ARTICLE 850.

The statement of a false cause for the institution of an heir shall be considered as not written, unless it appears from the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of such cause. (767a) AUSTRIA vs. REYES February 27, 1970 FACTS: The bulk of the estate of Basilia was destined under the will to pass on to the respondents, all of whom had been assumed and declared by Basilia as her own legally adopted children. Petitioners filed a petition in intervention for partition alleging that they are the nearest of kin of Basilia, and that the respondents had not in fact been adopted by the decedent in accordance with law, rendering these respondents mere strangers to the decedent and without any right to succeed as heirs. The court allowed the intervention. After 3 years after that they were allowed to intervene, petitioners moved to set for hearing the matter on genuineness of the adoption. HELD: The institution of heirs would retain efficacy in the event there exists proof that the adoption of the same heirs by the decedent is false. The petitioners seems to imply, from the use of the terms, "sapilitang tagapagmana" (compulsory heirs) and "sapilitang mana" (legitime), that the impelling reason or cause for the institution of the respondents was the testatrix's belief that under the law she could not do otherwise. If this were indeed what prompted the testatrix in instituting the respondents, she did not make it known in her will. If she was aware that succession to the legitime takes place by operation of law, independent of her own wishes, she would not have found it convenient to name her supposed compulsory heirs to their legitimes. The decedent's will does not state in a specific or unequivocal manner the cause for such institution of heirs. It cannot be annulled on the basis of guesswork or uncertain implications. Such institution may be annulled only when one is satisfied, after an examination of the will, that the testator clearly would not have made the institution if he had known the cause for it to be false. At all events, the legality of the adoption of the respondents by the testatrix can be assailed only in a separate action brought for that purpose, and cannot be the subject of a collateral attack.

NUGUID vs. NUGUID June 23, 1966 FACTS: The parents of the testatrix opposed the petition for probate on the ground of preterition. They contend that they are compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending line and that the institution of the testatrix of her sister as the universal heir preterited them, and that in consequence the institution is void. HELD: The court's area of inquiry is limited - to an examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will. The due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity, and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities by law prescribed, are the questions solely to be represented, and to be acted upon, by the court. However, if it is alleged that the will is void

because of preterition, a probate would be useless, if indeed there was preterition. Since the will provides for the institution of the testatrix sister as universal heir and nothing more, the result is the same. The entire will is null and void. to the probate of the will executed by Monterola under which Leonida is claiming title to the said property.

BALANAY, JR. vs. MARTINEZ June 27, 1975 FACTS: The testatrix said in her will that it was her desire that her properties should not be divided among her heirs during her husbands lifetime. She further stated that after her husbands death, her paraphernal lands and all the conjugal lands should be distributed in the manner set forth in her will. She devised and partitioned the conjugal lands as if she owned all of them. Thus, she disposed of in the will her husbands share of the conjugal assets. The husband and one of the daughters opposed the probate of the will alleging preterition of the husband and alleged improper partition of the conjugal estate. The husband later withdrew his opposition and expressed conformity with his wifes wishes. The probate court gave effect to the renunciation of the husbands hereditary rights. Later, the probate court dismissed the petition and declared the will void and converted the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding. HELD: The probate court can pass upon the intrinsic validity of the will before ruling on its formal validity in this case. In view of unusual provisions in the will, which are of dubious legality, and because of the motion to withdraw the petition for probate, the trial court acted correctly in passing upon the wills intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been established. The probate court, however, was not correct in declaring the will intrinsically void. The invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not result in the invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the testator would not have made such other dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not been made. The statement of the testatrix that she owned the southern half of the conjugal lands is contrary to law because, although she was a co-owner thereof, her share was inchoate and pro-indiviso. But that illegal declaration does not nullify the entire will. It may be disregarded. The distribution and partition would become effective upon the husbands death. In the meantime, the net income should be equitably divided among the children and the surviving spouse. By reason of the surviving husbands conformity to his wifes will and his renunciation of his hereditary rights, his conjugal share became a part of his deceased wifes estate. His conformity had the effect of validating the partition made in the will, without prejudice to the rights of the creditors and the legitimes of the compulsory heirs.

CAYETANO vs. LEONIDAS May 30, 1984 FACTS: Adoracion was a citizen and resident of US but died in the Manila. A reprobate of her will was allowed. Hermogenes, her father, contended that he was deprived of his legitime as a result of the reprobate of the will. HELD: The law which governs Adoracions will is the law of Pennsylvania, USA, which is the national law of the decedent. While it would seem that Philippine laws would make the will invalid because there seems to be an omission of a compulsory heir, still, the will was considered to be valid because it was measured in accordance with law of the US wherein no legitimes are recognized. If there are no legitmes, there could be no case of preterition. The will in this case is valid.

CAYETANO vs. LEONIDAS May 30, 1984 FACTS: Nenita, sister of the testatrix, filed a petition for the reprobate of a will allegedly executed by Adoracion in the US. Adoracion was a US citizen. The petition was granted. Hermogenes, father of Adoracion, maintained that since the reprobate was allowed, he was divested of his legitime which was reserved by law for him. HELD: The probate court can rule upon the issue on preterition, although such issue deals with the validity of the provisions of the will. As a general rule, the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law, The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However, where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue. Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited Hermogenes, and thus, reprobate should have been denied. But it was sufficiently established that Adoracion, at the time of her death, was a US citizen resident. As regards the intrinsic validity of the will, the national law of the decedent must apply.

ACAIN vs. IAC October 27, 1987 FACTS: Constantino filed a petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio. The will provided that all his shares from properties he earned with his wife shall be given to his brother Segundo (father of Constantino). In case Segundo dies, all such property shall be given to Segundos children. Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. The oppositors Virginia, a legally adopted daughter of the deceased, and the latter's widow Rosa filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (1) the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been preterited.

HELD: Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in the direct line. The same thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia, whose legal adoption by the testator has not been questioned by petitioner. Adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and that both adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child. Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate succession the entire inheritance. The only provisions which do not result in intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the will for they should stand valid and respected, except insofar as the legitimes are concerned. The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs - without any other testamentary disposition in the will - amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written. In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it. Petitioner is not the appointed executor, neither a devisee or a legatee there being no mention in the testamentary disposition of any gift of an individual item of personal or real property he is called upon to receive. At the outset, he appears to have an interest in the will as an heir. However, intestacy having resulted from the preterition of respondent adopted child and the universal institution of heirs, petitioner is in effect not an heir of the testator. He has no legal standing to petition for the probate of the will left by the deceased.

TESTATE ESTATE OF RAMIREZ vs. VDA. DE RAMIREZ February 15, 1982 FACTS: The principal beneficiaries of Jose are his widow, his 2 grandnephews and his companion Wanda. The widow is a French who lives in Paris, while the companion Wanda is an Austrian who lives in Spain. Moreover, the testator provided for substitutions. Jose, a Filipino, died in Spain with only his widow as compulsory heir. A project partition was submitted wherein One part shall go to the widow and the other part or "free portion" shall go to the grandnephews. It was provided that 1/3 of the free portion is charged with the widow's usufruct and the remaining 2/3 with a usufruct in favor of Wanda. The grandnephews opposed the project of partition and one of the grounds was that the provisions for fideicommissary substitutions are invalid because the first heirs are not related to the second heirs or substitutes within the first degree.

HELD: The fideicommissary substitution is void. The substitutes are not related to Wanda. The second heir must be related to and be one generation from the first heir. It follows that the fideicommissary can only be either a child or a parent of the first heir. Therefore, 1/2 of the estate which is the free portion goes to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in naked ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with a simple substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez, the substitutes.

RABADILLA vs. CA June 29, 2000 FACTS: In the codicil of testatrix, Rabadilla was instituted as a devisee of a lot, containing the following provisions: 1. Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he dies, every year, to give to Belleza 100 piculs of sugar until Belleza dies; 2. Should Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall give the lot shall have to obligation to still give yearly the sugar as specified to Belleza; 3. In the event that the lot is sold, leased or mortgaged, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee, shall have also the obligation to respect and deliver yearly sugar to Belleza. Should the command be not respected, Belleza shall immediately seize the lot and turn it over to the testatrix near descendants. HELD: This is not a case of simple substitution. The codicil did not provide that should Rabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the testatrix near descendants would substitute him. Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution. Here, the instituted heir is in fact allowed under the Codicil to alienate the property provided the negotiation is with the near descendants or the sister of the testatrix. Also, the near descendants right to inherit from the testatrix is not definite. It will only pass to them if the obligation to deliver is not fulfilled. Moreover, a fideicommissary substitution is void if the first heir is not related by first degree to the second degree. In this case, the near descendants are not at all related to Dr. Rabadilla. This is also not a conditional institution. The testatrix did not make Rabadillas inheritance dependent on the performance of the said obligation. Since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an obligation imposed upon the heir should not be considered a condition unless it clearly appears from the will itself that such was the intention of the testator. In case of doubt, the institution should be considered as modal and not conditional. The manner of institution is modal because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without affecting the efficacy of such institution. A mode imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession. In a conditional testamentary disposition, the condition must happen or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The condition suspends but does not obligate. The mode obligates but does not suspend. RABADILLA vs. CA June 29, 2000 HELD: A will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free

act by which a person disposes of his property, to take effect after his death. Since the will expresses the manner in which a person intends how his properties be disposed, the wishes and desires of the testator must be strictly followed. Thus, a will cannot be the subject of a compromise agreement which would thereby defeat the very purpose of making a will. INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA ROSALES vs. ROSALES FEBRUARY 27, 1987 FACTS: Petra died and was survived by her husband and 2 children Magna and Antonio. Carterio, another child, predeceased her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox, and his widow, Irenea. Irenea insisted in getting a share of the estate in her capacity as the surviving spouse of Carterio, claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law together with her son. HELD: The widow whose husband predeceased his mother cannot inherit from her mother-in-law. There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving spouse) of an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The essence and nature of the right of representation is explained by Articles 970 and 971 of the Civil Code. INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA ROSALES vs. ROSALES FEBRUARY 27, 1987 HELD: Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox is called to succession by law because of his blood relationship. He does not succeed his father, Carterio , but Petra whom his father would have succeeded. Irenea cannot assert the same right of representation as she has no filiation by blood with her mother-in-law. GONZALES vs. CFI OF MANILA May 19, 1981 FACTS: Legarda died survived by 3 groups of heirs who partitioned the real properties among themselves in 3 equal portions: one daughter, another daughter and heirs of a deceased son. The heirs of the deceased son were the sons widow and 7 children. One of the children, Filomena, Jr. died intestate and without any child. Her mother partitioned their 1/3 share in the estate of Legarda with her 6 surviving children and gave the properties she inherited from Filomena, Jr. to her 16 grandchildren by means of a holographic will. HELD: The giving through the holographic will is not lawful because the properties given by such holographic will were reservable properties because they were inherited gratuitously from an ascendant transmitted to a descendant (Filomena, Jr.) then given to another ascendant (Filomena, Sr.) by operation of law. Said properties should not have been given to the grandchildren (3rd degree reservees) but to the children (2nd degree reservees). Reservees may be the common descendants of the reservoir and the origin reserve troncal contemplates legitimate relationship. Illegitimate relationship and relationship by affinity are excluded.

DE PAPA vs. CAMACHO September 24, 1986 HELD: The stated purpose of the reserve is accomplished once the property has devolved to the specified relatives of the line of origin. But from this time on, there is no further occasion for its application. The lower court dismissed the petition holding that the law on intestate succession is clear that an adopted child concurring with the surviving spouse of the adopter excludes the legitimate ascendants from succession.

OZAETA vs. CUARTERO 99 PHIL 1041 FACTS: Carlos was married to Cesaria and they had 3 children. After Cesaria died, Carlos lived unmarried with Rosa and they had 8 children. While living with Rosa, Carlos had relations with Maria and they had 6 children. Subsequently, Carlos married Rosa and thereafter made his will. At the time the will was made, Carlos was living with Ramon while his house was being repaired. The will named Pres. Roxas as executor and Ramon as executor in default of Pres. Roxas. Ramon filed a petition for probate joined by Rosa and her children. Maria and her children opposed it on the ground that it was procured by fraud, undue pressure and influence. The lower court allowed probate. The children of the first marriage appealed. HELD: The imputation of blindness has not been substantiated. While witnesses testified that Carlos had to request them to read report and contract to him due to failing eyesight, they could not assure the court that he was in fact blind. The deceased was still signing checks and could read papers by himself. The decedent also appeared to be in full possession of his mental faculties. The claim that the will was obtained through undue influence and improper pressure has no substantial basis but is more matter of conjecture engendered by suspicion which the weight of authority regards as insufficient to sustain a verdict defeating a will on that ground. It is not enough that there was opportunity to exercise undue influence or possibility that it might have been exercised. There must be substantial evidence that it was actually exercised.

RAMIREZ vs. RAMIREZ 111 SCRA 82 FACTS: Jose Ramirez a Filipino, died in Spain leaving only his widow Marcelle Ramirez, a French. In the project partition, the property was divided into 2 parts: 1st part to the widow, and 2nd part to the grandnephews the naked ownership. Furthermore, as to the usufruct of the 2nd part, 1/3 was given to the widow and 2/3 to Wanda de Wrobleski, an Austrian. The grandnephews opposed on the ground that usufruct to Wanda is void because it violates the constitutional prohibition against the acquisition of lands by aliens. ISSUE: WON the ground for the opposition is correct. HELD: No, it is not correct. The SC held that the Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire private lands does not extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. The SC upheld the usufruct in favor of Wanda because although it is a real right, it does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.

TESTATE ESTATE OF RAMIREZ vs. VDA. DE RAMIREZ February 15, 1982 FACTS: The principal beneficiaries of Jose are his widow, his 2 grandnephews and his companion Wanda. The widow is a French who lives in Paris, while the companion Wanda is an Austrian who lives in Spain. Moreover, the testator provided for substitutions. Jose, a Filipino, died in Spain with only his widow as compulsory heir. A project partition was submitted wherein One part shall go to the widow and the other part or "free portion" shall go to the grandnephews. It was provided that 1/3 of the free portion is charged with the widow's usufruct and the remaining 2/3 with a usufruct in favor of Wanda.

The grandnephews opposed the project of partition and one of the grounds was that the provisions for fideicommissary substitutions are invalid because the first heirs are not related to the second heirs or substitutes within the first degree. HELD: The fideicommissary substitution is void. The substitutes are not related to Wanda. The second heir must be related to and be one generation from the first heir. It follows that the fideicommissary can only be either a child or a parent of the first heir. Therefore, 1/2 of the estate which is the free portion goes to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in naked ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with a simple substitution in favor of Juan