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The Southern Journal of Philosophy (1998) Vol.

X x X v I

On the Consistency of Spinozas Modal Theory


Olli Koistinen University of mrku, Finland
1 THE PROBLEM .
During t h e past few decades Spinozas modal theory h a s been the subject of considerable controversy. However, at first sight at least, Spinoza seems to have been admirably clear in stating his modal theory. All truths, Spinoza says, are necessary. In several passages of the Ethics, Spinoza denies the existence of contingency a n d accepts necessitarianism. For example, in IP29 he writes as follows:
In nature there is nothing contingent, but all things have been determined from the necessity of the divine nature to exist and produce an effect in a certain way.

And in IP35 he states his view in the following way:


Whatever we conceive to be in Gods power, necessarily exists.

IP35 says that what is in Gods power exists by necessity. But of course everything that is possible is in Gods power. Hence, everything that is possible exists by necessity. There is similar evidence for necessitarianism i n IP17S (GII/62/15-20):
I think I have shown clearly enough (see P16)that from Gods supreme power, or infinite nature, infinitely many things in infinitely many modes, i.e., all things, have necessarily flowed, or always follow, by the same necessity and in the same way as from the nature of a triangle it follows, from eternity and to eternity, that its three angles are equal to two right angles.

Olli Koistinen is currently acting professor of philosophy a t the University of Turku, Finland. He received a Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Turku in 1991. His interests are early modern philosophy and analytic metaphysics.

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Olli Koistinen The source of Spinozas necessitarianism is IP16 which reads as follows: From the necessity of the divine nature there must follow infinitely many things in infinitely many modes, (i.e., everything which can fall under an infinite inte1lect.Y Although the evidence for necessitarianism in Spinoza seems to be conclusive, several of the commentators seem to argue that Spinozas system entails contingency. I n this paper I defend the interpretation t h a t Spinoza accepted the absolute necessity of all truths. I show t h a t a cons i s t e n t formulation of Spinozas necessitarianism c a n be provided even though his necessitarianism threatens to be inconsistent in two different respect^.^

1 .I. First Threat: Apparent Direct Assertion of Contingency There a r e passages i n the Ethics where Spinoza seems to
commit himself to the existence of contingent truths. These passages are in conflict with the above cited passages where the denial of contingency appears to be quite definite. Commentators who attribute to Spinoza the view that there is real contingency, or who claim t h a t Spinozas modal theory is not consistent, focus mainly on two passages in the Ethics. First, in IIAl Spinoza writes as follows: The essence of man does not involve necessary existence, i.e., from the order of nature it can happen equally that this or that man does exist, or that he does not exist. In this passage Spinoza, it seems, wants to say t h a t each human being exists only contingently. Moreover, i t is evident that Spinoza would not want to say, on the basis of IIA1, t h a t only human beings are contingent beings. Rather, IIAl seems to be a n instance of the universal generalization according to which all singular things, i.e., finite modes whose existence is both spatially and temporally limited, exist contingently. The second important passage where Spinoza seems to allow contingency is TIPS which reads as follows: The i d e a s of singular things, o r of modes, that do not exist must be comprehended in Gods infinite idea in the same way a s the formal essences of the singular things, or modes, are contained in Gods attributes. In this passage Spinoza commits himself to the existence of ideas t h a t are about nonexistent individuals. Moreover, from

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the existence of ideas that are about nonexistent individuals it is quite natural to infer that there are possible but not actual entities. The principle that lies behind this inference is t h a t everything conceivable, i.e., everything of which a n idea can be formed, is also possible. Now, if this principle is accepted, then there are individuals, or modes, which do not exist but could have e ~ i s t e d . ~ The apparent inconsistency of Spinozas modal theory becomes perspicuous when IIAl is read in conjunction with the following passage from IP11D2 (GII/53/ 6-10):
But the reason why a circle or a triangle exists, or why it does not exist, does not follow from the nature of these things, but from the order of the whole of corporeal Nature. For from this order it must follow either that the triangle necessarily exists now or that it is impossible for it to exist now.

As Bennett (1985, 121) has pointed out, one would not be entitled to argue that there is no inconsistency between this passage from I P l l D 2 a n d IIAl because IIAl is about h u m a n beings and the passage from IPllD2 about triangles. Undoubtedly, Spinoza treats the passage from IPllD2 as a n instance of a universal truth according to which each singular thing (i.e., a finite mode) exists by necessity when i t exists. I n what follows I call the problem posed by those passages which appear to offer mutually inconsistent views of Spinozas modal theory

the problem of apparent direct assertion of contingency.


1.2. Second Threat:

The Problem of Alternative Systems of Finite Modes The second respect in which Spinozas modal theory is recalcitrant to a necessitarianist reading is t h a t Spinoza seems to base the necessity of all truths on the fact t h a t they follow from t r u t h s describing the immutable nature of GodsS However, the truths describing the immutable nature of God have as t h e i r objects things t h a t eternally exist, a n d i t is natural to think, as Spinoza does in IP21 and IP22, t h a t everything t h a t follows from something t h a t is eternal and immutable m u s t also be e t e r n a l a n d immutable. Thus, i t is impossible for finite modes, i.e., for singular things which have spatiotemporal limits to their existence, to follow from the immutable nature of God. They follow, Spinoza claims i n IP28, from Gods attributes as they are modified by finite modifications; and in Spinozas ontology this means that the existence of finite modes is determined only by other finite modes. But it seems t h a t if no finite mode follows from the absolute nature of God, then Spinozas metaphysics leaves room for alternative systems of finite modes because causal determinism i n a sys-

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tem of finite modes, say A, does not guarantee t h a t A is the only possible system of finite modes. In what follows I will call this problem the problem of alternative systems of finite modes. The problem is: Does Spinoza, in claiming that finite modes do not follow from the absolute nature of God, grant t h a t there are contingent truths?
2.

TWO PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

2.1. Different Senses of Necessity In the recent literature on Spinoza, various attempts have been made to save his modal theory from inconsistency. In one r a t h e r plausible solution, it h a s been argued t h a t Spinoza used the word necessary in different senses.6 There is some evidence for the view that Spinoza believed that there are different kinds of necessity in the following passage from IP33S1 (GII/74/6-8) :
A thing is called necessary either by reason of its essence or by reason of its cause. For a things existence follows necessarily either from its essence and definition or from a given efficient cause.

I n this passage, then, Spinoza makes a distinction between something being necessary by reason of i t s cause and something being necessary by reason of its essence. However, i t is not perfectly clear what Spinoza means by t h e distinction since two different readings of it are readily available. In the first reading the distinction should be interpreted as a distinction between different kinds of necessity. A thing which is necessary by reason of its essence is absolutely necessary, whereas a thing which is necessary by reason of its cause is only relatively necessary. In the second reading the distinction is meant to emphasize t h a t a thing which is necessary may have derived its necessity either from its essence or from some external cause. However, regardless of whether a thing has derived its necessity from its essence o r from some external cause, its existence is necessary in the same sense of n e ~ e s s i t y . ~ If the former reading of Spinozas distinction between necessity by reason of its cause and necessity by reason of its essence is accepted, then Spinozas modal theory can be saved from inconsistency as follows: in emphasizing the necessity of all things, Spinoza is saying t h a t each thing is such t h a t it is either relatively necessary or absolutely necessary. However, when what he says expresses the thought that singular things are contingent existents, he is claiming t h a t singular things are not absolutely necessary but are only relatively necessary. So when in I P l l D 2 Spinoza says that the existence of a given triangle is necessary and when in IIAl he denies t h a t human beings a r e necessary existents, t h e apparent inconsistency 64

Consistency of Spinozas Modal Theory

generated by these two passages would be eliminated by saying t h a t in the former Spinoza is speaking about relative necessity whereas in the l a t t e r he is speaking about absolute necessity. This solution gains some plausibility from Spinozas idea t h a t even if singular things are such t h a t their essences do not involve existence, they exist i n infinite causal series of singular things and could thus be necessary by reason of their causes. In this solution IIP8 would pose no difficulty; the contingency which t h a t proposition entails is absolute, or logical, contingency which is consistent with relative necessity. Thus, the problem of apparent direct assertion of contingency here receives a solution with prima facie plausibility. Equipped with a distinction between two kinds of necessity, the problem of alternative possible systems of finite modes is easy to explain away. Spinoza does not deny the logical possibility of alternative systems of finite modes. In this reading it is logically possible that instead of the actual system of finite modes some other system of finite modes would have existed; t h e necessary existence Spinoza seems to attribute to finite modes is j u s t relative necessity and, as we have seen, this relative necessity is consistent with absolute contingency.

2.1 .I. Problems in the Solution Even if the solution proposed above appears to be quite elegant, there is textual evidence which strongly suggests that it is not the one Spinoza would have endorsed. That Spinoza wanted to see t h e connection between Gods essence a n d modes as absolutely necessary receives confirmation from the already quoted passage i n IP17S (see p. 61 above), where he says t h a t everything follows from the power of God by t h e same necessity as it follows from the nature of a triangle t h a t its three angles are equal to two right angles. Additional evidence for attributing to Spinoza the view t h a t all the things there are exist by the same necessity is to be found from one of Spinozas letters to Oldenburg (Letter 75; The Letters, 337):
In no way do I subject God to fate, but I conceive that all things follow with inevitable necessity from Gods nature in the same way that everyone conceives that it follows from Gods nature that God understands himself.*

I n t h e Ethics Spinoza also makes some important remarks that identify the necessity with which God understands himself with the necessity by which he acts. In IIP3S he writes as follows:
we have shown in IP16 that God acts with the same necessity by which he understands himself, i.e., just as it follows from the necessity of the divine nature (as everyone maintains unanimously)

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Olli Koistinen that God understands himself, with the same necessity it also follows t h a t God does infinitely many things in infinitely many modes.

And in IIP7S Spinoza goes still further by identifying Gods ideas with the objects of those ideas. He writes there as follows:
a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, but expressed in two ways. Some of the Hebrews seem to have seen this, a s if through a cloud, when they maintained that God, Gods intellect, and the things understood by him are one and the same. For example, a circle existing in nature and the idea of the existing circle, which is also in God, are one and the same thing, which is explained through different attributes.

That this passage supports the reading that there is only kind of necessity can be seen as follows. It is absolutely necessary t h a t God h a s a n idea of everything t h a t is possible. But because each of these ideas is identical with its object, Gods thinking of something is, so to speak, Gods creating it. Thus, it is absolutely necessary t h a t God creates everything t h a t is possible. Additional evidence for the view t h a t Spinoza sees the relation between God and his modes as absolutely necessary is offered by IP25S where he writes as follows:
God must be c a l e d the cause of all things in the same sense in which he is called the cause of himself.

T h a t t h i s scholium supports a necessitarian reading of Spinoza becomes obvious once it has been explicated what he means by saying that God is the cause of himself. Spinoza explicates the meaning of causa sui in ID1. This definition runs as follows:
By cause of itself I understand that whose essence involves existence, or that whose nature cannot be conceived except a s existing.

Thus, Spinoza accepts the following principles: (1) x causes x if and only if xs essence involves the existence of x; and (2) The essence of x involves t h e existence of x if a n d only if the essence of x cannot be conceived without the existence of x .
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From IP25S it follows that in God is the cause of x where x is any thing distinct from God, cause means t h e same as i n principle (1)above. Thus, the following holds in Spinozas system:
(3) God is t h e cause of x if a n d only if t h e essence of God involves the existence of x .

But from the conjunction of (2) and (3) it seems to follow that
(4)

God is t h e cause of x if and only if t h e essence of God cannot be conceived without the existence of x .

However, the conjunction of (4) and Spinozas thesis that God is t h e cause of everything there is, entails t h a t each thing there is, is contained in the essence of God in such a way that Gods essence cannot be conceived without it. But this means t h a t if some thing t h a t does not exist had existed, Gods essence would have been different. However, Gods essence could not have been differenLg Thus, all things are necessary i n the same sense because all things, including God himself, derive their existence from their being included i n Gods essence. It seems to me t h a t the conceptual containment of all things in Gods essence is just Spinozas way of stating that the connection between Gods essence and other things is logical (i.e., conceptual).1 On t h e basis of what has been said above, I believe t h a t textual evidence forces one to favor the view t h a t in making the distinction between something being necessary by reason of its essence and something being necessary by reason of its cause, Spinoza is arguing that a thing which is necessary may have derived its absolute necessity either from its essence or from some external cause. 2.2. Garretts Solution In his excellent article about Spinozas modal theory, Don Garrett (1991)argues that Spinoza is best interpreted as a necessitarian. I s h a r e Garretts opinion i n several m a t t e r s , but I have some doubts concerning the way he treats IIP8 and IIA1. Also, I am a bit skeptical about his view on what necessitates the existence of finite modes. Garretts view is t h a t in IIPS Spinozas purpose is to show how there can be ideas of nonexistent individuals even though IIP7, the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things, seems to require that there is a perfect parallelism (or even identity) between ideas and their objects. As a n example of nonexistent ideas, Garrett considers ideas about unicorns. He claims t h a t these ideas really have existing things as their objects. Garrett does not, however, at67

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tribute t o Spinoza any Meinongian object theory. He seems t o claim that ideas of nonexistent individuals are in a sense conditional. Garrett (1991, 217, note 21) writes as follows:
But as EIIP8 explains, such an idea [of a unicorn] is not an idea having no object, which would violate EIIP7; rather it is an idea having a truly existent thing as its object. This truly existent thing is not an existent unicorn, however, but rather the formal essence of a unicorn. This essence is comprehendedin the attribute of Extension. As I understand it, this means that the essence is itself a real, existent, feature of Extension: specifically the pervasive and permanent feature that Extensions general laws are such as to permit the unicorn-mechanism to exist whenever and wherever the series of finite modes and causes should dictate.

It seems that in this interpretation someone is having an idea of a unicorn if she understands the circumstances in which a unicorn would be brought about. She is having an idea of a unicorn if she understands what is required for a unicorn t o exist. I believe that Garretts interpretation is in accordance with what Spinoza says about nonexistent individuals in his earlier writings, but as an explanation of ideas about nonexistent individuals it has an air of circularity around it. If someones idea of a nonexistent F is something like, if circumstances A, B, and C are realized then F exists, there is still both in the antecedent and in the consequent of the conditional reference t o nonexistents because the conditions required for the existence of F are not realized. Thus, if Garretts point is t h a t Spinoza tried t o show by IIP8 how ideas about nonexistents can be transformed into ideas about existents, then he does not succeed in proving it. Moreover, Garretts interpretation of IIP8 does not explain the ideas about those nonexistent individuals whose existence is against the laws of extension. In considering IIAl Garrett (1991, 199) points out that in saying that the essence of man does not involve necessary existence, Spinoza is not denying that the existence of finite modes is necessary. What Spinoza there denies is that the existence of finite modes is determined by their essence. However, in IIAl Spinoza expresses the same thought in two ways. He believes that
(A*) the essence of man does not involve necessary existence

means the same as

(B*) from the order of nature it can happen equally that this or that man does exist, or that he does not exist
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[ex naturae ordine, tam fieri potest, u t hic, & ille homo existat, quam ut non existat]. It seems t o me that (B*) suggests more strongly than (A*) that both the existence and nonexistence of this or that man are 217,note 23) gives two ingenuine possibilities. Garrett (1991, terpretations of (B*) which are based on different translations of the original Latin: (a) that the existence of a particular man in itself neither contradicts nor is required by the general and pervasive laws (order)of nature,
or

(b) that the mans essence does not determine whether he exists or not, but that his existence is instead determined as part of the actual series (order) of natural causes and effects. As Garrett admits, the first alternative requires that finite things are not part of the order of nature. However, it is plausible t o hold, as Garrett himself does, that finite things are included in the order of nature. Moreover, in this interpretation (B*) does not say the same as (A*) because the pervasive laws of nature cannot constitute the essence of any perishable individual. The second alternative seems t o emphasize that finite things are brought about by other finite things. However, it remains to be shown how existence in a causal series makes its elements necessary. All in all, I find difficulties in following Garrett here, because it seems to me that the equivalence of (A*) and ( B ) requires that what Spinoza means by IIAl is that the existence as well as the nonexistence of this or that man are genuine possibilities. I will later show how this is possible in necessitarianism. Garrett argues that finite modes may be necessary even though they do not follow from the absolute nature of the at198)offers two alternatives t o how finite tributes. He (1991, modes might be necessitated in Spinozas system. According to the first alternative:

... if Spinoza accepts the requirement t h a t the series of finite modes must express the highest degree of reality and perfection, then he could well maintain that the series of finite modes does not follow from the absolute nature of the attribute, but only from t h a t nature together with this additional necessary constraint.
According to the second alternative:

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Olli Koistinen Spinoza nowhere denies t h a t the whole series of finite modes follows from the absolute nature of the attributes. His claim is only that no individual finite mode follows from it.

Suppose that A is an infinite causal series of finite modes. According t o Garretts first alternative A follows from Gods absolute nature together with the requirement of perfection. According to the second alternative the infinite causal series follows from Gods absolute nature, and the requirement of perfection is not needed. Thus, according t o Garretts alternatives all infinite causal series of finite modes are entailed by necessary truths because truths about Gods absolute nature and the requirement of perfection are necessary in Spinozas system. What I find problematic in Garretts treatment is the following. If a n entire causal series is entailed by necessary truths, then that series has t o exist eternally (if my existence were entailed by the fact 2 + 2 = 4, then I would be an eternal existent). But what does it mean that an infinite causal series exists eternally? It seems t o me that there are two alternatives: either it eternally exists with all its parts or it eternally exists in the sense that at each moment of time some part of it exists. The first alternative would make the parts of the infinite series eternal and that would clash with their supposed finitude. Thus, the first alternative must be wrong. In the latter alternative it is hard t o understand the sense in which the causal series is entailed by necessary truths. What else can this mean but that each member in the series is entailed by necessary truths? But, if that is the case, each finite mode has t o exist eternally. It seems, then, that Garrett does not offer a plausible solution t o the problem of alternative systems of finite modes.12
3. CONSISTENT NECESSITARIANISM

3.1. Preliminaries I have defended above the view t h a t Spinoza adopted a clear necessitarianist position. Everything that there is and everything that occurs, is and occurs by the same necessity as it is true that 2 + 2 = 4, Spinoza did not in the famous passage from IP33S1 draw a distinction between different kinds of necessity. Rather, he was arguing that absolute necessity may be based either on the essence of a thing or on its cause. Thus, it has t o be shown how the problem of apparent direct assertion of contingency and the problem of alternative possible system of finite modes can be given a solution that is consistent with necessitarianism. The considerations that led t o the problem of alternative possible systems of finite modes showed quite clearly t h a t
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there is a sense in which particular things cannot be involved in the absolute nature of God: if they were they would be eternal. Thus finite modes must have their causal origin in other finite modes, i.e., in things which are spatially and temporally limited. However, the consistency of Spinozas necessitarianism requires t h a t i n some sense finite modes must be included i n Gods essence and follow from t h a t essence by absolute necessity. In what follows I will argue that once a distinction is made between finite modes and objects of truths about finite modes, Spinoza can be seen as arguing that the objects of truths about finite modes follow from Gods essence by absolute necessity even though t h e finite modes themselves do not follow from Gods essence by absolute necessity. I also claim that in order to be consistently a necessitarian Spinoza does not have to show t h a t finite modes as such follow from t h e absolute n a t u r e of God-it suffices t h a t the objects of t r u t h s about finite modes follow from t h a t absolute nature. Thus, the sense in which finite modes follow from the essence of God is that the objects of t r u t h s about finite modes follow from t h a t essence. It will be shown why t h i s sense of following from Gods essence is not against Spinozas nothing finite from infinite-thesis.

3 2 Solution .. Necessitarianism is the thesis that


(N) All truths are necessary. This expresses the idea t h a t there is only one possible world. Let us now consider what kind of ontological requirements (N) involves in Spinozas system. I n Spinozas system a t r u t h is either about Gods infinite features or about his finite features. There is no problem in assuming t h a t truths about Gods infinite features are necessary truths because the objects of these truths are also necessary existents. Thus, t h e assumption t h a t these t r u t h s follow from truths describing Gods absolute nature is not inconsistent with Spinozas view that from Gods absolute nature follow only infinite necessarily existing things. Let us, then, consider necessary truths about finite modes. I n Spinozas system t r u t h s about finite modes must be expressed by sentences that involve a reference to time and place. The reason for this time and place specification is t h a t finite modes have a spatiotemporal location. If sentences about finite modes lacked reference to times and places, then those sentences could not express ideas that could be meaningfully called true or false. The temporal aspect of this point was recognized by Gottlob Frege (1988 [1918-19191, 53) in the following passage:
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Olli Koistinen The words This tree is covered with green leaves are not sufficient by themselves to constitute the expression of thought, for the time of utterance is involved as well. Without the timespecification thus given we have not a complete thought, that is we have no thought at all. Only a sentence with the time-specification filled out, a sentence complete in every respect, expresses a thought. But this thought, if it is true, is true not only today or tomorrow but timele~sly.~

It is also evident that what Frege says here about time-specification holds also, mutatis mutandis, for specification of ~ 1 a c e . l ~ The proof of necessitarianism requires, then, that Spinoza has to show t h a t all time-place specified sentences about finite modes express necessarily true ideas. Thus, Spinozas modal theory does not require t h a t t h e existence of a particular storm is necessitated by the infinite features of God; but it requires t h a t if a particular storm occurs i n P a t t , then t h e truth this storm occurs in P at t is a necessary truth and follows from truths describing Gods infinite essence. To put the point more generally, t h e necessity of all t r u t h s about finite modes requires that the following principle holds: (NF) For each finite mode x and for each place P and for each time t , if x exists in P at t , then it is necessary that x exists in P at t .

But the necessity of all truths does not require the truth of the following principle with which it is easy to conflate: (NEF) Each finite mode is a necessary existent. Necessary existents for Spinoza are things that are not perishable. Thus (NEF) includes the view t h a t all finite modes a r e eternal, as well as the denial of all change, since change presupposes t h a t finite modes come into being and cease to exist. Thus, (NEF) is inconsistent with the existence of finite modes because finite modes have necessarily temporal limits to their existence. What has to be shown, then, is t h a t the distinction between (NF) and (NEF) does not collapse in Spinozas system. What (NF) says is t h a t all t r u t h s about finite modes a r e necessary, and what (NEF) says is t h a t no finite mode could have failed to exist at any moment of time at any place. Now because i n Spinozas system Gods essence is t h e ultimate source of all necessity, i t follows t h a t all t r u t h s about finite modes must follow from truths describing Gods essence. The crucial question we have to face is: does Spinozas view t h a t all t r u t h s about finite modes follow from t r u t h s describing Gods eternal essence violate his view t h a t nothing finite follows from the infinite essence of God?

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In order t o give the correct, i.e., negative, answer to the question just posed what must be shown is that the objects of truths about finite modes are infinite modes. Even if it may sound somewhat paradoxical to say that the objects of truths about finite modes are infinite modes, I believe that this claim is defensible in Spinozas metaphysics. For Spinoza modes are either finite or infinite. A finite mode has spatiotemporal limits and a mode that fails t o have such limits is an infinite mode.15Let us suppose that Jones raised his hand in his bedroom 12.2. 1995. Now, this particular raising of his hand by Jones is a finite mode. It came into being when Jones hand went up and it ceased t o exist when Jones laid his hand down. Moreover, this particular hand raising does not exist in Jones kitchen but in his bedroom. Thus, because this hand raising has spatiotemporal limits it is a finite mode. But consider now the truth expressed by the sentence Jones raised his hand in his bedroom 12.2. 1995. This sentence is about the finite mode, Jones raising his hand and it says that the finite mode occurred in Jones bedroom at 12.2. 1995. But, and this is important, what makes it true is not just the existence of Jones raising his hand but Jones raising his hand in his bedroom at 12.2. 1995.Now, Jones raising his hand in his bedroom 12.2.1995 seems t o differ crucially from Jones raising his hand. Jones raising his hand has a spatiotemporal location, but Jones raising his hand in his bedroom 12.2. 1995 seems t o have no spatiotemporal location. This entity is beyond the temporal and spatial order and is for that reason an infinite mode. But because all truths about finite modes must involve place and time specifications it follows that all truths about finite modes have as their objects infinite modes and are made true by infinite modes.16 The distinction between the objects of truths about finite modes and those finite modes themselves becomes very close to the distinction P F. Strawson makes between events in na. ture and facts. Strawson (1985,116)writes as follows:
There are, sometimes, relatively subtle indications of the difference. Thus we might compare His death, coming when it did, was responsible for the breakdown of the negotiations with His deaths coming when it did was responsible for the breakdown of the negotiations. His death, as referred to in the first of these sentences, is certainly an event in nature. It came when it did. But his deaths coming when it did did not come at any time. It is not an event in nature. It is the fact that a certain event occurred in nature at a certain time.I7

Thus, we have seen that Spinozas view that no finite mode follows from the absolute nature of God is not, in his system, 73

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inconsistent with the thesis that all truths are necessitated by their following from the absolute nature of God.18 Once the distinction between finite modes and those modes with their times and places has been spelled out, the solution t o the problem of apparent direct assertion of contingency is easy to see. In IIAl Spinoza is not speaking about the existence of men at some definite (or indefinite) time; in IP11D2, however, he speaks about the existence of a triangle In IIAl Spinoza is not saying t h a t from t h e order of n a t u r e it may happen t h a t this or t h a t man does not exist when he exists.20 Rather, he is simply drawing the readers attention to the fact t h a t men, being finite modes of God, are not eternal existents: their existence has temporal limits and for that reason they are contingent existents. They are contingent in the sense of IVDB, according to which those things whose essence does not involve existence or nonexistence are contingent. But this, of course, is consistent with t h e view t h a t all t r u t h s about these contingent things, truths which are expressed by temporally specified sentences, are absolutely necessary. Thus, IIAl and the passage from I P l l D 2 a r e in perfect harmony in t h e interpretation proposed. I I A l a n d t h e passage from I P l l D 2 are instances of quite different universal generalizations: IIAl is a n instance of the generalization t h a t no finite thing is a necessary existent, while the passage from I P l l D 2 is a n instance of the generalization t h a t each finite thing exists necessarily when it exists. In order to see how IfP8 is consistent with necessitarianism, it is appropriate to place it in a wider argumentative context. Prior to IIPS, Spinoza h a s demonstrated i n I I P 3 t h e omniscience of his God. There is in God a n eternal idea of everything that there has been, is, and will be.21But the conjunction of Gods having ideas of everything possible and IIP7, according to which there is a perfect parallelism between ideas and their objects, seems to generate a problem: if there is now a n idea i n God of some singular thing, say Alexander t h e Great, then the parallelism appears t o require that Alexander the Great should exist now. But Alexander the Great does not exist now. In IIP8 Spinoza, then, seems to argue t h a t the ontological correlates of ideas about past and present future individuals a r e not the individuals themselves but their formal essences, which are included in the attributes. In the light of the context in which IIPS occurs, it is thus not correct to claim t h a t it is about ideas of possible alternative individuals. Rather, i t is natural to view IIPS as providing a n answer to the question of how it is possible to refer to things that do not exist now.22 interpretation gets some confirmation from the My first sentence of the corollary to IIP8. This sentence reads as follows:

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Consistency of Spinozas Modal Theory From this it follows that so long as [quamdiu] singular things do not exist ...

Here quamdiu is a temporal adverb which is best translated, a s Curley does, with the phrase so long as. The use of quamdiu here suggests that in IIP8 Spinoza, by nonexistent individuals, means individuals which are nonexistent at some moment of time.23 What is also noteworthy in IIP8 is that in that proposition Spinoza introduces the technical term of formal essence (essentia formales). Now, this formal essence corresponds, I believe, t o the object of a truth about a finite mode. It is these formal essences or objects of truths about finite modes that follow from the eternal and infinite essence of God; and that they follow from the eternal and infinite essence of the necessarily existing God is, in Spinozas system, sufficient for there being only one possible system of finite modes.24

CONCLUSION
Spinozas necessitarianism seems inconsistent because he wants to derive his view on the necessity of all truths from IP16 according t o which everything there is follows from the nature of God by absolute necessity. Thus, all truths are necessary because each truth has as its object something that follows from Gods absolute nature. However, in IP21-22 Spinoza wants t o claim that the things that follow from that absolute nature must be infinite and eternal. But this means t h a t truths about finite modes cannot be necessary because they have as their objects things that have spatiotemporal limitations t o their existence. The solution to this apparent inconsistency is based on the following principles: (i) If a mode has no spatiotemporal limits t o its existence, then it is an infinite mode of God. (ii) The thing of which a truth is about is not the same as the object of the truth. (iii) Truths about finite modes have infinite modes as their objects. In this paper it has been argued that (iii) holds because sentences that express truths about finite modes must involve place and time specifications and that truths expressed by such sentences must be made true by things that are outside the spatiotemporal order. It seems that Spinoza made a distinction that corresponds to the distinction between finite modes themselves and the objects of truths about finite modes in the following passage from VP29S:

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Olli Koistinen We conceive things a s actual in two ways: either insofar as we conceive them to exist in relation to a certain time and place, or insofar as we conceive them to be contained in God and to follow from the necessity of the divine nature. But things we conceive in this second way a s true, or real, we conceive under a species of eternity, and to that extent they involve the eternal and infinite essence of God.

Here Spinozas point is t h a t finite modes as r e l a t a of spatiotemporal relations do not follow from the infinite essence of God. However, under a form of eternity they follow from the necessity of the divine nature. But this fits perfectly with the interpretation proposed above: finite modes having spatiotemporal limits to their existence do not follow from the absolute nature of God, but these modes with their times and places follow from t h a t nature. And it is in a sense perfectly reasonable to think t h a t a finite mode with its time and place of existence is t h a t mode under a form of eternity. It seems t h a t t h e r e is a certain resemblance between Spinoza a n d Wittgenstein on t h e topic of sub specie aeternitatis. Wittgenstein (Notebooks 1914-1916 , 83) writes as follows:
The usual way of looking a t things sees objects as it were from the midst of them, the view sub specie aeternitatis from outside. In such a way that they have the whole world as background. Is this it perhaps-in this view the object is seen together with space and time instead of in space and time?25s26

NOTES
Translations a r e from E.M. Curleys The Collected Works of Spinoza, vol. 1. (B. Spinoza, The Collected W r s of Spinoza, vol. I. E. M. ok Curley, ed. and trans. [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19851). Latin quotations are from Carl Gebhardts edition of Spinozas works (Short Treatise in The Collected W r s of Spinoza, vol. I. Spinoza Opok era. Carl Gebhardt, ed. [Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 19251). The system of numbering passages from the Ethics stems from Curley. Thus, ID6 refers to the sixth definition of the first part of the Ethics, IP16 refers to the sixteenth proposition of the first part and IIP7S refers to the scholium to proposition 7 of the second part. How, exactly, IP16 entails necessitarianism, see Don Garrett, Spinozas Necessitarianism, in God and Nature: Spinozas Metaphysics, Y. Yovel, ed. (Leiden: Brill, 1991), 205-207. Among the commentators who believe that Spinoza left room for logically contingent truths are Edwin Curley (Spinozas Metaphysics: An Essay in Znterpretation [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 19693, 101-106); and Curley, Behind the Geometrical Method: A Reading of Spinozas Ethics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19881, 4850);Alan Donagan, Spinozas Proof of Immortality, in Spinoza: A Collection of Critical Essays, Marjorie Grene, ed. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1973), 241-258; Joel Friedman, How the Finite

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Consistency of Spinozas Modal Theory Follows from the Infinite in Spinozas Metaphysical System, Synthese 69 (1986): 371-401; and Richard Mason, Spinoza on Modality, Philosophical Quarterly 36 (1986): 313342. In his philosophically subtle and historically illuminating paper, also John Carriero (SpinozasViews on Necessity in Historical Perspective, Philosophical lbpics 19 [19911: 4796) seems to find room for logical contingency in Spinozas system. For example, Donagan (Spinozas Proof of Immortality, 250)) seems to believe that in IIP8 ideas about nonexistent individuals include ideas about things that never exist. Carriero (SpinozasViews on Necessity in Historical Perspective, 77), seems to think that IIP8 is exclusively about internally possible things which never exist. See, for example, the passage cited from IP17S. The most elaborate version of this solution stems from Curley, Spinozas Metaphysics, 86-93. Jonathan Bennett, A Study of Spinozas Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 19841, 121, has some sympathy for it but seems to reject it; according to Bennett, Spinoza was committed both to necessitarianism and to its denial. Also Friedman, How the Finite Follows from the Infinite, 375-378, believes that Spinoza had different concepts of necessity. This reading is endorsed by Garrett (Spinozas Necessitarianism, 199), who writes as follows: It must be emphasized, however, that Spinoza does not present the distinction as one between two degrees of necessity, but rather a s one between two sources of necessity: a things own essence, and a cause other than the thing itself. A similar view seems to be attributed to Spinoza also by Bennett, A Study of Spinozas Ethics, 124. * This passage favors the reading offered here because i t certainly is absolutely necessary that God understands himself. This passage is cited by Garrett, Spinozas Necessitarianism,lSl. In IP33D Spinoza shows the impossibility of Gods having a different essence from the actual one. lo Of this point see also IP33D. My interpretation of IP25S seems to face the following objection. That God cannot be conceived without any of his modes, is inconsistent with Spinozas view that God is a substance (ID6) and hence conceived through himself (ID3). However, it seems to me that this objection can be met once it is recognized that x cannot be conceived without y is ambiguous. It may mean either that (i) x cannot be distinctly identified without y or that (ii) the proposition x is not y is inconceivable. My interpretation does not threaten Gods conceivability through himself because in saying that God cannot be conceived without any of its modes, 1 use cannot be conceived in the latter sense of the phrase; and it seems to me that in saying that substances are conceived through themselves, Spinoza means t h a t substances can be distinctly identified without their modes. l1 Friedman, HOW Finite Follows from the Infinite, 376-377, the also believes that the infinite causal series of finite modes follow logically from the absolute nature of God. I have criticized Friedmans interpretation in Koistinen, On the Metaphysics of Spinozas ETHICS (Turku, 1991), 127-135. l2 Richard Mason has presented an interesting interpretation of Spinozas modal theory. According to Mason, Spinoza had only one concept of necessity. Mason, Spinoza on Modality, 328, writes: [Spinozas] approach is ontological: it is the explanation of existence, not the explanation of truth, which concerns him. For him, the must of necessity is

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Olli Koistinen not must be true, but must be caused or explained. To be necessary is to be necessitated, and to be necessitated is to have a cause or explanation which necessitates. Masons view is, however, problematic because in the Short Treatise (GV41-42) Spinoza considers the possibility that in spite of universal causal determinism there is contingency. Spinoza argues that this is not a real possibility because everything depends on one single cause. If for Spinozato be necessary had meant to have a cause, then he would have needed no additional premise to show that universal determinism eliminates contingency. I have considered the crucial passage from the Short Deatise in Koistinen, On the Metaphysics of Spinozas ETHICS, 136-137, and in a n unpublished manuscript Spinozas Proof of Necessitarianism. l3 Gottlob Frege, Thoughts, in Propositions and Attitudes, Nathan Salmon and Scott Soames, eds. P. Geach and R. H. Stoothoff, trans. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 33-55. Originally published as Der Gedanke. Eine logische Untersuchung, in Beitruge zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus, I (1918/19), 58-77. l4 In the preface to his Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, Frege thinks that in addition to the specification of time also a specification of place is needed. He writes as follows: All determinations of the place, the time and the like, belong to the thought whose t r u t h is in point; its t r u t h itself is independent of place and time. This citation is from Gottlob Frege, The Basic Laws of Arithmetic, 14,Montgomery Furth, ed. and trans. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967); original German edition published in two volumes 1893 and 1903. I am indebted to Ari Maunu for bringing this passage to my attention. Also Bennett, A Study of Spinozas Ethics, 112-113, seems to interpret finite modes as spatiotemporally limited particulars. l6 It might be thought that whether a mode is finite and perishable or infinite and eternal depends on how that mode is thought of; considered in itself a mode is contingent and finite, whereas considered as a part of the infinite causal series the mode is eternal and necessary. I believe t h a t this interpretation is somewhat fascinating because Spinoza seems to believe that modes considered sub specie aeternitatis are necessary. However, what I find problematic in this interpretation is that it makes finitude and the coming into being of a mode and its ceasing to exist description dependent. But it seems to me that for Spinoza finitude and infinity are objective features of the world. In his doctrine of the eternity of mind (VP23) Spinoza says that something of the mind remains which is eternal. However, if Spinoza had believed that finitudelinfinitude is description dependent, then he could as well have said that the mind is eternal. Moreover, it is not easy for me to understand the underlying intuition behind the distinction between a mode in itself and a mode a s a part of the infinite causal nexus. How can a mode be infinite and eternal as a part of the infinite causal nexus without it being the case that the mode in itself is eternal, too? I am grateful to a n anonymous referee of this journal for bringing this alternative to my attention. l7 P. F. Strawson, Causation and Explanation, in Essays on Dauidson: Actions and Events, B. Vermazen and M. B. Hintikka, eds (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 19851, 115-136. l8 I t may be suggested that the distinction between the contingency of finite modes in themselves and the necessity of objects of truths about finite modes is a distinction between what is necessary in the or-

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Consistency of Spinozas Modal Theory der of being and what is necessary in language. However, it is not, a t least primarily, that what I want to say. Spinoza thought that the fundamental truth-bearers are ideas (IA6 and IIP47S). A sentence is true if it expresses a true idea. Spinoza also thought that a true idea must correspond to (or must in fact be identical with) its object (IA6 and IIP7S). Now, a temporally definite sentence which is always true must express an idea that is omnitemporally true. However, because of the parallelism, the object of the idea must be an omnitemporal existent, too. Moreover, because finite modes have spatiotemporal limits to their existence, the objects of these ideas cannot be finite modes but must be necessarily existing infinite modes. In my interpretation the distinction between finite modes in themselves and finite modes under a form of eternity resembles also the distinction that R. M. Chisholm, Person and Object: A Metaphysical Study (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court Publishing Company, 1976), chapter entitled States of Affairs, makes between events and facts. Suppose that Bill Clinton walks a t t. In Chisholms ontology Bill Clintons walking refers to a n event t h a t occurs at t because a t t Bill Clinton exemplifies the property of walking. Now, this event occurs exactly a t the times when Clinton has the property of walking. Thus, it does not always occur. However, in Chisholms ontology the fact Bill Clintons walking a t t always occurs. There is always in the world something t h a t concretizes t h a t fact. There are differences between my interpretative idea and Chisholms theory, but I believe that they are based on a similar intuition. l9 In Latin the passage from I P l l D 2 (G II/53/6-10) goes a s follows: At ratio, cur circulus, vel triangulus existit, vel cur non existit, ex eorum natura non sequitur, sed ex ordine universae naturae corporae; ex eo enim sequi debet, vel jam triangulum necessario existere, vel impossibile esse, ut jam existat. (Emphases mine.) 2o IIAl goes in Latin a s follows: Hominis essentia non involvit necessariam existentiam, hoc est, ex nature ordine, tam fieri potest, ut hic, & ille homo existat, quam ut non existat. 21 That the ideas about which IIP3, In God there is necessarily a n idea both of his essence and of everything that necessarily follows from his essence, are eternal is confirmed by VP23D. This demonstration requires that if x is necessarily in God, then x exists eternally. 22 Carriero, Spinozas Views on Necessity in Historical Perspective, 77, considers this alternative but does not accept it. 23 In addition to IIPS, Spinoza speaks of ideas of nonexistent individuals also in IP8S (GII/50/8-11), where he argues that we can have true ideas of modifications which do not exist. According to Spinoza a n idea is true if it agrees with its object. What sort of agreement Spinoza means is further explicated in IP30D, where he says that A true idea must agree with its object (by A6), i.e., (as is known through itselo, what is contained objectively in the intellect must necessarily be in nature. Now, it is of course problematic how to reconcile IA6 with there being t r u e ideas of nonexistent individuals. However, this problem disappears once it is understood t h a t by nonexistent individuals, Spinoza means things that do not exist now. IIP8 is illuminating to see as providing an answer to the problem posed by the conjunction of IA6 and the passage from IP8S2. For example, E. M. Curley, Spinoza On Truth, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1994): 15)has found the conjunction puzzling. Moreover, it should be noted that in addition to

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Olli Koistinen Gods omniscience, simple semantical considerations about the eternity of truth of ideas expressed by temporally definite sentences lead to the postulation of fact-like entities in Spinozas metaphysics. For Spinoza ideas are primary truth-bearers, and a true temporally definite sentence must therefore express a n idea that is always true. But Spinozas parallelism requires that there must always be in the world something that corresponds to, or is identical with that idea. It is instructive to compare the interpretation proposed here with Margaret Wilsons interpretation of IP16. In her, Infinite Understanding, Scientia Intuitiva, and Ethics 1.16, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 8 (1983): 184-186, interpretation Spinoza denies t h a t the durational existence of finite modes follows from the immutable nature of God. According to Wilson Spinoza claims that the essences of things follow from the necessity of the divine nature. Now, this is also what I argue because I identify the facts about finite modes with their (formal) essences. However, it also seems that the interpretation proposed here differs from Wilsons interpretation because she (186) writes a s follows: ... according to my reading of 1.16, nothing about existence at a certain time or place is supposed to be established by 1.16. The context makes i t clear that by referring to IP16 Wilson wants to say that nothing that follows from the necessity of the divine nature exists a t a certain time and place. The conflict between my view and Wilsons is only apparent. Neither in my interpretation follows any finite mode which has spatial and temporal limits for its existence from the absolute nature of God, or from the necessity of the divine nature. Facts about finite modes, which in my interpretation follow from the necessity of the divine nature, do not have existence that is limited to a certain time or place even if the things those facts are about have such a limited existence. In one point of interpretation my view, however, differs from Wilsons: she thinks that Spinozas view that finite modes do not follow from the necessity of the divine nature is a sign that his metaphysics leaves room for several possible worlds. In my interpretation the existence of several possible worlds is excluded by the facts, i.e., formal essences, following from the necessity of the divine nature. 25 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Notebooks 1914-1916. G. H. von Wright and G. E. M. Anscombe, eds. G. E. M. Anscombe, trans. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1961), 83. Emphases in the original. 26 I am indebted to Don Garrett, Charles J a r r e t t , J u h a n i Pietarinen and a n anonymous referee for the Southern Journal of Philosophy for their comments. I also want to thank John Carriero, Risto Hilpinen, and Seppo Sajama for their help.

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