City of Manila vs Gomez Facts: The issue in these present case is the validity of the additional realty tax

x imposed by the city of Manila. Prior to ordinance No. 7125 ,which provides the additional % realty tax, the city of manila thru Section 64 of the Revised Charter of Manila, RA. 409, fixes the annual realty tax at 1 %.cOn the other hand, section 4 of the Special Education Fund Law, RA. 5447, imposed "an annual additional tax of 1 % on the assessed value of real property in addition to the real property tax regularly levied thereon under existing laws" but "the total real property tax shall not exceed a maximum of 3%. The petitioner enacted ordinance no. 7125 and as result Esso Philippines, Inc. paid ( private respondent) under protest on additional % tax on its land and machineries located in Manila.cEsso filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the recovery of the said amount. It contended that the additional onehalf percent tax is void because it is not authorized by the city charter nor by any law. The trial court declared the tax ordinance void and ordered the city treasurer of Manila to refund to Esso the said tax. Hence this petition. Issue: Whether or not the additional % realty tax is valid and legal. Held: Yes. We hold that the doctrine of implications in statutory construction sustains the City of Manila's contention that the additional one-half percent realty tax is sanctioned by the provision in section 4 of the Special Education Fund Law that "the total real property tax shall not exceed a maximum of three per centum. The doctrine of implications means that "that which is plainly implied in the language of a statute is as much a part of it as that which is expressed" While the 1949 Revised Charter of Manila fixed the realty tax at one and a half percent, on the other hand, the 1968 Special Education Fund Law definitively fixed three percent as the maximum real property tax of which one percent would accrue to the Special Education Fund. cThe obvious implication is that an additional one-half percent tax could be imposed by municipal corporations. Inferentially, that law fixed at two percent the realty tax that would accrue to a city or municipality. And the fact that the 1974 Real Property Tax Code specifically fixes the real property tax at two percent confirms the prior intention of the lawmaker to impose two percent as the realty tax proper. That was also the avowed intention of the questioned ordinance. The unavoidable inference is that the later law ( Special Education Fund) authorized the imposition of an additional onehalf percent realty tax since the contingency referred to by the complaining taxpayer would not arise in the City of Manila As repeatedly observed, section 4 of the Special Education Fund Law, as confirmed by the Real Property Tax Code, in prescribing a total realty tax of three percent impliedly authorizes the augmentation by one-half percent of the pre-existing one and onehalf percent realty tax.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Disposition: the decision of the trial court is reversed and set aside. The complaint of Esso Philippines, Inc. for recovery of the realty tax paid under protest is dismissed. Philippine Association ofService Exporters Inc.,vs.Torres G.R. 101279,August6,1992 Facts: Philippine Association of Service Exporters Inc. (PASIE) is the largest national organization of private employment and recruitment agencies duly licensed and authorized by the POEA, to engage in the business of obtaining overseas employment for Filipino land-based workers, including domestic helpers. On June 1991, as a result of published stories regarding the abuses suffered by Filipino housemaids employed in Hong Kong, DOLE Secretary Ruben Torres issued Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of "Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong". The DOLE itself, through the POEA took over the business of deploying such Hong Kong-bound workers .Pursuant to the above DOLE circular, the POEA issued Memorandum Circular No. 30, Series of 1991, providing GUIDELINES on the Government processing and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers to Hong Kong and the accreditation of Hong Kong recruitment agencies intending to hire Filipino domestic helpers. Pursuant to the previous issuances, the POEA Administrator also issued Memorandum Circular No. 37, Series of 1991, on the processing of employment contracts ofdomestic workers forHong Kong. Issue: . 1. WON respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars 2. WON the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the Constitution, are unreasonable, unfair and oppressive; and 3. WON the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the National Administrative Register were not complied with. Held: There is no merit in the first and second grounds of the petition. 1 .No. Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities. Art. 36. Regulatory Power. The Secretary of Labor shall have the power to restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement activities of all agencies within the coverage of this title [Regulation of Recruitment

and Placement Activities] and is hereby authorized to issue orders and promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions of this title. 2. No. The vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative bodies is not unconstitutional, unreasonable and oppressive. It has been necessitated by "the growing complexity of the modern society" (Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, 177 SCRA 72, 79). More and more administrative bodies are necessary to help in the regulation of society's ramified activities. "Specialized in the particular field assigned to them, they can deal with the problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the courts of justice" It is noteworthy that the assailed circulars do not prohibit the petitioner from engaging in the recruitment and deployment of Filipino landbased workers for overseas employment. A careful reading of the challenged administrative issuances discloses that the same fall within the "administrative and policing powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred" upon the respondents (People vs. Maceren, 79 SCRA 450). The power to "restrict and regulate conferred by Article 36 of the Labor Code involves a grant of police power. To "restrict" means "to confine, limit or stop" (p. 62, Rollo) and the power to "regulate" means "the power to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control with due regard for the interests, first and foremost, of the public, then of the utility and of its patrons" The questioned circulars are therefore a valid exercise of the police power as delegated to the executive branch of Government. 3. Nevertheless, they are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of power publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Register as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987: Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazatte, unless it is otherwise provided. . . . (Civil Code.) Art. 5. Rules and Regulations. The Department of Labor and other government agencies charged with the administration and enforcement of this Code or any of its parts shall promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations. Such rules and regulations shall become effective fifteen (15) days after announcement of their adoption in newspapers of general circulation. (Emphasis supplied, Labor Code, as amended.) Sec. 3. Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center, three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons. (Emphasis supplied, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.) Sec. 4. Effectivity. In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by them. (Emphasis supplied, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987). We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the laws. (p. 448.) For lack of proper publication, the administrative circulars in question may not be enforced and implemented. . Chua v. Civil Service Commission Facts :In line with the policy of stream lining and trimming the bureaucracy, R.A.6683 (2 December 1988) was enacted to provide for the early retirement and voluntary separation of government employees as well as involuntary resignation to those affected due to reorganization. Those who may avail were regular, casual, temporary and emergency employees, with rendered service minimum of two years. Sec. 2. Coverage . This Act shall co ver all appointive officials and employees of the N a t i o n a l G o v e r n m e n t , i n c l u d i n g g o v e r n m e n t owned or controlled corporation with original charters, as well as the personnel of all local government units. The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary, c a s u a l a n d e m e r g e n c y employees, regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecuti ve years of government service as of the date of s e p a r a t i o n . U n i f o r m e d p e r s o n n e l o f t h e Armed Forces of the Philippines includin g those of the PC -INP are excluded from the coverage of this Act. Petitioner Lydia Chua was hired by the National Irrigation Administration Authoruty (NIA) for over 15years as a coterminous employee of 4 successive NIA projects. Petitioner Lydia Chua, believing that Sheis qualified to avail of the benefits of the program, filed an application on January 30, 1989 with the NIA but was denied and later on with the CSC who was likewise denied. She was instead offered aseparation benefits of monthly basic pay for each year of service .a) co-terminous w ith the project

 When the appointment is co - existent with the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made or subject to the availability of funds for the same; Issue: Whether or not petitioner was entitled to avail of the early retirement benefit as a coterminous employee. Held: It was stated that a coterminous employee is a non-career civil servant like casual and emergency employees, because of that they are entitled to the same benefits as long as they complied with the requirements of the law, which in this case, was done by Linda Chua. On that note, the court believes that the denial of petitioners application for early retirement benefits by the NIA and CSC is unreasonable, unjustified and oppressive due to the fact that she is entitled to the benefits of the same law because she served the government not only for two (2) years which is the minimum requirement under the law but for fifteen (15) years. In four (4) governmental projects. Wherefore, the petition is granted. ISSUE: W/N Petitioners status as a co-terminus employee is excluded from the benefits of RA 6683 (Early Retirement Law). HELD: The Early Retirement Law would violate the equal protection clause of the constitution if the Supreme Court were to sustainRespondents submission that the benefits of said law are to be denied a class of government employees who are similarly situate those covered by the said law. The court applied the doctrine of necessary implication in deciding this case

RTC, raising the issue of violation of the right of the striking teachers to due process of law. The case was eventually elevated to SC. Also in the meantime, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements to Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacement as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to them. While the case was pending with CHR, SC promulgated its resolution over the cases filed with it earlier, upholding the Sec. Carinos act of issuing the return-to-work orders. Despite this, CHR continued hearing its case and held that the striking teachers were denied due process of law;they should not have been replaced without a chance to reply to the administrative charges; there had been violation of their civil and political rights which the Commission is empowered to investigate. ISSUE:

Whether or not CHR has jurisdiction to try and hear the issues involved

HELD: The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter. The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have. Power to Investigate The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its findings. But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings.

Maxim:T he maxim of Expressio unius est exclusio alterius should not be the applicable maxim in this case but the doctrine of necessary implication which holds that: No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its application. There is always an omission that may not meet a particular situation. What is thought, at the time of enactment, to be an all-embracing legislation may be inadequate to provide for the unfolding events of the future. So-called gaps in the law develop as the law is enforced. One of the rules of statutory construction used to fill in the gap is the doctrine of necessary implication. The doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed. Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate legis. And every statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to include all incidental power, right or privilege. This is so because the greater includes the lesser, expressed in the Maxim, in eo plus sit, simper inest et minus. 18

Carino vs. CHR

204 SCRA 546

Investigate vs. Adjudicate "Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry. The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters." "Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . .

Distinction between the power to adjudicate and the power to investigate

FACTS: Some 800 public school teachers undertook mass concerted actions to protest the alleged failure of public authorities to act upon their grievances. The mass actions consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peacable assemblies, etc. The Secretary of Education served them with an order to return to work within 24 hours or face dismissal. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, eight teachers at the Ramon MagsaysayHigh School were administratively charged, preventively suspended for 90 days pursuant to sec. 41, P.D. 807 and temporarily replaced. An investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the charges. When their motion for suspension was denied by the Investigating Committee, said teachers staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings. Eventually, Secretary Carino decreed dismissal from service of Esber and the suspension for 9 months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. In the meantime, a case was filed with

to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy . . . ." In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions, and return to their classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained of by them; and (c) what where the particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions. Who has Power to Adjudicate? These are matters within the original jurisdiction of the Sec. of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the CSC. Manner of Appeal Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the Secretary of Education in disciplinary cases are correct and are adequately based on substantial evidence; whether or not the proceedings themselves are void or defective in not having accorded the respondents due process; and whether or not the Secretary of Education had in truth committed "human rights violations involving civil and political rights," are matters which may be passed upon and determined through a motion for reconsideration addressed to the Secretary Education himself, and in the event of an adverse verdict, may be reviewed by the Civil Service Commission and eventually the Supreme Court. EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., vs. PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENTADMINISTRATION (POEA) Facts: Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan on March 15, 1985. His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but by the Social Security System and should have been filed against the State Fund Insurance. The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after considering the position papers of the parties ruled in favour of the complainant. The petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner . The temporary restraining order dated December 10, 1986 is hereby LIFTED . It is so ordered. Issue: 1. Whether or not the POEA had jurisdiction over the case as the husband was not an overseas worker. 2. Whether or not the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. Held: 1. Yes. The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration was created under Executive Orde r No. 797, promulgated on May 1, 1982, to promote and monitor the overseas employment of Filipinos and to protect their rights. It replaced the National Seamen Board created earlier unde rArticle 20 of the Labor Code in 1974. Under Section 4(a) of the said executive order, the POEAi s vested with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims ,involving employee-employer relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino contract workers, including seamen." These cases, according to the 1985 Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment issued by the POEA, include, claims for death,d isability and other benefits arising out of such employment. The award of P180,000.00 for death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses was made by the POEA pursuant to its Memorandum Circular No. 2, which became effective on February 1,1984. This circular prescribed a standard contract to be adopted by both foreign and domestic shipping companies in the hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas employment. 2. Memorandum Circular No. 2 is an administrative regulation. The model contract prescribed thereby has been applied in a significant number of the cases without challenge by the employer. The power of the POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which, in creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment practices. "GENERAL RULE: Non-delegation of powers; exception It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the

legislature to the delegate. Two Tests of Valid Delegation of Legislative Power There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power,viz the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the boundariesof the delegates authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative. The delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation the exception. Rationale for Delegation of Legislative Power The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that th elegislature cannot be expected to reasonably comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. Too many of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields. Power of Subordinate Legislation. The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisionsof the statute. This is called the power of subordinate legislation.With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in statute byfilling in the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation.A dministrative agencies are vested with two basic powers, the quasilegislative and quasi- judicial. The first enables them to promulgate implementing rules and regulations, and thesecond enables them to interpret and apply such regulations.