvra
and voovfJLeva, we
presume that it is vorjcris, pure
shall
thought, and our presumption will be justified by the

immediate sequel.
(ii)
That ova-ia TrdaêL, so far at least as it
provides an object for 7^w<rt?, rightly so called,
and that therein it departs from its own rjp^^ ia.

In effect the Stranger rules, and Theaetetus
accepts his ruling, that ovcrla is double-faced :
(i)
As the subject and object of vorja-^ it is
(ii)
As the subject and object of yvwcns it
la
Arist. Topica Z. IO. 148 a 2O a-rraOf is yap Kal aitivriTOi $oicov<nv at
tSeat roTs \syovffiv t Se as flvai,frag. 184. 151004 eri Siaiperal kv elef al

itieai Kal /j.epi(TTai, olaai airadels, Diog. Laert. III. 12, 13 e<m Seruv
flSuv fv GKaffTov aiSidv re Kal v6f]/j.a Kal irpbs TOVTOIS airades. Hence
Ideal monads are said to be cnraBe is in Met. A. 9. 991 b 26 ouSey yap>
avrals oUv re virapx^v irdOos, ibid. M. 8. 1083 a 9. Compare Aristotle s

OF PLATO S ETHICS.
Can we, however, reconcile these opposing con

ceptions ? Can we predicate both aspects alike of
the same ova-la ? This is the problem to which the
Eleate now addresses himself in a passage of unusual
lucidity and directness.
He contends (249 A) that TO Tra^reXw? bv cannot
be cepvov Kal ayiov, vovv ov/c e%ov. And if z/ou? be
present, we shall be forced, he says, to admit also
far), and tcivqa K. At the same time we must
^t>%77,
be careful to retain that element of erracrt?, without

which vovs could not anywhere exist.
Ovcrla then, wherever it is found, will be endowed
with two qualities which are evavTiwrara d\\r)\ois,
namely :
(i) with arda-^j in which case we have 1/01)5 ;
(ii)
with Kivrja-is, in which case we have far; and
Soph. 249 D ro3 8?; 0\ocr6<ft>

. . . Trdcra dvdj/crj
. . . Kara TTJV TWV nrai^wv ev^rjv ocra dtcivrjTa
Kal KKt,vrjfjLeva TO ov T teal TO 7rav gvva/jL(j)6Tepa u
\eyeiv.
own doctrine :
Psych. A. 4. 14. 408 b 29 6 8e vovs fooos Qei6rep6v Kal n
O7ro06s f<rnv, ibid. F. 5. i. 430 a 17 Kal OVTOS 6 vovs (the vovs iroiyTiKts)
Xopio-rbs Kal afj.iy^s Kal airad-f)s, rrj ovffia &v evepyeia, Met. A. 7. 1073 a
1 1 which predicates airaOes Kal ava\\oiwrov of the ovffia . . . aiSios Kal
aKlvrjTos Kal Kexpto7i"? T^"
ala-Bijruv. Hermes (quoted by Stob.
Ed. I. Ixi. i, ed. Wachsmuth i.
p. 275, 17) has 6 vovs a-rraO-fis.
14
This explains why the definition of ovrus $>v
given in Soph. 247 E,
248 c was regarded as provisional and not final. Whatever possesses
this all-important result to the issues

Applying
of last section, we note that the argument from the
Partnenides dealt with only one side of the truth. It
regarded ova-la as the subject and object

of voâ-is,
without taking into account any lower intellectual

faculty, such as that of yvwatf
or \oîcrfio^. The
Sophist warns us against persisting in
such neglect.
It bids us to observe that the supreme of the i>oD?
Philebus is not only a 1/01)9, but also a voyrbv
Cp. Tim. 39 E iva roS &><?

o/jLoiorarov 77 TCO
Kal vorjrq) co&>

Trpo? TTJV TT}? Statoma? fJiipr}(Tiv
Phileb. 30 D OVK.OVV eV . . .
rfj TOV Jto? e/aet? </>
ecrOcu $t>a
TTJV rr}<?
alrias
and that the ideal voriâra of the Parmenides are not

only vorj/jLaTa, but also vorjTa %wa
Cp. 7Y;#. 30 C ra yap 8^ vorjra fwa iravfa eicelvo
ev eavrw TrepiXafibv e%et.
7foV/. 31 A TO 7ap irepieôv Travra, OTroaa voTjTa

o^
fcoa.
inasmuch as every you?, whether supreme or sub-
power of doing or suffering would indeed aptly characterise oltrla

"
the
qua subject and object of yvuxris. But qua subject and object of v6r](rts
this same ova-la was admitted to be ccTroflfc. Consequently, unless
Svvafjus can be taken to denote the power of passing from the first
or
static into the second or kinetic condition, we must substitute the
amended definition implied in 249 D.

ffi
2
ordinate, is forced by the necessary nature of its
own ova-la to pass out of its tranquil airddeia into

the TroirjfjLara and TraOrj/jiaTa of animation. 15 Thus
by emphasising the fact that, wherever pure thought
is found, there will its shadow the lower mental
phase be found also, it enables us to extend our
previous scheme as in the diagram.
III. Aristotle s Psychology.
Having learnt in the preceding section that all

ovaia deserving of the name must necessarily pass
from higher to lower phase, we have yet to enquire
15
For Plato s conviction that vovs must be attached to tyvx^ see the
following passages :Phileb. 300 /J.TIV Kal vovs avev ^VXTJS OVK &v
(ro<pia
7TOT6 yfvo urdrjv, Farm. 132 B /u^ TUV ci Swi/ fKa<rrov 77 TOVTWV voT]/j.a, Kal
ovSanov ainif TTpoa-f}KTj tyyiyvfffOai &\\o6t 4) iv tyvxais, Soph, 249 A ciAAa

Tavra /J.fv aju</>oT6pa (vovs and ^0)77) eV^r aur Ae-yo/iei/, ou /Arjv cV tyvxfi
*ye <f> fi<ToiJ.v

avrb %X flv oura; /cal TtV b.v frepov fX l
Tp6irov ; Tim. 30 K
vovv S a5 X U P^ S ^ U X^ J afivvarov irapayeveaQai ry, Ibid. 46 D TUV yap
OVTWV $ vovv fj.6v(f) KTOLcrdai Trpoo"f]Ki,
\fKTfov îvx^]v. Compare Arist.
Psych. F. 4. 4. 4290; 27 Kal fv ty ol \eyovres ryv ^t/xV ^vai TOTTOV eiSuv,
TT\))V on ovrt o\r] d\A

r} vorjriK-f], ovrt 4vrf\fx f t
ic AAo Svvd/nei TO, elfSyj,
Met. A. 1070 a 26 TJ ^vx^l 3. Tao-o oAA o vovs, Archytas in .
^
frag. phil. Gr. ed. Mullach i, 565 afoQacris fj.fv Iv (report yivfrai, vaos
8
16
See Soph. 249 B uyuau ei 6 ovv, & eo/Trjre, aKiv^rwv T ovruv
vovv wSfvl ire pi wo eris flvai ^Sa/jiov, the counterpart of 249 C Tt 5 ;
&vtv rovrtDV (sc. rov Kara ravra K.T.A.) vovv xaQopas ovra ^ yev6/j.fvov
if Kal btrovovv ;
how this passage may be effected, transporting us as
it does from the realm of serene intelligence

Tim. 5 2 A TO Kara ravrd eZSo? e%oVj &y&Wov Ka ^
dva>\e6pov,
ovT6 et? eavro elo-êôfêvov a\\o
a\\o0ev ovre avro ft? a\\o Trot lov, doparov Se
teal aXXcw? aval(T0ijTOV, TOVTO o Brj 1/6770-6?
to the world of complex sensitivity

Laws 896 E ay 61 [lev Srj ^w^r] Trawra ra
ovpavov ical yfjv teal Od\arrav rat? avrrjs Kivrj-
crecriv, at? ovofjuard IVTL /SovXecrQai,
, \VTTOV/jievrjv, Oappovaav, (f>oflov-
fjbiaovcrav, crrepyovaav, ical Trdaais ocrat,
Trpwrovpyol Kivr](7î^
%vy<yvels f) ra? Sevrep-
ovpyovs av TrapdXafjiftdvovcrai Kivr)Gi<$
ayovo-i, irdvra et? av^cnv Kal <j>6iaiv
fcal
Kal <rvy/cpi(Tiv.
The method of transition will, I think, be best fol
lowed by the aid of a vexed paragraph in Aristotle s
Psychology. I shall first state what I take to be the

argument of that paragraph ;
and then offer some
justification for the meaning which I
assign to its
several parts.
Aristotle s thesis is (Psych. A. 2. 6. 404^ 8) that
those thinkers, who find the main characteristic of
in TO yivcoo-Keiv Kal TO al<r9dve<r6ai, identify
witn their dp^ or apât. Empedokles, for
example, constructs the percipient soul out of the

same six elements which go to form the percepts of
his system. And that Plato acted in a similar way
may be inferred from three considerations 17 :
(i)
In the Timaeus Plato makes both 77 ^nJ\r] and
TCL TTpdyfjiara out of the same elements (sc. ravrbv and
Odrepov, combining to produce ovo-ia).
In ra irepl $t\ocro(/av \e^6êva he distinguishes

(ii)
four stages in the evolution of the percipient Idea
corresponding to four stages in the evolution of the

percept Ideas. These four are 77 TOV ei o? ZSea, and
Trpwrov JU.T}*O<?, TTp&Tov TrXaro?, irpwrov fiddos.
(iii) The percipient Idea thus evolved apprehends
by means of four faculties (namely i/ofc, and eirtffrtffjLr),
Sofa, cucr0rj<n<i),
which correlate with four eiSrj TOW
irpayiJidrwv, with things grouped according to the

i.e.
said four stages in the evolution of the percept Ideas.

For these reasons Aristotle concludes that Plato,
like Empedokles, constructed the subject and the
17
I append the exact words :
Psych. A. 2. 7. 404 16 TOV avrbv
T^V ^vx^v 4* ruv (TTOI^ MV irotet

*
8e Tpoirov KO.\ UXdrwv Iv r$ Ti/j.ai(f
yivdxTKea-Qai y&p r$ 6/j.oi(p TJ ftpoiov. TO. 5e Trpdyâra IK ruv apx&v elvai.

6/jLoia>s
5e Kal Iv rols irepl <pi\o(ro<l)ias \9yofltvotS Siupiffdifj, avrb JJLSV rb
<aov
e| avrys TT}S TOV tvbs iSeas Kal TOV irpuTov p-^Kovs Kal irXaTovs Kal
fidQovs, TO. 5 a\\a op,oioTp6Tr<as.
ert 8e Kal a\\ws, vovv n\v TO 4V,
firio T fjiJ.rfV 5 TO Svo fj-ovax^s y&p * 4"

*v >
T ^ I/ &* rov eVtTreSov apiO/mbr
86j-av, at<rQi}<nv
5e T~bv TOV o~Tpfov of p.ev yap apid/JLol TO. eftr;
oura Kal
apxal f\4yovTO tlffl 8 e/c TU>V

o-Totxfiw ,/fptVerot 5e TO. Tfpa.yp.aTa TO.
/jLfV v$, TO. 8 ^7r/(TT7)fi77, TO. Sc 86i;T), TO. 8 alo~0-f)fffi ftSr; 8 of api6fj.ol
OVTOl T&V
object of cognition out of the same constituents and
by parallel processes, thereby preserving the law ytva)-

a-KtcrOai TO opoiov rc5 6/W&) (Psych. A. 2. 20. 405 b 15).
i. The first of the three clauses here summarised
represents Plato as arguing to this effect :
(a) Like is known by like.
(b) ra TT
pay par a (i.e. things in general, the object
of knowledge) are formed IK. rwv dp^Mv.
(c) Therefore tyvxh

too (the subject^ of knowledge)
must be made IK rwv crroiêiwv.
This conclusion, says Aristotle, is to be found in
the Timaeus. And we can hardly doubt that he refers
on the one hand to Tim. 35 A, where the cosmic soul
is composed of ravrov and ddrepov, which coalesce to
produce ovaia and on the other hand to Tim. 41 D,

;
where the subordinate souls are compounded of the

same ingredients, though in a less pure condition. It
seems certain, therefore, that by ra Grroêla Aristotle
here denotes the principles of Identity and of Differ
ence, which are represented in the Timaeus by the
symbols ravrov and Sdrepov.
Again, the force of the argument depends on the
identification of these o-rotêta with al apâl. It has,
indeed, been suggested that ra cnoiyzla are ravrov,

Odrepov and ovcria considered as the elements of the
18
Cp. Simplic. in Arisl. Psych, ed. Hayduck p. 29, II
roivvv (is TOS a.px-s ra re yixaara TTOJ/TO, rovrfffri TO 6Vro, /cai ras
TOVTUV 8vvd.iJ.fiS
material world, whereas at ap-âi are the same prin
ciples considered as the constituents of the immaterial

soul ;
but I fail to find adequate support for such a
view in either Platonic or Aristotelian diction. If any
distinction is to be drawn, 19
should prefer to say that I
ravrbv and Od-repov regarded by themselves as ulti

mate principles are apxai, regarded as the elements
of derived existences are aroiêla cp. :
Arist. Met. N. 4. 1091^ 3 Sta TO TO ev apyj)v KOI
dpxn v &>?
(rroiêlov KalTovdpiOôveKTOV 1/69.
Ibid. N. 4. lOQI^ 19 TO i*ev $dvai Trjv

elvai, ev\oyov d\ij6e<;
elvaf TO
rj JJ,TJ rovro, GTOiyziQV re

elvai TO ev, et
KOI (TTOiêlov dpiOfjLwv, dSvvarov.

Ibid. N. 4. IO92# 6 nraaav aroLêlov dp^v
TTOLOVCTI,.
However that may be, both terms are regularly

employed by Aristotle to describe the same two bases
of Platonism :
e.g.
Met. N. I. 1087$ 12 d\\a /JLrjv KOL Ta? dpâ^ a?

Ka\ovGriv ov /taXw? d jroîSoaa iv ol
TO /JLeya ical TO fiitcpbv \eyovres /JLCTCL TOV
rpia ravra (noiêla TWV dpidjjiwv.

Ibid. M. 9. 1086^: 26 eVet ovv \eyova-i Tives roiav-
Ta9 elvai Ta9 t 8ea9 KOI dpiOpovSj Kal ra Toi>9
TOVTWV aroLêla rwv OVTWV elvai, o-TOtêta Kal

K.T.\.
19
Stob. Ed. i. x. i6b, ed. Wachsmuth i.
p. 128, 14 has ol ^v olv
rjyovvrai
And the substitution of rwv dp^wv for TWV

if
within the bounds of a single argument seem strange,

it is corroborated by the similar case of
Met. M. /. !O8l# 31 avdyrcrj 8 , eVetTrep ffrai TO
ev KOI Sua? (Troiêla. el 5 dSvvara

f) dopKTTO?
rd crvfJijBaivovTa, real ra? ap%a? iivai Tavras

dBvvarov.
The outcome of this first clause, therefore, is that

is an ova-la inasmuch as it is composed
which
ty v xtf
of ravrou and ddrepov has for the content of its
cognitions objects formed of the same constituents as
itself, in short other psychic ovcriat,. And whereas,
when dealing with vorjo-is only, we concluded that the
object of thought for any given Mind is itself or any
other Mind, we have now extended the same con
clusion to the whole ^rvxn whereof i/oO? is the static
phase, and are prepared to affirm that the object of

cognition for any such eptyvxov is itself or any similar
Moreover in the terms ravrbv and Odrepov we have

obtained a convenient notation 20 for higher and lower
psychosis, which permits us to re-edit our scheme in
the appended form.
ii. The precise import of the second clause is less
20
Foreshadowed in dialogues earlier than the Timaeus, e.g. Soph.
249 B TO Kara ravra /cal U<TO.VTWS /cal irepi rb avr6 K.r.K. Farm. 1580
TV fTfpav Qixriv TOV effiovs (= Tim. 35 A TV Qarepov fyvffiv).
easy to determine and widely divergent views have

;
been advanced, of which some account must be

rendered before further progress is possible.
Simplicius (in Arist. Psych, ed. Hayduck p. 28,

22 seqq.} takes the whole clause 6/W<o? Se /cai . . . ra
8 a\\a ofuiOLorporrax; to be descriptive of ra <yi>a)orrdj
the objects known : the next words, ert Se KOL a\\ws

.... ai(r6r]cnv Se rov rov crrepeoO, then denote ra
yvwcrrifcd, the subjects knowing : and the concluding
lines, ol fjuev yap apiOfjLol . . . ol dpiBfJbol ovroi rwv rrpaj-
fjbdrwv, point between object and
the parallelism
subject. But, apart from the fact that (a) the words
en Se teal a XAw? clearly mark a third exposition
coordinate with rov avrbv oe rporrov tc.r.\. and oyiWw?
oe Kal AC.T.X. rather than a mere sub-section, this
division (b) introduces special difficulties into the
passage with which we are immediately concerned.
For, granted that by avro ro wov is meant the

21
to ra avro-
intelligible world (6 IÔT/TO? 8^*007x09 e*>
etoij), and by ra a\\a the knowable opinable and

sensible world (ra \oirra rr}? rwv yvcocrrwv
21
I fail to see any such justification for the term as Mr. Wallace
(ed. Arist. Psych, p. 205) finds in Tim. 308 ovrtas ovv 5^ Kara \6yov
SeT \eyeiv r6v5f rbv K6<r/J.ov oaov ^fj^vôv evvovv re rrj
Sta TOV Qeov yeveffdai trpovoiav. The cosmos can only be
described as a uov in so far as its intelligibility implies the evolution
of eTrto-T^Tci, Soâcrrd, ajVflTjra and this is just what Simplicius would
exclude ;
for these he finds in T& &\\a.
ra eTTKrrrjrd TO, Boâara ra atffBrjrefy, itcan hardly be

said that the latter is constructed o/jboiorpoTrw? with
regard to the former. Simplicius himself acknow

ledges ra a\\a to be 6fc rwv dp^wv fjiev rwv et Scoi/, . . .
ovKen etc rwv avroap^wv 009 etc

<7Totê/ft)i/,
aXA, ef
to? er) Y)iJLevwv < e > alrlwv rwv
Themistius, who (66 B, ed. Spengel p. 2oseqq.) simi

larly finds in the words 6/Wo>?
e ât . . .
oôLOTpoirw^
a description of the cosmos as object thought, and in
the succeeding clause an account of the soul as sub
ject thinking, is liable to the same objections, viz.
(a) that in the words oyLto/w? Be KOI . . .
o/jLoiorpoTrcos we
expect to discover a comparison between
and 7^w(TToi/, not between different kinds of
and (6) that the phrase ra 8 aXXa 6yu,otor/307rco9 is an
22
over-statement of the case.
Nor does Philoponus (C. fol. 2 A) improve upon
this by understanding ra a\\a of such ill-assorted
elements as ra vorjrdj ra (frvffiKa, and ra alffdrjrd. As

Trendelenburg remarks Neo-Platonica
"
satis olent."
Lastly, Sophonias gives, along with much irrelev

ant matter, the view of his predecessors (de Anim.
paraph, ed. Hayduck p. 13, 6), making both members
22
Themistius explanation is T& ^tv olv avro&ov, row cert rbv
KOfffJLOV TOV VOTIT^V, ^K TU>V
TTp(t>TUV
tlTo lOW apX&V, TO. M /uLfpOUS fK
TUV vQei/jifvui &ffirep yap rck a(V0i}rck *x ei VP^ &\\T)\a. OUTW xal ras
IS fas avrwv irpbs oAA^jAas *x flv ( e d. Spengel p. 21).
of the clause under discussion descriptive of the object

of cognition rerrapa yap avrq) :
oroiêta rov . . . . . .
vorjrov ^LaKoafJLOV TreTroirjvrat,^ ev (o rb rwv ISewv ir\r]-
rb avroev, f) avrobvds, r) avrorpids fcal rj

avrorer-
deft MVTrep /col 6 al&OrjTbs ouro? KOO-/JLOS r/pr^rat co?

UTT alrlov TOV vorjrov teal at dp%al avrov efceWev.
Passing from the older commentators to more
recent interpreters, we find Trendelenburg though
in several points correcting their extravagance still
misled by them as to the sequence of the main

argument :
quemadmodum pergitur, ut similia

"
Ita et Plato,
similibus cognoscerentur, eosdem numeros
avToôoov fecit, eosdem menti indidit. Sic
utraque loci pars artissime coniungenda, neque

altera ab altera divellenda, quasi ab illo ert 5e
2
KOL a\Xo)5 novi quid incipiatur."
The result of this misconception is that he fails to
explain the words ra 8 a\\a o/zotorpoTTG)? :
Quae fuerint haec reliqua, non definimus, univer-

"
sas tantum ideas, ne quid Platoni obtrudatur,

24
intellegentes."
He aware that the explanations propounded by

is
Simplicius and Philoponus are unsatisfactory,

but
has little to offer in their stead.
23 ed. 1877, P- l8 7-
Arist. deanima,
24 88.
Ibid. p. 1
Others have seen that the key to the passage lies in

the very divulsio which Trendelenburg deprecates.
"
"
Dr. Jackson, for example, proposes to translate avrb

TO %wov by "the universal Subject"^ and ra d\\a by
"the universal Object? This is a distinct move in
the right direction it is, however, open to criticism
:
on the following grounds :
(a) An inexact and therefore unsatisfactory mean

ing is attached to the words which describe "the
"
universal Subject :
avTo nev TO ffiov e f ai/r?}<? T?}? TOV ^05 ZSea? KOI TOV
TTpCOTOV fjLlj/COVS Kal 7T\aTOV 9 Kol ftdOoV<$.
The phrase avrrjs TT}? TOV ez/o? /Sea? would thus be

loosely used for avTov TOV 0/05.
(/3) Elsewhere term avTo TO tyov

in Aristotle the
signifies merely the Idea from which a particular

animal derives animality, the Idea of "animal,"
its
e.g. Met. Z. 14. 1039$ 9 16 iroKka ecrrai CLVTO TO

wov K.T.\. ibid. M.
1085^ 26 TTOTepov TO 9.
avTo ev To3rj eTepov avTov
a)w ^toov^frag. 184.
14 fl fAV Kal %WOV (7Ti, /i6T6%Ot CLV Kal UVTOV TOV (t)OV.
Plato himself employs the plural of the same term to
describe the Ideas of animals generally :
23
That is, the supreme Nous in its passage into cosmic existence, as
opposed to that cosmic existence which originates from the evolution of
the supreme NoOs.
Rep. 532 A 7T/309 avra ij^rj ra wa ejnîpelv arro-

{3\e7T6lV Kal 7T/905 CLVTCL CLCTTpa tf.T.A,.
I conclude, therefore, that to restrict the phrase to

universal Subject" is a limitation unwarranted
"the
by either Aristotelian or Platonic usage.
Mr. Wallace, who interprets avro TO oi> as "
the
"
subject knowing i.e. the microcosm, and ra a\\a as

"the
objects known" i.e. the macrocosm, escapes the
first of these objections because the particular foW
(the microcosm) is of course the given Idea (97
rov <h>o?
IBea) as it appears in three-dimensional space. But

he too traverses the terminology of Aristotle, who by
ctvro TO foW elsewhere denotes not a particular 26 but
an Idea.
Another suggestion takes both avro TO fcooi/ and
ra a\\a as "subjects" the contrast between subject
and object being not expressed but only implied in
the sentence. The former will then mean the supreme
&W ;
the latter the subordinate wa. This view, apart
from its liability to the objections which I have brought
against Dr. Jackson s version, seems to me to destroy

the balance of Aristotle s triple argument. should We
have him adducing three clauses for the express pur
pose of pointing out the similarity between subject
26
Plato, according to Mr. Archer-Hind s rendering, uses auri rb
&ov of the individual animal in Tim. 89 B : but the passage, as we
shall see, may be taken differently.
and object, and then omitting to make any mention

27
of that object in the central clause of the three.
It is, think, possible to rectify all these flaws

I
as the absolute
"
by understanding avro TO a>o*>
animal" any given vor\rov ^wov (whether it

that is
be the iravreXes &ov of Tim. 3 1 B, or one of the eV
/zepou? et Set wa
of Tim. 30 C), and ra a\\a as tlie "
remaining absolute animals? This somewhat obvious

rendering of the words ra a\\a is suggested by Philo-
ponus (C. 2 ra S aXXo- o/xoiorpoTrci)?, ra aXXa, rjrot . . .
TI
ra a\\a rra palely para, olov TO avroicaXov, TO avrodv-
^pt7T09, Kal eVt TWV \onra)v o/ô/co?)
and strongly
supported by the variant readings 8 aXXa? T<?
(Themist. 66 B) and T? aXXa? 6//,oto-

(Philop. C. 2), which refer clearly to the
remaining ISeai. That the phrase is a natural one
may be gathered from such expressions as the fol
lowing :
Tim. 3OC ov e cm raXXa o>a tcaO"

1
ev ical Kara ye
Ibid. 90 E ra yap a\\a a)a fj <yeyovi>

av tc.r.X.
Phaedr. 247 E KOI ra\\a waavrcos ra ovra

K.r.\.
27 This is in a manner the converse of Trendelenburg s error. For

he, following the lead of the Greek commentators, held that
both parts
of the clause referred to the objects of cognition ; and the present sugges
tion makes both parts refer to the subjects of cognition.
Both the given fwoi/ as percipient and the remain

ing coa as percepts are constructed o/zotorpoTrco?, since
in every case an absolute animal if subjected to
logical analysis will be found to consist of that form

of TO ev which is appropriate to itself (hence the
article T?}<?
rov evbs ISeas) and the successive dimen
sions through which it is evolved.
This interpretation escapes the two objections
urged on p. 34 by admitting the claim of any and
every intelligible animal to the title avrb TO fwoz/,
28
instead of confining the term to the supreme woi>.
It preserves too the symmetry of the argument ;

and
that, not only by emphasising Aristotle s main con
tention the similarity between percipient and percept
but also by identifying the subject of the present
with that of the preceding sentence : for in the first
clause we saw that any given eftTJrvxov

whether it
be the whole cosmic &ov or one of the partial Ideal

wa. is formed out of the same elements as the other
e^vâ which constitute the objects of its cognition ;
and now in the second clause we see that any given

avrb CJMOV whether it be the whole cosmic animal or
28 As a matter of fact excluding Tim. 89 B, at present subjudice

the supreme &ov is not elsewhere, either in Plato or Aristotle, called
avrb rb &ov. It is however spoken of as aurb faov in Tim. 37 C, D us
5e mvriQev aur& /col &v lv6-n<Tf . . .
KaOdirfp ovv aur2>
rv-yx^ 1 uov
Proklos on
aiSiov ov /C.T.A.., which is perhaps the passage referred to by
UTT& rov
Tim. 40^ I/OTJT^ Travruv curia /cal TrapaStiy/jiaTiKTi
r<av
5rjfj.iovp-
yov TrotoujueVwi/. V fal avroûiov Siet TOVTO /ca\e?v 6 U\O.TUV ftit

one of the partial Ideal animals is developed through

the samefour stages as the other which consti
o>a
tute the objects of its cognition. The argument, I
conceive, is exactly parallel in the first two clauses,

and raises a presumption that it will be so in the
third also.
But before passing to the last consideration we
must enquire further concerning the nature of the
four stages that have hitherto been mentioned without
comment. Aristotle alludes to them again in Met. M.
2. 1077*2 24 e-ri al 76i>e<76t? Trpwrov JJLW jap
&r)\ovcrw.
eVt fjLrjKos yiyverai, etra 7rl
TrXarov, re\vraiov 8 et?
/3a#o9, Kal reXo? ecrêv. And his remarks both there

and here are best elucidated by a reference to Plato s
Laws 894 A
rj
Trdvrcov ryeveaw, fjViK av ri 7ra#o? 77 ;
SrjXov &)? OTTOTCIV ap%^ \a/3ovcra avr]v et? rrjv
Sevrepav e\6r) peTdpaGiv, Kal diro Tavrrjs et9
TT\i)(riov, Kal ^XP 1

Tpi&v eXdovaa alaOrjcriv
rot? alcrdavofJbivoLS. fjL6ra/3d\\ov fjue
Kal fjLTaKivov{jievov <yL<yveTai

Trdv eart Se
OK, oirorav jmevp- perapaXov 8e et? a\\r)v e
From these citations I conclude that the Platonic

Idea possesses four phases or conditions, whereof the
first is opposed to the remaining three as OVTWS ovaia

to yeveais. As 6W&>5 bv Aristotle calls the Idea aurrj
rj rov evbs ISea and Plato adds that it fjuevei (= the
;
of Soph. 2496, c). As 7*71/0/^6^0^ Aristotle

couples it with space of one, two, and three dimen
sions and Plato adds that it is developed through
;
these same stages /jLera0d\\ov ical ÎCLKIVOVILGVOV

29
(=the KivTjax of Soph. 249 A, B).
Thus, on the one hand, the separation between
Ideal ovaia and phenomenal yevecrw, enquired after
by the Platonic Parmenides
Farm. 1 30 B avrbs crv ovrw Siyprjcrai co? Xeyet?,
k fJLev el S?; avTa arra, %w/H9 Se TCL TOVTWV
and affirmed by the elSwv 0t\ot

Soph. 248 A <yev6(TW) vrjv Se ovaiav %wpt5 TTOV
pevoi \eyere ; rj yap ; Nai

ls still retained in Plato s mature ontology ;
for the
Idea eaTW 6Wo>? ov oTrorav ^vy êra(Ba\ov 8e 6t?

a\\rjve&v îeÔapTai iravrekw. While, on the other
hand, neither the Ideal nor the phenomenal world is
for crrao-t? and
complete apart from its correlative ;
/civrjaiSj although eWzmcoraTa aXXrJXot?, are both

essential factors
ovo-ia, of every case which is in
evolved from the single state of the former through

the threefold condition of the latter.
There are two further reflections suggested by the

passage from the Laws, which may be briefly indi-
29
[Alexander] in Arist. Met. M. 2. 1077^ 14 ed. Hayduck p. 731,
16 TTptrepov yap firl HTJKOS yiverai r/ a#|7?<rts ^ 6\ws

fireiTa ets TrAaros, elra ets
cated here, (a) In the first place, without discussing

the details of the context in which that passage is set
I may
point out that by the dpxn of Laws 894 A Plato
means tyvxn- Thus much is clear from the similarity
of the language that follows in 896 A, B
dpa eri 7ro0ovfjL6i> /z?) iKavws BeSelÔat, "^v^v

ravrov
ov /cal rrjv Trpairrjv êvecnv KOI icivr)aiv rwv re OVTGOV
/cal tyeyovorwv KOI ea-oêvwv KCU rrdvrwv av r&v
evavrleov TOVTOIS, eTreiBtf 76 avefydvr] /jL6ra(3o\rj<^
re
KOL Kivrjaews airaarfi air la arraaiv ; OVK, d\\a
l/cavcorara e$Lfcrai, royv iravrwv
tyv^rj rrpecr-
ffvrdrr), (fraveiad 76 dp^rj Kwrja-ews.

This identification 30 supports my contention that
avro ro tfaov, the subject of the second clause in the
argument from Aristotle s Psychology, is not to be

distinguished from ^rvx>l,
the subject of the first
clause in the same argument ;

inasmuch as the
four stages assigned by the PsycJiology to the avro
tfaov are by the Laws attributed to -v/ri^. (b)
Secondly, the full phrase dpyri Kwiiaew, which re

calls the language of earlier days (Phaedrus 245 c
Trrjyrj KOI dp^ Kivija-ews), may be taken to include

both aspects of -v/ru^ the rjpepia of its higher, and
30
If it be objected that Aristotle (vid.
p. 27) uses the term apxî to
denote not ^vx?i but the elements of which \^vxî is constructed, I answer
that the pupil s usage is no voucher for the master s. Indeed Aristotle
himself (Psych. A. 2. 7. 404^ 24), as we shall see
directly, complains
that Plato "calls the api6fMol efSrj /cai ap al whereas
X they really are
K TUV
the Kivrja-is of its lower intellectuality. The compiler

of the Platonic opoi was not far wrong when he
defined vorjcris as ap^rf brurnjitifi, and aiadr)cns as
vov KivrjGis.
But the mention of the diverse faculties of ^rv^rj
reminds us that we have still to analyse the remainder

of Aristotle s argument, which treats of them seriatim.
iii. The third clause is epitomized by Dr. Jackson
as follows
We reduce things to apidôi (i.e. Ideal Numbers),
and therefore to the elements of these aptOfJioij
sc. to i. 2. 3.4.
Again, the processes of mind are expressed by the

same elements, 1.2. 3.4.
This interpretation, though furnishing the needed

parallelism between subject and object, labours under
two serious drawbacks :
(a) The aroLêla of the Ideal apiO/Aol are not the

numbers 1.2. 3.4., but the principles of Identity and
Difference, which were technically known by this very

name ; see, for example,
Met. N. I.
io8/ 14 peya KOI TO
ol TO
\eyovr $ fjiera rov eô? rpia ravra

TWV aplOfjLWV.
(13) Either the words eiBtj 8 ol dpidôl ov-roi Trpay-
IJLa-rwv, or the words ol êv yap apiOfMol . ... ra &

become superfluous
alcrOrjcret,, ;
the argument is com
plete without them. Nor do we mend matters much

if we invert the order of these two sentences. For,

that transposition granted, the passage will run :
"And these numbers (sc. 1.2.3.4.) are forms of
things ;
for on the one hand the Numbers were
known as the absolute Ideas and first principles,
and they are constructed out of their elements (sc.
1.2.3.4.) while on the other hand things are appre
;
hended some by vovs, some by eTncrr?}^??, some by

Sofa, some by aiadrjvw" But that etoij & ol api6 jjuol
ovroi Trpay/jLcircoi should be followed immediately
TWV
by ol fAevyap apiOôl TCL eioq eXeyoi/ro, a sentence
. . .
in which both leading words are repeated in a different
sense, is hardly credible.

In the face of these difficulties I should prefer to
retain the text unaltered, remarking that if the words
olfjuev apiOfJiol
<yap CLOT) avra Kal apâl e\eyoi/TO, elal
ra
8 etc TWV o-roi xelwv had stood alone, they would have
been interpreted without fail The etBrjTiKol aptQpol

:
"
were spoken of as the absolute Ideas and principles,

though in point of fact they are compounded of the
Moreover, the expression etc rwv aToiytiwv
elements."
would have been understood here in 404$ 25 as it was

understood a few lines higher up in 404$ 17 of the
"
elements TavTbv + 6drepov=ovcrla." Again, it is natural

to suppose that the word ovrot, added to ol dpiBfiol in
the last sentence, is intented to connect them with the
faculties just enumerated and to distinguish them from
the Ideal apiOôi Lastly, the statement that these
four numbers (1.2. 3.4.) represent eiSrj TWV Trpajfjidrcov

must balance the statement that the percipient has
four modes of cognition symbolically denoted by the
same numbers (1.2.3.4.); and since a quasi-spacial
account of those modes has been given already (in
the words e7rtcmjfjLr)v 8e ra %vo fiovaâ)^ yap e $ V
rbv Be rov eTTiTre&ov apid/jiov Soâv, ai(r6i)crw Se rov
rov crrepeoO), it is probable that these el Sr? rwv
Trpay^drwv are things in general grouped according
to the four stages 31 through which, as we learnt from
the second clause, percept Ideas pass into the region
of ato-Ovais certainly the broad meaning thus assigned
:
to the word eZSo? = "
class
"
or "
group
"
is supported
by the fact that the article, prefixed to the same word
when used above in its technical sense (ra et 8?; aura),
is here absent. The argument, I take it, may be set
out as follows :
Again, the one is vovs,
the two is eiTKTrrjfJL rjj
the no. of the plane (i.e. three) is Sofa,

the no. of the solid (i.e. four) is at<70i?<rt9.
Now, on the one hand (/*/) the Numbers were

called the fundamental Ideas of the Platonic system
though, to speak with all precision, they are con-
31
Simplic. in Arist. Psych, ed. Hayduck p. 29, 12 Hijpovir
5e rd re
&vra ov Kara TrActros, a\\a Kara )8a0os, fts re ra vorjra /cat eTriar^ra Kal
So|ao-To Kal alvQyra, Kal 6/jLoius ras yvaxreis fis vovv Kal eirKrr^/j. rjv Kal
at<rQt](nv.
structed out of the crroLêla (sc. ravrov -\-6drepov over (a)
and they apprehend things by means of the four

faculties above mentioned.
On the other hand (Be) these four numbers (z>.

the
numbers 1.2. 3. 4., representing the four faculties) are
groups of things.
In brief, Aristotle s point is that the percipient
Ideas evolved as aforesaid apprehend by means of
four faculties, and that these faculties correspond to
four stages in the spacial evolution of the percept
Ideas what those stages are we already know.
:
The
recognition of the planes of consciousness
symbolised by these numbers I. 2. 3. 4. throws light
where light is much needed upon the use of the
technical term Be/cds. Aristotle more than once affirms
that certain Idealists continued their Ideal Numbers
Met. A. 8. 1073 a 20 rrepl Be rwv dpiO/juwv ore

&)? rrepl direlpcov \eyovaiv, ore 8 &>?
Ibid. M. 8. 1
084*? 12 el Be
7ro(7ov
; TOVTO yap Bel \eyecr0ai, ov fiovov cm,
d\\a KOI BIOTI. u\\a IJLTJV el fjue^pi rijs Be/cdBo?
6 dpiOfJios,
wcTTrep rives (f)acrii>, irpwrov /j,ev ra)(v
ra eiBrj olov el GCTTLV r) rpias avrodv-
,
r/9 carat, dpiOô^ avrolrrrros ; avrb yap
Kacrros diQos êi Be/cdBos.
Ibid. M. 8. 1084^: 29 ert aroTTOv el 6 apt^/xo? pe

r^9 Be/cd&oS) fjuaXkov TI ov TO ev Kal eZSo? au
7779 SetfaSo?.
Ibid. N. I. 1088^ IO olov 17 SeKas TTO\V, el rav

r
pr) eo"n JT\elov.
Phys. F. 6. 206 b 32 pexpi jap Setcd&os Troiel TOV
Now the statement that Ideal Numbers were con

tinued pexP T ^ ? SeaSo? is open to two interpretations.
1
On the one hand, it might mean that there are but

ten Ideas in the Ideal series. It was, in fact,
obviously
so understood, or misunderstood, by certain crude
followers of the first Academy. Aristotle s evidence
on the point is rendered explicit by
[Alex.] in Arist. Met. ed. Hayduck p. 700, 27 el
yap at l&eai, dpiOftoi, 6 B apt#/i.o<? &XP 1 T *? ?

Sefcdbos laTaraij al ISeai dpa Se/ea.
But to impute such puerility to Plato himself surely is
out of the question. Aware that his materials for a
comparative study of nature were as yet scanty in the

extreme, he probably refrained from delivering any
exact dogma with regard to the number of absolute
Ideas :
Met. A. 8. 1073 # 1 6 Trepl TrXôu? ovSev elprjrcaaw,

o TL Kal <ra$e9 eiTrelv.
At most he may have vouchsafed the remark that the

Ideas were ^vpia^ in order to prevent the supposition
that they were aTretpa. This limitation is

possibly
alluded to elsewhere by Aristotle :
Met. N. i. io88 II olov rj Se/ca? TTO\V, el TOUT?;?
1*>V)
6(7TL 7T\eloV, Yj
TO, flVplCL.
In any case Plato cannot have ignored the palpable
absurdity of a system comprising only ten infimae

species. On the other hand, the phrase /xe%pt TT}?
Se/eaSo? is susceptible of a different interpretation. It
may imply that each individual Idea contains within

itself the perfect number ten. And that this was
Plato s real meaning appears from an interesting
Aristotelian fragment (ed. Rose 1477 b 40) preserved
by Philoponus in Arist. Psych. A. 2. 7. 404 1 8 :
\ejei ovv (Aristotle) (frdo-fcew avTovs (Plato and the

Pythagoreans) ort TO. etSr; apidpoi elcriv, apiOpol
i e/cacrrov yap rwv elSwv SeicdSa
Recent exegesis has regarded the testimony of

Philoponus either as erroneous and without founda
tion (see Trendelenburg de an. ed. 1877 p. 189), or as
reliable and important (see Brandis de perd. Arist.
libris p. 49 seqq.}. Those who credit the assertion have,
however, been put to strange shifts to support their

view. Maguire, for example, in The Platonic Idea
p. 69 obtains his decad in the following fashion
seq. t :
"The Idea as I is the result of II the combination of

III the Indefinite and of IV Unity ____ The Idea
is a Result of a Combination of Two Elements, of

which the former indirectly, and the latter directly,
rests That is to say, The
on an absolute Basis. . . .
IV presupposes The III The III presupposes The ;
II The II presupposes The I; while The I is self-

;
sufficing, and verges on the absolute. But, since
we may see how, in Plato s mind, The Ten denoted

not only the highest form, but also the living sub
stance of Supreme Reality." I do not think that
we need resort to such subtleties for a satisfactory
explanation. If every Ideal Number possesses four
phases of consciousness denoted respectively by the

numbers i. 2. 3. 4., then it is evident that in a sense
every Ideal Number is the sum of I + 2 + 3 + 4, or, in

other words, is a Se*a9. 31a In short, the problematic
use of the term as applied to the Platonic Ideas
Seara?
finds a simple solution in this third clause of the
argument from Aristotle s Psychology.
The general bearing of that clause may be thus

illustrated.
32
We particular men, who fancy ourselves
31 "
Philoponus, then, is partially right when he adds (he. cit.)
apiO/j.ol fjitv otiv 8icb rovro SeKaSiKol 8e 5tck TIJV r\fi6r-rira T<av
fiSav. The TravT\(as bv of Soph. 248 E was found to involve the

development of vovs into ^Trio-T^^r;, SJ|o, and the symbols of at<rdr)<ris,
these four stages produce the decad, which the Pythagoreans named
Tlavrf\eia (Stob. Ed. I. ed. Wachsmuth i.
p. 22, 5).
32
For the ensuing description cp. Simplic. in Arist. Psych, ed.
Hayduck p. 29, 2 0^70^ 5e els ras etSrjrt/cas apxas Kal ras tyvxixas
separate entities, are but the Ideal animal Man re

garding itself on the plane of aiad^cn^ what we see :
is therefore a plurality of men moving in three-
dimensional space. When we entertain opinions

about things, we rise to a higher level and portray
them to ourselves by a kind of mental delineation :
they still shape themselves as pluralities, but pluralities
moving in two dimensions, a flat and it may be

delusive picture of surrounding life. As individuals
we are capable of a yet higher method of cognition,
namely that of eVto-T^/iu? : when a man knows a thing,

"
he so to speak goes "
straight to the point (/jLovax&s
yap 6(j) ev] in his intellectual presentation ;

and though
rraffas yyucreis, T^V n\v voepav &s naff evuxriv a/AepHTTov orvvaipov/j.fvr)v
els TT)v juoj/aSo, TV 5e iri(TTr}fJ.oi/iKr)V us ave\i(r(rofj.evT]v nal us cbrb ere pou
TOV airfov ets Tb aiTiaTbv Trpoayo/JLevrjv, &s 5e KOI 5ia Tb airwaves Kal del
8ja T&V avTcov 68evov ets T^V SvdSa, T^V 5e 86av fls r))V rpidSa Sia rb T^JV
^vya/jLtv avrijs yur/ eVi rb avrb aet, aAAa Tore fiej/ M rb d\7j0es Tore 5e
cirl rb tyevSos K\iveiv, fls Se rrjv rcrpaSa r}]V ouaQâiv 5td rb (rcafJ-dTuv
flva.1 avTik-rjirriK^v. Themist. in Arist. Psych, ed. Spengel p. 21, 17
eê/i e TTJS TOV cvbs tSe as avr-fjv (sc. r^v tyvxyv) 8t/>(ÔVTO,
5e eVc rys vpuTijs Svdtios
fTTi<rri]fji-riv
tubs yap ev Kal TJ a<p ^
yap TWV irpordcrfcav fTrl rb <rv/j.Trepaff/J.a, rfyv 8J|ov 5e e /c
airb
T^S irpurtfjs rpidSos, ttffos ^v Kal TOV eVnre Sou api6fj.6s TTJS yap 8^775 IjSt]
Kal rb oA7j0es Kal rb iêvSos IK rwv irpordaewv, atffOrjffiv 5e aTrb rrjs
irpwTfjs rerpdSos ^| ^s Kal f) TOV ffTcpeov aujj-aTos tSe a* irepl yap Tb .
TOIOVTOV ffta/j.a f) afod-rja-is. Sophonias in Arist. Psych, ed. Hayduck

P- I 3> 37 Sues yap TO firi(TTTJiJ.oviKa Tb -noQev TTT) Sopiffp.4vws eôvTO Tpias
8e ^ 8J|o- TptTTa yap Kal TO. SoâffTa Sia Tb apqippeirfS a-rrb Se Trjs
V afcr8r)a i.v t fai irepl Tb (Toi/io, ft
TeTpaSi a
Aristotle 33 scoffs at those who are content to regard

the soul s
knowledge as a series of lines, yet the
modern science of psychophysics has
certainly tended
to confirm Plato s acute To rise above
conjecture.
eTTio-rij/Jir) is impossible for us
Laws 897 D fArj roivvv eg evavrias olov et<?
ijXtov
aTro^XeTro^Te?, vvK-ra ev pea-rjpfiplq eira yoêvoi,
7roir)(7a)fjLe6a rrjv aTTOKpio-tv, &>9 vovv Trore
o/tfiacriv oifrofievoi re Kal
inasmuch as particular thinkers are the Ideal animal

actively functioning in the mode of Qdrepov, and in the
next stage 1/6170-19 particulars coalesce into the Idea.
It isreserved for the Idea itself to
enjoy that direct
intuition of which the neo-Platonists said 34 voel ov
We
are now in a position to combine the results of
all three clauses and to indicate the advance made
by
the passage as a whole.
From the critique of the Platonic Parmenides,
fittingly supplemented by that of the Eleatic stranger,
33
M. 2. 1077 a 29, Psych. A. 4. 17. 409 a 5. It is,
Met.
however,
to be observed that in 407 a
29 Aristotle has himself been guilty of much
the same conception as that which he ridicules: al 5
Kal airoSfiêis
OLTT
apx^s, Kal fgoiKrl irus re\os, T^tv <rv\\oyKT(jLbv t) rb o-vfjurepa(Tfj.a- et 5f
fj.fl TTfpaTovvTai, a\\ OVK avaKci/jnrTovfri ye ird.\iv ^TT apx f}
5 del /j-fGov Kal aKpov

tvQviropovtTiv.
34
Plotinus Enn. V. i. 4, cp. V. i. 10, V. v. i.
4
we had conceived the ground-plan of the universe as

a single ovcria multiplying itself into a series of oveiai.
Each ovcria was a vorjrbv %wov, whose nature necessarily
comprised two functions ;
on the one hand a power of
passionless thought, that might be named voycns on ;
the other hand a power of active and passive thought,

that might be named <yvwcri<s.
In the case of the
universal ovcria, vorjcris was represented by the supreme
NoO? ;
in the case of the series of ovcriai., vorjais was
represented by the Ideas.

The argument from Aristotle s Psychology, re
viewed in connection with certain corroborative state

ments, has amplified this theory as follows :
(1) Ovcria is now identified with ^ru^rj 35 the
single all-embracing ov with the Trai/reXe? woz>,

the
assemblage of partial or Ideal ovra with the eV uuepov?

effiei The higher and lower mentality, which
<wa.
together formed the ovcria of a VOTJTOV are thus woi>,
equated with ravrbv and Qdjepov, which together form

the ovcria of an Ideal e^v-ôv. Further, the objects
of cognition for any such eptywxpv are declared to be
the remaining and similarly constructed e^vâ.
(2) Every absolute animal, whether it be the whole

cosmic animal or one of the partial arid subordinate
animals, evolves itself through four phases or con-
^ Cp. Simplicius in Arist. Psych, ed. Hayduck, p. 10, 33 of
otiv Uvday6peioi Kal Tl\dTwv ovffiav avr-fjv (sc. r^v tyvxyv) <t>d<riv.
-PI
I? I
152
o
ditions, viz. [a] the immutable being of 97 rov ei/o? t Sc a,
and ({3)
the mutable becoming of the same in space of
one, two, and three dimensions. Its objects of cogni
tion are again the remaining and similarly developed

animals.
(3) Each Idea in its perceptive evolution acquires
four planes of consciousness :
As endowed with vovs it voel ;
As passing into eV^crTTJ/u,?; it eirurraTai,

As passing into it
86<z
Sofafet,
As passing into aiaBrjais it alo-ddverat,.
Moreover, the object of its perception throughout
these four stages is any other Idea, perceived
by 1/01)9 as an
by eTTco-jij/jLTj as a
by Sofa as an
by aiardrjcris as a arepeov.
Thus the passage as a whole enables us to fill
up and
complete the outlines of the Platonic scheme.
PART II.
HIGHER AND LOWER MENTALITY.
At the outset of the present enquiry I proposed

to analyse certain incidental passages of pregnant
meaning in order to obtain some simple and yet
adequate formula for the interrelations of Plato s
Idealism. This analysis has established the main
fact that Mind is operant in two different ways
within the limits of Platonic ontology. For, in the
first place, Mind is a Unity self-pluralised into a
conclave of Minds, which are objective i.e. really

existent Ideas. And in the second place, on pain
of forfeiting claim to real existence, Mind passes
its
everywhere out of its own condition of permanent

and immutable thought into the transitory and
mutable phases of knowledge, opinion, sensation,
thereby producing subjective i.e. phenomenally exist
ent particulars. In the words of Proklos iraa-a r) :
TCOV tyvx&v rdfys e/!? Bvo raura? avijprrjrai, 77777^9, rtfv

T 6
Srjfuovpyitcrjv /cat rrjv Zwoyovi/crjv.^
So far the outlines of the theory. It remains to
36
Proklos in Tim. 3 19 A.
the ethical colouring of the whole. But

indicate
will be well
before attempting this further task,
it
afresh the
to secure due perspective by emphasising
shall, therefore,
in the
salient points of view. I
present chapter
endeavour to illustrate from the
the contrast thus formulated
Platonic dialogues
and of Mind,
between the subjective aspects
objective
successive illustration, while
in the hope that each
in the use of
exhibiting Plato s technical consistency
the
non-technical terms, may bring into clearer light
moral significance of his design.
I. Purpose and Necessity.
Sta vov
Timaeus 47 E discriminates (a) ra
Hiovpwt** from W
dvdvtcr)* wvfava,
and^
declares that the universe is the combined product
CSe rov Koaôv ytveaK
of both :
pepiwtvri 7P V
vov o-vardaetoS eyevvrjOr].
ef avdyrcris re teal
we learnt from
Now (a) the creations of vow, as
of subordinate
the Parmenides, comprise a series
in a single
Minds called the Ideas, which are unified
as their basis and ground
supreme Mind conceived
& 1
are the
work. Again, (b) rd dvdyic^ y^vo^va
the necessary passage of
results brought about by
of -being" into
the said Minds from the higher mode
this lapse, this
lower mode of becoming" and
"
the ;
deviation, is as such 37 referred in the Timaeus to

r] TrXavw/iievrj alria. It is clear, therefore, that Plato,
when he contrasts ra Sia vov SeS^/uou/yyêW with ra

Si dvdjKr)? yiyvofteva, is
describing just those two
aspects of Mind which I have termed "
objective
"
and "subjective." And we are confronted by the

question on what principle of distinction is the
:
latter and not the former

assigned to (ivdy/cr) ?
The
reason of the change is not, I think, far to
seek. It
is dvdyKy that the
supreme Mind should
pass from the ravror^ of vovs into the erepor?;? of
eTna-rtf/AT], Soa, aiaBrjai^. It is avdy/cr}, too, that the
subordinate Ideal Minds should similarly pass from

perfect to imperfect thought. But it is not avdyKij
that the supreme Mind should
multiply itself into
the Ideas. That process of objective pluralisation is
never in Plato described as dvaytcalov. It is on the
contrary directly referred to @oi>\<r)ai<;,

the very
38
opposite of dvdyKTj.
In proof of this contention Tim.
I may cite first
37
Mr. Archer-Hind seems to me ill-advised in stating (ed. Tim.
p. 167 n.) that "Plato calls avdyKij the KKa.vuy.evT) alria, because,
though working strictly in obedience to a certain law, it is for the most
part as inscrutable to us as if it acted from
arbitrary caprice." The
term surely denotes nothing more than deviation.,
TT\av<a^.fv^ and is the
equivalent of 6a.Tpov as opposed to Ta.vr6v.
38
For &ov\rj<Tis ) ( avayKT] cp. Crat. 420 D where rb Kara TV
&ov\i]<Ttv yiyvoêvov is
opposed to rb avayKaTov Kal avrirvirov, irapa
29 E premising that the supreme i/oO<?, which in

Phileb. 28 A 31 A is the alrla 7-979 /ufe<w<?,
must be
identified with the 0eo? to whom in the Timaeus
precisely the same function is allotted :
TO irav roSe
(6 fwtora?) irdv-ra on, âKicrra
6{3ov\r)0r) TrapaTrXrjcria eavra>.
TCIVTTJV
t
ea>? KCLI Koo-fjiov
fjid\ta-r av rt? dp%f)
1
Trap dvSp&v <j>povlfj,a>v tt7ro8e^0yu,eô? 6p0orara

av. 6 0eos
j3ov\ij0l<i <yap dyuOa
.ev Trdvra, (frXavpov Be fwfiev elvai Kara Svva/j,iv,
OVTCI) r] Trav QIJOV rjv opaTov 7rapa\a{3a)v ov%
ayov d\\o Kivovêvov TrX^yueXw? KOLI

, efa rdfiv avro fyyayev etc T/}? araf/a?,
> M / / V
eKeuvo rovrov TTUVTWS ajj-eivov.
(29 E 3 A).
In this paragraph logical

analysis lays before us
the conception of a supreme Mind
brought face to
face with a visible chaos. Thus far we are concerned
only with dvdytcrj, which compels vovs to degenerate
into ato-#??o-9, 39 but does not determine under what
forms such aiaOrjais shall work. At this point, how
ever, a new element is announced the supreme Mind :
59
Laws 8l8 A foiKfv 6 rbv debit irpurov Trapoifj.ia(ra.p.fvos (cp. ibid.
741 A, Protag. 345 D) els ravra airo/3\f\l/as flirew ws ovSe 6ebs avdyKrj /j.-f)
wore pax&ptvos, ovai dftai ye, oT/iOi, rwv avayKtav eiffiv, K.T.\.
(f>avp
Similarly the author of the Epinomis (? Xenokrates) 982 B

avayKT] vovv KeKTf]fj.fvt]s airaaruv avayKuv TTO\V /jLeyiffrrj yiyvoi
&PXOVCTO. yap a\\ OVK a.pxofji.evi)
is said to reduce the confusion to order ;

and this
codification of anarchy, this marshalling of motion, is
distinctly ascribed to divine /BovXrjcris. If then it can

be shown that et? TCI^LV ayeiv TO oparov etc TT}? diaîas
was the recognised function of the Ideal series, it will
be justly urged that the existence of this series postu
lates a continued exercise of volition on the part of
the supreme Mind.
Phileb. 1 6 C 17 A informs us that confusion is
reduced to order by the interposition of a definite

number of species between the one genus and the
indefinite plurality of particulars. These species are
the TroXXa which connect the ev with the ajreipov, and
ipso facto distinguish Dialectic from Eristic. We

must not be satisfied, says Sokrates, ê^piTrep av TO
KCIT dpxas ev fjirj OTL ev KOL iro\\a KOI aTreipd eVrt
/Aovov i$y rt?, d\\a /cal OTrocra.

The method is exemplified by the conduct of the
Creator both in Tim. 53 B
ore S eVeêtpetro Koo-fjuelaOai TO TCCLV^ Trvp
KOI vSwp Kal <yi)v
/cal depa, fyvrj pev eôv
arra, TcavTciTcacfl 76 ^v SiaKeipeva wcrTrep
anal/, OTCLV airf) TWO? #609, OVTCO $rj Tore
TavTa Trp&Tov Stecr^yLtaT/o-aro
T /cal dpid/jiols.
and in Tim. 69 B
TavTa ardfCTO)? e%ovTa 6 6ebs ev etcdo-TW re
7T/30? auro /cal

7r/>o? aXX^Xa
crev, oera? re KOI OTTT) dvdXoya /cat,

OVVCLTOV rjv
a-vfJifieTpa
elvai. Tore yap ovre TOVTWV ocrov f^rj
rvvrj TL fjieTefyev, ovre TO rrapdrrav ovo^daai TWV

vvv ovoâCp^kvwv d%i6\oyov r)V ovoev, olov rrvp
KCLI v$a)p KOI ei rt TWV a\\a)V d\\a iravra ravra

eVeir etc TOVTOIV irav ro8e
TrpwTov SieKoa-fJLrjcrev,
ev Jwa eyov ra iravra ev aurco

gvvearricraTo, tfiov
6vr)-ra dOdvaTa re.
will be discerned most

But application to Idealism
its
of the Parmmides. The

clearly from the latter part
second hypothesis of that dialectical exercise educes,
among others, the following results :
ev el eariv, i.e. If ev participates in ou<r/a,

then
(a) ev ov is a Whole comprising Parts, whereof

each Part is itself a ei; ov comprising lesser parts and ;
by continuing this process of subdivision

we may show
that the original ev ov is arceioov TO rrXfjBos. (142 C
H3 A).
from
(/3)
ev(not ev ov, but ev conceived apart
is an undivided unity. The possession of owria,
ovaia)
however, forces ei; into combination with TO eVepoi/,
and occasions the production of vvfyylcu, which may

be regarded either as couplets or as triplets, according
as we fix our attention on any two of their three factors,
or add the third which completes the given triunity
Further, the interaction of such factors produces

every imaginable number ;
and we conclude El apa
eanv eV) dvdy/crj ical dpiOôv elvai. Avdy/cij. \4XXa
fjirjv dpiOjjLov ye 6Wo? TroXX av eij] /cal 7rX?5#09 aireipov
rwv ovrwv. (143 A 144 A).
(7) Every dpiO/ubs participates in oucn a, and has

which likewise participate in ovaia.
ftopta, viz. units,
Thus the original ev ov is not an indivisible Whole,
but a Whole that has Parts and is equal to the sum
1
of its Parts. TO ev dp"

avro KeKepârLa/jbevov VTTO TT)?
oucrm? 7ro\\d re KOL aTreipa TO 7r\rj66<$

eari. (144 A
-I44E).
(8) Lastly, TO ei>
may be called Trepan and TreTrepaa-
(jbevov in so far as a Trepieôv o\ov.
it is Hence TO ev
40
> ^ r ^ 1 / f/x \ \>
/ \ \
apa ov ev re earn TTOV Kai TroXXa, nai oXov /cat nopia,

Kal TreTrepao-fjievov /cal
aTreipov rr\r)6ei. (144 E
145 A).
Again, the fourth hypothesis of the Parmenides
maintains these propositions :
ev el eariv (i.e. If ev participates in over la), then
(a) On the one hand TaXXa, being aXXa ToO eV6<?,
are not ev. On the other hand ra\\a fêreêt, Try rov
eô? in virtue of possessing fjiopia, which are /jiopia rov
o\ov re /cal
40
Heindorf, Bekker, Schleiermacher, and the Zurich edd. wrongly
bracket the word ov : it is just this possession of which renders ov<ria
possible the subdivision of r2>

eV, apart from ova-la it would be
indivisible.
Thus we posit jjuia rt? l&ea ical ev rt, o
oXov, cnrdvjwv ev reXeiov yeyovos (1571), E), and

ef
affirm that it is composed of vroXXa fjiopia which serve

to link TaXXa with the ev o\ov -reXeiov. (157 B 157 E).
(/3)
Both the oXov and each popiov may be said
IJLereêiv TOV ez/6?, and therefore to be erepa rov evos.
And 77 erepa <f>vais
TOV fl Sou? will ever be aireipov
Tr\r)9ei. (I57E 1580).
(7) Lastly, ra a\\a rov eô?, when combined with
TO eV, give rise to a third class of existences, viz. ra
fj,6pia, which Trepan 7rdpo"^ Trpos aXX^Xa, thereby

limiting the aTreipta inherent in ra aXXa and establish
ing certain fixed relations with TO 6\ov. (1580

1580).
The argumentation of these two hypotheses re
iterates the lesson of the Fhilebus. Between ev ov and
7rXr)#o5aneipov TWV ovrcov must be ranged a series of
vroXXa ovra related to the former as apiOôl to ev or as
to 6 Xoz^, to the latter as Trepa? Trapeôvra to
These conditions being granted, knowledge
becomes a possibility (Farm. 1550). We may well
follow Dr. Jackson when in this class of intermediates
he recognises the Ideas of Plato s own ontology. 41
It appears, then, that both in the Philebus and in
the Parmenides the Ideas are regarded as a bond

between the single objective Mind and the indefinity
41
The Journal of Philology, xi, 318.
of subjective phenomena, their prerogative being to

introduce the Trepas of the former into the cnreipia
of the latter. The words of Aetios 42 are strictly
accurate :
ISea eo"T\v OVGICL acrco/Aaro?, avria TWV oia ea"Tiv

avrrj
Kal TrapdSevyfjLa Tr)<?
rwv Kara (frvaiv eôvrwv
al<76ijTcov vTrocrrdcrewSj avrrj fêv vêarwcra KCL&
eavTijv [>], elKoviôvaa Be ra? afjiopfyovs #Xa9 Kal
atria <yi<yvo/ji,ev7] TT)? TOVTWV StaTafea)9.
And since this very introduction of order into disorder
is stated in the Timaeus to be the outcome of the
divine intent, it results that the objective pluralisation
of which produces the Ideal vorj/jLara is due to

i>oO?
43
Oeia fiovXrjais, and is rightly opposed to the sub
jective action of dvdy/cr] or 77 7r\ava)jjLevr) ah la. As

Tim. 68 E puts it :
%pr) $v atr/a? el&r] SioplêcrOai, TO /lev dvayfcawVj TO

Se delov.
And here lest we should misconstrue Plato s

deliberate recognition of fiovXrjais into an acknowledge
ment of despotic caprice on the part of the Creator
42
Stob. Ed. I. xii. I a, ed. Wachsmuth i.
p. 134, Qff.
43
Unless, indeed, we hold that Plato like Aristotle recognised a
hypothetical avdyK-rj. The latter author sometimes (e.g. Psych. B. 8. 10.
420 b 19 seq.) distinguishes avayKaiov from eVe/ca rov c5, but elsewhere
(e.g. de part. an. A. I. 642 a 32 TJ 8 avayKi] brl tnifudvtt 6n el /xe</
^Kftvo fffrat rb ov eVe/co. ravra avdyKT) etrrlv %x*u , ore 8e /c.r.A.) admits
a necessity of a conditional or hypothetical sort. In the second sense
Plato s Ideal series would be itself avayicaiov.
let us recall the tenor of Tim. 41 B. In that passage

o roSe TO Trav yevvrjcras
addressing the Oeol Oe&v assures
them of endless life :
ov TI fjiev Srj \v6ricrea-0e ye ovSe revêaOe Oavdrov

poipas, rr)? e//% /SouXô-ea)? êtfoô? en Sev-
teal
Kupicorepov Xaôi/re? etceivcov, ot? or
Now the bonds wherewith the deal Oewv had been

bound at birth were those of ^vyr] and ^COTJ :
cp.
Tim. 38 E oeoy-tot? eyLf^ryôt? trcwyLtara SeOevTa ^wa
Ibid. 40 B fwa 6ela oina KOI di&ia ical Kara ravra

ev TauTw (rrpeôfjueva.
And it has been shown that far) and û%v are the
predicates of ovo-ia when it is in a state of motion. I
infer that the //.e/&>i>

Seoyzo? will be that which is
predicable of ovaia when it is in a state of rest, namely

vorja-^. The inference is supported by Tim. 48 A,
which denies the demotic creed ovSels dvdyK^ pel%ov
affirming that vovs is lord even over
Thus Tim. 41 B corroborates the coextension of

with vocals, inasmuch as it attributes to
14
Frag. Trag. adesp. 421 N. cp. Eur. Alk. 965
xpfiffffov ouSej/ avdyKas
-nlpov.
the former 45 a supremacy which is elsewhere ascribed

to nothing less than the latter, and by the same
means provides the needed assurance that we are
dealing with no arbitrary display of divine volition,

but with the unvarying purpose of a Being whose
eternal aim is the multiplication of his own inherent
qualities. Plotinus has read Plato aright :
r)
8e 6e\7](7i^ OVK dXoyos rjv, ov&e TOV etV?), ovB &>?
7rr)\9ev avrcc, a\)C o>? e Set, 0)9 ouSei>o? 6Wo?

iQ
EK6L itCr).
These conclusions accord with the wording of

41 A, where the supreme #eo? speaks of the handiwork
of the deol sc. the
rpla dvr/ra yevij
$ecoi>,
a SL /JLOV ryev6/j,va a\vra e/Jiov 76 /JLTJ e0e\ovro$ TO

/jiV ovv &] SeOev irav \vrov, TO y e ^
dp/jLO(r6ev Kal eôv eu \veiv eOe\eiv tca/cov.
That is, the Creator were he /caô?, not a

could, by ceasing to will the existence of the Ideas,
1
at a single blow abolish their dependent êvofieva.^
The security that he will not do so lies in the ethical
character of his fundamental attributes.
45 The
correspondence in point of diction with Cratylus 403 c is
remarkable: Aeerûbs (acp orcfovf, Sxrre jj.4vsiv dirovovv, TrSrepos
, OLvdyKt] f) eiridv/nia; HoAu Siatpepei,
46
Enn. vi. viii. 18.
47
Cp. Tim. 32 C &\VTOV i/iro rov &\\ov irX^v inrb TOV vv8r]<rai>Tos
The moral issues of the doctrine thus elicited are

of no trivial order. To follow them out to any length
would at this stage of my argument be premature.
I shall have occasion to revert to them in the sequel.
Here it must suffice to say that the equation

fiovXrja-Ls 1/0770-1? confines all true volition to the
Ideal world. For if neither knowledge nor opinion
nor sensation, but pure thought alone, be designated
as the seat of will, it follows that the unit of voluntary
action is no longer the particular but the vo-q-rov go>oi/,
since nothing short of the VOTJTOV %coov possesses the
prerequisite vorjaw.
Turning next from ra &a vov SeS^toupv^/oteW to
TO, St dvdy/cTjs ^v^vo^va (Tim. 47 E), we find that
Plato regards the degradation whereby Mind lapses
from the mode of Identity into that of Diversity as
a necessary transition, taking place perforce. The
Creator in Tim. 35 A combines the psychic ingre
dients rrjv Qarepov (frixnv Sva-fjiiKTOV ovaav et? ravrov
^vvapnoTTtov /9/a. The substantive avdyfcrj and the
adjective avar/tcaios are applied, primarily to the

appearance of Mind in the three lower planes, or in
popular parlance to the incarnation of tyvxtf, e.g.
Tim. 42 A OTTOTC 77 e^vrevdzlev<ra)fjLa<riv ef
dvdy/erjs (al ^vâi) K.T.\.
Ibid. 68 E ravTa $rj Trdvra Tore ravTy Tr
dvdy/cirjs 6 TOV Ka\\l(rrov re /ecu dplcrrov

ev rot? yiyvopivots irape\dfJLâvev /c.r.X.
5
and secondarily to the states consequent upon that

incarnation, whether they be physical laws, e.g.
Tim. 79 B Kara TavTijv rrjv avdyrcrjv irdv Trept,-
\avv6/j,evov K.T.\.
Ibid. 68 B &v (Jbrjre TIVCL dvdyKrjv pyre TOV elfcora
\6<yov
K.T.\.
bodily dispositions, e.g.
Tim. 75 A TI yap ef dvay/crjî î^vQ^kin] KOI %vv-

ovBa/jifj TrpoffBeêraL TTVKVOV
Tpe<pofjievr) (ftvais
OGTOVV /c.r.\.
Ibid. 77 A rrjv Be fyj&rjv eV jrvpl ical
%vvej3a,Lvev ef dvayfct]^ e%ety avTw.

sensory impulses, e.g.
Tim. 42 A TTpwrov fJLv aLO-Orjcriv dvayfcciLOv

piav Trdcnv etc /Biaiwv Tradrjfjidrciyv
Ibid. 896 TWV % dvdry/crjs T
emotional concomitants, e.g.
Tim. 690 D aXXo re elSo? eV avra) ^^^J? TT/OOCT-
TO Owrjrov, Seivd KOI dva<yicalaev eavTw

eVetra
%ov, TTp&rov êv rjftovrjv
. . .
. . . ert 8 av Odppos Kal <>6/3ov

. . .
ei, Be d\6yy Kal eTTLêipTjTfj iravros

L ravra dva<yicaLws TO
<yevo$ ^vvedeaav. Kal Bid ravra BTJ
piaiveiv TO 6elov, o TI pr] Trdaa rp>
K.T.\.
or the broader conditions of morality in general, e.g.

Theaet. 1 76 A a\V our drrdXeaOai ra /ca/fd Svvarov,
a>
@e6B(0pe vrrevavriov yap rt, r<a

dyada) del elvai,
dvdyKT]. ovr ev deals avrd iSpvaOat, rrjv Be
Ovrjrriv (frixriv /cal rovBe rov rorrov irepLirdKel e f

dvd<y KT]<S.
This usage of the word and its derivatives is peculiar

to Plato, though it was seemingly prefigured by
Empedokles, who held that the essence of Âvdy/cr}
lay in the combination of JVet/eo? and $i\ia

Simplic. in Arist. Phys. ed. Diels p. 197, 10
E/jLTreSoKXrjs . .
avveKopv^wcre TTJV rov velteovs
KOL TT}? ^>t\ia? (evavriwaiv) . . et? (JiovdSa
Hippolyt. Ref. vii. 29 Avdy/crjv KaX&v TTJV e f ez/o?

et? TroXXa /cara TO Net/co? /cal etc TTO\\COV et? ev
/card rrjv 3>i\iav

iierajBo\r)V.
and spoke of the punitive incarnation of the heavenly
beings as Avdytcrjs %pfjfia.
To sum up. Plato recognises both an objective
and a subjective aspect of Mind. In the former he dis
cerns the purposive pluralisation of unitary thought ;
in the latter the decadence necessarily attached to
the movementof every real intelligence. As to the
relative importance of these two there can be no
question Be vov /cal eVto-Tq/-^? epaaTrjv d
: TOJ>
ra? TT}<? e/i.0/3oz/o9 0ucrft)5 air Las Trpwr

QGCLI Be vrr d\\cov fjuev Kivovaevwv, erepa Be e
KIVOVVT&V yiyvovrai, Bevrepa^ (Tim. 46 E).

8
Hermes
49
nutshell when he says
puts the matter in a Trpovoia
6da v
rdgis, dvdyicr) Trpovoia
II. Identity and Difference.
An method of notation for the same

alternative
two aspects of Mind may be found in the quasi-
technical terms ravrov and Bdrepov. Hitherto I have
used these symbols to betoken respectively the one

of psychic existence,
higher and the three lower planes
whether conceived as actively cognising or as passively
cognised and I have secured provisional consistency
;
avTo
by adhering strictly to the statement that every
&ov unites in itself ravrbv the mode of pure thought
with ddrepov the mode of knowledge, opinion, sensa
tion. It seems, however, desirable to justify this
the matter somewhat more
procedure by probing
not unnatural tendency
deeply, in view of a certain
to confuse the issues of this terminology with the
ev iro\\d.
implications of the antithesis
KCL\
To it must be kept steadily in mind

begin with,
that we are employing neither pair of opposites in
48 Tim. 41 E ed. Wrobel p. 203 "iuxta

Cp. Chalcidius in Plat.
divina
Platonem praecedit providentia, sequitur fatum," p. 204 "et
his proxima sunt secundum provid-

quidem atque intellegibilia quaeque
entiam solam (fiunt), naturalia vero et corporea iuxta fatum."
49
Stob. Ed. I. xlL I. ed. Wachsmuth i.
p. 277, 15.
itswidest acceptation. For the Sophist, raising the

question ri Trorav vvv elprjicafjuev TO re ravrov
OUT&>?
/cal Odrepov ; (254 E), makes answer that these signs

denote general relations applicable to all things in
heaven and earth. And in like manner the PJiilebus,
declaring the conjunction of unity and multiplicity

to be rwv \o ya)v avrcov dddvarov
i
teal dyijpcov Trddos n
(15 D), states that
ev teal 7ro\\d vrrb \6ycov yiyvo/jieva Trepirpeêcv
Trdvrrj KaQ eicaarov rwv \&yofievwv del KOI 7rd\ai
KOL vvv.
Our business then is not with the broad logical sense
of these words, but rather with their narrower meta
physical meaning. And the restriction thus imported

assumes the following specific form :
(A) In the Platonic ^jrvôyoîa the term ravrov is

taken to denote that which does not, ddrepov that
which does, depart from its own identity. It is true
that Parmenidean precision might have desiderated
the full phrase ravrov eavrw as opposed to e-repov
eavrov ;compare e.g.
Farm. 146 A KOI /JL^V ravrov <ye
Set elvai avrb eaurcS
/col erepov eauroC K.T.\.
Ibid. 1460 TO erepwQi ov av-ro eavrov ev TW avra>
eavro) OVK dvd<y/crj

avrb eavrov erepov elvai y
ical erepwdi ecnai ; "E/Aoiye

Sofcet.
But for technical purposes it was obviously convenient

to adopt a shortened symbolism, all ambiguity being
avoided by the explicit reference of ravrbv and Odrepov

to a single ovo-ia. Thus the metaphysical limits the
logical usage in the following respect. Whereas the
logician appraising words at their current price
predicates both ravrov and ddrepov of any thing or
aggregate of things, whether real or phenomenal, on
the ground that it is the same as itself and different
from all else, the metaphysician fixing the intrinsic
value of the terms by a reference to the unvarying
standard of ova-la assigns ravrov to ovrws ovra and
Odrepov to <yi^voêva
as inalienable characteristics, in
asmuch as every 6Wo>9 bv abides in eternal self-same
ness, while every yiyvofjuevov is the fleeting projection of

some permanent being 50 vrpo? rd\rjdivov d^wfjiotwêvov
erepOV rOlOVrOV (Sop/I. 2Ô A).

Now if all that lapses not from the identity of
6W&K ovcria be termed ravrov, the domain of
fitly
ravrort]? will comprise on the one hand (a) the supreme

Mind for the ordering of the chaotic universe could
;
not impair the moveless calm of intelligence :
Tim. 42 E 6 /jiev $ij (#609, i.e. z/oO?) airavra ravra

epevev eV rw eavrov /card rpoTrov rjdei*
$e voYivavres ol TralSes K.T.\.
and on the other hand (/3)

the series of Ideal Minds ;
for they are as stable as the goodness that gave them

birth :
50
Vid. e.g. Tim. 520.
Tim. 5 2 A 6(j,o\o<yr}reov
ev fjuev elvai rb Kara ravra
>,
dyevrjrov Kal dvwXeOpoVj ovre et? eavrb
aXXo a\\oOev ovre avrb et? aXXo
TTOL iov, doparov Be Kal a XXcu? dvala-Qrjrov, rovro
The latter as comprehended by the former constitute

the TrapaBely/jLaros eto?, vorjrbv Kal del Kara ravra bv
(Tim. 48 E).
Again, if all that lapses from the identity of 6Ww?

ovffia be fitly termed erepov, the domain of erepbr^
will comprise on the one hand (a) the visible mani
festation of the supreme Mind, and on the other hand
the visible manifestations of the Ideal Minds. The
(/3)
latter as comprehended by the former constitute the

Kal bparbv (Tun.
fiifMT] fjua TrapaBely/jLarov, yeveaiv e\ov
49 A).
In short, the terms ravrbv and Odrepov in their
discriminate
primary ontological significance serve to
the dvrio-roi xa of Tim. 27 D 29 D :
7 e v e a- 9 the province of
ovo-ia, the province of
1
7T/0-Tt9. 29 C.
290.
TO 6i>
aet, <yeve<riv
Be ov/c TO yiyvojAevov fiev del, bv Be
ovBeirore (27 D)
(27 D)
TO Kara ravra e^pv (28 A) TO 76701/69 (28 B)
TO Kara ravra Kal TO 76701/69 (29 A)
(29 A)
TO dtSiov (29 A) TO 7670^69 (29 A)
TO voTf]o~i /JLera \6<yov Trepi- TO
XVJTTTOV, del tcara ravra d\6yov

ov (2 8 A) teal a7ro\\v{j,evov,
Be ovSeTrore ov
(28 A)
TO \6<yft>
Ka acr-
\rj7TTOv icai Kara ravrd teal
exov (29 A) yevvrjrd (28 B)

TO fjiovi/AOv Kal (3ej3aiov KOI \
TO Trpo? pev exeivo d
e?(29B) I
0&, ov Be elicvv (290)
There are, moreover, certain secondary applications

of the same terms, of which brief mention may here
be made. For since TCLVTOV and Bdrepov correspond
to ova-la and yevecns, each to each, they may by a
slight extension of usage designate also the essential

properties of ovcria and yeve<ri<;.
Thus (a) ravrbv connotes rest, Odrepov motion :
Tim. 57 E vrdcriv fj,ev ev 6fjLa\6rrjri, Kivrjaiv Se et?
dvco/jLaXoTrjTa del TiOw/LLev air la be dvicroTTjs av

TT)? dvGD/ji,d\ov (That CLVIGQTY]<$ here=r?J
0uo-6ft>9.
Oarepov <f>vais
is clear from its employment in
Arist. Met. B. 4. 1001 & 23, N. I. 1087 4ff.,
1088 # 15, 2. 1088 32, 1089 6ff., 5. 1092 a
29)-
Arist. Phys. P. 2. 201 & 19 or)\ov Be O-KOTTOVVIV a>?
TiQeacriv avrrjv eviotj ereporrjra KOI d

OF PLATO S ETHICS. 73;
Kal TO fir] bv <f>d(TKOVTes

elvai TTJV Kivrjcrtv (cp,
51
Met. K. 9. 1066 a io).
So in the disputed passage Tim. 74 A rfj Oarepov

7rpoa"xp(i)/j,evos
ev aurot? co? ueo-y evLCTTafjievrj
Bvvd/Ji 9 Kivrjffecos Kal Kdatyeays eve/ca it is not

the number of parts that is insisted on, but
"
"
rather their mobility and flexibility T&>

p%a?
eêiv Kivricrews drro TWOS ev rat? Kaîrat^ as
52
Aristotle has it (Met. Z. 16. 1040^ I2).
The rationale of this usage may be found in Cratylus
439 E (el Se del aya-avTcos eêt Kal TO
avTo eVrt, TTW? ai/
TOVTO rye /Ltera/3aXX(H fj KLVOITO, /jurjoev e^KTTdfjievov TT)?
avTov t 8ea? ; OuSayuak) as contrasted with Arist. Psych.
A. 3. 8. 406$ 12 (rraGa KLvrjcns eWrao-/? ecrTt roO
rj KwdTai], or in Farm. 145 E 146 A :
p,ev TTOV, ecrrep avTo ev eavTw IGTIV. ev yap

evl bv Kal IK TOVTOV pr) /jieTa(3aivov ev rc5 aurco av
6677, ev eavrcp. "EaTt
yap. To 8e ye ev T> aurca
del bv e0TO? STJTTOU dvdyKrj del elvai. Hdvv ye.
Ti oe ; TO ev eTepw del bv ov TO evavTiov dvdyKi)
^
ev TO) avTut elvai, fjujoerroTe Be bv ev T&>
e ecrTdvai, JJLTJ
ecrro? Be KiveiaOat, ; OUTW?.
Again (/3) TavTov connotes good, OaTepov evil.
51
These passages probably refer to Plato notwithstanding Philop.
in Arist. Phys. ed. Vitelli p. 352, 20 c\eyov 8e ot TIv8ay6pioi r^v
/cat avi(r6T7)ra Kal rb fiv. ^
52
Arist. Psych. P. io. 8. 433 b 24 is parallel only in appearance.
For this we have Aristotle s express testimony
Met. A. 6. 988 # 14 en Se rrjv rov eu /ecu rov KCLKWS

air Lav rot? errotê/ot? (sc. to ravrbv and ddrepov)
cnr&wKev e/carepois /carepav.
Ibid. A. IO. 1075 a 34 airavra rov $av\ov /xeflefet

efo>
roi) ei/09 TO jap KCLKOV avrb Odrepov rwv
Ibid. M. 8. 1084^ 34 ra (lev yap rat? <i/>%at?

a?ro-
St8oa,o~tz/, otoi/ KLvrjcnv crrd<ri,v

dyaQbv /cafcov, ra 8
aXka rot? dpiO/jbois.
Phys. A. 9. 192 <2
14 77
8 erepa fjuolpa TT}? evavriwaeco^
7roXXa/a? az^ (fravracrOeir) ra>

77/909 TO /caKOTroibv
01)7779 drevifyvn ri^v Sidvoiav oi)S etz/at TO
Plato, then,would by no means have shrunk from the

conclusions of the reductio ad absurdum in Met. N. 4.
1091 b 25 10920 5.
It was partly, no doubt, the facility afforded by the

terms ravrbv and Odrepov for the expression of such
secondary meanings (e.g. the common euphemism of

Tepo9
= /ca:o?), which recommended their adoption as
symbols for the primary aspects of Idealism.
(B) With regard to the antithesis ev KOI TroXXa it
may be shown that the limitations imposed by philo

sophic usage differed at different stages of Plato s
development.
During the period to which the Republic and

i.
the Phaedo belong, the words are sometimes found in

.a broadly physical sense to denote
(a) the one particular with its many attributes :
Phileb. 140 OT-av rt? 6fj,6 (f)fj IIpwTapxov, va <yeyov-
ora (f>V(7i,
TroXXou? elvau ira\iv TO 1/5 e/ê /cal
evavTtovs aXX??Xot?, fieyav ical afjuxpov Tt

KOI fSapvv KOI Kovfyov TOV avroVj KOI a\\a
Cp. the drift of Rep. 523 A 5240, Phaed. 102 B
103 A, though the phrase does not actually occur in
either passage
(j3)
the one particular with its many parts :
Parrn. 1
29 C el 8 e/z-e ev rt? a7roSe/a ovra teal
,
rl Oav/jLacrTov, \eywv, brav fjuev fiovXrjTai,
a a7ro<f)ati>iV)
ft)? erepa fiev ra eVl Sefta
fiov <TTLV,
erepa Se ra eV api<rrepd
K.T.\.
Cp. Rep. 5240 526 B, e.g. 525 A afjia <yap

TCLVTOV
ev re opwfjLev teal co? caret, pa
ft>9 TO TrX^ô?, 5 25 E
lav (TV KepfjuaTifys avro (sc. the visible unit),
eicelvoi TToXXaTrXacrioOcrw/, evXaôvêvoi /i-rj
Trore
^>a^
TO ev firj
ev aXXa TroXXa fjiopia.
But even at this date they were normally confined

to a narrower and more directly metaphysical scope,
53
being the ordinary equivalents for
(7) the informing Idea and its informed particulars.

53
An exceptional usage is Farm. 129 B dAA. ei
that of
WTO iro\\a O7ro8e/ei /col iro\\a Srj eV, roDro ^5r; Qavpaao-
o5 ret
/JLCU (cp. 1290 ou T& e?/ Tro\\a ov5f TO TToAAo eV), where e^ and iro\\a
represent ///^ /^/j ^/" Unity and Multiplicity.
So, for example, in the two cardinal rubrics of

immature Platonism we read
Rep. 5 96 A eZSo? <ydp

TTOV n ev etcacrrov ela>0afj,ev
TideaBai irepl etcacna ra TTO\\U, ol? ravrov

ovopa eTTLêpo/jiev.
Ibid. 476 A avro /j,ev ev e/caa-rov elvai, rfj Se TWV

Kal (JWfJbdrwv /cal d\\TJ\a)V Koivwvla
avraô/jieva 7ro\\a fyaiveaOai, etcacr-

TOV.
ii. The Philebits marks a transition. All these

denotations are passed in review (Philcb. 140 150),
the first two being summarily dismissed, the last
alone retained as suggesting problems worthy of
serious discussion. Subsequently, however, an im
portant change of nomenclature is observable. For
whereas 15 B drew our attention to the cruces of ev Kal
TroXXa, the Sialpeo-is of i6c E is yu,etoz/&>? 8^77/377^6^77
and embraces the three terms ev, TroXXa, and aireupa.
Again, the ev KOI TTO\\CL of 1 5 B were expressly stated

to be the one Idea and its many particulars but :
in i6c E, though the application is primarily dia

lectical, and the terms signify Genus, Species, and
Specimens, evident from the sequel that Plato
it is
is also thinking of its metaphysical bearings and to ;
the metaphysician ev denotes henceforward the single
supreme Mind, 7ro\\a the subordinate Ideal series,,
aTretpa the indefinite range of particular existence.

iii. In Plato s later writings the revised termin
ology has become firmly established. It will be
remembered, for instance, that the eV, TroXXa, and

7retpa, educed by Parmenides TrXdvrj from Platonic
data, stood for Mind, the Ideas, and Particulars.

And the same phraseology obtains throughout all
the works posterior to the Philebus as distinct from
those of the preceding period. I do not mean to
imply that the doctrine underlying the earlier dia
logues ignores the unity of the supreme Idea and

the indefinity of particulars 54 nor do I hold that ;
the teaching of the later dialogues fails to attain a

higher conception of the singleness and indivisibility
of each several Idea: I merely contend that to the
reader of Plato s less mature discourse the terms /
*al TroXXa naturally suggest the one Idea and the
many particulars, while to the student of his aKpift-

ffTpoi \6joi they represent the supreme Mind and
the Ideal Minds a new term aireipa being added as
a truer description of particulars.
iv. It may be objected that this contention is to
some extent invalidated by Aristotelian evidence,

-which shows that the phrase ev eVt 7ro\\wv continued
54
In point of fact I cannot find a satisfactory example of
particulars, nor even of ec
=
the supreme Idea, in the earlier dialogues.
The nearest approach to the former seems to be Rep. 445 C \v pfv eJvai
elSos TTJS operas, fadpa 5e rrjs Kaic ias. The latter is of course deducible
from the use of the singular number.
to be used in the Platonic school as denoting any

given Idea. Closer inspection proves that the passages
in which that collocation occurs, viz.
Met. A. 9. 990 7, 13, 991 a 2 (=M. 4. 1079 a 2 >

9>
55
32) and Z. 1 6. 1040$ 29,
are directed against certain Idealists probably
followers of Xenokrates o vc06p6s bQ who despite the
explicit criticism of the Parmenides adhered to the

ontology of the Republic. Further examples of iro\\a
"
in the sense of (e.g. Met. A. 6. 987 # 10,.

"
particulars
988 # 2, etc.) may be due to the same inaccuracy
which caused the retention of the term ê0ei? in the
place of the more exact /u/ô-t? (Met. A. 6. 987 b 10,
M. 4. 1079 # 2 5> Phys. A. 2. 209 b 35).
On the other hand Aristotle commonly identifies
the Platonic aireipov with the material cause, and
habitually speaks of the Ideas as dpiBpoi, a word

which we have elsewhere seen applied by Plato him
self to their multeity page 61) so that the (Farm. I.e. :
regular Aristotelian terminology may be said to agree

with that of the later rather than with that of the
earlier dialogues.
If the foregoing exposition be accepted as sub
stantially correct, it will be seen that, in strict meta
physical parlance, ravrov embraces the ev KOI
55
The list in the Index Arist. 618 a 25 is incomplete.
56
Diog. Laert. iv. 2. 6.
ddrepov the arreipa of later Platonism. The supreme

Mind and the Ideal Minds, so far as they do not
transgress the limits of their own noetic existence, are
termed ravrbv so far as they pass beyond those
;
limits into gnostic phase, they are termed Odrepov. And

since the objective and subjective aspects of Idealism
were distinguished by the same criterion, it is evident
that ravrov and Odrepov may be regarded as apt sym
bols for the double operation of Mind.
I would end by anticipating two misconceptions.
In the first place the erepoTT/s of the ev does not find
expression in the ravrbrr]<$ of the TroXXa. For
ereporw always connotes the motion and imperfection
of yvyvo/jieva, whereas the ravrbrrjs of the TroXXa i.e.
the Ideal series is endowed with the permanence
and perfection of ovra. When, therefore, the
6Vro>?
Greek commentators on Aristotle speak of the Ideas

as erepa, it follows that they are using the term in
57
its logical rather than

its metaphysical acceptation,
and are referring to the fact that the Ideas are a series
of different and differently constituted entities. But

58
26 ff., 147, 2 1 ff.

E.g. Simplic. in Arist. Phys. ed. Diels p. 143.
57
vov CKÔ-TTJ iSe a, aAA*

Plotinus, though right in saying oix erepa TOU
ol 6\os fj.ev & vovs ra iravra. 6^77, eitaffTov Se elSos
vovs
e/caa-TTj vovs.
eicavTos V. ix.
(Enn. commits a fatal blunder when he severs 6 vovs
8),
from T& !*/
by means of r) irptarn erepJrrjy (Enn. V. i. i).
w Ideal Numbers are composed of monads which are at /tc"

* "
fa*V
Met.
SiaQopoi, at 5 ei/ T^ avry apiBp-f aStaôpot oAArjAots p.6va.i (Arist.
M. 7. 1081^ 35 ff.)
8o THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS
such differences do not entitle them to be described

as Platonic erepa (i.e. erepa avra eavTwv) ;
at most they
warrant the use of the word aXXa :
cp.
Tim. 52 C, where of the particular phenomenon it
is said erepov 8e TWO? del <f>eprai
Sia TavTa ev erepw TTpoaiJKei, TLVL
but of the Ideal kingdom

eo><?
av TL TO fJiev aXXo $, TO Be aXXo, ovSeTepov ev
ovSerepa) TTOTG yevofjievov ev apa TCLVTOV teal $vo
ryevrj&ecrdov.
In the second place the erepoTrjs of TO ev is not to
be confused with the IT 6/36x779 of TO, TroXXa. This is
at first sight less obvious. It might have been thought

that the demands of Necessity would be satisfied and
her law the Ideas alone passed into the
fulfilled, if
sphere of OaTepov, and left the supreme Mind to

that i/oô-eo)? which it enjoys in Aristotle s
vor)o-i<;
conception (Met. A. g. 10746 33). But that such is

not the case appears to me certain from the following
considerations :
(i) Plato teaches that ova-la is necessarily an

alliance of TavTov with daTepov. If, therefore, TO ev
.acquires the latter element only through

the evolution
of Ta TroXXa, then Unity owes its existence to the
Ideas, not the Ideas to Unity. But we have already

concluded that the permanence of the Ideal series
depends upon the volition of the supreme Mind.
Hence, though prepared to allow that Unity does
not as a matter of fact exist without the Ideas, we

must deny that its existence is contingent upon theirs.
Rather, the Ideas owe their ova-ia its erepoTrjs as well
as its TavTorrj? to a self-subsisting Unity.
Again, the Ideas are ovra,

(2) they possess z>.
both TCLVTOTTJS and erepor^?. Their TavroTrjs they

admittedly derive from Unity. Their ereporrj^ either
is or is not derived from the same source. If it is,
we are justified in discriminating between the

ere/cxm??
of TO ev and the erepor?;? of ra 7ro\\d. If it is not,
whence comes it ? Certainly not from the mere fact
that the Ideas are a plurality that, as we have seen, :
makes them a\\a but not erepa.
(3) The Ideal Minds stand to the supreme Mind

in the relation of 7ro\\a to ev. It would seem then
that they are to be considered multiples of an original
Unit. As such, their TCLVTOTT]? presupposes its TCIVTOTTJSJ
their ereporrj^ its eTepor???. Otherwise they would be
neither fractional nor integral powers, but utterly
incommensurate quantities.
(4) Plato s own words suggest a erepotWt? of the

cosmic Jo>oz>
as distinct from that of the subordinate
f<wa.
In drawing
a comparison between the in
telligible and sensible universe he declares that the
partial Animals embraced by the entire Animal
answer to the particular specimens contained in a
visible cosmos : Tim. 30 C ra yap Brj VOTJTO, wa Trdvra
6
ev eavrw irepi\aôv eêt, KaOdirep 6 Se 6 KO

59
oaa re d\\a Opea/uara %vve<Tr7)Kv opara. Pann.
158 A makes the same point :
Mereêiv Se 76 rov evbs
ra> re oXw /cat rut aopla) . . . Ovrcos. OVKOVV

ere pa ovra rov evbs iêOeêi ra fjuereôvra avrov ;
w9 8 ov ; That is to say that TO o\ov (=rb rcav-
reXe? tyov of Tim. 3 1 B) as well as ra popia (= ra eV
/j,epov$ elBei fwa of Tim. 30 c) passes into the sphere of

Odrepov.
Agreeably to 30 D represents the

this Phileb.
Creator as having not only vovs but also ^v\r)
OVKOVV ev fjbev rfj rov epels ftaa-ikitcrjv aev -<dio9
<f>va-ei
fBaGiXiKov Be vovv eyyiyvea-Qai, Sia rrjv r?}? air las

K.r.\. And Phileb. 30 A clearly distinguishes
this cosmic soul from the souls of its particular crea
1 1
tions %fl. To Trap rjfjJiv crwua ap ov ^v^rj

; FLPfl. Arfkov on, <f>rj(TOfjLev.
%fl. IloOev, w
j \aj36v, eiTrep urj TO 76 TOU rravros
ervyâve, ravrd ye eôv rovru> Kal en

ov
rrdvrrf Ka\\iova ; IlPfl. ArjXov w? ovSauoOev a\\o6ev,
Finally, we have the problematic assignment of

two circles to the mundane soul. Now the circle of
the Other (Tim. 360, 380) cannot represent the part
icular souls of men, horses, etc., since they have
59
To the same effect Arius Didymus in Stob. Ed. I. xii. 2a. ed.
Wachsmuth i.
p. 136, 10.
special irepioSoi, (Tim. 420, 430, 85 A, 87 A, 88B, 91 E),

which are expressly distinguished from those of the
universe (Tim. 47 B, 900). Nor can it denote the
Ideal e^vâ :
for, so far as these possess vorjcrw they
do not belong to the realm of ddrepov at all, and so
far as they lapse into yvwo-is they are represented by
particulars. It must, therefore, stand for the lower
phase of the cosmic soul as distinguished on the one

hand from the Ideas, and on the other from their
particulars.
(5) If there be no perception of matter "by the

cosmic soul apart from the perceptions of finite
souls," we are of course driven to say No to the
question of the Platonic Parmenides

9
Ap ovv olos re av eVrat o $eo<? ra Trap* rjfuv 747^0)-
aKeiv avrrjv liriarrf^v eôw ; (Farm. 1
34 c)
Sokrates awe-struck comment
r) \lav, tyrj, Oavfiatnos o \6yoSj el rt? rbv
6ebv aTroGTepr)<reLe
rov elbevai. (Ibid. I34E)
prepares us, however, to find that in Plato s maturest

judgment this decision is reversed, or at any rate
evaded. And Laws 905 D
on /JLCV yap OeoL r el&l teal dvOpwTrcov
ovvrai,, 70)76 ov TravTCLTracri </>au\o)5
av
repeats the assurance of Phaedo 62 D

GO
êfc
TO deov ie elvai TOP 7rL/jL6\ovfjL6vov
KOI rjfjLas etceivov KTijfjiara elvai.
The moral
bearings of this question call for further
consideration for the present I proceed, noting merely
:
that if the supreme fwcw can pay separate attention

to the individual souls of men, it must unless the
argumentation of Parmenides be entirely groundless

pass from the ravTorrj^ of pure thought into the
Te/30T?7? of knowledge, opinion, and even sensation.
To challenge that passage is indeed to obscure the
connection between Plato s ethical speculations and
their ontological basis.
Mr. Archer-Hind commenting on Tim. 86 E

(6)
writes Absolute being, absolute thought, and
:
"
absolute goodness are one and the same. Therefore

from the absolute or universal soul can come no evil."
Had
"
he repeated the word thought,"

of "
in lieu "soul
no exception could have been taken to the dictum.

As it stands, the second clause seems to me a specific
denial of the evil world-soul described in the tenth
book of the Laws. The description there given
cannot be ignored ;
Trpoa-Xapovaa del Oeov 6eos ovcra,

opOa /cal evSaifjiova TraiSaywyel Trdvra, avoiq Be
Travra av Tavavria rourot?
.
(897 B)
60
Cp. Phaedr. 246 E Zeus HiaKoffptav irdvra ical
and it forces upon us the conclusion that the cosmic

soul qua cosmic functions not only in the mode of
ravrov as perfect thought, but also in the mode of
OaTepov as imperfect thought.

These are the main arguments which tend to show
that the ere/? or 77 9 of the One must not be confused
either with the ravTortj^ or with the ereporrj^ of

the Many. Its more precise determination will be
attempted in the succeeding section.
III. Theology.
In discussing the evolution of 1/01)9 we have more

than once had occasion to use the words 0eo? and
0eto9. We are not, however, entitled to adapt theo
logical terms to the purposes of philosophy unless we
can return an affirmative answer to the vexed ques
tion Did Plato, or did he not, bring his religious
convictions into any intimate connection with his
metaphysical views ? Dr. Zeller, who here as else

where represents modern orthodoxy at its best, holds
that theology does not rank with Dialectics, Physics,
and Ethics, as a definite part of the Platonic doctrine ;
that it cannot even be classified under any of these
sciences 61 that, ; short, the particular notions
in
"
which bring Plato in contact with positive religion are
61
Plato and The Older Academy, p. 494.
for the most part mere outworks of his system, or else
an inconsistent relapse into the language of ordinary

opinion."
62
And yet there are certain a priori con
siderations which militate strongly against the ortho
dox position. It is difficult to believe that a speculator
so thorough-going and fearless as Plato would have
shrunk from the attempt to base his own religion on
a sound intellectual foundation. And that foundation
lay ready to hand. For it must be observed

that, if
by a personal being is meant one conscious of uniting

in itself a diversity of its own states, then the supreme
Mind and the Ideal Minds have substantial claims to
personality; and further, that in the said Minds is

vested the directorate of the universe. shall not We
then be sinning against antecedent likelihood, if we
enquire how far Plato
provides material for the
expression of the Idealist creed in terms of divinity.
(A) Broadly speaking we may say that, in the

Platonic scheme, the objective realm of TCLVTQV is
characterised as divine, and its denizens as deities :
Polit. 2690 TO Kara Tavra ical ftxrauro)? eêuv ael
Kal ravTov elvat, ro? irdvrcov OeioraTOis irpo-
In fact, 1/0770-49 and OeioT^ are everywhere mutual

implicates :
63 and The Older Academy,

Plato p. 505.
Laws 897 B "^rv^rj

vovv fj,ev 7rpo<T\a@ov(ra
a el Oebv
#eo? ova-a K.T.\.
Phaedr. 2470 6eov iavoia vw re ical e
And this applies on the one hand (a) to the
supreme Mind, and on the other (&) to the Ideal

Minds.
(a) With regard to the supreme Mind, we have
already seen that the functions which the Philebus
assigns to it are in the Timaeus given to o 0e6?.
The
22 c)
phrase TOV aXrjOivov apa ical delov vovv (Phileb.
and the attribution of this i/ou? ftacrikiKos to Zeus
(Phileb. 30 D) serve to link the two titles together.
is, therefore, no room for doubt
There that in Plato s
teaching as in that of his immediate successors-

absolute Mind and absolute Godhead coincide.
Stobaeus, following registers Aetios, the Platonic
view correctly in the words 6 Be Oebs vow e er TOV
(b) With regard to the Ideas we have the evidence
of Tim. 37 c
ft)? 8e Kivrjdev avrb Kal {fav evolve TWV ai&lcov
76701/0? aya\iJ>a
o yevvrfaas
63
Stob. Ed. I. x. i6a ed. Wachsmuth i.
p. 127, 20. Ed. I. i. 29
rb p.ova$iK6v, rb
(Aetios) ibid. p. 37, 4 U\drwv Se rb Hv, rb /toi/o</)ues,
forces &v, Ta.yaQ6v. Udvra tie TO, rotavra ruv ovofjuirtav els rbv vovv
<nreu5t. Nous olv 6 eedr. Cp. Ed. I. vi. la (Menander) ibid. p. 83,
20, I. i. 24, ibid. p. 31, 5 rt iror iffrl 8e6s; vovs.

where they are termed Oeol as being the first plural-

isation 64 of and ai Stoi 0eol as being the first
0eo<?,
pluralisation of that which is an dlbiov tyov (Tim. 37D).

65
Mr. Archer-Hind well urges that Plato "used this
strange phrase with some deliberate purpose in view."
I cannot however agree with him that the signific "
ance of so calling them is very hard to see." It
appears to me a direct indication that the Ideas are

the partial Minds into which the universal Mind
multiplies itself.
The Politicus perhaps allegorizes the same Unity

and Plurality of gods, when it states (271 D seg.) that
in the golden age the universe as a whole was managed
66
by a 0eo5 apxowj
separate portions by Oeol a/ôire?.
its
These departmental gods are spoken of in terms that

certainly suggest Plato s deification of the natural
kinds :
ra o>a /cara yevij tcai a^yeXa? olov vofiel^ Oeloi Siei-
Sal/toves, avrdptcrjs et? iravra eAcao-ro?
wv ot<? auro? eW/xei/. (2/1 D)
(B) But ravTov must of necessity pass into Odrepov.

There isneed, therefore, to examine the subjective
manifestation of these objective deities. And since
64
irpura. SiaKCKpifjieva rrjs afjLfpiffTQv fvctxrews, as Simplicius in Arist.
Psych, ed. Hayduck p. 28, 22 calls them.
65
Ed. Ttmaeusp. nSn.
66
Cp. Polit. 272 E of /corei rovs roirovs crvvdpxovres r$
we have distinguished the eYepotWi? of the cosmic

0eo5 from that of the partial 6eoi, our enquiry sub
divides itself into two questions :
(a) What is the
minor mode of the supreme 0e6<? ? and (b) What is
the minor mode of the Ideal Qeoi ?
(a) It was shown in the course of the last section

that the eTeporrjs of TO v is bodied forth as a Trepie^wv
rcoo-pos, which embraces
all particular animals, taking
cognisance of their individual conduct, and being in

some sort responsible for their special deficiencies.
Now the said KoV//,o5, considered as the visible entire
of TO /,
of course a unity.
is Whether we hail from
the Academy or the Lyceum, we are bound to recog
apart from
7
nise eva ovpavov ,
because all question
of Idealism any physical totality may be logically
68
regarded as a single phenomenon. But to infer
that this case we have an idea with only one
"in
particular corresponding" seems to me premature.

When Plato mentions the externality of the supreme
0eo? in the singular number, it behoves us to ask first
whether it is not this collective unity that is intended.
In Tim. 34 A B, for example,
OUTO? Srj mi? 6Wo<? ael \oyia-fibs Oeov Trepl TOV IT ore
deov \oyw6els . . . reXeov etc
eiroiâe.
542 a
67
Tim. 3 1 A, cp. Bonitz Ind. Arist. p. 8.
68 &v 5e ov.
Cp. Farm. 1640 07*01 eowrat, cTs CKOO-TOS <pa.iv6nevos,
Soph. 237 D avdyirr) r6v n Xsyovra tv yt rt Xeytiv.

I take it that o cov del 6eb<$ is contrasted with 6 vrore

eVoyu-eô? #eov, i.e. God qua eternal with God qua
temporal. Again, in Tim. 92 c
opa,Tov ra 6 para Trepieôv^ GIKCOV TOV
#eo? alcrOrjTos el? ovpavos ooe . . .
and in Tim. 68 E
ravra Br]...6 TOV Ka\\i(TTov re /cal apiarov
o? ev rot? <yi<yvo/jU6vots
r
jrape\diJi(3aveV) fjvifca TOV
avTap/crj re tfal TOV T6\(*)TaTOv Oeov eyevva.

God qua Creator is opposed to God qua created. But
we must not on the strength of such passages argue
that the supreme being appears to sense-perception
as a unitary god. And this for the excellent reason
that such an appearance would impugn the very nature
of particular existence. To explain. By a particular
is meant a localisation of
any given VOT/TOV ffiov by
itself or any other VOTJTOV tfiov. The percipient Animal
and the percept Animal, both functioning in the fourth
plane of consciousness, provide what the Theaetetus
calls KLvr)crea)s Svo TrXrfOei
clSr], fjuev ajreipov e/caTepov,
^vva/jbLv 8e TO /juev TTOIGIV eôz/, TO Se irdcrêLv. (156 A).
This being so, a unique particular is a contradiction
in terms inasmuch as the predicate "
"
;
implies unique
that the object is perceived not in its shifting phase of
tcivrja-i? but in its permanent condition of o-rdat^ that
is, not as a particular but as an Idea. Hence in every
case particularity connotes numerical indefinity. The
denial of a solitary specimen is confirmed alike by

the wording of Parmenides fourth hypothesis
Farm. 1
5 8 B Ta 8 erepa rov ez>o? 7ro\\d TTOV av eirf.. .
-E-Tre! oe 76 7r\ela) eô? ecrrt rd re rov evbs

fjiopiov real TO, rov ez>o? 6\ov /juereôvra, OVK
dvdyfcvj ijor) 7T\r)6ei ajreipa eivai aura 76 etcelva ra
/jLeraXa/ji/BdvovTa TOV evos ;
and by the testimony of Aristotle :
Met. Zi. 15. 1040 tf

25 eorrat <yap
l&ea rt? rjv a&vva rov
eVt rjr\ei6vwv /caTiyyoprja-ai r) eô?. ou So /eel 8 6,
a\\a Trdaa ISea elvai fieOe/CTij.
Itwould seem, therefore, that the minor mode of the
supreme 0eo? may indeed be regarded as a unity,
inasmuch as it is a physical totality 69 containing
within itself all the visible manifestations of the Ideal
Tim. 30 D oW ev oparov, trdvO oaa avrov Kara

(frvciv %vyyevf) ^coa et To? e%ov eavrov.
but that nevertheless this Trepikyav /cocr/ô? must in
some sense be an indefinite plurality, if it represents
the ereporr;? of TO ev.
And here we should avoid the error of supposing
that the particular specimens of the natural kinds
69
Compare Cicero s description of Xenokrates theology: "Decs
enim octo esse dicit ; quinque eos qui in stellis vagis nominantur, unum
qui ex omnibus sideribus quae infixa caelo sunt ex dispersis quasi membris
simplex sitputandus Deus, septimumsolem adiungit, octavamque lunam."
(De Nat. Dear. i. 13. 34).

supply the needed plurality. That would be to mis

take the eTeporrjs of ra TroAAa for the erepoTTjs of TO ev.
The whole visible universe is the full concourse of
objective deol as viewed subjectively by any one of
their company localised on the plane of aicrOrjais. But
what we are seeking is the single sovereign 0eb<? as
viewed by the same spectator on the same plane.
If, functioning on the fourth
then, the 0eo9 Man
level apprehends the 0eo? Palm as a multiplicity of
palm-trees, there is no reason why he should not

similarly apprehend the supreme as a multiplicity 6eb<;
of supreme 6eoL Only, whereas particulars are desig

nated by the plural form of the name affixed to their
corresponding Idea, and whereas each of the Ideal
6eol has some distinguishing name Man, Horse, or
Palm from which such a plural may be derived, the
supreme has no appellation of the sort. He
0eo<?
might, however, as a supreme over the Ideal #eo<?
Beoij be fittingly titled 0eo? 6ewv, the God of gods.

Indeed he is so named by Proklos in his account of
Platonic Theology :
The. Plat. ii. II. p. HO (o TT/OWTO? #e6?) o><? $609

eart Oewv cLTravTtov, Kol &>? was evda)Vj...ayio<}
ev aylois, rot? vorjTofc evairoKeKpv^jjievo^ Oeols.
70
Cp. the fragment from Porphyry irepl a.ya.\na.T<av cited by Stob.
Ed. I. 25 ed. Wachsmuth i. p. 31, 8
i. Zevs ovv 6 iras /c<fo>tos, faov IK
(t>(i>v Kal debs CK dfuv. Zevs Se Kal <
<5 Qe6s > ,
Ka6b vovs a<p
ov
, tin $
When, therefore, we meet the phrase Qeol Oewv we

are tempted to find in it the plural (representing the
subjective indefinity) of him who is the #eo? 6ewv. So

far as the phrase itself is concerned, this would be a
perfectly simple and straightforward solution. But it
remains to be seen whether the nature and functions

of the deal dewv, as described in the Timaeus, tally
with those of the supreme vorjrbv &ov conceived as
the percept of particular percipients.
And first as to their nature. Tim. 34 B seqq. nar
rates how the original blend of -û^r; was compounded
of the three primal elements. It was used for the
cosmic soul, being divided into the circles of the Same

and the Other. Tim. 410 tells how the second blend
of tyw)(r) was compounded of the same elements, though
in a less pure condition. It went to form the subord
inate souls, each of which possessed a similar pair of

circles. Now in between these two brews we have
the planets described as Seoyôfc e/^Jrtôt? aco/jiara
SeOevra fwa (38 E), and the fixed stars called
fwa 6ela
Kal dtSia (40 B). Whence it may be asked came
the animation of these %wa ? It could not be fur
nished by the second mixture of -^f%7, since that
had not yet been compounded. Moreover, the first
mixture had been entirely used up (366) in the
making of the cosmic soul. It is obvious, therefore,
that the starry fcoa are the externalisation of the cosmic

soul as distinguished from the subordinate souls.
It was natural that their bodies should be placed

not only of the Other to perform the
in the circle
planetary functions, but also in the circle of the Same

to be a veritable KOCT/JLOS. For they are the exponents
of the Godhead in the sight of men ;
and by setting
"
forth the twofold aspect of their great original act

"
as an everlasting witness to an eternal truth. It was

no mere access of astronomical ardour which led Plato
to write :
TWV vvv \6ywv trepl rov Traz/ro? Xeyofjuevow ovftels av

TTore epptjB T) fjurfre acrrpa pyre rj\iov fjujre ovpavov
l&ovrwv (Tim. 47 A).
There can, then, be little doubt that the Oeol Oe&v,
whom Tim. 41 A identifies

simply with these stars, are
a subjective pluralisation of the supreme Mind. Were

we capable of pure 1/6770-49, we should apprehend them
as a single #eo<? 6ewv.
The same lesson may be learnt from the Laws

along with sundry practical corollaries. For it is
more than probable that the gods, whose care over
men is there vindicated by the Athenian, are identical
with the deal Be&v of the Timaeus. This becomes
evident, orav reKfjîjpia \eya)/JLev co? el&l Oeoij ravra avra
7rpo<f)epovT$, rfkiov re KOL creXrjvrjv KOI avrpa KOI yfjv 0)9

KOI Oela ovra (Laws 886 D).
71
Cp. Laws 950 D T^\iov...Kal rovs &\\ovs fleous, 828 C ruv
8<rovs o5 Ocovs ovpaviovs tirovonaffreov, Crat. 397 C Qatvovrai fj.oi ol
And in the conclusion drawn by 899 B I discern a

hint that this synod of Xa/juirpol Bvvda-rai, is but the
embodiment of a single Mind :
Se $rj irepi TrdvTcov teal cre\rivr)<$

eviavTwv re
Kal /j,7)va>v
real Traawv wpwv Trepi riva a\\ov
\6yov epov/jiev rj
rbv avTov TOVTOV, &>?
dyadal 8e Tracav apenjvj deovs

elvai eire ev crftifJLacriv evovaai, %wa
<j>ijcro/jL6Vj
ovra, Kocrpovai iravra ovpavov e lre airy re

Kal OTTO)? ;
It is interesting tonote that, as in this passage
and ^rvâl are used alternatively, so in those
parts of the Timaeus which deal with the doings of
the deal Oewv there is a constant oscillation between
the use of the singular and the plural number. Thus
we have deoi (44 D) . . . Oeov (44 E) . . . deoL (45 A) ... 6eos (46 c)
...0eo? (47 A)... 0fo j; (47B)...0eo (47 C) . . . 0ewz>
(47 C).
The alternation may be seen on an extended scale
from Tim. 69 C to almost the end of the dialogue. In
92 A the grammatical change is riot even marked, the
subject of eêvvrfcav viz. Oeol being supplied from the
previous Oeov ySacret? viroTiOevios. still more striking A
case occurs in 71 A where an actual anacoluthon is
irpuroi ra>v
o.vty&K<av
rav ircpl T^V E\\dSa rovrovs i*6vovs robs Ocovs
, ov<rirfp
vvv iro\\ol
affrpa Kal
72
produced: et Sore? 8e avr6...deo^...^vve(7Trj(7 . In
much the same way o oyfjLiovpyb? of Tim. 28 A, 29 A,
etc. is pluralised into ol Bq/juavpyol of 75 B, 6 ^vviaras of
29 E into ol fucr<JT7;cra^T69 of /I D.
Again, Plato s later writings consistently denote

the possession of Tavrorrjs by the term aQdvarov, that
of erepoT?;? by the term Ovrjrov. If, then, the deal Qecov
were objectively existent as a plurality, they would

doubtless be endowed with adavavia. But in Tim.
41 B we read :
73
d6dvaroi pev ov/c ecrre ouS aXvroi TO TrdfjLirav, ov
TL i*,ev Sr) \v0ijo-e00e ye ovSe revêade Oavdrov
yLto/pa?, TT)? /jurjs ySoi/Xô-ea)? jj,el%ovos ert

al Kvpiayrepov Xaôvre^ e/cetvow, ols or
and this agrees with the tenor of Politicus 270 A,

where the visible cosmos is spoken of as
72 The converse
change from singular to plural occurs in Farm.
1340 QVKOVV ei irapa r$ 6e$ avrt) e<rrlv
rj aKpifieffTdrr) eiriffTrnj.r], ovr
&v 77 SeffiroTeia f) ^Ksiixav VJ/JLWV irore kv Seo TrJo e/ej , OUT &v rj firiffT^/jLT)
fjftas yvoit]...oijT yiyv(txrKOVfft TO ai Opwireia irpdyfj.ara deol Sures.

73 Tim. 690
r68e fui/eo-Tô-aro,
It follows that in irav
ev >ov a>a
*X OV T To-VTa ev O.VT$ dvtjTa aQa.va.rd re, and in Tim. 92 C Qvt]Ta, yap /col
"
AfldVoTa \a&ii)v /cat |u^7rArjpa>0ets 38e 6 Koff/j.os K.T.\. the "immortal

<a
are not as has commonly been supposed

"
animals the stars. Rather,

o0aj/aTo = the supreme Mind and the Ideal Minds so far as they are
oDa
ra.in6v, floret aia

= the supreme Mind and the Ideal Minds so far as
they become Odrepov. Cp. Arist. Top. Z. 10. 1480; 15 &s Uhdruv
dpi&rai rb Qvt\T^v irpoadirruv fv rots ruv (a<av
6ptff/j.o7s ^ ykp tSea OVK
olov avrodvBptairos.
7*
eTrio-Kevaarrjv rrapa rov Srj/j,iovpyov.
These passages confirm us in the belief that the
existence of the starry gods as a plurality is
merely
subjective and phenomenal.
In brief, the Bed 6e&v are related to the
supreme
0eo9 as particulars to their corresponding Idea. Aetios
account of that relation in Eel. I. xii. i a ed. Wachs-
muth i.
p. 134, 9
loea early ovcria a(ra)jj,aro<*
. . .
rrarpos e7re%ov(7a
TO?? aiV0?7Tot? Tfifyv
is
apparently founded on, and certainly justified by,
Tim. SOD where the Idea is compared to a rrarrjp,
the particular to an eicyovov. Now in 42 E the Oeol
flew with reference to the supreme #eo? are called ol
TratSe? rov rrarpo^. Similarly in 37 C the latter is
75
6 yevvrjo-as Trarrfp, and in 69 C the former are ra
7Q
eavrov <yevvr)fjiara.
This coincidence of nomenclature,
by establishing the proportion As particulars their :
Ideas:: the Oeol de&v the supreme #eo? certainly :
favours the view have put forward, that the 6eol

I
Qewv are not an objective but a subjective pluralisation

1
of their Creator}
Cp. Polit. 273 E 0os 6 KOff/j.Tja as .... aQavmov avrbv
75
Cp. Polit. 273 B.
70
Soph. 266 B has 0eoD yew-fi/taTa of particular men etc.
77
Chalcidius in Tim. 41 A ed. Wrobel p. 200 well remarks: "Illi
enim optimates, id est stellae, non sunt intellegibiles sed sensiles ; at

vero fabricator eorum intellegibilis adprime."
7
To deal next with their functions, (i) In Tim.
4142 the 0eo9 addresses himself to the Oeol Oe&v and
says :
"
Three mortal tribes have still to be created

that the universe may be complete. So far as their
souls are imperishable and divine, they are mine to
make yours be it to fashion their bodies and thereby
:
cause such part of their souls activity as is necessarily

perishable."
Here Plato distinguishes the direct creations of

the 0609 from the indirect creations of the Oeol Oewv.
To the former belongs the task of providing the
immortal and passionless self:
Tim. 41 C KCL& oo ov . . . CLVTWV dOavdrots o^vvôv

elvai Trpoo-rjKei, Oelov \y6/jt,evov rjyefjiovovv re ...
(nreipas real virap^dêvo^.

Ibid. 42 E dOdvavov dp^rjv OVIJTOV fyoov
= 69 C dp^v
tyvxfy dOdvarov
to the latter that of adding the mortal body and its
attendant passions :
Tim. 42 D TO Se pera TOV airopov rot? veois

78
eoyLtara TrXarret^ Ovrjrdj TO Te e
TL rjv tyv %}? dvOpwirivr]^ Seov Trpoayeveadaij
rovro KOI TTOV& oaa dicoXovOa eiceivois direp^/a-
78
It may be remarked that the office which Rep. 41 5 A (a\\ 6 8ebs
TrAaTTOJf, ftffoi /J.v V/J.UV iKavol ^pxetr, xp va"bv eV rf) yevecrei vve/j.i}-ev,
cp. Arist. Pol. B. 5. 1264 12 6 irapa rov 6eov xp v <*6s) assigns to the
in the Timaeus assigned to the 6eol Qeuv.
Ibid. 6gC TO /juera TOVTO dvqrov <ra)/j,a avrfj irepi-

eropveva-av .... d\\o re eZ&o? eV avra)
TTpo(T(f>Koôôvv TO OvrjTov, Sen/a KOI

ev eavru) TraOij/juara
%ov.
This, as I understand it, means : men s very selves
are due to the evolution of the absolute Mind on the
first or noetic plane, being brought about
by objective
pluralisation ;
men s
bodies and bodily affections are
due to the evolution of the absolute Mind on the
remaining or gnostic planes, being brought about by
subjective pluralisation.
This statement of the case involves one issue of
peculiar importance. If the ultimate consciousness
of every individual is a direct creation of the Artificer,
or metaphor an objective multiple of Mind,
to drop
and the objective multiples of Mind are none other
if
than the Ideal series, it follows that the souls of par

ticular men, so far be called truly
as they may
existent, are not to be distinguished from the Idea
of Man. The realisation of this truth throws light
upon several details of the present passage. can We

now see why the aOdvaTos ap^rj OVTJTOV coov was called
Oelov fyepovovv re (Tim. 41 C) plainly because : it is
the Idea, and as dwelling within the pale of

is entitled not
only to aOavavia but also to
Again, when the Creator urges that, were he to make
the perishable part of his creatures, their mortal would
put on immortality and take rank with the gods,

I00 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS
Tim. 41 C St efjLov e ravra <yev6fj,eva

teal /3/ou
he virtually declares that the distinction between
dd-repov and ravrbv would be abolished ;

transient
invade the dominion of Ideal
particulars would
S eo
But be conceded that the immortal part of us
if it
all is identical with the Idea of Man, which Idea as it

attached
appears in the cosmos becomes subjectively
to bodies and split into a seeming multitude of souls
Trepl
ra acaâra <yiy voêvrj pepicrTr) (Tim. 35 A),
there are yet two possible errors which should be
signalised.
On the one hand, it must be observed that this
the unity of the Idea

procedure in no wise imperils ;
since the multiplicity of particular souls belongs only
potentially to the realm of Ideal ova La. As vovs,
the Idea is a single eternal Mind. As eTno-r^rj or

manifold activities
Sofa or aic-Qrja-v;, it passes into the
of human thought. But the latter phase is dynamic
latent in the former the former is the implicit
ally ;
verity of the latter :
Soph. 247 D \eya> 8rj TO teal ojroiavovv KCKT rjfJLevov

elr ek TO Trda-êiv
SvvafjLiv elV et? TO iroielv . . .
.. . irav TOUTO oWcw? elvac ride/tat, yap opov opiêiv
ra 6Wa, to? eemz> OVK a\\o TI 7T\rjv
79 This passage then furnishes a parallel to the use of Oeot = "Ideas"
in Tim. 370 cp. also the terminology of the neo-Platonists

: (p. H2).
On the other hand, the ancient landmark between

the soul and the body of any given individual remains
unmoved. Sokrates a special localisation of the
is
Idea of Man functioning in the mode of lower ment

ality. As such he a double being, comprising both
is
soul and body. His soul is the Ideal Animal con

ceived as actively cognisant on the planes of yeveo-is :
his body or, to speak strictly, his bodily shape is

the same Animal conceived as passively cognised on
the same planes. 80 The one, inasmuch as its activity
is the procession of an Ideal Mind, Plato regards as
the handiwork of God qua Being, viz. the supreme
81
0e6?. The other, inasmuch as its passivity is the
result of imperfect apprehension, he refers to the
workmanship of God qua becoming, viz. the Oeol Oewv.

It may here be objected and the objection is a
valid one that, allowing the body and its accom
panying emotions to be the outcome of imperfect

apprehension, we have as yet shown no reason why
the Oeol Oewv rather than the lower phase of any other
VOTJTOV %wov should be named as the cause of their
appearance. The reason, I think, lies in the fact that

the Ideal <wa are multiples of the supreme Jifloz/, whose
80 This doctrine was a refinement upon the teaching of the earlier

dialogues, e.g. Phaedrus 245 E irav yap awâ $ ptv eca6ev rb Kive?<r6ai,
Sf evtioQev avrcp avrov, f/j.\^vxov, us rairrrjs ofays tyvaews
81
Cp. Tim. 6QC TOJJ/ fjifv Be i<av avrbs yiyvercu
subjectivity therefore takes logical precedence of theirs.

Plato in fact goes more to the root of the matter by
assigning the causation of the OwrjTov 76^09 to the

lower aspect of the supreme #609. Elsewhere he
penetrates beyond their ulterior to their ultimate
source :
Tim. 41 A Seol OecoVj &v e<ya) 877/^01^709 irarrjp re
ep ycov.
Soph. 265 C &5a orj TTavra dvrira real
d\\ov TWOS r)
6 eov SrjfjLiovpyovvTos
vcrrepov <yi<yve(r6ai Trporepov OVK ovra ;
(2) A second office attributed to the 6eol dewv in Tim.
41 D 42 E may be thus expressed. The Artificer
begins his task of providing the delov êôvovv re

portion of individuals by dividing the whole mass of
soul at his disposal into -^rvâ^ laapiQpovs rot9
Bearing in mind what was said concerning

fjLepMTTr) we shall expect Dr. Zeller s view 82 to prove
correct, viz. that these -fyw)(al are the souls of particular
men. But the point may be certified by a considera
tion of the word l<rdpi,0ôi, whose significance has, I
believe, beenunduly neglected.
The employment of the terms o\ov and popia to
denote the supreme ^wov and the Ideal %wa shows that,
in Plato s view, the sum total of the latter represents
the content of the former. Now this equivalence was
83
Plato and The Older Academy p. 390, n. 8.
not confined to the higher phase of Ideal ravroTrjs it :
applied also to the lower order of particular ereporrjs.

Hence the Platonic Parmenides, after stating (Farm.
144 c) that ovala is split into ir\el<j-ra
pepr), corrects
himself and observes :
OVK dp 1
d\rj6rj dpn eXeyopev, \eyovres &>? Ti\el(rra
fjt<epr] rj ovcria vevefjLTjTai,, a\\ Icra, GO? eoifce, TW

evi. (1440 E)
Kal firjv TOL ye Trdvra /J-eprj
rd avrov TO ev eVr*, Kal
ovre TI irXeov ovre \arrov 77 iravra. (145 C)

From these passages I gather that what Aristotle 83
calls ra 7ro\\a TWV (TVVWVU/JLCOV rot? e&eaiv correspond
numerically to the similar phase of TO ev, that is, to

the 6eol 6ev. The meaning of the expression in Tim.
41 D will then be as follows. The îrâl lo-dpiO/Aoi

rot? aorpois are the souls of men which the Creator
divides and distributes to the number of the starry
gods, that they may severally learn the laws of the

universe. Thus the Tfrv%al IcrdpiQ^Qi are particular
souls, but particular souls considered as not yet embodied
and therefore as still the direct handiwork of the
Creator. Their state of dynamic multiplicity is of
course merely an analytical abstraction for, if the ;
body be but the soul passively apprehended by lower

psychosis, actual multiplicity must synchronise with
incarnation. The state of potential plurality is,
83
Met. A. 6. 987 b 10.
io4 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS
however, recognised and described in Farm. i$6l) as

TO efa/<z/779 84 a condition intermediate between ovaia
and yevcn,s :
Kara Srj TOV avrbv \6<yov

KOI ef evos eirl 7ro\\a Ibv
KOI K TToXXftJI/ 6( 6V OVT V CTT(V OVT6 TToXXa,
ovre Sia/cplveTcu ovre o-vyKpiverat, (157 A).
It may be added that the sojourn in the
^vvvoô^
oifcrj&is avrpov rationalises the influence over a man s
character which ancient astrology universally attri
buted to his birth-star. For the rest, having heard
their destiny, these potential particulars are sown into
the planets where they are clothed upon with bodies
by the subjective action of the late-born gods.

In fine, this examination of the nature and func
tions of the Oeol 6ewv enables us to determine their
metaphysical value with some assurance. They are

not co-ordinate with the rpia Bvrjra yevTj, except in so
far as they constitute the erepoiaxns of a vorjrbv ^wov,
but are related to them as the supreme Now is to the

Ideal vorjfjLara. If the term TrapdSeiy/jLa be understood
to denote the cognitions of ^rv^ functioning in the
84
Compare the use of tai<pvris
in Symp. 2IOE
rt Oav/jLaarbv r\\v tyvaiv na\6v K.T.A., Gorg. 523 E avrfj rfj
r^v xJ/vxV 9*povrra fâl^vris a.TroQa.v6vTos e/coo-rou. The former passage
conceives the individual mind confronting that which is avrb naff avrb
jucfl O.VTOV /j.ovoei5es del
the latter represents the disembodied soul of
ftv,
the particular man after death. Both depict a juxtaposition of the

properties of ovcria and yeveo-ts, which except in a moment of transition
is impossible.
mode of TCLVTOV, and the term elKwv to denote the
cognitions of ^f%^ functioning in the mode of Odrepov,

then I conceive that the position assigned by Plato to
the 6eol Oe&v may be fairly represented by the follow
ing diagram :
eltccov
TrapdSeiyfjLa
Oed? Oeoi 0cu!v
Oeoi rpia QvijTa
(b) Lastly, the question, What of the

we approach
subjective aspect of the Ideal gods ? There is but
one fitting term for a minor order of dlSioi Oeoi, namely
Sat/move?. And this Plato has used to describe the
reasoning powers of particular men :
Tim. 90 A TO 8e Trepl rov Kvptwrdrov Trap rjjuv
SiavoeicrOai, Set T^Se, &>?

apa avro
Ibid. 90 C are Se del depaTrevovra TO delov
re avrbv ev KeKocr^pevov rbv SaijULova %VVOLKOV
ev avrq) SiafapovTws evbainova elvai.

86
By SaliJUtiv then Plato means the intelligence
85
With the Platonic derivation from Sa-fi/J-uv in Crat. 398 B L. and S.
compare Archil. 3, 4 TCIUTTJS yap Kfivoi 8ai/j.ovcs flffl fj-dx^s.
that part of us which is the nearest approximation to

86
Ideal OewTTjs. It is indeed sometimes called TO
6elov on grounds which we have already examined.
But for the most part individuals are relegated to the
region of ere/oor?;?, and their highest faculty described
as
TO Oeiorarov TWV Trap rjjuv (Tim. 73 A)
TO OeioraTov TWV ev rjfuv (Ibid. 88 B)
o detorarov r eo"n KOI T&V ev r^jMV irdvrtov Seo*7TOT-
ovv (Ibid. 44 D)
TO eavrov deio-rarov (Rep. SSgE).
He who follows precepts deserves the name of
its
0eto? (Rep. 500 D, Epist. 340 c), and the resultant

".
life is TrdvTcov TWV /Slav deio-rcnos (Phileb. 33 B, cp.

Laws 766 A).
Enough has now been said to prove that a theo
logical designation of Plato s Idealism is not chimerical.

The objective aspect of Mind is represented on the one
hand by the supreme 0eo?, and on the other by the Ideal
OeoL The subjective aspect of the former finds expres
sion in the Beol 6e&v ; that of the latter in the Sa///,oz/e?
of individuals.
If it be asked In what relation does this hierarchy
stand to the evil World-soul of the Laws ? I should
reply that, since vow is del 0eo? (Laws 897 B), Necessity
or the force which produces the degeneration of
86
Tim. 41 c, 69 D, 720.
may be justly described not only as avoia, but also

as TO aQeov 87 whether in the case of the supreme
,
Mind,
Laws 897 B ^rv^rj...dvoia vyyevo{jiei>r}
TrdvTO, av
rdvavrta TOVTOL^ aTrepydêrat,.
Theaet, I/6E Trapaê^yfjidrcDv, o>
(f>i\6,
eV TO> own
eaT(i)T(tiv, rov pev Oelov evBaifjioveardrov, rov 8e
ddeov dOXtwrdrov
or in that of the subordinate minds,
Tim. 86 B voaov êv Brj û^? avoiav
Rep. 58QE el Se TO eavrov fetor arov VTTO
rdra) re teal ^napwrdrw &ov\ovrai,...ovK apa
Thus the Oeoi Oewv, so far as they represent the

o?, are dyaOol irdaav dpeTtjv (Laws 8996), so far as
they deviate from his perfection, are evil and respon
sible for the defects of their dependent creations.
natural
Similarly with particular specimens of the
kinds so far as they approximate to their Idea, they
:
are Bela and evbaipova ;

so far as they recede therefrom,
they are adea and
A word or two may be added with regard to

subsequent terminologies. Of Speusippos usage
next to nothing is known ;
but his severance of vow
from ev and rdyaObv must have produced theological
complications of a serious sort.
67 8c6s.
Cp. Tim. 53 B 6Tav airy rii/bs
With regard to Xenokrates our information is

88
less scanty. Aetios affirms of this philosopher s
religious theories that ra Trporepa Trapa rov TlXdrayvos
/jLTa7re<f)patcev.
And if we allow for Xenokrates*
identification of the Ideas with Mathematical num
bers the statement may be accepted as in the main
correct. At least all
the gods of the Platonic theocracy
play their part in the comprehensive system of Xeno

krates. Corresponding to the objective deities we find :
(a) A supreme and unitary IVot)? called Zevs or

TTpWTO? #609.
(/3) Certain Swa/zet? or Oeiai Siwa/xet? inherent
6eu>v
in elemental forms.
The place of the subjective deities is filled by

(7) The stars or OXv^Tnoi Oeol, which combine to
make a collective ovpavos also known as a 0eo<?.
These stars are the result of a union between

the One and the indeterminate Dyad or, in
allegorical phrase, between Zevs Trarrjp and the
(8) The souls of individual men are called &u-

89
/-toi/e? ;
and even the beasts have some instinct
of the Divine. 90
38
Stob. Ed. i. i.
29 b ed. Wachsmuth i.
p. 37, 2.
89
Arist. Top. .6. 112 a 37.
90
Clemens Strom. V. xiii. 87 KaQ6\ov yovv rV v*pl TOV Qelov Zvvoiav
EevoKpciTTjs.. OVK aTTf\irici Kal eV rots a\6yois fyois (quoted by Zeller
op. at. p. 592.)-
Plato opposition between the power that makes

s
for good and the power that makes for evil reappears
91
perhaps in Xenokrates broad contrast between Zeu?
UTraro? and Zevs vearos. But the further recognition
of vTrocek rjvoi abparoi seems a mere concession

SaiiJioves
to popular superstition. On the whole, Xenokrates

their
theology follows the Platonic outlines, though
author s design is marred and obscured by the attempt
ed innovations of his successor.
Aristotle likewise held the truth of the maxim 92-
Trdvra (pvaei e%et TL Oeiov. But a modified system of
metaphysics caused certain changes in his theological
The conception of a creative i/ou? he
vocabulary.
s account of the
appears to have borrowed from Plato
supreme Mind, and, like his master, he describes it by
the term #eo? :
Met. A. 7. 1072 b 1830. C^.frag. 46, 1483 a 27

6 0eo<? TI vovs earlv rj
eTre/cetvd TL rov vov, Top. E.
6. 136^ 7 %wov vor)Tov

= 6 6ebs Pol.T. 16. 12870
y
28 6 fj,ev
ovv rov vovv Ke\eva)v apxew So/eel Ke\eveiv
dpxetv rov 0eov, Eth.

End. H. 12. 1245 b 16 ov
yap OVTCOS 6 Oeds ev e%6f, d\\a @e\Tiov

w<7Te
rj
d\\o n voelv irap auro? avrov.

no
Since, however, Aristotle s ontology recognises
2. 1007
91
Clemens Strom. V. xiv. 116, Plut. Plat. Qu. ix. I, p.
Phil. Gr. p. 287).

(quoted by R. and P. Hist.
93
Arist. Eth. Nic. H. 14. 1153^ 32-
I io THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS
Xcopi&ral ISecu, he is free to transfer the title Oeol from

the Ideas to the starry spheres, without the encum
brance of a neologism such as Plato s Oeol Oewv, or the
confusion of equivocal names such as those of Xeno-
krates gods :
Met. A. 8. 1074 8 14 Oeovs . . . ra?

ova las elvau, de mund. 2. 391 b 1419 Oewv
OiKrjrripiov ovpavbs tovofjuaGrai K.r.\. Cp. ra
Oela Psych. A. 2. 17. 405 a 32, de part. an. A. 5.
645 a 4, dvOpcoirov TroXv Oeiorepa Eth. NIC. Z. f.
1 141 a 34, ra Qavepa rwv Oeiw Met. E. I. 1026 a
1 ra Oeiorara TWV fyavep&v Phys. B. 4. 196^
8,
33, ra Oela crcofjiara Met. A. 8. 1074^ 30, de

caelo B. 12. 292$ 32, and the more definite
expressions of [Alex.] in Met. ed. Hayduck p.

709, 28 ff. Oeol rocrovTot, QGCLL at o-fyalpai,
. . .
e^rjpTTjfjLevot rfj? deiOTdrrj^ Kal apLerrjs ovarian,

ibid. p. 709, 33 elvlv ovv Oeol Kal Oelov
Trepte-ôv TTJV o\ijv (frvcriv Kal rov anravia
ibid. p. ?2I, 31 els Oeos eVrt. ra yap rwv
/jLevwv air La Oeol /J.ev, a\\a fteOegei Kal Tc3
/3ov\rjfjLari, rov Trpcorov Kal ftaKapicordrov e%ijp-

rrjvrai z/oo?.
Again, Aristotle who is similarly impressed with

the divine nature of thought (Psych. A. 4. 14. 408 b 29,
Met. A. 8. 1074^ 1 6, de part. an. A. io. 686 # 28, de an.
gen. B. 3. 736 27) speaks of particular minds in
OF PLATO S ETHICS. ill
terms that repeat the language of the Platonic dia

logues :
Eth. End. H. 14. 12480 27 opposes TO ev r^fuv

Oelov to ev ro3 6 A.o> 6eb<$.
Eth. NlC. K. 7. II77& 1 6 TWV 6V rjfjLLV

TO OeiQTCLTOV.
Probl. AT. 7. 9620 22 (cp. 9. 9620 35) uses TO
0i6rarov TWV irepl r)fj>as
of the human head.
It is, therefore, highly probable that Plato s teach
ing was the source of the saying attributed to his
pupil :
Clemens Strom. VI. vi. 53 ApivTOTek rjs Saifjioo-i,
Ke XprjcrOai irdvTas av6p(i>irovs \eyet (TvvofjLaprov-

aiv auTOt? irapa TOV xpovov TT}? eVo-ft)/>taTco(7eQ)9,
Trpo^rjTiKov TOVTO /jLadrj/jLa \a/3oov /cal /cara0e/jLvo^

els ra eavrov /3i@\la, fjurj o/xo\07jcra? o0ev v<j)el\-
ero TOV \6yov TOVTOV.
Cic. defin. ii. 12.40 "hominem ad duas res, ut ait

Aristoteles, ad intellegendum et agendum esse
natum quasi mortalem deum"
Arist.frag. 187, 1511 a 43 TOU \oyiKov &ov TO . . .
fjt,v ecTTt Qeos,

TO 8e avOpcoTros, TO 8e olov TlvQa-
76/909.
It might be shown that the theology of the neo-
Platonists in some measure revived the usage of the
Academy. Plotinus, for example, mentions

(a) 6 TTaTrjp Oeos
93
,
i.e. the supreme Triad of TO ev +
6 vow +
93
Enn. v. i.
(ft)
The voepal Swa/xet?, z>. the Platonic Ideas,
which consist the supreme IVoi)? and, as
in
94
sharing its animation, are termed 0eot .
95
(7)
The 6pa)jj,evoi 6eol ,
i.e. the stars.
96
(8) The of particular men.
SatfjLoves and the 6eol
But to pursue the subject would carry us too far

afield. It is of more immediate importance to pass
from the theological aspect of Plato s philosophy to

the moral deductions which he expressly drew there
from, bearing in mind that his ontology was from first
to last intended to serve as a sound basis for ethical
reflection.
94
Enn. V. i.
4, cp. ibid. II. ix. 8 TTUS OVK &v ris &ja\fj.a fi/apyes
Ka\bv rwv VOIJTUV Ofwv ftiroi; ibid. V. i. 7 irav p.ev rb T&V
K<i\\os t ircd/ras 8e Oeovs voyrots. lamblichus too calls the Ideas
vofpoi (v. /. votjToi) Qeoi ap. Prokl. in Tim. 94 C.
95
Enn. V. i. 4, cp. ibid. V. i. 2 errrt Se Kal faios 0eJs, 6ri e^vxos t
Kal TO. &\\a &(TTpa.

96
Enn. v. i. 2, 4. Plotinus was himself guided by a 6e6s, according
to Porphyry, others by their respective Saifioves,Mo/copjos c? 8fbv i\<av
rbi>
Sai/Jiova Kal ov rou v<pei/j.cvov yevovs rbv <rvv6vra
( Vit. Plot. IO).
PART III.
METAPHYSICAL DESCENT AND MORAL ASCENT.
In the foregoing chapter I have emphasised the

distinction between the objective and the subjective
aspects of Plato s ontology. The former was found
to be the purposive pluralisation of a supreme Mind,
abiding in eternal self-sameness, and invested with all

the credentials of divinity. The latter was the necessary
eWTacrt9 of every such Mind, whereby it passed out
of the sphere of identical being into that of diverse
becoming, and stooped from the sovereignty of an

Ideal 0eo9 to the subservience of individual Saipoves.
This declension however, counterbalanced by certain
is,
compensatory tendencies which must not be over

looked. Metaphysics indeed compels a 0809 tcdra),
but Morality with equal insistence demands a 0809
avw and it remains to present the dictates of the one
;
in such a manner as will satisfy the claims of the

other.
Now it will be remembered that we have repeatedly
described the objective world as a pattern, the sub
jective world
as its copy. And this language
applies not only to particulars themselves which,
u4 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS
whether they be the 6eol Oecov or the rpia OVIJTO, 7^77,

are in any case semblances of higher verities,
Tim. 39 E TOVTO 8rj TO Karakonrov aireip^dêro avrov
Trpo? rrjv rov TrapaSeiyfJLaros aTrorvTrovaevos (f>va-iv.
fjirep ovv 1/01)9 eVoucra? tSea? T&> o ecrrt ffiov, olai
re eveiai Kal oaaij KaOopa, roiavras KOL rocraura?

elv Kal roSe cr%eiv. etcrl Srj rerrape?,
ovpdviov 06MV 76^09, a\\rj $e Trrrjvbv Kal

e Kal
aepoTropov, rplrrj Se evvftpov eI8o?, Tretyv
Xepaalov riraprov
but also to the conditions of particular existence. For
Time, according to Plato, is an image of Eternity, and
Space a simulacrum of Ideal Otherness.
The former fact is stated in so many words :
Tim. 37 D et/co) 8 eVtôet KLVTJTOV Tiva alwvos TroôYU,
Kal SiaKoafjicov a/jia ovpavbv iroiel fuevovros alcovos

ev evl Ka T ap(6fjLov lovaav alaviov elKova, TOVTOV
ov 8^ ypovov a)VOfjLaKafjiev.
The latter is a legitimate inference from Tim. 520,

where the thesis that we wrongly import spacial con
ceptions into the world of Ideas is supported by the

following argument :
"
A particular has not an absolute but a relative

existence it is in fact the mere phantasm of
;
another object : hence it demands a something

in which it may appear, unless indeed it is
to be reduced to an utter nonentity. [This

something is Space.] But in the region of real
existence for one thing (sc. Idea) to be formed

in another thing (sc. Idea 97 ) would be to make
that other thing both one and two, which is
[Therefore between the Ideas there

impossible.
no Space, but only Otherness.]"
is
This amounts to saying that Space, the medium

of subjective pluralisation, corresponds to numerical
Otherness, the medium of objective pluralisation.

Thus the question raised by Aristotle in Phys. A. 2.
209^33
TlXdrcovi /jLV70i Xeicreov . . . Sia rl ov/c ev TOTTCO ra
iSr) KCU ol apiduoi, elirep TO /AeOeKTi/cbv 6 TOTTO?,
176 70V /J,<yd\OV
KCU 7OV fJLlKpOV 6Wo? 70V
fJLedeK7t,KOV 617 T7J? uX???, to<77Te/3
V Tft)
TifJbO,i(i>
yeypafav
will be met by the answer that the term TOTTO? is not
rightly used till Ideal alterity has passed into indi
vidual extension.
It was this doctrine that particulars and the
modes of particular existence bear to ideas and the
modes of Ideal existence the relation of an ei/ccov to
97
Mr. Archer-Hind (ed. Tim. p. 171) paraphrases: "For true
reason declares that, while the type is one, and the image another, they
must be apart ; for they cannot exist one in the other and so be one and
two at once." But surely rb fj.ev and rb Se are both forus ovra, i.e.
Ideas : this is shown by the whole form of construction eiKovi /*>
Se ovrcas ovn. It is no question of the old doctrine of

"
K.T.A.. . .
,T<f
irapovvia," but a clear statement of the reason why particulars are

extended, Ideas unextended.
n6 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS
its which determined the whole alle

irapaSevyfJia
gorical form of the Timaeus,

and so popularised the
belief that
"
This visible World is but a Picture of the

invisible, wherein, as in a Pourtraict, things are not
truely, but in equivocal shapes,

and as they counter
feit some more real substance in that invisible fabrick."
The it links the

peculiar value of this imagery is that
world of relative to the world of absolute being, and
thereby expresses just that aspect of Idealism which
of
might best serve as a basis for the structure
morality. In other words, the artistic setting of the
Timaeus has a special significance of its own, inasmuch
as the raison d etre of Plato s ethics may be said to lie
in the simple reflection that, if the world as we know
it is a portrait, it ought to be as exact a portrait as
possible.
f
Starting from this point of contact between
Meta
attempt to show how the
physics and Morals,
I shall
larger lines of matured Platonism

mark out the rational
end of individual conduct. In so doing we should
remember thati-the true unit of voluntary action is
not the particular but the VOIJTOV l&ov. Nevertheless
&aXe7o//,e0a, aAA ov 0eofc, and therefore
must translate our motives, like our speech,

"We
Into the lower phrase that suits the sense

O the limitedly apprehensive. Let
"
Each level have its language !
It will be convenient to begin by resuming the

constitution of the moral agent. Every VOTJTOV

possesses four faculties, namely yoO?, e-Tn 0-777^77, Sofa,
a0-#77<jt9,
the three last being moments in the sub
jective evolution of the first, and opposed to it as

yevecris to 6W&>? over la. Particulars which, as such,
belong to the region of <yi<yv6fjieva

are consequently
debarred from vorj&is they :
are, however, endowed
98
with 7ricmj/j,r), Sofa, and though in the
ai<r0rj<ris ,
lower forms of life even these are to a greater or less

extent in abeyance.
This catalogue of the cognitive powers accords
well with the usage of the more advanced Platonic
writings. In the earlier dialogues pure thought is not
unfrequently ascribed to individual thinkers (e.g. Rep.

5 1 1 C, D, 5 24 c, Phaed. 83 B. alib.). The Philebus adopts
a half-way position for it expressly distinguishes the ;
human i/oO? of 21 D, 22 c, 580, from the a\j]Qivo^ ical

Betas vov<; of 22 C, 28 C, 30 D. But the Timaeus no
where" speaks of the particular man as possessing
i>oO? : it describes him as being at most a vov teal
epao-TTJv (46 D), and his finest faculty as
98
Cp. Stob. Ed. i. Ixi. I (Hermes) ed. Wachsmuth i.
p. 275, 16
& vovs fv Ttf 6*$, 6 \oyiv/j.b? ev T$ avOp<air(f.
Aristotle after describing
{Mel. A. 9. 1074 b 35 seqq.) the v6t]cris vo-^ffews of the supreme Being

continues Qaivcrai 5 aid &\\ov i) liri<TT-}]i*.i) /col TJ atffdijffis Kal rj
$6a Kal fj Sidvota, eouTTjs 5 tv -rraptpycp.
99
It does indeed use the phrase vovv ex**" (68 B), vovv ex*" (89 B ) =
"sensible, reasonable," and the compounds Ivvosiv (870), ttaravo^lv
(90 D) etc. But to avoid them would have been mere pedantry.
ii8 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS
rov vov fapo/jLevr) Svvafus

10
(7 1 B). To
females and the lower animals it alludes in 91 D
92 arranging them in a descending scale according
B,
as they approximate to or recede from that higher
mentality vov KOI avoids d7ro@o\fj KOL /crrjo-ei, (92 B) ;
while 77 B brings even vegetable life into the same
register, <w
0^77? pev real \oyio-pov (

= eVto-TT;^?;?)
101
re /cal vov alaOrjaeoos Se.
yu-ereo-rtIn like TO /JbrjSev,
manner the second hypothesis of the Parmenides

enumerates the powers of the human intellect :
Farm. 15 5 D va ^ eTrtcmjfjLTj ST; eirj av avrov teal
86ga Kal aladricris, eiTrep Kal vvv rjêl^ Trepl

avrov TTCLVTCL ravra TTpdrrofAev
but, as we have seen sometime since, this dialogue
confines the range of pure thought to the Ideal world.
Here, however, we encounter a difficulty which

has beset the student of the Platonic system ever
since Farm. 134 B was penned. If the realm of true
existence is /JLOVQ) Oearr) vu>
(Phaedr. 247 C), and if vovs
100
This strange expression seems chosen to escape the direct attri
bution of vovs to a particular. Similarly in 51 D, where Plato calls the
Ideas a*/o/<r07jTo rj/j.uv efty, voov^va. n6vov, the position of the
u<
pronoun is instructive.
101
Simplicius (in Arist. Psych, ed. Hayduck p. 317, 11) states that
plants %x ftv Al/J/ TWO. alffdrjffi^, a.fj,v8poTpav 5e t) KOTO TO &\\ws cD/To,
xal &s UXdrtav olov Ka6cv8ov(rav atffBtiffiv. Similarly Empedokles
f<j)Tj
(according to Sextus Math. viii. 286) TrdVro j}iov \oyiica rvyx&veiv, Kal
ov ua pAvov a\\a Kal Qvrd, prjrus ypaQuv irdura yap IffQi <f>p6vr)<riv
is not allowed to the individual as such, how is it that

Plato himself feels so secure about his ground-plan of
a supreme Mind existent both as a unity and as a
plurality ? The confidence which he displays e.g. in
Tim. 29 B TOV [lev ovv JMOVI/JLOV KOI (BejBaiov teal per a

vov KaTa<j)avov<> IAOVI/AOVS KOI
KO.& oaov [olov] re dve\6 yifTOi<;
elvai Kal diaviJTOis, TOVTOV Bel

could only be justified by the actual intuition of an
Ideal #eo<? :
Tim. 7 2 D ra fjuev ovv irepl ^f%)9 ... TO pen d\rj-

102
f fyu,^>/J(ra^T05, TOT av OVTO) /aozô)?
a TO ye /JLTJV etVo? /c.r.X.,

and that intuition is beyond the reach of the indi
vidual, however great his genius and however unceasing

his efforts. As Chalcidius 103
puts it,
"
sine divinitatis
adminiculo ipsa per se anima nihil valeat spectare
atque intellegere divinum."
The difficulty was a real one, and such as to bring

a consistent thinker within sight of scepticism :
Farm. I35C ri ovv Trotrjo-eis 0i\o(7o^>/a? Trepi, ; Trot
Tptyei dyvoov/JLevwv TOVTCOV ;

Plato meets it by two considerations, (i) The highest
103
Cp. Tim. 68 D 0ebs pev TO vo\\a fls ev tvytcepawvyai Kal Trd\ti>
e{ cvbs fls TTO\\O. Sia\vetv iitavus ftriffrdfievos apa Kal SUJ/OT^S, avQpta-
iruv Se ouSels ovStTfpa TOVTWV iKavbs o&Tf Herri vvv O&T ciffavBis TTOT*
(<rrai.
103
In Plat. Tim. 41 E, ed. Wrobel p. 202.
human eTrtcm^fy though it can never attain to divine

VOTJO-IS, may yet be reckoned an approximation
104
thereto :
Tim. 5 1 E Kai TOV /*ev (sc. Sogrjs d\7)0ov<>)

irdvra
avSpa fjL6Te%iv (frareoVj vov $e 0eou?
Be yevos ^pa^v TL.
The 761/0? in question is no doubt TO TWV
ro)v op&w? ye KOI d\77&w? yevo? (Epist. % 3 26 A).
Philosophers may in a sense be said vov êreÊLv
inasmuch as their intelligence leads them to desiderate
certain transcendent fixities in nature as a basis for
the eTTUTTijfjLr} which they do possess. They apprehend
1
rav fjLev l&eav vow /car eV terra pav ... ra S* airoye vvd-
fjuara alcr6rj(Tt ical Sofa (Tim. Locr. 946). And it is to
this 105
ayad&v dvBpwv o/jLo^pdSfjLcov 1/0770-4? that Plato
appeals when he wishes to establish any fundamental
truth. See, for example, the tenor of
Phileb. 28 C Trai/re? yap (TD^WVQIXTIV 01 . . .
(ro(f>ol
z/ou? eVrt /3ao-t\eu? rjfiiv

fo>?
ovpavov re Kal 777?.
Nevertheless the wisdom of men is at best
only
earth-born. It cannot by itself provide the needed
"
divinitatis adminiculum." Hence Plato, half in jest,

half seriously, delights to invest his authorities with a
supernatural halo, and to speak of their contributions

to knowledge as of a divine revelation. In Soph. 216 B
104
See the admirable remarks of Mr. Archer-Hind ed. Timaeus
pp.
48-49.
105
Plat. Epist. d. 3 10 A.
the critic of immature Idealism is #609 rt?

KTUCOS ;
and in P/iileb. i6c the revised ontology is
called in so many words "a

gift of the gods to man
"
kind
vOpwTrovs 6<n?, o>?
76 Ka-ra<f>aiv6Tcu
fj,ol, Trodev CK Qewv Ippityrj Sid TWOS Ilpo/jirjOea)?
(f>avordr(f)
TLVL Trvpi teal ol fiev TraXaioi,
fjfjLwv ical ejyvrepw Oecov oltcovvres,
ravrrjv <f>?ifjLrjv Trape&ocrav, &>?

ef ei/o? fjiev /cat etc
7ro\\(t)V OVTWV TWV uel Xeyofjievcov elvai, Trepas oe

KOI aireipiav ev aurot? ^v/jL(f)urov eôvrwv.
The phrase of this passage aptly expresses just
last
that scheme which one particular man could not by

his unaided reason have descried ;
it gives us the
appended diagram, in which ev denotes the supreme
Mind, and iro\\a the Ideal series.
(2) any one turns a deaf ear to this theory

But if
of inspiration, or quotes by way of retort Rep. 381 E

av VTTO TOUTODV dvaTreiOo/jLeval al /j,r}Tpes ra
W, ox? apa 6eoi rti/e? irepiep Xpv Tcu
TroXXot? feyot? teal TrarroSaTTot? iv%a\\6nevoi, iva
apa pev et? 0eoi>9 ^Xaa^^waLv, apa Be TOU?

fjurj
TratSa? aTrep^d^wvTai, SetXcrepou?
Plato can fall back on a less pregnable position.
He holds that the souls of individuals have before

their incarnation stood face to face with the Creator,
I2 4 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS
and learnt from his lips rrjv rov iravros fyvcriv (Tim.
41 E). This they were enabled to do, because the
souls of men conceived as not yet associated with
their bodies do not differ from the Idea of Man, under
whose intuition all noetic existence would naturally
106
fall. The doctrine of Anamnesis is in fact the safe
guard of Idealism. It may be denied : but it can

hardly be disproved, and as has before been hinted
it presupposes some such relation of the ideas to Mind
as was from the assumptions of the Parmenides.

elicited
The confinement of pure thought to the world of

Ideas cannot, then, invalidate the foundations of the
Idealist system, because the individual philosopher
not only builds upon the experience of previous
thinkers but also possesses an innate criterion of his
own structure :
Phaedrus 2496, C Set yap avOpwirov %vvievai KCLT
)
CK 7ro\\(H)v lov aladrjcrewv et? ev
^vvaipovêvov. rovro Be ecrnv dvd/jivrjffis
e/ceivwv. a TTOT elSev rjfjLWv r) ^rv)(rj cv/juTropevOelara
teal vTrepiSovGa a vvv elval (fra/JLev

real dva-
TO ov oVro)?. 8to Brj St/caiW fJ.6vrj
TTTepovrcu rj Tov <f>t\oa6(j>ov

Sidvoia 7T/305 yap
eVetVot? del eari i^vrifMrj Kara 8um/z>, vrpo?
0eb<f a>
106
Diog. Laert. iii.
38 iSmfrara /j.ev aofyiav vyc irai (sc. Plato) eivai
ruv vot\T<i)V xal uvrus &VTUV 4iri(rTr)/jLir)v, ^v <pT)(n irepl
The removal of this difficulty in epistemology also

clears the way for ethical advance. It might have
been argued that to make the world as we know it
conform to an Ideal pattern is a futile task for those
who have no acquaintance with that pattern. But if
it be conceded that we can not only approach to such
knowledge but also appraise our own progress, the

reduction of individual conduct to directive rules
demands immediate attention
The foremost of these rules, as laid down by Plato,
isthe general obligation of bpoiwai* This was 6ea>.
indeed a duty inculcated at all stages of his philo

sophic development, with the constant qualification of
approximate success :
Rep. 500 C #/&>

&rj KOI ico(T/jbi(p
6 -ye faXocrocfros 6/u\<wv
fc6<r(jLi6$
re Kal Oelos et? TO Svvarbv dv@pa)7rq)
yiyverat.
Ibid. 613 B eTTiTrjSevcov dperrjv efc ocrov SWCLTOV
dvOpcoTTto bfJioiovddai dew.
Phaedrus 25 3 A eviropovai ia TO (rvvrbva)? rjvay-
KOLdOaL ?rpo<?
rbv Oebv /SXeTret^, /cal
avrov rfj jjLVTJfjir)) ev0ov(n,a>vTes, ef; etceivov
dvovai ra edrj KOI ra eVtTT/Seu/u-aTa, ica& oaov

Svvarbv 0eov dvQpayrra) /jLeraaêlv (cp. 249 c).
Theaet. 1
76 A, B Sto teal ireipacrdai %pr) evdevbe e/celae
Be
favyeiv o TI Td%t,<7Ta. <f>vyrj
Kara TO Bvvarov.
Tim. 29 E Trdvra 6 ri /-caXwra yeveo-dat, (3ov\ij0rf
TrapaTrXtfcria eavrw.
Laws 716 C rbv ovv rc3 TOIOVTM (sc. Oew) TrpocrfaXf}
yevrjo-opevov et? ^vvafjuv o TI fidXicrTa teal avrbv
TOIOVTOV dvayxalov yiyveo-Oai.
But with the modification of the earlier metaphysic it
became possible to employ more precise definition.
I have said that in Plato s maturer view the individual
man and body soul being the active,
consists of soul
body the passive function of the same entity. One

result of this is that the later dialogues, while deter
mining the human reXo? a twofold application,

in
emphasise the complementary nature of both its

aspects. The Timaeus, for example, affirms that
fuyLtyu-erp/a KOI aêtpia {Jbe^wv r) Û^T)? avrfjs
avro (87 D), and insists on parallel develop
<r(t)jj,a
ment as a mutual security. And the Lazvs, adopting

the customary division of TraiSeva-is into Music and
Gymnastic, interpret the former to mean ra TT}? (0)^7}?

T ^ ? tyv%i)s Trpo? aper?}? TraiSelav, the latter ra
rov crco/taTO? dperfjs (673 A).
T?7<?
(A) To speak first of ^y%/;. The rational end for

individual souls is not as we might have supposed
the minimising of the difference between their own
eTTio-Tij/jir) and the VOTJGIS of their corresponding Idea.
For the Ideas themselves are as Aristotle says

(Met. M. 6. 1080 12, alib.) Numbers involving TO
irporepov KOI vorrepov, that is, a definite succession of
Minds, each of which exhibits some part of the entire

Mind and takes rank according to its noetic iroa-ov.
Hence Plato finds the summum bonum in conformity
to the supreme 0eo? rather than in resemblance to any
of the Ideal OeoL
But how is this o/itotWt? Qew to be effected ? Par
ticulars, as such, are debarred from rising to the
spaceless and timeless condition of pure thought.
Happily for us, the supreme 0eo9 no less than the
Ideal 6eo\ passes into space and time as a plurality
possessed of eVtcrr^T;, Sofa, ctfafiijcri?. The aim and

object of particular morality is approximation to the
supreme 0eo? as revealed to us in the #eot Oewv. Our

eTria-TrjfjLT), our Sofa, our afoOrjcri*;, must be made like
to theirs. Otherwise we shall have failed of life s true
purpose :
Tim. 90 D TO) 8 eV rjiuv 6eiw jfvyyevels eld Kivrjcreis

al TOU 7raz>To<?
Siavorjaeis KOI Trepifyopai raurat?
Srj ^vveTTo/jievov e/cacrrov Sel ra? Trepl TTJV
ev rp /c<f)a\f) rjfjuwv TreptoSovs
ie<f>6apfjieva<s
e
OovvTa Sta TO KaraâvOdveLV ra? rov

dpfjLOvtas re Kal 7T6pi,<f>opa$
TO) Karavoovfjievq) TO
tcaravoovv efo/AOtwo-at Kara rrjv dpâiav fyvaw,
o/uLOiaxravTa 8e Te\o? eêiv rov TrporeOevTos dvOpco-

TTOt? U7TO 00)V dpiCTTOV /3/OU TTpO? T6 TOV
Kal TOV eVetTct 107
107
These last words are noteworthy. Had the bonum been defined
as approximation to any single Idea, it might have been inapplicable to
This statement supersedes all previous and partial

determinations. It is introduced by words which
epitomise the teaching of the Republic, the clause

rj iravri (sc. rrj<; ^f%}9 et Set)
ot/ceta? /td(TT<0 ical

Tpo<j)a<;
(90 C)
recognising just that apportioned activity which is
the mark of genuine justice. 108 Nor do we lose sight
of the fjLiKTos jSlos advocated in the Pkilebtis, for with
this conception of the rational object is closely linked
a ovce>Jri9 dv6pa)7rlvr)<; evScu/jLovlas Kal dOXioTrjTOs (Theaet.
175 c). As in the Republic evSaijjLovia was proportioned

to attainment of SucauHrvinj (Rep. 5806, c), so in the
later dialogues true pleasure depends upon the reali
sation of the human end :

109
Theaet. 76 E 7rapa&i,yiJ,dT(ov
1 ev T&J OVTI e<7TO)TCt)^, . . .
7ov JAW Oelov evBat/jLOveardTOv, TOV Se aOeov
Laws 664 B rbv avrov JjBiaTov re Kal apurTov VTTO

0ea)v j3lov Xeyea-Qat, $d<TKovre<$ dXrjOea-Tara
epovfjiev.
the particulars of that Idea in their future life, because such particulars
may by metempsychosis change their status in the Ideal order.

108
M Cp. e.g. Rep. 433 E fj TOV oiiceiov re Kal tavrov efis re Kal
irpais SiKaioffvvT) kv 6fj.o\oyo iTO, 441 D Mj/rj/ioj/eureoj/ apa T]\uv, 6n
Kal 7)/Ji<av Ka(TTos, KTOV kv ra avrov fKaffrov fv avrtf sparry, TU>V
ovros Sfacuoy re <rrai Kal ra avrov irparruv.

109
Diog. Laert. iii. 42 irepl 5e ayaBwv t) naKuv rotavra e\eye
(sc. Plato)- reAos yuci/ zivai r}\v ItyfUtlwriv rep 6cf- r^v 5 aper)]ir avrdpKrj
fj.ei>
eTvai -rrpbs evSai/Jtoviav K.r.\,
Ibid. 732 E Sei 8rj TOV tcdXXia-Tov filov eiraiveiv

^
povov on T<a
o-^rjân Kparel vrpo? evSogtav, d\\a
KOL a)? ... /cparel Kal TOVTW o Trdvres ^jTovfie^j
ro3 %alpet,v 7r\eto>,
eXarro) Be \VTrela-6ai Trapa
rov ftiov aTravra.
The external manifestation of the supreme Mind

is called collectively a evSafacov 0eo? (Tim. 34 B). The
philosopher who studies truth /crrjo-eax; eveica ev$al/j,ovos
filovj KO.& ooov rjfjLwv T) <pva^ eVSeêrat (Tim. 68 E) may
win much felicity in the present life
Tim. 90 C are Se del depairevovra TO 0elov

eôvra re
avrov v K6/co(T/jLr)]j,evov TOV Saifjiova ^VVOLKOV ev
avTO) 8ia<f>ep6vTO)s evSatfj,ova elvai,
and in the future
Ibid. 42 B 7rd\Lv eh TTJV TOV ^VVVO/JLOV i

11
oi/crjo-Lv do-TpoVj ffiov evSai/jiOva /cal
efot.
For in truth the o-vvayvpfAos
(frpovrfaews, the conversion
of opinion into knowledge, is pvpia) ?rpo? evScupoviav
&i,a(f>epa)v (Politic. 272 c). Even on the perceptive
plane conformity to nature s design is attended by
pleasure. Thus of sensation in general we read :
Tim. 64 C TO ftev Trapd tyixrw . . .

dkyeivov, TO S
69 <f)V(7lV
. . .
f)$V.
110
The number 6fuv must balance that of the rpla Qv-nra.
of the fleol
(see p. 103). Hence

the philosopher is said to travel to the
of the star, not to become an actual star himself.
9
Tim. 8 1 D E Kara <f>v(T(,v peO" 77801^9 efe

av yap TO //.ez> irapa <])V(n,v d\yew6v, TO
Ibid. 83 A rdtyv rwv Kara fyvaiv ovKer
pa /juev avra avTols Sea TO

, ^6
airoKavcnv eavrwv eêw
and of the single senses :
Taste. Tim. 66 B OTrorav rj ^varaa-i^ . . . ol/ceia
Travrl TTCLV TO TOIOVTOV.
67 A TO
1
S me ll. Ibid. O"

f)Si>
Kal TO Xwirrjpbv ... TO
ev . . .
(Buifypevov ... TO 8e ... tra\iv 77 ir
Hearing. Ibid. 80 B fj&ovrjv pev TO?? afypocriv, ev<f)po-
Be Tot? e^pocn Sia TTJV rrjs Qelas dpjjLO-

ev Ovrjrals vevofiewrjv </>opat9
In the last extract 1780^ is the emotion normally
accompanying that which conforms to nature ; ev(f>po-
vvvri is the higher feeling due

to consciousness of that
conformity.
(B) Secondly, we have to consider the character
and conditions of crw/ui. Here a distinction must be

made between matter and shape. The material out
of which our limbs are apparently constructed is but

a portion of the whole U7ro8o^ 7ez/e<re&>9,
borrowed
therefrom (Phileb. 29 c) and to be returned thereto
(Tim. 43 A). By a law of orderly development, akin

to that which fixes the quadruple classification of the
natural kinds, this uTroSo^r/ is
figured throughout with
the forms of the four elements forms which repre
sent not indeed any avra icaO avTa, self-existent
111
Ideas, but still certain avra e $ eavrcov, logically
distinct types. In this substrate the transient shapes
of particulars, the elaiovra ical egiovra of Tim. 5OC,
are momentarily expressed. They are declared to
be TWV OVTCOV ael /xt/^âra for bodily shape
; is as
already stated the individual soul as viewed by our

imperfect faculties, and the individual soul is but the
Idea as it passes into the triple phase of genetic
thought. This holds good, whether percipient and
percept belong to different species or to the same, or
again coincide in a single personality. So far as
method is concerned it matters not whether Sokrates
beholds a star, or a friend, or himself. In any case a
vorjrbv cognised by
cooi> is a VOTJTOV oW on the plane
of sensation, and the result must be a localisation of
the former by the latter in the vTroSo^rj.
Now it is clear enough that the material content

of this localisation is a fractional part of the whole
cosmic avo-racns. What is not at once clear is the

determination of specific contour and its connection
with the shape of the universe. Why, for example,
111
Tim. 51 B.
132
is Sokrates body unlike that of a star, and by no

to distinguish from that of his friend ?
means hard
And how are all three related to the mundane sphere ?
The answer to these questions, though implicit

in Plato s writings, seems in
rather than explicit
If a particular shape is a particular soul
evitable.
it follows that
as appears to particular cognition,
it
of
difference of embodiment presupposes difference^
soul. In fact we formulate the law As is the imita :
tion of the active ^v^, so wil1 be the unitation f ^te

Individual souls were grouped under
passive o-w/im.
to
certain definite types, viz. the fwa, according
vorjra
to the cosmic soul.
their degree of approximation
Therefore individual bodies will
be similarly grouped
viz. the natural kinds,
tinder certain fixed forms,
to the
according to their degree of approximation
cosmic body. A
being endowed with superhuman-
will be apprehended not as a man
say, stellar thought
limits of each several
but as a star. Again, within the
of personal shape will be referred
species differences
allowance being
to differences of personal attainment,
tendencies soon to be
made certain
for retarding
noticed.
That in Plato view physical was thus dependent
s
from
upon psychical development may be gathered
Aristotle s criticism in Psych. A. 3. 22-23, 407 ^ *S- 2 4
alrlav teal TTW?

ov6ev Trpoo-SioptWre? 8ta TIV
TOV (rco/xaro?. KaiTot, Boêtev av TOT*
dvayKalov elvai" Sia yap rrjv KouvwvLav TO fiev

7TOL6L TO 8e TTcicTêt Kol TO JJL6V KlVeiTCLl TO $
Kivel, TOVTWV 8 ovdev V7rdp%i TT/JOV a\\r)\a
TV^pixnv. ol 8e /JLOVOV
TTOLOV ri r) tyv)(r), Trepl $e rov

ouê^ eVt TrpocrSiop%ovcriv, axrTrep
Kara TOV? IIvOcuyopiKOVS pvOovs TTJV
L&IOV ex^tv e28o? Kal
The here brought against the Timaeus,

objection
which admits the Koivuvia of an active soul with a
of this theory are
passive body, is that adherents
satisfied when they have determined the nature of
the former and do not trouble themselves about the

fitness of the latter. The objection is a typical one.
It amounts to a complaint that the theory is incon
not with Plato s

presuppositions,
but with
sistent,
of
Aristotle s rejection of them as is said elsewhere
:
those who posit Ideal Numbers,

S OVK
vtroOecriv,
Trpo? ftey TTJV \eyoveiv, 6
op0w X&>?
7ro\\a yap dvaipovcnv (Met. M. 7.

opOw
1082 b 32).
From the Platonic standpoint to determine the
also to determine the
TTOiOTns of a given soul was
as that body is the
TTOIOTW of its body, inasmuch
visualisation of that soul. This account of the rela
the two confirmed by
subsisting between
is
tion
I 34 THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS
Tim. 91 D 92 B, a passage which implies throughout

that the nature of the body depends upon the nature
of the soul. It agrees, too, with the priority always
assigned by Plato to ^rv^ as analytically contrasted

with awfj,a, e.g.
Tim. 34 B, C rr)v Se Sr) tyvxfjv ov% o>? vvv vvrepav
7nêi,povfjL6V \e<yeiv,
oi>To>9
e^âvâro KOL o
#eo9 vewrepav ou yap av apyeadcn, Trpea-fivrepov

VTTO vecorepov %vvep%as eiaaev.
Laws 896 B op#w? apa Kal /cvpia)s d\r)9e(TTaTd re
KOI reXecorara elprjKores av elpev ^rv)
Trporepav yeyovevai creo/zaTO? TJ/JLLV, cra>//,a
repbv re Kal va-repov ^^779 apô

icara (frva-iv.
Moreover, it justifies certain materialistic descriptions

of soul which occur for the most part in the Timaeus
and are sometimes almost obtrusively unspiritual.
In 87 A, for example, it is said of bodily humours
that, when rrjv a$>
avrwv arîSa rfi TT}?
/j,7roi,ovcn. And in 43 D sensations are described as

<r<f)o$p(t)s
aeiovcrat, ra? TT)? ^vîj^ irepiobovs. So too the
bonds that bind soul to body are mentioned in a
strangely tangible and visible connection :
TOVTOIS gv/ATraaiv ap%rj [lev f)

TOV fiveXov <yevecn<s
ol
<yap
rov (Biov Secr/Aol T^? ^^7)9 TO) o-(t)fj,art
Iv TOVTW SiaSovfjuevoi, Kareppiôvv TO

76^09 (73 B )
These and similar examples of verbal license

Aristotleis never weary of
attacking his motive if ;
we may being the elimination of

trust his followers
all metaphor and inexactitude from the domain of
rigid science :
Simplic. in Arist. Psych, ed. Hayduck p. 28, n

Apia-TOTeXrjs . . . ael euoOw? . . . OVK . . .
avaipelv
avrrjv TTJV a\r)6eiav, a\\a JJLQVQV
Still, when in Psych. A. 3. n, 406 25 23, 407 26

he refutes at length the manner in which o Tifiaios
(frv&toXoyei rrjv "fyvxrjv K-WZIV TO it is hard to<r&>/Aa,
acquit him of ignoring the real justification for such

language, namely Plato s belief that matter only is
another aspect of mind a belief which warranted the

extension of physical terminology to psychical pheno
mena, and even palliated the chiasmus of the cosmic
soul.
There is, however, one difficulty besetting this

view of the relation between mind and matter which
has not yet been examined. If the body is the soul
as apprehended by particular cognition, how can there
be any such disproportion between soul and body as
is contemplated in Tim. 87 D ?
teal Travrrj yd\r)v a&Oevea Tepov KOLI

i
la"xypav fjn~
etSo5 oiav 0^77?

Ka ^ orav av rovvavriov
TOUTO), ov /ca\bv oXov TO woz>.
At first sight this passage certainly appears to gainsay

the rule enunciated above :
"
As is the imitation of the

active ^v^r), so will be the imitation of the passive
But a little reflection will show that the
o-wyu-a."
two statements are quite compatible. If a and p

denote the active and passive aspects of the individual
Sokrates on the plane of en-Krrqfjuj, a and/ the same
aspects on the plane of Sofa, and on the plane of a"
p"
ala-Orjo-is, then the law concerning the parallel develop
ment of ^f%?7 and crw/za may be represented by a

series of equations :
5.
Suppose now that Sokrates, though intellectually

superior to the average man, suffers from some
physical defect, say TO T&V o^^drwy. By the law
efo>
of correspondence this peculiar conformation of the
eyes must accurately express a limitation of the power

of sight. But such limitation may well coexist with,
or even be brought on by, unusual mental develop
ment. Indeed it is just this sacrifice of one set of
faculties to another that Plato here deprecates. Let
us, he says, have no ill-conditioned disparity between
higher and lower functions. If a be fully developed
and a"
starved, or if a be starved and a! fully developed,
in either case there is a lack of symmetry about TO
%vvafjL<j)6Tepov,
o>oi> o KaXovpev.
Tim. 88 B fjbla Srj awr^pia TT/JO? a^co, fjbrjre rrjv
avev 0"a>/*flT09
Mvelv fJLr)T (Tw/jba avev
"va
afAVvo/Jieva) rylyvrjo-Oov la-oppoirco KOI
fjs,
vyirj.
Asa practical precept, both yL6e\eT?; Siavoia, the

exercise of active thought, and o-cofjLao-Kia, the cultiva
tion of a healthy frame, are alike enjoined upon one
who would imitate the example set by the Universe
the result being a mode of life more harmonious than
the high-souled but somewhat ascetic aspirations of
the Phaedo:
Phaed. 67 D TO /ieXeT??/x<x
avro rovro ecm
KOL
Soul and body are indeed distinct, but the distinction

is no longer to be an antagonism. Rather it is the
contrast between inseparable complements. Active
and passive functions are to the particular what voelv
and voel&OaL are to the Idea.

condition is deter
Granting, then, that physical
mined by psychical development, we return to consider
the effect produced upon the one by the graduated
attainment of the other.
The nearest approach to the voâis of the supreme
0eo? is, we hold, to be found in the sublime intelligence
of the Beol u2
6ea)i> .
Consequently the best imitation
of that circularity which symbolises 113 pure thought
will be the spherical shapes and revolving orbits of
the ovpdvioi 6eol :
Tim. 40 A TW e Travrl Trpoa-eiKa^tov evtcvicXov
. .
Kivr)<rew
Be &vo Trpoarj^frev e/cdcrTq), rrjv
ev TXVTO) Kara ravra Trepl TWV avrwv del ra

eavra) SiavoovfJLevq), rrjv 8e efc TO TrpoaOev.
Aristophanes myth turns to similar account the

ov\o<f)Vis
TVTTOL of the Empedoklean cosmogony. He
makes the children of the sun, the earth, and the
moon, bear the impress of their divine origin
still :
Symp. iSQE, 190 B o\ov rjv eKacrrov TOV d

TO elSo? V&TOV teal TrXeupa?
<TTpo<yyv\ov,
. . .
7rpL<f)6p rj
Se rjv KOL avra KOI fj Tropeia
&v Sta TO Tot? yoveva-w ofioia elvai.
As regards the present human frame, the #eol 6ewv

have confined the revolutions of immortal soul in a
terrestrial body, whereof the cranium is a copy of the
cosmos :
Tim. 44 D Ta? fiev $rj Oeias irepioôv^ 8uo oucra? TO

TOV TravTos a^rjfjLa aTro^fjirja-d/jLevoi, irept,<f>epe<s
ov
^9 <7^>atpoetSe? o-coyua eveSrjcrav, TOVTO o vvv
Ke<j>a\r]v 67rovojjtd%o/Jiev, o deiOTCLTOV T CO-TL teal
ev rMV irdvTwv
112
They are repeatedly said to follow the example of the supreme
s, c.g. Tim. 410, 42 E, 69 C.
113
Tim. 34 A, Laws 898 A.
Tim. 73 C Trjv ... TO Qelov o-Trep/JLa olov apovpav /ue\-

\ovarav e%eiv ev avrrj 7Tpi(f>eprj Travra^fj TrXaaa?.
The rest of the body is a mere vTr^peaia avT(*>
( Tim.
440) ; yet, inasmuch as contains TO \onrov KOI Bv^rov
it
T)9 tyv-xfis, it was fashioned of the next best shape :
11 *
a/jLd (TTpoyyvXa /cal TT poorer) SiypeiTo (r^fiara (73 D).
This difference marked by two curious
in dignity is
expressions. The head is held in position by sinews

which the Creator TrepicrTijcras KVK\W Trepl TOV rpd^rjXov
Ko\\7)crev ofjLoioTTjrt, (Tim. 75 D) whereas in making :
the vertebral column he acted ry da-repov 7rpo<7%p&>-
/j,evos Swd/jiei (ibid. 74 A). Apart from one

. . .
another these expressions are barely intelligible.

Viewed together, they recall Tim. 57 E crrdo-iv nw ev
ojjLoXoTrjTL, Kivr](Tiv Se et? dvco/jLaXorrjra del TiQ^^v
atria Se dviooTrj^ av r^ dvca/jbaXov <ucreet)9,
where as I
showed from Aristotle awo-oT??? is equivalent to 77
Barepov Svva/j,w. In short, Plato means that the

backbone is flexible, while the head is not.
So strong is his faith in the microcosmic structure

of the human body that in Tim. 81 A he does not
scruple to apply the word ovpavbs to it :
Ta Se evaifjia . . .
TrepLeC^rj^êva axnrep VTT* ovpavov
e/cdarov TOV feoou, rrjv TOV
i
<f>opdv.
114
For irp6iJ.r}Kfs as a deterioration of o-âtpoetSes cp. Tim. 91 E
is re Kal iravroias
apyias iKavrwv al TrepupopaL
The significance of phrase will become clearer

this
ifwe consider that, not only does the vibration of
the vTroSoxrj correspond to the due motions of the
body,
Tim. 88 C teal TCL fi^prj OepairevTeov^ TO TOV Travrb?
Ibid. 88 D lav Se r]v re Tpo<f>bv

/cal rMvrjv
irpoaei jrofJLev pi^Tai rt?, teal TO crco/u-a
fj,ev /jLTjSeTTOTe Y](TV)^Lav ayeiv ea, Kivfj Se /cal
yu/oi ? dei Tim? GfjuTroiwv avTay . . .

/caraKocr/jifj,
Kara TOP TTpbcrOev \6yov, bv Trepl TOV
e\eyo/jLv, . . .
vyleiav Trapeêt,
but even the concentric spheres of air and fire, which

form the mantle of the universe, find their counterpart
in the fiery and airy envelopes of the human frame,
This, I believe, is the purport of the Platonic theory
of respiration, the main points of which may here be
summarised.
The passage in which that theory is set forth (Tim.
78 A 79 E, cp. Tim. Locr. 101 D) has a reputation for
difficulty, which it would not, I think, have gained
had two facts been borne
begin with, in mind. To
the whole apparatus of breathing is independent of
the animal organism 115 the &ov was already ir\aa6ev ;
115
This is not so puerile a notion as it seems at first sight to be.
"
We can as yet hardly say what are even the local boundaries that
when the contrivance was added to

it (Tim. 78 c).
And secondly, the preliminary remarks in 78 A show
that TTCLvra ocra ef eXarrovwv fiWcrTarat areyei ra

ra 5 K fjLeityvwv ra G/jLi/cporepa ov &vvarai hence
/u,ei&>,
:
the structure of the human body is pervious to both

air and fire, but fire which is rrdvrwv yevwv o-îKpofjuep-
ecrrarov excludes air.
According to Plato, the Creator constructed a

116
network or bag (irXeyiJLa olov ol Kvprot ),
which . . .
was apparently formed of two layers the outer one
(TO /cvpros) of air, the inner one of fire. This TrXeâ or

fcvpros was subdivided into a couple of smaller bags
(ey/cvpna) also made of air. The whole, by alternate
impletion and depletion, swings to and fro through the
divide the organism from its environment. When does the air in our
lungs begin to belong to us, and when does it cease to be

a constituent
(Lotze Microcosmus i. 136).

"
of the body ?
116
By a /eupros is meant a basket of wicker work with a wide mouth
but a comparatively narrow neck, used for catching fish see the illus :
trations in Rich Diet. Ant. s.v. nassa, Daremberg & Saglio Diet. Ant.
s.v. Prof. Cook Wilson in his polemic on the Timaeus
colum.
p. adopts M. Th. H. Martin s view that the
78 seq.
mouth of the trap
must have the ends of the reeds pointing inwards. But he himself
admits that "there is nothing about such a hindrance in Plato," and it
seems more probable that Kvpros here denotes that form of fish-trap
which was closed a lid ; for we should thus obtain a parallel between
by
the lid and the closing of mouth and nostrils. Oppian Hal. iii. 341370
gives a full account of this Kvpros
with a lid : when
the trap is full, the
fisherman claps to the lid and lifts the whole out of the water WHO.
r6r avfy Kvproio irepl ffr6(ia
ykp iro\\oi re Kal cfanrees reAeflaxn, | 5$J
Ka\vvTi e5 apap6s TOVS 5 tvSov eV ireirr nwTas

e>Kt
vffrdnov \
7rot>fj.a |
KV<t)ffffovra.s
avfipvffev.
body et? TJ]V IK T/}? KoiKias crrl ra? (f)\efta<; vSpelav. The
process may readily be followed by the help of the
appended illustration. It comprises two movements,
(a) eKTrvor) and (b) avairvor). (a) Expiration. We
start with our eyicvpna full of air (fig. i). This air,
heated by the fiery envelope, escapes upwards by the

nearest way ets- rrjv avrov %a)pav TT/JO? TO %uy<yve$. ef&>
The nearest way is Kara TO arofjia KOL ra? plvas. As

it issues thence, it would leave a vacuum behind it,
did not the principle of TrepiwGis come into operation.
By this principle the whole Kvpros is compressed, so

that the air at A, which was just outside the body,
enters Sia /jiav&v T&V crapK&v and occupies the position
B described as TO rwv crrrjOcov K.OLI rov 7r\ev/jLovo<;. (b)
Inspiration. The air at B (fig. ii) is now in its turn
heated by the fiery envelope, and rushing out the

nearest way Sia pavwv TWV crapK&v sets up Trepiwcris
again. The Treplwcris forces fresh air Kara TO crro/u-a
Kal T<z9
pivas into the eyKvpTia, and we reach our
original position once more.
This arrargement of air and fire in concentric
layers recalls the elemental \r)%ei 9 of Tim. 5 3 A, 63 B
seqq., and the oscillation of the whole is described in
terms which tally with the alcopa of Phaed. 1 1 1 E :
Tim. 78 E Siaimpovfjievov Sia KoiXlas. . . .

TT}<?
Ibid. 80 D TOV Trvpos, alwpovfjievq) . . . eVTo? TW

TTvevfiaTi, ^vveirofjievoV) TCLS (frXe/Bas T CK TTJS
Koi\ia<s Trj
PIG.l. FIG 2
To fa.ce page
Indeed, Plato himself draws out the comparison :
Phaed. 1 1 2 B KOI wa-irep rcov dvaTrveovTwv del eKTrvel

re Kal dvairvel peov TO Trvev/Jia, ovrco Kal Kt
J~waiG)poviLt,voi>
TGO vypoi) TO iTvevfjLa Seivovs TIVQSS
Kal dfjbTvxdvGvs irapeêrai, Kal elcriov Kal
So far the human form. The shapes of the lower

animals are similarly proportioned to their degree of
intellectual activity. Flighty conceits beget wings.
Indulgence of emotion and appetite distorts the
spherical cranium and increases the number of earthly
props. Lower passions trail the body in the dust,
or SLKTJV apaOias eVâT??? eVâTa? oiKtjoeis elXrjô-
Tew plunge it into the impurities of subaqueous
life.
Moreover, just as the differing grades of soul s

intelligence were accompanied by differing grades of
evSaL/jLovta, so the approximation to cosmic sphericity
entails an approximation to perfect beauty. The
evKVK\ov crw/jia of a star is \afjL7rp6raTov ibelv T6 Ka\-
\icrTov . . .
KO&IJLOS d\r)0ivos (Tim. 40 A). Other
particulars reach a positive or comparative degree,
according to the rank of their corresponding Idea
and their own conformity to it. In fact, all natural
products are more or less beautiful since they are

more or less accurate copies of Ideal types :
Tim. 28 A orov fjLev ovv av o SijiJLiovpybs Trpo?

TO Kara Tavra e%pv /3\e7ro>z> aet, TOIOVTCO rtvl
rrjv ISeav KOI Svva-
fitv amov a.Trep ydfyj Tai, Ka\bv e dvdjK^ OVTCOS
airoreketadai, TTCLV.
Tim. 30 A Xo7tcTtt//,ei>o<?
ovv evpia/cev ere TWV Kara
fyvcLv oparwv ovbev dvoTjrov rov vovv eftovros
6\ov o\ov rcdXXiov eaeo-Oai irore epyov.
In a word, Plato looks upon beauty as the visible
manifestation of that goodness which is the essential
attribute of mental activity :
Tim. 87 C irav STJ TO dyaObv Ka\ov.

Herein he outstrips contemporary art, which, while
carrying to completion the principle of unity in variety,
omitted that other necessary feature of beauty, viz.
expressiveness. We
may surely regard Plato s fusion
of the two, a fusion ultimately derived from his identi
fication of TO ev with rdyaOov, as a distinct anticipation
of the modern aesthetic judgment.
Our examination of the human re\o9 in its twofold
application to soul and to body has brought before

us in clear relief the conception of the individual as a
microcosm, of the universe as a macrocosm. In using
these terms I do not necessarily imply that the former
resembles the latter in the important respect of being
an animal comprising other animals, but merely that
the individual is a miniature a better or worse copy
of Mind as it passes into cosmic existence. At the
same time I maypoint out that, just as the opening
sections of the Timaeus reassert the valid parts of the
Republic, so the triple division of the soul in Tim. 69 c

seq. recalls the threefold simile of Rep. 588 B seq. and
suggests the image of a man containing diverse animal

natures 117 within himself:
The Timaeus. The Republic.
TO Qdov = lSea avOpoairov (5880).

fc Sea Xe o^TO? (588 D, cp.
590 B avrl
= ISea (hjplov Troixikov /cal
(5880).
This help to explain the "curious quasi-personi-

may
fication of sexual impulse" in Tim. 91 A seq. For if
the various mental states of the individual stand to
him in somewhat the same relation as the Ideal ?<wa
to the cosmic iwoi>,

it is legitimate to use the phrase
%wov eii fyvxpv of such a definite state as that indicated
by the passage in question. The expression wov

7ndv^rjrLKov evov rfjs Trai&oirouas (Tim. 91 C) is to my
mind a distinct reminiscence of the 7ro\v/ce<f)a\ov
which in the Republic symbolises TO eTriOv-

:
cp. e.g. the drift of Rep. 5 90 A
e6yovs re Kal
117
Cp. also the |u^<f>irros 8vvafj.i$ viroirrepov
of Phaedrus 246 A.
10
OVKOVV fcal TO aKO\ao~Tatvetv otet Sia Toiavra rrdXat,
tye<yeo~dai,
em avierai ev TOJ TOLOVTM TO Sewbv
TO fjieya eiceivo /cal 7ro\ueiSe9 dpe/jufjua Trepa TOV
with Tim. 91 B
s re KOI auro/cpare? 7670^69, olov ,wov avvrrtj-

KOOV TOV
It remains to investigate one further result trace
able to the law of correspondence between ^tn^r) and

I do
o-wjjia namely, the belief in Metempsychosis.
118
not hold with Mr. Archer-Hind that such a belief
"
has no essential connexion with the Platonic onto

logy."
For if the localised activity of a given VOTJTOV
Z&ov attains that degree of excellence which is the

external manifestation of the next higher $ovj or
sinks to that degree which marks the next lower fwoi/,
the particular shape under which the said activity
was seen must of necessity undergo a corresponding
change. To take an example. The Ideal being Man
on the plane of sensation perceives himself as a diverse
multiplicity of men. One member of this multiplicity
say, Orpheus is apprehended as possessing poetic
genius. When his particular form perishes, a com
pensating form is bound to appear somewhere within
118 Ed. Tim. p. 344;;.

the limits of the cosmic JoW. And since transmigra

tion is ever towards TO oôiov
Laws 904 E /cafcici) iêv ryvyvoêvov Trpo? Ta? Katciov$

i/ruâ?, a/jbeivo) 8e Trpo? Ta? a/zetVou? Tropevo-
11!
fJLGVOV
the new formwill appear in the presentations of that
Idea which the paradeigm of the acquired qualities,

is
say, the Idea of Swan. What has happened is this.

The Idea of Man has not become the Idea of Swan ;
for every an eternal being oine eh eavrb etVSe^-

Idea is
opevov a\\o a\\o6ev ovre avrb et? aXXo TTOL lov (Tim.
52 A). But one e%iov of Man has vanished and one

elcriov of Swan appeared in virtue of the fact that the
Ideal series is the unitary Mind existent as a plurality.
But, it will be asked, if the body is such an
infallible why do not acquired
index of the soul,
characteristics gradually display themselves in form
and features ? How comes it that Horace s fancy is
not a commonplace fact ?
"
lam iam residunt cruribus asperae

pelles, et album mutor in alitem
superne, nascunturque leves

per digitos humerosque plumae."
119
Stobaeus Ed. I. xlix. 60 (Porphurios) ed. Wachsmuth i. p. 445,
23 observes that, according to Plato, the soul eV TOIS \eyofj.fvai
(T^fi Kal fj.eTaK6(Tfj.Tfj<riv
els e repo
T& TTp6(T<pOpOV
Kttl OlKe lC
It not a satisfactory answer to this question to reply

is
that the natural kinds are permanent types between

which no hybrid means may be inserted, and that the
species of the individual is determined by the prepon
derance of his characteristics. For, once allow that
the soul as passively apprehended on the level of
sense-perception is the body, and it follows that all

traits whether they preponderate or not must, so far
as they are apprehended, take shape as corporeal

deviations. The truer reason is, I take it, that during
a man s life-time certain restrictions are laid
upon
him by the society and influence of his fellowmen,
which prevent him from rising or sinking to any very
marked extent. 120 But in TO egatyvrjs, the moment
of transition which we call death, the individual
121
soul is not distinguished from the idea {BovXyais :
therefore comes into play and, the limitations of ;
humanity being removed, that particular fraction of

the entire Mind leaps into sudden realisation of
faculties towards which it had previously felt but
an incipient tendency.
120 In Tim. 76 E he has the rudiments of a bird s not the

talons,
feathers and beak.
121
Cp. Stob. Ed. i. xlix. 6 (Hermes) ed. Wachsmuth i.
p. 324, 5
Toivvv ttfrlv euStos J/OIJTIK)] ouata . . .
a7raAAa*yr<ra 5e TOV QVITIKOV
vr^j K.a&" avr^v /xeVct, OUT^ IOUTTJS olffa.
v) /car ovffiav (/cu/rjcns)

Other questions relative to this transition suggest

themselves. It is brought about,
according to the
Timaeus, by a failure of bodily conditions, a relaxation
of the bonds by which we are bound to a certain
portion of the VTTOÔ^. Accident or disease or mere

old age may so disorder or dislocate the complex of
elemental triangles, which make up the material of a
man s members, that becomes no longer a fit tene
it
ment for him. It has sometimes been held that, in

Plato s theory, the molecular angles are dulled and
blunted by the wear and tear of life till they can no
longer retain the soul. This, I think, is an inexact
statement of the case. For (i) if triangulation is the
expression of a law, we should not expect the triangles
ever to be warped "
"
or malformed. When pressure

is applied, no shearing takes place
distortion or
"
"
they simply crystallise into double the number of

sides. The octahedron does not become two four-
sided pyramids, as it would if a model were cut with
a knife, but two t/iree-sided pyramids or tetrahedra
(Tim. 560). Again, (2) Plato himself explains icatva
TpLjwva to mean la^vpav TTJV v<yK\i,(riv

CLVT&V
7T/309 a\\T]\a /ceKTrj/jueva (Tim. 8 1 B), that is, triangles

whose hamation is as yet unimpaired. Hence in 81 C
the 7ra\aiorepa KOI acrOevecnepa must be those which
are no longer so securely interlocked and in 73 B ;
a&rpafifj will denote the opposite of <7T/aa/3o?, "dis

located."
Agreeably to this in 81 C we have the
phrase fjpiâ TWV rptywvwv %a\a, a double metaphor

intended to recall the wording of 73 B :
TOVTOIS ^vfjiTTacnv dp%r) fjuev T) TOV fj,ve\ov yevecris ol
yap TOV fiiov Secr/jLol TT}? ^^77? rc5
Bov/jLevr)<;
ev TOVTW &ia$ov/j,vo
TO 9VT]TOV 761/09.
Thus 8 1 C declares that, when the triangles of the
spinal chord are loosed, fyOivei TTCLV %wov: and 81 D
adds that, when the same triangles give way alto
gether, then death follows.

But if death ushers in the sudden transpeciation
that I have described, what enables the dead body to
retain the lineaments of humanity ? How is the awpa
rapêvdev (Pkaedo 80 C) explicable on the Idealist
hypothesis ?
Again I would refer to the distinction
already drawn between the matter and the shape of

our bodies. At the moment of death the soul s
activity ceases to impress with appropriate shape its
that portion of the vTroBo^rj to which it has hitherto

been confined, and begins to imprint another portion
of the same susceptible medium with new-born out
lines. Nevertheless the previous portion is left with
a certain definite arrangement of triangles, which
naturally subsists till it is dissipated by other forces :
this arrangement of inanimate matter the corpse is
neither soul nor body (though it may popularly be
122
Cp. ibid. 73 C a"irepfj.a
. . .
&povpai>, 846 TWV friîav, 86 C SevSpov.
termed the latter), but a mere congeries of elemental

123
triangles part and parcel of the cosmic
, u-TroSo^?)
to
whose store-house it has been returned. Sokrates
may say with more truth than ever :
PJiaedo 1 1
5 D ovKen vfuv Trapa/jLevw, aXA, ot^fjcro/uat
aiTLCov et9 fMaicdpayv 8/7 Tivas evâiôvla^.
For the soul escapes and the bodily form though ;
not the matter which it once impressed attends its

124
flight.
Reappearance involves change of place :
Laws 9040 fjLTa(3d\\ovTa Se êperot Kara Trjv TT)?
ia%iv KOI vofjiov. oyu/cporepa fjiev TWV

/jLera/3d\\ovTa ekdrTW Kara TO
aTTOpeveraLj 7r\ela) 8e /cal
et? /3d9os TO, T6 Kara)
TOTTfOV.
In other words, the supreme Mind transforms and

deserts
transports individual souls according to their
Laws 903 D eVel Be del ^f%7 cvvrerajfjievr}
Tore pev aXXw, Tore 8e aXXw, fteraâXX

o/a? //,6Ta/3o\a? i eavrrjv rj Si erepav
The same explanation must be given of

123 all artificial objects
the "house
"
and "
ring which are not fytotcfyxaTa of Ideas but colloc

"
ations of inert material.
124
Alexis Olympiad, frag. com. ed. Meineke iii. 455 <ru>/j.a
j.v
rb 5 aQavarov ttfpf irpbs ravr

0V7JT&J/ alov êVero, atpa. rbi>
\
|
ov ffoX^ TlXaruvos ;
152 METAPHYSICAL BASIS OF PLATO S ETHICS.
epyov
TO fjêv apeivov yiyvofjievov r}6o<$ els
ico
TOTTOVj êlpov Se et? TOV êipova^ Kara TO
TTpeTTOV CLVTMV Ka<TTOV
-
so that particular life is justly said to depend on the
supreme %wov :
1
Tim. 89 B tear avro TO ^wov el/juap/juevov ef
eôv TOV ftiov
Thus in the last resort we come back to the #609 Oe&v,

and have warrant for describing Plato s ethical theory
as the moral synthesis of a metaphysical analysis, the
return of Unity towards itself, a process that is
discrete rather than continuous, inasmuch as the aTreipa
journey towards the w through the several stages of
the
INDEX LOCORUM
Alex, de anim. ed. Bruns p.

85,20
in Artst. Met. ed. Hay-
duck p. 92, 19, 22
- p. 670, 27
p. 700, 27
p. 709, 28 ff
P- 709. 33
P- 721, 31
p. l6
73 J
Alexis Olympiad, frag. com.
ed. Meineke iii. 455
Archilochus 3. 4
Archytas in frag. phil. Gr.
ed. Mullach i. 565
Arist. de an. gen. B. 3. 736
27
decaelo B. 12. 292* 32
demundo 2. 391 b 14 19 no
de part. an. A. I. 6420
32
*
5. 645 4
- A. 10. 6860 28
Eth.Eud.H. 12. 1245*
16
14. 12480 27
Eth.Nic. Z. 7. 1141034
- H. 14. 1153* 3 2
K. 7. 11770 16
frag. 46. 14830 27
- 184. 15100 4
184. 15100 14
187. 1511043
apud Philoponum
Met. A. 6. 987 b 10
6. 987* 10
6. 987* 10
6. 988 2
154 INDEX LOCORUM.
INDEX LOCORUM. 155
I
56 INDEX LOCORUM.
INDEX LOCORUM. 157
158 INDEX LOCORUM.
INDEX LOCORUM. 159
i6o INDEX LOCORUM.
J. PALMER, PRINTER, ALEXANDRA STREET, CAMBRIDGE.

FEB1 5 Q84
NOV 1 9 1980
CT 7 195,
flTT
S 5
Cf> *
10
CvJ

A.B.cook - The Metaphysical Basis of Plato&#39;s Ethics, 1895

Diunggah oleh

Informasi Dokumen

Deskripsi Asli:

Hak Cipta

Format Tersedia

Bagikan dokumen Ini

Bagikan atau Tanam Dokumen

Opsi Berbagi

Apakah menurut Anda dokumen ini bermanfaat?

Apakah konten ini tidak pantas?

Hak Cipta:

Format Tersedia

A.B.cook - The Metaphysical Basis of Plato&#39;s Ethics, 1895

Diunggah oleh

Hak Cipta:

Format Tersedia

VICTORIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

ARTHUR BERNARD COOK M.A.

&quot;Quis ille primus, cuius ex imagine

DEIGHTON BELL & CO.

PRINTED BY JONATHAN PALMER

PART I. THE PLATONIC THEORY OF MIND i

2. The Sophist . . ... . . . .

2. Identity and Difference 68

PART III. METAPHYSICAL DESCENT AND MORAL ASCENT. 113

INDEX LOCORUM 153

PROKLOS in Farm. ed. Cousin vi. 30.

THE following essay is neither a systematic account

of Plato s metaphysics, nor an adequate exposition

aims at clearing up the connection between the two.

metaphysical scheme that underlay the ethics of

tendency of modern Platonic criticism. For the sup

gruous positions. And this is due partly, I think, to

a growing appreciation of the artistic side of his

thought, partly to special efforts that have been made

style the true order of the Platonic writings. The

the latter has shown that sundry seeming inconsis

ment. But, whatever be the precise causes which

regard the Platonic philosophy from the standpoint of

the reality of the Ideal world. The late Dr. Maguire

Odrepov, i.e. not only objective but also subjective.

dicating in the briefest possible manner how this

theory of objective and subjective ova ia furnished a

containing within itself a series of voyra wa. Every

to make good its claim to real being must (he says)

higher condition are the Ideas ;

dition they are particular specimens of the natural

kinds. And since the higher mentality must be

0eo? and the Ideas ai&ioi Oeoi, in contradistinction to

particulars which are at best only $ai/j,oves.

The significance of these remarks will be at

apparent if we consider the case of a single vorpov

faculties, named respectively vovs, and eVicrr^/xT;, Sofa,

aiaOrja-^. As possessed of vovs he is the Idea of

Man, an immutable entity correlating with, i.e. think

opinion, sensation, no longer functioning as a unitary

minds. These particulars in their turn correlate with,

them ijrin^at, as passively apprehensible we call them

Further, the world of absolute being (the sovereign

starry gods + all specimens of the natural kinds).

pass into the latter, so morality demands that the

may be, to the condition of the sovereign Mind itself.

Such attainment in the present life is perforce meagre

stages of the Ideal series.

of the latter as a copy of the former, and en

bodies in accordance with the ethical end above

It will be seen from this statement that my

Jackson s papers in the Journal of Philology (vols.

x xv) have, to my thinking, established beyond

Dialogues. Any attempt to reconstruct

mainly upon the P/iilebus, the Parmenides, the 77^-

actetus, the Sophist, the Politicus, the Timaeus, and

the Laivs. And those who set about it may spare

the list of Ideas, whereby relations, negations, and

products ceased to be regarded as Ideas

proper (aura KCL& avra eiBrj) and (2) a modification ;

of the conception of the relation subsisting between

who have ears to hear that, according to Plato s

the one universal Thought evolves

A.B.cook - The Metaphysical Basis of Plato's Ethics, 1895

A.B.cook - The Metaphysical Basis of Plato's Ethics, 1895

"Quis ille primus, cuius ex imagine

interpretation of the second limb of the dilemma would be "or there :

147 observes \eyerai <yap vorj/jia KOI rb voyrbv avrb TO

the equivalent of But it is difficult to believe v6rj<ri<;.

v6fi<ris. But (i) in that passage "thought is thoughts"

denotes "the actual object of thought, the thing

bended by thought." The latter is TO vorjfia. Thus

particular as such is incapable of vbr)(n<s,

a thought that thinks. Now to the question, "What

Thoughts that think." Moreover, as we have