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Australasian Journal of Philosophy

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A rhetorical view of the ad hominem

Alan Brinton a a Boise State University, Online Publication Date: 01 March 1985

To cite this Article Brinton, Alan(1985)'A rhetorical view of the ad hominem',Australasian Journal of Philosophy,63:1,50 63 To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/00048408512341681 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048408512341681

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Australasian Journal of Philosophy

Vol. 63, No. 1; March 1985

A R H E T O R I C A L VIEW OF T H E A D H O M I N E M Alan Brinton In a recent issue of this journal, Lawrence M. Hinman has drawn our attention to an important distinction between two conceptions of the ad hominem argument. 1 There is, on the one hand, the attack on the person holding a position or advancing an argument, in terms of background, motivation, or other personal considerations. On the other hand, there is the Lockean notion of ad hominem argument as an attempt to show that an opponent's claim or argument entails consequences which are inconsistent with his other beliefs. It is the first of these two conceptions, the one usually discussed in modern logic textbooks in sections on 'informal fallacies', which I want to discuss. The phrase 'ad hominem argument' will be used here to refer to cases of this first sort. Hinman's aim in dealing with this form of the ad hominern, which he calls 'the contemporary conception of the ad hominem', is (as with the other form) to show that it should not be generally treated as a fallacy. He argues that there are at least three sorts of cases in which an attack on the arguer in terms of background and motivation are appropriate: (1) cases in which we must in some sense rely upon the authority or good will of the arguer in accepting certain premises of the argument as 'given'; (2) cases in which we must decide, in terms of credentials and motivations, whether to accept the arguer's assumptions about the relevant standards of evidence in a particular instance; and (3) cases in which the content of belief in some sense makes reference to the belief's own origins or social function. It seems to me that there is a good deal of sense in what Hinman says; and I agree with him that the use of the ad hominem should not generally be regarded as fallacious. However, it also seems to me that a stronger case can be made for Hinman's position if we regard the ad hominem 'contemporary' as primarily a rhetorical phenomenon rather than as primarily a logical one. Rhetorical theory generally gives us a wider view than logic does of argumentation, a view which does not focus so narrowly on the relationships between premises and conclusions. Our difficulties about the ad hominem argument arise out of an opposition between two feelings: (1) that in most cases personal facts about the speaker are not relevant to the truth-value of claims made or to the validity of arguments given; and (2) that attention to the background and intentions of the speaker do seem to have some relevance to our accepting arguments
l 'The Case for A d Horninem Arguments', Australasian Journal o f Philosophy, 60 (1982), pp. 338-345.

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and claims. Like others who have complained about textbook accounts o f the ad h o m i n e m , H i n m a n seems to have little use for attempts to apply the notion o f deductive validity to it. W h a t e v e r logical grounds there are for the reasonableness o f accepting ad h o m i n e m arguments on some occasions, these grounds must be probabilistic. But, as I say, the reasonableness o f being influenced by ad h o m i n e m arguments, as well as the structure o f ad h o m i n e m argument, will be best understood f r o m a rhetorical point o f view.
The Rhetorical

Rhetorical theory has a long and distinguished history which begins with the early Sophists and P l a t o and which continues up to the present day. 2 The concept o f the rhetorical which lends itself most readily to an explication of the ad h o m i n e m is one suggested by Aristotle's Rhetoric' (taken in conjunction with the N i c h o m a c h e a n Ethics and the Politics) and embraced by the most i m p o r t a n t rhetoricians o f later antiquity. Aristotle, like other classical rhetoricians, is primarily concerned with public speaking; but what he has to say can be extended without m u c h difficulty to other contexts o f discussion. 3 Aristotle defines rhetoric as 'the faculty o f discovering the possible means of persuasion in reference to any subject whatever'. 4 He means, o f course, verbal persuasion. There is a possible ambiguity here, between the theoretical study o f rhetoric (rhetorical theory) and rhetoric itself as a faculty or set o f skills. Let us use the w o r d 'rhetorician' for the theorist a b o u t rhetoric and the word 'rhetor' for the person who exercises the faculty or skill, the rhetorical practitioner. Rhetorical phenomena, we might say, are the acts and occasions of persuasion. The rhetor is involved directly with rhetorical p h e n o m e n a ; rhetoric is a sort o f involvement with these phenomena. The rhetorician theorises about rhetors and their rhetoric. Rhetorical theory has a distinct subject matter, namely rhetoric. Rhetoric itself for Aristotle involves uncovering and making use o f the means o f persuasion on particular occasions. A m o n g the central characteristics o f the rhetorical for Aristotle are two which are especially important for our purposes. First there are three general sorts of rhetorical appeals: the appeals to logos, pathos, and ethos. This threefold distinction has great importance for subsequent rhetorical theory. Roughly, logos is a matter o f the content o f what is said and its supports by evidence and a r g u m e n t (in the logician's sense); p a t h o s is a matter o f the 2 Scholarship on the history of rhetorical theory has flourished during the last twenty years. For a good general account, with references to more detailed works, see George Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times (Chapel Hill: Univ. of N. Carolina Press, 1980). 3 In the Phaedrus, Plato conceives of rhetoric in broader terms, as concerned with writing and speaking in general; and, for Aristotle, rhetoric as the counterpart to dialectic has applications on the level of individual conversation as well as in public oratory. But the emphasis for Aristotle and the classical rhetoricians in general is on public speaking. 4 The 'Art" of Rhetoric, trans. J. H. Freese, in the Loeb Classical Library (London: William Heinemann, 1926), I,ii,1, The Rhetoric will hereafter be referred to as 'R'.

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passions; and ethos is a matter o f the character o f the speaker. The three appeals are reflected in Cicero's three 'ends' o f rhetoric: the appeal to ethos aims to please hearers, thereby rendering them receptive; the appeal to Iogos aims to p r o d u c e assent to claims m a d e b y the persuader; and the appeal to p a t h o s aims to m o v e hearers to act on the basis o f their assent. 5 The second i m p o r t a n t characteristic o f rhetoric for Aristotle is that, while it does not have its o w n distinctive subject-matter, it does deal typically w i t h certain sorts o f questions. Rhetoric (as o p p o s e d to rhetorical theory) has no distinctive subject-matter in that it 'does not deal with any one definite class o f subjects', but is, like dialectic, ' o f general application'. (R I, 1,12) O n the other hand, it does characteristically deal with questions o f a particular kind; let us call these (putting aside the m o r e c o m m o n signification o f this phrase) 'rhetorical questions'. Rhetorical questions, in this sense, are characterised by the sort o f imprecision to which Aristotle so insightfully draws attention early in the N i c h o m a c h e a n Ethics, when he says that 'precision is not to be sought for alike in all discussions'. 6 The answers to rhetorical questions are, in m o s t cases at least, to some degree indeterminate; they cannot, strictly speaking, be said to be k n o w a b l e (for Aristotle). (There have been attempts in rhetorical theory, especially recently, to specify a subject-matter, and even tO develop a conception o f a special kind o f knowledge, 'rhetorical knowledge'. N o doubt these attempts involve conceptions o f subject-matter and knowledge which are somewhat diluted in c o m p a r i s o n with Aristotle's. But they are motivated by the same assumption, one which has had wide currency t h r o u g h o u t the history o f rhetorical theory, the a s s u m p t i o n that the sphere o f the rhetorical is principally, if not exclusively, the indeterminate and the uncertain.) 7 The answers to rhetorical questions are typically indeterminate because these questions have to do with decision and h u m a n action rather t h a n with what is or what must be. There are, according to Aristotle, three kinds o f rhetorical speeches: deliberative (avt~ovk~vrL~6p), forensic, and epideictic. (R I,iii,lff.) Deliberative rhetoric, as characterised in the Rhetoric, has to do with making decisions a b o u t public policy and a b o u t courses o f action. Forensic rhetoric is concerned with deciding legal suits. A n d epideictic rhetoric is a matter o f 5 See Cicero's Orator, trans. H. M. Hubbell, in the Loeb Classical Library (London: William Heinemann, 1939), Ch. 21. For two philosophically interesting applications of Cicero's three 'ends', with reference to logos, pathos, and ethos, set Augustine's discussion of rhetoric in Bk. IV of On Christian Doctrine, trans. D. W. Robertson, Jr. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1958?, and Francois Fenelon's Dialogues on Eloquence, trans. W. S. Howell (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1951). 6 TheNichomachean Ethics of Aristotle, trans. Sir David Ross (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1925). The Nichomachean Ethics will hereafter be referred to as 'NE', and further references will be to the translation by H. Rackham in the Loeb Classical Library (London: William Heinemann, 1926). Rackham's translation of the passage quoted here, from ArE I,iii,1, is as follows: 'The same exactness must not be expected in all departments of philosophy alike'. Philosophy is not mentioned by name at this point in the Greek text. 7 Attempts to develop a conception of rhetorical knowledge include the following (the literature is extensive): Robert L. Scott, 'On Viewing Rhetoric as Epistemic', Central States Speech Journal, 18 (1967), pp. 9-17; Thomas B. Farrell, 'Knowledge, Consensus, and Rhetorical Theory', Quarterly Journal o f Speech, 62 (1976), pp. 1-14; and Lloyd Bitzer, 'Rhetoric and Public Knowledge' in Rhetoric, Philosophy, and Literature: An Exploration, ed. Don Burks (Lafayette: Purdue Univ. Press, 1978), pp. 67-92.

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praise and blame. It is perfectly clear that Aristotle regards deliberative rhetoric as primary. He complains early in Book I that rhetoricians have hitherto given altogether too much emphasis to forensic rhetoric; his own view is that deliberative rhetoric is 'nobler and more worthy of a statesman'. (R I,i, 10) Epideictic rhetoric he regards as really nothing more than a special kind of deliberation (about what our attitudes toward certain people or things should be). (R, I,ix,36) There is good reason to believe that he regards forensic rhetoric also as a special (less noble) kind of deliberation. 'The function of rhetoric', he says (at R I,ii,12), 'is to deal with things about which we deliberate'. The things about which we deliberate are human actions. (R I,ii,14) Aristotle tells us in the Nichomachean Ethics (at VI,i,6) that deliberation (13ovketia~) is a function of the calculative (as opposed to the scientific) aspect of the intellectual part of the soul. It is about things which are %ariable' (which might or might not be), and about things done as opposed to things made. (NE VI,iv, lff.) Both aspects of the intellectual part of the soil (the scientific and the calculative) aim at truth (x~h~be~a) (NE VI,ii,6-7), but truth for the calculative aspect is rightness of action, as opposed to rightness of belief for the scientific, orthopraxy as opposed to orthodoxy. (See NE VI,v,4.) This contrast is essentially involved in the difference between the logical (in the modern sense) and the rhetorical (in the classical sense). Now, situations which call for action are in a sense indeterminate: they may be completed or resolved through a choice among alternative policies or courses of action; this is what Aristotle means when he says they are 'variable'. Rightness of action cannot typically be determined with the same precision that we hope for with respect to rightness of belief, since expedience or human goods may be served equally well by any of a number of mutually exclusive courses of action, and since expedience and human good are themselves imprecise notions. On the other hand, in Aristotle's view rightness o f belief is a matter of accuracy, of the truth-values of propositions, whether about what simply is or about what must be, so that greater exactness is to be expected in matters of belief (especially in the sciences) than in matters o f action. Furthermore, a belief which excludes a correct alternative belief cannot itself be correct, so that the answers to real questions of belief are determinate even if unknown. We need now to pay a little more attention to the Ethics in preparation for our treatment of the ad hominem. The virtue of the calculative aspect of the soil is prudence (~Oou~a~), which is 'a truth-attaining rational quality, concerned with action in relation to things that are good for human beings'. (NE VI,v,6) Prudence is the same thing as deliberative excellence (e~l~ovX[a) for Aristotle, which is a form of correctness (600or~), not correctness o f knowledge or opinion (NE VI,ix), but correctness 'in the sense of arriving at something good' (NE VI,ix,4) in the context of practical choice, 'arriving at the right conclusion on the right grounds at the right time'. (NE VI,ix,6) Politics is prudence with respect to affairs of the state, as applied to particular circumstances. (NE VI,viii, 1-2) It is no accident that later rhetorical theorists use the expression 'political rhetoric' for what Aristotle calls 'deliberative

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rhetoric'. The essential role of deliberation in ethics and politics accounts for the fact that rhetoric may appear to some to be politics. (R I,ii,7) Aristotle's account is representative o f the most dominant themes of subsequent classical rhetorical theory. It is characteristic of the most important later classical rhetoricians, especially of Cicero and Quintilian, that they (like the Sophists) regard training in rhetoric as a prerequisite for participation in the affairs of state, that they focus more on action than on belief, and that they regard the practice of rhetoric as, at its best, a way of dealing with practical and political problems and of resolving indeterminacies in the public sphere. Rhetoric, in this view then, is more than simply the discovery and manipulation of the 'means of persuasion' in order to persuade; it is conceived as, at its best, a method for making practical decisions and forming policies, especially in the context of public affairs. The ideal rhetor is not so much one who marshalls whatever forces m a y be brought to bear in order to produce belief in hearers, but rather one who is wise in deliberation about matters of practice.

The A d H o m i n e m Taking a rhetorical, rather than a strictly logical, view of the ad hominem will involve going beyond thinking just in terms of the appeal to Iogos. As the reader may already anticipate, the strategy will be a move in the direction o f ethos and in the direction o f seeing the ad hominem as occurring (at least in its justifiable uses) more commonly in contexts which are primarily practical than in those which are primarily doxastic. Let me now speak in more detail about the notion o f ethos and then explain, with some examples, how I think the ad hominem should be understood. The rhetorical conception of ethos, which has some connection with the Sophistic emphasis on the personality o f the orator, figures prominently in ancient rhetorical theory. All o f the important ancient rhetorical theorists discuss it in one way or another. It is spoken o f in two distinguishable ways, however. On the one hand, the concern is sometimes exclusively with the impression which an audience has of the character, background, and motives of the speaker. The two famous anonymous rhetoric handbooks of the ancient world, the Rhetorica ad Atexandrum and the Rhetorica ad Herennium, unabashedly advise the orator in detail about how to appear to be a person of good character and good intentions. They especially concern themselves with getting an audience to feel that the speaker shares its values and expectations. On the other hand, other writers, for example Isocrates and Quintilian, argue that the effective orator must actually be a person of good character; Quintilian even goes so far as to argue that the true orator is by definition a good person, vir bonus, s Still other theorists, most notably Aristotle and Cicero, seem to vacillate between an emphasis on actual 8 Quintilian's doctrine of the vir bonus is developed in Bk. XII of his Institutio Oratoria. For a detailed examination of this doctrine of the ideal orator, see Alan Brinton, 'Quintilian, Plato, and the Vir Bonus', Philosophy and Rhetoric, 16 (1983), pp. I67-184.

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character and an emphasis on the impression which a speaker creates. But there is general agreement a m o n g all these writers about the sorts o f attributes which an effective o r a t o r will have or at least a p p e a r to have: competence in the subject-matter at hand, g o o d intentions, shared values and interests and assumptions with the audience, truthfulness, trustworthiness. The true orator, for Cicero and Quintilian, is exemplified by a Demosthenes or a Cato: a statesman, a person w h o knows and is wise and in w h o m the more general ethos (character) o f the society is embodied, one w h o m we can trust to express our shared values, to think in terms o f our c o m m o n assumptions, to exercise good judgment, and to speak for us. This, especially as articulated by Cicero and Quintilian, is the m o s t full-bodied conception o f the ideal orator and of rhetorical ethos. Within the context o f this conception o f public rhetoric and the role o f the true orator, it makes perfectly g o o d sense to raise questions o f ethos in the face o f a speaker's claims and arguments. I n s o f a r as the ethos o f the orator-statesman fails to truly reflect the ethos o f his society, his credentials as one w h o is to speak f o r and deliberate o n behalf o f his society are questionable. The appropriate w a y to do this is in terms o f attention to personal facts a b o u t his b a c k g r o u n d , past behaviour, allegiances, and motivations. He is fair game, in other words, for the ad hominem. These conceptions o f public rhetoric and o f ethos belong to a time other than our own, to be sure. But they have their more humble analogues in our own contexts o f public debate and ordinary argumentation. One more modest and more general analogue to the ideal o r a t o r is suggested by Aristotle's appeals to the g o o d m a n or the m a n o f prudence as a sort o f standard o f what is correct in ethics, both on the level o f general principle and on the level o f decision making. Aristotle says (NE VI,xi,6) that 'the u n p r o v e d assertions or opinions o f experienced and elderly people, or o f prudent men, are as m u c h deserving o f attention as those which are supported by p r o o f ; for experience has given them an eye for things, and they see correctly. '9 I suggest that the most appropriate occurrences (and p r o b a b l y most actual occurrences) o f the ad h o m i n e m - especially in the public s p h e r e - are to be found in contexts which are in the appropriate ways analogous to the contexts of classical oratory. It is most obviously (although not exclusively) in deliberative contexts that the ad hominem has a place and should be regarded as an acceptable f o r m o f argument. These are contexts in which there is a concern with matters o f policy and practice. The ad hominem, as H i n m a n and others have suggested, is a type o f 9 See also NE X,v,10: 'But we hold that in all such cases the thing really is what it appears to be to the good man. And if this rule is sound, as it is generallyheld to be, and if the standard of everything is goodness, or the good man, qua good, then the things that seem to him to be pleasures are pleasures, and the things he enjoys are pleasant'. Some readers are puzzled by Aristotle's frequent appeals in NE to what is 'generally held', 'commonly said', 'thought to be the case', and the like, with occasional emphasis on the opinions of persons of wisdom and virtue. But, when one remembers that ethos is in a way (as the title of the work suggests) the subject of the whole work, appeals to the ethos, both of society at large and of the good and wise individual, seem more appropriate.

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argument; 'ad hominem' ought not to be regarded as a term of abuse. There are good ad hominems and bad ones. If someone says 'That was an ad hominem !', the appropriate reply is 'Yes, but was it a good one?' The ad hominem typically questions someone's credentials as a speaker on a given occasion or as a participant in deliberation or discussion. The typical ad hominem involves at least two factors: (1) a factual claim or claims, and (2) the implication that the fact or facts mentioned show that the person in question is not a good deliberator, lacks moral authority on the question at hand, is not really committed to good deliberation or careful thinking in this case on account of ulterior motives, does not really share values or beliefs or principles which are presupposed in this context, or otherwise is deficient in ethos. A good ad hominem is one whose factual claim or claims are true as well as ethotically relevant. Ethotic relevance is a less exact matter than factual correctness; it is best determined by those with 'an eye for things'. It is partly a function o f context, so that the full and final evaluation of an ad hominem would normally require attention to the particular case, for the determination of relevance as well as for the determination of factual correctness. It is characteristic of the rhetorical, in contrast with the logical, that it requires attention to the particular case. The notion of ethotic relevance can best be understood, as we might expect, by means of some attention to particular examples of the ad hominem. Let us begin with two text-book examples. The first comes from A Concise Introduction to Logic by Patrick J. Hurley: Professor Pearson's arguments in favor of the theory o f evolution should be discounted. Pearson is a cocaine-snorting sex pervert and, according to some reports, a m e m b e r of the Communist Party. If the reader will excuse a little ad hominem of our own, we might wonder how well a logic text-book's author who has to resort to such an artificial and implausible illustration understands his own subject-matter. (If we want to understand the ad hominem, should we spend time reading his explanations?) But, suppose Professor Pearson is in fact attacked in the very words of this example. H o w are we to evaluate this ad hominem ? Well, as in most cases, we might do well to attend first to the question of ethotic relevance. Being a sex pervert is unlikely to have any serious deleterious effects on Pearson's reasonings about evolution. If he spends a good deal o f time snorting cocaine, that might raise some doubts about the present condition of his intellect. And if, as a m e m b e r of the Communist Party, he is unduly influenced by ideologically motivated Soviet biologists, there might be some reason to question his ethos as a biologist. On the other hand, the conclusion (uncharacteristically among ad hominems) suggests that we should discount his arguments; even if there is some question about his ethos as a biologist, it is hard to see how that would bear on the quality of the arguments themselves. But suppose the occasion for this ad hominem had been the infamous ~0 (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Pub. Co., 1982), p. 87.

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Scopes trial of the 1920s, and Pearson had been cited as an example of a respected scientist who regarded the theory of evolution as clearly enough substantiated to be taught in the public schools. Then an ad hominem to a different conclusion, that Pearson's opinon on this matter ought not to carry much weight, one appealing to ideological motivations and mentally debilitating habits, might make perfectly good sense. Further questions about Pearson's credentials, background, and motivations might be in order as well. Of course we would need to know whether the allegations against Pearson were factually correct. Notice how a context and a few modifications make the example less artificial. Our second text-book example is Copi's quotation from Thomas Paine:
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However, it matters very little now what the king of England either says or does; he hath wickedly broken through every moral and human obligation, trampled nature and conscience beneath his feet, and by a steady and constitutional spirit o f insolence and cruelty procured for himself an universal hatred. 11 What really is the conclusion of this ad hominem, and what are its premises? One of the central questions of Paine's Common Sense (published in 1776) was whether the American colonists ought to revolt or to attempt a reconciliation through negotiations. Paine's view was that the crown could not be expected to negotiate in good faith, but would use whatever deceits and other tricks were necessary in order to keep its firm and exploitative hand on the colonists. The conclusion must be this, that apparently conciliatory words or actions from the king ought not to be taken seriously: the king cannot be trusted in negotiations. If it is true that the king has a record of breaking agreements, trampling human rights, and acquiring a reputation for insolence and cruelty, then this attack on his ethos is a good and fitting ad hominem. These two cases are representative o f the two most common sorts of textbook examples o f the ad hominem. Some text-book examples are obviously bad, highly artificial and implausible ad hominems ('Jones says that 2 + 2 equals 4; but he was once seen entering a gay bar, so 2 + 2 must equal 5'). Others are real cases, isolated from their contexts, careful attention to which would at least make them less ridiculous and in many cases show them to be reasonable attacks on ethos, i.e. good ad hominems. The function of the ad hominem and its evaluation, though, can be better understood in a more extended context of argumentation. Consider, for example, the debate in the Congress of the United States in 1813 over the New Army Bill, which was to provide for 20,000 additional troops for the prosecution o f the war against Great Britain. The majority, led by Speaker of the House Henry Clay, argued that an invasion o f Canada buttressed by these extra forces would drive Great Britain to the bargaining table and help bring about a quick resolution to the conflict, on terms favourable to American interests. The most outspoken member of the opposition was Josiah
11 Irving M. Copi, Introduction to Logic (New York: Macmillan, 1982), p. 117.

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Quincy, representative from Massachusetts, who on January 5th delivered a vitriolic speech, arguing that the additional forces would be insufficient, that an invasion o f C a n a d a would be unsuccessful as well as immoral, that even if the conquest of Canada could be accomplished it would be inexpedient and would not force Great Britain to negotiate, and finally that the bill was politically motivated, as was the war itself, 'as a means for the advancement o f objects of personal or local ambition o f the members o f the American Cabinet'. lz The implication was that the supporters of the bill in Congress, or at least the most outspoken ones, were also motivated by personal ambition. Quincy's speech is filled with appeals to pathos and ethos as well as logos. It contains a variety of ad hominems, but the one just mentioned is the most prominent since it is a central thrust of the speech. He develops an elaborate scenario, according to which the President, his cabinet, and their supporters in Congress have continued to sabotage negotiations and to prolong the war in order to perpetuate public support for the administration and to engineer the election of a member of the cabinet (James Monroe, who was in fact elected) as successor to President James Madison. Quincy's language is strong, perhaps intemperate. But there is a long litany of particular facts in support o f his claims about the bill's chief advocates; and there is the implication that they are not to be trusted, on account o f their hidden motives. Let us suppose that we are uncommitted members of the House. I do not propose to judge whether Quincy's scenario is accurate; parts of it are, no doubt, too extreme. But suppose that we other voting members come to the conclusion (through non-ad hominem reasoning) that Clay and the other leaders of the House who speak so eloquently in favour of the bill (appealing to our national pride and sense of outrage over the impressment by the British of American sailors) are in fact motivated by personal political ambition. Suppose it seems very clear to us that they support this bill only because they believe that it will favour their personal interests, that if it did not hold this promise they would oppose it. The nation is at war; its very existence could be at stake. We had assumed that it was the interests of the republic which were paramount in the present deliberations; but now we have reason to believe that, for some among us, other considerations loom larger. Assuming that the factual component of Quincy's ad hominem is correct, does the ad hominem have a reasonable place, as an argument on the side o f rejecting the bill, in this debate; is it reasonable for us to allow it to influence our vote? It seems to me that it does have a place and that it is a factor to be considered when we vote, at least indirectly. Its place in this particular debate is a function of the deliberative character of the situation: these are imprecise matters which are being discussed; there are considerations of expediency and o f moral principle on both sides o f the q u e s t i o n - - w e are interested in having these considerations brought before us. But we are also interested, justifiably, in hearing the considered opinions of experienced
12 Annals o f the Congress o f the United States, 12th Congress, 2nd Session, Comprising the Period From November 2, 1812 to March 3, 1813, Inclusive (Washington, D.C.: Gales and Seaton, 1853), pp. 540-570.

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deliberators whom we respect as persons of good will and good judgment. On matters of expedience, public policy, moral choice and the like, the judgment of the wise and prudent person carries some weight, especially when there is no other standard. Clay was in 1813 already a respected and influential member of the House. Quincy's ad hominem is best regarded as an attack on Clay's deliberative ethos in the context of the debate over the New Army Bill and the current war with England. The conclusion of the ad hominem, strictly considered, is not that the bill should be defeated, but that the opinions of certain leading members of the House should not carry the weight that they would justifiably carry apart from the considerations raised in the ad hominem. A definitive evaluation of this ad hominem, if possible, would require a clear determination of the accuracy of the charges made in it. But it does meet the condition of ethotic relevance. In a speech given a few days later (pp. 659-675), Clay came back with a few ad hominems of his own, some of which also meet the condition of ethotic relevance. For example, he accuses the opposition o f inconsistency since they originally criticised the administration for being too slow to go to war, an inconsistency which he attributes to their personal ambitions; and he accuses Quincy and his allies of a lingering tendency to be loyal to the crown. On the other hand, both make use of ad hominem s which fall short of meeting the condition of ethotic relevance (although this is a matter of degree, no doubt). From Quincy we get this: 'Those must be very young politicians, their pin-feathers not yet grown, and however they may flutter on this floor, they are not yet fledged for any high or distant f l i g h t . . . ' And then he is reported to have designated his opponents as 'toads, or reptiles, which spread their slime on the drawing room floor'. (p. 599) Clay refers to Quincy as the gentleman 'of whom I am sorry to say, it becomes necessary for me, in the course of my remarks, to take some notice' and compares him to Judas Iscariot for his oposition to Jefferson; Quincy's charges of personal ambition, he says, are a result of 'the diseased state o f the gentleman's imagination'. 13 Let us now turn to a more complicated example, Socrates' use of the ad hominem in Plato's Apology. 14 Some readers of the Apology are puzzled by the arguments which Socrates uses in his cross-examination of Meletus at 24C-27E, arguments which are likely to strike those unfamiliar with the intricacies o f other dialogues such as the Meno and the Protagoras as sophistical. In this same section, Socrates mounts an ad hominem attack against Meletus, who is one of his prosecutors. Speaking o f the formal indictment, Socrates says (at 24C) this: First it says that I am guilty of corrupting the young. But I say, gentlemen, that Meletus is guilty o f treating a serious matter with levity, since he summons people to stand their trial on frivolous grounds and professes
t3 Annals o f Congress, pp. 659-676. 14 trans. Hugh Tredennick, in E. Hamilton and H. Cairns, eds., Plato: The Collected Dialogues, Bolingen Series LXXI (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1969).

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concern and keen anxiety in matters about which he has never had the slightest interest. I will try to prove this to your satisfaction. Socrates then presses Meletus for some more precise account o f the nature o f the charge and engages him in discussion about certain puzzles having to do with wrongdoing and harming one's associates. Meletus' perplexity and inability to deal with these subtleties is then pointed to by Socrates as p r o o f that Meletus has never really been concerned about the young: 'It is quite clear by now, gentlemen, that Meletus, as I said before, has never shown any degree of interest in this subject'. (26A-B) Socrates then follows the same tactic with respect to the other charge (that he rejects belief in the gods of the state). 'In m y opinion', he says at 26E, 'this m a n is a thoroughly selfish bully, and has brought this action against me out o f sheet wanton aggressiveness and self-assertion'. The situation is clearly rhetorical (a forensic context, according to Aristotle's classification); and, in fact, the speech is constructed according to rhetorical conventions of the day. 15 Although most readers are likely to feel that Meletus deserves the humiliation that Socrates inflicts on him, a logician might object to Socrates' tactic, on the grounds that the character and intentions of Meletus can surely have no bearing on the question whether Socrates is guilty or not o f the charges in the formal indictment. But this is too simple a view of the situation. This is not a case for indulging Socrates with permission to overstep the bounds of good argument. This is, in an extended sense, a deliberative context. Prosecutors, defendant, and jurors are reasoning together on questions of justice and character and on the fate of Socrates. From a legal point of view, Socrates is questioning the legitimacy o f the entire proceedings) 6 F r o m a rhetorical point o f view, he is in effect arguing that the conditions for discussion and deliberation on this occasion have not been met. His approach is reasonable and it is sound rhetorically (i.e., in the context of a wider view of argumentation). It consists in an attack on the ethos, not only o f his prosecutors, but later o f the jury itself (or at least a majority of its members) and of Athenian society. These other participants lack the personal credentials which qualify a person as a competent deliberator about matters o f justice and character. At the same time, the rest o f the speech is a defence of Socrates' own ethos (partly in connection with the charges, but also much more generally) and a contrast between it, on the one hand, and that of Athenian society on the other. H e is the one who knows about virtue.17 It is interesting to contast the attitude of Socrates toward Meletus and the jury with that of Laches toward Socrates in the Laches. Lysimachus and Melesias, concerned about the education o f their sons, have approached the two generals, Nicias and Laches, for their advice. Laches suggests that they 15 See George Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1963), pp. 149-152, 'Trial of Socrates'. 16 For discussion of the legal irregularities of the trial, see A. E. Taylor's Plato: The Man and His Work (Cleveland: World Pub. Co., 1963), pp. 157-160. 17 The court lacks not only moral authority, but eventhe power to do him harm (30C-D, 41C-D).

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also consult with Socrates, and expresses his own willingness to be crossexamined by Socrates: LACHES: I have but one feeling, Nicias, or shall I say two feelings, about discussions? Some would think that I am a lover, and to others I may seem to be a hater, o f discourse. For when I hear a man discoursing of virtue, or o f any sort of wisdom, who is a true man and worthy of his theme, I am delighted beyond measure, and I compare the man and his words, and note the h a r m o n y and correspondence of t h e m . . , and when I hear him I am thought to be a lover of discourse; so eager am I in drinking in his words. But a man whose actions do not agree with his words is an annoyance to me, and the better he speaks the more I hate him, and then I seem to be a hater of discourse. As to Socrates, I have no knowledge of his words, but of old, as appears, I have had experience of his deeds, and his deeds show that he is entitled to noble sentiments and complete freedom of speech. And if his words accord, then I am of one mind with him, and shall be delighted to be interrogated by a m a n such as he is . . .18 Lysimachus then suggests that Socrates take his place in the discussion to 'talk and consult' with Laches and Nicias, 'and Melesias and I will act upon your conclusions'. (189C-D) Socrates has the right credentials, Lysimachus agrees with Laches, to conduct this inquiry about the improvement of the young and (as it turns out) about the nature of courage. Lysimachus is willing to go so far, in fact, as to allow Socrates to reason on his behalf, as Laches and Nicias are willing to have Socrates lead them in their reasonings, even on matters about which they claim to have some expertise. (Are they illadvised in this?) The situation in the Laches, like that in the Apology, is one which involves deliberation. The occasion for the inquiry is a concern about how the education of the sons of Lysimachus and Melesias ought to be conducted. But the inquiry itself is not a deliberation (in the sense in which we have been using the word); it is a conceptual investigation. Socrates' own manifestations of virtue, and especially his courage in battle, seem to the others to especially qualify him to engage in and take the lead in discourse on the subject at hand. There is confidence as well in Socrates' intellectual skills and in his intention to vigorously pursue the matter at hand with a view to finding the truth. Another presupposition of the situation is that the other members of the discussion share this intention. Now, when members of Congress arose to speak in the deliberations about the New A r m y Bill in 1813, they were assuming for a time the same sort of role which Socrates is more or less officially assigned in the Laches. They were purporting to share certain commitments and interests with the other members o f Congress, to have in view certain c o m m o n ends, to speak on behalf of the republic as a whole a well as for their constituencies, and they were temporarily assuming the role of a leader in the discussion. The same is true, in a much more modest ~8Trans. B. Jowett, Huntington and Cairns, 188C-189A+

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A Rhetorical View of the Ad Hominem

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way, in more ordinary contexts of discussion, not only in deliberative contexts but in argumentative contexts in general. There are in general, but also relative to particular contexts, certain presuppositions o f discourse and of argumentation. Especially important a m o n g these presuppositions are some having to do with the credentials, commitments, and intentions of those who participate, and especially of those who take the lead. The ad hominem typically raises doubts about whether these ethotic presuppositions have been fulfilled. In classical rhetorical theory, as we have seen, the emphasis is on action rather than on belief, and on deliberative reasoning. But the rhetorical notion o f ethos has its applications in other contexts of reasoning, as well. The use of the ad hominem, the attack on ethos, in non-deliberative contexts is illustrated in a number of other Socratic dialogues in which Socrates is accused of 'quibbling' and of not arguing in good faith. Thrasymachus complains in Book I of the Republic, for example, that Socrates contrives to crossexamine others and refute their views while being evasive about giving any opinions of his own. (337E) Thrasymachus is right, of course, at least so far as the earlier stages of the discussion go. (See also the Gorgias, 498B and 497A-B; the Ruthydemus, 295C; and the Theaetetus, 167A-E.) I f these ad hominems fail to carry much weight, it is because Socrates' method seems to produce good results and because he usually does express some opinions of his own in the end. But they do have some basis in fact, and they are ethotically relevant, unlike Thrasymachus' remark at 343A that Socrates needs a wetnurse to go around wiping his driveling nose.

The A d Hominem and the A d Verecundiam

The notion of the authority of a source or of an expert pretty obviously bears some relation to certain aspects of ethos. It has sometimes been suggested that one form of the ad hominem is an attack on someone's status as an authority. This is surely correct. On the other hand, fresh from our examination of the ad hominem, we might be tempted to suggest that, in contrast with the ad hominem, which is an attack on ethos, the ad verecundiam might be best understood as an attempt to bolster the ethos of a speaker or source. This would, however, be a mistake. The ad verecundiam is not directed at the person at all; it is an argument from authority. If it bears on a person, it bears on the hearer and is a sort of argument to modesty, as indicated by its name (literally, 'to modesty'). So the ad verecundiam and the ad hominem do not stand in the sort o f relation which we might at first suspect. The ad verecundiam should, however, be understood in terms of ethos, at least in m a n y of its occurrences. It is an appeal to the ethos of some source in support of some claim. Some of the observations made in the previous section would bear on a fuller analysis of it. There is, also, a form of argument which is closely related to the ad verecundiam and which might be regarded as a variant of it, but which bears a much closer resemblance to the ad hominern and probably ought to be regarded as a f o r m of it. It sometimes

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happens, for e x a m p l e in an e d i t o r ' s i n t r o d u c t i o n to a b o o k , o r when one speaker is i n t r o d u c e d o r d e f e r r e d to b y a n o t h e r , t h a t an effort is m a d e to bolster or d r a w attention to the g o o d ethos o f another, often with the intention that this s h o u l d p r e d i s p o s e r e a d e r s o r listeners to be receptive. This is, o f course, the sort o f thing which the r h e t o r i c a l h a n d b o o k s e n c o u r a g e a s p e a k e r to do for himself. T h e r e is g o o d r e a s o n , I t h i n k , to r e g a r d this as a positive form o f the ad hominem a n d to t a k e it to be as fully entitled to that label as the m o r e f a m i l i a r negative f o r m .

Conclusion
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I have tried to m a k e a case for the r h e t o r i c a l a p p r o a c h to u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d evaluating ad hominem a r g u m e n t s ; they should be seen f r o m a rhetorical rather t h a n f r o m a p u r e l y logical p o i n t o f view. T h e structure o f this sort of a r g u m e n t , I have tried to show, can be best u n d e r s t o o d in terms o f the rhetorical n o t i o n o f ethos. Once this is done, it b e c o m e s clear that the ad hominem is a k i n d o f a r g u m e n t r a t h e r t h a n a k i n d o f fallacy, and that it has its place in a r g u m e n t a t i o n , especially in c o n n e c t i o n with questions o f practice. I suggested t h a t the same general sort o f a p p r o a c h might be t a k e n with the ad verecundiam. A l l this suggests the f u r t h e r possibility o f a general a p p r o a c h to the so-called ' i n f o r m a l fallacies' in terms o f the r h e t o r i c a l p o i n t of view, p e r h a p s an a p p r o a c h which sorts out m a n y or even all o f these p h e n o m e n a in t e r m s o f A r i s t o t l e ' s n o t i o n o f ethos, pathos, a n d logos. 19

Boise State University

Received A p r i l 1984

19 I am grateful for comments on an earlier draft by two referees. My interest in taking a rhetorical approach to the 'informal fallacies' had its origins in Edward P. J. Corbett's 1981 NEH Summer Seminar on 'Rhetoric and Public Discourse' at Ohio State University. especiallyin conversations with Walter Minot, For an effort by Minot, though in different directions, see 'A Rhetorical View of Fallacies: Ad Hominem and Ad Populum',Rhetoric Society Quarterly, 11 (1981), pp. 222-235. I have also benefitted from discussions on this subject with my colleague, Warren Harbison; I have tried to do on the level of theory for the ad hominem what Harbison does on the level of practice.