COUNTRY REPORT OF

THE ASEAN ASSESSMENT ON

THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF
THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS:
THE PHILIPPINES
with the support of:
i
This volume is a product resulting from a project jointly implemented by the staff of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/
the World Bank and the ASEAN Secretariat, with fnancial support of the Australian Government. The fndings, interpretations, and conclusions
expressed in this paper do not necessarily refect the views of the Executive Directors of the World Bank, the governments they represent, the ASEAN
Secretariat, the Australian Government and/or ASEAN Member States. The World Bank, the ASEAN Secretariat and the Australian Government do
not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in
this work do not imply any judgment on the part of the World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance
of such boundaries.
1
I. The ImpacT of The crIsIs and The GovernmenTs response
after posting strong economic growth for several years, the philippines is currently experiencing an economic
slowdown as a result of the global economic crisis. The Philippine economy grew at an annual average rate of 5.6
percent between 2003 and 2006 and reached 7.3 percent in 2007, the highest growth in three decades. However,
this strong economic performance was not sustained as the country has not been spared the effects of the global
economic crisis. In 2008, domestic industrial production, particularly the export-oriented manufacturing industries,
began to slow down due to the reduction in global demand (Figure 1) (NSO, 2009a and 2009b). Exports, which
account for nearly half of GDP, declined towards the end of 2008 and eventually contracted. As a result, GDP grew
at a slower pace in 2008 at 3.8 percent than in previous years, and it decelerated even further in the frst half of 2009
(NSCB, 2009a) (Figure 2).
The global economic crisis came at a time when the philippines was still struggling with the lingering effects
of the food and fuel crisis in 2008. Considered to be the single largest rice importer in the world, the Philippines
was badly hit by the sharp increases in international rice prices in mid-2008, which translated into an 18 percent
increase in domestic food infation in July 2008 and a 57 percent increase in the retail price of rice. Fuel prices
also peaked in October 2008 at 10.7 percent (NSO, 2009c). These price increases were considered to be signifcant
especially if compared to the average infation rate of 2.8 percent in 2007. Simulations using data on the income and
spending patterns of households from the 2006 Family Income and Expenditures Survey show that the combined
effects of the food and fuel infation in July 2008 may have increased the incidence of poverty in the Philippines by
3.9 percentage points, causing an additional 3.3 million people to fall into poverty.
1
In the months after the peak of
the food and fuel crisis, the impact of the global economic crisis began to be seen, exposing even more Filipinos to
economic shocks.
1 World Bank staff estimates using the 2006 Family Income and Expenditures Survey (NSO, 2006)
2
households have felt the impact of the global economic crisis through a combination of reduced earnings and
reduced employment. The national unemployment rate increased from 6.8 percent in October 2008 to 7.6 percent
in July 2009 (NSO, 2009d). The government reported that as many as 208,128 domestic workers and 6,951 overseas
Filipino workers (OFWs) temporarily or permanently lost their jobs between October 2008 and August 2009 due
to the global economic crisis (DOLE, 2009). A crisis assessment survey commissioned by the World Bank in May
2009 has also shown that around 37 percent of working adults had their work hours or days shortened or their
salary or income reduced or had lost a job between February and April 2009 (World Bank, 2009a).
2
The increasing
number of retrenchments at the height of the crisis was refected in another household survey, which showed the
unemployment rate reaching 34.2 percent in February 2009, up from 30.9 percent in September 2008 (SWS, 2009).
3

Moreover, underemployment rates (in other words, the number of people who would like to work longer hours in
their present or a new job or who have an additional job on top of their main job) also increased from 17.5 percent
in October 2008 to 19.8 percent in July 2009. Meanwhile, visible underemployment (in other words, the number of
people who work for fewer than 40 hours a week) remained high at 11.1 percent (NSO, 2009d) (Figure 3).
evidence suggests that there has been a shift from formal to informal employment and that the sectoral distribution
of labor has changed. The economic crisis seems to have put particular pressure on formal employment,
particularly in the manufacturing sector. In April 2009, when retrenchments of workers were at their peak, the
number of wage and salary workers (considered as formal sector workers) grew only by 2.5 percent, while the
number of people working as unpaid family workers increased by 9.4 percent compared with April 2008. As export-
oriented manufacturing production slowed down, the number of workers in the manufacturing sector declined
by 1.5 percent in April 2009, while the number of workers in construction and mining increased by 1.5 percent
2 The previous three months were used as a reference period. The household survey had a total of 1,600 respondents: Luzon (300), Visayas (300), and Mindanao
(300), and additional samples in Laguna (200) and Cavite (200). The survey was carried out by an independent survey frm, Pulse Asia, Inc.
3 This household survey was undertaken by Social Weather Stations (SWS), an independent social research institute, which conducts perception surveys on
poverty, hunger, unemployment, among other issues.
2

food and fuel crlsls, Lhe lmpacL of Lhe alobal economlc crlsls beaan Lo be seen, exposlna even more
llllplnos Lo economlc shocks.

P(7)$0(39)& 021$& "$3#& #0$& *.'2-#& ("& #0$& ,3(:23& $-(+(.*-& -%*)*)& #0%(7,0& 2& -(.:*+2#*(+& ("& %$97-$9&
$2%+*+,)& 2+9& %$97-$9& $.'3(4.$+#;& 1he naLlonal& unemplovmenL raLe lncreased from 6.8 percenL ln
CcLober 2008 Lo 7.6 percenL ln !ulv 2009 (nSC, 2009d). 1he aovernmenL reporLed LhaL as manv as
208,128 domesLlc workers and 6,931 overseas llllplno workers (ClWs) Lemporarllv or permanenLlv losL
Lhelr [obs beLween CcLober 2008 and AuausL 2009 due Lo Lhe alobal economlc crlsls (uCLL, 2009). A
crlsls assessmenL survev commlssloned bv Lhe World 8ank ln Mav 2009 has also shown LhaL around 37
percenL of worklna adulLs had Lhelr work hours or davs shorLened or Lhelr salarv or lncome reduced or
had losL a [ob beLween lebruarv and Aprll 2009 (World 8ank, 2009a).
2
1he lncreaslna number of
reLrenchmenLs&aL Lhe helahL of Lhe crlsls was reflecLed ln anoLher household survev, whlch showed Lhe
unemplovmenL raLe reachlna 34.2 percenL ln lebruarv 2009, up from 30.9 percenL ln SepLember 2008
(SWS, 2009).
3
Moreover, underemplovmenL raLes (ln oLher words, Lhe number of people who would
llke Lo work lonaer hours ln Lhelr presenL or a new [ob or who have an addlLlonal [ob on Lop of Lhelr
maln [ob) also lncreased from 17.3 percenL ln CcLober 2008 Lo 19.8 percenL ln !ulv 2009. Meanwhlle,
vlslble underemplovmenL (ln oLher words, Lhe number of people who work for fewer Lhan 40 hours a
week) remalned hlah aL 11.1 percenL (nSC, 2009d) (llaure 3).


&
<*,7%$&Q>&R+9$%$.'3(4.$+#&B2#$)&FG&("&#(#23&$.'3(4$9H

"#$%&': nSC
&
D1*9$+-$& )7,,$)#)& #02#& #0$%$& 02)& :$$+& 2& )0*"#& "%(.& "(%.23& #(& *+"(%.23& $.'3(4.$+#& 2+9& #02#& #0$&
)$-#(%23&9*)#%*:7#*(+&("&32:(%&02)&-02+,$9. 1he economlc crlsls seems Lo have puL parLlcular pressure on
formal emplovmenL, parLlcularlv ln Lhe manufacLurlna secLor. ln Aprll 2009, when reLrenchmenLs of
workers were aL Lhelr peak, Lhe number of waae and salarv workers (consldered as formal secLor
workers) arew onlv bv 2.3 percenL, whlle Lhe number of people worklna as unpald famllv workers
lncreased bv 9.4 percenL compared wlLh Aprll 2008. As exporL-orlenLed manufacLurlna producLlon

2
1he prevlous Lhree monLhs were used as a reference perlod. 1he household survev had a LoLal of 1,600
respondenLs: Luzon (300), vlsavas (300), and Mlndanao (300), and addlLlonal samples ln Laauna (200) and CavlLe
(200). 1he survev was carrled ouL bv an lndependenL survev flrm, ulse Asla, lnc.
3
1hls household survev was underLaken bv Soclal WeaLher SLaLlons (SWS), an lndependenL soclal research
lnsLlLuLe, whlch conducLs percepLlon survevs on poverLv, hunaer, unemplovmenL, amona oLher lssues.
0.0
3.0
10.0
13.0
20.0
23.0
'!an-2007 Apr !ul CcL '!an-2008 Apr !ul CcL '!an-2009 Apr !ul
underemplovmenL 8aLe vlslble underemplovmenL 8aLe
3
compared with April 2008, as the government introduced emergency measures to mitigate the employment effects
of the crisis (NSO, 2009d).
The World Banks crisis assessment survey also indicated that poor households have been hit harder than richer
ones. The survey found that, of those who were currently working (as of May 2009), 60 percent of all workers in the
bottom socioeconomic class suffered from either job loss, reduced salary, or decreased work hours in the previous
three months, whereas of those in the highest socioeconomic class, only 13 percent had been affected. The survey
results also suggest that more than half of the population (53 percent) think that they are worse off than they were
a year earlier (11 percent say they are better off and 31 percent have experienced no change). Most Filipinos (70
percent) blame higher commodity prices for the deterioration in their quality of life, which may be attributable to
the recent food crisis. Indications that the global economic crisis has affected households were shown by the
11 percent of respondents who that cited job loss in the family and the 9 percent that reported reduced income/
earnings as the prime reasons for their reduced quality of life. About 83 percent of Filipino adults think that the
current economic crisis is having a substantial impact on their community (World Bank, 2009a).
meanwhile, as the number of overseas employment opportunities declined, so did the amount of remittances sent
by emigrant workers to their families.
4
Remittances from overseas workers and from domestic migrant workers
account for 14.8 percent of total household income and beneft three out of fve households in the Philippines. Of
those households that receive remittances, one-quarter live below the poverty line.
5
In 2008, remittances from
abroad grew by 13.8 percent, but they grew only modestly between January and August 2009 compared with same
period in 2008 (BSP, 2009). In particular, offcial data show that remittances from the Americas decreased over the
one and a half years between early 2008 and mid-2009 (Table 1). The crisis assessment survey has shown that the
reduction in global GDP has affected not only the remittances of overseas workers but also the number of workers
going abroad. The participants in the focus group discussions that were held as part of the crisis assessment
stated that remittances make up a large share of their household income and that all had experienced severe
decreases in the amount sent home by their migrant family members.
4 Overseas workers account for about 27 percent of the labor force and 11 percent of the population. Remittances from abroad accounted for around 10 percent
of GDP in 2008.
5 World Bank staff estimates using the 2006 Family Income and Expenditure Survey (NSO, 2006).
3

slowed down, Lhe number of workers ln Lhe manufacLurlna secLor decllned bv 1.3 percenL ln Aprll 2009,
whlle Lhe number of workers ln consLrucLlon and mlnlna lncreased bv 1.3 percenL compared wlLh Aprll
2008, as Lhe aovernmenL lnLroduced emeraencv measures Lo mlLlaaLe Lhe emplovmenL effecLs of Lhe
crlsls (nSC, 2009d).

1he Wor|d 8ank's cr|s|s assessment survey a|so |nd|cated that poor househo|ds have been h|t harder
than r|cher ones. 1he survev found LhaL, of Lhose who were currenLlv worklna (as of Mav 2009), 60
percenL of all workers ln Lhe boLLom socloeconomlc class suffered from elLher [ob loss, reduced salarv,
or decreased work hours ln Lhe prevlous Lhree monLhs, whereas of Lhose ln Lhe hlahesL socloeconomlc
class, onlv 13 percenL had been affecLed. 1he survev resulLs also suaaesL LhaL more Lhan half of Lhe
populaLlon (33 percenL) Lhlnk LhaL Lhev are worse off Lhan Lhev were a vear earller (11 percenL sav Lhev
are beLLer off and 31 percenL have experlenced no chanae). MosL llllplnos (70 percenL) blame hlaher
commodlLv prlces for Lhe deLerloraLlon ln Lhelr quallLv of llfe, whlch mav be aLLrlbuLable Lo Lhe recenL
food crlsls. lndlcaLlons LhaL Lhe alobal economlc crlsls has affecLed households were shown bv Lhe 11
percenL of respondenLs who LhaL clLed [ob loss ln Lhe famllv and Lhe 9 percenL LhaL reporLed reduced
lncome/ earnlnas as Lhe prlme reasons for Lhelr reduced quallLv of llfe. AbouL 83 percenL of llllplno
adulLs Lhlnk LhaL Lhe currenL economlc crlsls ls havlna a subsLanLlal lmpacL on Lhelr communlLv (World
8ank, 2009a).

Meanwh||e, as the number of overseas emp|oyment opportun|t|es dec||ned, so d|d the amount of
rem|ttances sent by em|grant workers to the|r fam|||es.
4
8emlLLances from overseas workers and from
domesLlc mlaranL workers accounL for 14.8 percenL of LoLal household lncome and beneflL Lhree ouL of
flve households ln Lhe hlllpplnes. Cf Lhose households LhaL recelve remlLLances, one-quarLer llve below
Lhe poverLv llne.
3
ln 2008, remlLLances from abroad arew bv 13.8 percenL, buL Lhev arew onlv modesLlv
beLween !anuarv and AuausL 2009 compared wlLh same perlod ln 2008 (8S, 2009). ln parLlcular, offlclal
daLa show LhaL remlLLances from Lhe Amerlcas decreased over Lhe one and a half vears beLween earlv
2008 and mld-2009 (1able 1). 1he crlsls assessmenL survev has shown LhaL Lhe reducLlon ln alobal Cu
has affecLed noL onlv Lhe remlLLances of overseas workers buL also Lhe number of workers aolna abroad.
1he parLlclpanLs ln Lhe focus aroup dlscusslons LhaL were held as parL of Lhe crlsls assessmenL sLaLed
LhaL remlLLances make up a larae share of Lhelr household lncome and LhaL all had experlenced severe
decreases ln Lhe amounL senL home bv Lhelr mlaranL famllv members.


1ab|e 1: G|oba| ear-on-year Growth of kem|ttances by 1r|mester
1oLal Asla Amerlcas Cceanla Lurope Mlddle LasL
11 08 14.3 16.6 13.2 32.2 19.3 3.0
12 08 19.8 11.9 29.9 20.6 6.8 3.7
13 08 7.3 37.3 -3.4 17.4 12.3 40.3
11 09 2.6 14.3 -1.6 14.3 4.2 6.0
"#$%&': nSC


4
Cverseas workers accounL for abouL 27 percenL of Lhe labor force and 11 percenL of Lhe populaLlon. 8emlLLances
from abroad accounLed for around 10 percenL of Cu ln 2008.
3
World 8ank sLaff esLlmaLes uslna Lhe 2006 lamllv lncome and LxpendlLure Survev (nSC, 2006).
4
The slower growth of remittances from abroad may not increase poverty since richer household tend to beneft
more from overseas remittances while poorer households tend to beneft more from domestic remittances.
Figure 4 shows the share of remittances from both domestic and overseas workers to total household income
disaggregated by income deciles. It confrms that poorer households receive a larger share of domestic remittances
than richer households while richer ones receive more remittances from overseas. This suggests that a reduction
in remittances from abroad is likely to affect rich rather than poor households. Simulations of the impact of a
reduction in total remittances suggest that a decrease in remittances from abroad and domestic sources by 10
percent increases poverty incidence by about 0.5 percentage points. Meanwhile, as the domestic labor market
slackens, remittances from domestic sources are also expected to fall. The crisis assessment survey showed that,
of the households that receive remittances from domestic migrant workers, about 30 percent reported that their
cash remittances had decreased (World Bank, 2009a).
The protracted effects of the global economic crisis could lead to a higher domestic unemployment and push
vulnerable households into poverty. The unemployment effects of the crisis due to low export demand and the
reduction in household income could eventually increase the number of Filipinos living below the poverty line.
Already, nearly half of all Filipino households are vulnerable to income shocks. The government has estimated
that 45 percent of Filipino households face the risk of falling into poverty and that the proportion of vulnerable
households is higher among the poor (91.6 percent) than the non-poor (27.0 percent) (NAPC and NSCB, 2006).
6
What
has been learned from the experience of previous economic crises, such as the 1997 Asian fnancial crisis and the
El Nino phenomenon, is that a substantial proportion of poor households are unable to protect themselves from
income shocks and even non-poor households can succumb immediately to the effects of crises (Reyes, 2002).
6 The estimates in NAPC and NSCB (2006) are based on 1997 Family Income and Expenditure Survey.
4

1he s|ower growth of rem|ttances from abroad may not |ncrease poverty s|nce r|cher househo|d tend
to benef|t more from overseas rem|ttances wh||e poorer househo|ds tend to benef|t more from
domest|c rem|ttances. llaure 4 shows Lhe share of remlLLances from boLh domesLlc and overseas
workers Lo LoLal household lncome dlsaaareaaLed bv lncome declles. lL conflrms LhaL poorer households
recelve a laraer share of domesLlc remlLLances Lhan rlcher households whlle rlcher ones recelve more
remlLLances from overseas. 1hls suaaesLs LhaL a reducLlon ln remlLLances from abroad ls llkelv Lo affecL
rlch raLher Lhan poor households. SlmulaLlons of Lhe lmpacL of a reducLlon ln LoLal remlLLances suaaesL
LhaL a decrease ln remlLLances from abroad and domesLlc sources bv 10 percenL lncreases poverLv
lncldence bv abouL 0.3 percenLaae polnLs. Meanwhlle, as Lhe domesLlc labor markeL slackens,
remlLLances from domesLlc sources are also expecLed Lo fall. 1he crlsls assessmenL survev showed LhaL,
of Lhe households LhaL recelve remlLLances from domesLlc mlaranL workers, abouL 30 percenL reporLed
LhaL Lhelr cash remlLLances had decreased (World 8ank, 2009a).

I|gure 4: 5hare of kem|ttances |n 1ota| nouseho|d Income (), by Income Dec||e

"#$%&': World 8ank sLaff calculaLlons based on 2006 llLS (nSC, 2006).

1he protracted effects of the g|oba| econom|c cr|s|s cou|d |ead to a h|gher domest|c unemp|oyment
and push vu|nerab|e househo|ds |nto poverty. 1he unemplovmenL effecLs of Lhe crlsls due Lo low
exporL demand and Lhe reducLlon ln household lncome could evenLuallv lncrease Lhe number of
llllplnos llvlna below Lhe poverLv llne. Alreadv, nearlv half of all llllplno households are vulnerable Lo
lncome shocks. 1he aovernmenL has esLlmaLed LhaL 43 percenL of llllplno households face Lhe rlsk of
falllna lnLo poverLv and LhaL Lhe proporLlon of vulnerable households ls hlaher amona Lhe poor (91.6
percenL) Lhan Lhe non-poor (27.0 percenL) (nAC and nSC8, 2006).
6
WhaL has been learned from Lhe
experlence of prevlous economlc crlses, such as Lhe 1997 Aslan flnanclal crlsls and Lhe Ll nlno
phenomenon, ls LhaL a subsLanLlal proporLlon of poor households are unable Lo proLecL Lhemselves from
lncome shocks and even non-poor households can succumb lmmedlaLelv Lo Lhe effecLs of crlses (8eves,
2002).

Iaced w|th shr|nk|ng |ncome, househo|ds take a var|ety of act|ons to cope w|th the econom|c cr|s|s.
1he crlsls assessmenL survev showed LhaL mosL households are flndlna wavs Lo cope wlLh Lhe economlc

6
1he esLlmaLes ln nAC and nSC8 (2006) are based on 1997 lamllv lncome and LxpendlLure Survev.
5
faced with shrinking income, households take a variety of actions to cope with the economic crisis. The crisis
assessment survey showed that most households are fnding ways to cope with the economic crisis and a majority
is choosing to reduce their household expenditures by reducing their food consumption or by replacing certain
food items with cheaper alternatives (Table 2). This coping strategy is particularly evident in poor households
as food accounts for as much as 90 percent of the total expenditures of these households.
7
Other households
cope by seeking additional jobs or fnding other sources of income to meet their basic needs, usually having to
take jobs that offer no labor protection. Households in urban and rural areas adopt similar coping strategies, but
urban dwellers more frequently resort to reducing their expenditure on transportation, gas, light, and water. Some
migrant workers consider going back to their home provinces to start up their own businesses or seeking work
oversees, although some have reported fnding it diffcult to fnd jobs abroad because of the global recession. Other
ways to cope include borrowing money from informal lenders (friends and relatives) and formal institutions, selling
assets, and reducing household expenditures on health and medical care as well as on childrens education (World
Bank, 2009a). For young workers, overseas migration is still an attractive option, but most agree that investing in
education is a more appropriate long-term strategy.
The employment effects of the global economic crisis are having a particularly harmful impact on female workers.
Export-oriented manufacturing industries in the Philippines such as electronics, garments, textiles, and footwear,
have a higher concentration of female workers than male workers, whereas male workers predominate in auto
manufacturing (Dejardin and Owens, 2009). The disproportionate share of female workers in these export-oriented
industries suggests that the contraction of global markets in these sectors will negatively affect female workers.
This seems to be borne out by the fact that unemployment rates for women workers increased from 6.6 percent in
October 2008 to 7.6 in July 2009, while unemployment rates for male workers increased only by 0.6 percentage points
7 World Bank staff estimates using the 2006 Family Income and Expenditures Survey (NSO, 2006)
5

crlsls and a ma[orlLv ls chooslna Lo reduce Lhelr household expendlLures bv reduclna Lhelr food
consumpLlon or bv replaclna cerLaln food lLems wlLh cheaper alLernaLlves (1able 2). 1hls coplna sLraLeav
ls parLlcularlv evldenL ln poor households as food accounLs for as much as 90 percenL of Lhe LoLal
expendlLures of Lhese households.
7
CLher households cope bv seeklna addlLlonal [obs or flndlna oLher
sources of lncome Lo meeL Lhelr baslc needs, usuallv havlna Lo Lake [obs LhaL offer no labor proLecLlon.
Pouseholds ln urban and rural areas adopL slmllar coplna sLraLeales, buL urban dwellers more frequenLlv
resorL Lo reduclna Lhelr expendlLure on LransporLaLlon, aas, llahL, and waLer. Some mlaranL workers
conslder aolna back Lo Lhelr home provlnces Lo sLarL up Lhelr own buslnesses or seeklna work oversees,
alLhouah some have reporLed flndlna lL dlfflculL Lo flnd [obs abroad because of Lhe alobal recesslon.
CLher wavs Lo cope lnclude borrowlna monev from lnformal lenders (frlends and relaLlves) and formal
lnsLlLuLlons, selllna asseLs, and reduclna household expendlLures on healLh and medlcal care as well as
on chlldren's educaLlon (World 8ank, 2009a). lor vouna workers, overseas mlaraLlon ls sLlll an aLLracLlve
opLlon, buL mosL aaree LhaL lnvesLlna ln educaLlon ls a more approprlaLe lona-Lerm sLraLeav. &
&
M2:3$&I>&P(7)$0(39)V&Z('*+,&Y#%2#$,*$)&FGH&
SLraLeales
All
Pouseholds
Pouseholds ln
urban Areas
Pouseholds ln
8ural Areas
8educe amounL of food consumpLlon 28.0 28.1 28.0
8eplace consumpLlon of food lLems wlLh cheaper alLernaLlve 23.2 23.8 22.7
Seek addlLlonal [obs or oLher sources of lncome 11.8 11.2 12.4
8educe expenses on LransporLaLlon, aas, llahL, and waLer 11.6 16.6 7.3
8orrow monev from relaLlves and frlends 6.3 3.9 7.0
8educe expenses on healLh and medlcal care 4.1 3.3 4.8
8orrow monev from flnanclal lnsLlLuLlons 3.9 2.8 4.9
Sell or pawn asseLs 2.7 1.7 3.3
WlLhdraw chlldren from school or posLpone enrollmenL 2.6 1.3 3.6
1ransfer chlldren Lo anoLher school wlLh lower fees 2.2 0.9 3.4
Send non-worklna famllv members ouL Lo work 1.9 2.2 1.6
8educe or use up savlnas 1.4 2.2 0.7
All households LhaL reporLed coplna sLraLeales 100.0 100.0 100.0
"#$%&': World 8ank (2009a)
&
M0$& $.'3(4.$+#& $""$-#)& ("& #0$& ,3(:23& $-(+(.*-& -%*)*)& 2%$& 021*+,& 2& '2%#*-732%34& 02%."73& *.'2-#& (+&
"$.23$& /(%U$%); LxporL-orlenLed manufacLurlna lndusLrles ln Lhe hlllpplnes such as elecLronlcs,
aarmenLs, LexLlles, and fooLwear, have a hlaher concenLraLlon of female workers Lhan male workers,
whereas male workers predomlnaLe ln auLo manufacLurlna (ue[ardln and Cwens, 2009). 1he
dlsproporLlonaLe share of female workers ln Lhese exporL-orlenLed lndusLrles suaaesLs LhaL Lhe
conLracLlon of alobal markeLs ln Lhese secLors wlll neaaLlvelv affecL female workers. 1hls seems Lo be
borne ouL bv Lhe facL LhaL unemplovmenL raLes for women workers lncreased from 6.6 percenL ln
CcLober 2008 Lo 7.6 ln !ulv 2009, whlle unemplovmenL raLes for male workers lncreased onlv bv 0.6
percenLaae polnLs durlna Lhe same perlod (nSC, 2009d). As mosL dlsplaced workers cannoL afford Lo
sLav unemploved, especlallv Lhose from poorer households, female workers mav resorL Lo lnformal pald
or unpald work and mav be wllllna Lo accepL [obs LhaL offer lower pav and fewer emplovees' beneflLs.
&
&

7
World 8ank sLaff esLlmaLes uslna Lhe 2006 lamllv lncome and LxpendlLures Survev (nSC, 2006)
6
during the same period (NSO, 2009d). As most displaced workers cannot afford to stay unemployed, especially
those from poorer households, female workers may resort to informal paid or unpaid work and may be willing to
accept jobs that offer lower pay and fewer employees benefts.
Governments response
To respond to the crisis, in february 2009, the government introduced a p330 billion (Us$6.9 billion) stimulus
package, which is equivalent to around 4 percent of Gdp.
8
The Economic Resiliency Plan (ERP) is the countrys
response to the global economic crisis. Almost half of the package (P160 billion) is accounted for by the nominal
increase in the governments budget for 2009 over that of 2008. This amount is indicatively allocated for small
infrastructure projects and the expansion of selected social protection programmes (Figure 5). Another P40 billion
consists of tax adjustments, including a scheduled reduction of corporate income taxes from 35 to 30 percent that
will allow frms to spend about P20 billion more in investments and an increased exemption in personal income tax
that will empower individuals to the tune of an estimated P20 billion. Around P100 billion will be invested in large
infrastructure projects by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), the Social Security System (SSS),
and government-owned and controlled corporations. The remaining P30 billion will come from the additional social
security benefts provided by the GSIS, the SSS, and the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PhilHealth)
(NEDA, 2009a). However, the government created no special crisis institution to coordinate the implementation of
the stimulus package.
To provide immediate jobs for displaced workers, the government frontloaded the spending on infrastructure
projects in the frst half of 2009. In early 2009, the government agencies that implement infrastructure projects
such as the Department of Public Works and Highways, the Department of Transportation and Communication,
the Department of Agriculture, and the Department of Education committed to frontload the spending of around
8 This report uses a currency conversion rate of US$1 = 48 Philippine pesos.
7
P95 billion (US$2 billion) worth of projects, which is equivalent to around 60 percent of the P160 billion (US$3.3
billion) component of the ERP. The construction of infrastructure projects was fast-tracked primarily to create jobs
for workers who were displaced as a result of the global economic crisis. These jobs include the construction,
repair, and rehabilitation of transport infrastructure such as highways and farm-to-market roads as well as school
buildings, including classrooms and school toilet facilities. By September 2009, 89 percent of the P95 billion had
been obligated, but only 46 percent has been disbursed.
9

The government also allocated more funds for the expansion and strengthening of social protection programmes.
The P160 billion (US$3.3 billion) component of the ERP also included increases in the budget for some of the countrys
social protection programmes, including the conditional cash transfer programme, the conditional commodity-
based transfer programme, the insurance subsidy for the poor, and training and scholarships. The government also
allocated more funds to improve the delivery of social services by, for example, hiring nurses to work in rural areas
and to improve the facilities and increase the manpower of primary and secondary hospitals. Moreover, to improve
the targeting of poor households, the government increased the budget for implementing a national household
targeting system.

as the crisis necessitated an increase in government spending, the government decided to forego its plan to close
the national government budget defcit by 2010. While the signifcant fscal consolidation and the fscal reform
undertaken by the government between 2003 and 2007 had produced positive results, the gains were not sustained
over time due to the rise in spending pressures since 2008. For the frst half of 2009, the national government has
recorded a defcit of 4.3 percent of GDP, which is higher than the average defcit-to-GDP ratio of 2.2 percent that
prevailed between 2003 and 2008. The slowing economy along with the sharp contraction in collections of import
taxes by the Bureau of Customs, the recent cuts in personal income tax in July 2008 and in corporate income tax
in January 2009 are all among the factors that have contributed to the slowdown in revenue generation (World
Bank, 2009b).
monitoring
monitoring the impact of the crisis has been a challenge because of a lack of up-to-date household survey data.
The National Statistics Offce (NSO) conducts household surveys but only at long intervals, and the surveys do not
collect information on some of the best variables for evaluating the impact of the crisis.
10
For instance, the NSO
conducts a quarterly Labor Force Survey (LFS), the preliminary aggregated results of which are published online
45 days after the data have been enumerated. The results of the LFS are generally not disaggregated by gender,
which makes it diffcult to conduct deep analysis of the gender effects of the crisis. Data on unemployment are
also collected by several private companies such as Social Weather Stations (SWS) and Pulse Asia on a quarterly
basis. However, these numbers are only of limited use since they are not directly comparable with the offcial
LFS results for several reasons, among the most important of which is their limited sample sizes. Moreover, just
9 Calculated based on fgures contained in NEDA (2009b).
10 Other data sources on employment other than the LFS include the following: (a) Survey on Overseas Filipinos, done every year (b) Labor Turnover Survey, every
quarter and (c) Bureau of Labor Employment Statistics Integrated Survey, every two years.
8
as in other countries, there is no single government agency that observes and monitors the social impact of the
economic and fnancial crisis, but the government is taking steps to strengthen this capacity.
II. socIal proTecTIon proGrammes aT The onseT of The crIsIs
The philippine government is implementing 66 different social protection programmes that exist to protect filipinos
against lifecycle, economic, social, and environmental risks. The governments social protection programmes
aim to reduce poverty and vulnerability to risks and to enhance the social status and rights of the marginalized
by promoting and protecting their livelihoods, by protecting them against hazards and sudden losses of income,
and by increasing their capacity to manage risks.
11
Since July 2009, the government has been implementing social
protection programmes that address four types of risk: (i) lifecycle risks, which include hunger and malnutrition,
illness, injury, disability, old age, and death; (ii) economic risks, which include the lack of a source of livelihood,
low income, unemployment, underemployment, economic crises or transitions, and the high prices of basic
goods; (iii) social risks arising from exclusion or marginalization, a lack of social investments, the loss of family
care, homelessness, and manmade disasters; and (iv) environmental risks, which pertain to natural calamities
(DAP, 2009).
12

The social protection programmes are integrated into various sectors and are being implemented by 21 different
government agencies. However, as most social protection programmes are cross-sectoral (in other words,
cover, for example, labor, education, and health issues), several departments are involved in implementing those
programmes that address various types of risks. The 21 government agencies implement from as few as one to as
many as 15 social protection programmes, either alone or in partnership with other government agencies. While
most of the programmes are directly relevant to the agencys mandate (core programmes), several are considered
as support (in that they complement or augment existing programmes) or peripheral (they make a minor contribution
to the agencys mandate). Among these agencies, the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD)
implements the highest number of social protection programmes (15 out of the 66). There are cases when several
agencies address one type of risk, which can result in an overlap of benefciaries and a duplication of provision
of social protection services. For instance, there are about 12 agencies that implement programmes that address
the risks associated with the lack of a source of livelihood, low income, unemployment, and underemployment
(DAP, 2009).
social insurance programmes, which are meant to mitigate income shocks by pooling resources and spreading
risks across time and socioeconomic groups do not reach the majority of filipinos. The Social Security System
(SSS) and Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) are the two main agencies providing social insurance
in the Philippines. In addition, there are fve other agencies implementing social insurance programmes covering
three major areas: (i) social security benefts and employees compensation (mainly provided for private and public
11 The offcial defnition of social protection was adopted in 2007 by the National Economic and Development Authoritys Social Development Committee in
Resolution No. 1 Series of 2007.
12 Based on the Review and Strengthening of the National Social Protection and Welfare Programme, which is the governments quick assessment of social
protection programmes in the Philippines undertaken by the Development Academy of the Philippines in collaboration with the National Economic and
Development Authority, the Department of Social Welfare and Development, and the National Social Welfare Programme.
9
sector workers by the SSS and the GSIS respectively); (ii) health insurance (mainly provided by PhilHealth); and
(iii) agricultural insurance (mainly provided by the Philippine Crop Insurance Corporation). Currently, there are
over 20 social insurance programmes, all of which are designed in such a way that benefciaries pay a premium
over a given period of time to cover or protect themselves from loss of income due to health and employment or
livelihood-related hazards.
13
Nevertheless, the coverage rate of these programmes is low. In 2008 the contributing
members of the SSS and the GSIS accounted for only 32.1 percent of the employed population while PhilHealths
contributory programmes covered only 40 percent of the total number of employed population (Manasan, 2009a).
Informal sector workers, who account for about one-third of the labor force, have little or no access to social
insurance programmes as most of them are excluded from many provisions (DAP, 2009).
social protection programmes in the philippines are inadequately funded, especially compared with other
developing countries. Government spending on social protection accounted for 0.4 percent of GDP in 2007 and
went up to 1.1 percent of GDP in 2008 in response to food and fuel crisis. However, a large share of this spending
was allocated to the operation of the rice price subsidy programme of the National Food Authority (NFA), which
accounted for 50 percent and 73 percent of government spending on social protection in 2007 and 2008 respectively
(Manasan, 2009b). In a non-crisis year such as 2007, government spending of 0.4 percent of GDP on social protection
is low compared with what is spent in other developing countries. Some Southeast Asian countries are estimated
to spend about 0.5 to 1.2 percent of GDP on social protection, while many Latin American and South Asian countries
are estimated to spend 2.9 percent and 1.5 percent of their GDP respectively (Besley et al, 2003) (Figure 6).
14
Another
study has shown that mean spending on safety nets in 87 developing and transition countries is 1.9 percent of GDP
(Weigand and Grosh, 2008).
13 All are contributory programmes except for the health insurance subsidy for the poor operated by PhilHealth in which premiums are jointly paid for the
national government (through PhilHealth) and sponsors (such as local governments, private individuals, or private corporations).
14 Social protection spending in Besley et al (2003) covers social security and welfare, while Manasan (2009b) covers the key non-contributory social protection
programmes, including active labor market programmes and community-driven development projects. Besley et al (2003) contains no estimates of spending for
social security and welfare for the Philippines.
9

5oc|a| protect|on programs |n the h|||pp|nes are |nadequate|y funded, espec|a||y compared w|th
other deve|op|ng countr|es. CovernmenL spendlna on soclal proLecLlon accounLed for 0.4 percenL of
Cu ln 2007 and wenL up Lo 1.1 percenL of Cu ln 2008 ln response Lo food and fuel crlsls. Powever, a
larae share of Lhls spendlna was allocaLed Lo Lhe operaLlon of Lhe rlce prlce subsldv proaram of Lhe
naLlonal lood AuLhorlLv (nlA), whlch accounLed for 30 percenL and 73 percenL of aovernmenL spendlna
on soclal proLecLlon ln 2007 and 2008 respecLlvelv (Manasan, 2009b). ln a non-crlsls vear such as 2007,
aovernmenL spendlna of 0.4 percenL of Cu on soclal proLecLlon ls low compared wlLh whaL ls spenL ln
oLher developlna counLrles. Some SouLheasL Aslan counLrles are esLlmaLed Lo spend abouL 0.3 Lo 1.2
percenL of Cu on soclal proLecLlon, whlle manv LaLln Amerlcan and SouLh Aslan counLrles are
esLlmaLed Lo spend 2.9 percenL and 1.3 percenL of Lhelr Cu respecLlvelv (8eslev eL al, 2003) (llaure
6).
14
AnoLher sLudv has shown LhaL mean spendlna on safeLv neLs ln 87 developlna and LranslLlon
counLrles ls 1.9 percenL of Cu (Welaand and Crosh, 2008).

I|gure 6: Lst|mates of Government 5pend|ng on 5oc|a| rotect|on ( of GD)


Desp|te the numerous programs that are |n p|ace |n the h|||pp|nes, the|r effect|veness |s
comprom|sed by poor target|ng, wh|ch resu|ts |n h|gh |eakage rates. A number of soclal proLecLlon
proarams, parLlcularlv Lhose LhaL comprlse Lhe laraesL porLlon of aovernmenL spendlna, are
characLerlzed bv hlah leakaae raLes (Lhe proporLlon of proaram beneflclarles LhaL are classlfled as non-
poor). 1he nlA rlce prlce subsldv, whlch ls sLlll Lhe proaram wlLh Lhe hlahesL esLlmaLed cosLs even afLer
Lhe food crlsls, ls a unlversal consumer prlce subsldv LhaL, bv deslan, also beneflLs Lhe non-poor. lL ls
esLlmaLed LhaL 41 percenL of Lhe LoLal nlA rlce subsldv aoes Lo non-poor and, across lncome declles, Lhe
pooresL households consume onlv 14 percenL whlle Lhe wealLhlesL households consume around 2
percenL of nlA rlce (llaure 7).
13
roarams such as Lhe 40.205)6! 7$%+'.2'3 a one-Llme cash Lransfer for
llfellne power consumers durlna Lhe fuel crlsls, Lhe lood-for-School roaram (lS), a condlLlonal
commodlLv-based Lransfer, and Lhe lnsurance subsldv for Lhe poor under Lhe hllPealLh's naLlonal
PealLh lnsurance roaram (nPl) also suffer from hlah leakaae raLes due Lo weaknesses ln Lhelr
LaraeLlna meLhodoloales. Powever, recenL aLLempLs Lo lmprove Lhe LaraeLlna svsLem have produced
poslLlve resulLs. 8eflecLlna Lhe aovernmenL's commlLmenL Lo sLrenaLhenlna lLs soclal proLecLlon svsLem,
Lhe CperaLlonal Culdellnes for Lhe lS were revlsed ln 2008 Lo lmprove lLs aeoaraphlc LaraeLlna of Lhe

14
Soclal proLecLlon spendlna ln 8eslev eL al (2003) covers soclal securlLv and welfare, whlle Manasan (2009b)
covers Lhe kev non-conLrlbuLorv soclal proLecLlon proarams, lncludlna acLlve labor markeL proarams and
communlLv-drlven developmenL pro[ecLs. 8eslev eL al (2003) conLalns no esLlmaLes of spendlna for soclal securlLv
and welfare for Lhe hlllpplnes.
13
World 8ank sLaff esLlmaLes based on Lhe 2006 lamllv lncome and LxpendlLure Survev (nSC, 2006).
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
Laun
Amerlcan
CounLrles
SouLh Aslan
CounLrles
Malavsla lndonesla 1halland Slnaapore hlllpplnes*
"#$%&',: 8eslev eL al (2003) for all counLrles excepL hlllpplnes, whlch ls esLlmaLed from Manasan
(2009b).
10
despite the numerous programmes that are in place in the philippines, their effectiveness is compromised by poor
targeting, which results in high leakage rates. A number of social protection programmes, particularly those that
comprise the largest portion of government spending, are characterized by high leakage rates (the proportion of
programme benefciaries that are classifed as non-poor). The NFA rice price subsidy, which is still the programme
with the highest estimated costs even after the food crisis, is a universal consumer price subsidy that, by design,
also benefts the non-poor. It is estimated that 41 percent of the total NFA rice subsidy goes to non-poor and,
across income deciles, the poorest households consume only 14 percent while the wealthiest households consume
around 2 percent of NFA rice (Figure 7).
15
Programmes such as the Pantawid Kuryente, a one-time cash transfer for
lifeline power consumers during the fuel crisis, the Food-for-School Program (FSP), a conditional commodity-based
transfer, and the insurance subsidy for the poor under the PhilHealths National Health Insurance Programme
(NHIP) also suffer from high leakage rates due to weaknesses in their targeting methodologies. However, recent
attempts to improve the targeting system have produced positive results. Refecting the governments commitment
to strengthening its social protection system, the Operational Guidelines for the FSP were revised in 2008 to
improve its geographic targeting of the poor. In the case of the conditional cash transfer programme, the Pantawid
Pamilyang Pilipino Programme (4Ps), a proxy means test (PMT) targeting methodology is now being used to select
its benefciaries. From international experience, the PMT methodology has the benefts of being objectively based
and of having low inclusion error rates (in other words, the inclusion of the non-poor). Meanwhile, the government
has indicated that it plans to adopt the PMT-based targeting system to select the benefciaries of the NHIPs
insurance subsidy for the poor.
recently, there has been a gradual shift in the focus of social protection programmes from subsidies and
commodity-based transfers to cash-based transfer programmes. For several decades, the NFA rice price
15 World Bank staff estimates based on the 2006 Family Income and Expenditure Survey (NSO, 2006).
11
subsidy has been the mainstay of the governments portfolio of social protection interventions and has been
used to respond to crises such as the food price shock in 2008. Likewise, commodity-based transfers such as
the FSP have been used to mitigate the negative impact on welfare of the food crisis, particularly for the poor.
Recently, however, there has been an evident shift in focus in the range of social protection programmes
from subsidies and commodity-based transfer programmes to cash-based transfers such as the 4Ps (Figure
8). While the NFA rice price subsidy remains signifcant in terms of government spending, the conditional cash
transfer programme has gained dramatic recognition as an effective mechanism to supplement the income of
the poorest households while also supporting their human capital development. Even at the height of the food
crisis, the government already recognized the cost-effectiveness and fexibility of cash for the quick delivery of
assistance to poorer households to cope with economic shocks. In addition to the 4Ps, the government introduced
several cash transfers during the food crisis including Pantawid Kuryente (the one-time cash transfer for
lifeline power consumers) and Tulong Para Kay Lolo and Lola (a P500 cash transfer for people aged 60 years
or older who do not receive old age benefts). Cash transfers are the most direct type of intervention designed
to support the poor and offer more advantages than food transfers. In particular, providing cash transfers
is a much less costly operation once the administrative system is in place than providing assistance in kind
(Grosh et al, 2008).
III. adjUsTmenTs made To socIal proTecTIon proGrammes In response To The crIsIs
The government has increased its budget for social protection programmes to cushion the effects of the global
economic crisis. Recognizing the need to protect the poor and the most vulnerable from the adverse effects of the
crisis, the government has made signifcant adjustments to its social protection programmes, particularly in terms
of budget. Funding support for the conditional cash transfer programme (the 4Ps) was signifcantly increased from
12
P1.3 billion in 2008 to P15 billion in 2009.
16
Likewise, funding support for the conditional commodity-based transfer
(the FSP) was increased from P3.3 billion in 2008 to P4.8 billion in 2009.
17
Among other increases in funding support
included the premium subsidy for the poor under the NHIP and the enhancement of health facilities programme
being undertaken by the Department of Health (DOH) (Figure 9).
18
The allocated funds for NFA operations were also
increased from P2 billion in 2008 to P4 billion in 2009, but off-budget releases for the NFA to account for the implicit
cost of its operations decreased from an estimated amount of P58.9 billion in 2008 to P27.2 billion in 2009.
The coverage of the conditional cash transfer programme was signifcantly expanded to cover more poor
households. As discussed in the previous section, the 4Ps has been signifcantly expanded to mitigate the negative
impact of the global economic crisis. The 4Ps provides grants to eligible household benefciaries to improve their
health, nutrition, and education, particularly of children aged 0 to 14 years old, as long as the households comply
with certain conditions. The programme started in 2007 with 20,000 household benefciaries and budgetary support
of P50 million. In response to the food and fuel crisis in mid-2008 and the global economic crisis that affected
the domestic economy towards the end of the year, the government signifcantly expanded the programme to
cover 376,000 households and provided P1.3 billion to the programme. In 2009, the government decided to increase
the number of household benefciaries to 1 million households to cover around 20 percent of the countrys poor
population and increased the budget to P15 billion (Figure 10).
16 Under the General Appropriations Act (GAA), the government allocated P298.6 million for the 4Ps in 2008 and P5 billion in 2009. In addition, the government
provided an additional P998.6 million for the expansion of the programme in 2008, and P10 billion additional funds are expected to be provided to the
programme to cover 1 million households in 2009.
17 The allocated amount for the FSP in 2008 was P766 million for the DSWD component and P2.5 billion for the DepEd component under the GAA. In 2009, it
was increased to P1.8 billion for the DSWD component and P3 billion for the DepEd component (which refers to the rice component of the Malusog na Simula
Yaman ng Bansa Programme under the National Nutrition Council).
18 As refected in the budgets in the General Appropriations Act of 2008 and 2009 for the NHIP, the DOH,, and the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) (DBM, 2009).
12




I|gure 9: 8udgetary Increases |n 5e|ected 5oc|a| rotect|on rograms (In b||||on pesos)


1he coverage of the cond|t|ona| cash transfer program was s|gn|f|cant|y expanded to cover more poor
househo|ds. As dlscussed ln Lhe prevlous secLlon, Lhe 4s has been slanlflcanLlv expanded Lo mlLlaaLe
Lhe neaaLlve lmpacL of Lhe alobal economlc crlsls. 1he 4s provldes aranLs Lo ellalble household
beneflclarles Lo lmprove Lhelr healLh, nuLrlLlon, and educaLlon, parLlcularlv of chlldren aaed 0 Lo 14 vears
old, as lona as Lhe households complv wlLh cerLaln condlLlons. 1he proaram sLarLed ln 2007 wlLh 20,000
household beneflclarles and budaeLarv supporL of 30 mllllon. ln response Lo Lhe food and fuel crlsls ln
mld-2008 and Lhe alobal economlc crlsls LhaL affecLed Lhe domesLlc economv Lowards Lhe end of Lhe
vear, Lhe aovernmenL slanlflcanLlv expanded Lhe proaram Lo cover 376,000 households and provlded
1.3 bllllon Lo Lhe proaram. ln 2009, Lhe aovernmenL declded Lo lncrease Lhe number of household
beneflclarles Lo 1 mllllon households Lo cover around 20 percenL of Lhe counLrv's poor populaLlon and
lncreased Lhe budaeL Lo 13 bllllon (llaure 10).

I|gure 10: Lxpans|on of the Cond|t|ona| Cash 1ransfer rogram, 2007-2009


5ome programs that were or|g|na||y created to prov|de cash re||ef to househo|ds to m|t|gate the sharp
|ncreases resu|t|ng from the food and fue| cr|s|s were extended to cover those affected by the g|oba|
econom|c cr|s|s. Cne of Lhe proarams creaLed ln 2008 ln response Lo Lhe food and fuel crlsls was Lhe
cash Lransfer, :$(#.8! 40%0! 70+! ;#(#! 0.6! ;#(0, whlch was lnLended Lo provlde cash rellef Lo quallfled
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
uSWu anLawld amllvana lllplno roaram
nPl lndlaenL roaram
uSWu/uepLd lood-for-School roaram
uCP PealLh laclllues LnhancemenL roaram
2008
2009
0
200,000
400,000
600,000
800,000
1,000,000
1,200,000
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
12.0
14.0
16.0
2007 2008 2009
n
o
.

o
f

L
a
r
a
e
L
e
d

b
e
n
e

c
l
a
r
l
e
s

l
u
n
d
l
n
a

S
u
p
p
o
r
L

(
l
n

b
l
l
l
l
o
n

p
e
s
o
s
)

lundlna supporL
no. of LaraeLed beneclarles
"#$%&',: varlous aovernmenL aaencles
Source: uSWu
13
some programmes that were originally created to provide cash relief to households to mitigate the sharp increases
resulting from the food and fuel crisis were extended to cover those affected by the global economic crisis. One
of the programmes created in 2008 in response to the food and fuel crisis was the cash transfer, Tulong Para Kay
Lolo and Lola, which was intended to provide cash relief to qualifed senior citizens (aged 70 and over) who had
no regular income and were not covered by social security or any other government beneft. Funded from oil VAT
receipts, the program was implemented nationwide to meet the needs of poor senior citizens and to recognize their
contribution to the country. The programme initially targeted 1 million benefciaries but was expanded to reach as
many as 1.37 million senior citizens by the end of 2009. Some of the funding support to expand the programme was
taken from the excess funds allotted for the Pantawid Kuryente, which ended in December 2008.
expanding the social protection system also involved introducing interventions to mitigate the employment effects
of the global economic crisis. To create more jobs and, at the same time, to improve the delivery of health care
services, in February 2009, the government launched the Nurses Assigned in Rural Service (NARS) Programme
to create jobs for unemployed nurses and improve health service delivery in rural areas. The NARS Programme,
which employs about 10 registered nurses to be deployed in each of the 1,000 poorest municipalities for a period of
six months, is estimated to cost P480 million.
19
By June 2009, the government had deployed 4,046 registered nurses
in the selected municipalities. The programme, while creating jobs for a large number of unemployed nurses, also
aims to accelerate progress towards meeting the Millennium Development Goals, which has been slow so far
given the high maternal mortality rate in the country and the low proportion of births that are attended by skilled
health personnel.
20

In addition, the government has coordinated all emergency employment and livelihood programmes that would
generate jobs for displaced workers. Recognizing the need to generate emergency employment, in October
19 World Bank staff estimates based on the P8,000 per nurse per month honorarium provided by the government.
20 The number of maternal deaths per 100,000 live births was 162 in 2006, while the proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel was 72.9 percent
in 2007. Both of these statistics are behind the MDG targets of 52.3 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births and 100 percent respectively (NSCB, 2009b).
12




I|gure 9: 8udgetary Increases |n 5e|ected 5oc|a| rotect|on rograms (In b||||on pesos)


1he coverage of the cond|t|ona| cash transfer program was s|gn|f|cant|y expanded to cover more poor
househo|ds. As dlscussed ln Lhe prevlous secLlon, Lhe 4s has been slanlflcanLlv expanded Lo mlLlaaLe
Lhe neaaLlve lmpacL of Lhe alobal economlc crlsls. 1he 4s provldes aranLs Lo ellalble household
beneflclarles Lo lmprove Lhelr healLh, nuLrlLlon, and educaLlon, parLlcularlv of chlldren aaed 0 Lo 14 vears
old, as lona as Lhe households complv wlLh cerLaln condlLlons. 1he proaram sLarLed ln 2007 wlLh 20,000
household beneflclarles and budaeLarv supporL of 30 mllllon. ln response Lo Lhe food and fuel crlsls ln
mld-2008 and Lhe alobal economlc crlsls LhaL affecLed Lhe domesLlc economv Lowards Lhe end of Lhe
vear, Lhe aovernmenL slanlflcanLlv expanded Lhe proaram Lo cover 376,000 households and provlded
1.3 bllllon Lo Lhe proaram. ln 2009, Lhe aovernmenL declded Lo lncrease Lhe number of household
beneflclarles Lo 1 mllllon households Lo cover around 20 percenL of Lhe counLrv's poor populaLlon and
lncreased Lhe budaeL Lo 13 bllllon (llaure 10).

I|gure 10: Lxpans|on of the Cond|t|ona| Cash 1ransfer rogram, 2007-2009


5ome programs that were or|g|na||y created to prov|de cash re||ef to househo|ds to m|t|gate the sharp
|ncreases resu|t|ng from the food and fue| cr|s|s were extended to cover those affected by the g|oba|
econom|c cr|s|s. Cne of Lhe proarams creaLed ln 2008 ln response Lo Lhe food and fuel crlsls was Lhe
cash Lransfer, :$(#.8! 40%0! 70+! ;#(#! 0.6! ;#(0, whlch was lnLended Lo provlde cash rellef Lo quallfled
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
uSWu anLawld amllvana lllplno roaram
nPl lndlaenL roaram
uSWu/uepLd lood-for-School roaram
uCP PealLh laclllues LnhancemenL roaram
2008
2009
0
200,000
400,000
600,000
800,000
1,000,000
1,200,000
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
12.0
14.0
16.0
2007 2008 2009
n
o
.

o
f

L
a
r
a
e
L
e
d

b
e
n
e

c
l
a
r
l
e
s

l
u
n
d
l
n
a

S
u
p
p
o
r
L

(
l
n

b
l
l
l
l
o
n

p
e
s
o
s
)

lundlna supporL
no. of LaraeLed beneclarles
"#$%&',: varlous aovernmenL aaencles
Source: uSWu
14
2008 the government launched the Comprehensive Livelihood and Emergency Employment Programme (CLEEP),
which consolidated about 35 existing government programmes and projects that required immediate manpower.
The agencies involved in the implementation of the CLEEP allocated a total of about P13.7 billion (US$285 million),
of which 59 percent had been obligated by September 2009. The jobs generated under the CLEEP include the
construction and maintenance of farm-to-market roads and the repair and rehabilitation of irrigation facilities,
among others. In 2009, CLEEP is expected to generate as many as 251,017 jobs and employ as many as 465,945
individuals. By September 2009, the programme had already created 197,435 jobs and employed 328,262 individuals
(NAPC, 2009).
cleep also includes some of the governments pre-existing social protection programmes, particularly those
that generate employment and provide livelihoods. For instance, the Self-Employment Assistance - Kaunlaran
(SEA-K) Programme, a community-based microfnance project aimed at building the capacity of community level
organizations to self-administer the provision of socialized credit, which is an existing social protection programme,
is also one the programmes under CLEEP. Another is the Out-of-School Youth Serving towards Economic Recovery
(OYSTER) project, which aims to provide employment to young people who are both out of school and out of work
to work on the maintenance of roadsides and carriageways of national roads and highways, bridges, and other
transport infrastructure projects.
Iv. polIcy IssUes
for several years, the government has put a high priority on protecting the poor but the recent crises have compelled
it to accelerate its efforts to strengthen the social protection system. Even before the onset of the recent crises,
pro-poor programmes have been deeply embedded in the administrations development plans. The Philippines has
succeeded in reducing poverty from almost half of the population in 1991 (45.3 percent) to about one-third in 2006
(32.9 percent), although this performance is quite weak compared to other countries in the region (NSCB, 2009b and
Balisacan, 2009). In recent years, the government has given increased attention to reforming the social protection
system. In 2007, the government, through the DSWD, put in place the four main building blocks for developing
a sound social protection programme in the Philippines: (i) develop a social protection strategy; (ii) develop an
accurate mechanism for targeting the poor; (iii) pilot a strategy for conditional cash transfer programmes; and
(iv) ensure the systems and infrastructure have the capacity and fexibility to respond quickly to disasters. Just
when the government was initiating these reforms, the food and fuel crisis and the global economic crisis hit
the Philippines, which made it imperative for the government to re-double its efforts and accelerate its reforms.
In 2008, the government created the inter-agency National Social Welfare and Protection Cluster to consolidate
programmes of various government agencies into a single, national social welfare strategy.
21
Over the longer term,
this inter-agency programme is expected to reallocate resources from less effective programmes to more effective
social protection programmes.
21 The Administrative Order (AO) No. 232 was issued by the President on July 8, 2008, which brought together the government agencies dealing with social
welfare into a National Social Welfare Programme. The President later issued another AO on July 28, 2008 (AO No. 232-A), which strengthened the cluster by
including more agencies and assigning the responsibility for coordination to the DSWD.
15
one of the key issues that the government plans to address in its reform is the fragmented and uncoordinated
delivery of social protection programmes. The various reviews and assessments of social protection programmes
in the Philippines have highlighted the lack of policy and institutional coordination in the broad area of social
protection. Because each government ministry operates under its own mandate, social protection programmes
tend to be uncoordinated and are often implemented in an ad hoc manner. Some social protection programmes
are short-lived as they are contingent on the priorities of whatever administration happens to be in offce. As there
are several interventions that address the same risks, it is very likely that there is some overlapping of benefts
and double-counting of benefciaries (DAP, 2009 and ADB, 2007). With a view to improving the delivery of social
protection services, the government has now created a social protection framework that lays out the strategies
for enhancing coordination among programmes and improving the delivery of social protection services. In
addition, it has conducted an assessment of its existing social protection programmes with a view to scaling up
and reallocating resources to the most effective and effcient ones. It is crucial that the government follow through
with the implementation of this effort.
The government recognizes that the benefts from social protection programmes are not being fully realized
because of the absence of a legitimate and functional system for targeting the poorest households. As discussed
in Section II, some of the countrys major social protection programmes suffer from high leakage rates. In
recognition of this issue, the government has established a National Household Targeting System for Poverty
Reduction (NHTS-PR), which is a systematic and objective targeting system (using the PMT methodology) that
includes a standardized database of poor households. The NHTS-PR is expected to target only poor households,
thus enhancing the poverty-reducing impact of its social protection programmes. In the case of the NFA rice price
subsidy, estimates have shown that the poverty reduction impact of this programme during the food crisis could
have been more signifcant if the rice had been made available only to poor households (targeted) rather than
to all households (untargeted). Given the same programme budget, the NFA rice price subsidy would reduced
poverty incidence by 4.7 percentage points, the income gap by 3.1 percentage points, and poverty severity by 1.3
percentage points if only poor households beneftted from the programme (Figure 11). It would be benefcial if all
government agencies that implement social protection programmes use the targeting database to select their
benefciaries. In July 2009, the DSWD endorsed a draft Executive Order to the Offce of the President asking for
the NHTS-PR to be adopted as a mechanism for identifying those eligible to beneft from government programmes
and services to reduce leakages. Currently, the Department of Health is considering using the NHTS-PR poverty
database to target its health insurance programme for the poor. This would be an important positive step forward
in improving the targeting of national programmes.
16
although subsidies and commodity-based transfers are still a signifcant component of the social protection
system, the government has begun to put more emphasis on conditional cash transfers than in previous years. In
general, subsidizing commodities distort marketing and production incentives as this creates a parallel infrastructure
that crowds out private trade or preempts its development. In addition, the costs required to administer price
stabilization programmes are high as they involve large administrative structures and their budgets are hard to
control given the fuctuations in the international price of the commodity.
22
The alternative providing commodity-
based transfers is also problematic because of the diffculty in targeting only the intended benefciaries, which
can result in high leakage rates. Another alternative providing the commodity directly to the consumer limits
consumers immediate choices, and the procurement, transport, and distribution of food can potentially create
distortions in food markets. The action that the government recently took to signifcantly increase the budget and
coverage of 4Ps has indicated a shift of preference towards cash-based transfer programmes. The 4Ps is a basic
needs-based social assistance programme for the chronically poor with children and encourages the formation of
human capital among the young as a means of breaking the inter-generational cycle of poverty.
The government has also recognized the need for a unifed monitoring and evaluation system for its social
protection programmes. As in other developing countries, several social protection programmes in the Philippines
lack built-in monitoring and evaluation components, which makes it diffcult to evaluate whether they have achieved
their objectives and intended outcomes. Impact evaluation can be used to improve the programme and enhance
its performance. It also helps the government to be able to devise future programme budgets based on empirical
evidence. The government has taken a positive step in the direction of adopting monitoring and evaluation systems
for it SP programmes. The DSWD is planning to undertake a rigorous impact evaluation of the 4Ps, which could
usefully be replicated for more of the governments social protection programmes.
22 Estimates show that it costs the NFA P3 to P8.6 for every peso-equivalent given to the poor through the rice subsidy programme (World Bank, 2009c).
15

more slanlflcanL lf Lhe rlce had been made avallable onlv Lo poor households (LaraeLed) raLher Lhan Lo all
households (unLaraeLed). Clven Lhe same proaram budaeL, Lhe nlA rlce prlce subsldv would reduced
poverLv lncldence bv 4.7 percenLaae polnLs, Lhe lncome aap bv 3.1 percenLaae polnLs, and poverLv
severlLv bv 1.3 percenLaae polnLs lf onlv poor households beneflLLed from Lhe proaram (llaure 11). lL
would be beneflclal lf all aovernmenL aaencles LhaL lmplemenL soclal proLecLlon proarams use Lhe
LaraeLlna daLabase Lo selecL Lhelr beneflclarles. ln !ulv 2009, Lhe uSWu endorsed a drafL LxecuLlve Crder
Lo Lhe Cfflce of Lhe resldenL asklna for Lhe nP1S-8 Lo be adopLed as a mechanlsm for ldenLlfvlna Lhose
ellalble Lo beneflL from aovernmenL proarams and servlces Lo reduce leakaaes. CurrenLlv, Lhe
ueparLmenL of PealLh ls conslderlna uslna Lhe nP1S-8 poverLv daLabase Lo LaraeL lLs healLh lnsurance
proaram for Lhe poor. 1hls would be an lmporLanL poslLlve sLep forward ln lmprovlna Lhe LaraeLlna of
naLlonal proarams.

I|gure 11: Impact of NIA k|ce r|ce 5ubs|dy on Intended 8enef|c|ar|es ()


A|though subs|d|es and commod|ty-based transfers are st||| a s|gn|f|cant component of the soc|a|
protect|on system, the government has begun to put more emphas|s on cond|t|ona| cash transfers
than |n prev|ous years. ln aeneral, subsldlzlna commodlLles dlsLorL markeLlna and producLlon lncenLlves
as Lhls creaLes a parallel lnfrasLrucLure LhaL crowds ouL prlvaLe Lrade or preempLs lLs developmenL. ln
addlLlon, Lhe cosLs requlred Lo admlnlsLer prlce sLablllzaLlon proarams are hlah as Lhev lnvolve larae
admlnlsLraLlve sLrucLures and Lhelr budaeLs are hard Lo conLrol alven Lhe flucLuaLlons ln Lhe
lnLernaLlonal prlce of Lhe commodlLv.
22
1he alLernaLlve - provldlna commodlLv-based Lransfers - ls also
problemaLlc because of Lhe dlfflculLv ln LaraeLlna onlv Lhe lnLended beneflclarles, whlch can resulL ln
hlah leakaae raLes. AnoLher alLernaLlve - provldlna Lhe commodlLv dlrecLlv Lo Lhe consumer - llmlLs
consumers' lmmedlaLe cholces, and Lhe procuremenL, LransporL, and dlsLrlbuLlon of food can poLenLlallv
creaLe dlsLorLlons ln food markeLs. 1he acLlon LhaL Lhe aovernmenL recenLlv Look Lo slanlflcanLlv
lncrease Lhe budaeL and coveraae of 4s has lndlcaLed a shlfL of preference Lowards cash-based Lransfer
proarams. 1he 4s ls a baslc needs-based soclal asslsLance proaram for Lhe chronlcallv poor wlLh
chlldren and encouraaes Lhe formaLlon of human caplLal amona Lhe vouna as a means of breaklna Lhe
lnLer-aeneraLlonal cvcle of poverLv.

1he government has a|so recogn|zed the need for a un|f|ed mon|tor|ng and eva|uat|on system for |ts
soc|a| protect|on programs. As ln oLher developlna counLrles, several soclal proLecLlon proarams ln Lhe
hlllpplnes lack bullL-ln monlLorlna and evaluaLlon componenLs, whlch makes lL dlfflculL Lo evaluaLe

22
LsLlmaLes show LhaL lL cosLs Lhe nlA 3 Lo 8.6 for everv peso-equlvalenL alven Lo Lhe poor Lhrouah Lhe rlce
subsldv proaram (World 8ank, 2009c).
0.0
0.3
1.0
1.3
2.0
2.3
3.0
3.3
4.0
4.3
3.0
All Pouseholds
(unLaraeLed)
oor Pouseholds Cnlv
(1araeLed)
overLv lncldence
lncome aap
overLv severlLv
ercenLaae polnLs reducLlon ln:
Source: World 8ank sLaff
esLlmaLes based on 2006 llLS and
lmpllclL subsldv for nlA rlce aL
Lhe helahL of Lhe rlce crlsls ln
2008.
17
The government is also addressing the limited implementation capacity of its agencies. In particular, the
DSWDs reform programme focuses on increasing its effectiveness in delivering social welfare programmes
and on strengthening its leadership role in social protection. This is particularly important at this stage given the
considerable administrative capacity that is required of the agency to roll out the 4Ps. International experience
suggests that implementing a conditional cash transfer programme requires extensive training of the agencys staff
at both the central and the local level in all of the operational steps of the programme, while long-term sustainability
of the programme is contingent on the credibility and quality of the programme and its results.
enhancing the social protection system not only requires increased spending, but also more budget transparency
and greater budget effciency. Inadequate funding has been among the key factors that have limited the development
impact of social protection programmes. The coverage rates and beneft levels of these programmes are low,
and some programmes have not been sustainable over time due to a lack of funding. Recently the government
has increased its spending for major social protection programmes. There is scope for further reallocation to
such programmes to bring spending in line with that of other middle-income countries, along with improving the
targeting and increasing the effciency of these programmes. In addition, there is also a need to make budgeting
more transparent and effcient. In particular, over the course of a year, the actual allocations to programmes across
agencies can differ markedly from the initial budget allocation, as set by the General Appropriations Act (GAA). This
can result in shortfalls because the budget is not released as planned. Moreover, there are often unpredictable
reallocations during the year, with some agencies getting less money and others more than they were budgeted to
receive.
23
Also, signifcant off-budget expenditures can sometimes be necessary, which further complicates actual
expenditure patterns. During the food crisis, for example, the government was estimated to have spent P60.9 billion
(US$1.3 billion) for the NFA rice price subsidy through its Government Owned and Controlled Corporation (GOCC),
even though only P2 billion was allocated to the NFA under the 2008 GAA. Recognizing these issues, Congress and
the Senate are considering legislation to increase the transparency and effciency of the budgeting process. Civil
society organizations have also played a signifcant role in advocating for more transparency and accountability in
the budgeting system.
another constraint, that has also made it diffcult to assess the welfare impact of crises, has been the lack
of regularly collected, up-to-date household-level data. The government conducts several household surveys
including the Labor Force Survey (LFS), the Family Income and Expenditure Survey (FIES), and the Annual Poverty
Indicator Survey (APIS), but the current design of these surveys and the long intervals between the times when they
are felded has constrained their usefulness in monitoring the effects of the crisis.
24
Surveys that collect indicators
on education and health outcomes also suffer from long time lags. The two key factors that are currently standing
in the way of improving the statistical system in the Philippines are a lack of budgetary support and inadequate
23 Aside from their budget allocations, the agencies get additional funding for certain programmes or projects (from the pooled savings or unreleased
appropriations of other agencies) or additional releases from the Special Purpose Fund (such as the unprogrammed fund, the miscellaneous personnel and
benefts fund, the contingent fund, the priority development assistance fund, the general fund adjustment, or the economic stimulus fund, among others),
which are lump sum funds in the GAA that are handled and managed by the Department of Budget and Management.
24 The LFS is conducted quarterly (the most recent was felded in July 2009), and preliminary results are available 45 days after enumeration. The FIES is
conducted every three years (the most recent was felded in 2006), but results are released with about 18 months lag. Meanwhile, the APIS is conducted
irregularly (the most recent was felded in 2008), and results are also released with long time lag.
18
manpower and capacity. In the 2005-2010 Philippine Statistical Development Programme, the government laid out
the medium-term directions, strategies, and priorities of the Philippine Statistical System (PSS) as well as the
indicative budgets for the most important statistical programmes and activities. This is a window of opportunity for
the PSS to seek international funding to underwrite the strengthening of the countrys data collection activities.
While the Government of the philippines faces numerous challenges in administering its social protection
programmes, it is taking important steps to improve the delivery of social protection services to address its
lagging poverty and human development outcomes. Since 2007, the government has taken several steps in this
direction. It has issued an operational defnition of social protection. It has initiated the sector reform in the DSWD.
It has increased the funds available for social protection following the recent crises enabling the introduction of
cash transfer programmes and the establishment of a national household targeting system. At the same time, the
government has created the inter-agency body (the National Social Welfare and Protection Cluster) to coordinate
efforts to improve the social protection system. It is vital that the government sustains these efforts and continues
to implement further reforms to make the social protection system more effective and transparent.

acknoWledGemenTs
This report was prepared by Rosechin Olfndo as an input to the ASEAN regional review of the social impact of and
policy responses to the global fnancial crisis, with the fnancial support of the World Bank. The author benefted
greatly from the comments and guidance received from Jehan Arulpragasam of the World Bank Offce in Manila and
the ongoing work of the Banks Human Development team in assessing the impact of the global fnancial crisis. Sincere
thanks are due to Secretary Domingo Panganiban of the National Anti-Poverty Commission of the Philippines and
Rashiel Velarde of the World Bank.
19
references
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Balisacan, A. (2009), Poverty Reduction: Theories, Facts, and Remedies, Presentation during the National Conference on
Imperatives for Poverty Reduction Amidst and Beyond the Global Economic Crisis, Crowne Plaza Galleria Manila,QuezonCity,
31 March 2009.
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (2009), Overseas Filipino Remittances, http://www.bsp.gov.ph/statistics/keystat/ofw.htm
Besley, T., Burgess, R. and Rasul, I. (2003), Benchmarking Government Provision of Social Safety Nets, Social Safety Net Primer
Series, May 2003.
Dejardin, A. and Owens, J. (2009), Asia in the Global Economic Crisis: Impacts and Responses from a Gender Perspective Technical
Note during the conference on Responding to the Economic Crisis Coherent Policies for Growth, Employment and Decent
Work in Asia and Pacifc, Manila, Philippines, 18-20 February 2009.
Development Academy of the Philippines (2009), Review and Strengthening of the National Social Protection and Welfare
Program, draft report.
Department of Budget and Management (2009), General Appropriations Act, http://www.dbm.gov.ph/index.php?id=28&pid=8
Department of Labor and Employment (2009), Establishment Employment Reports, report as of 31 August 2009.
Grosh, M., del Ninno, C., Tesliuc, E. and Ouerghi, A. (2008), For Protection and Promotion: The Design and Implementation of
Effective Safety Nets, World Bank, Washington, DC.
Manasan, R. and Cuenca, J. (2007), Who Benefts from the Food-for-School Program and Tindahan Natin Program: Lessons in
Targeting, PIDS Discussion Paper Series No. 2007-10.
Manasan, R. (2009a), Reforming Social Protection Policy: Responding to the Global Financial Crisis and Beyond, PIDS Discussion
Paper Series No. 2009-22.
Manasan, R. (2009b), Assessment of Social Protection Programs in the Philippines, World Bank background paper.
National Anti-Poverty Commission (2009), Comprehensive Livelihood and Emergency Employment Program, http://www.napc.
gov.ph/CLEEP/index.htm
National Anti-Poverty Commission and National Statistical Coordination Board (2006), Assessment of Vulnerability to Poverty in
the Philippines, Quezon City.
National Economic and Development Authority (2009a), Economic Resiliency Plan: Frequently Asked Questions in ERP Watch,
http://www.neda.gov.ph/erp/downloads_/Q&A%20on%20ERP.pdf
National Economic and Development Authority (2009b), Global Recession Impact News (GRIN) and Positioning for the Rebound
in ERP Watch, http://www.neda.gov.ph/erp/downloads_/GRIN/GRINSept29.pdf
National Statistical Coordination Board (2009a), Economic Accounts, http://www.nscb.gov.ph/secstat/d_accounts.asp
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the MDG indicators, as of October 2009 http://www.nscb.gov.ph/stats/mdg/mdg_watch.asp
National Statistics Offce (2006), Family Income and Expenditures Survey, public use fle.
National Statistics Offce (2008), 2007 Census of Population, http://www.census.gov.ph/data/census2007/index.html
20
National Statistics Offce (2009a), Index of Foreign Trade Statistics, http://www.census.gov.ph/data/sectordata/datafts.html
National Statistics Offce (2009b), Index of Manufacturing Statistics, http://www.census.gov.ph/data/sectordata/datamfg.html
National Statistics Offce (2009c), Index of Price/Infation Statistics, http://www.census.gov.ph/data/sectordata/datacpi.html
National Statistics Offce (2009d), Labor Force Statistics, http://www.census.gov.ph/data/pressrelease/2009/lf0902tx.html
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stats2007.pdf
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stats.pdf
Reyes, C. (2002), The Poverty Fight: Have We Made an Impact?, PIDS Discussion Paper 2000-20.
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jobs involuntarily, 9% resigned, SWS Media Release: 8 September 2009.
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Protection Discussion Paper No. 0817.
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World Bank (2009c), Philippines Quarterly Economic Update November 2009, forthcoming.
World Bank (2009d), Global Crises and Household Vulnerability in the Philippines: Social Impacts and Policy Responses,
unpublished manuscript, 10 August 2009.
21
21

)&&#*!+!
!++$8&M2:3$&=>&Y$3$-#$9&b2:(%&W2%U$#&*+9*-2#(%)&
&&
Apr09 !an09 CcL08 !ul08 Apr08 !an08 CcL07 !ul07 Apr07 !an07
F/9(#+/'.2J!
$.'/9(#+/'.2!


Labor lorce (ln .*(.
f+(#&-3$2%gH
37.8 37.1 37.1 37.4 36.3 36.4 33.9 36.1 36.4 36.4

Labor lorce
arLlclpaLlon 8aLe
64.0 63.3 63.7 64.3 63.2 63.4 63.2 63.6 64.3 64.8
LmplovmenL 8aLe 92.3 92.3 93.2 92.6 92.0 92.6 93.7 92.2 92.6 92.2
unemplovmenL 8aLe 7.3 7.7 6.8 7.4 8.0 7.4 6.3 7.8 7.4 7.8

under-emplovmenL
8aLe
18.9 18.2 17.3 21.0 19.8 18.9 18.1 22.0 18.9 21.3
F/9(#+/'.2!I+!
,'&2#%!

! AarlculLure 32.6 31.9 33.2 32.4 32.6 32.4 33.9 31.8 32.6 32.0
! lndusLrv 13.4 13.1 13.7 13.7 13.7 13.7 14.1 14.3 14.4 13.7
! Servlces 46.6 47.3 46.2 46.3 43.6 46.3 43.8 46.1 43.6 46.3
F/9(#+/'.2!I+!
,202$,!
Waae & Salarv
Workers
42.8 43.6 44.3 43.1 43.4 47.9 46.4 49.6 47.3 48.6
!
Waae & Salarv
Workers (rlvaLe
Pousehold)
3.9 4.0 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.9 4.6 3.3 4.6 3.0

Waae & Salarv
Workers (rlvaLe
LsLabllshmenLs)
31.9 32.7 33.3 32.1 33.9 33.6 34.3 36.6 33.4 33.8
!
Waae & Salarv
Workers
(CovernmenL)
6.3 6.6 6.3 6.3 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.2 7.1 7.4
!
Waae & Salarv
Workers (WlLh av,
lamllv 8uslness)
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3
! Cwn AccounL 32.0 32.2 32.3 31.9 33.6 32.2 33.2 32.3 33.1 32.6
!
Cwn AccounL (Self-
emploved)
28.0 28.2 28.4 28.0 30.0 28.2 29.1 28.2 29.6 28.7
!
Cwn AccounL
(Lmplover)
4.0 4.0 3.9 3.8 3.6 4.1 4.1 4.3 3.6 3.9
!
unpald lamllv
Workers
9.3 10.9 11.1 10.8 10.7 10.4 12.0 10.7 12.1 10.3
Apr-09 !an-09 CcL-08 !ul-08 Apr-08 !an-08 CcL-07 !ul-07 Apr-07 !an-07
22
23
24
One Vision, One Identity, One Community
www.asean.org