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Thursday, August 30, 2012
Christian G. Villasis Atty. Christian "Kit" Villasis is a professor and BAR Reviewer on Remedial Law of several law Schools and Review Centers. Aside from being a litigation (civil and criminal) lawyer, Prof. Villasis has a diversified general law practice. He handles all aspects of corporate, commercial business and banking transactions, protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights, collection, admiralty and maritime practice, labormanagement relations, election, administrative and local government cases, family cases, real estate transactions, land titles, deeds and conveyances, foreclosure of mortgages, taxation, regulatory compliance, etc. View my complete profile
JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR. PROCEDURAL RULES ARE NOT TO BE DISDAINED AS MERE TECHNICALITIES
They may not be ignored to suit the convenience of a party. Adjective law ensures the effective enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly and speedy administration of justice. Rules are not intended to hamper litigants or complicate litigation. But they help provide for a vital system of justice where suitors may be heard following judicial procedure and in the correct forum. Public order and our system of justice are well served by a conscientious observance by the parties of the procedural rules (SAMAHAN
NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA HYATT (SAMASAH-NUWHRAIN), VS. HON. VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR BUENAVENTURA C. MAGSALIN AND HOTEL ENTERPRISES OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 172303, JUNE 6, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).
Blog Archive
2012 (125) September (1) August (41)
2012 SPECIAL PRE-BAR LECTURE IN REMEDIAL LAW PART OF RES GESTAE JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR. PROCEDURAL RULES ARE... JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: THE DETERMINATION O... JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: NOTICE OF LIS PENDE... COORDINATION WITH THE PDEA IS NOT AN INDISPENSABLE... JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: EXPROPRIATION: THE ... CONTEMPT OF COURT THE APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR LIES WI... MODES OF APPEAL JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: A LAWYER MAY BE SUS... PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE HIERARCHY OF EVIDENTIARY V ALUES THE TESTIMONY OF A HANDWRITING EXPERT, WHILE USEFU...
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Monday, August 27, 2012
JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: THE DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST THOSE IN PUBLIC OFFICE DURING A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS A FUNCTION THAT BELONGS TO THE OMBUDSMAN
The Ombudsman is vested with the sole power to investigate and prosecute, motu proprio or upon the complaint of any person, any act or omission which appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient (Vergara v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 174567, March 12, 2009, 580 SCRA 693, 708.). It has the discretion to determine whether a criminal case, given its
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discretion to determine whether a criminal case, given its attendant facts and circumstances, should be filed or not. As explained in Esquivel v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 137237, September 17, 2002, 389: The Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the appropriate courts. Settled is the rule that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsmans exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and compelling reasons to indicate otherwise. Said exercise of powers is based upon his constitutional mandate and the courts will not interfere in its exercise. The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, innumerable petitions seeking dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Ombudsman will grievously hamper the functions of the office and the courts, in much the same way that courts will be swamped if they had to review the exercise of discretion on the part of public prosecutors each time they decided to file an information or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.
(M.A. JIMENEZ ENTERPRISES, INC., VS. THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN, JESUS P. CAMMAYO G.R. NO. 155307, JUNE 6, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).
DOUBLE JEOPARDY EXECUTION SALE: THE JUDGMENT DEBTOR ALLEGING LACK... JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: EXECUTION OF JUDGME... ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE RULES JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: GOOD REASONS AS G... JUSTICE MARTIN VILlARAMA, JR.: EXECUTION PENDINGA... JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: DIRECT AND COLLTERA... JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: CERTIORARI IS AN EX... JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: DECISIONS, ORDERS ... JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: THE TRIAL COURTS D... JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: ANNULMENT OF JUDGME... JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: PAROL EVIDENCE RULE... JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: QUESTION OF FACT JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: A RE-EXAMINATION OF... JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: PETITION FOR REVIEW... JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: THE APPELLATE COURT... IT IS A WELL-SETTLED RULE THAT A PARTY WHO DELIBE... JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: RIGHT TO APPEAL RELEV ANT DOCTRINAL PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THE SUPREME ... JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: MOTION FOR RECONSID... SUMMARY JUDGMENT: JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: DOCTRINE OF IMMUTAB... THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT,
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JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS

Lis pendens, which literally means pending suit, refers to
the jurisdiction, power or control which a court acquires over property involved in a suit, pending the continuance of the action, and until final judgment. Founded upon public policy and necessity, lis pendens is intended to keep the properties in litigation within the power of the court until the litigation is terminated, and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent alienation. Its notice is an announcement to the whole world that a particular property is in litigation and serves as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said property. The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold effect: (1) to keep the subject matter of the litigation within the power of the court until the entry of the final judgment to prevent the defeat of the final judgment by successive alienations; and (2) to bind a purchaser, bona fide or not, of the land subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree that the court will promulgate subsequently. Once a notice of lis pendens has been duly registered, any subsequent transaction affecting the land involved would have to be subject to the outcome of the litigation. (Vicente v. Avera, G.R. No. 169970, January 20, 2009). x x x x Thus, the Supreme Court has held
that one who buys land where there is a pending notice of lis pendens cannot invoke the right of a purchaser in good faith; neither can he have acquired better rights than those of his predecessor in interest (TOP MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS
CORPORATION VS. LUIS FAJARDO & THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LAS PINAS CITY, G.R. NO. 150462, JUNE 15, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).
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AFFIRMED ... THE FUNDAMENTAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN A FINAL JUDGME... PRE-TRIAL NOTICE IS MANDATORY OMNIBUS MOTION RULE NOTICE OF HEARING
July (39) June (10) May (16) April (5)
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JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: EXPROPRIATION: THE POWER TO DECIDE JUST COMPENSATION CASES FOR THE TAKING OF LANDS UNDER R.A. NO. 6657 IS VESTED IN THE COURTS:
In Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132767, January 18, 2000, 322 SCRA 139.), petitioner landowner who was dissatisfied with the valuation made by LBP and DARAB, filed a petition for determination of just compensation in the RTC (SAC). However, the RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that it was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period for filing appeals from the orders of the DARAB. On appeal, the CA upheld the order of dismissal. When the case was elevated to the Supreme Court, it likewise affirmed the CA and declared that:
As we held in Republic v. Court of Appeals, this rule is an acknowledgment by the DARAB that the power to decide just compensation cases for the taking of lands under R.A. No. 6657 is vested in the courts. It is error to think that, because of Rule XIII, 11, the original and exclusive jurisdiction given to the courts to decide petitions for determination of just compensation has thereby been transformed into an appellate jurisdiction. It only means that, in accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR as an administrative agency to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid for the lands taken under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, but such determination is subject to challenge in the courts.
March (3) February (3) January (7) 2011 (89)
The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts is not any less original and exclusive because the question is first passed upon by the DAR, as the judicial proceedings are not a continuation of the administrative determination. For that matter, the law may provide that the decision of the DAR is final and unappealable. Nevertheless, resort to the courts cannot be foreclosed on the theory that courts are the guarantors of the legality of the administrative action (LAND BANK OF THE PHILS. VS. SEVERINO LISTANA, G.R. NO. 168105, JULY 27, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.). AL. V s a p^ X mso-bidi-font-weight:bold'>DISTRIBUTION BUTTON
MANAGEMENT ASSOCIA TION OF THE PHILIPPINES ET AL., G.R. NO. 155849,
AUGUST 31, 2011, BERSAMIN, J.).

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Sunday, August 26, 2012
JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: A LAWYER MAY BE SUSPENDED OR DISBARRED FOR ANY MISCONDUCT SHOWING ANY FAULT OR DEFICIENCY IN HIS MORAL CHARACTER, HONESTY, PROBITY OR GOOD DEMEANOR
A LAWYER MAY BE SUSPENDED OR DISBARRED FOR ANY MISCONDUCT SHOWING ANY FAULT OR DEFICIENCY IN HIS MORAL CHARACTER, HONESTY, PROBITY OR GOOD DEMEANOR (Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court). In Gonzales, the notary public who notarized the document despite the nonappearance of one of the signatories was meted the penalties of revocation of his notarial commission and disqualification from reappointment for two years. The notary in Gonzales was likewise suspended from the practice of law for one year. x x x The Court found that by notarizing the questioned deed, the respondent in Gonzales engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. In the instant case, the Supreme Court held that respondent should similarly be meted the penalty of suspension and revocation of his notarial commission for having violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice (PACITA CAALIM-VERZONILLA VS. ATTY. VICTORIANO G. PASCUA, A.C. NO. 6655 , OCTOBER 11, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).
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Friday, August 24, 2012
JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS FOR MONEY

Section 31, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court then applicable provides: SEC. 31. Effect of redemption by judgment debtor, and a certificate to be delivered and recorded thereupon. To whom payments on redemption made.If the judgment debtor redeem, he must make the same payments as are required to effect a redemption by a redemptioner, whereupon the effect of the sale is terminated and he is restored to his estate, and the person to whom the payment is made must execute and deliver to him a certificate of redemption acknowledged or approved before a notary public or other officer authorized to take acknowledgments of conveyances of real property. Such certificate must be filed and recorded in the
office of the registrar of deeds of the province in which the property is situated, and the registrar of deeds must note the record thereof on the margin of the record of the certificate of sale. The payments mentioned in this and the last preceding sections may be made to the purchaser or redemptioner, or for him to the officer who made the sale (Emphasis supplied). (SPS. FRANCISCO D. YAP & WHELMA S. YAP VS. SPS. ZOSIMO DY, JR. & NATIVIDAD CHIU DY, G.R. NO. 171868, JULY 27, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).
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Tuesday, August 21, 2012
JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: GOOD REASONS AS GROUND FOR EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL
In Florendo v. Paramount Insurance Corp., G.R. No. 167976, January 20, 2010, 610 SCRA 377, 384-385, citing Flexo Manufacturing Corporation v. Columbus Foods, Inc., 495 Phil. 254, 260 (2005) and Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay v. National Power Corp., G.R. No. 141447, May 4, 2006, 489 SCRA 401, 417. The Supreme Court held: x x x Good reasons, it has been held, consist of compelling circumstances that justify immediate execution lest the judgment becomes illusory. The circumstances must be superior, outweighing the injury or damages that might result should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment. Lesser reasons would make of execution pending appeal, instead of an instrument of solicitude and justice, a tool of oppression and inequity.
Good reason as required by Section 2, Rule 39 of t h e Rules of Court does not necessarily mean unassailable and flawless basis but at the very least, it must be on solid footing. Dire financial conditions of the plaintiffs supported by mere self-serving statements as good reason for the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal does not stand on solid footing. It does not even stand on its own (NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION VS. JUDGWE SANTOS ADIONG, JULY 27, 2011 VILLARAMA, JR., J.).
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JUSTICE MARTIN VILlARAMA, JR.: EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL IS NOT APPLICABLE IN A LAND REGISTRATION
PROCEEDING
EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL IS NOT APPLICABLE IN A LAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDING. It is fraught with dangerous consequences. Innocent purchasers may be misled into purchasing real properties upon reliance on a judgment which may be reversed on appeal (TOP MANAGEMENT
PROGRAMS CORPORATION VS. LUIS FAJARDO & THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LAS PINAS CITY, G.R. NO. 150462, JUNE 15, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).
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Monday, August 20, 2012
JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: DIRECT AND COLLTERAL ATACK ON THE TITLE
An action is deemed an attack on a title when its objective is to nullify the title, thereby challenging the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is direct when the objective is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof (Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152627, September 16, 2005, 470 SCRA 99, 107-108 cited in ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF SAN FERNANDO PAMPANGA VS. FERNANDO SORIANO JR., ET AL., G.R. NO. 153829, AUGUST 17, 2011,VILLARAMA, JR., J.).
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JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: DECISIONS, ORDERS OR RULINGS OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT MAY BE BROUGHT TO THE SUPREME COURT ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 BY THE AGGRIEVED PARTY
To begin with, petitioner availed of the wrong remedy in filing a petition for review under Rule 45. Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution provides that decisions, orders or rulings of the Commission on Audit may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party (Reyes v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 125129, March 29, 1999, 305 SCRA 512, 516 cited in CANDELARIO L. VERZOSA, JR. VS. GUILERMO N. CARAGUE, G.R. NO. 157838, MARCH 8, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).
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JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: THE TRIAL COURTS DENIAL OF A MOTION TO DISMISS CANNOT BE QUESTIONED IN A CERTIORARI PROCEEDING UNDER RULE 65
This is because a certiorari writ is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. The appropriate course of action of the movant in such event is to file an answer and interpose as affirmative defenses the objections raised in the motion to dismiss. If, later, the decision of the trial judge is adverse, the movant may then elevate on appeal the same issues raised in the motion. (Urethane Trading Specialist, Inc. v. Ong, G.R. No. 164632, October 29, 2008, 570 SCRA 188, 191-192.) The only exception to this rule is when the trial court gravely abused its discretion in denying the motion.( See Nicolas v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 175930-31 & 176010-11, February 11, 2008, 544 SCRA 324, 336 and Choa v. Choa, 441 Phil. 175, 182-183 (2002). This exception is, nevertheless, applied sparingly, and only in instances when there is a clear showing that the trial court exercised its judicial power in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.( Balo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129704, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 227, 234.)
Further, the abuse of the court's discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by, or to act at all in contemplation of, law. (ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF SAN FERNANDO PAMPANGA VS. FERNANDO SORIANO JR., ET AL., G.R. NO. 153829, AUGUST 17, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.:)
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Friday, August 10, 2012
JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: PAROL EVIDENCE RULE

Under the general rule in Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, when the terms of an agreement were reduced in writing, as in this case, it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of such terms can be admitted other than the contents thereof. Rudlin argues that under Section 9, Rule 130, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the
written agreement if it is put in issue in the pleading, "[t]he failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and the agreement of the parties thereto." Assuming as true Rudlins claim that Exhibit "7" failed to accurately reflect an intent of the parties to fix the total contract price at P6,006,965.00, Rudlin failed to avail of its right to seek the reformation of the instrument to the end that such true intention may be expressed.
Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid contract. (Lapulapu Foundation,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 466 Phil. 53, 62 (2004), citing MC Engineering, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104047, April 3, 2002, 380 SCRA 116, 137).
SEC. 9. Evidence of written agreements. When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement. However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading: (a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement; (b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto; (c) The validity of the written agreement; or (d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors-in-interest after the execution of the written agreement. The term "agreement" includes wills (emphasis supplied). Rudlin cannot invoke the exception under (a) or (b) of the above provision. Such exception obtains only where "the written contract is so ambiguous or obscure in terms that the contractual intention of the parties cannot be understood from a mere reading of the instrument. In such a case, extrinsic evidence of the subject matter of the contract, of the relations of the parties to each other, and of the facts and circumstances surrounding them when they entered into the contract may be received to enable the court to make a proper interpretation of the instrument." (Seaoil Petroleum
Corporation v. Autocorp Group, G.R. No. 164326, October 17, 2008, 569 SCRA 387, 396-397, citing Ortaez v. CA, 334 Phil. 514, 519-520 (1997) & Heirs of Amparo del Rosario v. Aurora Santos, et al., 194 Phil. 670, 687 (1981).
Under the fourth exception, however, Rudlins evidence is admissible to show the existence of such other terms agreed to by the parties after the execution of the contract. But apart from the Bar Chart and Cash Flow Chart prepared by FBC, and the testimony of Rodolfo J. Lagera, no competent evidence was adduced by Rudlin to prove that the amount of P6,006,965.00
stated therein as contract price was the actual decreased amount that FBC and Rudlin found mutually acceptable. As to the affidavits executed by Architect Quezon and his associate Roberto R. Antonio, the same do not serve as competent proof of the purported actual contract price as they did not testify thereon. Significantly, the June 5, 1986 Letter-Agreement did not at all mention the total contract price. Likewise, there is nothing in the various letters sent by Rudlin to FBC while construction was in progress and even subsequent to the execution of the said Letter-Agreement indicating that Rudlin corrected the contract price of P6,933,268.00 which FBC had repeatedly mentioned in its letters and documents (FINANCIAL
BUILDING CORPORATION VS. CORPORATION, BLOOMFIELD EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION, INC., RODOLFO J. LAGERA, MA. ERLINDA J. LAGERA AND JOSAPHAT R. BRAVANTE, RUDLIN INTERNATIONAL, G.R. NO. 164186, OCTOBER 4, 2010, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).
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JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: QUESTION OF FACT

The question of whether a tenancy relationship exists is basically a question of fact which, as a general rule, is beyond the scope of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. The question of whether there was an implied tenancy and sharing are basically questions of fact and the findings of the Court of Appeals and the Boards a quo are, generally, entitled to respect and nondisturbance, as long as they are supported by substantial evidence. Such findings of fact may be reviewed by the Court when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures, or if the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based. (ESTATE OF PASTOR M.
SAMSON VS. MERCEDES R. SUSANO & NORBERTO R. SUSANO, G.R. NO. 179024, MAY 30, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).
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JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: A RE-EXAMINATION OF FACTUAL FINDINGS CANNOT BE DONE THROUGH A PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45 OF THE RULES OF COURT
It is aphoristic that a re-examination of factual findings cannot be done through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court because this Court is not a trier of facts; it reviews only questions of law. The Supreme Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh again the evidence considered in the proceedings below. (Id. at 460-461.) Now, superior courts are not triers of facts. When the findings of fact of the Ombudsman are supported by substantial evidence, it should be considered as conclusive.( Olivarez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 118533, October 4, 1995, 248 SCRA 700, 715). This Court recognizes the expertise and independence of the Ombudsman and will avoid interfering with its findings absent a finding of grave abuse of discretion.( See Jao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 104604 & 111223, October 6, 1995, 249 SCRA 35, 42 and Yabut v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 111304, June 17, 1994, 233 SCRA 310, 314.) Hence, being supported by substantial evidence, we find no reason to disturb the factual findings of the Ombudsman which are affirmed by the CA. The general rule is that factual findings of the CA are not reviewable by this Court, we find that Olaivars case falls in one of the recognized exceptions laid down in jurisprudence since the CAs findings regarding his liability are premised on the supposed absence of evidence but contradicted by the evidence on record.( See Hyatt Elevators and Escalators Corporation v. Cathedral Heights Building Complex Association, Inc., G.R. No. 173881, December 1, 2010, 636 SCRA 401, 405406.) (Gemma P. Cabalit vs. Commission on Audit-Region VII,
G.R. No. 180236, Filadelfo S. Apit vs. Commission on Audit (COA) Legal and Adjudication, Region VII, G.R. No. 180341; LEONARDO G. OLAIVAR VS. HON. PRIMO C. MIRO ET AL., G.R. NO. 180342, JANUARY 17, 2012, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).
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JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45
As a general rule, in petitions for review, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought before it from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing questions of law which involves no examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts; it is not its function to analyze or weigh evidence all over again. (Heirs of Marcelino Cabal v. Cabal, G.R. No. 153625, July 31, 2006, 497 SCRA 301, 312, citing Hanopol v. Shoemart, Incorporated, G.R. Nos. 137774 & 148185, October 4, 2002, 390 SCRA 439, 447; St. Michaels Institute v. Santos, G.R. No. 145280, December 4, 2001, 371 SCRA 383, 396; Go v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 158922, May 28, 2004, 430 SCRA 358, 364.) x x x x Accordingly, findings of fact of the appellate court affirming those of the trial court are generally conclusive on this Court.
Nonetheless, jurisprudence has recognized certain
exceptions to the general rule that findings of the fact by the Court of Appeals are not reviewable by the Supreme Court. One such exception is when such findings are not sustained by the evidence. Sarmiento v. Yu, G.R. No. 141431, August 3, 2006, 497 SCRA 513, 517. Another is when the judgment of the CA is based on misapprehension of facts or overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. (Estate of Edward Miller Grimm v. Estate of Charles Parsons and Patrick C. Parsons, G.R. No. 159810, October 9, 2006, 504 SCRA 67, 75-76, citing Sampayan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156360, January 14, 2005, 448 SCRA 220, 229.) (HEIRS OF MARGARITO PABAUS
VS. HEIRS OF AMANDA YUTIAMCO, G.R. NO. 164356, JULY 27, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).
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Wednesday, August 8, 2012
JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: RIGHT TO APPEAL

The right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process, but merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirements of the rules, failing in which the right to appeal is lost. (Producers Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126620, April 17, 2002, 381 SCRA 185, 197.)
(HEIRS OF AGAPATIO T. OLARTE AND ANGELA A. OLARTE ET AL. VS. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES ET AL., G.R. NO. 177995, JUNE 15, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).
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JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION PRO FORMA

The Supreme Court has held that mere reiteration of issues already passed upon by the court does not automatically make a motion for reconsideration pro forma. What is essential is compliance with the requisites of the Rules. Indeed, in the cases where a motion for reconsideration was held to be pro forma, the motion was so held because (1) it was a second motion for reconsideration, or (2) it did not comply with the rule that the motion must specify the findings and conclusions
alleged to be contrary to law or not supported by the evidence, or (3) it failed to substantiate the alleged errors, or (4) it merely alleged that the decision in question was contrary to law, or (5) the adverse party was not given notice thereof. (FERNANDO V. GONZALES VS. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 192856, MARCH 8, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).
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JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: DOCTRINE OF IMMUTABILITY OF JUDGMENT

It is a fundamental legal principle that a decision that has acquired inality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modi ied in any respect, even if the modi ication is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. The only exceptions to the general rule on inality of judgments are the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the inality of the decision which render its execution unjust and inequitable (Sacdalan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128967, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 586, 599. x x x Indeed, litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, even at the risk of occasional errors (Gallardo-Corro v. Gallardo, G.R. No. 136228, January 30, 2001 cited in LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. SEVERINO LISTANA, G.R. NO. 168105, JULY 27, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).
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Saturday, July 28, 2012
JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS

Lis pendens, which literally means pending suit, refers to the jurisdiction, power or control which a court acquires over property involved in a suit, pending the continuance of the action, and until inal judgment. Founded upon public policy and necessity, lis pendens is intended to keep the properties in litigation within the power of the court until the litigation is terminated, and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent alienation. Its notice is an announcement to the whole world that a particular property is in litigation and serves as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said property.( Associated Bank v. Pronstroller, G.R. No. 148444, July 14, 2008, 558 SCRA 113, 133, citing Romero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142406, May 16, 2005, 458 SCRA 483, 492.) The iling of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold effect : (1) to keep the subject matter of the litigation within the power of the court until the entry of the inal judgment to prevent the defeat of the inal judgment by successive alienations; and (2) to bind a purchaser, bona ide or not, of the land subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree that the court will promulgate subsequently. Id., citing Romero v. Court of Appeals, id. at 492-493 and Heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 146262, January 21, 2005, 449 SCRA
173, 186. Once a notice of lis pendens has been duly registered, any subsequent transaction affecting the land involved would have to be subject to the outcome of the litigation. (Vicente v. Avera, G.R. No. 169970, January 20, 2009, 576 SCRA 634, 643.)
Petitioner being a mere transferee at the time the decision of the RTC of Pasig in Civil Case No. 35305 had become inal and executory on December 6, 1988, it is bound by the said judgment which ordered the heirs of Emilio Gregorio to convey Lots 1, 2, 3 & 4, Psu-204875 in favor of private respondent and Trinidad.
It is to be noted that the notation of the lis pendens on the back of the owners duplicate is not mentioned for the purpose of constituting a constructive notice because usually such owners duplicate certi icate is presented for the purpose of the annotation later, and sometimes not at all until [it is] ordered by the court. (A. H. Noblejas and E. H. Noblejas, REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLES AND DEEDS, 2007 Ed., pp. 436-437.) Strictly speaking, the lis pendens annotation is not to be referred to as a part of the doctrine of notice; the purchaser pendente lite is affected, not by notice, but because the law does not allow litigating parties to give to others, pending the litigation, rights to the property in dispute so as to prejudice the opposite party. The doctrine rests upon public policy, not notice. (Id. at 437, citing 2 Bouviers Law Dictionary and Concise Encyclopedia, p. 2033, SCRA Annotation on Civil Law, the Public Land Act and the Property Registration Decree, 1983 Ed., pp. 118-119 quoted in Tirado v. Sevilla, G.R. No. 84201, August 3, 1990, 188 SCRA 321, 326-327.) Thus we have held that one who buys land where there is a pending notice of lis pendens cannot invoke the right of a purchaser in good faith; neither can he have acquired better rights than those of his predecessor in interest. (Yu v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109078, December 25, 1995, 251 SCRA 509, 513-514, citing Constantino v. Espiritu, No. L-23268, June 30, 1972, 45 SCRA 557, 563 and Tanchoco v. Aquino, No. L-30670, September 15, 1987, 154 SCRA 1, 15; see Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, No. L-34404, June 25, 1980, 98 SCRA 207, 232.) (TOP MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS CORPORATION VS. LUIS FAJARDO & THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LAS PINAS CITY, G.R. NO. 150462, JUNE 15, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).
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JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: VERIFICATION OF A PLEADING IS ONLY A FORMAL REQUIREMENT. IT IS NOT JURISDICTIONAL
It is simply a condition affecting the form of the pleading, and noncompliance therewith does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. Veri ication is simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is iled in good faith. The court may order the correction of the pleading if veri ication is lacking or act on the pleading although it is not veri ied, if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance
with the rules may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may thereby be served (MEDISERV, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL. G.R. NO. 161368, APRIL 5, 2010, FIRST DIVISION, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).
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