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Party Polarization and Legislative Gridlock Author(s): David R. Jones Source: Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 54, No. 1 (Mar., 2001), pp. 125-141 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. on behalf of the University of Utah Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/449211 . Accessed: 13/01/2011 21:48
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_s Party Polarization and Legislative Gridlock

DAVID R. JONES, BARUCH CITY OF COLLEGE, UNIVERSITYNEWYORK

This articleinvestigates partiesaffectlegislative how gridlock-the of on to inability government enact significant proposals the policy Conventional that of accounts control govagenda. suggest divided party I ernment causessuch stalemate. offeran alternative modelof partisan and that gridlock incorporates polarization, seatdivision, the party party data interaction between thesetwofactors. Usingan original set of major considered between1975 and 1994, I find that legislative proposals and divided onceparty does polarization government not affect gridlock I seat are into Instead, findthathigher party party division taken account. of increases likelihood encountering the on gridlock a given polarization to butthatthemagnitude thisincrease of diminishes theextent proposal, and seats thwart to filibusters vetoes. thata party closeto having is enough The persistence of divided party control of the legislative and executive branches of governmentover most of the last three decades has prompted an extensive,and as yet unresolved,debateabout whetheror not this phenomenon to leads to the stalematein the lawmakingprocesswhich is often referred as gridlock. In the meantime,however,anotherphenomenon has been takingplace in Americanpolitics that has receivedscant attentionin studies of legislativegridlock: the policy preferencesof the two partieshave become increasinglypolarvotes have featureda majorized. Since 1990, more than half of all congressional ity of one party opposing a majority of the other party. This level of party polarization representsa steadyincreaseover the 47 percentof such votes in the 1980s and 39 percentin the 1970s. To date, despite the indisputablerise in party polarization,few scholarshave included a thoroughinvestigationof partypolarization in their studies of gridlock. of This articleexpands our understanding legislativegridlockby examining how partypolarization,in conjunctionwith varyingpartisanseat arrangements,
Barbara NOTE: The authoris gratefulto KathleenBawn,SarahBinder,MonikaMcDermott, Sinclair, for Research Quarterly their GeorgeTsebelis,anonymousreviewers,and the editorsof Political commentson earlierversions of this article. Research Vol. Political Quarterly, 54, No. 1 (March2001) pp. 125-141

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affectsthe relativeinabilityof governmentto enact significantproposalson the policy agenda. First, I briefly review the literatureon the divided government hypothesisand discuss some aspectsof the theory that might explain the mixed empiricalfindings.I then offeran alternative theoryto explainhow partiesaffect gridlock.This new theory focuses on partypolarization,and its interactionwith partyseatdivision.I test these two hypotheses,using an originaldataset of major legislativeproposalsconsideredbetween 1975 and 1998. The resultssuggestthat partiesdo affectgridlock,but that their impact is more complex than the standarddivided governmentargumentsuggests.
GRIDLOCK PARTISAN MODELSOF LEGISLATIVE

The standardpartisanmodel thathas been offeredas an explanationfor legislative gridlock (or its counterpart,productivity)is the divided government hypothesis (see Sundquist 1988; Cutler 1988; Kelly 1993; Cameron,Howell, and Adler,and Riemann1997; Edwards,Barrett, Peake 1997). The divided governmenthypothesis claims that legislationis less likely to be enacted when the President's partydoes not hold a majorityof seats in both chambersof Congress. of Supporters this hypothesisexplainthat the constitutionalseparationof powers requirespolicy agreementamong the House, Senate,and Presidentin order for bills to become law.They furtherarguethat agreementamong these threebodies is likely to be thwartedduringdivided government(see also Kernell1991). While the divided governmentargumentis quite intuitive, empiricalsup(1991) systematicanalysisof port has been mixed. For example,while Mayhew's laws passed in the postwar era finds no evidence that divided govsignificant ernment is any less productivethan unified government,Kelly (1993) reexamlaws"and finds that data using differentcriteriafor "significant ines Mayhew's divided governmentdoes reduce enactmentof these laws. Takinginto account natureof time series data, Cameron,Howell, Adler,and Riethe non-stationary mann (1997) find that divided governmentreduces enactment of "landmark" legislation,but increasesenactmentof less significantlegislation.Edwards,Barrett, and Peake (1997) find that divided governmentincreasesfailureof legislation opposed by the President,but does not increasefailureof legislationthat the Presidentsupports. Binder (1999) finds that divided government produces a mild increasethe proportionof salient legislationthat fails, but has an effect no greaterthan severalother causalvariables. It is possible to explain the mixed empiricalevidence regardingthe legislative effect of divided governmentby re-examiningthree implicit assumptions made in the divided governmentargument.First,the divided governmentargument implicitlyassumes that passagein Congressrequiressupport from only a simple majorityin both chambers.Second, the argumentimplicitlyassumesthat Congressand the Presidentmust agree in order to break gridlock. Third, the argumentimplicitlyassumes that the two majorpartieshave distinctlydifferent 126

and Polarization Legislative Gridlock Party

I policy preferences. shall illustratehow violationsof these assumptionscan lead to breakdownsin the divided governmenthypothesis. The argumentthatunifiedgovernmentis not prone to gridlockassumesthat passagein Congressrequiressupportfromonly a simple majorityin both chambers. If this were true, then unified governmentwould guaranteethat the President'sparty had enough seats in Congressto pass its legislativeagenda. In the Senate,however,a minorityof memberscan preventfinal action on a bill by filibustering(or credibly threateningto do so), and thereby prevent enactment. of Endinga filibusterrequiresthe supportof three-fifths the Senate,or 60 out of 100 votes. Therefore, unifiedgovernmentin which the Presidenthas the support of less than three-fifths the Senatecould be just as proneto gridlockas divided of government. Furthermore,the prediction that divided government leads to gridlock assumes that Congressand the Presidentmust agreein orderto breakgridlock. If this were true, then presidentialoppositionto legislationpassedby the majority party in Congress would prevent enactment during divided government. However, the presidentialveto power is not absolute. Congress can override whenever vetoes with a two-thirdsvote in both chambers.Therefore, presidential two-thirdsof the House and Senatesupport a bill, divided governmentwill not necessarilylead to gridlock. The prediction that divided government causes gridlock also implicitly In assumesthat the two majorpartieshave distinctlydifferentpolicy preferences. to this article I use the term "partypolarization" describe the degree to which party preferencesare distinct from each other.1When party preferencesare highly polarized,membersof one partyare more likely to be uniformlyopposed by membersof the otherpartyon the policy matterat hand. Since the President's partylacks a majorityin Congressduringdivided government,highly polarized would be unlikely partieswould mean thatlegislationsupportedby the President to musterthe majorityneeded to pass in Congress,and legislationthat passed in Congresswould likely be opposed by the President,thus promptinga veto. However,just because governmentis divided it does not necessarilyfollow thatthe respectivepreferences the two partiesareclearlydistinct.In the Amerof ican system of government,party preferencescan be highly polarizedin some cases and have a considerabledegreeof overlapin other cases. When partypreferences are significantlyless polarized, members of one party may be no less likely to vote for a measurethan membersof the other party are. In this case, divided governmentwill not necessarilypreventagreementbetween the legislative and executivebranches.
1 In other words, polarizedpartiesare partieswhose respectivepolicy views would be distantfrom each other if placed on an ideologicalscale. I do not seek to identify the particularsource(s) of partypolarization,I am merelyinterestedin its effectson gridlock.

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Overall, the argumentthat divided party control of governmentleads to gridlockis premisedon assumptionsof majorityrule, absoluteveto, and distinct veto override,and parties.By takinginto accountthe importanceof the filibuster, I variationin partypolarization, shall attemptto constructan improvedmodel of how partiesaffectlegislativegridlock. The divided governmentargumentassumesthat supportfromthe President and a simple majorityin the House and Senateare necessaryand sufficientconditions for enactinga law.As a result of the filibuster,however,legislationsupneeds not only simple majority supportin the House, but portedby the President also three-fifthssupport in the Senateto overcomegridlock.As a result of veto overrideprovisions,legislationopposed by the Presidentcan, in fact, overcome gridlockif it has two-thirdssupportin the Senateand in the House. Overall,in orderforlegislationto overcomegridlockthe Senatealwaysneeds to have at least three-fifthssupport and sometimes as much as two-thirds, while the House alwaysneeds to have simple majoritysupport, and sometimes as much as twothirds. Recent works by Jones (1995) Krehbiel(1998) and Bradyand Volden models focusing on the (1998) formalizethis argumentthat supermajoritarian to Senatefilibusterand the veto are more appropriate the study of gridlockthan models (such as the divided government hypothesis). However, majoritarian institutionsare generally these gridlockmodels that focus on supermajoritarian models, and thus have little to say (or test) regardinghow various nonpartisan types of partisanconditionsmight make gridlockmore or less likely (other than to suggest that divided governmentis irrelevant). Given that not only majoritysupport, but often supermajority support is needed to breakgridlock,what partyvariablesaffectthe likelihoodof achieving in in One largemajorities eachchamber? factoris the levelof partypolarization each When partypolarization low, Democrats not uniformlyopposedto is are chamber. are proposals,and Republicans not uniformlyopposed to Democratic Republican are Withthe possibility votes fromboth parties, of larger majorities more proposals. and therefore shouldbe less likely(see also Binder1999). likely, gridlock At the same time, however,while low partypolarizationshould reduce the likelihood of gridlock,higher partypolarizationmay not uniformlyincreasethe likelihood of gridlock. Instead, the effect of higher party polarizationmay be partyseat division.In the dependenton a second partyvariablein each chamber: or Senate, when neither party is close to having a filibuster-proof veto-proof majorityhighly polarizedpartiesshould be most likely to cause gridlock.This is because neitherpartyhas enough seats to preventa filibusteror overridea veto increasesthe if the otherpartysolidly opposes its agenda,and partypolarization to However, membership.2 oppositionof one party's membership the otherparty's
2 Any group of 41 or more like-mindedSenatorscan filibuster.In this sense, low partypolarization is no guaranteeof relief from the threat of filibusters.On the other hand, however, high party

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Polarization Legislative and Gridlock Party

as a party comes closer and closer to a filibuster-proof veto-proofmajority and (such as a three-fifths partypolarmajorityalongwith controlof the Presidency), ization should become less and less likely to increase gridlock. This happens of because as a partygets closer to the supermajority seats it needs to enact its agenda,it needs fewervotes frommembersof the other party.Therefore, higher party polarizationis less of an obstacle to the supermajoritysupport that is needed to breakgridlock. In other words, as a partygets closer to a veto-proof and filibuster-proof majorityin the Senate,partypolarizationprovidesa diminboost to legislativeobstruction. ishing marginal Partyseat division should have a similareffectin the House. When the President'spartydoes not have a majorityand the opposition partydoes not have a highly polarizedpartiesshould be most likely to cause gridveto-proofmajority, lock. This is because neitherpartyhas enough seats to enact its agendawithout help from the other party However,as the President's partyapproachesmajority partystatusin the House (or, less likely,the opposition partyapproachesa vetoshould become less likely to increasegridlock. partypolarization proofmajority) In these cases, a partyneeds less help fromacrossthe aisle to pass its agenda.In sum, as a partyapproachesthe majorityit needs to pass its agendain the House without fearof a veto, partypolarizationprovidesa diminishingmarginalboost to legislativeobstruction. the Overall,reanalyzing assumptionsof the divided governmenthypothesis the suggestsa new, more nuancedhypothesisregarding effect of partieson gridlock. This new hypothesis,which I will referto as the partypolarization hypothesis, arguesthat unified versus divided governmentper se does not affectgridlock. Instead, gridlock is caused by the interaction between two partisan variables:party polarizationand party seat division. While a few scholarshave looked at one or the other of these variables,none has analyzedthe interaction between them that is central to this hypothesis. Binder (1999) examines the effect of partypolarizationon gridlock,but does not take into accountvariation in party seat division. She thereforedoes not test whether the effect of party diminishesunder certainpartisanseat configurations the discus(as polarization sion abovewould suggest).In fact, Bindersuggeststhat divided governmentwill is still have an effecton gridlockeven when partypolarization takeninto account -an assertionthatis contraryto my hypothesis.Coleman(1999) looks at Senate but supermajorities, only as a dichotomousvariable,and without consideringits interactionwith partypolarization.3

polarization-in which membersof one partyuniformlyoppose membersof the other party-will necessarilyincreasethe threatof filibusterswhen neitherpartyhas a filibuster-proof majority 3 Coleman does consider possible effects of divisions within each congressionalparty,but not directlybetween parties,and not in interactionwith partyseat division.

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In contrastto previousworks, this study arguesthat higher partypolarization increasesgridlock,but that the magnitudeof this increasediminishesto the and extentthata partyis close to havingenough seats to thwartfilibusters vetoes. unifiedgovernmentis just as proneto gridlockas dividedgovernment Therefore, when parties are highly polarizedand neither party has a large majority.Conversely,divided governmentis just as productiveas unified governmentwhen party polarizationis low or when one party has a veto-proof, filibuster-proof majority.
DATA AND METHOD

affectthe relative This articleexamineshow different partisanconfigurations of government to enact significant proposals on the policy agenda inability Given this goal, the first step in the analysis is to identify what ("gridlock"). Once Mayhew(1991: 35-36) refersto as the "agendaof potential enactments." this agendais identified,it is then possible to comparethe conditionsassociated failurerelativeto those associatedwith governmental with governmental success, for each item on the policy agenda. Kingdon(1984: 3) defines the agendaas "thelist of subjectsor problemsto which governmental officials,and people outside governmentclosely associated with those officials,are payingsome serious attentionat any given time."I idenQuarterly Weekly tify such significantpotential enactmentsusing Congressional lists Report's of majorlegislativeproposalsfor every Congressfrom 1975 through 1998 (94th-105th Congress).The startingdate of 1975 is used becausethis is the cloturerule for ending filibusterswent into effect.4 firstyear that the three-fifths For each Congress, I examined every issue of Congressional Quarterly Weekly that was published duringits two-yearterm. Using every periodic list of Report major legislativeproposals contained in these issues, I compiled one comprehensivelist for each Congress.FollowingMayhew(1991: 40), I exclude fromthis if data set a small number of proposalsthat would not constitute "law" passed, and non-bindingcongressionalresolutions. appointments includingpresidential I also exclude treaties,which do not requirepassagein both chambers. The smallest possible unit of analysisfor gridlock is the failureof a single item on the policy agenda.Specifically, gridlockcan be said to occur whenevera

4 From 1917 until 1975 the Senateoperatedunder a two-thirdscloturerule. With a two-thirdscloseat between partypolarization, ture rule, the theorywould predicta slightlydifferentrelationship share and gridlock.For example,with the two-thirdscloture rule (priorto 1975) partypolarization in the Senatewould be expectedto producegridlockeven when a partyheld between 60 and cloturerule, partypolarizationis not nec66 percentof Senateseats. With the currentthree-fifths essarilyexpected to increasegridlock in this seat range. For purposes of brevity and clarity,this work does not attemptto elaborateand test the differentimplicationsof the theoryunder different cloturelevels.

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significantproposal on the policy agenda fails to be enacted into law during a two-yearCongress.Using this definition, I create a dichotomous gridlockvariable. Thisvariableis coded 1 for proposalsin the dataset that failedto be enacted into law-regardless of what stage in the legislativeprocess the proposaldiedand 0 for proposalsthatwere enactedinto law-regardless of the particular route to enactment.5 For each case in the dependent variable,we need a measurementof party polarizationand a measureof partyseat division in each chamber.Partypolarizationvariesnot only acrossCongresses,but also acrossmajorpolicy initiatives within a given Congress.In the 105th Congress,for example, the partiesheld widely divergentviews from each other on the subject of managedhealth care, but held positions that were more difficultto distinguish from one another on the subject of transportation funds. This study arguesthat even within a Conshould be less likely gress, policies on which the partieshave similarpreferences to become mired in gridlock than policies on which the partiespreferencesare far apart.Therefore,measuresof partypolarizationthat are aggregated Conby for gress are inappropriate testing the hypothesisat this level (and can even lead to counterfactual inferences;see King 1997). Since only individual-level analysis can effectivelybe used to explain variationsin gridlock across policy items as well as acrossCongresses,I measurepartypolarization a case-by-casebasis as on the absolutedifferencebetween the percentageof Democratsvoting yea and the percentageof Republicans voting yea on a measure.6 Ideally,the votes used to measurepartypolarizationshould attemptto capture the sincere preferencesof membersratherthan any strategicbehavior.For this reason,I measurepartypolarization the finalrecordedvote takenon each on measure in each chamber. Though other votes, such as those on particular amendments,may sometimes display higher party polarization,final votes are the most conducive to sincere voting on the issue at hand. As Mayhew(1991: 120) aptly points out, final votes "arethe ones that pose an up-or-downchoice between passing a bill or doing nothing .... Victoriousamendmentsare incorWhile measuringparty poratedin the final measures;others are left behind."7 polarizationon a case-by-casebasis is the best way to establish a direct causal link and avoid inferenceproblemsinherent in aggregateanalyses,it does carry a caveat. Since party polarization is measured using votes on each proposal,
5 The data set contains49 cases of gridlockand 181 enactments. the should capturethe degreeof distancebetweenthe parties. Ideally, measureof partypolarization While it is difficultto measurepartydistanceat the individuallevel, the index of partydifference When aggregated Congress,the index of partydiffermeasureprovidesa good approximation. by with the distancein partymedians (based on DW-NOMINATE ence correlates scores, a common measureof memberideology)at .91 (Senate)and .87 (House) for the periodunder consideration. 7 In the data set, polarizationrangesfrom 0-97 (House) and 0-100 (Senate),with means of 33 (H) and 29 (S), and standarddeviationsof 26 (H) and 28 (S).

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significantproposalsthat did not receiverecordedvotes arenecessarilyexcluded from the analysis.However,analysisof these excluded cases suggests that their exclusion does not bias the findingsof this study8 For party seat division, I measure the percentageof seats held by voting membersof the President's partyin a chamberat the time each proposalwas considered.In the Senate,since the President's partyonly needs a three-fifths majority to end a filibusterwhile the non-presidential partyneeds a two-thirdsmajority to overridea veto, it is much more likely that largerproportionsof seats held by the President's partywill help overcomegridlockthan it is that largerproportions of seats held by the non-presidentialparty will help overcome gridlock. This is also the case in the House, where the President's partyneeds only a simple majorityfor passagewhile the non-presidentialpartyneeds a two-thirdsmajority to overridea veto.9 Finally,to test the divided governmenthypothesis, I code for unified versus dividedgovernment.10 Since the divided governmenthypothesisclaimsthat only unified party control of all three legislative actors-House, Senate, and President-can break gridlock,proposalsthat were consideredwhen the President's partyheld a majorityin both the House and the Senateare coded 0 for unified government(N = 58) and proposalsthat were consideredwhen the President's partydid not hold a majorityof seats in both the House and Senateare coded 1 for divided government(N = 172).11

Approximatelytwo-thirds of all proposals listed in CQ received recorded floor votes in both chambers.Using Poole and Rosenthal's (1997) coding scheme of 99 specific issues, I find that all of the issue areascoveredby the excluded cases are also presentamong the included cases. I also develop a rough estimate of party polarizationfor most (86 percent) of the excluded cases. A Chow test suggests if these cases were included they would have no significantimpact on the magnitudeor significanceof any of the key coefficients. 9 Presidential partyseat percentagerangesfrom 32-69 (House) and 37-61 (Senate),with means of 47 (H) and 49 (S), and standarddeviationsof 10 (H) and 7 (S). 10 While other variablessuch as leadershipinvolvementand presidentialposition are also relatedto impact via the preferences legislativeoutcomes, they are generallymodeled as having an indirect of partymembersin Congress-a factorthat is alreadyaccounted for in the analysis.For example, Bondand Fleisher(2000) find thatwhen a Presidenttakesa position on a measurehe is more likely to draw more support from his own partythan from the opposition party,and when congressionalleaderssupport such measures,fellow partisansare more likely to support them and opposing partymembersare more likely to oppose them (thus affectingpartypolarization).I this study,I restrictmy focus to the effectsof polarizationratherthan its potentialcauses. 11 Consistentwith the divided governmenthypothesis, the 97th-99th Congressesin which Republicans held the White House and a majorityin the Senate,but not a majorityin the House, are coded as divided government.There is no significantdifferencein the results if two separate divided governmentdummy variablesare used instead (one for 97th-99th, another for "pure" divided government),indicatingthat the findings are in no way dependent on whether divided governmentis defined broadlyor narrowly(resultsavailablefrom the author).

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Polarization Legislative and Gridlock Party

Since the dependentvariablein this study is dichotomous(a proposaleither fails or is enacted into law), I employ logistic regressionanalysis.The analysis thereforeevaluatesthe impact of the independentvariableson the likelihood that will ("likelihoodof gridlock"). government fail to enacta givensignificant proposal
FINDINGS

Table1 presentsthe resultsof five logistic regressionmodels testingalternative partisanexplanationsfor gridlock.'2 The first model estimatesthe effect of divided governmentalone on the likelihood of gridlock. As predicted by the divided governmenthypothesis, the coefficientfor divided governmentis positive and significant.The specific effect of an independentvariablein a logistic the regressionmodel can be interpreted translating resultsinto probabilities. by In this case, the results indicate that the presence of divided government increasesthe probabilityof gridlockby 12 percentagepoints-a fairlysubstantial amount.However,the divided governmentvariabledoes not actuallylead to any more cases being correctlypredicted. The next column in Table1 tests the relativestrengthof the partypolarization hypothesis versus the divided governmenthypothesis by adding variables with presand the interactionof partypolarization measuringpartypolarization identialpartyseat percentagein each chamber.The partypolarizationhypothesis predicts that higher party polarizationin a chamberincreasessystem-wide gridlock,but that the magnitudeof this increasediminishesto the extent that the President's partyhas a largerpercentageof seats in that chamber.If this hypothesis is correct,the coefficientsfor partypolarizationshould be positive and the coefficientsfor the interactivetermsshould be negative. The results of the estimation of model 2 support the party polarization hypothesis.In both the House and Senate,the coefficientsfor partypolarization interaction with presidential are and for partypolarization's partyseat percentage in the expecteddirection,and in the Senateboth variablesare statistically significant. Furthermore, inclusion of the partypolarization hypothesisvariablesprovides a statisticallysignificantboost in the model chi-squareand improves its predictiveefficiency On the other hand, the resultssuggest that divided government does not have any impact on gridlock over and above the effect of party and its interactionwith partyseat division. When these other party polarization variablesare included in the estimation,the magnitudeof the divided government coefficientdrops and its significancevanishes. the and It is worth speculating why,empirically, partypolarization partyseat division in the Senateseem to have a more significantimpact on gridlockthan
12 I also ran the model with dummy variablesfor each Congressto test for any Congress-specific

fixed effects.The fixed effectswere neitherjointly nor individuallysignificant,while my key variables remainedjointly significantand their signs and magnitudeswere not affected.

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1 TABLE OF EFFECT PARTY VARIABLES GRIDLOCK, ON 1975-1998 IndependentVariables Model 1 Divided government Partypolarization (Senate) PartypolarizationX seats of President's party(Senate) Partypolarization (House) PartypolarizationX seats of President's party(House) PartypolarizationX divided government Constant Numberof cases Initial-2 log likelihood Model chi-square Reductionin error Aldrich-Nelsona pseudo-R2 .8560** (.4404) Model 2 .4347 (1.0402) .1028** (.0584) -.0016* (.0012) .0453 (.0511) -.0002 (.0011)
-.0087

Model 3 .2390 (.7294) .1372*** (.0446) -.0018** (.0009)

Model 4 .4945 (1.0037) .1568** (.0671) -.0021** (.0012)

Model 5

.1449*** (.0322) -.0020*** (.0006)

(.0220) -1.9859*** -4.0828*** -3.2619*** -3.4660*** -3.0646*** (.7175) (.9200) (.3656) (.4031) (.9960) 230 230 230 230 230

238.262 238.262 238.262 238.262 238.262 70.786*** 70.945*** 68.909*** 4.325** 78.443*** 30.63% 32.63% 26.53% 30.63% 0.00% .04 .51 .47 .47 .46

in errors parentheses). < .10, **p< .05, are coefficients Note:Entries unstandardized (standard *p ***p< .001 one-tailed.
aUses Hagle and Mitchell(1992) correction.

similarmeasuresin the House when both are includedin the model. One possiconditionsin the Senatearesufficientto overcomethe bilityis thatwhen partisan institutional obstaclesto enactmentin thatchamber,they are empirically likely to be sufficientin the House as well, but the reverseis not necessarilytrue. In this in measured the Senatewould be sufficientfor explainingalmostall case,variables effectin both chambers.This scenariois consistentwith of the partypolarization the empiricalfinding that partyvariablesare highly correlatedacross chambers .78, (polarization seats .87), and the factthatonly the Senateallowsfilibusters.'3
13 I

do not mean to suggest that passageof a proposalin the Senateguaranteesenactment.What I do suggest is if partypolarizationin the Senateis low enough to overcomea potential filibuster

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Since the insignificanceof the divided governmentvariablecould be attributable to mispecificationof the model, I estimate two alternativemodels with divided government.First, model 3 removes the insignificantHouse variables. Nevertheless,dividedgovernmentremainsinsignificant-unlike the partypolarization variablesfrom the Senate. Second, model 4 tests for the possibility that divided governmentis significantonly when partiesare polarizedby adding an interaction betweenthese two variables(using Senatepolarization). However,the even this reviseddivided govoriginalpartypolarization hypothesisoutperforms ernmenthypothesis. Finally,I estimate a reduced model of policy gridlock that includes only partypolarizationand its interactionwith presidentialpartyseats in the Senate. As in the previous three models, these two variablesare significantand retain removalof the divided governmentvaritheir relativemagnitude.Furthermore, able does little to diminish the explanatory power of the model.14 the terms.The Figure1 translates resultsof this estimationinto probabilistic figuredisplays three lines, each representingthe effect of party polarizationon gridlockfor a differenthypotheticalpercentageof Senateseats held by the President'sparty:41 percent,51 percent,and 61 percent.When partypolarizationis non-existent (0 percent), the probabilityof gridlock for all three seat levels is equally unlikely-about .04. However,as party polarizationrises, the effect on gridlockis differentfor each of the threeseat levels. For the line labeled41 perincreasethe probabilityof cent, greaterlevels of partypolarizationdramatically as indicatedby the steep, positive slope. Specifically, gridlockbecomes gridlock, > more likely than enactment(probability .5) for all levels of partypolarization above 48 percent.When the President's partyhas a largerproportionof Senate still seats-the line labeled51 percent,for example-party polarization increases gridlock,but the magnitudeof its effectdiminishessomewhat.In this case, gridlock becomes more likely than enactmentonly for levels of party polarization above 71 percent. Finally,when the President's party has 61 percent of Senate seats, gridlock is always less likely than enactment (probabilityalways < .5), of regardless the level of partypolarization.

14

and seat (in conjunctionwith a particular partyseat division),a similarlevel of partypolarization distributionin the House (as expected empirically)should be more than sufficientto achieve the simple majoritysupport that is needed for passagethere. But, if partypolarizationin the House is just barelylow enough to ensuresimple majoritysupportin the lower chamber(in conjunction with a particular partyseat division), it is quite possible that a similarlevel of partypolarization and seat distributionin the Senatewill not be sufficientto overcomepotential filibustersin the upper chamber. method for testing the partypolarizaWhile individualbill-level analysisis the most appropriate tion model, the results are similarwhen one conducts an aggregateanalysisof the model using data on the number of enactmentsper Congressand averagepartypolarizationscores Mayhew's for each Congress(Jones 1998).

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1 FIGURE
AND ESTIMATED EFFECT PARTY OF POLARIZATION PARTY SEATDIVISION ON THEPROBABILITY GRIDLOCK OF 5) (BASEDON TABLE EQUATION 1,

0.90.8 -

0.7 - 0.6| 0.45 0.4 0.3 0. 0.2 c c c cc F .C'?-(? r rr c ,, ,? - ?' '" I ))

c .r

0.1 Le L

c,

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45 50 55 60 Polarization Party (%)

65

70

75

80

85

90

95

100

_
_ _____

------

41% of seats held by President's party 51% of seats held by President's party 61% of seats held by President's party

Figure 1 also offersan explanationwhy divided governmentmight appear increasegridlock when one does not control for party polarizationor party to a seat division. The regressionline representing 41 percentminorityof seats for the President's is necessarilyan exampleof divided government,while the party line representing 51 percentmajorityof seats for the President's a partyis more of unified government.5In otherwords, divided governmentmay appear typical is more prone to gridlocksimplybecausepartypolarization moreharmfulto leghas fewerseats, not becauselegislative-execuislationwhen the President's party tive agreementis precluded.
CONCLUSION

data from 1975 through 1998, this article Basedon originalindividual-level finds thatdividedgovernmentper se does not causegridlock.Instead,the results
15

party did not Though this could also qualifyas a form of divided governmentif the President's have a majorityof House seats.

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Polarization Legislative and Gridlock Party show that higherpartypolarization increasesgridlock,but that the magnitudeof this increasediminishesto the extent thata partyis closer to havingenough seats to thwartfilibustersand vetoes. Therefore, unified governmentis just as prone to as divided governmentwhen parties are highly polarized and neither gridlock On partyhas a largemajority. the otherhand, divided governmentis just as productive as unifiedgovernmentwhen partypolarization low or when one party is has a veto-proof,filibuster-proof majority. Based on the conventionalwisdom of the divided governmentargument, some reformers hoping to alleviatelegislativegridlockhave advocatedchangesin the electoral system designed to promote unified government (see Sundquist 1992). Yet the resultsof this study suggest that adoptingsuch changes may not help to reduce gridlock, since unified governmentis not necessarilyany less prone to gridlock than divided government.A more effectivestrategyfor those who desire active governmentmay be to reduce the threatof filibustersby lowhowever,lowering the cloering the three-fifthscloture requirement.Ironically, ture requirement a vote of two-thirdsof the Senate,a level of agreement requires that is unlikely to be reachedin the currentera of partypolarization.
APPENDIX:MAJORLEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS

105thCongress bankruptcyrevisions managedcare partialbirth abortion supplementalapprop. 1997 budget reconcil.-spend.1998 budget reconcil.-taxes1998 defense authorization1998 supplementalapprop. 1998 defense authorization1999 higher education housing overhaul interet tax IRSrestructuring transportation 1Q4th Congress balancedbudget flag desecration StateDept., for. aid 1996-97 job training budget reconciliation1996 productliability

overhaul regulatory term limits anti-terrorism/death appeals congressionalcompliance defense authorization1996 defense authorization1997 farmbill recissions 1995 health insurance immigration line item veto lobbying paperworkreduction safe drinkingwater shareholder lawsuits minimumwage hike telecommunications unfunded mandates welfarereform 103rdCongress campaignfinance lobbying 137

Political Research Quarterly

EPAcabinetposition abortionclinic access Bradybill budget reconcil. 1993 defense authorization1994 defense authorization1995 economic stimuluspackage educationreauthorization family& medicalleave GATT Goals 2000 HatchAct independentcounsel motor voter NAFTA nationalservice NIH reauthorization omnibus crime savings& loan bailout unemploymentbenefits 102ndCongress crime bill educationgoals strikerreplacement urbanaid tax bill 1992 campaignfinancereform China-MFN motor voter familyleave gag rule middle class tax cut 1992 NIH reauthorization balancedbudget foreignaid auth. 1992-3 verticalprice fixing bankingoverhaul cable TV regulation civil rights defense authorization1992 DesertStormsupplemental energypolicy

federalwaste compliance higher educationreauth. RTCfinancing Russianaid disasterrelief supplementalauth. 1991 surfacetransportation unemploymentbenefits use of force in Gulf 101st Congress civil rights HatchAct revisions textile & appareltrade campaignfinancereform age discrimination clean air contraaid defense authorization1989 defense authorization1990 disabilitiesact farmprograms housing programs legal immigrationrevision minimumwage increase Nicaraguaelection aid oil-spill liability Poland,Hungaryaid budget reconciliation1990 thriftbailout/reform vocationaleducation 100thCongress airportreauthorization health care catastrophic GroveCity civil rights clean wateract contraaid G-R-Hrevisions defense authorization1989 droughtrelief fairhousing 138

and Gridlock Polarization Legislative Party

farmcredit FSLIC recapitalization defense authorization1988 budget reconciliation1988 highwayreauthorization homeless aid housing authorization omnibus drug omnibus trade plant closings/notice welfarereform 99th Congress clean wateract extension emergencyfarmcredit budget reconciliation1986 defense authorization1986 farmbill foreignaid authorization1985 Gramm-Rudman budget act reform immigration MXmissile appropriation MXmissile authorization South Africasanctions contraaid superfundreauthorization tax reform 98th Congress immigration defense authorization deficit reduction housing authorization revenuesharing social security/medicare emergency jobs program 97th Congress oil allocation balancedbudget amend. defense authorization1983 budget reconcil.-taxes1982

foreignaid auth. 1982 highways/masstransit militarypay nuclearwaste omnibus farmbill budget reconciliation1983 budget reconcil.-spend.1982 social security supplementalapprop. 1982 tax cut voting rightsact 96th Congress energymobilizationboard Alaskalands banking/NOWaccounts Chrysleraid educationdepartment food stamp spending cap FederalTradeCommission Genevatradeagreements nuclearenergy railroadderegulation syntheticfuels Taiwanrelations truckingderegulation windfallprofits 95th Congress laborlaw revision campaignfinancing aid for education airlinederegulation Arabboycott civil servicereform clean air amendments emergencynaturalgas energydepartment financialdisclosure Humphrey-Hawkins minimumwage nationalenergyact 139

Political Research Ouarterlv

New YorkCity aid omnibus farm-foodbill public worksjobs reorganization authority social securityfinancing stimulustax cuts 1977 strip mining tax cuts 1978 waterpollution control 94th Congress clean air common-sitepicketing consumeragency farmsupports lobby reform naturalgas strip mining

Vietnamcontingencyact arms sales/military aid educationaid emergencyhousing energyconservation& oil FECchanges food stamp price freeze northeastrail assistance New YorkCity aid public servicejobs public worksjobs railroadreorganization revenuesharing tax reduction tax revision Vietnamrefugeerelief voting rights

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Polarization Legislative and Gridlock Party Jones, David R. 1995. "Explaining Policy Stabilityin the United States:Divided in Governmentor Partisanship the House?"Paperpresentedat the annual meeting of the MidwestPoliticalScienceAssociation,Chicago. . 1998. "Parties and the Volume of Law Production, 1947-1994." Presented at the annual meeting of the MidwestPoliticalScience Association, Chicago,IL. We Polity25 :473-84. Kelly,Sean Q. 1993. "Divided Govern?A Reassessment." an StrateKernell,Samuel. 1991. "Facing OppositionCongress:The President's In Circumstance." GaryW Cox and SamuelKerell, eds., ThePolitics of gic Divided Government, 97-112. San Francisco,CA:WestviewPress. pp. Indito Problem: King,Gary.1997. A Solution theEcological Inference Reconstructing Data. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University vidualBehavior FromAggregate Press. and Alternatives, PublicPolicies.Boston:Little Kingdon,John W 1984. Agendas, Brown. Krehbiel,Keith. 1998. PivotalPolitics. Chicago:Universityof ChicagoPress. We New Haven:YaleUniversityPress. David R. 1991. Divided Govern. Mayhew, A HisPoole, KeithT. and HowardRosenthal.1997. Congress: Political-Economic New York:OxfordUniversityPress. toryof RollCallVoting. Processes the in Z4ew Sinclair,Barbara.1997. Unorthodox Lawmaking: Legislative DC: CQ Press. U.S. Congress. Washington, A Sundquist,JamesL. 1988. "Needed: PoliticalTheoryfor the New Eraof Coali103: 614Political Science tion Governmentin the United States." Quarterly 24. rev. and _ . 1992. Constitutional Government, ed. WashingReform Effective ton, DC: BrookingsInstitution. American Politics Government AndrewJ. 1998. "Explaining Productivity." Taylor, 26: Quarterly 439-58.

Received: July 19, 1999 July 5, 2000 Acceptedfor Publication: davidjonesl @baruch.cuny.edu 141