Zvi Zamir : Leadership style based on the big five model 1. Extraversion: He displayed a high degree of extraversion from a very young age by joining the military at the age of 18 and fighting in the Second World War. Being in the military for a long period of time he showed a high degree of extraversion which enabled him lead missions during the Munich crisis where he provided a stunning amount of evidence in the released archives, including hand drawn maps of the Furstenfeldbruck airfield, where the final showdown between police and the terrorists took place. Zamir outlined a series of errors on the German part, including lack
of necessary equipment and general ineptitude at communications. It was Zamir who finally had the responsibility of informing the Israeli prime minister that the rescue mission had failed. The army Chief Moshe Dayan refused to come to Munich. He however went there even at the risk of his reputation 2. Agreeableness: He was moderate to low on agreeableness whereby he openly criticised the German response to the hostage crisis. "They didn't make even a minimal effort to save lives, didn't take even a minimal risk to save people, neither theirs nor ours, Zamir said., the Germans only wanted to finish with this business, at all costs, in order to get on with the Olympics. Another instance is when he criticized the chief General Zeria in 2002 for disclosing the identity of the Egyptian spy. 3. Conscientiousness: He was high on conscientiousness as is expected of a intelligence chief. He also emphasised in the media post the release of the movie Munich that the operation wrath of god was not a liquidation mission but a mission to strike an the infrastructure of the terrorists . He also took moral responsibility of the accidental death of non target and resigned. Emotional stability: He has always worked in very high pressure situations where decisions resulted in not only life and death scenarios but also would cause nations to go to war. He has acted calmly and steadfastly as is seen in his handling of the hostage situation in Germany as well as the operation wrath of god. Openness to experience: He has depicted remarkable openness to new experiences whether it was his negotiation with the Italian agency to procure a strasi missile after a successful mission in Italy. He even went behind enemy lines to assess a situation.
Zvi Zamir: A portrait of a Transactional leadership Transactional leadership involves motivating and directing followers primarily through appealing to their own self-interest. The power of transactional leaders comes from their formal authority and responsibility in the organization. The main goal of the follower is to obey the instructions of the leader. The style can also be mentioned as a telling style. The leader believes in motivating through a system of rewards and punishment. If a subordinate does what is desired, a reward will follow, and if he does not go as per the wishes of the leader, a punishment will follow. Here, the exchange between leader and follower takes place to achieve routine performance goals.
clarify expectations, provide necessary resources, set mutually agreed upon goals, and provide various kinds of rewards for successful performance. They set SMART (specific, measurable, attainable, realistic, and timely) goals for their subordinates. During his tenure at the Mossad, he helped carry out Operation Wrath of God, the Israeli response to the Munich Massacre, and dealt with the lead up and aftermath of the Yom Kippur War in 1973.
2. Active Management by Exception: Transactional leaders actively
monitor the work of their subordinates, watch for deviations from rules and standards and taking corrective action to prevent mistakes. This can be corroborated from January 14, 1973, when a sayan, or local volunteer, informed the Mossad that he had handled two telephone calls from a payphone in an apartment block where PLO members sometimes stayed. Mossad Director-General Zvi Zamir was convinced that this was a coded order connected to an upcoming attack. Zamir had been convinced that the Bangkok embassy raid was a diversion for a larger attack, due to the participants in the raid having so easily given up, something he did not expect from a group as well-trained, financed, strategically cunning, and motivated as Black September. Zamir further interpreted that "birthday candles" could refer to weapons, and the most likely one with a candle connonation was rocket. Zamir linked the possible upcoming missile attack with Meir's upcoming arrival, and guessed that Black September was planning to shoot down Meir's plane. Zamir then sent a Mossad katsa, or field intelligence officer, to Rome, and travelled to the city with a team of Mossad officers. Zamir met with the head of DIGOS, the Italian anti-terrorism unit, and laid out his concerns. DIGOS officers raided the apartment blocks from where the calls had been made, and found a Russian instruction manual for launching missiles. Throughout the night, DIGOS teams, each accompanied by a Mossad katsa, raided known PLO apartments, but found no evidence of any plot to kill Meir. In the morning, a few hours before Meir's plane arrived, Mossad agents and Italian police surrounded Fiumicino Airport.