Formulating and Implementing Sector-wide Approaches in Agriculture and Rural Development:

The Agriculture Sector Development Programme (ASDP) Tanzania

Acknowledgements
A large number of individuals in government and elsewhere gave the study team their time in Dar es Salaam in September and October 2006. It was a particularly busy time, immediately preceding the sector expenditure review, so we are very grateful that we were able to hold such fruitful discussions and thankful to all that helped the team get their work done. Special thanks go to the Economic and Social Research Foundation for logistical support and making appointments and to Louise Setshwaelo, FAO Representative, Jacqueline Machangu and their colleagues at FAO for hosting the mission and working on our itinerary so effectively. The report is solely the responsibility of the authors.

Contents
Executive Summary 1. Introduction 2. Approach and method 3. The Agriculture and Rural Development Sector 4. The SWAp the Agriculture Sector Development Programme 5. Experiences, issues and achievements 6. Agricultural SWAps and the wider development assistance context 7. Overall assessment and performance Major documents consulted Appendix One: The change model underlying the SWAp process Appendix Two: Accommodating Projects under ASDP discussion note by Melissa Brown, FAO Investment Centre Appendix Three: Persons interviewed in Tanzania 5 7 8 9 11 16 23 24 25 27 28 30

List of Acronyms
A-CBG A-EBG AfDB ASDP ASDS ASLMs DADP DADG DDP DIDF DP DPG FASWOG GBS GoT ICC IFMS JAS LGA LGCDG LGRP MAFC MITM MDGs MTEF MLD NSGRP PER PO-RALG PRS/PRSP PRBS PSFM SWAp TAS URT Agriculture-Capacity Building Grant Agriculture-Extension Block Grant African Development Bank Agricultural Sector Development Programme Agricultural Sector Development Strategy Agricultural Sector Lead Ministries District Agricultural Development Plan District Agricultural Development Grant District Development Plan District Irrigation Development Fund Development Partners Development Partner Group Food and Agricultural Sector Working Group General Budget Support Government of Tanzania Inter-ministerial Coordination Committee Integrated Financial Management System Joint Assistance Strategy Local Government Authority Local Government Capital Development Grant Local Government Reform Programme Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives Ministry of Industry, Trade and Marketing Millennium Development Goals Medium Term Expenditure Framework Ministry of Livestock Development National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (Mkukuta) Public Expenditure Review Prime Ministers Office Regional Administration and Local Government Poverty Reduction Strategy/Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Poverty Reduction Budget Support Public Sector financial Management Sector Wide Approach Tanzania Assistance Strategy United Republic of Tanzania

Sector-Wide Approaches for Agriculture and Rural Development: The Agriculture Sector Development Programme Tanzania Executive Summary
This Tanzania study is one of a series commissioned through FAO by the Global Donor Platform on Rural Development on sector-wide approaches for agriculture and rural development. The final output will be a synthesis paper that brings together the main findings from the country studies. The country case studies build upon a desk review which developed a change framework to lay out the expected benefits from the SWAp process. The framework seeks to trace the logic of the SWAp from Initial Conditions through Inputs, Activities and Outputs to Outcomes and Impacts. This study involved two weeks in Tanzania for interviews and information collection, work undertaken by Martin Greeley (IDS), Melissa Brown (FAO), Professor HKR Amani and Oswald Mashindano (ESRF). Tanzania has emerged as one of the front runners in the redesign of the aid relationship. The Tanzania Joint Assistance Strategy is an ambitious approach by the government and donors, the Development Partner Group, to apply best practice principles on harmonisation and alignment. The sector wide approach for Tanzanian agriculture, the Agricultural Sector Development Programme (ASDP) is very much a part of this reform process. The harmonisation and alignment agenda has been a significant contributor to the evolution of the aid relationship in agriculture towards the promotion of a single sector policy and expenditure framework. Despite this ambition, development of the ASDP has not been a smooth process; many stakeholders complained of the high transactions costs and the slow progress in actually getting donor resources to flow. Tanzanias Agricultural Sector Development Strategy (ASDS) emphasises her agricultural potential based on: comparative advantages in export and food commodities, the large human capital resource, the underused natural resource base and the political commitment to provide a policy environment conducive to sector growth, trade opportunities and private sector partnership. The ASDP is the programme instrument to implement the ASDS. The resource envelope, on paper for the first seven years of the ASDP, is over two thousand billion shillings which, if realised, would be a revolutionary transformation of agricultural financing. At the heart of the strategy is the decentralisation of investment decisions to the local-level. This builds on the local government reform programme (LGRP) and strengthened democratic accountability underpinning that agenda. A second key feature of the ASDP is that the budget, disbursements and monitoring of the ASDP are fully integrated into the MTEF process and aligned with the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty. The study identifies three overarching concerns with the ASDP, all central to improved public sector policy and investment in an aid dependent economy and each of which provides important insights into the challenges to the ASDP process. These three concerns are local-level planning; domestic ownership, illustrated through policy contestation over irrigation; and, harmonisation and alignment. The single biggest concern on the growth and poverty reduction potential of the ASDP relates to the quality of district planning. The District Agricultural Development Plans are the vehicle for most of the public investment in the sector and there is little evidence from the process so far that they will lead to a coherent strategy for poverty-reducing agricultural growth. The policy challenge of agricultural investment decentralisation is poorly understood. Another central issue emerging from the massively scaled-up proposals for public investment in irrigation in the final formative stages of the ASDP is development partners understandings of domestic ownership and their willingness to engage constructively with shifts in national policy which they have not initiated. Harmonisation and Alignment issues were the third main concern with three sets of problems. First was the limited domestic capacity to plan something as ambitious as the ASDP. The resourcing of the ASDP Secretariat, even with technical support from donors, was inadequate for the task of sector development. This undermined alignment processes. Second, donor proliferation, with seven DPs helping to develop the ASDP, has been a serious obstacle to speedy ASDP progress. There is lack of internal coherence of DPs within country offices (sometimes) and often with their HQs. These problems led to lengthy delays in the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding for the Basket Fund. Thirdly, there is only lukewarm delivery from DPs on domestic ownership. Concerns of fiduciary risk 5

and quality of spending may have been used as means to disguise a more fundamental concern over the scope of the proposed sector investments. Despite these important concerns, the ASDP provides a meaningful opportunity to engage effectively with pro-poor agricultural growth in contrast to the generalised growth management associated with GBS. The problems of incoherent and ineffective sector development associated with earlier project investments are potentially removed through the commitment to the ASDP. GoT has recognised this and energetically promoted the programme politically. It is unlikely that agricultural sector performance would improve in pro-poor ways without the dedicated support of specialists in leading DPs and it is therefore unlikely that Tanzania would move successfully towards the MDG targets- MDG 1 being key- without the ASDP. DPs are in many ways culpable for the slowness and anguish around getting the ASDP on the move but the commitment to it promises a more secure pro-poor development strategy that other aid instruments would not deliver. Senior civil servants in the MAFC were keen to emphasise the transitional nature of the ASDP SWAp arrangements. But it is not clear that a rapid evolution to GBS, the preferred aid modality for some senior figures, would promote the agricultural sector line ministries in broader MTEF and budget processes and thereby would risk undermining the potential for poverty reduction through enhanced and efficient sector spending. The difficulty for the agricultural DP community is an effective marriage between sector priorities and the evolution of DP-GoT partnership arrangements. At present, the DPs in agriculture are distanced from the partnership processes being implemented through the JAS. There is little relationship with the mainstream agenda which focuses on the PSFM and the PRSP framework. The agriculture sector and public expenditure review (PER) provides an opportunity to demonstrate the poverty reduction need for increased public investment in agriculture. So far though, the PER process in agriculture is weak. It is not yet clear that the ASLMs and the agriculture DPs have engaged strategically on utilising the PER as a vehicle for improvement of the ASDP process. In doing so, there could be substantive gains for the ASDP in ensuring it is an aspect of the mainstream policy dialogue in the Development Partner Group. Possible area for Global Donor Platform for Rural Development to pursue in further analytic work: A headquarters study four donors had HQ issues that delayed the MoU focused on incentives and rules and how these affect capacity to engage with the harmonisation agenda in agriculture. Supporting more structured approaches to analytic work on agriculture and poverty (and the other MDGs.) Reviewing experience with decentralised planning. Examining ways to strengthen agricultural PER processes focusing on the pro-poor growth potential of the sector.

1. Introduction
This study is one of a series commissioned through FAO by the Global Donor Platform on Rural Development. It was preceded by a desk review of Agriculture and Rural Sector Wide Approaches (SWAps) which laid out an analytic framework for the study. The intention of this work is to assess the role of SWAps in agricultural and rural development assistance and to improve understanding and practice of donor support for the agriculture sector and impact upon poverty. The final output will be a synthesis paper that brings together the main findings from the country studies. Tanzania has had a chequered history on aid effectiveness. There was a major crisis in the aid relationship in the 1990s which triggered an independent review - the Helleiner report in 1995. Since then, Tanzania has emerged as one of the front runners in the redesign of the aid relationship. The Tanzania Joint Assistance Strategy is an ambitious approach by the government and donors, the Development Partner Group, to apply best practice principles on harmonisation and alignment. Tanzania is also one of eight countries piloting the One UN this year (United Nations, 2006). This is the UNs high profile initiative on internal reform aiming to become a more effective partner in targeting the Millennium Development Goals. The sector wide approach for Tanzanian agriculture, the Agricultural Sector Development Programme (ASDP) is very much a part of this reform process. The harmonisation and alignment agenda has been a significant contributor to the evolution of the aid relationship in agriculture towards the promotion of a single sector policy and expenditure framework (Amani, 2003). Despite this ambition, development of the ASDP has not been a smooth process; many stakeholders complained of the high transactions costs and the slow progress in actually getting donor resources to flow. Section two of this report outlines the approach adopted in the study followed by a brief overview of the agriculture and rural development sector (section three) and an account of the ASDP (section four). Section five is the analytic core of the study and examines the experience with the SWAp to date. External resource flows for the execution of the ASDP are only starting this year so it is premature to examine any impacts on growth or poverty. The study identifies three concerns, all central to improved public sector policy and investment in an aid dependent economy and each of which provides important insights into the challenges to the ASDP process. These three concerns are local-level planning; domestic ownership, illustrated through the contestation over irrigation; and, harmonisation and alignment. The section explores why they are central to an understanding of the underlying prospects for the ASDP to provide agriculture policy and public investment that deliver growth and poverty reduction. A core argument developed concerns the benefits, in terms of pro-poor growth, that are the potential gains from a successful ASDP. This is contrasted with use of General Budget Support (GBS) as the main aid modality. GBS in Tanzania is not associated with expanded or improved agricultural spending and the ASDP represents an opportunity to do both of these things. Sections six (SWAps and the wider development context) argues for a more effective use of the sector Public Expenditure Review as a means of strengthening the ASDP, particularly in seeking to realise the potential for pro-poor growth as well as providing engagement with broader public spending and aid processes. Section seven (overall assessment and performance) summarises the findings with specific suggestions on priorities for further analytic work.

2. Approach and Method

The country case studies build upon the desk review (Evans et al. 2006) which developed a change framework to lay out the expected benefits from the SWAp process. The framework seeks to trace the logic of the SWAp from Initial Conditions through Inputs, Activities and Outputs to Outcomes and Impacts. The framework is summarised in a diagram (see Appendix One). The expected outcomes are diversified, less risky livelihoods, better productivity and market opportunities and more country ownership. The impacts expected are better growth and higher incomes, non-income poverty reduction, empowerment and inclusion of poor people. In the case of Tanzania, these impacts are reflected in the goals of the National Strategy on Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP) and in the results framework of the ASDP (URT, 2006f). However, although the ASDP is based on a sector strategy written in 2001 it has had a long development and is only beginning this current financial year. The focus of this study is therefore on the five expected outputs from a SWAp. Improved policy coordination and planning Improved public financial management and service delivery Improved institutional capacity and government leadership Enhanced private sector interface Improved harmonisation and alignment

These outputs are building blocks for the Tanzanian agricultural SWAp. The ASDP is fully integrated into the PRSP/ MTEF framework and its budgeting, reporting and monitoring systems. The ASDP is focused on decentralised service delivery and its operational systems locally are fully integrated into the approaches pursued in the Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP). The ASDP also gives the private sector a very substantial role in agricultural service delivery either through contracts at local-level or through public-private partnership. Amongst these outputs there are three that are particularly interesting for the purposes of this Tanzanian study; these are the three relating to improvements in policy coordination and planning; improved institutional capacity and government leadership; and, improved harmonisation and alignment. In section five, a major issue relating to each of these is assessed from the experience with the preparation phase of the ASDP. In the logic of the SWAp framework, this assessment will reviews the challenges which initial conditions may offer to inputs and activities designed to derive these three outputs. Development Partners have been instrumental in working with government on the other two outputs -to improve public sector financial performance and service delivery and to develop a private sector strategy; these are government-wide concerns that have emerged over the last two decades as central features of national development policy. Tanzania has gradually made substantial improvements in public sector financial management reflected in the growing confidence with which development partners use GBS (Lawson et al. 2005). Part of this confidence also derives from a shared vision of the development challenges and the role of the private sector. But, it is too early yet to assess how well the ASDP actually delivers on financial management, service delivery or the private-public interface. The study included two weeks in Tanzania for interviews and information collection, work undertaken by Martin Greeley (IDS), Melissa Brown (FAO), Professor HKR Amani and Oswald Mashindano (ESRF). The team interviewed a large number of stake holders -see Appendix Three- in central government, in the donor community, in the academic community, and the NGO and private sectors. They also interviewed local government officials in Bagamoyo and rural Morogoro and visited villages to see local implementation of extension and investment activities and discuss agricultural planning. The team did not hold a separate workshop to discuss initial findings because the end of the mission coincided with the holding of the Agriculture Sector Public Expenditure Review, also in Bagamoyo. A study review workshop was thus ruled out but we had the advantage of being invited to attend the review meeting and benefited enormously from two days of intensive interaction with many of the key stakeholders. The three outputs identified for closer review were self-selecting in that they were the three most recurrent themes 8

of our conversations in Tanzania. On planning, the issue was decentralisation; on government ownership, the policy shift towards large public investment in irrigation proved a challenge to development partners; on harmonisation and alignment, adoption of the SWAp exposed important institutional challenges. In each of these three cases the Tanzanian experience should be of broader relevance to donors and help identify focal concerns for the Global Donor Platform for Rural Development.

3. The Agriculture and Rural Development Sector

The agriculture sector provides livelihoods for about 75% of the population and contributes almost 50% of GDP. Agriculture has been growing on average at nearly 5 per cent in the last five years and with a population growth rate of two per cent, farm households have had real income growth. The latest poverty data were published for 2000/01 and measured rural poverty at 39%, a marginal fall from 41% in 1991/92. During the 1990s average agricultural growth rates were 3.6%. There is no firm evidence on how poverty may have reduced as a consequence of the slightly higher average growth rates achieved over the last five years. However, meeting the MDG of halving poverty and food insecurity by 2015 will require GDP growth of at least 6-7% and therefore a required agricultural growth rate of the same order. There is no coherence around agricultural and rural development in Tanzania. As Guy Evers (2005) made plain on the first page of his Tanzanian study on harmonisation and alignment in rural development, in government-partnership arrangements there is no analytic focus on rural development. A Rural Development Strategy was developed in 2002 and subsequently a policy paper was produced but there is no engagement of development partners and government around these papers. Agriculture policy is formally based on the 2001 Agricultural Sector Development Strategy which was developed over three years through a consultative process and strong engagement of all the ASLMs. The strategy was informed by the 1997 Agricultural Sector Policy, the Tanzania Development Vision 2025 and by the first PRSP. The Strategy document formed the starting point for the three priority Task Forces set up to develop the ASDP. Through the Food and Agriculture Sector Working Group (FASWOG), development partners were important contributors to both these processes. The Agricultural Sector Development Strategy (ASDS) emphasises Tanzanias agricultural potential based on: comparative advantages in export and food commodities, the large human capital resource, the underused natural resource base and the political commitment to provide a policy environment conducive to sector growth, trade opportunities and private sector partnership. It also recognises the potential benefits from the political commitment to the development of decentralised planning, execution and monitoring of programmes utilising the LGRP. Agriculture policy is a core element of The National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty, the second PRSP, introduced in June 2005 and known by the Swahili term, Mkukuta. It is a carefully prepared document built on a yearlong process of consultation. It emphasises private sector growth, efficient government and decentralised planning. It underlines the critical role of agriculture in reducing poverty whilst recognising the constraints.

Constraints to Rural Growth The constraints to rural growth are largely related to those in the agricultural sector, broadly defined to include livestock and bee-keeping. The constraints include low productivity of land, labour and production inputs; underdeveloped irrigation potential; limited capital and access to financial services; inadequate agricultural technical support services; poor rural infrastructure hindering effective rural - urban linkages; infestations and outbreaks of crop and animal pests and diseases; erosion of the natural resource base and environmental degradation. Others include gender relations, weak producers organizations, poor coordination and limited technological capacity, depressed prices for primary commodities in global markets and insecurity with respect to property rights to land and its use as collateral for credit. Source: NSGRP, p6

The NSGRP is an important organising framework for budgetary allocations and also for monitoring and results assessment. There is a national poverty monitoring secretariat which assembles data on Mkukuta poverty cluster indicators (URT, 2006c) and the government is working to ensure that accounting mechanisms are consistent with the results reporting needs of the poverty reduction strategy. The NSGRP is also a central focus for implementing the Joint Assistance Strategy which promotes the harmonisation and alignment of development assistance. The agriculture sector is engaging with the NSGRP through the ASDP which, as described below, shares some of the key features of the NSGRP listed here (as summarised by the Joint Staffs Advisory Note (IMF/IDA 2005)). The macroeconomic framework underlying the MKUKUTA is consistent with its poverty reduction objectives. The MKUKUTA recognizes that achieving the authorities ambitious targets will require significant amounts of foreign assistance over the medium term as well as a careful management of aid inflows. Achieving the MKUKUTAs objectives will also require increased devolution of spending to lower levels of government. Development and implementation of the MKUKUTA has taken place in the context of a significant overhaul of national planning and budgeting systems aiming at comprehensive results based management, increased domestic accountability and greater alignment and harmonization of external financing. Extensive consultation in development of the MKUKUTA has been part of a broader effort in recent years to encourage greater participation in national planning and budget systems.

These NSGRP features are the national context which must inform the development of sector policy and budgets. Over 50% of the agricultural sector budget goes to MAFC where the budget has increased nearly threefold over four years (Table One). There has been a very substantial rise in the total government budget, due to good macroeconomic management and increasing donor support, but because of agricultures small initial share, the very large rise in the sector budget is small in percentage terms of the national budget. The agriculture sectors share in the total budget (MTEF) increased from 2.9% in 2003/04 to 4.0% in 2006/7. Contrasting the numbers in the two tables below shows -though only three years have data in both tables- that the ASLMs share in the development budget is small. Partly this is a reflection of perceived difficulties in effective spending in the sector; partly it is a result of dissatisfaction with sector policies and because of entrenched neoliberalism in DP attitudes wherein state support to agriculture is for the enabling environment. Moreover, GBS has typically been associated with increased expenditures on health and education not agriculture and until the ASDP, the ASLMs had to rely on project funding.

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Table 1: The Agricultural Development Budget (MTEF-based estimates) 2003/04 Total(T.Shs Billion) Local Share (%) Foreign Share (%) 30.3 9.6 90.4 2004/05 33.0 23.3 76.7 2005/06 30.4 11.5 88.5 2006/07 74.6 13.5 86.5

Source: The Agriculture Sector Public Expenditure Review 2006 (URT, 2006a) Table 2: External Resource Flows to Tanzania (Billion Tanzanian shillings) 2001/02 Total External Resources Total Budget Support Total Basket Total Project 558.8 164.9 74.1 319.7 2002/03 831.9 278.5 168.1 385.1 2003/04 871.4 494.4 87.2 289,824.0 2004/05 1,406 427.8 350.0 628,443.0 2005/06 1,389 591.7 299.7 497.9

Source: Ministry of Finance (rounded) The increase in 2006/07 in the agricultural development budget is due to the ASDP. The resource envelope, on paper for the first seven years of the ASDP, is over two thousand billion shillings which, if realised, would be a revolutionary transformation of agricultural financing. As one scientist in MAFC remarked with satisfaction but probably some optimism as well, it used to be schools, water or dispensaries, now it will be on-farm research, stores, irrigation, dams, dips, disease control and seedlings.

4. The SWAp
The NSGRP is a high-level planning document and its priorities have to be translated through sector strategies and policies into sector programmes and investment plans. The ASDS, produced in 2001, was a relatively early example of the new focus on PRSPs in Tanzania and was a suitable strategic framework for agriculture sector programme development. The strategy recognises the importance of related polices- cooperative development, land, water, microfinance, gender and environment- but is focused on the mandates of the agricultural line ministries and this is what informed the development of the ASDP. Key features of agricultural sector policy as laid out in the ASDS (and supporting documents) Sustained agricultural growth target of at least 5 percent per annum, to be achieved through the transformation from subsistence to commercial agriculture, and through the growth of existing commercial enterprises, as a core element of the National Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction. Transformation and growth is to be private sector-led through an improved enabling environment for enhancing the productivity and profitability of agriculture, with the removal of constraints to private sector involvement. Sector development to be facilitated through public/private partnerships, including increased contract farming (vertical integration), with a delineation of public/private roles. Focus on participatory planning and implementation, using the framework of the District Agricultural Development Plans (DADPs), which are part of the District Development Plans (DDPs). Decentralization of service delivery responsibilities to Local Governments Authorities.

Source: URT, 2006f p11

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The Agricultural Sector Development Programme is directed to proper agriculture -specifically technical ministries covering livestock, marketing, crop production and farmer groups (cooperatives). It does not include forestry, fisheries, wild life or natural resources. It does include marketing, roads (if local-planning identifies that investment need) and potentially, through the cooperatives and NGOs, access to rural finance. Its development has benefited from close involvement of the FAO Investment Centre (see e.g. FAO Investment Centre 2002 and 2003). They supported the development and work of three priority Task Forces to design the ASDP: TF-1: TF-2: TF-3: Investment and Implementation at District and Field Level Policy, Regulatory and Institutional Framework Agricultural Research, Extension, Training and Technical Services

Each of these Task Forces had several working Groups, of variable productivity, that enunciated the finer detail of the sector programme. Four ministries are involved. The PO-RALG is central to the strategy since it is responsible for management of district development planning processes. It supports and approves the local-level planning processes and implementation. In addition there are three technical line Ministries: Ministry of Livestock, the Department of Marketing in the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Marketing and the Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives (MAFC). MAFC houses the ASDP Secretariat and has been the lead ministry overall in developing the programme. The ASDP is built upon five principles (URT, 2006f, p12): Increasing control of resources by beneficiaries pluralism in service provision results-based resource transfers integration with government systems national scope

The objectives of the programme are: i). To enable farmers to have better access to and use of agricultural knowledge, technologies, marketing systems and infrastructure, all of which contribute to higher productivity, profitability and farm incomes. And, ii). To promote private investment based on an improved regulatory and policy environment. The programme involves three sub-programmes: agricultural sector support and implementation at district and field level (75%); agricultural sector support at national level (20%); and , cross-cutting and cross-sectoral issues (5%). Figure One below lays out the content of the ASDP sub-programmes and components.

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Figure 1: ASDP Sub-programmes and Components. Sub-Programme A. Agricultural Sector Support and Implementation at District and Field Level Main Components A.1 Investment and Implementation The production and processing of agricultural outputs; indicative funding allocation: 7080% of Sub-programme A (Through DADP/DDP) A.2 Policy, Regulatory and Institutional Framework Supporting enabling environment at LGAs for all farmers (indicative funding allocation: 75%) A.3 Research, Advisory Services and Training Establishing the support services needed for agricultural growth A.4 Private Sector Development, Marketing and Rural finance Supporting the commercialisation of agricultural growth A.5 Cross Cutting and Cross-Sectoral Issues Managing links between Agriculture and other sectors B. Agricultural Sector Support at Nationallevel (indicative funding allocation 20%) B. 1 Policy, Regulatory and Institutional Framework Creating a national enabling environment for all farmers and other actors in the sector B.2. Research, Advisory Services, and Training Establishing the basis for agricultural growth B.3. Private Sector Development, Marketing And Rural Finance C. Cross-Cutting and Cross Sectoral Issues Proposed Sub Components May include amongst other: Irrigation and water management Range management Livestock development and animal health Better land husbandry Crop production and protection Mechanisation Storage and post-harvest Agro-processing Policy and Regulatory framework District institutions Community empowerment Agricultural information Advocacy Client-oriented research Animal and plant multiplication Advisory services Training of producers Service provider training Private sector development Market development and infrastructure Producer organizations Financial institutions and services Agro-processing Same list as Sub-Programme C: e.g. HIV/Aids, Gender, Environment etc.) Policy & regulatory framework Commercial sub-sector development Agricultural information ASDP management and Secretariat Advocacy Research Animal and plant multiplication Extension/Advisory services Training and education Marketing; Rural finance Private sector development Agro-processing

Managing links between agriculture and other sectors, may include amongst others: Rural infrastructure and energy; Civil service and LGA reform; Land Acts implementation; Health (HIV/AIDS, Malaria); Gender; Education; Environmental management; Forestry and fisheries; Water

(indicative funding allocation: 5%) Source: Government ASDP Programme document p9. (URT, 2006f)

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At the heart of the strategy is the decentralisation of investment decisions to the local-level. This builds on the local government reform programme (LGRP) and strengthened democratic accountability underpinning that agenda. The LGRP is designed to strengthen transparency and accountability at local-level and to promote participatory approaches to the production of district development plans. Part of this agenda was new public finance management arrangements. In the case of agriculture, decentralising spending decisions is a good approach in principle because local needs to improve agricultural productivity are often context specific. This approach is examined in more detail in the next section. A second key feature of the ASDP is that the budget, disbursements and monitoring of the ASDP are fully integrated into the MTEF process and aligned with the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty. The programme document has a table listing 19 NSGRP targets that it will address. There is no coherence at this stage in the monitoring arrangements for the ASDP and the Mkukuta but this is an objective as monitoring arrangements for the ASDP are refined. The country context diagram below (Evers, 2005) sets out the relationships between different activities and stakeholders during the development phase of the ASDP. This remains valid -although the future of FASWOG is not clear. In addition, there are now more specific governance arrangements for the ASDP. The ASDP Secretariat reports to a committee of ASLMs directors. Above them there is an inter-ministerial coordination committee (ICC) responsible for overall policy guidance and coordination. The ASDP Basket Fund Steering Committee has both development partners and members of the ICC and is responsible for basket fund reviews,, work plans and budgets as well as having oversight of implementation. A fully-fledged agricultural strategy involves a wider set of policy arenas than is covered by the ASDP. Coordination around these policies happens at Cabinet-level. In addition the Ministers of Finance and of Planning, Economy and Empowerment will attend selected steering committee meetings.

Tanzania: Country Context - Overview

Joint Assistance Strategy (JAS)

National Strategy for Growth and the Reduction of Poverty (PRS 2)

Harmonization and Alignment (H&A) Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) Budget Support (including Basket Fund)

Development Partner Group (DPG)

Other Sectors Support

Local Government Support

Agricultural Sector Development Programme (ASDP)

Agricultural DPG

Food and Agriculture Sector Working Group

(FASWOG)
Source: Guy Evers, FAO Investment Centre, presentation at a Global Donor Platform meeting on Harmonisation and Alignment, Brussels, April 2006

Stakeholder Perspectives
From our first meetings in Dar es Salaam, it was clear that the concept of a SWAp meant different things to different people. The definition contained in the ASDP programme document is All significant funding for the sector supports a single sector strategy and expenditure framework, under government leadership, adopting common approaches across the sector, and progressing towards relying on government procedures to plan, disburse and account for all funds. Of particular concern was clarity of what types of funding modality could be part of a SWAp. Whilst the answer is any, as was said frequently, the devil is in the detail. The principles of the SWAp have to be maintained if the benefits are to be realised and the single expenditure framework becomes more complex to manage when there are 14

several different funding modalities. As discussed in section five, this is a major drawback. Senior civil servants in the MAFC were keen to emphasise the transitional nature of the ASDP SWAp arrangements. The commitment of development partners to General Budget Support was contrasted with these same donors, wishing to be in the kitchen in the ASDP. For these government officials, the ASDP was a compromise and they would have preferred budget support. This would allow some distancing of development partners from the detail of policy and a great reliance on monitoring and the Performance Assessment Framework for assessing development effectiveness. Given the commitment to the JAS and its first principle, of domestic ownership, donor behaviour may appear inconsistent. At least two of the original seven donors regarded the adoption of a basket fund approach as old-fashioned given their parallel commitments to GBS. Problems of capacity within the sector were highlighted as the explanation for this approach. Donors wanted more direct voice on sector policy than a GBS approach would provide. Indeed GBS conditionalities do not relate to the sector and the preferred mechanism under GBS for monitoring performance is the Public Expenditure Review. Other lead donors saw the basket fund approach as the only way to improve donor coordination in the sector given variable commitment to GBS. The alternative, it appeared, was more projects. A further reason for the transitional arrangements was the likelihood that funding would be more secure than through budget support. The shift to budget support had not benefited the ASLMs financially except in so far as better economic and financial management was leading to more overall resources both internal and external. Senior staff in the ASLMs are using the ASDP to argue for a higher share of the MTEF resource envelope. They are supported by some colleagues in the donor community with whom they work. Their case has three elements; first that agriculture has suffered gross relative neglect especially given the context of the poverty reduction and growth agenda 80% of poverty is rural. The dismantling or collapse of the old systems of support to small holder agriculture had not been effectively replaced by the private sector. More had to be done to promote private sector engagement. Second, that the ASDP was required if the NSGRP was to be effective since the growth and poverty reduction agenda was so closely linked to the condition of the agricultural sector, agricultural households in particular. Thirdly, that implementation of the ASDP would improve the quality of public expenditure in the sector and would generate demand for additional resources that, if available, would serve the NSGRP objectives. A related concern here expressed in more than one interview was that if resources were not forthcoming at local-level then decentralised planning processes would be seriously weakened as communities decided it was business as usual. A further domestic political argument is the increasing attention that politicians are giving to the ASDP. The benefits from ASDP-mounted awareness campaigns at Regional and lower-levels could also be in the form of greater local support for resourcing the ASDP. The commitment in the development of the ASDP to ensuring coherence with the NSGRP and with the budget process, has projected the ASLMs more into the Development Partner Group mainstream and this should also provide more opportunity for them to present their MTEF case.

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5. Experiences, Issues and Achievements

The slowness of the processes in moving from the 2001 ASDS to the ASDP programme document of May 2006 are not untypical of agricultural SWAps (Foster et al. 2000). Despite the time taken it is important to acknowledge the goodwill shown towards the process, the underlying spirit of collaboration as one development partner put it. He emphasised the capacity-building and lesson-learning on scaling-up from the sharing of different insights on promotion of poverty-reducing agricultural growth. Certainly, many developing partners worked intensively with government in the Task Forces to develop the ASDP. In fact though, much of the sharing was on process issues-such as planning, financial flows, monitoring and reporting- rather than on substantive agricultural policy matters. This was a complaint from ASLMs and other local stakeholders who went on to say that when donors did engage on policy it was informed by their own -non-harmonised- agendas and not supportive of government perspectives. Our analysis suggests that the underlying problems with the ASDP process were in fact largely due to fundamental difficulties in three areas: decentralisation, irrigation and harmonisation and alignment. Certainly, these were the topics that commanded most attention from stakeholders. We examine each of these in turn.

Decentralisation
There is considerable momentum behind the promotion of participatory planning in local government in Tanzania. The Local Government Capital Development Grant (LGCDG) has been an important instrument for strengthening local planning based on processes of consultation. The arguments favouring this democratic decentralisation are based on the expected greater relevance of plans to peoples welfare, transparency around their implementation and accountability for results. Building on these precepts, the ASDP is based on an ambitious plan to spend an indicative amount of 75% of total funds at district-level through District Agricultural Development Grants (DADGs). The expenditure is of three types: capacity building grants, extension grants and agricultural development (investment) grants. Each grant type has two components. There is a formula-based grant (using data on number of villages (80%), population (10%), and rainfall index (10%)). This formula has been changed twice since first introduced and it is still not obvious that it does the right job. However, it only affects the smaller amounts available in the basic grants. All districts qualify for the three basic grants and all are eligible to receive an enhancement based upon meeting some minimum initial conditions and thereafter on district annual performance assessments. The basic grants are financed through government resources and the enhancements come from the basket fund. The enhancements promise significant resources -between 120-240 million shillings a year per qualifying LGA. Each year every Local Government Authority (LGA) will be assessed and receive a 25% increase, no change or a reduction. In order to qualify for enhanced funding each LGA has first to qualify under the Local Government Reform Agenda which has strict annual assessment criteria. For example, an LGA that had failed to recruit staff according to their staffing plan, or that failed to have a proper audit could fail under the criteria set by the rules of the local government ministry (PO-RALG, Prime Ministers Office, Regional and Local Government). This is designed to ensure consistency from the centre but of course divorces agriculture funding decisions from any form of opportunities and obstacles for development analysis that leads the participatory agricultural planning process at local level in Tanzania. The cornerstone of the approach lies in the production of district agricultural development plans (DADPs). These were introduced in 2003 and since 2005 have been promoted through an extensive training programme (URT, 2006d). The ASDP is to be implemented at local-level through DADPs for which indicative budgets are pre-set and which emerge through a structured process of village-and ward-level meetings facilitated by district staff. The quality of the process is expected to improve over time as training support is extended and familiarity with this approach to planning grows. Other projects (notably, the Participatory Agricultural Development Empowerment Project) have bought useful experience on local agricultural planning. However, for the government such area-based programmes are problematic because it becomes more complex to manage a national district-planning strategy. The government commissioned a study (ESRF, 2004) to explore funding modalities of donors for strengthening district-level planning and it is now incorporated within ASDP. 16

Most of the development money- the enhanced DADG- is provided by development partners initially, with a 100% support this financial year declining to a projected 50% by 2010/11. In addition to compliance with the local government reform agenda and timetable, the DADPs will be assessed annually to determine access to enhanced DADGs. The criteria are: Quality of the local government agricultural planning Progress on agricultural services reform and provision Quality of local agricultural investments Local policy and regulatory environment 35% 20% 30% 15%

This approach, of performance-linked fund transfers, is sometimes described as a hands off, eyes on approach by the ASLMs. It is supported by a process of backstopping production and review of DADPs at Regional-level by Agricultural and Livestock Advisors. The annual performance assessment will be informed by M&E activities under the Planning and Reporting Database, which seeks to link MTEF Objectives and Targets with indicators which are measurable. Together with the financial tracking system -and the two systems are not yet fully convergent around the MTEF- this M&E activity will: track funds and measure outputs; measure LGA performance with grant funds; and, measure outcomes. The latter goal is not yet properly addressed and various ideas exist to link up with alternative sources of data such as the Local Government Monitoring Database, Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys and a Rapid Agricultural Services Survey every two years. With scarce resources, agriculture has had to compete with other sectors and sometimes these have taken priority -in 2005 it was education that was high on the political agenda and resources were directed towards primary enrolment targets and approved or even partially completed agricultural investments were left unfunded. A critical advantage of strengthened public sector financial management and the new planning and budget arrangements (IFMS and MTEF) under the ASDP is that they provide protection for agricultural spending, at least in so far as nationally agreed budgets are in fact funded and funds transferred to the ASLMs. There are substantial increases budgeted in the ASDP for public agriculture investment so these new instruments under the ASDP will become an increasingly large part of the local development agenda with a corresponding growth in local interest in influencing the patterns of expenditure. Arguably, the single biggest concern on the growth and poverty reduction potential of the ASDP relates to the quality of district planning. The DADPs are the vehicle for most of the public investment in the sector and there is little evidence from the process so far that they will lead to a coherent strategy for poverty-reducing agricultural growth. A crucial observation from one leading development partner was that the current quality of district planning was so low that good plans were unlikely. This donor is not prepared to put funds into the basket. This concern, over local capacity, was linked to deficits in knowledge, shortage of personnel, and the slower speed and poor technology at district-level. These problems were seen to be systemic and counterpart TA would not be a solution. For this donor, putting so many more financial resources at local level was unwise. Most other stakeholders shared these concerns but some of these felt it too early to pass judgement and that a longer time horizon was needed in assessing the approach. In a few cases, there were more fundamental concerns - the Ministry of Livestock for example did not feel that pastoralist voice would be heard in DADP processes. Other respondents in the ASLMs also pointed to problems of lack of trust between local-levels -village, ward, district- and to the complexities of managing multiple funds at local-level. In a field trip to the district town and villages in Rural Morogoro the district officials were well-versed in procedures and explained issues around planning with great clarity; they had produced a credible, if summary, plan with detailed costings for investments in accordance with planning requirements (URT, 2006b). They were also aware of potential problems in accommodation to the new way of doing things business unusual as it was described. For example, the ASDP involves new procedures for transferring money to villages -direct central payments rather than cheques given physically by district treasurers- and there were apprehensions about how they would work. The officials admitted that little was known about DADPs at ward- or village-level. Other problems identified, by villagers, related to the difficulty of getting their agricultural priorities recognised. Water was more likely to get identified, by women especially, as a priority and village leaders were thought to have other interests, political and business. The view was expressed that agriculture did not have a history in local-planning; there was some familiarity with participatory processes around dispensaries, water and sometimes roads. But in most cases, these local planning proc17

esses never have had an agricultural services focus and this would challenge the planning process. Unlike SWAps in the social sector, it is difficult to define minimum standards for service delivery in agriculture, or indeed to define agriculture, and past experience of district plans generally shows little focus on agriculture. As reported in the box below, research studies also suggest that the problems of local-level planning may be difficult to resolve. But, this Tanzanian study also observes a few lines earlier that At the same time, respondents indicated that the more successfully implemented components of the district plan were those benefiting from central government programmes - basket-funded sectors (education and health) and the Road Fund (an earmarked tax) for district road maintenance and repair (Cooksey and Kikula, summary, 2005). International research on decentralised service delivery -mainly education and health services- also suggests that where central line departments have direct control -usually via a legal mandate, decentralised planning is more effective because local planning is constrained even though there may be no explicit earmarking (see Robinson 2007). This would appear to augur well for the ASDP in an efficiency sense but the researchers add that this approach is not conducive to participatory approaches or to equity and social justice. Further Tanzanian research confirms this view. Ellis and Mdoe (2002 cited in Cooksey, 2004, p3) in their rural livelihoods research identify a gap between the objectives of the Poverty Reduction Strategy and the nature of local-level governance, highlighting the risk that decentralisation will lead to an escalation of predatory behaviour on the part of local councils rather than more accountable government and better service provision. The PRS needs to identify, evaluate, and seek to diminish those factors in the institutional and fiscal environment at local levels that are discouraging and inimical to trade, investment, risk-taking and enterprise If this does not occur then no amount of school or road building in rural areas will result in the poverty reduction that the PRSP process seeks to achieve. Extract from summary of a recent research study on district planning in Tanzania Most respondents (from a survey of district staff) declared various factors constraining effective planning at the district level. They mentioned lack of resources particularly transport, unmotivated and under-trained district officials, serious staff shortages, unenlightened communities, of politics and corruption. Most of the respondents thought local revenue raising practices discouraged local-level initiative and discriminated against the poor, and that both council staff and councillors were guilty of unbecoming behaviour. These findings support the view that district-level planning is a relatively weak resource allocation mechanism. The capacity to set and finance priority investments is seriously undermined. The weaker resource base at district level compared to that of the central level, the unsustainable parallel structures set up by donor agencies and the practice of political patronage at all levels are some of the factors that impact on the planning and implementation of sustainable development initiatives at the district level. The current policy thrust in favour of participatory district planning does not address these underlying constraints. To contribute to poverty reduction within a decentralising local government system, there needs to be much more grounded and reflective political and institutional realities, and more modest in its ambitions. Effective participatory planning presupposes effective devolution of power. This means elected local governments enjoying certain autonomy from the centre, and accountability to the local populace for the use of resources. The latter has been demonstrated by participatory planning in parts of Mbozi and Sengerema Districts (Kikula, 2004). Ultimately, devolved local government goes together with democratisation, a plural society, and a viable civic culture. For the moment, the dominance of patrimonial politics continues to limit reform efforts. Source: When Bottom-Up Meets Top-Down: The Limits of Local Participation in Local Government Planning in Tanzania. Brian Cooksey & Idris Kikula, REPOA, Special Paper no 17, 2005 It is widely acknowledged that there is a steep learning curve on local-level planning and there are programmes for training of trainers and detailed planning and implementation guidelines (URT, 2006d) for undertaking DADPs. Several development partners have supported strengthening of district planning and more resources are likely to be made available to help strengthen local-level planning. There is widespread recognition of the problems and some evidence (ESRF, 2004) of improvement. Probably, the biggest challenge lies in promoting equity concerns in these processes. As other decentralisation research studies have clearly shown, it is usually possible to direct benefits to the poor specifically only as a consequence of them sharing in improved universal service provision resulting from decentralisation. In Tanzania, agriculture is the primary sector for the promotion of pro-poor growth yet there is lit18

tle or no attention to distributional outcomes in the new planning processes. This only reflects the broader malaise of much development planning and its poor history but the considerable scaling up of resources for agriculture and their deployment at district-level may not result in the anticipated poverty reduction outcomes if local-investment decisions have no specific poverty-focus and are biased towards powerful interests locally. Responding to these types of challenge is not even on the agenda, on the presumption that if planning can deliver a decent growth strategy it will necessarily be good for poverty reduction. The early experience of DADPs from 2003 onwards was undermined by delays in preparations of plans and delays in funding. The current financial year had the same two problems. The financial year started in July 2006 but the DADP plans were still going through their approval process at PO-RALG in Dodoma in early October; release of funds, at least for the donor money for the enhanced grants, requires these approvals and no funds were released in the first quarter though since this was the first ever Basket Fund disbursement there were other causes of delay as well. Without any history to inform an opinion, it is not clear how precisely the approval of work plans by the ASDP Basket Fund Steering Committee would operate but there was a clear concern from civil servants in MAFC that development partners on the committee would seek to micro-manage. This in itself would undermine the immediate DADP process but it would also fundamentally distort the longer-term accountability gains expected from a domesticallyowned process as it starts to gain greater fluency. The policy challenge of agricultural investment decentralisation is poorly understood but the answer will not be to divest the process of its democratic aspiration. Lead partners are aware of this and emphasise the importance of monitoring and good financial management instead.

Irrigation
The implementation of the ASDP is largely based on executing the DADPs which are expected to reflect local priorities. However, the estimated ASDP costs by component indicate that, in the first seven years, almost 60% of local programme investment will be spent on irrigation. In addition to the DADG there is a separate fund (DIDF) for district irrigation investments which is 15 times larger than the funds for the enhanced DADG. The ASDP programme document recognises that it is not yet known what exactly will be identified locally but has nevertheless made this commitment. In addition to any irrigation budgets drawn up under the LCGDG and DADG, the DIDF is there as a substantial resource to finance LGA irrigation proposals. Access to these funds will be determined by a central committee with Ministry of Finance, ASLM, River Basin Development Authorities and private sector representation; it will be chaired by a civil servant from PO-RALG. An irrigable area of 1 million hectares was identified in the 1997 agricultural policy paper and this number was repeated in the 2001 ASDS though not elaborated upon. It then re-surfaced in the election manifesto of the current government in 2005. The substantial allocation to irrigation has only emerged since then. In the August 2005 version of the programme document the total expenditure (over 8 years to include part of 2005/06) was estimated at 744 billion Tanzanian shillings; in the next version published, the seven year budget was 2,493 billion Tanzanian shillings. The (over threefold) difference is largely due to irrigation. There was a DIDF, at 87 billion Tanzanian shillings in the original programme document that covered both local and national schemes; these have been separated- 1,493 billion for the DIDF and 474 billion for the national schemes. The numbers may be rough projections only but they are a sign of government intent and a major shift in agricultural policy towards a huge public investment commitment. Further evidence is in the budget breakdown for the ASDP. The government has signed up for very little investment outside of irrigation and has left capacity building almost entirely to development partners investments. The financing proposal involves 32% of expenditures being over the MTEF ceiling in 2008/09 the last year of the current three year framework. This is expected to come from changes in MTEF ceilings and an increasing share of ASLMs in the MTEF. This direction for the ASDP was not supported by several development partners and led to delays and re-negotiations. The annual work plan and budget for MAFC was one focus of the blockage -including issues around national irrigation services- and was resubmitted to the development partners by the government in September after first being sent in May. The first version of the new investment agenda in the draft ASDP programme document was unambiguous in the irrigation focus. The document included a graph which presumed that the irrigation investments would be made and referred to Additional ASDP irrigation expenditures -Basket financed. After negotiations with developing partners the agreed version was reformulated to read Proposed irrigation expenditures exceeding current MTEF request. One development partner withdrew from the basket fund over this issue. In practice, such 19

withdrawal is consistent with the Joint Assistance Strategy aim to reduce the number of donors in each sector, limiting proliferation and the associated transactions costs; this then became the ostensible grounds for withdrawal. However, where sector funds are so scarce, as in Tanzanian agriculture, proliferation may best be handled by using silent partnersdonors who are willing and able to trust in the engagement of other developing partners to manage fiduciary risk and direction of spending but this would not have carried the message intended. For another, major, partner the introduction of this strong investment emphasis on irrigation undermined their immediate support for the Basket Fund and led to protracted negotiations. Their concerns were also with the new focus on irrigation at the national level which is 19% of the total ASDP budget. These investments are to occur on a public-private partnership basis with government providing investment equivalent to a quarter of private provision. The issue was not irrigation per se as an area for agriculture investment but capacity to implement and particularly to properly utilise environmental, social and resettlement guidelines, for the national schemes. The differences over irrigation brought into sharp focus the issue of national ownership. The government is clearly committed to irrigation expansion; this view is heard from senior politicians as well as top bureaucrats in major ministries. In fact, senior politicians have promoted the ASDP in speeches made during tours out of the capital and linked it to progress on poverty reduction. And irrigation investment certainly has potential for agricultural-growth led poverty reduction so it is unfortunate that what could have been a golden opportunity to embrace domestic ownership became such a bone of contention. This was partly based on disillusion because the type of domestic ownership expected from some development partners was one based on participatory district plans not on central steer of the investment portfolio. Clearly the DIDF resource envelope is effectively controlled from the centre. Partly it was based on worries about implementation capacity because of the scale of irrigation investment proposed. Partly perhaps as well, there was a feeling that the process that development partners had supported -the Task Forces and Working Groups that helped develop the ASDP- was sidelined. For some more acerbic commentators it represented a retreat from private sector focus in development of the sector, at least with the DIDF. An alternative view, more charitable to the shift in policy direction, was that the problems of effective local-level planning, outlined above, were a real issue for the government. Experience so far did not suggest that farmers would typically have a strong voice in district priority setting and encouraging irrigation investment is a way to restore the balance. The likely alternative of roads, whilst potentially offering a vibrant agriculture a high return, was not a priority for the ASLMs. Moreover, since much of the irrigated-linked public expenditure would be with local contractors this was a possible way to create a win-win situation despite the difficulties of managing local political economy. Whilst there are many examples where local-level planning has been effective in identifying agricultural opportunities they have typically been associated with development partner projects and have not really charted an institutional and political economy road map for effective local-level agricultural planning. Tying the bulk of resources in this way restored ASLM control over the process in practice even though the formal situation was essentially the same since LGAs were responsible for submitting their proposals to the DIDF. They may anyway have received help from their Zonal Agricultural Research and Development Institute or Regional-level staff. Such links will obviously influence their funding prospects and de facto strengthen the role of the centre in irrigation investment decisions. Another more charitable view is that the government does not believe that reliance on the private sector investments would really serve the PRSP agenda. There is increasing support for this view amongst development partners also given the limited impact that the modest agricultural growth of the last decade has had on the poverty reduction target. Irrigation investments have been supported by most stakeholders, seeing experience elsewhere in the world, that irrigation can be an effective vehicle for poverty reduction. The national irrigation master plan may have become redundant but there is a legacy of prepared schemes that can be polished. The ASDP however, does not itself provide the analytic background work that would allow more detailed understanding of irrigation-poverty reduction links. The national irrigation scheme investments anticipate a major role for the private sector (75% of expenditure) and, according to the ASDP, improved water management of over 441,000 hectares. Poverty and social impact appraisal is clearly a priority concern. With small schemes, that have been allocated nearly three times the resources of national schemes, there is also the expectation that poor farmers are likely to be beneficiaries. The poverty reduction outcomes will depend on a number of factors foremost amongst which are the crop grown, the labour use and labour productivity implications. A focus on traditional cereal crops may be the most effective in poverty reduction though some analysts argue that since these are largely non-traded the eventual outcome would be lower food prices injurious to poor farmers. If such price effects do occur and are significant there are interventions to correct for them; 20

for the vast majority of Tanzanias rural poor who are seasonally food deficit this outcome is clearly beneficial. Value chain analysis suggests that the alternative of irrigating export crops, especially with the new export crops, flowers for example which are more likely to result from private sector engagement, has less likelihood of significant direct poverty reduction. With such a strong emphasis on irrigation in the ASDP, there will no doubt be more attention in future to the distributional and poverty impacts. The policy is founded on a belief, and some limited evidence, e.g. of increased marketed surplus with irrigation, that this is the right approach for poverty reduction and that such change is necessary. Opinion surveys show (see Cooksey 2004, Box 1) that there is a widely-held perception that the poor have not been wellserved by public policies to date and this too creates a pressure for visible and effective public investments. Development partner anxiety is partly based on history and a worry that a high degree of state direction over investment is inefficient and the wrong direction in which to be moving. A senior civil servant commented dont use (our) bad history to condemn the future. There was evident commitment to the emphasis on irrigation-led growth from the senior civil servants and development partner anxieties may be misplaced. They may not fully appreciate adjusting to the fact of a shift in policy but it is a country-led policy shift. The central issue emerging from the irrigation saga during the final formative stages of the ASDP is development partners understandings of domestic ownership and their willingness to engage constructively with shifts in national policy which they have not initiated.

Harmonisation and Alignment

Tanzania is rightly well-regarded for the progress during the last decade on improved DP-GoT relationships. OECD (2003) is one of numerous donor reports that speak positively of the changes, whilst acknowledging that challenges remain. It is clear that the challenges, sometimes confrontations, surrounding the development of the ASDP could easily have led to an impasse; the wider commitment to Harmonisation and Alignment was instrumental in patiently working to overcome these difficulties. Nevertheless, there is a sense of frustration all round that delays have occurred. GoT-DP relationships have surmounted serious obstacles in the past but the ASDP process has not so far been a good case study of improving practice. There are three groups of problems. First was the limited domestic capacity to plan something as ambitious as the ASDP which undermined processes of alignment. The resourcing of the ASDP Secretariat, even with technical support from donors, was inadequate for the task of sector development. The project mode was familiar, and sometimes had had lucrative incentives through PIUs, and the change in mind set towards the sector approach took time to become embedded within the ASLMs. Even now commitment varies, at least in private, amongst the ASLM Ministries, as perceived, and real, resource benefits from the ASDP are unevenly distributed. Through the Joint Assistance Strategy (JAS), donors are trying to improve their coordination around capacity building, supporting strategic as well as technical skills (Suzuki, 2005). This coordination is not yet apparent in the ASLMs. Second, donor proliferation has been a serious obstacle to speedy ASDP progress. Seven DPs supported the ASDP but they, and other DPs, also have projects. Donors were undisciplined in the preparatory phase, for example by not engaging through the ASDP Working Group, an offshoot of FASWOG, but instead negotiating bilaterally. Some donors had little to contribute technically to the development of the ASDP but nevertheless exercised voice. Government officers complained of the difficulties in dealing with donors who sometimes were unable to agree amongst themselves in meetings with the ASLMs. Staff capacities were an issue - strong technical agencies need to be empowered to take a stronger leadership role. At some points in time deficiencies here meant that some DPs did not respect DP sector leadership. Linked to this problem of proliferation, for several donors, there is lack of internal coherence of DPs within country offices (sometimes) and often with their HQs. These problems led to lengthy delays in the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding for the Basket Fund. The problems relate to accountability mechanisms and legal and policy frameworks. This is true even for DPs that provide GBS since their sector funding operates under different governance arrangements. For several donors, including the largest donor, their Basket Fund contributions are processed as projects with their attendant governance rules. This has resulted in detailed review processes requiring multiple donor approvals of work plans, through the Basket Fund Steering Committee. It is not clear just how much voice donors will seek to exercise through this mechanism but it is clearly obstructive of genuine domestic ownership. And of course, management of existing (and some new) projects into the ASDP mainstream is problematic. This issue is addressed in more detail, including specific recommendations, in Appendix Two, prepared by Melissa Brown. 21

Thirdly, and as elaborated in the earlier discussion on irrigation, there is only lukewarm delivery from DPs on domestic ownership. Some DPs thought the re-centralisation implicit in the funding arrangements for irrigation were symptomatic of a wider trend though it is not at all clear why they should think that. The state has undergone major transformation from its socialist roots to a political stance that embraces the neo-liberal reform agenda. This may have been foisted upon the state initially but the urgency of renewing the social compact between the state and its citizens following the failure of the socialist experiment is clear (Greeley and Jenkins, 2000). The state has been very active in seeking politically legitimacy for its policies and the push on irrigation is a prime example. Delivering services effectively and raising living standards does drive policy reform but DPs are often uncomfortable, even suspicious, and insufficiently fleet-footed to adjust to domestic policy initiatives. In some cases, this DP stance reflects arrogance and for others it reflects a lack of historic knowledge and analytic capacity. DPs complained that the new policies were politically-motivated. This is curious when domestic ownership is supposedly their mantra. Moreover, in the case of irrigation, it is clearly central to improved poverty reduction effectiveness of public investment so DP unhappiness is questionable. Certainly, issues of technical capacity to effectively implement the domestic policy agenda are legitimate but the DPs problems with new policy directions were not wholly driven by this concern. Despite these three sets of problems, many stakeholders were able to see benefits as well as costs from the lengthy transactions involved in the development of the ASDP. The project mode as practised within the sector was inconsistent with and undermining of wider reform processes. Now, there is recognition that, even if international resource flows continue in project mode, they should be consistent with H&A principles under the ASDP. For lead donors, this is one of the key achievements of the protracted process in finalising the ASDP. Secondly, agricultural specialists within DP organisations are often uncomfortable with new aid modalities that have systematically underplayed the importance of agriculture even though the main route to poverty reduction, and MDG 1, has to depend on stronger agricultural sector performance. The neglect of agriculture generally in SSA is clear from disbursement records (World Bank 2006) and Tanzania is no exception. The renewed commitment to public investment in agriculture, led by GoT, is overdue and the ASDP provides a modality that GBS does not because of its focus on PSFM and macroeconomic management. The ASDP provides a meaningful opportunity to engage effectively with pro-poor agricultural growth in contrast to the generalised growth management associated with GBS. The problems of incoherent and ineffective sector development associated with earlier project investments are potentially removed through the commitment to the ASDP. GoT has recognised this and energetically promoted the programme politically. DP specialists in the sector recognise the opportunity and have promoted the programme despite collegial quibbling over the use of old instruments. The ASDP is perhaps the most important opportunity to promote pro-poor growth, renew state legitimacy and enhance donor effectiveness; at least some of the DP stakeholders have recognised this and, despite the problems listed above, have committed their organisations to positive support. GoT, together with the lead donors, has also brought pressure to bear on other DPs, whose governance structures are antiquated, to buy in to this progressive agenda. To summarise, these problems described above -decentralisation, irrigation, harmonisation and alignment- are of course serious but the opportunity that the ASDP provides is worth the investment. It is unlikely that agricultural sector performance would improve in pro-poor ways without the dedicated support of specialists in leading DPs and it is therefore unlikely that Tanzania would move successfully towards the MDG targets MDG 1 being key without the ASDP. DPs are in many ways culpable for the slowness and anguish around getting the ASDP on the move but the commitment to it promises a more secure pro-poor development strategy that other aid instruments would not deliver.

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6. Agricultural Swaps and the Wider Development Assistance Context

The GoT has been clear that the ASDP is regarded as temporary measure, preceding a transition to GBS. It is not clear though how long exactly temporary is. SWAPs are not only a temporary transition to GBS; they maybe a better way to help develop new policy, also policy assessment and technical assessment. Sector performance on these aspects has been weak and there are compelling arguments for strong longer-term sector engagement from DPs. In the absence of the ASDP what is the counterfactual? And could it deliver the complex change programme on public investment in agriculture underway in the ASDP? The key issue for the DP sector specialists is to develop their partnership agenda under the ASDP in ways which are consistent with the mainstream JAS. The difficulty for the agricultural DP community is an effective marriage between sector priorities and the evolution of DP-GoT partnership arrangements. At present, the DPs in agriculture are distanced from the partnership processes being implemented through the JAS. There is little relationship with the mainstream agenda which focuses on the PSFM and the PRSP framework. The underlying problem is a lack of analytic depth in mainstream partnership arrangements on the analysis of poverty reduction priorities and the translation of this into effective DP engagement. This is not a problem just of the sector but of donor buy in to a growth strategy which has not cogently identified poverty emphases in sectoral terms. In common sense terms such a strategy would involve a strong engagement with small-holder agriculture yet the mainstream agenda from the DPs has no such focus. The failure of the mainstream agenda, preferred by the wider DP community, to focus on what are the constituent elements of a propoor growth strategy is a challenge for the specialised agencies and DP agricultural constituencies. The mechanism, advocated by government, now, and by leading voices in the DPs, through which these two agendas must be reconciled is the Public Expenditure Review process. The agriculture sector and public expenditure review provides an opportunity to demonstrate the poverty reduction need for increased public investment in agriculture. So far though, the PRS process in agriculture is weak. Through the FASWOG, there is close DP collaboration with GoT on the agricultural PER but it has been developed in a responsive mode, focusing on process issues and achievement of targets rather than being strategic on future priorities. The presentation of the latest PER took place whilst the mission was on and the team attended. It was a very positive experience with strong affirmation of the government commitment to the ASDP. Yet, the donor voice was weak, focusing on project-based out grower schemes and general sector growth strategies. However, the consultants, (Price Waterhouse, Uganda, a very strong team) who wrote the PER document identified opportunities for strengthening the process, chiefly through specification of priority study areas for subsequent PERs. This is sensible and provides the opportunity to focus attention on how the ASDP can be fine-tuned to more aggressively address poverty reduction. At the same time, supporting the PER analytically, the agriculture DPs can become more closely aligned with the JAS. The PER process is a part of the broader PSFM framework and represents a neglected, opportunity to provide the analytics of agriculture necessary for a successful growth and poverty reduction strategy. With the crucial importance of agricultural for poverty reduction it is clear where the PER focus should be yet this has not yet had effective support from DPs. There is not an estrangement from the PER process but only limited understanding of how the PER can be used to strengthen the ASDP as a growth and poverty reduction strategy in language understood in the JAS context. Claims by the DPs on the PER process in Tanzania are positive:

Another positive example is in Tanzania, where government and donors have redefined the traditional PER from a study that primarily fulfils fiduciary requirements to one that is part of the governments work plan and informs the annual budgetary decision-making cycle (World Bank, 2005, p64).
However, despite enthusiastic recommendations on process from the agriculture PER consultants, it is not yet clear that the ASLMs and the agriculture DPs have engaged strategically on utilising the PER as a vehicle for improvement of the ASDP process. In doing so, there could be substantive gains for the ASDP in ensuring it is an aspect of the mainstream policy dialogue in the Development Partner Group.

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7. Overall Assessment and Performance

The ASDP is consistent with the broad principles of the Paris agenda on improved development management Decentralisation of agricultural planning has a powerful logic but the quality of the consequent public investment is threatened by poor capacity to plan effectively. Development partners have been big supporters of democratic decentralisation but have not invested in the skills to make it happen. The SWAp is being used by GoT and lead DPs as an instrument to promote sectoral harmonisationsomething that they could not do with budget, probably not even with sector budget, support because of aid proliferation. The centrality of the sector strategy to effective pro-poor growth requires the more detailed engagement that the SWAp provides. DPs weak commitment to domestic ownership was exposed when new policy directions on irrigation investment were declared. Concerns of fiduciary risk and quality of spending may have been used as means to disguise a more fundamental concern over the scope of the proposed investments. Moreover, since the irrigation implementation plans effectively involve a recentralisation of spending decisions there is a legitimate question over what domestic ownership really means in a decentralised planning process. Headquarters policy and legal frameworks are, even now, an obstacle to harmonisation. There has been a failure to engage with analytic work on poverty. This is most apparent in assessing the policy shift towards irrigation investments. Donors have very different capacities to support such work but coordinated sector poverty analysis is necessary if the poverty reduction benefits of strong sector engagement are to be realised. Since agriculture sector performance is the principle driver of poverty reduction in Tanzania this should be a priority as the ASDP develops.

Present and Future role: Agricultural SWAps are potentially empowering for agricultural ministries that will/could lose out under GBS; their centrality to poverty reduction and growth behoves donors not to think of them as just transitional arrangements. The default mode of projects is not impossible in a SWAp BUT there is no doubt that they do impose high transactions costs; so do SWAps but if things go well then their costs should come done over time. There are transactions benefits as well if the outcomes include a stronger sense of shared vision for the development of the sector. Through the ASDP, Tanzania is gradually moving in the right direction. It is clear that other forms of DP support, specifically including GBS, would not have been able to achieve this progress because the dialogue and studies necessary for it would not have occurred. Possible area for the Global Donor Platform for Rural Development to pursue in further analytic work: A headquarters study four donors had HQ issues that delayed the MoU focused on incentives and rules and how these affect capacity to engage with the harmonisation agenda in agriculture. Supporting more structured approaches to analytic work on agriculture and poverty (and the other MDGs.) Reviewing experience with decentralised planning. Examining ways to strengthen agricultural PER processes focusing on the pro-poor growth potential of the sector.

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Major Documents Consulted

Amani, H K R, (2003), Poverty Reduction Strategy: Status and Issues, Module 6, PowerPoint presentation given at the Training Workshop on Policy Analysis Jambiani, Zanzibar, 17 21 March. Cooksey B, and I. Kikula, (2005), When Bottom-Up Meets Top-Down: The Limits of Local Participation in Local Government Planning in Tanzania. REPOA, Special Paper no 17. Cooksey, B. (2004), Can PRS succeed where SAP failed, HakiElimu, Working Paper 04.3. Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF), (2004), Strategies and Modalities for Joint Donor Support for District Agricultural Plans (DADPs), Final Report. Ellis, F. and N. Mdoe (2002), Livelihoods and Rural Poverty Reduction in Tanzania, LADDER Working Paper No. 11, Overseas Development Group, University of East Anglia. Evans A, Cabral L, and D Vadnjal, (2006), Sector Wide Approaches in Agriculture and Rural Development: Desk Review, prepared as part of a study of Sector Approaches in Agriculture and Rural Development, commissioned by the Global Donor Platform for Rural Development, May. Evers, G, (2005), Global Donor Platform Working Paper: Assessment Study on Harmonisation and Alignment in Rural Development: The Case of Tanzania, March. FAO Investment Centre, (2002), TANZANIA: Agricultural Sector Development Programme (ASDP) Third Backstopping Mission Back-to-Office Report, December. FAO Investment Centre, (2003), TANZANIA: Agricultural Sector Development Programme (ASDP) Fourth Backstopping Mission - Aide Mmoire February. Foster, M, Brown A and F Naschold, (2000), Whats different about agricultural SWAps?, Centre for Aid and Public Expenditure (CAPE), ODI, London June, (paper presented at DFID Natural Resources Advisers Conference 10 -14 July). Greeley M. and R, Jenkins, (2000) Mainstreaming the Poverty-Reduction Agenda: an Analysis of Institutional Mechanisms to Support Pro-Poor Policy making and Implementation in Six African Countries, IDS Research Report #51. International Monetary Fund and International Development Association, (2006), Tanzania National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRPMKUKUTA) Joint Staff Advisory Note, March. International Development Department (IDD) and Associates, (2006), Joint Evaluation of General Budget Support 1994-2004: Burkino Faso, Malawi, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Uganda, Vietnam, Draft Synthesis Report, IDD, School of Public Policy, University of Birmingham. Lawson, A, Booth, D, Msuya, M, Wangwe, S, and t. Williamson, (2005), Does General Budget Support Work, Overseas Development Institute, London, July. Menocal, A R, and S Mulley (2006), Learning from experience: A review of recipient-government efforts to manage donor relations and improve the quality of aid, ODI Working Paper No 268, May. Nilsson, M, (2004), Effects of Budget Support A Discussion of Early Evidence, UTV Working Paper No 4. Organisation For Economic Co-Operation And Development, (2003) DAC Peer Review, TANZANIA Development Assistance Committee, Paris. Robinson M, Does Decentralisation Improve Equity and Efficiency in Public Service Delivery Provision, IDS Bulletin, Decentralising Service Delivery, (2007), IDS, Vol 38 No 1, January, pp7-17. Suzuki, Yuko, (2005), Capacity Development: In Context of Aid Coordination, Harmonization and Alignment Agenda, UNDP, Tanzania, November. United Nations, (2006), Delivering as One Report of the Secretary-Generals High-level Panel on UN System-wide Coherence in the Areas of Development, Humanitarian Assistance, and the Environment. 25

United Republic of Tanzania, (2001), Agricultural Sector Development Strategy, October. United Republic of Tanzania, (2005), The National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty, Vice Presidents Office, Dar es Salaam, June. United Republic of Tanzania, (2006), A Memorandum of Understanding for the Establishment of the Agricultural Sector Development Programme Basket Fund between The Government of the United Republic of Tanzania and Development Partners. United Republic of Tanzania, (2006a), Agricultural Sector Review: Performance, Issues and Options, Main Report (Volume I), October. United Republic of Tanzania, (2006b), Agriculture Development Plan (DADP) FY 2005/2006 Morogoro District Council. United Republic of Tanzania, (2006c), Indicators to monitor the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty, (MKUKUTA), Draft 1, Mkukuta Monitoring Secretariat, July. United Republic of Tanzania, (2006d), Local Level Training on ASDP: Training and Implementation Guidelines - July 2006, Agriculture Sector Development Programme. United Republic of Tanzania, (2006e), Annual Work Plan and Budget for FY 2006/2007, Agriculture Sector Development Programme. United Republic of Tanzania, (2006f), Agricultural Sector Development Programme (ASDP): Support Through Basket Fund, Government Programme Document, May. United Republic of Tanzania, (1997), The Agricultural Policy of Tanzania 1997, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, Dar es Salaam, January. World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (2005). 2005 Review of the PRS Approach: Balancing Accountabilities and Scaling Up Results, Washington DC, September. World Bank, (2006), World Development Report 2008 -Agriculture for Development in a Changing World: Overview, (draft), Washington DC, November.

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Appendix One: The change model underlying the SWAp process

Initial Conditions Inputs Activities Outputs Outcomes Impacts

Partner govts. Sector strategy & policy Annual sector exp. programme Sound macro Policy/strategy formulation & dialogue Sector exp Framework/ MTEF Policy focused on key public expemditure & enabling actions for growth & PR Policy clear about cross sectoral objectives/priorities More resources for govt. budget & more resources on budget Capacity building & improved PFM, enabling actions for private sector & non state actors Donors move towards H & A around sector goals and priorities Improved policy coordination, implementation & accountability Improved expenditure management & more equitable service delivery Improved institutional capacity & govt leadership Enhanced public/ private interface Improved aid management Promotion of diversified livelihoods Risk & vulnerability addressed Improved productivity & market opportunities Effective country led partnerships

More conducive growth & higher incomes Non-income poverty reduction Empowerment & inclusion of poor people

Participation by key stakeholders in sector Funding domestic policy pooled Govt.-led donor budget coordination project Non govt. Donors/DPs Major donors provide support within sector fw Donors moving towards reliance on govt. financial & accounting systems Donors moving to common approaches for management & implementation TA/capacity building

Harmonisation & Alignment

Key Assumptions & Risks: Political leadership & commitment to sector reform process Progress in other/related reform areas National & local authorities able to absorb increased finance/TA in this area Donors willing, able to align & harmonise their procedures

Source: Evans et al. (2006)

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Appendix Two
Moving towards Greater Harmonization and Alignment under ASDP: A Discussion Note on Accommodating Projects under ASDP Melissa Brown, FAO Investment Centre October 2006 Implementation of ASDP is expected to result in greater movement towards a single financing modality such as basket funding or budget support. In the short run, however, Government and Development Partners (DPs) will have to accommodate the mainstreaming of existing projects into ASDP and the development of new ASDP projects, both of which are likely to remain outside the basket financing arrangement. ASDP was launched in July 2006 and as implementation moves forward, it remains unclear how new and existing projects should be integrated if they are unable to participate in the basket. This brief discussion note is an attempt to identify principles that could be followed to ensure project and basket financing of ASDP is harmonized, maintains Government ownership, and reduces the transactions costs associated with managing multiple externally financed projects. A key element to ensuring harmonization between the ASDP basket fund and projects would be adherence to the same ASDP implementation modalities. In a fully harmonized scenario, project and basket funded ASDP activities would differ only in their source of funding and would be otherwise indistinguishable. While this may not be possible in practice, adoption of a set of principles designed to maintain the same core design of ASDP would represent a real move towards greater harmonization. An agreed set of core principles could be based on the following implementation modalities for both new and existing projects and basket funds: District Level Support Resource allocation to districts would follow the DADP planning process and activities that fail to appear in district plans would not be financed. No ex-ante earmarking of specific expenditures through the DADP would be allowed all districts would receive block grants and have discretion in deciding how to spend funds (investment, capacity building or services). Any earmarking of specific support activities to district level (such as specific training) would be managed at national level through the appropriate line ministry. Project funds would not be treated as additional funds expenditure ceilings for districts set by PMO-RALG/ Ministry of Finance would be adhered to and no district would benefit from having more projects (any district with multiple projects would see a reduction in the overall allocation from the block grant equal to the amount received by the project). Separate project accounts may be established but preference for disbursement through the LGA grants system and/or ASDP basket fund would be strongly encouraged. Any funds directed to separate accounts would follow the same procedures for approval and disbursement as the established LGA grants system and ASDP. No separate format for physical and financial reporting would be allowed but project expenditures and outputs could be identified and ring-fenced within the report documentation.

National Level Support Resource allocation would follow Government planning process and any item that is not identified in line ministry annual work programmes and budgets would not be financed. ASDP programme documents would be the primary basis for developing project activities any separate project document used to obtain approval for external financing would be based on government programme documents that describe specific activities in detail and which could be included as an annex. Separate project accounts may be established but a preference for basket funding would be strongly encouraged.

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ASDP Management and Financing The ASDP basket fund committee meetings should be expanded to include other ASDP financiers/DPs so that all external partners participate in the same discussions over annual work programmes, budgets, and reporting. While the basket fund committee would remain as a body with obligations under the existing MOU, Government should convene only one meeting with DPs regarding ASDP monitoring and financing. Approval of project activities and disbursement would take place through established ASDP procedures. No separate committee would be established to approve project disbursements. No separate project implementation units would be established at district or national level, the ASDP Secretariat and lead ASLM would take the lead in coordinating any projects. If there is a need for staff to manage the extra burden of project reporting, procurement or auditing, they should be financed and assigned to the ASDP Secretariat. All project activities would follow standard ASDP reporting, if there is need for additional project specific reporting to the financier, this would be an additional reporting format supported by the extra staff identified above. Information sharing among all external financiers of ASDP should be pursued including dissemination of any findings and reports associated with project or basked funded activities.

New Pilot Activities Any new pilot activities should be first identified and developed through DADPs or annual work programmes and budgets within the appropriate line ministries. They would follow the same approval, monitoring and reporting system as ASDP. Extra training to sensitize districts on pilot activities would be managed by appropriate line ministries but may involve more donor provided TA or in-kind resources than would be expected in other ASDP activities. New pilot activities would be expected to be short in duration (1 to 2 years) and then mainstreamed within ASDP.

Technical Assistance Requirements for technical assistance (TA) would be identified through the established Government planning process line ministry annual work programmes and budgets. TA could be provided on an in-kind basis or procured directly by DPs but untied TA would be strongly encouraged. Even if TA is off budget (procured by DPs), it should be included as an activity to be tracked in the ASDP monitoring and reporting system.

Adopting the principles outlined above may require revisiting of existing ASDP reporting formats and procedures to accommodate new and existing DP projects. It may also require DPs not currently participating in the basket fund to more fully commit to harmonization within ASDP. There will be a need for non basket donors to move away from implementing under the general framework of ASDP to a greater commitment to adopt specific ASDP implementation procedures. Existing projects may be required to amend project agreements to accommodate the changes outlined above. During implementation there will also be a need for greater advance planning and coordination to ensure compliance with the Government planning and budget process. All of this is likely to be time consuming and involve a process of negotiation and dialogue. Once implemented, however, it is likely to more fully contribute to achievement of the goal of harmonization under ASDP.

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Appendix Three: People Interviewed

Dr Peter Bisset Agricultural Development Consultant 15 Kennet Road PETERSFIELD GU31 4LS UK Ms Janet Bitegeko Agricultural council of Tanzania Dr J M N Bwire Director, National Livestock Research Institute Government of Tanzania Ellen Buch-Hansen Counsellor (Development) Agriculture, Pastoralists and Gender Royal Danish Embassy Ghana Avenue PO Box 9171 Dar es Salaam Mr J Buretta Acting Assistant Commissioner, External Finance (Multilaterals) Ministry of Finance, MOF Joseph Akrofi Coompson Principal Agricultural Economist African Development Bank/African Development Fund Agriculture and Rural Development Department BP 323 1002 Tunis Belvdre Dr S M Das Director Central Veterinary Lab Ministry of Livestock Development PO Box 9254 Dar es Salaam Mr Mbogo Futakamba Director, Irrigation and Technical Services MAFC Kilimo II House, Temeke PO Box 9192 Dar es Salaam Johann Hesse First Secretary Natural Resources Delegation of the European Commission Umoja House PO Box 9514 30

Dar es Salaam Hirofumi Hoshi Chief, Agriculture Sector Unit Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) 3rd Floor Barclays House, 1008/1 Ohio Street PO Box 9450 Dar es Salaam Mr I M Issae Agricultural Director Pastoral Systems Development MLD Ms Catherine Joseph Director of Policy and Planning Ministry of Livestock Development Mandela Road PO Box 9152 Dar es Salaam Mwatima A Juma (PhD) IFAD Country Officer c/o FAO Office PO Box 2 Tetex House Pamba Road Dar Es Salaam Dr Sizya Lugeye Agriculture and Natural Resources Advisor Irish Aid Embassy of Ireland PO Box 9612 Dar Es Salaam Mr Peniel M Lyimo Permanent Secretary Head of Delegation Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives PO Box 9192 Kilimo 1 Dar Es Salaam Dr Noah G Maiseli Ministry of Livestock Livestock Identification, Registration and Traceability PO Box 9154 Dar Es Salaam Koji Makino Deputy Resident Representative and Senior Economist Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) 3rd Floor Barclays House 1008/1 Ohio Street

PO Box 2 Dar Es Salaam Dr S B Meena Agricultural Director for Research, Training Extension Ministry of Livestock Development Josephine Joseph Mkunda Training, Lobbing and Advocacy Officer National Network of Farmers Groups in Tanzania (MVIWATA) PO Box 3220 Morogoro Dr J O Mollet Ministry of Livestock Development PO Box 9152 Dar Es Salaam Louis-Philippe Mousseau Senior Environment Specialist Department of Agriculture and Rural Development Country operations for North, East and South Regions (ONAR), AfDB BP 323 1002 Tunis Belvdre Arthur Mwakapugi Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Energy and Minerals 754/33 Samora Avenue PO Box 2000 Dar Es Salaam Mr P S Mwasha Assistant Director Livestock Extension Services Ministry of Livestock Department PO Box 9152 Dar Es Salaam Jane Mwangi Poverty Eradication Division Ministry of Planning Economy and Empowerment Professor Bruno J Ndunguru Executive Director Tea Research Institute of Tanzania 5th Floor, Twiga House, Samora Avenue PO Box 2177, Dar Es Salaam Mrs A P Njombe Ministry of Livestock Development PO Box 9152 DSM Mr Chacha Nyakimori Coordinator, ASDP Secretariat

MAFC David A Nyange Agricultural Economist Dept of Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness Sokoine University of Agriculture PO Box 3007 Morogoro Kevin Quinlan Growth Policy Adviser DFID British High Commission DFID Tanzania PO Box 9200 5th Floor, Umoja House Garden Avenue Dar Es Salaam Josephat S Sanda Executive Director Tanzania Chamber of Commerce Industry and Agriculture (TCCIA) PO Box 9713 Dar Es Salaam Louise L Setshwaelo FAO Representative in Tanzania Telex House Pamba Road PO Box 2 Dar Es Salaam Clifford Tendari MKUKUTA Monitoring Secretariat Poverty Eradication Division Ministry of Planning Economy and Empowerment Government of Tanzania Andrew E Temu (PhD) Associate Professor Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness Sokoine University of Agriculture PO Box 3007 Morogoro Dr. Florens Turuka, Director, Marketing Department Ministry of Industry, Trade and Marketing Government of Tanzania Professor Brian Van Arkadie Social Adviser Economic and Social Research Foundation PO Box 31226, Dar Es Salaam 31

Professor Samuel M Wangwe Chairman Daima Associates Limited Development & Management Consultants Daima House Makumbusho Street Kijitonyama PO Box 75027 Dar Es Salaam James Yonazi Assistant FAO Representative Programme FAO Tetex House Pamba Road PO Box 2 Dar Es Salaam

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Prepared by Martin Greeley (IDS) (IDS: Institute of Development Studies) The views presented in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Global Donor Platform for Rural Development. Published by Global Donor Platform for Rural Development, c/o Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) Adenauerallee 139-141, 53113 Bonn, Germany November 2007

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www.donorplatform.org

Contact: Secretariat of the Global Donor Platform for Rural Development, c/o Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) Adenauerallee 139-141, 53113 Bonn, Germany Phone: +49 (0) 228 535 3276 and 3699 Fax: +49 (0) 228 9910 535 3276 Email: secretariat@donorplatform.org Website: www.donorplatform.org Publication date: November 2007