Aristotles Categories

When things have only a name in common we call those things homonymous (e.g. man and a picture of a man are said to be animals). When things have the name in common and the definition of being, they are called synonymous. For example both a man and an ox are animals. When things get their name from something with only a difference in ending we call them paronymous (the brave, bravery; grammarian, grammar). Chapter 2 Chapter 1

Book I

Some statements involve combination (man runs) and some do not (man, runs, ox). Of things there are: (a) some are said of a subject but are not in any subject (e.g. man, the individual man); (b) some are in a subject, but are not said of any subject (the individual white is in a subject, the body, but not said of any subject); (c) some are both said of a subject and in a subject (knowledge, in a subject, the soul, and is also said of a subject, the knowledge of grammar); (d) some things are neither in a subject, not said of a subject (the individual man or individual horsefor nothing is of this sort is either in a subject or said of a subject). ([a] is substance, [b] is accidental quality, [c] ??, [d] individual casesbut not individual ??s.) Whenever one thing is predicated of another as of the subject, all things said of what is predicated will be said of the subject also (Hank is a man; all man can be said of Hank). Differentiae of genera which are different (not subordinate genera) are themselves different in kind (animal: winged, two-footed, acquatic, vs. knowledge does not admit differences of being winged) Of things said without an combination, each signifies either: substance, quantity, qualification, relative, where, when, being-in-a-position, having, doing, or being affected. (and examples) Things can be true or false only in combination, not without (e.g. man, white, runs, wins). Chapter 5 Chapter 4 Chapter 3

 Most strictly, a subject is (d) above, that which is neither said of a subject, nor in a subject (e.g. the individual man) and the species in which the things primarily are are called secondary substances (e.g. individual man belongs in man; animal is genus of man; man and animal are secondary substances). What is in the predicate is said of the subject in both name and definition but not vice versa. For those things in the subject, they are predicated of the subject in name only. Things are said of primary subjects either as subjects or in them as subjects (e.g. animal is predicated of man and therefore also of individual man). Of secondary substances, the species is more a substance than the genus. (e.g. an individual man is more a man than an animal) Of the species, one is no more a substance than another (e.g. individual man is not more man, than individual horse is a horse). After the primary substances, their species and genera should be the only things called secondary substances. Primary substances are never in a subject, nor secondary (e.g. man is not in the individual man). The differentia is not in the subject either; the definition of differentia is predicated of that which the differentia is said. (e.g. if we say footed of man, the definition of footed will apply to man) When we speak of things in a subject we do not mean a part/whole relationship. It is a characteristic of substances and differentiae that all things called from them are so called synonymously. (differentiae are predicated of both species and individual.) Both species and individuals admit the definition of the differentiae synonymously. Every substance seems to signify a certain thisobviously for primary substances and only in terms of signifying substance of a certain qualification for secondary substances (contrast this with white which only signifies a certain qualification). Every substance has nothing contrary to it (e.g. nothing is contrary to an individual man, nor to man, nor to animal). There is nothing contrary to any definite quality. Substance does not admit to a more and a lessthat is any given substance is not called more, or less, than it is. It is distinctive of substance that what is numerically one is able to receive contrariesand not in other cases like a numerically one color cannot admit both black and white. This isnt the case in other things, even with beliefs which seem to be true and then false later. Yet with substances it is the thing itself which admits the contraries. Chapter 6 Of quantities some are discrete, others continuous; and some are composed of parts which have position in relation to one another, others are not composed of parts which have position.

 We call relatives all such tings as are said to be just what they are, of or than other things, or in some other way in relation to something else (e.g. larger than something else): state, condition, perception, knowledge, position. Position is relative, like lying, standing, and sitting. There is contrariety in relatives, but there is not a contrary to every relative (e.g. virtue and vice; e.g. double, treble). Relatives seem to admit a more and a less, but not alllike double. Relatives are found in relation to correlatives that reciprocate, though sometimes there will be a difference in case endings in terms of their relationship. Sometimes they will not seem to reciprocateif a mistake is made and that in relation to which something is spoken of is not given properly (e.g. a wing of a bird; a bird of a wing). Sometimes it will be necessary to invent words to demonstrate this relationship (e.g. a rudder of a boat is wrong because not all boats have wings; but e.g. a rudder of the ruddered would work). So, All relatives are spoken of in relation to correlatives that reciprocate provided they are properly given. If improperly given it does not work (e.g. a slave is not of a man). One should give as correlative whatever it is properly spoken of in relation to, if the word existsif not make it up. Most of the time correlatives live and die together. Yet, not always do they since the knowable seems prior to knowledge. Also, this seems to be the case for the perceptible and perception. It is a problem with secondary substances to determine if they are in fact relative (e.g. a head could be called some ones head). The prior definition does not seem to solve the problem, but perhaps this is inadequate in some way?

Discrete are those which do not join together at a common boundary (spoken language; five and five). Continuous are those which share a common boundary and are joined (line, time, place). Some quantities have parts which have position in relation to each other (e.g. line, plane, solid) and others do not (time, numbers, spoken language). Only these we have mentioned are qualities strictly, all others derivatively (e.g. large amount of white because the surface is large; the size of the surface is what determines the size of the white). A quantity has no contrary (few, large, small are relatives). If someone were to take relatives as quantities this is absurd because a think would have to admit contraries at the same time. Most of all it seems with place there is contrariety, down meaning toward the center of the world and up meaning toward the limits. A quantity does not admit more or less (e.g. one thing is not more four feet than another). The most distinctive of a quantity is that it is called both equal and unequal. Chapter 7

 If some one knows a relative, he will also know that in relation to which it is spoken. But as for a head it is possible to know it definitely without knowing definitely that in relation to which it is spoken of. So these would not be relatives. Ergo, no substances are relatives. Hard to make firm statements, but weve made some headway. Chapter 8

By a quality I mean that in virtue of which things are said to be qualified somehowbut there are multiple ways to speak of this. There are states and conditions; a state is more stable and last longer (e.g. the branches of knowledge and virtue) while condition is shorter and more easily changed. States are conditions, but conditions are not necessarily states. Another quality is anything which they are called in virtue of a natural capacity or incapacity (e.g. healthy, a natural capacity for staying well). A third kind of quality consists of affective qualities and affections such as sweetness, bitterness, sourness, and all their kin, and hotness, coldness, paleness, and darkness; these are called affective qualities because they each produce an affection of the senses. Paleness and darkness are affective qualities in a different way since they are brought about by an affection (e.g. a man goes pale when frightened). When circumstances come about by nature, are brought about by nature, and are hard to change, we call these qualities. Affections, which are hard to get rid of, that we have from birth or through environment we call qualities. A fourth kind of quality is shape and the external form of a thing. Rare, dense, rough, smooth might seem like qualification, but rather the refer to a certin position of parts. This has been a pretty complete list. These are called qualities because the things that have them are qualified. Things of this nature are called paronymously. There is contrariety in regard to qualification (e.g. justice to injustice; whiteness to blackness; etc.), but not in all cases (e.g. red, yellow, etc.). If one of a pair of contraries is a quality, the other will be. Qualifications admit of a more and a less. Not all qualifications admit of a more and a less (e.g. square, triangle). It is in virtue of qualities that things are called similar or dissimilar. Qualities are not relatives because they are qualities of particular cases. Moreover, if something really is both a quality and a relative, theres nothing wrong with it being counted in both genera. Chapter 9 Doing and being affected admit of contrariety.

 [editors note] Chapter 10

[Something must be said about opposites and various ways in which things are customarily opposed.] Things are said to be opposed to one another in four ways: (1) relatives, (2) contraries, (3) privation/possession, (4) affirmation/negation. Things opposed as relatives are called just what they are, of their opposites or in some other way in relation to one another. Things opposed as contraries differ from one another. If contraries are such that it is necessary for one or the other of them to belong to the things for which they occur, then there is no intermediate between them (e.g. sickness and health); but if it is not necessary for one or the other to belong, then there is something intermediate between them (e.g. black or white). Privation and possession are spoken in connexion with the same thing (e.g. sight and blindness in connexion with the eye). Being deprived and possessing are not privation and possession; that is being blind is not privation, but blindness is. Yet, being blind is opposed to having sight. Privation and possession are not opposed as relatives (e.g., one would not call blindness, blindness of sight). Cases of privation and possession are not opposed as contraries. This is because privation and possession is not a case where it is necessary for one or the other to belong to everything capable of receiving them, not to the things which one belongs by nature. But rather there is a time element involved. Further, with contraries it is possible for change into one another to occur, unless the one belongs to something by nature as being hot does to fire. With P and P it is impossible for change into one another to occur for change occurs only from possession to privation. Also, things opposed as affirmation (with combination) and negation are not opposed in any of the above ways for it is necessary one be true and the other false. Even in the cases where contraries are put forward with combination, it is still necessary that one be true and the other false. The contrary to a good is bad; but the contrary to a bad thing may also be bad (opposite extreme). It is not necessary, with contraries, for the opposite to exists (e.g. if everyone was well, no one would be sick). It is clearly the nature of contraries to belong to the same thing. All contraries must either be in the same genus or in contrary genera, or be themselves genera (e.g. white and black [same], justice and injustice [opposite], good and bad [are themselves actually general of certain things]). Chapter 12 Chapter 11

 A thing can be called prior to another in four ways: (1) in respect to time, (2) what does not reciprocate as to implication of existence (e.g. two implies one already), (3) in respect to some order, as with sciences and speeches, (4) with respect to the better or more valued (this way is least proper). But there is another way, that which is the cause of another is prior, thus there are 5 ways. Chapter 13 Things that are called simultaneous most strictly are so in respect of time; but there are things that are simultaneous by nature, which reciprocate as to implication of existence, provided that neither is the cause of the other (e.g. double to half). Also co-ordinate species of the same genus are called simultaneous by nature. Chapter 14 There are six kinds of change: (1) generation, (2) destruction, (3) increase, (4) diminution, (5) alteration, (6) change of place; there is a question about alternationis this necessary. The answer is yes because with all the affections we undergo, we undergo alteration without the other changes. Change is contrary to staying the same; destructiongeneration, diminution increase, change of placestaying in the same place or contrary change. Alteration is change in qualification, change is between two contrary qualifications. Chapter 15

Having is spoken about in many ways: (1) state or condition or some other quality, (2) quantity, (3) as things on the body (e.g. clothes), (4) as a part (e.g. hand or foot), (5) as in a container (e.g. measure of wheat), (6) as a possession (e.g. house).