Barrientos vs.

Rapal Facts: On April 15, 1998, respondent Mario Rapal acquired a parcel of land at Quezon city via a notarized Deed of Transfer of Possessory Right. The parcel of land was said to be a portion of the estate of the late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban. Thereafter, respondent constructed a semi-concrete house on the lot and took actual possession of the property by himself and through his caretaker, Benjamin Tamayo. In 1993, Petitioner Bienvinido Barrientos and his family were allowed to stay in the subject property as caretakers with a condition that they shall vacate the premises when the respond would need it. Upon demand to vacate, petitioner refused to leave the subject property. Thus, respondent filed a complaint of Unlawful Detainer against the petitioner. On February 21, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the respondent. It ordered petitioner to vacate the premises and to pay respondent a compensation for the use of the structure. On appeal, (RTC) reversed the Decision of the MeTC and resolved in favor of petitioner, reasoning that respondent has not shown any prior lawful possession of the property in question. On April 29, 2005, the CA rendered the assailed Decision reversing the decision of the RTC and reinstating the decision of the MeTC. The CA found that both parties presented weak evidence of ownership. In determining who between the parties was first in possession, the CA concluded that respondent was, indeed, first in possession of the lot. Hence, petitioner elevated the case to the SC. Issues: WHETHER THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP CAN BE INITIALLY RESOLVED FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING THE ISSUE OF POSSESSION. WHETHER THE RESPONDENT'S DOCUMENT PURPORTING TO BE A TRANSFER OF POSSESSORY RIGHT CAN PREVAIL OVER THE PETITIONER'S CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP AND THE LATTER'S ACTUAL POSSESSORY RIGHT OVER THE PROPERTY

Ratio Decidendi: Both petitioner and respondent presented weak evidence of ownership. Respondent on his part based his claim of ownership over the subject property on the strength of a notarized Deed of Transfer of Possessory Right from a certain Antonio Natavio. However, respondent could not derive any right therefrom as the original certificate of title over the land was declared null and void. Petitioner, on the other hand, anchored his contention that he has a better right to possess the property on the fact the he is in actual possession of the property. Yet he failed to adduce sufficient evidence on the manner by which he acquired ownership. Based on the evidences presented, it can be deduced that petitioner's occupation of the subject lot was by mere tolerance only. Petitioner was initially permitted by respondent to occupy the lot as a caretaker. Therefore, he is bound by an implied promise that he will vacate the same upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy.

The Sc stressed that in ejectment suits, the issue is pure physical or de facto possession, and pronouncements made on questions of ownership are provisional in nature. The provisional determination of ownership in the ejectment case cannot be clothed with finality.

Ruling: The petition is denied. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

Facts: Sometime in 1978, F.G.R. Sales, the original developer of Happy Glen Loop, ontained a loan from Ernesto Marcelo. Failure to settle his debt, he assigned to Marcelo all rights over several parcels of land in the Subdivision. Marcelo represented to the subdivision lot buyers that a water facility was available in the Subdivision. For almost 30 years, the residents of the Subv. relied on the facility as the only source of water. In 1995, Marcelo sold Lot 11, Block No. 5 to Hermogenes Liwag, petitioners husband. When Hermogenes died, petitioner Emeteria Liwag wrote a letter to respondent Association for the removal of the overhead water tank from the subject parcel of land. Respondent association filed before the HLURB Arbiter an action for specific performance, confirmation, maintenance.against Marcelo, the petitioner and other surviving heirs of Hermogenes.

HLURB arbiter ruled in favor of the Association and cause the invalidation of the transfer of parcel of land in favour of Hermogenes. On appeal by petitioner, the HLURB Board of Commissioners found that the subject parcel of land was not an open space and that the use of lot as a site of the water tank was merely tolerated. Respondent Association interposed an appeal to the OP which set aside the decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners and affirmed that of the HLURB Arbiter. Petitioner unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration then filed a Petition for Review before the CA CA affirmed that the HLURB possessed jurisdiction over the case. It agreed with OP that an easement for water facility existed on the subject parcel of land and formed part of open space. Aggrieved, Petitioner filed the instant petition before the SC.

Issues: Whether or not HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction over the case at bar? Whether or not there an easement exists on the subject parcel of land? Whether or not the subject parcel of land forms part of the open space? Whether or not the subject parcel of land is beyond the coomerce of men and its sale is prohibited by law?

The Court noted that HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction over complaints arising from contracts between subdivision developer and the buyer. P.D. 957 was promulgated to regulate real estate subdivision and condominium businesses. The decree aimed to provide for an appropriate govt agency, the HLURB, to which aggrieved parties in transactions involving subdivisions and condominiums may take recourse. Art. 615 of the Civil Code provides that easements may be continuous or discontinuous and apparent or non-apparent. In this case, the water facility is an encumbrance on the subject parcel of land for the benefit of the community. It is continuous and apparent, because it is used without human intervention, and it is kept in view by the overhead water tank, which reveals its use to the public. Moreover, the easement of the water facility was already acquired through prescription.

The Court also held that based on the principle of ejusdem generis and taking into consideration the intention of P.D. 1216, the location of the water facility in the Subd. must form part of the area reserved for open space. Furthermore, open spaces in subdivisions are reserved for public use and are beyond the commerce of men. Ruling: The instant Petition for Review is denied and the decision and resolution of CA are affirmed.