Ini i Sp eci Forces Op erat ons i Vi nam t al al i n et by Col onelRonal A.

Sh acket d l on
Originally Published by Phoenix Press Box 837 Arvada, Colorado 80001 Copyright 1975, 2007 by Ronald A. Shackleton. All rights reserved. Reproduced in digital form by RADIX Press with permission of the Author. This document, or parts thereof, may not be reproduced in any form without permission. ISBN: 0-915222-02-7 Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 75-18573 Printed in the United States of America Special thanks to the Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, for their assistance in scanning photographs.

VILLAGE DEFENSE:

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON Table of Contents INTRODUCTION ACKNOWLEDGMENT FORWARD Chapter One Chapter Two Chapter Three Chapter Four Chapter Five Chapter Six Chapter Seven Chapter Eight Chapter Nine Chapter Ten Chapter Eleven Chapter Twelve Chapter Thirteen Chapter Fourteen

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Area of Operations The People The Enemy Village Defense Command and Control The Concept The Operational Base The Strike Force Village Defenders The Training Program Administration Logistics Communications Intelligence

iv viii x 1 13 39 68 79 87 93 155 169 180 209 235 252 267

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON Chapter Fifteen Medical Chapter Sixteen Operations Chapter Seventeen Air Support Chapter Eighteen Civic Action Chapter Nineteen Psychological Operations Chapter Twenty Predeployment Training (U.S.) Chapter Twenty-One Affairs of U.S. Personnel Concluding Statement An Overview Epilogue Glossary of Terms Abbreviations

iii 277 297 314 326 335 351 368 386 388 408 413 426

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON iv INTRODUCTION by Major General Michael D. Healy Village Defense is a deceptively simple title to a most complicated campaign conducted during the formative and standard-setting years of US Army Special Forces participation in the Vietnam War. This personal account by Colonel Ronald Shackleton, in large part written by him when a Captain, covers the US Army Special Forces involvement and contribution during a phase of the war that is not really widely known. One that has been too easily forgotten by those who were somewhere on the fringe of developments during early involvement but doing other things at the time. Unlike most of the "experts" who have gained fame for their writings concerning this complex discipline, Shackleton learned the lessons he presents here firsthand, the hard way, by trial and error; he did it! he lived it! Village Defense should not be confused with the "village defense programs," a term of later vintage that came into vogue during later years when "counterinsurgency" became the thing. This book is much more than that. Colonel Shackleton has written a very detailed account of the tactics and techniques he developed and used as a young Captain to operationalize a strategic program of population denial and interdiction. Denying the Communists access to a distinct and isolated ethnic minority group, the Rhade, was his prime mission. He presents this classic example of a Remote Area Campaign centered in the rugged mountains and jungles of the Central Highlands of Darlac Province. He and his men wrote the first pages of the protracted story of gallantry of the US

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON v Army Special Forces soldiers service to their nation working and fighting side by side with the Vietnamese ethnic minorities, comrades in large part from the Republic of Vietnam. It reflects special soldierly greatness, selfless dedication and graduated innovative ability of those few early ". . . brave men of the Green Beret" who went to the end of the road and beyond, into the remote and unattended, threatened areas of Vietnam in the service of their country and for the freedom of man. The author lays out the myriad of details associated with organizing and conducting remotearea campaign, including the very important, maybe most important, human dimension problems and his solutions. This is an excellent work for all students of this aspect of special warfare. Many of the organizational and operational concepts that have been developed over the years began with his experience. The principals remain valid and applicable to most unconventional warfare environment: These lessons learned from experience and put down here for all to study are provided by one of the true professionals who lead the way under the charge of the US Army Special Forces: De Oppresso Liber!

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BUON ENAO, 1962

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON PUBLISHERS NOTE This account was written by Captain (Colonel) Ronald Shackleton in 1964. It has been left to remain in that context so as to better portray Special Warfare in its rudimentary form and as it exists before the introduction of large numbers of troops and sophisticated weapons into such type of conflict.

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VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON ACKNOWLEDGMENT This report is compiled from personal experience in establishing and operating the Village Defense Program (VDP) in Vietnam. The greater portion of this report is taken from the period January 1962 through August 1962. Grateful acknowledgment is made to members of Special Forces Detachment A-113, Company A, 1st Special Forces Group, Okinawa (see below). Their tireless efforts and outstanding devotion to duty have made it possible to depict the Village Defense Program with pride and satisfaction. Special thanks go to our area specialist for his overwhelming contribution and sincere cooperation in the performance of his duties and particularly to the commander of the Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force (JUWTF), for his guidance, understanding, and faith in our ability by permitting us the operational freedom so vital for accomplishing this counterinsurgency mission. The program that is described herein can only succeed through teamwork, loyalty, understanding, respect, and trust of each member in the other. When this posture is downgraded for individualism the result will be defeat.

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VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON M/Sgt (E8) John Slover (Retired) Operations Sergeant Sfc (E6) Manfried Baier (Retired) Medical Specialist Sgt (E5) Lester Walkley (Major) Communications Chief Sgt (E5) William Beltch (Captain) Communications Specialist Sgt (E5) John Clark Heavy Weapons Specialist Sgt (E5) Charles Lindewald (MIA) Light Weapons Specialist Sp5 (E5) Alford Warok (Retired) Engineer Specialist

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VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON x FORWARD Support of the population is essential to the political and military strength of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) in its battle against communist insurgency. A matter of serious concern in 1961 was the alignment of the Montagnards (tribesmen). Approximately 700,000 Montagnards occupied more than half the land of the RVN though they made up only about five percent of the total population. The Central Highland, in which they live, dominates the Mekong Delta to the south and the rich rice lands on the east coast. Through this area pass many Viet Cong (VC) trails and supply routes leading from North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia into the Delta region of South Vietnam. This area is considered strategic to the security of all South Vietnam. Many scattered tribal villages had willingly and unwillingly become sources of food, intelligence, laborers, supplies, and recruiting centers for the VC. The VC prospered in this area not because the Montagnards were against the government or for the VC, but because they were vulnerable. When a village chief was asked whom he supported he simply replied, 'Whoever walks through that gate with a submachine gun.' The villagers were not looking for a new way of life. They were satisfied with being left alone to live in accordance with their own customs and traditions. To be harassed and exploited by both sides, however, offered little peace and security and no future. They were prepared to render loyalty to whichever side could offer them protection. Montagnard support of the VC was primarily a result of fear because of lacking government

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON xi protection. The many remote and inaccessible villages made it impossible for military forces to protect the villagers. This allowed the VC to carry on his association with the Montagnards rather freely. Another consideration was the remoteness and vast area concerned. This made it difficult for the government to carry on effective assistance programs for the Montagnards. In the past, Montagnards had aligned themselves with the government but promises of help never materialized. The tribesmen witnessed many development programs directed towards the Vietnamese while none came his way. This caused a basic distrust to exist. Finally, ill-feelings existed between the Vietnamese and the Montagnards. The government had taken little interest in tribal laws and customs and in 1955 they took much of their land to resettle a million Vietnamese from North Vietnam and the crowded coastal areas. They taxed them, outlawed their hunting weapons (crossbows), treated them with brutality and seldom considered their feelings or their interests in any matters of state. The Montagnards are recognized as a primitive people who are naturally at home the jungles and mountains of central Vietnam. They are hunters and trackers, adept at living off the land, and their physical stamina make them ideally suited for counter-guerrilla warfare. Many of them fought for the French during the Indochina war and take rapidly to modern weapons. It was recognized that in the Montagnards existed the greatest potential civil force for fighting a jungle war in all Vietnam. It is apparent that the VC had considered this also. It is common knowledge that to be effective he required the support of the Montagnards. This support included food, re-

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON xii cruits, intelligence and supplies. The VC also possess natural advantages for their type of operations. These include knowledge of the terrain, ability to speak the Montagnard language, and wisdom in the customs and characteristics of the Montagnards. This provides the VC with paths of entry and escape. Routes of speedy maneuver, good hiding places and communal sanctuaries for the conduct of their activities. The government needed to act. No longer could the Montagnards be ignored if victory was to be achieved. A program had to be developed to gain their support and loyalty while it was denied the VC; to protect them as well as exploit their potential as counter-guerilla fighters. To accomplish this the Montagnards had to be armed, taught to shoot, and trained so that they would be able to protect their own villages. Once physical security was obtained, then government civic action programs would have to follow, The battle for the hearts and minds of the people would be the target. The aim, to form a closer link between the Montagnards and the government. The VDP, as it was to be called, would have some military significance, but the psychological impact it would have on the VC, would greatly outweigh the military contribution. The VDP was developed along the lines of training desirous tribesmen in the use of weapons and defensive tactics for the protection of their homes, families, and possessions from the terrorisms of the VC. The object was not to resettle the villagers into strong, fortified and centrally located villages, thus giving up valuable land, but rather, to provide the villagers a means to protect what is theirs while they continue to support themselves in the area which is most familiar to

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON xiii them. Village defenders received no pay and were therefore required to extract their livelihood from the defended area which is the bulwark of this denial operation. A handful of VC, armed with one or two weapons, are no longer able to force their wishes upon defended villagers. To obtain food and other necessary support requires the VC to mass. Once he masses he is vulnerable to regular military forces or to the Montagnard Strike Force. This Strike Force (SF) is employed on a full time basis and received pay equivalent to that of Vietnamese civil guards. They are highly trained, well armed, and have the mobility to assist villages which come under large scale VC attacks. Additionally, they are required to conduct offensive operations necessary to keep the VC off-balance. As more and more villages become trained and armed, the VC lose more and more support. His accessibility and freedom of movement no longer goes unnoticed or unreported. The VC is forced to revert to repressive measures; seizing rice, conscripting men, and taking hostages in their desperation to survive. As they lose popular support they have nothing to fall back on as they suffer military defeats. The VC is compelled to devote a majority of his effort to mere survival, and his military efforts are reduced considerably. Of equal importance, this program releases regular military units to conduct offensive operations, in force, against the VC Regular units and are no longer depleted for security, patrolling, or population control measures in the remote, isolated areas. The protection of the Montagnards is no longer a military responsibility. The village defenders are responsible for their own security

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON xiv and protection. The operational concept is visualized as follows: a secure base (village) is established from where the VDP is supported and controlled. The area is marked off and the 'ink blot' approach for arming and training villagers begins. Villagers are taught the rudiments of self-defense, including village defensive preparations and individual training. Fences are constructed around the village, and shelters and fortifications are prepared. Systems for patrolling, early warning, communications, collecting and reporting intelligence, village security, population control, mutual coordination, and support with neighboring villages is stressed. As an area becomes secure the "ink blot" is enlarged and new villages are brought into the program. This mesh of defended villages, each with its own self-defense force, kills or repels any VC that venture into them. Between villages, patrolling and laying ambushes, would be the SF. The VC is no longer able to rely on surprise nor choose his time and place of attack. He soon needs food and supplies and is, therefore, forced to attack a defended village. If he gets by the patrols and ambushes he must still fight he way into the village. The VC become the object of fighting on the terms of the VDP. His doctrine teaches, "that to fight on other than he own terms is too great a risk," and he must therefore disband or move to a new location to obtain his support. This was the situation, plan, and concept for developing and organizing the VDP in 1962. The implementation of the VDP with the Montagnards is discussed in this report.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 1 Chapter One Area of Operations I. General The Rhade tribe dwells in an area of the Central Highlands known as Darlac Province. Their domain extends northward about 100 kilometers from Ban Methout, the provincial capital, and eastward from the Cambodian border to the coastal mountain range. This area has a common border with Cambodia and therefore provides accessible routes into Vietnam by the communists for guerilla development. The Ho Chi Mirth trail is the most renowned route which trespasses through this area. The Central Highland plateau varies in elevation from 600 to 3,000 feet above sea level. The northern portion of the plateau is covered by dense, tropical jungles while the southern portion is characterized by savanna grasslands, open forests and gently rolling terrain. Rugged mountain chains extend from north to south. II. Terrain Most of the area can be classified as mountainous or plateau with changes from one to the other being rather abrupt. Gently rolling terrain, which forms the valley floors, often stretches for many kilometers. The mountain chains are well defined at about 5,000 feet with some peaks a bit higher. Usually the mountains are covered with evergreen and deciduous trees resembling

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 2 woodlands rather than jungle. The jungle thickets of bamboo and tropical broadleaf forests are found in the lowlands and along stream beds. There are many streams throughout the area, with few presenting obstacles to foot movement. Drinking water, though plentiful, usually requires purification. During the monsoon season flash flooding swells streams creating major obstacles (Figure 1). III. Climate The weather in the area is seasonal. Temperatures range from 50 to 95 degrees with an annual rainfall of near 70 inches. The humidity is often high and uncomfortable but the high altitude and constant breeze reduces the unpleasantness. The southwest monsoon (wet) season transpires from June through October. The northwest monsoon (dry) season extends from November through May. During the wet season heavy rains, accompanied by high winds, can be expected twenty or more days each month. The rains are normally intermittent downpours from heavy, low hanging clouds. Visibility is normally restricted during this period and aerial observation completely ineffective. Unsurfaced roads, paths and trails become quagmires. Wheeled vehicular traffic is next to impossible. Road movement by foot is slow and treacherous while cross country foot traffic-ability is not greatly hampered. The temperatures drop into the low 50's and the air gets chilly and damp. During the dry season rain is infrequent. When it does rain it is drizzly and light and is normally accompanied by the sun. The sun shines continually and temperatures reach into the 90's.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON

FIG 1. MOUNTAIN STREAM (DRY SEASON)

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 4 Variable, light to moderate winds are forever present and cloudless skies prevail. Visibility during this period is almost unlimited except for the early morning haze. The red soil becomes parched and unimproved roads and trails now revert to layers of dust. IV. Vegetation Compartmentation, created by the mountain chains, produces a variety of vegetation throughout the Central Highlands. Deciduous and evergreen forests are predominant in the mountain ranges. Trees grow tall and straight. They branch out at the top and form a loose canopy. Between trees, where sunlight has penetrated, small bushes and shrubs grow. Bald spots are found where rock formations exist. Throughout this type forest leaning trees which are still growing, and deadfall constantly hamper movement. Rain forests are found in the foothills and or the plateaux. These are characterized by a thick overhead canopy and a dark, damp jungle floor. Undergrowth varies in density but is normally not heavy or restrictive. It is common to see trees growing with their roots exposed five to ten feet above ground. Savanna grassland is extensive throughout the plateau. This coarse, heavy grass, which grows from ten to twelve feet high in wide scattered patches, is intermingled with trees, bushes, and plants.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 5 Along the banks of streams and in the marshy areas jungle thickets are found. Comprised of bamboo growths, thorny bushes, prickly trees, dense vegetation and undergrowth they present a formidable obstacle (Figure 2). Rubber plantations are in abundance and extend for hundreds of meters or even kilometers. Main or secondary routes of communications are usually close by. Trees grow in straight rows about eight to twelve feet apart with mature trees reaching heights of 40 feet. The plantations are normally well tended and underbrush is kept well trimmed (Figure 3). Coffee plantations, like rubber plantations, are also located in the vicinity of roads. This treelike bush grows from ten to twelve feet high. From about four feet off the ground it branches out to meet or enjoin other bushes, forming a fence of leaves. Spread throughout the coffee fields are tall, spindly trees ten to twenty feet high. Although sparse in leaves, their purpose is to provide shade for the coffee bushes, thus preventing premature ripening of the coffee beans (Figure 4). As in most parts of Asia, rice fields can be found wherever there are inhabitants. However, unlike the delta where rice paddies are used, rice is cultivated similarly to wheat or oats and the familiar paddies are non-existent in the plateau area. Banana groves are found in or close to villages. Trees are not planted in any particular pattern but are clumped together and offer a degree of concealment.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON

FIG 2. JUNGLE THICKET

FIG 3. RUBBER PLANTATION

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON

FIG 4. COFFEE PLANTATION

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 8 Wherever a village is located there will be farms and gardens. Cultivated areas are seldom within the confines of the village. They generally begin just outside the fence and extend about 100 meters. At this point the rice fields begin, as well as grazing ground for the livestock. The principal crops are peppers, corn, sugar cane, radishes, potatoes, and other root and leafy vegetables. V. Animals Animals are a vital part of Rhade life. Domestic or wild, they provide food, skins, transportation, labor and also play an important part in the Rhade's superstitions and sacrificial ceremonies. Pigs, beef cattle, goats, ducks and chickens are raised primarily for food and sacrifices. The water buffalo and elephant are essentially beasts of burden, the water buffalo being a source of food, and a sacrificial offering. Dogs, although raised primarily for sacrifices, are sometimes eaten. (Figure 5) Wild animals and birds are abundant throughout this area. However, many species such as tigers and leopards, are seldom seen. Wild buffalo, wild pigs, wild ducks, wild chickens, rabbits, squirrels, different types of monkeys, a number of varieties of deer, civet cats, alligators, turtles, owls, hawks, parrots, cobras, and pythons inhabit the jungle and mountains and are in abundance (Figure 6).

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON

FIG 5. BEAST OF BURDEN

FIG 6. 14 FOOT PYTHON

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 10 Insects and bugs are more appropriately mentioned in Chapter Fifteen (medical) which discusses the medical aspects of the VDP. VI. Communications There are few all-weather roads. Most of the area is accessible only by foot trails and cart tracks. Two all-weather roads run through Ban Methout; one runs generally east and west and the other north and south. These two-lane paved highways are in dire need of repair due to the heavy commercial and military transport. Automobiles are so few they have become a novelty. Along highways and around cities or towns the pedicab, or three-wheeled motor cab, is a primary means of transportation. In other areas the normal mode of travel is by foot or bicycle. The trails are narrow and winding. Some have been improved to accommodate jeep traffic but these are one way affairs. Tracks are beds of dust or impassable quagmires, depending on the season. Vegetation is usually thick along tracks and trails and visibility is usually restricted to two or three meters to the flanks. Vehicular movement off the roads or the tracks is impossible and foot movement is often slow and tedious. There are no railroads in this area. A commercial airfield is located just outside Ban Methout and can accommodate any propeller type military aircraft presently in Vietnam. Bridges are constructed of timbers or logs. During the wet season, they are often washed away making roads impassable (Figure 7).

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FIG 7. IMPROVISED BRIDGE

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 12 VII. Conclusion Climate and terrain in the Central Highlands greatly affect military operations. Mobility, cover and concealment, visibility, communications and disease will often restrict an American's effectiveness if precautionary measures are not taken. Jungle climate naturally saps vitality, and high humidity causes excessive perspiration. As men weaken, they become prone to tropical diseases and lose their effectiveness. Even the Montagnards, who are usually immune to most of these diseases and accustomed to the hardships that are created by the tropics, must practice the highest standards of hygiene. Equipment deteriorates at a fast rate in the damp, humid jungles. Rust, corrosion, and jungle rot must be curtailed by proper maintenance and storage of supplies and equipment. The terrain drastically impedes mobility. The mountains are steep with many crosscompartments, crevices and pitfalls. Travel is slow and laborious. Mobility in the jungle is reduced by the soft soil, intertwisted vines, thorny bushes, and dense shrubs. With the exception of farmlands and open areas, cover and concealment is excellent, visibility poor, and aerial observation seriously restricted. Radio communications are not only affected by the terrain but also by atmospheric conditions.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 13 Chapter Two The People I. Introduction This chapter presents a detailed description of the Rhade and their language, customs, and religion. Having lived in isolation from the Vietnamese, whom they distrust and dislike, they speak their own language and maintain their own cultural traditions. The Rhade language is related to the Malayo-Polynesian family of languages. It contains about 500 words including those derived from the French and English languages as a result of their association with the French and the Americans. In physical appearance, the Rhade more nearly resemble the American Indian than they do the Vietnamese. They have a short and sturdy build, jet black hair and black eyes which are more nearly round than slanted. High cheek bones and a fair, bronze tinted complexion distinguishes the Montagnard from other Orientals (Figure 8). The 125,000 Rhade are organized into matrilineal lineages which form clans. Their animistic religion centers on their belief in spirits. These spirits are numerous and are associated with the wind, sky, rain, streams, fields, animals, and other living objects. The Rhade are farmers and peasants who know only their own way of life. Most produce their livelihood by farming and raising livestock. Others work the many French-owned rubber and coffee plantations. Their standard of living is simple but adequate. It was not until 1955 that

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 14 they became concerned with politics and matters of state. It was then that land reform measures, taxes, resettlement programs, as well as the VC, compelled them to protect their own interests. Since then, they have clamored for autonomy similar to what the North Vietnamese have extended to the Montagnards of North Vietnam. Their religious beliefs and practices include worship of the local spirits; but Buddhist, Confucist, and Christian elements are also detected as a result of the French influence and the work of missionaries. Modern warfare is not new to the Rhade. Many of them fought courageously with the French during the Indochina War and their transformation from the crossbow and spear, to rncdern weapons, has been rapid. They have a low illiteracy rate, and they are considered the most intelligent of the Montagnards. Extremely friendly and pro-Western, their relations with the French were amicable. The rapport established with the Americans is congenial and intimate. They possess antagonistic feelings towards the Vietnamese, but this has not deterred from their loyalty in combating the VC. The Rhade are closely inter-related and have strong family ties and relationships. This characteristic is tantamount in the establishment of the VDP, which is brought out in subsequent chapters (Figure 9).

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FIG 8. RHADE ELDERS

FIG 9. MONTAGNARD FAMILY

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 16 Normal dress for the male is a loin cloth; and for the female a sarong which extends from the waist. Ceremonial dress for the males is comprised of a colorful shirt and loin cloth (Figures 10 and 11). Strong, ambitious, and hard-working, they rise at dawn and toil until sunset. They are proficient in tracking, trapping, and shooting, which makes them excellent hunters. Their dwelling is the longhouse. Constructed of logs, straw and bamboo, it rests on stilts about four feet off the ground. Ten to thirty longhouses make up a village. A population of 200 to 800 persons, mostly women and children, occupy a village. Each longhouse is occupied by a number of families who have marital affinity (Figures 12 and 13). II. Origin Authorities indicate that the Montagnards migrated from greater China, Tibet and Mongolia southward to Malaya. Funneled through Indonesia and the South Seas, some groups moved back and forth between the various geographic areas and thus there is a relationship between the Montagnards and the Polynesians. It is difficult to determine when each of the tribal groups settled in their present areas.

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FIG 10. RHADE MOTHER & CHILD

FIG 11. RHADE IN CEREMONIAL ATTIRE

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 18 III. Settlement Family groups settled within a selected tribal region where today each tribe and tribal region remains distinct and separate. Rhade settlement evolved in accordance with the scheme of nature, i.e., land for growing crops, bamboo, thatch and timber for building houses, forests for game and streams for drink, food and bathing. As a family group moved into an unoccupied area, each clan of this group laid claim to a particular commodity as decided by a council. One clan would claim the land, another the bamboo, another the stream, and so on. Each clan would then establish a price or rental fee for use of its claim by the other clans. This system broke down when clans in need of more rice were forced to sell sections of their claims to other clans, whereas today, clans own sufficient land, forest, thatch, bamboo etc., to satisfy their needs. An important factor in this association with nature is the scattering of villages. This was done to prevent the disruption of the natural scheme of settlement because of overpopulation. This explains the lack of a large concentration of villages or population. Knowledge of this system also provides an understanding for the antagonism developed when thousands of Vietnamese were resettled in this area to upset the tribal balance with nature.

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FIG 12. VILLAGE LONGHOUSES

FIG 13. FEMALE STAIRCASE

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 20 IV. Religious Beliefs A Rhade's faith is centered around a god, a devil, and spirits. Sacrifices, in the form of buffalos, pigs, chickens or dogs plus rice wine, are made throughout the year to all spirits. A sacrifice depicts a promise to the spirit. Brass bracelets worn around the wrist, represent a sacrifice. Each bracelet has cuts to indicate the number of rice wine jugs offered in the sacrifice. Spirits are summoned whenever a family disturbance, such as sickness, cannot be coped with. A sorcerer or enchanter equipped with a stick and a candle supervises the proceedings. He overlooks the preparation of the animal to be sacrificed and the rice wine to be offered. The more serious the disturbance the greater the offering. If a family is poor and cannot provide the offerings it may be promised for a later date. Spirits are usually summoned for births, sickness, death, marriage, planting, harvest, or to confirm important decisions. V. Superstitions Superstitions center around legends, dreams, animals and birds in the forest, and the spirits. For example, three barks from a barking deer on a newly prepared field will cause death in the family if a field is planted. If a crow alights on the roof of a longhouse under construction it must be abandoned or the occupants will have bad luck. When walking along a trail, a particular bird call from the left will bring good luck while the same call from the right will result in bad luck. Dreams might determine the activities of a Rhade. A dream of an accident will keep him indoors the next day. A dream of fishing will bring good luck if a white fish is caught the next day.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 21 A dream of harvesting eggplant indicates others will speak evil of him. A pregnant mother's dream of a knife or crossbow will result in a son being born; a dream of a basket results in a daughter being born. An old custom, which is now seldom observed, requires that a village be relocated if a boa constrictor passes through it. A sneeze before work means one should remain at home, whereas a sneeze prior to a hunt means good hunting. There are many forms and types of spirits. In any event, they cannot be blasphemed, scolded or spoken of in jest. When spirits are summoned, they are called by groups, depending on the occasion. VI. Marriage System Certain family groups are restricted from marrying because of legend. Others cannot marry within the same clan. It is customary to permit a girl to marry when she has physically matured or reached her sixteenth birthday, whichever occurs first. Whenever a girl becomes of age, the parents hold an assembly and discuss the possibilities of a husband for the girl. When the boy has been decided upon, his uncles and brothers are summoned for their approval. If they agree, the brothers and uncles assemble the boy and his parents. If they consent, a meeting is arranged for both families to be at the boy's house. A wise man presides and first explains the marriage vows. The boy sits at one end of a mat and the girl at the other end. Each places a brass bracelet in the center. If they take each others bracelet from the mat, the wedlock is completed. The boy's par-

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 22 ents then ask the girl for a dowry. The value of the dowry is on a par with the wealth of the boy's family. It is usually a practical item. A buffalo, ceremonial gong, rice wine jug or a blanket are appropriate. Money is not normally offered. If the girl cannot pay the dowry, the couple move into the boy's home until it is paid. When the dowry is paid, the newlyweds then move to the girl's home. If at any time the marriage is broken by the husband, he must pay his wife twice the dowry she paid for him plus a fine for each child. If the wife breaks the marriage she must pay the husband the same dowry she paid his parents. Divorce is rare among the Rhade. If the wife dies the husband returns to his family unless there is another free woman in the family for him to marry. He leaves any children with a female member of his wife's family and his wife's brothers are responsible for their care. When the husband dies the wife raises the children regardless of whether or not she remarries. Rules for adultery are also included in the marriage system. If the husband commits adultery his wife levies a fine against him in accordance with the wealth of his family. He must obtain this money from his family and present it to his wife. If the wife commits adultery she is likewise fined; unless her lover is unmarried. He then pays the fine to the husband. When adultery is committed by two married people, the woman must pay her husband the money, which is given to his parents. The man must pay his wife.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 23 A wealthy man may take more than one wife if approved by the brothers of his first wife. Women cannot have more than one husband. The brothers of a married woman have the power of correction in all family matters. If two unmarried people have an affair, a bracelet is exchanged in secret. If the girl becomes pregnant, the exchange of bracelets constitutes a marriage. It is rare when a boy would deny the secret marriage. VII. Family Relationships The oldest female of a house owns the house, animals, land, jugs and any other property of the household. A husband lives with his wife's family and is required to show the greatest respect for his mother-in-law. He avoids her compartment in the house and treats her with distant respect. There is no joking between them. Any breach of this practice requires that a sorcerer determine what sacrifice must be offered to gain absolution. Joking within a household is considered undesirable. Children and elderly people are exempt from this custom. It is permissible to joke with other clans. When a house is built, members of the family group are gathered to determine who will live in the house. The house is then built, to accommodate the clans. Members of the clan may volunteer to assist in the construction. Houses are usually built with entrances facing to the east and west. This offers additional protection from the elements. An average house is about 50 feet in length and 15 feet wide; it has a door at the front and one at the rear. There are no windows but

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 24 construction normally provides for some sliding panels on the sides to be used as such. At the front of the longhouse there are two staircases. One is simply a log with footsteps cut into it. This is the male staircase. The other is a plank with footsteps cut into it and breasts carved at the top. This is the female staircase (Fig. 13). The staircases lead to the front porch which is about 8 feet deep, is constructed of logs, and receives a few feet of overhang from the thatch roof. The porch is used for storage, conducting household chores, pounding rice, children's play area and plain relaxing. From the porch, the main entrance leads into the main room of the house (living room). Visitors are received here by the head male of the household. This room is also the family sitting room and ceremonial room. It is bedecked with long wooden benches carved from local hardwood, one or more drums made of buffalo skin, numerous brass gongs, wine jugs, and center poles which hold the wine jugs in arranged rows for ceremonies. Near the center of the room is a fire pit. Beyond the main room are the private rooms (bedrooms). The first room(s) are guest rooms for female guests. If married, her husband may sleep here with her. However, male guests normally sleep in the main room. Following the guest room(s) is a series of private rooms for the clans. These are open compartments on either side of the longhouse with a corridor running the length of the house. Along the corridor are open fireplaces for preparing meals or heating water. Members of the same lineage may eat together or each clan can prepare its own pot. The last compartment of the house is reserved for the elders of the family group. There may or may not be a back porch. If there is a back porch then there is only one staircase. This is

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 25 considered a private entrance and guests should never enter a long-house from the rear for it places a curse upon the house. When making a call on a member of the family group one of their children is asked for by name. If a man or woman has no children it is then permissive to ask for them by name. All children take the name of their mother as their first name. Wealth passes to the daughters upon the death of the parents, and sons may not receive any property. A caller is provided a mat and is shown to the sitting room table near the fire. He is offered tobacco, and should he be tired, he is offered a blanket and a pillow. If he has travelled far and wishes to rest with the family, food is prepared for him. Rice wine will be offered if he is a distinguished visitor (Figure 14). Most of the manual chores are accomplished by the males. These include cutting trees and bamboo, clearing land, weaving bamboo, fishing and hunting for food, building coffins, constructing ornamental instruments, burying the dead, storing rice, and protecting his family. Women carry on the normal domestic household chores. They draw water, gather firewood, cook, sew and weave, clean the house, and pound the rice. They will also assist in the fields during the planting and harvesting (Figure 15).

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FIG 14. CUSTOMARY RICE WINE OFFERING

FIG 15. POUNDING RICE

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 27 While parents are working at their chores, the infants are cared for by the older children. Children also assist in the fields, gather firewood, cook, and guard the livestock. The parents are held responsible for teaching their children the customs of the Rhade. They teach them not to lie or to steal, to respect their elders, and to respect property, livestock, and other means of livelihood (Figure 16). VIII. The Village System The eldest female is normally considered the guardian of the village land. The land of each clan is marked by well defined natural boundaries such as streams, hills, valleys, and tree lines. The land area of each clan is passed by word of mouth from generation to generation. The guardian is an overseer of this system and has certain duties which accompany the title. She must visit the outer limits of the village land, at least annually, to pay her respects to the souls of her ancestors who are buried in the ground. This is accomplished by way of the sacrifice. It is performed to please the spirits who will provide rain for the soil. She is also authorized to assess fines on anyone who violates territorial laws. The practice of shifting agriculture or downing trees in restricted forest areas are examples of violations. For her services, a guardian receives baskets of rice, chickens, pigs, cotton and other commodities once every seven years. While on her inspection trips she is wined and dined by the villagers. Each village has a chief and a council of elders. The chief, who is usually the wealthiest or the most intelligent man in the village, is chosen by the villagers. He must be approved by the council of elders who are the

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FIG 16. CHILDREN TENDING LIVESTOCK

FIG 17. CHIEF OF RHADE TRIBE

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 29 oldest and most respected members of the village. The village chief is responsible for conducting all of the village affairs (Figure 17). The Rhade selection of farmland is based upon their dreams. They select virgin soil or soil that has not been used for sixty to seventy years. In preparing fields, explicit procedures are followed and rituals are performed throughout. They are also guided by their superstitions. It is not necessary for a traveler to carry food on his trip. The head of any Rhade household will offer him food and drink without charge. This is true for all the Rhade even if the traveler is not known. Superstitions also play a large part in making trips. A bird's song at the start of a journey means the people to be visited will not be at home. The bark of a deer indicates the traveler's family will have sickness if the trip is continued. If he strikes his hand against a rock his journey will be unsuccessful. A visitor must knock or call out the name of the visited before entering a house. Hands are shook and permission to enter the house must be granted before entering. If rice wine is offered it must be taken. Village sports and games are of the simple variety and are based on the natural talents and skills of the people. Running, jumping, wrestling, spear throwing, and sabre fighting are the most common. Children make kites, play tag, roll hoops, shake stones and play with bugs. During the rainy season, many of the villagers walk through .the muddy village on stilts at which they are quite proficient.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 30 Rhade very seldom hunt for the sport of it, although they do at times hunt tiger. Their hunting weapons include crossbows, knives spears, traps and snares. Recently rifles were added to their arsenal. Dogs are occasionally used for the hunt. In the past, horses were used to run down and spear buffalo. Sparrow hawks have been trained to catch fish. Traps and snares are commonly used to catch fox, rabbits, deer, peacocks, rats and other small game. Birds are shot with the crossbow. Fish are taken with a net, a basket or a spear. Domestic animals run loose throughout the village as there are no crops for them to harm. They usually spend the nights under the longhouses. The Rhade own few elephants as they are very expensive. A village may pool their resources to purchase an elephant because of its value as a beast of burden. From six to twelve months after the purchase of an elephant, a sacrifice is made on the first day of every month to ward off the evil spirits. The villagers are also on their strictest behavior during this period. IX. Rituals Explicit routines must be practiced for each particular occasion if the spirits are to be pleased. The wealth of the family and the purpose for the sacrifice will determine the procedure used. A sacrifice normally begins with a small animal, such as a chicken or suckling, and two jugs of rice wine, (a standard rice wine jug can hold about twenty gallons of wine). If the spirits are not pleased, a larger animal and additional jugs of wine are sacrificed. For certain occasions it is mandatory that only the largest type of ceremony be conducted.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 31 The men make most of the preparations for the ceremony. They prepare the wine jugs and bamboo sipping straws; kill and prepare the animal(s) for sacrifice; and carry the word of the sacrifice to other relatives in distant villages. The women gather firewood, draw water and prepare the food (Figure 18). In the early morning of the ceremony day, the wine jugs are placed and tied to the center poles in the ceremonial rooms. Brass gongs are beaten which signals the preparation of the animal(s) to be sacrificed. Ceremonial clothes are donned and the sorcerer calls to the spirits asking that they also dress in their ceremonial clothes. The men are organized to beat the drums and gongs in a fascinating rhythm. They are seated on the hardwood bench. Others sit behind the wine jugs to keep the level full. The sorcerer calls out to the spirits of his ancestors to join the ceremony. He then summons the spirits of nature to join the sacrifice. A request is asked of the spirits, at which time sipping from the wine jugs begins. Sipping from each jug is alternated by sex with a specific portion to be drunk before relinquishing the straw, The men behind the jugs measure the quantity consumed and keep the jugs full. The gongs and drums are intermittently played throughout the ceremony. At dusk the food is served and everyone eats, after which the drinking and music continues. The person offering the sacrifice always takes the first bite of food. Upon conclusion of the meal, married families may return to their homes, while the single people continue drinking and chanting until early morning.

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FIG 18. PREPARING ANIMAL FOR SACRIFICE

FIG 19. POSITIONING SACRIFICIAL DRUMS

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 33 If the offering is a small animal and the spirits are pleased, the ceremony terminates. If a larger animal is offered, a second day of rituals follows; and where a buffalo is offered, the ceremony may last for three or four days. Subsequent days are enacted in much the same manner as the initial day, however, different spirits are called upon each ensuing day. It is important that the head and tail of the animal(s) sacrificed be placed on the east side of the wine jugs along with a candle, fireplace, pipe, and tobacco for the great spirit. It is a Rhade belief that the great spirit resides in the east. Upon completion of the ceremony, a small amount of wine and a chicken are sacrificed to bid the spirits farewell. Once annually, a village-wide planting sacrifice is organized by the village chief and assisted by the planting sorcerer. A plot of land is selected and a small granary is placed in the center of the plot. A carved, wooden figure depicting the evil spirits is placed in the granary. His head is passed through a carved yoke and his feet are encased in wooden blocks. A sabre is stuck in the head of the figure. Carved animals and birds are placed in the field. Later they are placed in traps and cages or destroyed with knives or arrows. This symbolizes evil spirits being driven from the animals and birds so as not to harm the crops. Only after this ritual are the fields planted. Men walk over the fields with a stick in each hand. They poke holes in the ground to the rhythm of drums while the women move in groups, bending low to place a few

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FIG 20. OFFERING THE SACRIFICE

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 35 seeds in each hole. Periodically the group assembles to drink from the wine jug placed in the field for this ritual. Other rituals are held at various stages of the rice crop: when it is about three feet tall, when it has ripened, when it is harvested, and when it is stored (Figures 19 and 20). Two other rituals are common throughout the year. One for birth and the other for death. At the birth of a child, a chicken and one jug of wine are sacrificed. A meal is prepared for the midwife, who, after the sacrifice, places the baby on her lap and feeds it a small piece of chicken liver and a taste of morning dew from her fingertips. The baby is then given a name. If a boy, he is presented with a crossbow and arrows or a sabre to make him rich, wise and strong. If the baby is a girl, she receives a small shirt, skirt and jacket to make her rich, wise and strong. The midwife receives a gift for her services, while the mother rests from two to five days before returning to her chores. When a person dies he is dressed in new clothes and is bedecked with jewelry. He is placed on his bed in the longhouse with his hands wrapped to his body and his feet bound together. The body is covered with from one to three blankets depending upon his wealth. A coffin-making ritual takes place after each death. Gongs are banged while the men are in the forest making the coffin (which takes about three days). Each evening they return to the village to participate in the ceremony. When the coffin is completed it is brought to the long-house and the body is placed into it. It remains in the longhouse for one night with the deceased's family and friends performing their rituals. At this time, anyone to whom the deceased was indebted,

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 36 informs the family. If the deceased left a wife, any man wishing to take the widow for his wife lets his intentions be known. The following morning an earthen tomb is prepared. Arrangements are made for the sacrifice and wooden statues are carved for the grave covering. When the tomb is partially completed the sacrifice commences and the casket is placed in the grave. A canopy is built with branches and leaves over the coffin. This provides an air space where the dirt will not cover his coffin. A live chicken, wine, and rice are placed in this space to feed the spirit who will live in this tomb for one year. After a year another ceremony is held for the departing spirit. During the entire entombment procedures, the widow continuously mourns the dead. She calls to the spirits, sheds tears, and sings. Her hair is combed straight down and reaches her buttocks. She wears only a sarong. A completed tomb is a conical dirt mass with a bamboo air vent extending from it. This vent not only provides oxygen for the spirit but is also used to drop food to the spirit. Many fires are built around the tomb and drinking lasts until midnight.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 37 X. Sickness Remedies Sores, cuts and abrasions are cleansed with hot water and then painted with tree or plant medicine. If the wound does not heal, a sorcerer is summoned. He places his hand over certain portions of the body to determine the proper ritual to heal the wound. They believe that small children have diarrhea because they are teething. Older children and adults drink tree medicine to cure diarrhea. The urine of a scorpion is drunk for the most serious cases. Cough medicine is prepared by cooking grass. Rash medicines are made from plants with bitter leaves. Other plant medicines are used for sore or infected eyes, and sprains are treated by wise men. A leper must remove himself from the other villagers and retreat into the forest. A family cannot accommodate a leper. When a leper dies, his house is burned. A leper must forever prepare and drink plant juices. He must refrain from eating meat. This, they believe, prevents the disease from spreading. XI. Conclusions Rhade culture has changed considerably in the past decade. It appears that many patterns of superstition are practiced as a matter of habit and custom, rather than belief. However, strict ceremonial laws and the severe village system have resulted in a slow and difficult transition for

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 38 many of the Rhade. Their customs and traditions must be considered in the VDP, for very often they will have a marked degree of influence on proposed courses of action. American personnel must establish themselves with the indigenous population who will be supporting the VDP. To accomplish this it is natural that they be aware of the traditions and customs of the Montagnards and to include recognition of their problems and the enigma which surrounds them. This is attained solely by sharing in the daily existence of the people through association and participation in their activities. This requires Americans to reside within the village on a continuous basis. The environment does much to establish a foundation for subsequent aspirations. Although the Montagnards are primitive by modern standards, they are by no means illiterate, foolish, or stupid. Much can be learned from the Montagnards. They possess a great deal of common sense and ingenuity. They are highly motivated when given responsibility, and they must be offered the opportunity to make decisions.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 39 Chapter Three The Enemy* I. Introduction It is no secret that communism is behind the insurgent movement in Vietnam; nor that the VC is the military arm of this communist inspired revolution. Therefore, VC methods of operation are not new, and except for minor variations, parallel the basic pattern of communist doctrine for this type of warfare. It is not necessary that the average American soldier obtain a profound knowledge of communism, but it is important to have an understanding of its effects on VC operations and activities. It is not the intent of this chapter to discuss communist doctrine and theory. It is a discussion of VC characteristics, aims and methods which, within the scope of this report, is presented. Variances with other areas are certainly noted, but the pattern remains the same. Even as the Indochina War was ending in 1954, the communists were planning to establish control over the Montagnards. Agents remained in Rhade villages. Guerrillas were establishing themselves in the mountains and jungles of the highlands; and 400 to 500 Rhade were taken into North Vietnam, trained as cadre, and returned to the south to await their orders. In the years

Footnote: This chapter is based solely on 1962 reports.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 40 1956-58, the guerrilla movement began to organize and by 1960 the VC operated freely in the Central Highlands. They gained much civilian support for their movement.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 41 II. The VC Soldier A. Most of the VC lead a hard, peasant existence before being recruited. Consequently, the VC is self-controlled in the face of death, extreme discomforts, and cruel punishments. To him, life is cheap. The biggest asset of the VC is the mass of hardy manpower available to them while the greatest disadvantage is their illiteracy. VC leaders have placed emphasis on raising the status of their soldiers. Establishment of training centers and schools, and the introduction of more and better arms and equipment, are two methods being used to improve their image. B. Three types of VC soldiers operated in this area. One was the village soldier, who wears no uniform and received no pay. He lives and continues to work in his parent village. His purpose is to obtain intelligence, conduct psychological operations (psyops), and obtain village support for the VC. The VC prefer to have two to six village soldiers in each village. C. The second type is the irregular soldier. He is the villager who has been recruited or forced to join the VC band. Poorly equipped and poorly trained, he lives in the jungle and receives little pay or compensation for his work. He has the mission of terrorizing villages who will not conform to the VC policies of levying and collecting rice taxes and of conducting minor combat actions (Figure 21). D. The professional soldier (hard core) is the third type. He is the full time regular. Of hardy peasant stock with a poor education, he is accustomed to a low standard of living and his per-

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 42 sonal needs are small. He is physically tough and he can travel long distances with heavy loads and at a fast pace. He can exist for extended periods of time on plain and meager rations. His military training prepares him to use the terrain to his advantage. His political training makes him mentally strong and prepared to support the VC efforts at all costs. As a result of austere living conditions, he has developed an immunity against the displeasures of guerrilla survival. This is not to imply that he enjoys uncomfortable hardships; indeed he doesn't. His sole basis for survival is the promise of a better life when victory is achieved. E. Whatever category the VC soldier fits into, his ability to merge into the civilian population is his greatest asset. What makes the VC an effective fighting force? Is it population support, intelligence or mobility? All of these, yes! Most important it is the strict discipline instilled in each soldier and the strong dedication of his leaders. This is best illustrated as follows: 1. On almost every occasion, when a village entered the area of influence of the VDP, the village soldier was easily detected and apprehended. He very often volunteers information, repents for his association with the VC and denounces VC activities. He is dedicated only to himself and to whatever side offers him protection and security. He is not a dedicated and closely integrated member of the VC band. He is not subject to the rigors of guerrilla hardships nor to the close and continuous control and direction of the VC leaders. This lack of rapport and influence, coupled with his limited training and moderate indoctrination, is responsible for this weak link in the VC cell.

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FIG 21. CAPTURED VC

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 44 2. The irregular soldier is not particularly dedicated to the VC movement either. He is committed to their cause for one reason or another. Although better trained than the village soldier he is not considered professionally competent for his military endeavors. He is completely dependent upon the direction and initiative of his leader and seldom acts of his own accord. His leaders are well trained, hard core (regular) VC. However, the leaders are greatly hindered because logistical support from higher headquarters is usually denied these irregular units. As a result, the leaders cannot adequately meet the needs of his followers and his leadership suffers accordingly. It is not difficult to persuade the irregular soldier to defect from the VC through psychological activities. 3. It is the regular soldier who is the well-disciplined and adequately trained VC. Unlike the irregular units, these are Vietnamese troops with only a handful of Rhade guides, interpreters and messengers. The leaders are extremely well qualified and they conduct large scale military operations in a professional manner. They are fair with their men and care for their needs. A high esprit exists and it is seldom that a wounded man is left behind; or the dead, for that matter. The few hard core prisoners that were taken divulged no information nor would they alter their ideological behavior. Devoted leaders make these units what they are.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 45 III. Organization There is no set organization for the forces. One battalion has hundreds of guerrillas while another has less than a hundred. They are generally organized on a military structure with each organization unit assigned an area of operations - a province, a district or a combat zone to conduct its activities. The size of a force depends on many factors. For example, prior to the development of the VDP, the VC irregular units recruited as many Rhade as they could. This was the only major force assigned to this area. Once the VDP proved itself, and the irregular forces began to meet resistance and lose Rhade support, regular VC units were assigned to the area. Hence, strategic importance is a factor which will determine the number and type of troop support the VC will assign to an area. Military importance, psychological importance, and logistical importance are other determining factors. Whatever the size or the type unit, the VC principle of centralized direction with decentralized control, is practiced at the lowest level. This permits freedom of action and responsiveness as opportunities present themselves. The most effective type unit is the platoon (20-30 men) or company (75-100 men). These units have sufficient strength to enforce sizeable demands and yet are small enough to retain their mobility, security, ease of control and unburdened logistical support. If a larger force is required for a particular operation, smaller units simply mass at the designated time and place. Upon completion of the operation, they disband and return from whence they came.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 46 The dress of the guerrilla soldier usually reveals the type of VC unit he is assigned to. The guerrilla soldier seldom wears a recognized military uniform. He prefers native clothing for obvious reasons. As previously mentioned, the village soldier wears no uniform. The irregular soldier can usually be distinguished by the black, peasant type shirt and trousers (uniform) he wears. A scarf, armband or other removable insignia is also worn as means of recognition. The irregulars are also characterized by a mixture of other garments they have captured or confiscated. Items such as fatigues, field jackets and other military clothing as well as civilian footgear, headgear and other civilian clothing are worn at will. The appearance of the irregular unit might best be described as a conglomeration of renegades. The regular soldier, on the other hand, is dramatized by a distinctive battle dress of khaki colored uniforms adorned with a unit insignia. Tennis shoes and pith helmets or fatigue caps are a part of this uniform. IV. Equipment and Supplies In general terms, the VC logistical status is best described as from "poor to adequate" but never better or seldom equal to the supply status of the government forces. An exception of course, is where the VC strike at a weaker force. If choice of equipment were his, light durable equipment would be selected to enhance speed, mobility and ease of maintenance. His arms would have these same characteristics to include a large volume of firepower.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 47 The irregular forces are poorly equipped and weapons are in short supply. An average distribution of weapons is one for every two men. A majority of the weapons are old French MATS 36 rifles and a limited number of French MAS 49 automatic rifles. Since a greater portion of their logistical support is dependent upon captured supplies and equipment, there is a variety of other weapons in their possession. The fact remains, however, that weapons need to be passed from man to man as he is committed for an operation. Ammunition is very critical and seldom does any one individual have more than ten or twenty rounds. An exception is the men who have automatic weapons. They have considerably more ammunition. One captured VC soldier armed with a MATS 36, had forty rounds of ammunition wrapped in a handkerchief, on his person. Only four rounds fit his weapon. The other types were U.S. .45 cal, .30 cal carbine, .30 cal, .22 cal, and .38 cal pistol, 9mm and some Chinese ammunition. No one type numbered more than ten rounds. Questioning revealed that he had hopes of capturing a weapon any weapon for which he would have ammo. This was a typical VC scavenger approach to their logistical problems. The following two accounts will sum up the equipment status of an irregular force. The first account is extracted from an interrogation report of a captured VC on 10 May 1962. (Translated) -- The group I was with numbered 100 men. 60 were Rhade and 40 were Vietnamese. About 50 men were armed with a mixture of French rifles and American carbines. They had one 60mm

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 48 mortar and four British Bren guns (automatic rifles). The cadre (leaders) wore pistols and carried grenades. Our area of operations was always within 10 to 15 kilometers of Buon Knoup (village). We had no uniforms and we wore mixed clothing. -The second account is extracted from the interrogation of an escaped captive of the VC on 12 May 1962. (Translated) ---I was captured near my village on 15 April. During my captivity I saw hundreds of Vietnamese and Rhade VC. More than half were armed and their dress was mixed. A few days after my capture I was turned over to a 15 man group. Three were Vietnamese cadre, armed with pistols; and 12 were Rhade, armed with 10 MATS 36's and two MAS 49's -Miscellaneous other equipment and supplies such as binoculars, canteens, medicines, rations and others are of mixed origin (French, American, British, Japanese, Russian, Chinese and Vietnamese). Regular units are very well equipped and supplied. Each soldier is armed and has sufficient ammunition. Crew served weapons, mortars, machine guns and recoilless rifles, are normal equipment for these units. Their equipment is also standardized within each unit to a great degree. French and Chinese equipment were the predominant issues. This eases their maintenance and resupply considerations. Communications equipment was not observed in this area but it is safe to assume they had small radios (PRC-6 variety) for inter unit control. Equipment they capture is usually turned over to the irregular units in the area.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 49 VC rice cache sites are dispersed throughout the area. Favorite locations are close to streams and routes of VC movement. Supply dumps are rare. One logistical and administrative support area services an entire zone. These are rather elaborate, well protected, and secure installations. It is habitually located along the major route of exfiltration and infiltration. These support areas include training centers, dispensaries, supply points, arms manufacturing and repair facilities, shoe and clothing repair shops, propaganda printing plants and the like. These are not professional type factories by any means. The work is crude and accomplished primarily by apprentice workmen with hand tools. It must be mentioned that a great deal of the VC weapons systems (mines, bangalore torpedos, grenades and some weapons) are improvised and proved to be effective. V. Training With few exceptions, cadre and specialist training is conducted in North Vietnam, Laos and other established training centers in South Vietnam. Political education, leadership and the principles of guerrilla warfare are emphasized in these training programs. Unit training programs also consist of political indoctrination. These classes establish reasons for defending VC actions and instill a fighting spirit in each guerrilla. On the military side of the program, training emphasis is placed on survival, shooting, stealth, and developing individual military skills. A recruit, unless he is endowed with a specific talent or qualification, is first trained for the duties of a tax collector, agent or other non-combatant position. As he progresses in his training

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 50 he accompanies tactical units on operations as an observer. He is not issued a weapon for many weeks or months, or until his leader is assured of his ability and loyalty. VI. Characteristics of VC Operations A. Movement The VC is able to move quickly over difficult terrain. This is primarily true because he is lightly equipped, he is familiar with the terrain, and he is in good physical condition. B. Initiative The VC has choice of action and therefore retains the initiative so vital for his operations. C. Discipline Because of the difficulty and secrecy of their missions the VC resort to severe measures to enforce discipline. Their difficult living conditions and the fact that many of their followers are not exactly volunteers requires offenders to be severely punished. D. Activity When not engaged in combat operations the VC are actively engaged in training, receiving political indoctrinations, or caring for their weapons and equipment. They are not given time to think about the hardships they are enduring. E. Secrecy

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 51 Secrecy is the foundation for all VC operations and activities. If this is violated, because of their inferior strength, they run into many difficulties. As a result, the loyalty of personnel is closely checked. Briefings are presented only to those personnel who have a real need to know and plans are not divulged until the last minute. F. Surprise The VC requires concentration of the largest possible force, secret and swift actions, surprise attacks, and quick decisions in battle if he is to be successful. G. Determination The dedicated VC believes in his cause. He puts up with hardship and suffering to achieve these aims. His individual loyalty and dedication tends to keep non-conformists, within the VC unit, in place. VII. Tactics and Operations The VC place emphasis on the same tactical principles as all communist indoctrinated guerrillas; speed, surprise, deception, security, and favored odds. They are compelled to study the works of Vo Nguyen Giap (Commander-in-Chief, Vietnam Peoples Army). The VC conserve their forces by establishing tactical advantages. They seek the most vulnerable targets such as isolated villages, security posts, lightly guarded military and civilian installations, and poorly trained civil guard and paramilitary units, which they carefully reconnoiter and keep under constant surveillance. The VC concentrate quickly, take their positions at once,

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 52 and do not linger in the area. They start from a given point and march for one, two, or more nights to the area of attack, creating a strong element of surprise. Their positions are developed rapidly and they launch their attack at night or early in the morning. They then disappear back to the jungle as quietly and as quickly as they came, before first light. A. Their attacks on defended villages follow the same general pattern. The VC move into position at dark. They normally select two areas for breaching into the village. Their first step is to yell into the village, from all sides, informing the villagers that they are surrounded and that if they surrender their arms they won't be harmed. After a pause of 30-60 minutes, the VC rattle the fence or hit it with sticks in an attempt to draw fire and thus locate the defensive positions. Next, they take one of two courses of action: they either lay down a heavy volume of automatic fire as they breach the fence with explosives; or they attempt to breach the fence undetected and without supporting fire. The following actions best illustrate this procedure. 1. Attack on Buon Tang Ju At approximately 0300 hours on 10 July 1962, the village of Buon Tang Ju was attacked by a company of VC irregulars. The attack took place during a heavy rain and complete darkness. Immediately prior to the attack the VC yelled into the village and began to rattle the fence surrounding the village. While this distraction was taking place, the VC began breaching (by cutting) the fence in the vicinity of point 1 (Figure 22). When the first VC to enter the village

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 53 reached point 2, he was fired upon and killed by a village defender, Y-Ao, who fired a single shot from his foxhole (point 3). The VC then proceeded to open fire from all directions outside the village while other VC entered the village in the vicinity of point 1. Y-Ao was killed and his carbine captured. The defenders returned the fire and at approximately 0600 hours the VC were driven off. From the moment the VC attacked, Buon Enao operational base (ob) had radio contact with Buon Tang Ju. When informed of the attack, two sections (platoons) of the SF were placed on stand-by alert. However, they were not dispatched until 0500 hours so as to reach the vicinity of Buon Tang Ju at first light. (Experience proved that reinforcing a village during the hours of darkness took many hours, unless roads and trails were utilized for movement. The VC always had ambushes set on all routes into the village while it was being attacked. Furthermore, the risk of being fired upon by the villagers themselves was too great.) When the SF arrived they immediately sent out patrols to search the area. They located two dead VC (Vietnamese) approximately 100 yards from the village. The nature of their wounds revealed they had to be carried into the jungle. There was a large amount of blood along the south fence as well as in the vicinity of points 1 and 2. Many punji stakes (bamboo spikes) in the vicinity of point 1 we-re blood stained, and blood trails made it easy to follow the VC route of withdrawal. The amount of blood stains, the number of saplings that had been cut for use as stretcher poles, and the fact that two VC were carried away from the village but then abandoned, indicated the VC suffered many

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 54 casualties. It was later reported that the VC suffered approximately 50 casualties. The defenders captured two weapons (MATS 36's), much clothing and equipment, and a complete dossier of the VC company, which contained a complete company roster, personal history of each guerrilla, organizational charts and other pertinent information. The VC unit was 100 percent Vietnamese and had recently been operating in Zone D (Saigon area). The company commander s name was Van Nam, and his records showed that nine of his men were killed in actions prior to this encounter. It was evident that the VC had the village well scouted. They attacked from the most advantageous point as the banana grove in the vicinity of point 2 conceals movement from all village positions except that at point 3. Evidently the VC did not detect the added strength accumulating at Buon Tang Ju or they probably would never have attacked. There were 36 armed defenders at Buon Tang Ju. However, a SF section had completed a week of operations south of the village and had assembled there to await pick-up the next morning. Another section was conducting psychological activities at Buon Tang Ju and remained overnight. These fortunate circumstances increased the village defense by 68 men, 36 submachine guns, six automatic rifles and 26 carbines. This accounts for the nearly 15,000 rounds of ammunition that the defenders fired in the three hour battle.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON FIG 22. BUON TANG JU SKETCH MAP

55

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON

56

FIG 23. (LEFT) WOMAN AND CHILDREN EXITING PROTECTIVE SHELTER FIG 24 (RIGHT) BREACH IN FENCE (POINT 1)

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON FIG 25. (BELOW) PUNJI STAKES ENCOUNTED BY VC (POINT 1)

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FIG 26. (ABOVE) BANANA GROVE (POINT 2)

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FIG 28. (BELOW) ABANDONED VC

FIG 27. (ABOVE) VILLAGE FIRING POSITION (POINT 3)

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FIG 29. (ABOVE) ABANDONED VC FIG 30. (RIGHT) CAPTURED VC EQUIPMENT

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FIG 31. COMPENSATION & CONDOLENCES TO WIDOW OF DEAD VILLAGE DEFENDER

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FIG 33. (BELOW) CRITIQUE OF VILLAGE DEFENDERS FOLLOWING VC ATTACK

FIG 32. (ABOVE) RESUPPLYING VILLAGERS AFTER REPELLING VC

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 62 The village losses were one defender and his carbine. The women and children had gone to their protective shelters and were still there when the reinforcements arrived. The village defenders ammunition was replenished and they were critiqued and congratulated for a fine job. The widow of the dead man was given 2,000 piasters ($20) for funeral expenses and care for her children. One SF section was left in the village and remained until we were certain the VC would not retaliate for their losses. Note: The VC probed Buon Tang Ju the next night (11 July) but did not make any attempt to attack (Figures 23-33). This next account, an attack by a VC regular unit, will establish the definite pattern established by the VC. However, note the minor variations of this attack in comparison with the previous account. 2. Attack on Buon Trea Mman At approximately 010500 August 1962, the villagers of Buon Trea Mman heard noises outside their village. An alert was called and the village defenders manned their positions. Soon thereafter, a VC was killed as he tried to breach the north gate of the village. At this time a bugle sounded and the VC opened fire into the village from all directions. There was then a huge explosion which breached portions of the north and west outer fences. (Crude bangalore torpedos, made of bamboo tubes six feet long and six inches in diameter, and filled with powder and explosives, were used.) An exchange of fire ensued for about an hour. At approximately 0600 hours, another explosion ripped the north and west inner fences. An estimated VC battalion at-

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 63 tacked and stormed into the village at approximately 0630 hours. The village defenders retreated to the south and east gates and fought their way into the jungle. Three village defenders were left behind as a covering force and all three were killed. Once in the jungle the village defenders split into small groups and made their way to nearby villages. Because there was no radio contact with Buon Trea Mman, it wasn't until 0900 hours that Buon Enao received word of the VC attack. Buon Ea Huk (the closest village to Buon Trea Mman that had a radio) was instructed to send a patrol to Buon Trea Mman and assess the situation. A SF section was immediately dispatched with four American Special Forces men consisting of the detachment commander, an operations sergeant, a medic and commo specialist. They were equipped with communications equipment, medical supplies, and ammunition. ARVN (Army of Vietnam) was contacted and aerial observation requested. They immediately dispatched an L-19 and placed a company of the 45th Regiment (ARVN) on a stand-by alert and available at our request. At approximately 1000 hours reports began filtering into Buon Enao that escaped villagers from Buon Trea Mman had reached various other villages. At 1100 hours the observation aircraft reported that the patrol from Buon Ea Huk was entering the village of Buon Trea Mman and that the SF section was approximately 2 kilometers northeast of the village. He could see only women and children in the village and detected no VC. Upon reaching the village, the SF immediately established communications with Buon Enao. They reported the entire west and north fences were destroyed, and that all the livestock, rice

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 64 and clothing were taken from the village by the VC. What they didn't want or couldn't carry was destroyed. Their trail led to the southeast. The fleeing village defenders were rounded up and returned to Buon Trea Mman. Restoration of the village defenses was begun. Information revealed that the VC wore khaki or black uniforms and the leaders wore a camouflaged uniform. Most of the VC wore pith helmets. Females were observed with the VC. At approximately 1500 hours patrols reported that the VC were again surrounding the village in an apparent attempt to attack at dark. MAAG was requested to furnish an aircraft for a re-supply drop of mortars and ammunition to Buon Trea Mman. They immediately responded and at approximately 1600 hours the equipment was dropped into the village. A Marine company (Vietnamese) was conducting operations nearby and was diverted to Buon Trea Mman and placed at our disposal. They arrived at approximately 1700 hours. By dark, the defenses were restored and the village defenders, SF and Marine company were all in position. The VC made several attempts to attack the night of 1-2 August but never succeeded in getting any closer than the fence. By morning they had withdrawn from the area. The Marine company was released. The SF remained at the village. VC casualties could not be determined. There were 89 village defenders at Buon Trea Mman. Three village defenders were killed and 17 wounded. Four weapons were lost. Buon Trea Mman was again attacked two days later but with the aid of aircraft flares the VC were repelled and later hit with an air strike.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 65 B. The ambush is used extensively by the VC. Whenever they conduct an operation, such as an attack on a village, they always set ambushes along all routes into the village in hopes of destroying reinforcements. Except when in conjunction with another operation, ambushes are generally conducted during daylight hours. If conducted against vehicular convoys, electrical mines are almost always used on the lead vehicle followed by a heavy volume of fire and grenades. We found the VC to be very weak in their ambush techniques. Their selection of sites was poor; they located themselves too far into the jungle to have effective and observed fire; they often fired prematurely; and as soon as their fire was returned they were inclined to withdraw. We did not lose one man as a result of being ambushed although there were times our casualties should have been heavy. This is brought out in detail in chapter sixteen (Operations). VIII. Conclusion The VC (communists) have a history of guerrilla warfare and their military thinking is based upon the premise of small unit actions, long duration conflicts and population support. His intent or aim is to exhaust his enemy while he infiltrates political and military positions of the government of Vietnam (GVN) to interrupt their efforts. The VC makes every effort to strike where his enemy is weakest, to quickly mass and concentrate troops supported by the local population for one large battle, and to quickly disperse to avoid a fixed engagement against more combat power than he had planned on.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 66 The ambush is the favorite VC tactic. Large scale attacks are launched only after careful reconnaissance, careful planning, and exhaustive rehearsals are accomplished. They are usually conducted during periods of poor visibility. Harassing actions, (sniping, booby traps, etc.) are continuously employed to deter and reduce the mobility of GVN forces. VC defenses are likely to be the mobile type, although sophisticated structures, emplacements, tunnels, etc. may contain the force. The VC are not in the least reluctant to evacuate such sophisticated installations when required, only to return when a safe condition exists. The VC, although effective when choosing the time and place of battle, is not as highly skilled, as well trained, nor as unbeatable as some make him to be. He is simply an opportunist who takes advantage of his own strengths, and more so, his enemies weaknesses and carelessness. The VC resort to terrorist tactics and reprisals when they feel they are losing the support of the population which in turn endangers their security. Thus they have little or no concern for noncombatants when conducting a raid or attack on an installation. They fire indiscriminately into the village, used women and children to protect their movements, and take hostages to cover their withdrawal. They fight best when unopposed. When they meet resistance they seek guidance from their leaders. If their leaders become casualties they immediately withdraw to the safety of the jungle.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 67 The VC take great care to keep their movements and camps hidden and secluded. Movement is accomplished during restricted visibility and camps are established in difficult terrain. Camps are always near a water source. The VC conduct nearly all of their operations during darkness. Their favorite time of attack is sometime between 2400-0400 hours. This provides them with time to move to a location, engage the enemy, and withdraw all during poor visibility. Attacks on fortified villages are likely to be with a superior number of troops concentrated at the weakest point of the defense, while simultaneous attacks or probes are undertaken at one or more other points. VD forces cannot afford to fight the VC cn his terms: allowing him to select where, when, and how he will fight. This alone is a difficult mission. However, increased security, timely intelligence, population support and control, and initiative will deny the VC much of his freedom of action. Numerous and continuous small unit actions are necessary to keep the VC off-balance, while the ability to quickly mass a powerful force is necessary for his destruction.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 68 Chapter Four Village Defense I. General As stated in the introduction, the VDP is designed primarily as a denial operation rather than a population control measure or offensive counter-guerrilla program; although, most certainly, both of these are incorporated into the overall concept. VD was established to gain support of the Rhade and thus contain the VC activities in the area. It must be noted at this time that there were many Vietnamese also living in this area. Most of them were centered around Ban Methout or in large co-op type settlements throughout the area. Many of these people were also under VC influence. The Vietnamese came under the purview of the Province Chief and the Rhade under the VDP. It is with the latter that this report concerns itself. Before discussion of VD can be fully appreciated, an understanding of the type and methods of control the VC had imposed upon the Rhade by 1962 is most helpful. The VC initially gained control over the tribesmen through the mild technique of propaganda and psychological activities. They assisted the villagers in raising crops, building houses, and clearing land. They abided by the Rhade customs and traditions and established a solid rapport with the villagers. Once this was accomplished the VC began to impose their own laws and regulations upon the villagers in an attempt to expand their program. Their precepts generally followed the same pattern:

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 69 A. Mandatory attendance at communist classes and lectures. B. Imposed and regulated 'rice taxes' for support of the VC guerrillas. C. Establishment of warning systems for protection of the VC forces. D. Organization of intelligence nets and informer systems. E. Conscription of Rhade as scouts, agents, infiltrators and guides based on aquota system. Since they had been well indoctrinated to the VC cause of 'liberating the Rhade', most of the villagers didn't object to the VC requirements. The VC hadn't really been too harsh or demanding with their laws. And if they did object, could the government protect them? There were some villagers who objected. To keep these non-conformists in line the VC threatened their lives, terrorized them and their families, took hostages, and even murdered group leaders. This deep rooted evil eventually turned the minds and hearts of the Rhade from the VC. It was therefore felt that it wouldn't be too difficult to sway the Rhade from the VC. The difficulty would lie in convincing them that the government would support and protect their interests. II. Conditions for VD There are two basic and important reasons which support the VDP as an effective counterinsurgency operation. The first is that defensible villages are a barrier to the VC and an aid in isolating the VC from the villagers which therefore cuts him off from his support. The second reason is that defended villages offer protection to the villagers so that they can cooperate with the GVN without fear of VC reprisal.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 70 There will be a large variation in plans for each situation. Regardless of how many variations there are, a VDP must accomplish these two conditions. To be successful the VDP must have popular support from those who will be directly involved that being the villagers. Villagers will take a more willing and active part in the program when a feeling of unity and belonging is developed within them. The selection of a potential VDP area is a basic decision and must be predicated upon the consideration of the following criteria: A. The area contains suitable CI potential. B. The area contains worthwhile VC activity. C. The area contains possible causes for insurgency. D. The area is strategic. E. The area can sustain the VDP. There are also considerations for the selection of boundaries for the areas: A. Size, shape, and topography of the area. B. State or provincial borders and ethnic groupings of indigenous personnel. C. Proximity to other VDP`s. D. Groupings of the VC. E. Local support capabilities. F. Ultimate developmental objectives in the form of civic action projects.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 71 G. Other sponsored CI programs. III. Introduction of Village Defense to the Rhade Prior to contacting the Rhade, a thorough study of the problems that existed, coupled with the resources available, were analyzed and possible solutions developed. A meeting was scheduled with Rhade leaders in one of their villages. In addition to the Rhade representatives, U.S. representation was from the JUWTF and Vietnamese representation was from the Presidential Survey Office (PSO). Initially, the meetings and discussions did not attempt to explain the theories of VD. Instead, they were conducted to feel out the Rhade and to gain an impression of their attitude towards the VC and the measures that might be taken in establishing the VDP. Meetings and discussions continued for about two months as it was imperative that each side be in agreement and understand their responsibilities towards the program. Once the program was initiated and weapons issued, it would be too late to resolve differences. As negotiations were being conducted, the planning for the establishment of the program was also accomplished. This included logistical plans, administrative plans, operations plans, political plans, and plans for command and control. Thus, when the 'Green Light' was given for the establishment of the program, there was no delay at the operational level. In January 1962, an agreement was reached and the plans for VD were implemented. The Rhade agreed to physically denounce the VC and support the Vietnamese government. The Vietnamese government agreed to allow the JUWTF to administer and control the program to

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON FIG 34. SKETCH OF INKBLOT CONCEPT

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VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 73 provide economic and social programs for the Rhade, and to keep all Vietnamese military or civilian officials, with the exception of the Province Chief, from interfering with the program. The JUWTF agreed to administer the program and fund it, to maintain operational control over the program, and to coordinate the actions of the program with the Vietnamese. It was also agreed that if this program proved effective with the Rhade, it would then be introduced to other tribes and areas. IV. Concept of Village Defense A. The over-all concept is now discussed in general terms as chapter six (the concept) fully discusses the specifics of the program. In simple terms, the Rhade were to be trained and armed to protect their own village. There would be no resettlement or assemblage of villagers into a 'Strategic Hamlet' concept as was conducted in the Delta. There are many reasons for taking this approach. 1. First, strategic considerations do not support the resettlement or regrouping of villages. Resettlement permits the VC to extend their domain and thereby increase the area from which they can safely harbor and support their forces. Then too, the government forces are driven deeper into the confines of safely garrisoned cities and 'Strategic Hamlets.' 2. The second reason is the psychological impact resettlement has. It would make it appear that the villagers lost their freedom while the VC increased their freedom of movement. The in-

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 74 creased security of the villagers that accompanies resettlement, is greatly overshadowed by the confinement that accompanies it. 3. The economic burden that is placed on the government is the third reason for not resettling. As more villagers are displaced, less land and materials are available for these self sufficient people to gain a livelihood. B. Tactically, population control is not the answer for defeating the VC. Population support is what is required. Resettlement suggests a defensive attitude and inspires no one. VD requires the Rhade to actively engage in a program that is theirs. This inspires them to act with vigor and initiative. More important, it does not require that they be confined for the duration of the insurgent movement. On the contrary, they have the peace and security they desire as soon as they drive the VC from their homes. There are several considerations in determining the concept for VD: the area of operations, population density, degree of VC control and the administrative capability for supporting the program. With approximately 130,000 Rhade living in over 400 villages, spread over an area of nearly 10,000 square kilometers, the 'Ink Blot' concept was determined to be the most suitable approach.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON FIG 35. SKETCH OF INKBLOT EXPANSION

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VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 76 An operational base (OB) is selected and an imaginary L1 circle inscribed (Figure 34). Where this line is drawn will depend on the factors listed earlier. The villages within this circle are then trained and armed, in a logical sequence, while the strike force constantly patrols the outer limits of the area. When the villages in the L1 zone complete training the 'Ink Blot' is enlarged (L2 circle) and the next group of villages are trained and armed. This procedure is continued until the 'Ink Blot' becomes too large to be supported and adequately controlled from the OB. It is then that sub-bases are established (Figure 35) and the 'Ink Blot' approach applied from each of these sub-bases. Figure 36 depicts the communications and road network required to maintain control and provide mutual support between the OB and the sub-bases. V. Conclusion Once there is an understanding of the GVN national plan for combating the VC and the role of both military and civil programs is known, then the VDP can be employed effectively. In most cases, the need for employing the VDP in any specific area will be preceded by the failure on the part of the military forces to encounter, control and-or subdue the VC. Activities between different commands must be coordinated to insure unity of effort. If one command carries out its program as a vigorous operation while another is passive, VC elements will be difficult to overwhelm.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON FIG 36. COMMUNICATIONS SKETCH OF INKBLOT CONCEPT

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VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 78 Political, natural, and ethnic boundaries are the most likely to be used for subdividing areas of responsibility. In our case, it was a combination of political and ethnic. The political boundary was Darlac Province, while the ethnic limitation was the Montagnards within the province.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 79 Chapter Five Command and Control I. General Since the inception of the VDP in January 1962, there have been many changes in the command structure and control of the VDP. Figure 37 depicts what I believe to be the most satisfactory arrangement for the over-all success of the mission. This structure offers unity of command and coordination at the highest level, yet, it provides for decentralized operational control, which is necessary in CI operations. Each VDP is administered by a Combined Team (CT) of U.S., Vietnamese and, in this instance, Rhade personnel. At the operational level this includes the Special Forces Detachment Commander, Vietnamese counterpart, and the area specialist. The project director works closely with the JUWTF and is in reality, the logistical and administrative coordinator of his assigned VDP. II. Specific Duties of the Combined Team There are numerous duties and responsibilities that accompany a VDP - many of which are overlapping. To eliminate a duplication of effort and to fix responsibility, it is necessary to specifically assign tasks. Each member of the CT must be able to perform the functions of other members during their absence.

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FIG 37. COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE FOR VDP

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 81 A. The Area Specialist, by the nature of his training and knowledge of the people, makes recommendations and routine decisions on those activities either economic, political or social in nature. He is the G5 of the VDP. The following duties are logically within his province: 1. Hiring the required indigenous personnel for interpreters, laborers, clerks, cooks and other administrative positions. 2. Securing necessary land for training sites, firing ranges, camp facilities and administrative structures. 3. Controlling the funds required for payrolls, materials, labor, maintenance, civic improvements and the like. 4. Recommending the sequence of training villages based on social and political considerations. 5. Satisfying the many personal problems of the people based on his explicit knowledge of their habits and customs. 6. Coordinating with U.S. civilian agencies in the area of operations. Likely agencies are the United States Operational Mission (USOM), International Volunteer Service (IVS), Association for International Development (AID), United States Information Service (USIS) and other commissions who render economic and civic support: B. The Special Forces Detachment Commander, by the very nature of his position, training, and experience, is the commander of the CT. He is also responsible for the members of his de-

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 82 tachment to include their utilization and performance of duty. The following duties are within his scope of direction: 1. Selecting and notifying villages to be trained, based upon the military and tactical considerations; and in conjunction with the recommendations of the area specialist and the PSO. 2. Organizing the SF and establishing the military structure for the VD forces, organizing the zone of operations, and organizing the OB. 3. Establishing training programs and conducting training. 4. Planning, organizing and conducting military operations. 5. Establishing intelligence procedures and systems. 6. Determining logistical requirements and procedures. 7. Processing trainees. 8. Administering the OB. 9. Recommending and supervising the construction and establishment of the village defenses to include protective measures and security systems. 10. Coordinating with U.S. military establishments in the area of operations. MAAG units, Field Operations Intelligence (FOI) units, and security units are examples of such.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 83 11. Establishing and maintaining communications with higher and subordinate headquarters. 12. Requesting U.S. military support for specific missions. This support might include aircraft, Special Action Force (SAF) augmentation, Underwater Demolition Teams (UDT), and similar units. 13. Controlling the funds for military operations and related activities. 14. Preparing and submitting reports as directed by higher headquarters. C. The Vietnamese representative (PSO) is an extremely important member of the `team' and he can make or break the VDP. It is unfortunate that many of these individuals do not possess the qualities nor have the capability to manage their responsibilities as required. Captain Phu, the PSO assigned to this project, was well qualified and did an outstanding job (Figure 38). A major effort in Vietnam is directed at bringing the Montagnards and Vietnamese closer together. It is therefore imperative that the efforts of the VDP appear to derive from the PSO and his related sources. The following duties are the responsibility of the PSO: 1. Informing Vietnamese officials of the progress and effectiveness of the VDP. In this respect, he will also be required to observe and report on the activities and the actions of U.S. personnel.

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FIG 38. CAPTAIN PHU (PSO)

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 85 2. Coordinating with the Province Chief, Surete, Vietnamese military commanders, Vietnamese welfare agencies and other Vietnamese officials in the area of operations. 3. Requesting military support (artillery, troops, and transportation) and administrative support (engineer equipment, training facilities, and tools) from Vietnamese military sources. 4. Preparing and submitting reports through Vietnamese channels. 5. Recommending villages to receive training based upon the government's considerations. 6. Insuring that the needs and requirements of the Vietnamese are being met. III. Considerations for Control The CT must establish an indigenous command structure which produces harmonious relationships between themselves and the Montagnards. Problems might initially arise when efforts are made to unify, organize-reorganize and establish leaders and commanders within the VDP. Problems and political disputes among the indigenous forces might also affect command and control. The following considerations might help preclude these problems from ever arising: A. Display of professional skill. B. Individual behavior. C. Mutual respect of capabilities. D. Appreciation of one anothers qualities.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 86 E. Showing interest in their welfare. F. Displaying concern for their proficiency. G. Setting the example. H. Using good judgement and common sense. I. Making judicious use of logistical support. IV. Conclusions It would normally seem logical that the director or commander of the CT should be the senior Vietnamese member (PSO). However, every function of the VDP requires speed of action. Decisions must be made rapidly and they normally contain monetary or political implications. A U.S. commander is in a better position to act implicitly than is the PSO who is guided by stringent rules and who has no control over funds. However, each decision must be a mutual effort of the team. Therefore, an intimate and cooperative relationship must be developed to avoid delay, confusion and embarrassment. It is not unusual for the CT to include village leaders, SF commanders and others in on their discussions. This policy will develop a more responsive relationship with everyone concerned and will reap many rewards. The team commander is still responsible for all decisions; and each team member is expected to make his contribution towards reaching timely decisions.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 87 Chapter Six The Concept I. General Village defense (VD) requires a paramilitary force (Rhade), supported by the Vietnamese government (GVN) and U.S. agencies, to conduct denial operations, clear and hold operations, and resistance movements against the VC. This is accomplished by training and arming villagers who will outwardly oppose the VC. The success of the VDP is dependent upon the continuous support of the GVN as well as the moral and physical support of the villagers. VD is characterized by the urgency accorded those matters which directly affect the tribesmen; with emphasis applied to a gradual increase and improvement of their social environment. Although VD is a denial operation aimed at severing the VC from the civilian population, it also encompasses combat operations in those areas which are either controlled or influenced by the VC (red or pink areas). VD relies upon the SF to conduct offensive type activities while the villagers are expected to report VC activity; or if attacked, to contain the VC until the arrival of the SF. II. Development Aspects The development of the VDP entails the initial organization of the area, structure and orientation of forces, build-up, and expansion. Initial organization includes the establishment of the

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 88 OB (chapter seven), coordination with military and civilian agencies, field surveys to make contact with the villages, and psychological operations to provide information of the program. Organization of forces commences with the establishment of the SF (chapter eight). Build-up occurs when villagers are summoned for training, are armed, and returned to their village (chapter nine). The logistical build-up is also completed and short range, high impact civic action programs are begun. The expansion phase introduces the undertaking of long range civic action programs and the establishment of sub-OB's. Adjustments in the program are made to include a redistribution of weapons and the reorientation of SF missions towards counter-guerrilla operations. The development of a VDP might be compared to the development of a Guerrilla Warfare Operational Area (GWOA). The exceptions, of course, are that VD is defensive in nature and is operated within the confines of friendly territory. (The degree of VC control within this friendly territory may alter this posture). Regardless, the principles of security, intelligence and tactics are quite similar. The JUWTF controls and supports the committed detachment(s) from outside the operation area; the OB is the Special Forces Operational Base (SFOB); and each of the subOB's are sector headquarters. The paramilitary forces are trained and equipped in a fashion similar to a guerrilla force. Their employment, however, is quite different.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 89 III. Planning Tasks The VD Operations Plan (OPLAN) at the national level is very broad in scope and avoids detailed instructions. The plan is normally in the form of a mission order with the ground commander formulating the detailed plans. This is best illustrated by the following oral order received to initiate this VDP. 'You will move to this area (pointing to map) tomorrow to organize, train, arm, equip, and direct the Rhade in operations necessary to drive the VC from this region (again pointing to map). Submit your plan as soon as possible and let me know your requirements'. With this guidance (what, where, when, and why) the how was left to the team commander. The OPLAN is devised based on the objectives, availability of potential indigenous forces, nature and strength of the VC, tactical and political considerations, terrain, attitude of the civilians, and other such factors. When the OPLAN is completed it is evident that such a plan could be formulated only by those operating the area. The OPLAN calls for five phases. Phase one (preparatory phase) provides for the establishment of the OB; conducting of medical treatment for the villagers to immediately begin, winning their confidence; psychological operations to establish a base of allegiance; recruiting and training sufficient personnel to establish security for the OB; procurement of interpreters; the selection of recruits for the SF; refinement and adjustment of the various plans, capabilities, and priorities of tasks.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 90 Phase two (initiation phase) provides for the training and organization of the SF; villages begin preparing their defenses and villagers begin to receive training; intelligence nets and systems are established; establishing contact with the villages; establishing alert systems; and final coordination with MAAG and ARVN units. Phase three(counteraction phase)makes an all-out effort to clear the area of the VC. The SF is employed within all of its combat capabilities; Village Defenders are encouraged to secure their areas at all costs; constant pressures are maintained on the VC and known supporters of the VC; civic action and psychological operations are increased; and the intelligence and counterintelligence programs are stepped up. Phase four (realignment phase) is the expansion of the program. The main effort is shifted to the L2 and L3 zones with the establishment of sub-OB's. Introduction of GVN civic action programs is emphasized; communications capabilities are expanded; weapons of villagers in the pacified (white) zones are redistributed and a specified number of the trained Montagnards are assigned to Vietnamese civil guard units. Phase five (demobilization phase) completes the mission. Major changes in the VDP are initiated. The weapons in the hands of the Village Defenders are reapportioned and reduced considerably. Only those selected for retention as Civil Guards remain armed. They are placed under the control of the District or Province Chief but continue to operate from their own village. The SF is reorganized as a militia under the control of either the ARVN military commander or the

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 91 Province Chief. They continue to patrol, secure, and maintain surveillance throughout the area to preclude another VC movement. The entire program reverts to the operational control of the GVN to include the logistic and administrative support required. The VDP ceases to exist upon completion of phase five. However, the GVN must make a drastic shift to civic action programs, psychological operations, and border surveillance. IV. Conclusions A VDP achieves maximum success when it is directed at the population and provides a broad base of security and community development for them. Civic action programs and psychological operations need increased emphasis to provide a unity of effort. This includes the support and cooperation of MAAG and ARVN units. Of primary consideration is the provision that the VDP be conducted to permit for an immediate and aggressive response to requirements. Hungry people can't wait a day or week for rice to be approved for issue, nor can an armed defender do his job when he lacks ammunition. I believe that one of the strongest assets of this program was the reaction of the JUWTF to meet the logistical requirements. The many diversified capabilities of the VDP must be recognized and utilized to the utmost. As was mentioned earlier, population control measures were not implemented by the CT. The VDP was established so that the Rhade themselves enforced the most stringent control measures upon themselves in order to meet the criteria established for VD. By merely placing a qualified

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 92 Rhade in a responsible position and holding him responsible for that activity, invoked a strong feeling of faith and trust for the CT. As a result, restrictions were of their own doing for which there was no animosity on the part of the indigenous population. Thus, population control was a result of population support. If this program is conducted with the intention of 'working yourself out of a job', then indeed a major step towards success has been achieved. Teach and utilize the populace to handle all facets of the VDP; from commanding the SF to receiving and issuing supplies; interrogating to instructing; repairing weapons to administering first aid. Not only is a self-sustaining force developed for counter-guerrilla operations but so are individual skills developed for use in their civilian endeavors.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 93 Chapter Seven The Operational Base I. General The organization of the OB includes the establishment of required command, administrative structures and security for these facilities. The OB is the operational and administrative focal point for the VDP. For maximum efficiency it is located within the area of operations. VC dominance of an area will require greater security measures than otherwise necessary. II. Mission The mission of the OB is to direct, support and administer the VDP. III. Functions A. Plan and direct operations. B. Coordination. C. Plan and direct civic action programs. D. Communications support. E. Training F. Logistical support. G. Intelligence support. H. Plan and direct psychological operations. I. Briefings.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 94 J. Medical support. K. Other support. IV. Organization The OB is organized into two main functional groups: the Operational Element (Strike Force) and the Administrative and Training Element (Figure 39). A. The combined team (CT), which is the command group, is located in the Tactical Operations Center (TOC). From here it directs and coordinates all functions of the VDP, administrative as well as operational. The CT is normally augmented with the SF Commander and the chief interpreter on operational matters. Other specialists are summoned when required. The TOC is also used as a briefing center for operational elements as well as visitors (Figure 40). The communications center is considered an element of the TOC. It consists of the necessary communications to support the VDP. The communications chief (US) is the supervisor. U.S. operators maintain contact with Saigon (JUWTF) on a scheduled basis while the Rhade maintain a 24 hour net over the VDP communications system. B. The SF operates and manages its own headquarters for the planning and functioning of its activities. C. Administrative and training element.

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FIG 39. VDP ORGANIZATIONAL CHART

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON FIG 40. BRIEFING VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS

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VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 97 The Administrative and Training Element is organized into two distinct sections (Figure 41). 1. The admin center is the facility where representatives, who provide administrative support operations, are located. Each of these representatives normally operates from the specific facility where his duties are performed. They are supervised by one or more of the Special Forces personnel. The Administrative Section (Admin Sec) is composed of varied and numerous indigenous personnel. The exact number and type specialists required depends primarily upon the magnitude of each specific VDP. A majority of these duties may initially be performed by the Special Forces detachment until the required indigenous personnel are trained and available to assume these duties. As a result, the Admin Sec will seldom be organized, in total, until the second or third phase of the VDP is reached. The Chief Interpreter supervises the functioning of the Admin Sec in addition to his duties at the TOC. Operational command is retained by the CT for immediate reaction and response to the overall needs of the VDP. In addition to their administrative duties away from the OB, they are also assigned alert positions in the event the OB comes under attack. Generally, administrative personnel are extremely intelligent and learn their duties rapidly. By the very nature of their positions, they receive a slightly higher salary than the average SF soldier. Nevertheless, in almost every instance, administrative trainees preferred training and assignment to the SF. For this reason, an attempt is made to obtain qualified women for as many

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 98 positions as possible, or qualified men who are unqualified for military duties because of age or physical defects. (A) Interpreters - A majority of the Rhade speak only their tribal tongue. Due to the French influence, however, many of the males also speak French; a few speak Vietnamese. Only eight Rhade spoke English when this program was initiated. These were trained by missionaries. They were proficient in reading and writing English as well as speaking it. Two of the eight were females. The VDP managed to employ all eight. They were assigned as follows: (1) The hospital (aid-station), by the very nature of its purpose, requires a full-time interpreter. One of the females was placed in this position. In addition, one of the male interpreters had studied medicine - he was not a doctor but more a pharmacist or druggist -and he too was placed in the hospital. His wife, the other female interpreter, was employed as a secretarytranslator in the TOC (Figure 42). The position of Chief Interpreter went to Y-Rit. Not only was he the best English speaking Rhade but he was also well qualified in the military arts, and understood military terminology. He was also assigned to the TOC. Another of the interpreters was assigned to the Area Specialist. Although the Area Specialist could speak Rhade fairly well, he needed assistance to carry out the preponderance of civil affairs tasks which confronted him each day.

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FIG 41. ADMIN & TRAINING ORGANIZATION CHART

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON

100

FIG 42. TOC TRANSLATOR INTERPRETER

FIG 43. INTERPRETER

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 101 The remaining interpreters were pooled and utilized as required. For all practical purposes, they were continuously on operations with members of the Special Forces Detachment who accompanied the SF (Figure 43). Communicating through interpreters is not always necessary. There are other languages which are commonly spoken by the Rhade and members of the CT. French and Vietnamese are the two most common. Figure 44 de picts the language capabilities of the CT. Japanese, German, and Russian were of no value in communicating with Rhade; Chinese and Thai had only limited value. Our cook was Chinese and one SF Company Commander spoke Thai. In addition, other innovations were attempted. The commo chief established a means of communicating with his Rhade counterpart through morse code and international signals. The logistic chief held nightly English classes for key Rhade personnel. I estimate that within six months, upwards of 25 Rhade could effectively communicate in English. The value of teaching English to Rhade is best exemplified when our replacement team arrived and found that they could communicate in English with nearly all of the key Rhade personnel. We left an important contribution behind. Whereas, if we had strived to learn their language, or relied upon interpreters, we would have departed leaving a great void in our contribution to the VDP. Interpreters work long and arduous hours. They are virtually on duty 24 hours a day. Because of their importance and the nature of their duties, they are the highest paid members of the VDP. They receive from 1200 to 2500 piasters ($15-$30 US) per month depending on their experience and longevity.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 102 Whenever working through an interpreter, caution is exercised in their employment. The Rhade are quite efficient and very seldom express their own translation or interpretation. However, the message to be translated has to be stated in the simplest and clearest terms - terms they understand - for the best results. By learning the Rhade action verbs, one can usually detect whether or not the translation is presented with the intent desired. (B) Finance clerk - As the VDP grow, so does the payroll. The finance clerk is selected based upon his integrity and his ability to maintain accurate records. He is completely responsible for receipt, disbursement and accountability of the indigenous payroll. He has a full time job keeping records and insuring that all personnel are payed regardless of their location. Considering that the payroll may reach the sum of 1,000,000 piasters ($15,000 US) or more per month, the selection of the finance clerk becomes more significant. It must be mentioned that he is never entrusted with the entire payroll in one lump sum. It is portioned out in increments to reduce the risk of loss and temptation. (C) Mess personnel - Cooks are required for the CT as well as for hospital patients. All others - SF, trainees, refugees, administrative employees, pow's, etc. - prepare their own meals. As is Rhade practice, a group often gets together and prepares a common pot, which reduces the cooking efforts.

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FIG 44. LANGUAGE QUALIFICATIONS CHART

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 104 It is interesting to note that as the VDP developed, two indigenous cafes sprang up outside the OB, where a meal could readily be obtained. The CT requires a cook who is accustomed or experienced in western cooking procedures. Native prepared food is nutritious and tasty and is eaten exclusively on operations. However, I feel that, if possible, the normal diet should be offered at the OB for both morale and health reasons. We obtained a Chinese cook. He was the only non-Montagnard employed in the VDP. (It was necessary to obtain Rhade approval to permit an outsider to live and work in one of their villages). In addition to his cooking chores, he is also required to do all the marketing. This is done at a nearby Vietnamese market. His ability to speak Vietnamese, as well as his inherent characteristic of haggling over prices, works to our benefit. This stabilizes the price of goods sold to Americans. The local economy is boosted at a normal rate of increased sales and is not exploded by exorbitant prices paid by Americans. This is further controlled by the budget imposed upon the cook. He is provided with a specific sum of money each day and told how many persons to prepare for. The amount of money he receives is based on a set rate of 25 piasters per day, per man (based on experience factors). With this system he haggles quite energetically to obtain the best buys. If he can adequately feed the team for less, he is permitted to retain the few extra piasters he could wrangle each week. His salary is 25,000 piasters per month, including room and board. This may seem excessive, but he works seven days a week and from dawn until dark each

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 105 day. To assist him with the KP chores, two captured VC girls worked for him. This was a part of their rehabilitation and reindoctrination training. One female cook is provided for the hospital. She prepares meals for the patients. Meals are provided free of charge and are on a scheduled basis. Therefore, this position is considered a part-time job, for the cook works only the meal hours. Accordingly, her wages are approximately 200-300 piasters per month: (D) Clerks and typists - As previously mentioned, one of the interpreters is dually employed as a clerk in the TOC. As the VDP expands it is necessary to hire additional help. The major effort is devoted to processing trainees and maintaining numerous files. Processing becomes so important and involved that it is not long before an interpreter is placed in charge of this function on a full-time basis. A clerk is also required at the hospital to maintain the medical files. All other sections perform their own administrative functions. (E) Supply personnel - These employees receive wages comparable to soldiers of the S.F. The number employed is again dependent upon the size of the VDP. Included is the transport section, where one driver is employed for each vehicle, an armorer, supply chief, two supply helpers and a carpenter. In addition, a mechanic is trained and employed to maintain the vehicles and the electric power producing generators. The specific duties of this section is discussed in chapter twelve (logistics).

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 106 (F) Hospital personnel - An interpreter, medical assistant and cook are assigned to the hospital. The aidmen, pharmacist, and other helpers are temporarily assigned as a part of their VD medical training. This is their final phase before returning to their village as village medics. During their training period, as well as their tenure as village medics, they receive a monthly salary of 900 piasters. The complete medical program is discussed in chapter fifteen (medical). 2. The training section is divided into two groups. A weapons and basic skills group, and a tactics and operations group. The cadre are all former SF personnel who are singled out as the 'best'. They receive extensive additional training and are afforded additional entitlements and prestige inducements. They also receive a higher wage than any member of the SF (1700 piasters per month). The functions and duties of the training section is discussed in chapter ten (training program) (Figure 45). V. Development of the OB. The primary consideration for selection of the OB for VD, is security. The actual site is influenced by many considerations, but the area should at least be temporarily free from VC interference. The establishment of the OB may possibly be entirely peaceful and free of incident. However, it is more than certain that VC agents and terrorists will begin to operate against the VDP almost immediately. Securing an existing village for the OB and establishing a show of force as rapidly as possible will counteract the VC intent to a great degree.

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FIG 45. RHADE CADRE

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 108 The establishment of the OB must offer relative assurance of success as a set-back at this early stage of development will undoubtedly defeat the VDP prior to the inception of plans and policies. A. The ideal OB should have the following characteristics: 1. Free from VC interference. 2. Have a defensible perimeter. 3. Be located near an airfield. 4. Be located near MA AG and ARVN units. 5. Be large enough to accommodate the various installations required for the VDP. 6. Be located near the provincial capital. B. The following considerations must be mentally processed with priority and emphasis placed on those factors which enhance the accomplishment of the purpose of the OB. The situation that exists in each area will definitely influence the decision. 1. Security - The nature of the terrain, accessibility, location of military units, and VC strength and influence will determine the degree of security inherently provided to the OB. The OB is highly vulnerable during the developmental stage and every effort is made to take advantage of those existing conditions which favor the selection of a site. Selecting the OB within a VC stronghold is avoided. If there is no other solution, then the OB must take on the same perspective as establishing an OB for unconventional warfare (UW) operations.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 109 2. Centrally located - Protection and support for the villages must be equally effective in all directions. This is not to imply that the OB is placed in the geographical center of the area of operations. Instead, a time-distance factor is employed, based on the road networks and type of transportation to be utilized. This is extremely important because of the VC tactic of 'hit and run'. 3. Airfield - The requirement for having an airfield nearby cannot be overstressed. This airfield must be capable of accommodating cargo aircraft as well as tactical air. This is particularly true during the build-up and expansion phases of the VDP. The OB is located hundreds of miles from the supporting headquarters in Nha Trang, Saigon or Da Nang. The inaccessible terrain and long distance makes air the only effective method of conducting resupply. Cargo aircraft, such as the C-46, C-47, C-123 and the Caribou, will deliver nearly all of the large tonnages of supplies, vehicles and other large items. The utilization of overland transportation is unsafe, uneconomical, time consuming, and almost impossible during the rainy season. Aerial resupply (air dropped) creates many problems. Packing containers, rigging drops, weather limitations, damage, losses, and retrieving drops are major disadvantages. Resupply in this manner should be retained for emergency situations. The use of helicopters and light aircraft provide an excellent means for resupply. However, shortages of these type of aircraft, gross load limitations, and range limitations restrict their

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 110 capability to provide continuous large tonnage logistical support. These aircraft are better utilized for other types of supply missions. Notably, they are ideally suited for resupply missions between the OB and sub-OB's or for resupply of operational elements. Landing strips and pads can very easily be constructed adjacent or close-in to these facilities to expedite delivery. Tactical air (TAC AIR) support of VD can only be effective when the aircraft are based within the near proximity of the program they are supporting. The time-distance factor plus the fuel consumption of aircraft based hundreds of miles away, offers very little support to the VDP where the enemy comes and goes within a few hours. By taking advantage of an existing airfield other bonus effects are provided. It also services MAAG, ARVN and perhaps commercial aircraft. This provides an alternate and supplementary means for obtaining necessary air transportation. Chapter seventeen (Air Support) discusses this in greater detail. 4. MAAG - MAAG has the capability of providing a great deal of administrative and technical support to the VDP. This is particularly true in the field of communications and army aircraft. The VDP, in turn, can provide an abundance of intelligence, security and operational assistance to MAAG. At this time, it is not my intention to discuss the merits of having or not having a command relationship established between MAAG and the VDP. Whatever the case, a successful VDP requires that a harmonious relationship exist between the two. In this program there was no command or administrative requirements imposed upon either headquarters for

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 111 support of the other. However, in my opinion, a more agreeable situation could not have existed regardless of established command authority. Lt Col R. J. Billado, Senior MAAG Advisor for this region, realized that we were not in competition with his mission but rather the two programs supported each other. As a result, he provided the VDP maximum assistance within his purview for which we reciprocated whenever possible. This relationship is best exemplified by the following letter. It was written to the commanding officer, JUWTF, at a time when many people doubted the worth of the VDP. As a disinterested person the senior MAAG advisor's comments would have considerable weight and bearing on the future of the VDP (Figure 46). Needless to say, the VDP continued with greater vigor and support than ever before. Within a month, the VDP was expanded eight fold. 5. ARVN - Vietnamese army units are a lucrative source of support for the VDP if handled properly. The PSO is the action officer and coordinator in this respect. Artillery, armor, aircraft and troops can be made available to support a specific action. Many ARVN facilities such as rifle ranges, which are suited for the VDP, might also be made available. The engineer support ARVN can provide, offers the greatest potential for establishing more favorable relations between the Vietnamese and the Rhade. 6. Routes - To facilitate control and influence the action, the OB must have sufficient roads to speedily move to an area of interest with the support required. Don't be misled into thinking that roads or trails lead into each and every village. The routes required are merely

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON UNITED STATES ARMY MILITARY ADVISORY DETACHMENT 23D TACTICAL AREA BAN ME THOUT, VIETNAM

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29 July 1962 Commanding Officer JUWTF Headquarters COMUSMACV Saigon, Vietnam Dear In my opinion there are two primary factors which triggered the recent VC activities in and around Buon Trap. These are: Reconnaissance probes by ARVN, which undoubtedly pricked at least two sensitive VC areas, and the spreading and effectiveness of the Buon Enao program (VDP). The latter seems to have considerable logic and I consider it the most important. As you are well aware, the addition of village after village to the community of Buon Enao Village Defense force has deprived the VC from an important food source, camp workers, and has seriously restricted their freedom of movement. In addition, VC agents have found it increasingly difficult to operate in this area without being compromised or in many instances captured. Under these conditions we must, I think, anticipate stronger and more frequent attacks

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 113 against the Village Defense system. This is a test for the VC as well as the Buon Enao concept and I seriously doubt that they will let this expansion go on without seriously contesting it. While there were some VC innovations during the recent Buon Trap incidents which are new to this area, i.e. camouflage uniforms, the use of bugles etc, we have developed no indications of any sizeable VC infiltration into DARLAC (province). There is no doubt that the VC element that hit Buon Trap was a well trained, well equipped, highly disciplined regular unit. This was probably a joint effort by the two VC companies which have been carried by J2 MAAG for some time. At the time of attack on Buon Trap, one Marine Company was within reinforcing distance and in my estimation could have and should have launched a counter attack. Why the commander of this unit did not do so is beyond my comprehension. From the accounts I have received, my conclusion is that the Village Defenders did one hell of a lot of shooting and inflicted heavy casualties on the VC. One escapee reported counting 4050 dead and another 20-30 wounded while he was in the custody of the VC. The Buon Trap defenders did not withdraw until their ammunition was expended and their covering force fought as bravely and aggressively as you would have reason to expect. The action of the Strike Force when ambushed some 8 K's from Buon Trap was a perfect example of the effectiveness of immediate counter ambush assault. The VC manning the main

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 114 automatic weapons position never had a chance and were annihilated. This violent reaction to ambush completely eliminated the ambush set-up and scattered the VC in utter confusion. I presume the loss of some weapons resulted in a few questions, but the number is being reduced daily as more and more tribesmen return. Many of these weapons had been rendered inoperative before being hidden in the jungle by their owners. I would say that we should all feel highly encouraged by what these Village Defenders accomplished. It was their first action and they were pitted against a strong, well trained and well led regular VC unit of the so-called hard core type. The fact that Buon Trap is still in our hands and with the same defenders on site should quiet some of the critics. It is my firm opinion that the Buon Enao concept might well be the answer to restoring law and order on the High Plateau. Buon Trap is not the only village in which the Rhade have shown they will fight against the VC. The Village Defense system in DARLAC is rapidly approaching the day when they will be able to, as General Patton used to say, "Hold them by the nose while they kick them in the ass". Hope this answers some of the questions of dis-believers and he assured of my continued support. Warm personal regards, s/R J BILLADO R J BILLADO Lt Col Inf Senior Advisor Fig. 46 LETTER REPORT FROM SENIOR MAAG ADVISOR

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 115 used to transport support to within a reasonable distance of the village. 7. Provincial Capital Locating the OB in close proximity to the Province Chief might create as many problems as there are advantages. Good relationships with political figures will provide the VDP with a great deal of political support to maintain the momentum of a program that will have many non-supporters. Of course, the Province Chief will have many problems which he thinks the VDP can help him solve. The .PSO must again handle this in a diplomatic manner. 8. Built-up Area This type of accommodation provides the opportunity to purchase food, supplies, materials, clothing, equipment and other commodities. An equally important consideration is the garages and repair facilities available for vehicles, generators, and other mechanical equipment. This practice eliminates time consuming paperwork as well as the time-lag for processing the requirement for repairs or replacement. The cost of transporting and packing is avoided, while the local purchase boosts the local economy which stimulates social improvement and psychologically motivates support for the VDP. While the above cited factors are ideal for the establishment of an OB, seldom will they all be available. It is common knowledge that the presence of the OB provides the area with a great many benefits; improved economy, increased security, social stimulation, and prestige, to name but a few. As a result, Province Chiefs, religious leaders and military commanders will be vying to have the OB established where it will also benefit them. Therefore, in many instances the OB is selected by higher headquarters for political, strategic, or personal justifications. If this is true,

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 116 then these mentioned factors must be manufactured and incorporated into the OB as best as possible. VI. Constructing the OB The OB needs to be established and built as a semi-permanent facility. It usually remains in place as the control and logistical center for the duration of the VDP; or at least until the Fifth Phase (demobilization). It may take a year or longer to reach this phase. Therefore, facilities that are erected must be sturdy and able to withstand the elements. If the OB is located within an existing village, which is recommended, the construction should follow the general pattern and conform to the construction of the local habitat wherever practical. Certain facilities such as latrines and refuse pits, are not only built for use at the OB, but also provide models for the villages to follow when sanitation and other civic action programs are introduced to them. A. Defense and Security - The OB is definitely a lucrative target for the VC. Adequate defensive and security measures must be taken to eliminate this threat of destruction. The following measures are by no means all inclusive of what might be accomplished along these lines. The area and materials available will definitely dictate, to some degree, what is most feasible. In the Delta, for instance, because of the flooding and low elevation of the terrain, it is conceivable that foxholes will be built above the ground rather than dug below the surface of the earth. The following measures proved to be effective in this VDP, as the OB was never threatened.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 117 1. A fence is erected to completely encircle the village (OB). There are two fences, an inner fence and an outer fence, each tall enough (nine feet or more) and barbed at the top to cause difficulty in scaling. A fence made of bamboo is wobbly and more difficult to scale than a rigid, taut fence. Whatever type fence is constructed it should preclude gaps to prevent man or animal from crawling through the structure. The primary concern in this instance is not the penetration of the VC, (as they would merely enter a mass of obstacles and become casualties) but entrance by children, livestock and dogs who live in the village. Not only is the possible injury or death to children of prime concern but where animals are involved, reconstituting mines and flares can be a tedious and time consuming effort. Chickens are almost impossible to keep from between the fences. On occasion they will alight on trip flare wires, creating a restless alert, while others peck themselves to 'kingdom come' on M14 mines. The two fences, inner and outer, must be wide enough apart to prevent the scaling of both simultaneously; or to preclude toppling the outer fence against the inner fence to provide a ramp for entrance into the village. The distance between fences will be determined by the height of the outer fence. Noise makers such as tin cans, bamboo tubes and gongs may be attached to the fence to assist detection of intruders during darkness. Very often the slightest wind may trigger the firing of weapons at noises rather than the enemy.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 118 Gates in the fence should be held to a minimum but they must be sufficient to provide the villagers normal accessibility to their fields. Gates must be sturdy, easily opened and closed, and provided with locking devices. It is imperative that the main gate(s) have a pedestrian 'walk through' to preclude opening and closing bulky vehicle gates unnecessarily. Gates must be continually guarded and under constant observation. They are normally the most vulnerable spot(s) of the perimeter. Observation towers, searchlights and field phones to the guard house, will assist the security of this vulnerable location. During the hours of darkness one gate is used for entrance or departure by members of the CT (villagers are not permitted outside the gates during darkness nor do patrols return to the village during darkness). A single guard never opens a gate but works with a partner. One guard provides protection while the other opens a gate and inspects the entrants. No one without a pass is permitted to enter the village at the discretion of the guard; this includes Americans and Vietnamese. If someone desires entrance and does not have a pass, the CP is phoned to obtain clearance. Guards seldom remain at a fixed or exposed post. They are usually in bunkers or foxholes, or off to the side to reduce their vulnerability to sniper fires. No matter where they position themselves they must always be able to observe the gate. Because of their vulnerability to mass entrance by the VC, gates are constantly protected with automatic rifles and light machine guns. Between the inner and outer fences are placed a variety of obstacles. Punji stakes (sharpened bamboo stakes) which can be coated with native poison, nail mines, anti-personnel mines,

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 119 trip flares, toxic vegetation (kapung) and others may be used. Around the outer fence, moats, pitfalls and ditches will supplement the defense (Figure 47). 2. Permanent type obstacles, unless clearly marked and visible, are never placed along trails and roads or in the fields, for fear of injuring friendly villagers. This does not preclude setting up obstacles along likely VC avenues of approach during darkness, and removing them the following morning. 3. Fortifications, weapons emplacements, foxholes and trenches are tactically constructed throughout the village. They are prepared and constructed with the same considerations as for any defensive position. They must be permanently constructed, durable during the rainy season with effective drainage, offer good fields of fire, and be located far enough from the outer fence to reduce vulnera bility to VC grenades. The positions must be mutually supporting and trench lines for resupply and communications are necessary (Figure 48). 4. When establishing the defense, consideration must be given to the VC tactic of utilizing foxholes and trenchlines for their own use if they succeed in penetrating the village perimeter. When this occurs confusion often results, particularly during darkness. Recognition of the VC from the villagers is extremely difficult. During darkness it must always be assumed that those on the outside of the fence (perimeter) are VC and those on the inside are friendly. When the VC succeed in penetrating a section of the defense, this assumption is no longer valid (as pertains to the fence at the point of penetration) since the perimeter must be drawn-in to supple-

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON FIG 47. (BELOW) PROTECTIVE FENCE PUNJI STAKES BEING EMPLACED

120

FIG 48. (ABOVE) AUTOMATIC WEAPONS BUNKER

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 121 mentary positions at that point. To prevent the VC from fighting from protected trenches at the point of penetration, trench lines cannot extend laterally from position to position as is commonly found on the conventional battlefield. The defense must be established so that the defenders are able to fight in one direction towards the outer perimeter, to prevent disorganization and shooting of one another. The 'spoke' system is a method of accomplishing these aims. Figure 49 explains this method. As depicted in the sketch, the trench lines extend from the command group and reserve to the fighting positions. The reserve can back up each firing position and-or be committed to influence the action. If the VC succeed in penetrating, the defenders are able to withdraw to their alternate positions and still maintain the perimeter defense even though condensed at the point of the penetration. Sectors of fire remain basically the same and therefore the defense system remains simple and adequate for this type of operation. Protective shelters are also necessary for the safety of women, children and other noncombatants. Family shelters are constructed throughout the village and are located relatively close to the dwellings. By no means are they located close to the fence or in the vicinity of the primary fighting positions. The common type shelter is the underground bunker, which not only offers protection from flat trajectory fires, but from mortar fires as well. The entrance is zig-zagged to prevent grenades or deliberate bursts of fire from reaching the main chamber if the VC penetrate. In addition to providing protection for the villagers, these shelters ease the minds of the

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122

FIG 49. SKETCH OF OB PERIMETER DEFENSE

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 123 defenders. They realize that when a village is under attack their families are safe and they will not hesitate in firing for fear that movement in and around the village may be villagers (Figure 50). Another consideration is clearing fields of fire. Brush, undergrowth and jungle vegetation is cleared a minimum distance of 100 meters from the fence (perimeter of the village). This also provides greater observation and security. Unlike other tactical defenses, careful and selective clearing, to preclude exposing the firing positions, is not a consideration. The villages are well scouted by the VC and he will generally know the scheme of defense. Dummy positions offer some degree of security. It is necessary to trim or cut bamboo and trees that overhang the protective fence to eliminate them as a means of access into the village. The cleared area surrounding the village need not be completely wasted as land is often valuable. It may be used for planting low crops such as potatoes and peppers. During the hours of darkness, early warning systems must be established. Listening posts, patrols, noise makers, and booby traps provide greater security to the defense of the OB. The closer anOB is located to rugged or denied terrain, such as jungle, swamp, or mountains, the more intensified early warning systems must be.

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124

FIG 50. PROTECTIVE SHELTER FOR NON-COMBATANTS

FIG 52. HOSPITAL AT BUON ENAO

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 125 B. Medical Facility Medical treatment begins at the outset of the VDP. Initially, treatment is provided from any longhouse, hut, or even from under a tree to accomplish its purpose. Plans must be made to construct a medical facility as soon as sufficient security for the OB is established. Not only is a hospital or aid-station required for an effective medical assistance program, but its very presence is the first outward assurance of social improvement. This psychologically motivates the people and contributes more to gaining the allegiance and support of the people than all other civic action programs combined. This is primarily because the medical program reaches more of the populace directly than any other assistance. Locating the hospital at the OB has many advantages in addition to the security provided. The airfield facilitates medical evacuation of wounded, sick or injured American personnel to established U.S. hospitals in Vietnam. Nearby MAAG units might conceivably have medical doctors and dentists assigned, who will offer medical assistance or advice to the Special Forces medic. They can also provide treatment for U.S. personnel but will usually be prohibited from treating villagers of the VDP. ARVN units may be able to provide medical evacuation, drugs and medicines. However, they too will either be prohibited from treating the Montagnards or won't have sufficient medical personnel or facilities to treat anyone but their own troops. The road network assists in speeding the medical evacuation from the villages to the hospital; or the medical personnel from the hospital to a village when the patient cannot be moved. Finally, Province Chiefs, who are usually restricted in their travels, will

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 126 be able to witness the VDP medical program and the important contribution it makes to alleviate some of the overcrowded conditions at the understaffed provincial medical center or hospital. This may induce them to render maximum support to the VDP. In selecting the actual site for the hospital (within the OB) many factors must be considered. The hospital must be able to accomplish its functions, yet in some instances, there may be a requirement for reduced efficiency for security. Not only must it be capable of functioning on a 24 hour a day basis but the site must be conducive to that which favors treatment. In addition, it must be located so as to prevent patients and those on sick-call from wandering around the OB, observing or hearing restricted activities, witnessing training, recognizing prisoners, etc; and it must fit into the defensive scheme of the OB. To satisfy these considerations the hospital is constructed as a separate compound outside the OB but contiguous to its perimeter. This controls and restricts the activities of the hospital without lowering service or weakening security (Figure 51). The actual construction of the hospital, like all other facilities, best meets the needs of the VDP when it is constructed of local materials and fashioned after local buildings. In this respect the hospital we constructed was of bamboo and thatch, but it was not practical to place it on stilts. The people came to the hospital with many kinds of ailments and many of them could not climb steps. It is also imperative that the floor of the hospital have a solid foundation to reduce

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON

127

dust and mud, help sanitation, and to handle heavy traffic. A concrete floor is recommended (Figure 52).

FIG 51. SKETCH DEPICTING SUITABLE HOSPITAL SITE

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 128 The size of the hospital is governed by: 1. The number of patients anticipated for treatment. 2. The proximity of other medical facilities in the area. 3. The status of the hospital when phase five is completed. 4. The number of bed patients that can be accommodated at any given time; or amount of treatment that can be administered during any given period. 5. The expansion of the VDP and the number of other aid stations to be incorporated into the program. Whatever the size of the hospital, it should contain a waiting room, doctors office, treatment room, operating room, delivery room, pharmacy, storage room and two wards. One of the wards is used for overnight or short-term patients and the other for long-term patients. A latrine must be constructed near by. 1. Waiting room - This is the first room off the entrance. It is furnished with benches for the patients, and a desk for the receptionist. It is here that patients describe their ailments and their temperatures are taken. The information is recorded on a sick-slip, and the patient is referred to the special forces medic or to an indigenous medic, depending on the ailment. 2. Doctors office - This is equipped with a desk, examination table, instrument cabinet and medicine chest. Here is where the special forces medic examines, diagnoses the ailment, and treats it as required.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 129 3. Treatment room - Here the indigenous medics treat patients who have minor wounds, cuts, bruises, abrasions, etc. The room is equipped identically to that of the doctor office, to s include awash stand and a heating unit. 4. Operating room - The operating room and the delivery room can be one in the same. It contains an operating table, wash stand, heating unit and must have the best lighting available. It is screened and completely sanitized. 5. Pharmacy - This area contains sufficient shelves for the storage of medicines and medical supplies. In addition to a desk it contains a safe for the storage of critical drugs and medicines, and a refrigerator for the storage of perishable medicines. There is an issue window that is accessible from the outside of the hospital building. This precludes patients from obstructing the duties of hospital personnel while waiting for their prescriptions to be filled. 6. Wards - The wards must contain sufficient beds and bedding, mosquito netting, etc. for the patients. In many instances, the parents are required to remain with children who are hospitalized, particularly the mother of a child who is breast-fed. 7. Storage room - This is not meant to be a catch-all. In addition to storing reserve supplies and medical equipment, books and other medical training aids are stored here. Additionally, the hospital requires adequate ventilation, and sufficient windows must be installed. To be free from dust, the windows must have shutters for protection during periods of high winds or heavy rains. The ceiling can also be lined with a parachute canopy to reduce the

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 130 amount of foreign matter which falls from the straw roof and clutters the hospital. Arrangements are made to adequately light the hospital whether it be generated electricity, kerosene lanterns, oil lamps, or what have you. C. Logistics Compound Adequate facilities must be provided for the storage of ammunition, weapons, clothing, foodstuffs, and other equipment and materials. The exact requirements are dictated by the dimensions of the VDP; the bulkiness, types and amount of supplies to be stored; and the dispersion required. Consideration is given to separating supplies to preclude the loss of an entire class of supply in the event of fire, sabotage, mortar barrage, or VC penetration. Until sufficient facilities are built, only a limited amount of supplies is stored at the OB. MAAG or ARVN units may be able to provide temporary storage facilities until the logistics compound is completed. Logistical facilities function more adequately when established within a central compound. However, ammunition bunkers (dumps)may have to be dispersed throughout the OB, and rice storage sheds are usually located elsewhere. Whatever system is adopted, supply installations are highly vulnerable to VC activity for they are prime targets for destruction or confiscation. Therefore, the compound must be additionally secured by fences and barbed wire, be constantly guarded, and be defended from prepared positions whenever an alert condition exists. To preclude the supplies from falling into the hands of the VC, this facility is also 'charged' for destruction in the event the OB is in danger of being over-run.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 131 The site selected for the logistics compound should conform to the principles of security, scheme of defense, and operational effectiveness. It must be easily accessible to trucks and vans; to facilitate delivery and loading and off-loading of supplies; be as far removed from the perimeter of the OB as possible or be where it is not subject to direct fire or observed indirect fire; and be located so as not to interfere with the operation of other facilities such as the hospital, CP, and communications center. The logistics compound is subject to constant vehicular traffic and a heavy volume of other supply transactions, which makes it an active facility. Facilities which might logically be contained in the compound are: 1. Ammunition Bunker -Constructed of heavy logs and revetted with bamboo, the ammo bunker is a strongly fortified, underground storage facility. A bunker, 30 x 30 feet and 10 feet deep, will adequately handle the ammunition requirements for the VDP. The bunker extends about two feet above the ground where a log roof is constructed of six to nine inch (diameter) timbers. The roof is further covered with approximately two to three feet of earth. Cement or gravel flooring reduces dampness and a good drainage system is required to prevent water seepage during heavy rains. The entrance is secured by a heavy log door which can be locked. The ammunition is segregated by type (to ease inventory and issuing), placed on dunnage (to decrease spoilage as well as ease handling), rotated periodically, and inventoried as necessary, but at least weekly. If electrical power is available then this bunker should be wired for lighting (Figure 53).

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 132 2. Arms Room - This must be a securely and strongly constructed accommodation. As a rule, crated arms are not stored in the arms room; and weapons are not uncrated until they are to be issued. There are weapons which require proper storage; weapons for special operations such as machine guns, rocket launchers and shotguns; weapons used for training demonstrations; and those weapons uncrated but not completely issued. In addition, the arms room also provides storage space for other critical items of supplies like binoculars, compasses, firing sights and photographic equipment. Shelving and racks must be built in the arms room as well as heating cabinets to reduce mildew to sensitive items. The arms room is built to remain as dry as possible at all times. 3. Generator Shed - Generators are critical pieces of equipment and are in short supply. They are difficult to repair and, therefore, must be constantly maintained. To assist in their upkeep, a generator shed is built. This is a simple wooden frame shed with an overhead covering and a raised floor to which the generator can be bolted. This reduces vibration and keeps the elements from the generator, thus reducing wear and tear. A POL pit for five gallon gas and oil cans is located close by for operation of the generator. It is mandatory to have two generators if electrical power is required for any appreciable length of time. Generators need to be rotated every three to four hours for efficient and long lasting service. Electrical power is used for lighting, for projectors, and for providing power for radio communications. Lighting is provided on a scheduled basis from 1700-2300 and 0500-

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 133 0800 and at any other time deemed necessary. The hospital and communications facilities are the prime users of electrical power during unscheduled periods. The logistic compound is the most appropriate location for the generators. Here they receive proper maintenance and can be started and stopped at the proper times by personnel who are always on duty at the compound. The logistic compound is far removed from the hospital, communications center, and the CP and therefore there is little noise interference carried to these installations. 4. Supply Room - The supply room does not have to be a heavily fortified or a strongly constructed establishment. A large shed with shelving is usually sufficient for storing field equipment and clothing which constitutes the bulk of supplies located at this facility. The primary consideration is to protect the equipment from the elements. It is necessary that the roof be leak-proof and that the floor be raised several inches off the ground. Removable, sliding panels of woven bamboo are recommended for the siding. This offers maximum ventilation during periods of dry weather and protection during adverse weather conditions. This minimizes mildew which accumulates overnight in high humidity regions.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON FIG 54. (BELOW) COMMUNICATIONS COMPLEX

134

FIG 53. (ABOVE) AMMUNITION STORAGE BUNKER

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 135 D. Communications Center A native type structure is adequate for the communications complex. It is located where it is free from obstructions (especially bamboo thickets) and removed from the normal flow of traffic. A likely VC target, the commo center is difficult to conceal. The various antenna systems and the amount of activity normally centered around this installation makes it easy to distinguish. By the nature of their duties and the requirement for continuous 24 hour operations, the U.S. communications personnel are billeted at this facility. A room for the indigenous 'on-duty' radio operators, who operate the VDP net, is also provided for. Locked storage space is required for commo equipment and supplies. An adjoining bunker is constructed so that continuous communications can be provided during a VC attack. If electrical power is available, the commo shack is wired for electricity to provide transmitting power in lieu of hand generators. Arrangements are also made for the immediate destruction of this facility to prevent equipment from falling into the hands of the VC. Consideration is given to fencing or wiring off the commo complex to preclude eavesdropping by curious villagers (Figure 54). E. Intelligence Facilities Sites for various intelligence activities must be carefully selected from both the standpoint of concealment from the village populace, and isolation from the din of everyday village activity. Most of the work carried on at this facility, i.e. interrogations, POW activity, rehabilitation, etc., is not for the eyes and ears of the villagers.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 136 The interrogation area is in a remote and subdued sector. It is not a large area and perhaps the smaller and more confining it is, the better suited for interrogation. A small shack with a table and chairs is where interrogations are conducted and voluntary information is received. Isolation areas are established nearby. POW compounds are devised in any manner suitable for their intended purpose. By no means are the living conditions equal to those of the population. Once again the strong ties the Montagnards have for one another comes into focus. While inspecting the POW compound around noon one day, I observed one of the hard core VC, who was in solitary confinement, being offered his lunch. It consisted of a heaping plate of rice, some dried fish, hot peppers, and an assortment of fruit. This is high living even for the average villager. Upon investigation I found that he and other prisoners were receiving meals of equal palatableness three times a day. I soon impressed upon the Rhade that prisoners would receive reduced rations, prepared plainly and simply, and less frequently. These prisoners were not guests, but were enemies of the Rhade. Vietnamese VC were never retained by the Rhade for other than immediate interrogation upon capture. These were turned over to Vietnamese officials for disposition. The Rhade don't want them in their village nor do they want to care for them, even as prisoners. It is felt that the Vietnamese can gain more intelligence from the Vietnamese VC than could the Rhade. Montagnard prisoners are retained in the compound or, depending upon their classification, in isolation. Class I VC are the hard core VC who do not submit to reindoctrination. It is this

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 137 class that is retained in isolation until it is determined that they are absolutely detrimental to the VDP. We had fewer than a dozen who received this classification during my tenure, and they were handled completely by the Rhade in accordance with their own traditions. Class II VC are those who might possibly align themselves with the GVN. Class III VC are those who readily accept reindoctrination and rehabilitation. To our good fortune, more than 90 percent of the prisoners fell into the Class III category. Intelligence briefings and debriefings are conducted at the Tactical Operations Center where adequate facilities are available. Rehabilitation facilities are of such magnitude and of such importance that they are discussed in Chapter Nineteen (Psychological Operations). F. Headquarters (CP) There are many diversified activities which characterize the 'nerve center' of the OB; and there are numerous considerations to be evaluated prior to selecting the site for this facility. The CP can function best when it is located apart from other installations within the OB. It must be easily accessible to visitors and the workings of the OB. Foremost, it must be secure. If unique in style, it is easily singled out as a target. When located close to the perimeter of the OB, or when isolated, it is then vulnerable to sniper fire, observation, and other VC actions. It is wise to locate the CP near the least likely area of VC penetration, if this can be determined.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 138 The arrangement and management of the CP differs little from that of any field situation. It contains an orderly room, operations and intelligence office, indigenous clerk and interpreters office, PSO office, Team Commanders office and a briefing room. Lighting (electric, lamp, lantern, candle, etc.), desks, chairs, filing cabinets, safe, maps, typewriters and other office materials completes this facility. Most of the furnishings mentioned can be procured from local sources. The CP building is constructed of native materials to the extent feasible. Black-out curtains are placed over openings or one room can be completely blacked-out for alert operations. Escape hatches are built into the sides of the building to facilitate easy evacuation in all directions in the event of an emergency. Foxholes, protective shelters, and defensive positions are constructed nearby and manned as part of the defensive scheme during alert periods (Figure 55). G. Transportation Facility Selecting secure sites for parking and maintaining motor vehicles, carts, beasts of burden, etc., and related items such as fuel, parts, fodder and tools can create quite a problem if this is not properly considered. The number and types of transportation available will determine the size and location(s) of this facility. It provides a means for dispatching and controlling transportation, maintenance-upkeep, storage, and security. Troop movements can very easily be detected by observed movement of vehicles, therefore a deception plan is incorporated into movement orders.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 139 A grease pit and fuel storage bunker-pit, a hardstand of crushed rock, and an overhead shelter for maintenance work, are provided to assist in the operation of this facility. There are many occasions when pre-positioning motor vehicles in strategic locations throughout the village and facing the fence just prior to darkness, is advantageous. If attacked, the driver who is positioned with his vehicle, can immediately turn on his headlights and illuminate the battlefield (Figure 56). H. Administrative Facilities Administrative structures and areas must be established for processing, paying, hiring, preparing and maintaining records, preparing reports and so on. One small structure sectioned into working spaces will usually be sufficient even for the larger VDP's. Included in this facility is the capability to fingerprint and photograph for identification cards. I. Strike Force Facilities 1. Quarters - Members of the SF and their families usually take lodging with local home owners, when available, and in accordance with their customs. However, as the SF develops and increases in size, the housing situation becomes acute. Barracks and dependent housing must be planned and provided for if the health, welfare, and morale of this force is to retain its highest level.

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140

FIG 56. (BELOW) MOTOR POOL

FIG 55. (ABOVE) OB COMMAND CENTER

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 141 Overcrowded conditions can be alleviated in a number of ways through prior planning and close scrutinization of the situation. Portions of the SF can be assigned to operate from nearby villages if the ability to control and have them react immediately to the demands of the OB is not lost. 2. Guard House - This facility operates similarly to what we are accustomed to in the U.S. Army. The daily guard remains at this site during their tour of duty (except when posted) and is responsible for the security of the OB. The posts that are manned, range from security posts, population control (gate guards), installation guards, prison chasers, tower guards, observation posts (op), and manning selected automatic weapons positions. A SF section is detailed as the 'guard section'; this is rotated every 30 days. A member of the intelligence section is the permanent security officer and is responsible for the conduct of the guard. The guard house is equipped with a telephone to the main gate and the CP. There is also a sleeping area for off-duty guards who work shifts of 4 hours 'on' and 8 hours 'off'. 3. CP - The SF commander and his staff require a building from which to conduct the daily internal and administrative tasks of his unit. This is particularly true when a great deal of operational control is passed and entrusted to the Rhade leaders. A small and simple building will suffice.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 142 J. Control Team Facilities Once again I must mention that whenever practical, all facilities are constructed of locally procured materials and fashioned after the local dwellings. This integrates these establishments with the local surroundings and offers more security as well as emitting a psychological impression upon the natives. 1. Quarters - There are several options available for housing U.S. personnel. Whichever method is adopted, dispersion is mandatory. If centrally located, the entire team can be easily wiped out with one grenade, one mortar round, or a single demolitions charge. By dispersing Americans throughout the OB, in groups of two's or three's, it not only enhances security, but provides a greater number of villagers the opportunity to become neighbors of Americans and thereby become accustomed to the American image. The psychological impact is tremendous and the amount of information and intelligence gleaned, which would otherwise go unnoticed or undetected, is astounding. Dispersion separates Americans, for which there can be several draw-backs. On the other hand, the team requires a degree of independence and freedom from the arduous, grueling, constant day-to-day activities which require teamwork and togetherness. 'Familiarity breeds contempt', and to eat and live and sleep and work with the same faces, day in and day out, will naturally cause some uneasiness. The following methods are for consideration. Each method has its merits and shortcomings for a certain set of conditions.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 143 (A) Living With Villagers In Their Homes Of the three methods to be discussed herein we found living with the villagers to be the most secure method. Other advantages are that it makes a favorable impression upon the villagers, increases the wealth and economy of the village from the rentals paid, assists Americans in learning the language and customs of the Montagnards more readily, and is the most readily available. Meals with the villagers can be easily arranged for as well as laundry and other necessary chores. Some of the disadvantages are the steady native diet, sleeping on the floor, or at best, on bamboo mats, smoke filled rooms, the perpetual odors and the lack of privacy. In addition, the relative proximity to a latrine and a water source, and convenience of electric lights or lanterns might have to be foregone. Regardless, it is my experience that a majority of the Americans preferred this method. It was the method used while on operations or when conducting decentralized training. It is by far the easiest and least burdensome to adopt; and it may be the only method available during the early stages of the VDP. (B). The Erection Of Separate Quarters. This method offers a choice of erecting separate quarters or renting portions of longhouses. With either method, dispersion and security is considered. The VC must be hindered from easily detecting American facilities and thus making them the object of concentration during an attack. As with the previous method, the good-neighbor policy and boost for the economy is also at-

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 144 tained. Houseboys can be hired to care for the household chores to include cooking if desired. Usually a central mess is better suited for this method. Since these facilities are occupied solely by Americans, 'extras' can be installed without creating ill-feelings or violating tribal customs. Beds or the use of air mattresses and sleeping bags, water cans for drinking water and washing, and lighting may be incorporated into the housing. This method offers a degree of privacy for those much sought free moments (Figure 57). (C). Erecting Central Billets. It is a personal opinion that this method should be avoided if at all possible. However, situations might exist where there is no alternative but to adopt this method. If attached to MAAG or if the VDP is established under garrison conditions, preference might be given to this method. However, Americans must live in the villages, with the people, if the VDP is to succeed. There are no sound advantages to commuting; only a loss of security, operational control, friendship and mutual respect. 2. Latrine(s) - The principles for constructing latrines under normal field conditions apply here. An important consideration is that the monsoon season, with its torrential rains, greatly affects functioning and sanitation, if not properly constructed. The latrine is centrally located, sanitarily located and located in a secure area. Sniper fires can be more than harassing if the latrine is not located in a covered area.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON FIG 59. (BELOW) LATRINE

145

FIG 57. (ABOVE) SEPARATE AMERICAN QUARTERS

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON Figure 58. SEALED WATER PIT LATRINE

146

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON Figure 58b. SEALED WATER PIT LATRINE

147

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 148 The latrine itself should be screened for ventilation and for restraining insects. A 'water sealed pit' latrine is an excellent one for providing good drainage, eliminating maggots, mosquitos and other bugs, and for minimizing odors. Figure 58 depicts its construction. Inside the latrine is a 55 gallon drum of water, with scoop, for flushing purposes, and toilet paper containers. The scoop and containers are made from ammo cans. A hole 20 feet deep x 10 feet long x 6 feet wide and with an eight seater astride it, is adequate for the OB and should last about one year. The usual sanitary measures, such as sprinkling lime, are practiced to improve the effectiveness of this facility. A urinal, constructed of bamboo tubing and sheet metal, is also a part of the interior of the latrine (Figure 59). 3. Shower - Any type field expedient shower will suffice. Two 55 gallon drums, placed above an enclosure, is more than adequate for up to 20 personnel per day. Shower heads, with a hand turned locking valve, are welded into the center of the drums to produce a controlled flow of water. A sump is dug and an enclosure, made of bamboo and straw matting, is placed around it while a wooden palette provides the flooring. A ladder is also required to fill the 55 gallon drums from five gallon water cans. The shower must be located where it is free from sniper fire (Figure 60). 4. Washing and Shaving Area - Establishing a washing and shaving area takes little time, effort, and materials, while it greatly benefits personal appearance and hygiene, which indirectly

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 149 improves a man's performance of duty. A sump, habachi (for heating water), basins, mirrors, a wash stand, and a water source (five gallon cans), are all that is required for this extremely important necessity. The location is selected with care. 5. Mess Hall and Kitchen-This facility may or may not be practical for a given situation. At the OB every effort should be made to include this facility for the proper intake and enjoyment of meals. The mess also doubles as a day room and once again a native type structure with an attached kitchen (cooking area) is required. If a refrigerator can be procured, it should be a kerosene type, otherwise a constant electrical source is required. Cooking is accomplished on habachi's or improvised grills made from halved 55 gallon drums. Charcoal and wood are the common fuels used for cooking. Nearly all foods are obtained from local sources and at thrifty prices. Locally procured food, supplemented with B rations and C rations, are sufficient. Commissary supplies, other than condiments, spreads and staples, are not required, - but never-the-less are always welcome. Hunting game provides an abundance of meat as deer, duck, squirrel, monkey and rabbit are plentiful. A python provides from 60-100 pounds of solid meat and peacock, pheasant and dove add a little sophistication to the menu. When hunting is good, meats are stored in the refrigerator for future use; otherwise all meats must be eaten almost immediately because of spoilage.

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150

FIG 60. SHOWER

FIG 61. KITCHEN

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 151 We permitted the villagers to use their rifles for hunting. This accomplished three things. First, it increased their marksmanship and their confidence in their weapon. Second, it provided the Montagnards a source of food. And third, it provided the Americans with an abundance of meat. The Rhade are proud of their hunting skills. As a result they always present Americans a choice cut of meat to verify their kill and to be reimbursed for the ammo which they spent to make the kill. As a control measure, no more than 10 rounds was ever reimbursed. On one occasion a hunter indicated that it took him 30 rounds to bag a deer. His intent was to receive some extra ammo. We immediately placed him into a retraining cycle to receive eight extra hours of PMI to increase his marksmanship so he could thereafter bag a deer with one round. We were never confronted with this situation again. Normal mess sanitation is exercised. The kitchen is screened and bread boxes, vegetable bins, soapy water and rinse water containers and garbage pit are provided. Edible garbage is retained in containers and distributed daily to the villagers for hog feed (Figure 61). 6, Recreation Facilities - In addition to reading materials and small games, other facilities are constructed to offer Americans and indigenous personnel a pleasant pastime; and very often in competition against one another. Horseshoe pits, volleyball courts, ping pong and weight lifting areas don't require a great deal of space or construction. Competition in these sports as well as archery, turkey shoots, and tests of strength and agility (favorite Rhade games) not only cement

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 152 relations and build teamwork, but they also provide much needed outlets for tension which unavoidably accumulates from the pressures of day-to-day activities. In addition, musical sessions are a pastime enjoyed by most everyone. There is always someone who can strum a guitar or play a harmonica, and it isn't long before others are humming the tune. 7. Miscellaneous Facilities - Village stores, religious centers, schools, corrals, animal pens, etc., are also established at the OB as an example and guide for those of other villages in hopes that they too will accomplish these tasks to increase their social, health and economic standards (Figure 62). VIII. Conclusion When planning for the establishment of the OB, consider that as the VDP makes progress, it will eventually become a secure area. It therefore should offer a greater sense of security and relaxation for personnel who are predominantly away from the OB on training or operational missions. The OB reflects a 'forward rest area' where laundry, improved messing, washing and shower facilities, and entertainment are available. This does not imply that a grandiose installation is required. I simply indicate that this is accomplished to improve the living conditions so as to satisfy human needs in making the VDP an endurable and satisfying endeavor. What has been described in this chapter does not intend to leave the impression that everything mentioned is ab-

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153

solute in making the VDP a success. They are merely presented as ideals and to stimulate thoughts toward making the endeavor a success.

FIG 62. CATTLE PENS OUTSIDE THE VILLAGE

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 154 Security of the O.B requires the detailed attention of all personnel from the outset of the program. During the initial phase, personnel are unfamiliar with the area of operations and with the indigenous personnel and therefore a degree of risk exists in selecting indigenous personnel who will provide security. Also, the VC will try to test the program early by infiltrating agents. To reduce this susceptibility to VC infiltration and attack, security must be achieved as rapidly as possible by employing all means and methods available. At first, hasty type structures are constructed with priority on defenses and the security of weapons and equipment. Continual improvements are made until they become permanent in nature. After security is attained, other facilities are constructed as required, to meet the demands of the program.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 155 Chapter Eight Establishing The Strike Force I. General Each VDP must have a force of sufficient strength and operational proficiency to conduct the intelligence, security, protective, and offensive operations required to accomplish the mission. Upon the SF, which becomes the military arm and strength of the VDP, falls these responsibilities. The primary employment of the SF is for VDP missions. To utilize this force in other roles which are the responsibility of ARVN units; or for missions unrelated or removed from VD, will deter from their usefulness and effectiveness as the VD striking force. II. Mission The mission of the SF is to provide security to the VDP through tactical and non-tactical operations, and to deny the VC access to the VDP. To accomplish this mission the SF assumes the following tasks. A. Protect a village and its inhabitants while the able males are undergoing VD training. A village that places its manpower into a training cycle is highly vulnerable to VC intimidations and retaliatory actions. A SF unit is sent to occupy, secure, and defend this village until the training is completed. Not only does this force patrol the nearby area but it also conducts psychological operations and civic action functions as well. They supervise and assist the villagers in the preparation of their defenses, protective shelters, warning systems and alert procedures.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 156 When the trainees return, the SF remains at the village for a period of one week. During this period they accompany the villagers on patrols, stand guard with them, and continue to educate them in the conduct of the VD. This support strengthens their morale, broadens their confidence, and improves the efficiency of the village defenders. Equally important, this force offers protection to the village during this vulnerable transition period. B. Be immediately available for instant and rapid dispatch to reinforce or support a village which has come under a VC attack. C. Gather intelligence of the VC's location(s), strength, intentions and activities, by gaining and maintaining contact with these elements. D. Conduct necessary offensive operations which enhance the defensive posture of the VDP. E. Conduct security activities such as village surveillance and stake-outs. F. Continually employ defensive tactical operations (ambushes) as a means of deterring VC attacks on defenseless villages. G. Conduct psychological operations and civic action functions within their capability and means. III. Source of Recruits A. There are many sources from which manpower can be drawn. The degree of selectivity is based on many considerations. The primary consideration is the number of recruits required.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 157 Those best suited for the task will naturally be chosen if the following criteria is implemented to the greatest degree possible. 1. The primary source of recruits is civilian volunteers, in their twenties, who have been driven from their homes by the VC. They are already motivated and possess a goal for which they will strive, that of freedom from VC oppression. 2. The second source is civilian volunteers who do not own land nor have a civilian occupation or trade critical to the economy. 3. Civilian volunteers who have had previous military training from the French, Vietnamese, or Viet Minh are a third source. It is important that Montagnards who are serving with ARVN are not recruited. We found that many of these soldiers preferred the VDP organization. They would discard their uniforms and report to the VDP as refugees who wanted to join the SF. It was not until a complaint was registered by the GVN that we became aware of this and had to exercise control measures to preclude this from reoccurring. B. SF personnel must be hardy and able to withstand long, hard marches under difficult conditions; cope with duress and strain; and remain effective fighters. A soldier between the ages of 18-30 is the best suited for the SF. This is not to say that an older or younger Montag-nard is not acceptable, particularly those with wartime experience, but only to indicate that discretion

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 158 must be used. A single man with no family responsibilities also has definite advantages over a married man, from both an administrative and a tactical viewpoint. C. At the outset of the VDP the best of the village defenders are asked to join the SF but they are never assigned against their wishes; nor is one village ever stripped of its best manpower. Selecting personnel from each of the villages has many advantages. They receive extensive training, gain valuable experience, and become unquestionably indoctrinated to the VDP. This makes them a valuable asset to their village, as well as the VDP, for when in the future they are no longer required for the SF and are returned to their village as village defenders, they make an outstanding contribution in bolstering the village force. Additionally, these village representatives provide liaison between their village and the OB, in assuring that the village is conducting itself in the best interests of the VDP. For each and every village, there is a member of the SF who possesses intricate knowledge of the village, its people, its terrain and its surroundings, and who has the ability to obtain military information from a personal approach, which promotes VD. IV. Organization There are no hard and fast rules or established Tables of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) or Tables of Distribution (TD) for organizing the SF. Each organization is tailored to fit the needs of each area of operation. The manpower available, characteristics of the area of

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 159 operations, enemy capabilities, funds, logistical support, etc., greatly influences the size, structure, and composition of the SF. The basic element is the group (squad). This 10-12 man fighting unit is trained and equipped to operate independently as a self-contained force or as part of a larger force. Groups are organized into sections (platoons) and sections into companies. A section consists of three to four groups each identically armed and equipped. Two or more sections are formed into a company and two or more companies into a battalion. Span of control as well as the number of qualified indigenous commanders, influence the type of organization established. The selection of commanders is based on ability and leadership potential. There are no political appointees, nor are appointments based upon traditions or customs of the tribe. Leaders will spring forth and when they are recognized as such, seldom will there be animosity or displeasure among their cohorts. Indigenous commanders are permitted to make decisions, and to command and control their units as soon as they have demonstrated their ability to handle such responsibility with authority. A chain-of-command is established and used by trainees as well as advisors. Through this practice, esprit, discipline, confidence, and respect for the leaders is developed and outstanding results will naturally follow.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 160 In addition to the infantry sections there is also a heavy weapons section and a specialized section. These sections are organized and equipped to support and supplement the infantry units through attachment; or to conduct independent special operations. A. As previously mentioned, the organization of the SF is a matter of preference and availability, which is based on the local situation. The organization naturally starts small, a section or less, and is built upon as the program develops. The following type organizations depict the structures we utilized for a company size force (Figure 63) and for a battalion size force (Figure 64). 1. Each infantry section consists of a headquarters and three (four) rifle groups. The section leader, section sergeant, radioman and medic are assigned to the headquarters detachment. In each of the rifle groups, there is one Automatic Rifleman (AR) who is armed with a Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR), four sub-machine gunners who are armed with the Swedish K, and five riflemen, one of which is the group leader, who are armed with the M1A1 carbine. Each group has as a minimum, one member who is cross-trained as a medic and another who is cross-trained as a radio operator. 2. The heavy weapons section also contains a headquarters detachment which is organized identically to that of the infantry section. Each of the weapons detachments are organized the same. Each consists of three groups of four men, with one crew served weapon per group (mor-

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 161 tar or mg). The heavy weapons section seldom operates independently. Groups are attached to infantry sections as required. 3. The special section is composed of the sabotage and infiltration experts. They are trained in the use of demolitions, silent-kill methods, sabotage, infiltration and clandestine operations, to include joining VC bands and dispatching back intelligence. These carefully selected personnel are trained in secrecy. 4. The psychological and civic action section can either be a permanent detail or rotated among the infantry sections. We rotated the duty every 2-3 months. The activities and functions of this unit has a decided impact upon the VDP. Prior to conducting operations, the personnel are carefully and critically trained to accomplish their mission. Details of the training and functions of this unit are discussed in Chapter Nineteen (Psychological Operations). B. Companies are organized to control and administer two or more sections. When only one company is required, the company headquarters is organized similar to that of a battalion headquarters, i.e. it includes staff sections. When two or more companies are formed, then a battalion is organized and so on to a regiment. The senior commander is also designated the SF commander. A company contains from 100-150 men (depending on the number of infantry sections) and a battalion anywhere from 400-500 men. When fully developed, the SF organization, to include the admin and training section, approaches a strength of possibly 1500 men.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON SKETCH OF SF ORGANIZATIONAL CHART (COMPANY)

|

162

FIG 63.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON SKETCH OF SF ORGANIZATIONAL CHART (BATTALION)

163

FIG 64.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 164 C. The training program for the SF is extensive and complete. They reach a higher degree of proficiency and skill than do the village defenders. They are soldiers who are available twenty four hours a day and they are paid for their services. They receive wages comparable to those of the Vietnamese Civil Guards or ARVN forces. If a higher wage is paid, then resentment by GVN forces results and this induces desertion by the Montagnard soldiers. To supplement their wages, a system of rewards is devised. However, most important is the timely and full payment of wages. On payday the finance clerk pays each man personally, for which he receives a signature or mark, regardless of the man's location. This insures that each man receives his full pay without graft or kick-back to anyone. I am certain this never occurred in our situation, but I am told it did in later VDP's where the Vietnamese were given the responsibility of handling the payroll. D. For its mission, the SF is as well equipped as most military units. A onetime issue of the following items is made during their initial processing. 1. All personnel (A). Two sets of black peasant clothing. (B). One pair of tennis shoes. (C). Pistol belt with ammo pouches. (D). Canteen. (E). Individual weapon.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 165 (F). Double basic load of ammunition. 2. Officers (A). Binoculars. (B). Compass (C). Watch. (D). Camouflage uniform (tiger suits). 3. Cadre (A). A side arm (pistol). (B). Sheath knife. Grenades, pyrotechnics, demolitions, radios, telephones and other special equipment are issued for operations as required. V. Employment of the SF A. For the missions associated with the VDP the SF is best employed by group. This small, compact, and self-contained force is strong in firepower and particularly suited for counterguerrilla-guerrilla warfare. When the VC strength and situation dictates the employment of a larger force, such as a section, the section is segmented into groups with each group having specific tasks. These tasks are an integrated and coordinated portion of the section's plan to accomplish the mission. To illustrate: ambush sites or patrol routes are conducted independently by groups.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 166 When visualized by the section commander, they are closely coordinated, interfacing actions which mutually support the accomplishment of the section mission. The requirement for closer coordination and more careful planning is recognized. On the other hand, communications requirements are eased; the premature massing of forces is eliminated; and it permits groups to react much faster and to make more timely decisions, which are so vital in the indefinite and obscure situations which characterize VC operations. It is not the intent to discount or deemphasize the importance of mass for the destruction of VC forces. Recall the VDP mission which is defensive in nature and where success is not measured by the number of VC killed but by the degree of support denied the VC by the people. This requires that a vast area be continually patrolled. Seldom can sizeable forces accomplish this task without reducing available manpower so as to leave gaps in the defense. The village defenders must be utilized and incorporated into the defensive plan while support from ARVN forces is required for the engagement and destruction of large VC concentrations. B. The SF is trained, equipped and dressed to operate much like the VC himself. They are required to live off the land, operate as small units, maintain mobility and constantly change locations, obtain intelligence from the local inhabitants, and to keep their location and activities closely guarded (Figure 65).

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 167 It is not uncommon for a large SF unit such as a company to be employed to a target area for a week or month at a time. If so, they are required to establish an OB and sustain themselves. Units of the SF are still employed as discussed earlier: decentralized to the group level. The practice of employing or placing as much of the SF as possible on operations at all times, is a requirement for successful VD. Only those units required for security of the OB and for a reserve to meet contingencies, are retained in garrison. While in a reserve status, SF personnel are used to assist in training, maintain equipment, receive refresher training, given leave and rest and recreation, and accomplish other administrative tasks. Units are constantly rotated into a reserve status but a set pattern is never established. Operational employment and utilization of the SF for combat missions is discussed in Chapter Sixteen (Operations). VI. Conclusion Tactical operations against the VC are carried out by the SF who are the only trained force organic to the VDP, who are capable of conducting offensive operations. They are organized, trained and dressed to 'outguerrilla' the VC. Their organization is tailored to meet all situations; they are trained to cover a wide range of activities; and are indigenous to the area of operations for added security and increased intelligence efforts. The SF is predicated upon aggressive leadership and unit response; well trained and disciplined troops; and teamwork.

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FIG 65. RHADE SF SECTION

FIG 66. CONSTRUCTING BAMBOO PROTECTIVE FENCE

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 169 Chapter Nine Village Defenders I. General Prior to a village participating in VD, it must outwardly demonstrate its desires and efforts to combat the VC. The most pronounced indication is the establishment of defensive structures, notably a fence around the village, which clearly informs the VC that he will not receive support from that village. This also establishes the village as a willing supporter of the GVN (Figure 66). II. Selection of Villages Villages cannot be selected at random to receive training and arms. They are not selected merely because they have constructed a fence nor in the sequence of which the fence is built. A definite plan for organizing the operations area must be formulated with the priority of selection based upon the following considerations. A. Strategic location of the village. One or more villages may be so located that it becomes imperative that they receive training to facilitate VDP planning. A village located near an airfield, a district capitol, or along lines-routes of communications may require priority. A village, which, if trained, will induce popular support for the VDP, might also be placed into this group.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 170 B. Tactical importance of village. Consideration is given to the security a trained village will offer the VDP; the mutual support it will provide other villages; the manpower it offers to oppose the VC; and its location relative to VC activities, routes and support. A majority of these villages are selected based on the 'ink blot' approach previously discussed. C. Psychological effect of the selection. There are numerous small and insignificant villages embraced throughout the area of operations who will not be favorably considered for training because of their impotent military potential. It is important to these people that they join in the fight against the VC. Therefore, as an area becomes secure, train a limited number of these villagers. At the opposite end of the spectrum is defiance of the VC by training and arming a village in what is generally considered to be a 'red area'. If successfully accomplished, this will generate enthusiasm for the VDP while it drives the VC deeper and deeper into despair. When this is attempted, the village must be strongly defended to include the positioning of a SF unit in the area, for if this endeavor fails, the psychological impact reverses itself and sets the VDP back many weeks. D. The desire, strength and ability of the village to oppose the VC. This is an obscure statement, but every once in a while you come across a 'tiger' who is champing at the bit to get into action. The village is large, well organized, and has capable leaders. To hold them back is a waste of energy and fighting power. We came across such a village,

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 171 (Buon Tah), who advanced our program to such a degree, that in six months the VC had been cleared from an area of approximately 40 kilometers in diameter. E. Previous activities and reports about the village. Previous association and support of the VC is an indication that a village is interested only in self preservation or collaboration with the VC and not in supporting the VDP. Anxiety or impatience is undoubtedly a mistake. The village is placed under surveillance until their intentions are unquestionable. If the village is that important to the overall plan, then it should be occupied with entrusted forces until it comes into the fold. These are the considerations that are used in selecting villages for training. Remember that once a village denounces the VC, whether it is immediately selected for training or not, it must receive the protection of the VDP. This is best accomplished by enveloping the village(s) into the protective custody of the VDP plan. If this is not accomplished the villages will be destroyed and the occupants subjected to VC punishment. Envelopment is, however, sometimes impractical due to distances (villages come from as far off as 75-100 kilometers) or because of VC domination of a sector. The only solution is to either temporarily relocate these people into strong, fortified areas; or if the demand warrants, establish a sub-OB and initiate another 'ink blot' as depicted in Figure 35.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 172 III. Notification Procedures A. Upon selection for training, a village is visited and presented a series of lectures, propaganda literature, and psychological activities as a means of indoctrination. If, during this period, a favorable impression is received, the village chief is notified when his village will receive training. He is made thoroughly aware that the selection of trainees is his responsibility and that they must be reliable, dependable, and able and willing to abide by the pledge of the VDP. He also receives the following instructions (Figure 67). 1. The number of villagers to be trained. 2. The time and place the villagers will report for training. 3. The necessary preparations the villagers must make to receive the SF unit which will occupy the village during this period (this is usually confined to quarters and intelligence). 4. The equipment that trainees are required to possess. Such items are personal clothing, bedding, cooking utensils and a two week supply of rice. B. A village is not notified of their training date until it has been firmly established and then no sooner than five days prior to the reporting date. This is required for security as well as psychological reasons. There can be serious implications when training is cancelled. The Montagnards don't conceive judgments in the same manner as Americans do. A change in VC strength or activity, the tactical situation, logistical shortages, or political reasons can alter the priority

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 173 considerations discussed earlier. Cancellation of training demoralizes these people and they can be fully exploited by the VC. IV. Arrival of Trainees For centralized training, trainees arrive at the training camp at the specified time and with the required equipment. For decentralized training, the training cadre with the necessary equipment to conduct training, arrive at the village in sufficient time to commence the training cycle. The trainees receive an initial orientation on training policies and procedures and administrative instructions. They are shown their 'camp site' and given the opportunity to organize and prepare their cooking and sleeping areas (this is not. a requirement for decentralized training). 'Camp sites' are not located within the OB nor are trainees permitted to enter the OB without specific approval. Then they must be escorted to reduce the security risk. It is not advisable to needlessly expose the OB to untested and untried trainees. I have often wondered how many VC were actually trained and armed, for we detected more than 25 who attempted to infiltrate the VDP (Figure 68).

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON FIG 67. (BELOW) NOTIFYING A VILLAGE THEY WILL RECEIVE TRAINING

174

FIG 68. (ABOVE) TRAINEES JUNGLE CAMP SITE

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 175 V. Processing Trainees A. Regardless of the type training (centralized or decentralized) trainees are processed in an orderly and systematic manner by the admin section to include the following: 1. Medical examination. 2. ID photograph with the trainees name and village (Figure 69). 3. Personal history form. 4. Fingerprints. 5. Group picture of trainees (by village). 6. Information about the village. (A). The village population (categorized by men, women and children). (B). The number of dwellings in the village (to include types, i.e., church, school, community house, barn, etc.). (C). The relative wealth of the village (number and types of vehicles, farming machinery, beasts of burden, livestock, etc.). B. A folder is prepared for each village, containing this and other information. One copy is furnished to higher headquarters and another copy to the Vietnamese. Not only is this information of military value, but it also provides a census, the first true count ever, of these far removed people.

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FIG 69. ID PHOTO

FIG 70. A VILLAGE DEFENDER

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 177 VI. Village Defensive Preparations A. Village defenses are prepared, in part, prior to a village reporting for training. They are continuously improved upon thereafter. All eligible villagers, including women and children, assist in the construction. Defenses are prepared as discussed in Chapter Seven (The OB) but are not as extensive nor refined as those of the OB. Village defenses seldom have manufactured devices or materials, such as mines, flares, cement, barbed wire and the like, but use only local materials. Once again it is important that protective shelters for noncombatants be constructed. Prior to an attack, the VC indiscriminately spray a village with automatic weapons fire, for which flimsy bamboo and straw is no protection. The following actual account best describes the importance of protective shelters. Attack on Buon Ea Sut At 222300 June approximately 30-40 VC approached the village of Buon Ea Sut from the south and established an attack position approximately 50-100 yards from the village perimeter. On the east, west and north sides of the village, they emplaced automatic weapons and at 222330 hours they opened fire into the village. The village was literally sprayed with automatic fire for about five minutes. Every long house and building was the recipient of this fire. Three cows, two water buffalo, three pigs and two goats were struck by this incoherent fire, and lay dead in the village. As a twenty-five year old mother picked up her small son and was preparing to take him to the family shelter, a bullet

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 178 ripped through the wall of her bamboo house, struck her in the head, and killed her instantly. Fortunately, the remainder of the inhabitants managed to scramble to their shelters before the decisive fires ripped through the village. There were no other casualties. As the battle for the village raged on, these people were protected not only from the fires of the VC, but also from the fires of the village defenders. B. In many instances, when a village commences their defensive preparations, the VC are riled into retaliatory actions. They will tear down fences, terrorize the villagers, kidnap and murder village leaders, and force captives to march with them. A determined village builds and rebuilds their defenses many times over before they are accommodated into the training program. If sufficient SF units aren't available to protect these villages to some degree, then the use of Vietnamese civil guards or ARVN forces, if available, is considered. However, caution must be exercised in this respect. Montagnards and Vietnamese aren't congenial to one another, and seldom will the Vietnamese units be welcomed or permitted to enter one of the Montagnard villages. VII. Conclusion Organizing and selecting villages for VD is the second most critical phase of the VDP (establishment of the OB is the most critical), and is therefore a well planned and properly executed operation. Precise and accurate procedures are pursued to reduce defection by a village once it is trained and armed.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 179 Prior to acceptance, the village is well studied and all information closely analyzed. Village leaders are personally contacted and frequently visited. The layout and preparation of their defenses is discussed with them, and all efforts are made to improve living conditions in the village. When properly trained, armed and motivated, each village is extremely capable of warding off small VC bands and units. However, seldom are they capable of repulsing (although they can delay) a determined VC attack without assistance from the OB (strike force) (Figure 70).

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 180 Chapter Ten The Training Program I. General It is essential to keep in mind that all training is directed at making the Montagnards proficient in skills necessary to accomplish their tasks. For village defenders, available training time is normally limited for one or more of the following reasons. A. Guidance from higher headquarters. B. Mission of the forces to be trained. C. Restrictions and limitations imposed by the GVN. D. The strength and proficiency of the VC. It is therefore essential that training time be utilized wisely, and training goals be established to make the villagers a formidable opponent for the VC. Political implications often restricts training since the GVN does not have complete faith or trust in specific tribal or religious groups. For this reason, they desire that they receive limited training so as not to make them a formidable opponent for the government forces, if in the future they encounter one another. It is extremely difficult to send men into battle knowing that a more extensive training program could be offered. Thus, to satisfy this moral obligation, as well as to respect the restrictions imposed, a two week training period of instruction was developed. Operational training periods and refresher training periods were not included as part of the 'formal' training program.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 181 This two week training program, when contrasted against the eight weeks of basic training ARVN forces received, meets no opposition from the GVN or Vietnamese military commanders. The intensity at which training is administered and the preclusion of administrative delays and impositions, as well as the length of the training day, increases the effectiveness of the two week program. Close scrutiny of the training program eliminates many of the nonessentials. Secondary training objectives, such as arm and hand signals and the challenge and password, are integrated into the primary training courses such as patrolling or village security. In addition, physical training, political lectures, psychological operations, care and cleaning and other subjects which lend themselves to concurrent training, are incorporated into the tactical and operational phases of training (Figure 71). The operational phase of training (one week) is conducted at the trainees village immediately upon completion of the formal training cycle. Conducted with the guidance and support of the SF (discussed in Chapter Eight), this phase of training bolsters the confidence and morale of the village defenders, while the possibility of serious harm to them or the VDP is reduced during this critical transition period. As you read further into this chapter it becomes evident that all training programs are wellrounded and extensive for the purpose for which they are designed. The number of training

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 182 weeks or training hours become meaningless when desire, initiative, and sense of purpose are the real motivators and indicators of a well trained force. II. Conduct of Training Training is presented in the simplest and shortest form possible; using the simplest terminology and creative training aids imaginable. Only the essential points are instructed and practiced, and then to perfection. All other nice-to-know information is considered unimportant and confusing by these non-educated tribesmen. Training objectives are based upon the mission of the trainees and only those subjects which are absolutely essential to the accomplishment of the mission are instructed. A minimum of training time is spent lecturing and approximately 95 percent of the instruction is conducted by the 'show and do' method. It is recommended that instructors not become engrossed in theories or reasons for a particular application. Instead, utilize teaching methods that best fit the adaptation of the trainees. Trainees seldom ask questions. They often adjust the techniques that are presented to accommodate what best suits them. Perfection is not sought in the same vein as American standards. Don't require or expect people, different in size and stature, thinking, and natural ability, to accomplish tasks in accordance with what is natural for Americans. Be interested and critical in the end result. Surprisingly, the Montagnards surpass the Americans in many aspects of special warfare.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 183 Training also takes advantage of the natural skills of the Montagnards. Fieldcraft, tracking, fitness, endurance, jungle living, and navigation are some of the inherent skills they possess, which they need not be taught. These skills are pointed out and demonstrated to show how they can best be employed advantageously in combating the VC. Then too, the Montagnards have been exposed to the VC and his methods of fighting; for many years. They know his tactics and methods of operation. Americans must use this knowledge to further their own. Americans are required to instruct at the outset of the VDP for obvious reasons; and perhaps for special training throughout the VDP (Figure 72). To be utilized primarily as instructors throughout, however, is neither logical nor functional. A trained indigenous cadre is the most important training consideration for VD. The most obvious advantages are: A. Most effective use of training time. There is no requirement for an interpreter to translate the instruction. This reduces by approximately 50 percent of the time required to present a block of instruction. B. Increased comprehension of the subject. Training is presented in a fluent, coherent manner and without a loss of continuity, which so often occurs when instruction needs translation. The instructor also obtains a feel for the class and can react to the student ability to understand and grasp what is being presented. His true s meanings and feelings are emitted to the class which are very often lost or misinterpreted through translation (Figure 73).

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON FIG 71. (BELOW) CARE AND CLEANING OF WEAPONS

184

FIG 72. (ABOVE) AMERICAN INSTRUCTING MEDICAL CLASS TO RHADE

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON

185

FIG 73. (ABOVE) RHADE INSTRUCTOR FIG 74. (RIGHT) PRELIMINARY RIFLE MARKSMANSHIP INSTRUCTION

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 186 C. Standardizes Training It is not uncommon for American personnel to be rotated or replaced many times over before a VDP reaches the fifth phase (demobilization). An indigenous cadre eliminates this shortcoming of a continuous and wholesale change of instructor personnel and thus adds stability to the program. D. Allows for Mass Training Indigenous instructors are trained (in numbers) to meet the requirements of the training program. If only American instructors are utilized, then the training program needs to be adjusted to meet the availability of instructors. The number of American instructors is further limited by the number of interpreters available; and interpreters are more scarce than Americans. When American instructors are utilized, it must be conceded that these personnel are laden down with training, thus reducing their over-all effectiveness to the VDP. At the peak of this particular program, there were fourteen centralized training cycles and two decentralized training cycles running concurrently, not to mention the normal military operations and other functions of the VDP. It would have been impossible to conduct this training were it not for the trained instructor cadre. E. Established Rapport This symbol of trust establishes the confidence that the Americans have bestowed upon the Montagnards to conduct this important facet of the VDP. It also establishes, within the

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 187 trainees, a sense of pride, security and satisfaction to witness the advancements and attainments of their own people. The cadre is also in an excellent position to recognize the more adept trainees for selection as members of the SF. III. Training Cycles Separate training programs are conducted for each type of trainee although much of the subject material is similar for each of the programs. Within each training program, instruction is also overlapping and each training group (Village Defender, Strike Force, cadre and specialist) is drilled specifically in those arts necessary to accomplish their tasks. Each of these programs is now discussed separately. A. Village Defenders. This two week training cycle is based on the mission of the Village Defenders (deny the VC support and access to their village through armed conflict if required). This mission denotes the requirement for training emphasis to be placed on weapons, intelligence, and security. The following formal training program is established for the village defenders. 1. 1st week. (A). Individual weapon 16 hours (B). Range firing 16 hours (C). Security 8 hours (D). Warning systems 8 hours

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 188 2. 2nd week (A). Combat intelligence 12 hours (B). Patrolling 8 hours (C). Ambushes 8 hours (D). Intelligence nets 4 hours (E). Immediate action 4 hours (F). Village defense 8 hours Recognize that this program indicates a 44-48 hour formal training week. However, since most of these subjects are applied during daylight and darkness, the training week encompasses an 88-96 hour week. In addition, 'free hours' are occupied with psychological indoctrinations, and make-up training (particularly in weapons marksmanship) for those trainees who show unsatisfactory progress. B. Scope of Training. 1. Weapons Training. (A). General - It is unnecessary to explain the importance of weapons training. Skillat-arms ultimately decides the outcome of battle and it must be stressed. Of equal importance is the maintenance and care of weapons, which must be of the highest order for this type of operation. Village defenders are taught a special type of marksmanship; to fire from fixed positions, and during the hours of poor visibility. Only a minimum amount of time is spent on fleeting tar-

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 189 gets and rapid, quick reaction type firing. Trainees are drilled on firing at targets at a range of from 25-100 meters with the aforementioned distance the most likely range at which the village defender will encounter the VC. Also included in marksmanship training is target detection, conservation of ammunition, and fire discipline. A trainee is issued his weapon during initial processing. However, ammunition is not provided until he has qualified on the firing range. The trainee is required to carry his weapon with him at all times from the day it is issued. A preliminary marksmanship instruction (PM) program is modified to meet specific requirements of this training. Positions, windage, and proper breathing are foregone, and sighting and aiming consists simply of aligning the front and rear sights and aiming at target mass. Trigger squeeze is confined to "pulling" the trigger without upsetting the sight alignment. Shot groups or 'bulls-eyes' are not a consideration as any hit is graded as satisfactory. Confidence in the weapon is an important part of weapons training. The recoil, noise, weight and size, of many of the weapons, upset the firer. Through practice, trainees soon develop their own methods of grasping and controlling the weapon and many of them become expert shots (Figure 74). (B). Ranges - Two different type ranges are used for training village defenders. These are the known distance (KD) and the jungle lane. Only a limited amount of firing is conducted on the jungle lane.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 190 (1). The KD range is used to familiarize the individual with his weapon. Training is conducted similarly to that of the U.S. Army. The KD range is a clearing in the jungle with firing lines marked at 25 and 50 meters from silhouette targets which are placed down range. The trainees are taught to fire from the prone or supported position. Rapid fire exercises are not conducted. In some instances nearby ARVN KD ranges maybe available; however, it is felt that these ranges are not the best suited for the needs of these trainees. These ranges do not present the same light conditions or similarity of firing environment that the Village Defenders are exposed to when at their village. The improvised ranges were constructed to closely resemble the conditions of VD (Figure 75). (2). The jungle lane is used to provide trainees familiarization in firing quickly and accurately while on the move. It is also a diversionary method for having them gain confidence in their weapon. A winding track is cleared in the jungle and silhouette targets are placed on each side of the track. A firer advances along the track and engages targets as they appear. The fixed target, rather than the spring-up target, was best suited for our needs. They are easier to construct and they reduce the number of controllers required to operate the range. The firer is also required to detect a target without the aid of noise or motion which accompanies spring-up targets.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 191 2. Security Training A simple but adequate security system for Village Defenders is devised and taught. A 24 hour guard system, population control (entrance and departure from the village), proper storage of weapons, discussion of military information, and disposition of weapons in the event capture is imminent, is the scope of this block of instruction. Gates are manned and guarded continuously. During darkness additional posts are manned throughout the village. Security patrols and listening posts are incorporated into the village security system on an unscheduled basis. When establishing the village guard system, it must be remembered that these people receive no pay and are required to work the fields and accomplish other chores to maintain their livelihood. As a result, an 'alert system' which provides and accounts for these people being away from their village, is incorporated into the plan. A defender has his weapon with him at all times except when he is travelling away from his village on non-military activities. When this occurs, he turns his weapon over to the village military commander for safe-keeping and accountability. When he works in the fields or in the general area of the village, the defender is permitted to take his weapon with him. He hides it in close proximity to where he is working so it is readily available in the event the alarm is sounded. This also reduces the possibility of it being confiscated by the VC who very often search for isolated soldiers, civil guards, Village Defenders, etc., who are armed and can be easily separated from their weapon.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 192 Village Defenders are constantly reminded to protect their weapons at all costs. If capture is imminent they are to remove the bolt, trigger housing, barrel, or other necessary component and hide it where it can be recovered at a later time. If this is not feasible, then the weapon is to be destroyed to prevent it from falling into the hands of the VC. 3. Warning Systems. Successful VD evolves around the early detection of a VC attack. Information is relayed throughout the VDP whenever the VC are detected. Gongs, drums, runners and any other suitable means are employed to relay this information. Between villages, secret jungle routes are used to pass this information or to render support to a village under attack. 4. Combat Intelligence Emphasis is placed upon speed and accuracy of reporting information. Villagers are instructed to report the presence of strangers or any unusual incident that occurs in the fields or in the marketplace. Development and stress on these aspects of the intelligence system resulted in hundreds of pieces of information, some far removed from being intelligence, to be reported weekly. This gave a good indication that the system was functioning. 5. Patrolling Village Defenders receive limited training on short-range reconnaissance patrols. It is generally felt that a village force is required to periodically remove themselves from the confines of the village to conduct patrolling action, either in support of SF operations or to maintain their

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 193 own security. This action makes it difficult for the VC to mass or to reconnoiter a village with the assurance he won't be detected. This patrolling action also instills a degree of initiative within the Village Defenders. However, their patrolling action is limited to a two kilometer radius from the village. This freedom of action does much to prevent the village defenders from getting lax by waiting for the VC to bring the fight to them. 6. Ambushes As with patrolling, ambush instruction is limited in scope to the selection of ambush sites and the conduct of the simple ambush. Ambushes by Village Defenders are employed only on extreme occasions, and then only as a part of the village security or defensive plan. It must be remembered that the Village Defenders are trained and equipped to fight best from the confines of their village. 7. Intelligence Nets A simple means of employing women and children and other non-combatants to gather information and to transmit or report this information is presented. In addition, methods of providing look-outs and drops is demonstrated. 8. Immediate Action Immediate action, although primarily a counter-ambush tactic, is taught to Village Defenders as a protective means of quickly making decisions when unexpectedly confronted with the enemy. In all instances, it refers to incidents which occur outside the area of influence of the

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 194 Village Defenders (the perimeter of the village defensive structures). Immediate action is denoted as the instantaneous reaction to surprise. For VD it denotes actions taken when outside the confines of the village either in groups or individually. If the VC force is estimated to be stronger, the Village Defenders are taught to inflict as many casualties as possible with an initial burst of fire and to then immediately retreat to the confines of their village. They spread the alarm and immediately prepare to defend their village. When the VC force encountered is weaker, once again they inflict as many casualties as they can with an initial overwhelming burst of fire, but they then take positions and continue to inflict as many casualties on the VC as they can until he surrenders or withdraws. 9. Village Defense All of the aforementioned subjects are within the scope of VD. In this particular block of instruction the concept of VD is presented along with methods of locating and emplacing protective and defensive structures, control and commitment of reserves, escape routes from the village, alert systems, self-imposed training, and the place of non-combatant villagers in the VDP. IV. Strike Force A. The mission of the SF, as described in Chapter Eight, reflects this three week training program. The mission amplifies the requirement for a well trained and well organized force in all aspects of CI operations. Recall that the SF trainees have previously received the two week VD

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 195 training course and have been selected for this advanced training based upon their outstanding potential as full time soldiers. The following is their program of instruction. 1. 1st Week (A). Weapons 26 hours (B). Grenades 2 hours (C). Flares, mines and booby traps 2 hours (D). Firing and employing (A), (B), and (C) above 16 hours 2. 2nd Week (A). Patrolling 8 hours (B). Ambushes 8 hours (C). Immediate action 4 hours (D). Combat intelligence 4 hours (E). Search and seizure 4 hour s (F). Interrogation 4 hours (G). Raids 8 hours (H). Village defense 4 hours 3. 3rd Week (A). Daylight reconnaissance patrol (B). Night combat patrol with ambush

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 196 (C). Twenty-four hour patrol (D). Seventy-two hour patrol. B. Unlike the training program for the village Defenders, the SF training program is limited to that which is scheduled, including the number of hours indicated. The scope of training is as follows: 1. Weapons training (A). General - SF trainees receive detailed instruction on the carbine and Swedish K sub-machine gun, which are the two primary weapons of the force, as well as familiarization training on all other weapons employed in the VDP. Contrary to Village Defenders, the SF trainees are taught to fire at fleeting targets, while on the move, and from hasty, unsupported positions. They are primarily taught how to bring a heavy volume of accurate fire on a short range target as rapidly as possible. They receive training in firing from obscure positions, such as from behind stumps, from within trees, through underbrush etc., while the better shots are further trained as snipers. It must be noted that the SF is armed with weapons that are light and produce a heavy volume of fire. These are best suited for jungle fighting. As part of their marksmanship training, they are taught to always carry their weapon at the ready position while on operations. To accomplish this training we utilized ranges similar to what the British use in Malaya.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON FIG 76. (BELOW) CRITIQUE OF PATROL

197

FIG 7. (ABOVE) IMPROVISED KD RANGE

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 198 (B). Ranges (1). Malayan ranges This range is used to teach the trainees to fire from all of the offhand positions and at moving targets. This range is placed in the jungle with very little vegetation disturbed. It includes a system of pull-type and sliding targets which are controlled by wires and pulleys. The firer remains in a stationary firing area and once a target is activated, he has from three to four seconds to detect and engage it with fire. This range develops target detection as well as quick reaction firing. (2). Jungle lane The jungle lane is constructed and operated identically to that which was described for the Village Defender. (3). Shooting gallery This range is used primarily for familiarization firing of weapons and adds incentive to the marksmanship program. It consists of a clearing, 50 meters in depth, in the jungle. Within the clearing are various targets consisting of cans, light bulbs, metal plates, balloons, and other devices, each painted different colors. These targets vary in distance from ten to fifty meters from the firer, with the firing position being stationary (either on the ground or in a tree). While in the ready position the controller shouts "red light bulb." The firer immediately scans the

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 199 target area for a red light bulb and fires at it. This procedure continues until all ammunition is expended. All of these ranges are constructed for quick reaction firing and to develop confidence in the trainee to quickly engage and hit a target. 2. Grenades and booby traps These are invaluable weapons for jungle fighting and particularly for defensive fighting. In addition to the proper use of fragmentation and white phosphorous (WP) grenades, trainees are taught how to employ these weapons for the destruction of VC caches; and for employment as booby traps. Pyrotechnics and the employment and construction of mines is also presented at this time. At first, trainees are skeptical about pulling a grenade pin and throwing it, as they are very much afraid of them. When they learn how to use them, however, it becomes very difficult to send them on a patrol without them. 3. Patrolling This block of instruction is devoted primarily to patrol movement and formations. It is impressed upon trainees that all movement is tactical; formations permit maximum fire power immediately upon contact; and troops will be capable of employing immediate action if ambushed.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 200 4. Ambushes Training is directed at the principles of ambushing, i e., preparation for the ambush, planning, siting, organizing forces, the layout, lying in ambush, security, springing the ambush and rendezvous. 5. Immediate action With reference to VD, immediate action implies only to counter ambushes; or when brought under VC long range fires. Immediate action when making undetected contact of a VC camp or patrol; or when the VC and SF become aware of each other simultaneously, is instructed as a part of the operational phase of training where tactics is presented. Encounters with the VC are sudden, short, and so unsuspected that a force can be made completely ineffective if indecision exists, or if they await orders and instructions from their leaders. Immediate, positive and aggressive action by each member of the force is required to regain the initiative and subdue the effect of surprise. If ambushed, trainees are instructed to immediately lay down a heavy volume of fire and aggressively attack into the ambushing force. If brought under VC long range fires, they are instructed to immediately move to covered and concealed positions and return the fire. until a form of maneuver can be accomplished.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 201 6. Combat intelligence In the VDP two specific fields of intelligence training is emphasized; information of the VC; and of friendly village activity, in other words, preventive intelligence measures which are designed to produce increased security for the VDP. 7. Search and seizure Search and seizure for VD pertains to those tactics employed to sterilize a village (white, pink, or red) and does not include the sterilization of a VC base or camp. While on operations, the SF will very often place a village under surveillance both for their own protection and protection of the VDP, to observe anything unusual that occurs. If suspicious, search and seizure is employed. The village is surrounded by the "security party" and the "cut-off party" places itself in ambush along the most probable escape route(s). The search party enters the village and quickly and systematically inspects the entire village. 8. Interrogation Training is limited in scope to the basic questioning techniques and procedures to be employed on VC as well as friendly or other indifferent sources. 9. Raids Raids encompass the methods of attacking a VC camp or installation. These installations are very seldom stationary for any appreciable length of time, and are usually uncovered accidentally. When they are discovered, raiding tactics are employed to eliminate them. A base of

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 202 fire is established from one (or more) location with the intent of forcing the VC to flee away from the fire and into ambush positions established by another segment of the SF. 10. Village defense Unlike that which is presented to the Village Defenders, emphasis is placed on the mutual support missions villages can offer one another, and the support they can offer the SF. This scope of instruction is not intended to depict the entire realm of training. The tactics and techniques employed are better explained in Chapter Sixteen (Operations). 11. Operations training The third week or operational week of training, is concentrated on the proper employment of the fundamental techniques taught during the first two weeks of training. Americans accompany and observe training patrols and make recommendations to the cadre commander concerning his observations. The areas selected for training patrols are "live" areas and could conceivably contain VC. The chances, however, of a sizeable force being encountered is remote, but the possibility keeps the trainees alert and conscientious towards their duties, and creates a better training environment (Figure 76). (A). The daylight reconnaissance patrol is of short duration and through difficult terrain. It is of sufficient length to tax and test the proficiency and physical stamina of the trainees.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 203 (B). The night combat patrol is usually conducted in the same area as the reconnaissance patrol; or another area familiar to the trainee. If feasible, this training patrol is conducted in conjunction with an SF operation. (C). The two remaining patrols are simply advanced versions of the shorter patrols previously mentioned. All aspects of the training program are accomplished during these operations and include everything from establishing base camps to laying ambushes, and from fieldcraft to security. This type of patrol tests a trainees character and his fighting spirit. He is continually on the move and rests only for short periods. -Plagued with anxiety and wonder he learns that his life depends upon the ability and dedication of each member of the patrol to carry out his individual responsibilities. The SF training program outlined above is the basic program which is taught to all trainees who qualify for the SF. Selected personnel are further selected to undergo crew-served weapons training for assignment to the weapons section; or for demolitions, sabotage, or silent kill methods if they are to be assigned these type of duties. V. Cadre training A. The cadre must be proficient in all facets of VD training. The two week training cycle presented to these individuals places emphasis on methods of instruction (MOI) and leadership. Those selected for cadre training must be, without a doubt, the most proficient and loyal of all the Montagnards associated with the program. These trainees have excelled at their duties with

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 204 the SF and, therefore, are not strangers to VDP procedures. All cadre training is conducted by CT personnel who stress teaching methods. Trainees are expected to observe the teaching methods of the instructor rather than grasp the subject. Once again, a training program is listed. 1. 1st week (A). Principles of leadership 4 hours (B). Weapons 16 hours (C). Range procedures 8 hours (D). Ambushes 8 hours (E). Immediate action 8 hours (F). Patrolling 8 hours 2. 2nd week (A). Combat intelligence 4 hours (B). Map reading and compass 8 hours (C). Communications 12 hours (D). Search and seizure 4 hours (E). Interrogation 4 hours (F). Raids 4 hours (G). Village defense 4 hours (H). Intelligence nets and security 4 hours

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 205 (D. Methods of instruction (MOI) 8 hours B. Not only are the trainees shown the proper methods of presenting these subjects, but the training includes practical application of instruction by members of the class. When training is completed, each cadre instructor is assigned an American advisor. This advisor assists the instructor in every way possible; observes his first course of instruction and as frequently thereafter as possible; and maintains a personal relationship with him. Teaching subjects are rotated among the instructors each training cycle. VI. Specialist training Special training is conducted based upon the needs of the VDP. The hospital needs trained nurses, medics, and helpers. The intelligence section requires trained interrogators, agents, guards etc., and so on in the fields of communications, psychological warfare, logistics, administration and civic action. The scope of training for these is discussed in each of these specific chapters (Figure 77). VII. Miscellaneous training Just as the need for the VDP to seek administrative and operational assistance from the various ARVN and MAAG units exists, so will these units seek training assistance from the VDP. Some of this training support is listed as follows:

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON

206

FIG 77. MEDICAL TRAINING

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 207 A. ARVN units requested that certain forces of theirs be trained in CI operations. As a result we trained eight ARVN Montagnard companies in scouting and patrolling. B. The Sret was interested in having personnel trained in the use of weapons which they were beginning to receive for their operations. As a result, twenty-four of them received training with the Thompson SMG. C. The chief of the Field Operations Intelligence (FOI) team in our area requested that indigenous members of his team be trained and integrated as agents into the VDP, which we did. D. The Province and District Chiefs requested that their special guard detachment be trained for security duties. This we did on a one time basis. E. In addition, we trained a Vietnamese cadre (similar to the Rhade cadre we trained) in hopes that the Province Chief would undertake the task of employing a VDP throughout the Vietnamese villages. This never materialized although this nucleus of trained Vietnamese were later employed in Civil Guard units. VIII. Conclusion The training program expressed herein, or any other, cannot be accomplished overnight. However, a well planned and functional program can make many inroads in a short period of time. I must impress that the cadre system must be developed and instituted with the indigenous personnel. U.S. personnel are required to train the first groups (Village Defenders, Strike Force, medical specialists and so on), but once a solid foundation is established, it is the cadre system

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 208 that carries the VDP training program to its successes. In addition, training doesn't conclude with these formal training programs. A field team is organized and travels from village to village to conduct familiarization firing and training, inspect the village defenses, inspect the maintenance and accountability of weapons, sanitation and other facets of the VDP. This is a continuous cycle which ends only with demobilization. The Montagnards are highly motivated and receive and accept training in a rapid manner. In a matter of a month or so, they become very proficient and adept at the art of using modern weapons to counter the VC. They are responsive and they produce untiring efforts when called upon to assist the VDP. For them the simplest and most rustic of training procedures produce the best results. Firing the weapon is the most important skill to them and they have the highest respect and regard for maintenance and the security of equipment.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 209 Chapter Eleven Administration I. General Administration of the VDP is conducted from the OB. Functions include all tactical and administrative tasks required to support VD. The Team Commander, by virtue of his position, is also the camp (OB) commander. Together with the area asset (civic action advisor), PSO (political advisor), and other members of the team (special staff and technical advisors), administrative policies are formulated and facilities administered to perform the required tasks. The specific duties of each 'team' member is listed in Chapter Five (Command and Control). Other chapters explain, in detail, the functions of each installation i.e., medical, communications, logistics, intelligence, training, operations, etc. The purpose of this chapter is to depict the operation of the OB by placing each of its functions in perspective with the other. This chapter does not include the administration of U.S. personnel, although there is a degree of overlap. U.S. personnel procedures are explained in Chapter Twenty one, (U.S. Personnel).

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 210 II. Administrative facilities The required facilities to support the VDP is appropriately discussed in Chapter Seven (The OB). Included is the personnel required to administer these facilities and the duties they perform. III. Administrative functions Administration of the VDP is accomplished very differently than for conventional programs. However, fundamental requirements remain basically unchanged. That is, strengths, replacements, morale and personnel services, discipline, law and order, personnel procedures and miscellaneous, which any GI will recognize, constitute the operation. These functions, however, do not possess the same degree of magnitude or importance as for conventional operations. This is true primarily because the personnel are indigenous to the area of operations, are of the same stock, have the same beliefs, and are fighting for the same cause. Functions which do become more complex and difficult to fulfill are those of logistics, training, medical support, and communications. In conventional operations, this support is usually contiguous to the area of operations. For the VDP logistic bases are a great distance from the OB; sufficient modern and technical equipment is not normally available; and the natural characteristics of the VDP make communications, transportation, and medical supplies in short demand. The political limitations imposed upon this program do not enhance this situation.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 211 IV. Standard operating procedures (SOP's) SOP's are developed and each individual becomes familiar with his duties. This is the simplest and most effective manner of assuring that all tasks are accomplished. SOP's are not long, detailed explanations with reasons thereof. They are more apt to be 'check lists' and 'guidelines' which direct the efforts of each facility. The following is a list of administrative SOP's which we published for the VDP: A. Communications Procedures (incl 1). B. Logistical Procedures (incl 2). C. Training Procedures (incl 3). D. Processing Procedures (incl 4). E. Emergency Actions (incl 5). F. POW Procedures. G. Refugee Procedures. H. Rehabilitation Procedures. V. Schedules It is very difficult to establish a daily schedule, nevertheless justify one, when in a combat environment. The OB, will in time, become a secure area. I feel that scheduling is a must if the administrative functions are to be properly and effectively conducted. To make the statement 'We'll work as long as it takes to get the job done, 24 hours a day if necessary' seems somewhat

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 212 superfluous to me. It is not, in my opinion, the proper statement to motivate men to do their best under difficult conditions. The success of the VDP relies upon the initiative, dedication, and integrity of all its members. As a result, training schedules and duty hours are published, if for no other reason than for planning purposes, as follows: Duty Hours 0730-1200 & 1300-1700 Mon thru Fri 0800-1200 Sat training hours 0800-1200 & 1300-1700 Mon thru Fri 0800-1200 Sat Don't be misguided by these delightful, 'state-side' hours. It isn't very often that personnel are able to take advantage of them. Training objectives and daily events require adjustments to this schedule. For example, trainees are given physical training, dismounted drill, and other disciplinary, quick-reaction exercises at 0600 each training day. Also, the training hours don't reflect night training, make-up training, and political-psychological lectures and rallies which very often last until midnight. The duty hours, as well, don't reflect operational commitments which places personnel on full time duty for days and weeks on end; communications checks which must be made by communications personnel throughout the night; alert status of all personnel; the sick-call that begins at dawn and lasts until dusk (if all patients are to be treated) or the emergency cases which keep

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 213 the medical personnel working throughout the night; interrogators who work long into the night attempting to withdraw information from POW's so it will be timely; or the planning sessions and briefings which are conducted regardless of the time of day. Then why establish duty hours? Psychological!! I feel that an individual is psychologically motivated when he has been allotted a certain time to be away from his job and is free to do generally what he pleases. But, with mature, dedicated and responsible people, as were the Rhade, 'free time' is only that time when there isn't work to be done. They work long hours, and the feeling that they are devoting their own time to accomplish the task, makes their job and the results more rewarding. Rarely did I ever have to instill or express my desires on anyone for 'dogging'. VI. Functions A. Strengths The size of the SF is dependent upon many factors. These are discussed in Chapter Eight (The Strike Force). Although completely voluntary, the recruitment of personnel to maintain a desired size SF was never a problem. The size of each VD force is also based upon many factors. These are discussed in Chapter Nine (Village Defenders). One of these conditions is the available manpower source from which a village can draw to maintain its defense in the event it receives casualties. Once again, this is no problem. Villagers are never moved from one village to another for the purpose of maintain-

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 214 ing strengths. B. Replacements There are thousands of Village Defenders from which the SF can draw upon, without depleting the villages, if this becomes necessary. The replacement of individuals with critical skills such as interpreters and medical technicians, does pose a problem. Wherever possible, understudies, who are cross-trained to fill key positions in an emergency are maintained. C. Discipline, law and order This is a minor function as disciplinary cases are rare. If not handled properly, however, it can be a major problem. The Rhade were permitted to handle their own disciplinary problems. Minor infractions, such as tardiness, are punishable by fines and reduced (survival) rations, while any infraction which shows negligence and can seriously harm the VDP, such as falling asleep on guard or improper actions in the face of the enemy, are punishable by immediate dismissal from the VDP and/or confinement. D. POW's This is a responsibility of the intelligence section and is explained in Chapter Fourteen (Intelligence). E. Morale and personnel services There are many areas within this function which must be properly considered and provided to assure an effective organization.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 215 1. For the Strike Force these include: (A). Finance - Payment of personnel must be made in full and when due. Wages are comparable to those received by ARVN forces or GVN employees. No portion of the wage is withheld (unless an advance was made or a fine incurred) nor are there any kick-backs. (B). Rewards - Outstanding accomplishments and service are recognized with promotions, decorations, or other types of awards. (C). Gratuity - In the event of death, the widow is presented with sufficient funds to re-establish herself and her children. Funeral expenses are borne by the VDP. Rhade customs take care of the rest. (D). Medical treatment - The best the VDP can provide is offered. For the seriously wounded this includes evacuation to the nearest facility capable of rendering the required treatment. (E). Passes and leaves. (F). Increased standard of living - The pay, medical treatment, and civic action programs bring these people a status of living they have never before achieved. 2. For the Village Defenders personnel services include: (A). Recipients of civic action programs. (B). Funeral payments for defenders killed in action.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 216 (C). Partial compensation of livelihood items lost because of VC activities (livestock, personal possessions, homes). (D). Rewards for intelligence and heroic actions. (E). Security of the VDP. VII. Daily tasks A. Team Commander He makes his presence known by inspecting as many functions and facilities of the VDP as often as possible. Coordination with the Senior MAAG Advisor, FOI Chief, and other U.S. military agencies in the area, is advisable. Daily meetings of team personnel are appropriate, but we found this procedure to be too restrictive and time consuming. Therefore, each member of the CT reports significant events to the Team Commander on a daily basis to include the action taken. In addition, each function maintains a daily log which summarizes all activities. Team members coordinate their activities with each other as required, and each member is authorized to make tactical or administrative decisions in the Team Commander's absence. Political decisions or decisions which affect agencies external to the VDP, are made only by the Team Commander or the area asset. The Team Commander is also required to keep all members of the 'team' informed on information he has received. Contacts with outside agencies is restricted to a minimum of personnel.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 217 A great portion of the Team Commander's time is also devoted to inspecting villages and talking to the village chiefs, coordinating with JUWTF, and conducting briefings and inspections for the numerous U.S. and Vietnamese military and civilian officials (Figure 78). B. Area Asset He devotes the major portion of his time to the refugee program, civic action programs, and other civilian interests. He also frequently coordinates with U.S. administrative organizations in the area as well as AID and USOM in Saigon. C. PSO He must coordinate with the Province Chief, District Chiefs, Vietnamese Military Commanders, and other Vietnamese agencies in the area. He frequently accompanies the Team Commander on visits to the villages to establish rapport between the Vietnamese and Montagnards. In turn, the Team Commander makes an effort to accompany the PSO on his visits with Vietnamese officials. D. Medical Facility Sick-call is conducted from0700-1800 hours daily. Medical training is conducted for medical trainees as scheduled. The OB is inspected for sanitary conditions to include malaria control measures. Visits with refugees, pow's, and the rehabilitation center are made to inspect sanitation and conduct medical treatment. The Field Inspection Team (FIT) which visits outlying villages, is also staffed (Figure 79).

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON

218

FIG 78. ESCORTING GENERAL OFFICERS ON TOUR OF OB

FIG 79. MEDIC EXAMINING CHILD ON INSPECTION TRIP

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 219 E. Logistical Facility Normal functions of receiving, issuing and maintaining supplies and equipment are conducted, local procurements are made; inspection of the OB defenses are conducted; and the control and dispatch of vehicles accomplished. The FIT is staffed with an armorer. F. Communications Facility Normal radio contacts are made and the communications equipment maintained. A complete log of all transmissions is kept. Communications classes are conducted for selected personnel. Other communications sites are visited and inspected. G. CP Facility The preparation of reports and other paper work keeps this facility completely occupied. All VDP reports are maintained at the CP and all translations are conducted here. Preparations for the receipt and briefing of visitors is accomplished and the function of processing trainees is controlled from this installation. All internal functions of the OB are coordinated from the CP (Figure 80). H. Intelligence Facility Normal interrogation functions, maintaining of a chronological sequential log, preparation of ISUMS, and the maintenance of the situation map keep this facility on their toes. They also log and record captured VC documents and equipment.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON

220

FIG 80. FIG 78. ESCORTING GENERAL PROCESSING TRAINEES OFFICERS ON TOUR OF OB

FIG 81. PERIODIC VISITS TO OUTLYING VILLAGES

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 221 I. Operational Facility Normal debriefing functions, maintaining the operations map and a chronological log, preparing SITREPS and planning operations are a full time operation. In addition, the training program is administered and inspected. VIII. Field Inspection Team (FIT) A FIT is established to conduct roving administrative and functional tasks. It consists of an indigenous weapons repairman, a medic, a civic action-psyop specialist and intelligence specialist, and a U.S. representative with interpreter. The function of the FIT is to periodically visit and inspect trained villages and render necessary support. Intelligence is sought and propaganda activities are conducted. Villages must not be left to shift for themselves once they are trained. A continuous effort is made to improve all aspects of VD and continue harmonious relations with all villages (Figure 81). IX. Conclusion This outlines the daily activities conducted from the OB. It is a comprehensive guide which illustrates how all matters are funneled through this installation. All functions must be properly organized and efficiently administered, even in the remotest areas, to effectively and proficiently conduct the VDP. It is much easier to disregard organiza-

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 222 tion and to conduct the program on a day-to-day basis. However, this is completely unsatisfactory, and will literally destroy and lead to the failure of the VDP. Inclosure 1 (Chapter Eleven) Communications Procedures I. General Communications is a command responsibility. Communications personnel are assigned to perform commo tasks, make recommendations to the Team Commander on the utilization of communications, carry out the desires of the Team Commander and the VDP, and conduct communications training as necessary. II. Equipment All communications equipment will be maintained, stored, issued, received, and accountable to the communications section. An alert package of communications equipment will be easily accessible in the event of emergency action procedures. III. Responsibilities A. Communications 1. Make scheduled radio contacts with the JUWTF at 0800, 1500 and 2200 hours daily. 2. Emergency contacts will be made as required. Stations will remain on the air until the emergency has subsided. 3. Maintain communications checks with sub-OB's via the AN-GRC-109; and village nets, via the RT-20, on a scheduled basis.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 223 4. Provide frequencies and communications for operational commitments. B. Inspections Conduct visits, as necessary, to all communications sites for the purpose of checking communications for maintenance, repair, replenishment of batteries, parts, etc. C. Training Conduct training in communications to maintain sufficient personnel to operate communications throughout the VDP, and as prescribed by the Team Commander. D. Administration 1. Maintain a complete chronological log of all transmissions to include a suspense system on messages that require action. 2. All messages dispatched will first be cleared through the Team Commander In his absence the communications chief will use his own discretion and notify the Team Commander (upon his return), of what transpired. 3. Maintain security for enciphering and deciphering materials. 4. Prepare for the immediate destruction of all communications equipment and materials in the event the OB must be evacuated. s/Ronald A. Shackleton Ronald A. Shackleton Team Commander

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 224 Inclosure 2 (Chapter Eleven) Logistic Procedures I. General Logistical responsibility remains that of the Team Commander. Logistic personnel are assigned duties and responsibilities to assist in this function. The logistic supervisor will receipt, issue, store, maintain, and be accountable for all supplies, materials, and equipment less those of communication and medical functions. He will keep the Team Commander abreast of the logistical status, and will be guided by the Team Commander's policies for issuing supplies. II. Facilities Logistic facilities will be the responsibility of the logistics section. They will be maintained in a neat and orderly manner. They will be prepared for immediate destruction in the event the OB must be evacuated. III. Responsibilities A. Receipt of Supplies 1. Dispatches necessary transportation and personnel to secure supplies from incoming aircraft. 2. Procures those items of supply and materials locally available. B. Issue of Supplies 1. Routine issues will be made as directed by the logistic chief. 2. Special issues will be made upon approval of the Team Commander.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 225 3. Emergency issues will be made at the discretion of any team member. C. Alert Actions 1. Maintain pre-loaded magazines ammunition cans, and other weapons in easy to issue lots for emergency action procedures. 2. Provide security for logistic installations with personnel available. 3. Maintain equipment and materials for training purposes. D. Training Conduct training, as required, to maintain proficiency within the logistics section. E. Administration 1. Maintain complete inventories, receipts, issues and other records required for accountability. 2. Check manifests of incoming aircraft to insure delivery of items listed. 3. Submit weekly requisitions to the team chief with justification. 4. Maintain accurate records of funds used for local procurements. s/Ronald A. Shackleton Ronald A. Shackleton Team Commander

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 226 Inclosure 3 (Chapter Eleven) Training Procedures I. General Training is the concern of all members of the team. It is of primary importance to the operations sergeant, who is responsible to the Team Commander, for the implementation of the training program. He must incorporate and coordinate all training matters into a workable plan based upon the guidance and direction of the Team Commander. II. Responsibilities A. Training Program 1. A training program (scope of instruction) will be prepared for each specific type of training cycle i.e., Strike Force, Village Defender, cadre, medical, and other special training programs. This will be governed by the mission of each of these units (personnel) and the following allotted time periods: (A) Cadre training 2 weeks (B) Strike Force training 3 weeks (C) Village Defender training 2 weeks (D) Medical training 3 weeks (E) Special training as required B. Training Schedules

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 227 1. Schedules will be prepared for each training cycle and will indicate pertinent information. 2. Schedules will be prepared so as to make maximum use of instructors and training facilities. 3. Training cycles will be conducted by village(s) with a maximum input of 50 students per cycle. 4. A VD training cycle will commence each training day, a medical training cycle each month, and others as required for as long as this is feasible and can he logistically and administratively supported. 5. Decentralized training will be scheduled in conjunction with the centralized program when the situation so dictates. C. Instructors 1. Instructors will be trained and qualified to teach all subjects. 2. Instructors will be assigned to teach scheduled classes. 3. Cadre (instructor) meetings will be held as required, but at least weekly. D. Equipment Coordination will be affected with the logistics section to insure the required equipment, training aids, transportation, etc. is available. E. Coordination

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 228 1. Contact with the Team Commander, Area Asset, PSO, etc. will be made as necessary to determine the training input by village, number, and date. 2. Notification of American personnel who are required to assist in the training program will be made as far in advance as 'practical. 3. Tactical operations will be coordinated with training objectives whenever possible. 4. The requirement for other training support, (medical, communications, aviation, etc.) will be coordinated. F. Inspections Training inspections and observations will be made as frequently as the situation permits. G. Administration Complete training records will be maintained and inclosed as a part of the village folders which are prepared by the admin section. s/Ronald A. Shackleton Ronald A. Shackleton Team Commander

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 229 Inclosure 4 (Chapter Eleven) Processing Procedures I. General All personnel employed, trained, or equipped by the VDP will be processed. Appropriate forms will be completed and maintained on file for the duration of the program. The processing team, in conjunction with the CP, will accommodate the processing functions. II. Information Required A. Personal History Statement B. Photograph.Physical examination. C. Fingerprints. D. Weapon issued to include serial number. E. Information of the village. 1. Number of people living in the village. 4. Sketch of village to include structures. 2. Number trained for VD. 5. Sketch of defensive positions. 3. Number of weapons (by type). 6. Photograph(s) of the village. This information plus other (logistics, medical, intelligence, etc.) will be retained in the central files, by village, as well as provided to the JUWTF and Vietnamese officials. s/Ronald A. Shackleton Ronald A. Shackleton Team Commander

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 230 Inclosure 5 (Chapter Eleven) Emergency Action Procedures Note: Emergency action procedures for the VDP was issued in the form of an OPLAN with a copy provided to the JUWTF. OPLAN 1 (Emergency Action Procedures, VDP Buon Enao) Reference: Map, Ban Methout, sheet 182W Indochina, 1;100,000 I. Situation A. Enemy Forces Assumption: VC forces have begun an all-out offensive against the VDP or Republic of Vietnam (RVN) forcing the present location of the VDP to become a denied area. B. Friendly Forces Assumption: The VDP will initially be cut-off from friendly forces, U.S. and Vietnamese; the Montagnards will support and assist U.S.-Vietnamese efforts; other Special Forces detachments in the area will assume the same posture. II. Mission Remain in the denied areas and conduct guerrilla-UW operations against the VC in support of conventional forces. III. Execution A. Concept of Operation: On D-day, the team will move to Area Tiger (AQ900230) and establish an Operational Base. Utilizing organized forces (Strike Force and Village Defenders) and

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 231 cached supplies, the conduct of interdiction of LOC's will commence to prevent the movement of VC reinforcements to the south. E&E nets will be established with direction of flow to the south and to the east coast. Development and training of guerrillas will be expanded and all operations will be covert, unless otherwise directed. B. Coordinating Instructions 1. Plan becomes effective D-day. 2. Coordination and control of efforts will remain with the JUWTF. 3. Upon implementation of this plan communications will be established on the guard frequency to commence normal signal procedures. IV. Administration and Logistics A. Personnel 1. Strengths; SOP 2. Records; SOP 3. Reports; SOP 4. Replacements; SOP 5. Discipline, law and order; SOP 6. Prisoners of war. (A) Treated in accordance with Geneva convention. (B) Exfiltrated to rear; SOP

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 7. Morale and personnel services. (A) Awards and decorations; SOP (B) Mail to be delivered with resupply drops. (C) Promotions; SOP (D) Pay. (1) U.S. personnel paid when exfiltrated; or transmit funds to family. (2) Payment for guerrillas as directed. 8. Burial and Graves Registration. (A) Positive action to identify the dead. (B) [Evacuation of remains] when practical. (C) Graves of U.S. personnel clearly marked and reported by coordinates. (D) Guerrilla deceased disposed of in accordance with their own customs. 9. Miscellaneous. Confidential funds to support operation provided on initial supply drop. B. Supply 1. Local procurement whenever possible. (A) By purchase. (B) By levy. (C) As a result of action against the VC.

232

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 233 2. Catalogue system of resupply will be utilized to the extent feasible. 3. Automatic resupply; SOP. 4. Emergency resupply; SOP. C. Transportation Procured locally. D. Miscellaneous 1. Stockpiles in the area of operations will be kept to a minimum. 2. Caches will contain assorted supplies. 3. Accountability ceases upon delivery; supply conservation enforced. V. Command and Signal A. Signal 1. Two encoding and decoding pads and crystals dropped with initial supplies. 2. Two frequencies available: 8016.7 KC 6125 KC 3. Complete SOI to include pads and crystals dropped with initial supplies. 4. Report immediately the loss or compromise of SOI's or SSI's. 5. Communications procedures and contacts with other teams in the area as prescribed by the JUWTF. 6. Exercise maximum radio security. 7. Maximum use of oral orders. Records and journals kept to a minimum.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON B. Command Established within the team by military rank. s/Ronald A. Shackleton Ronald A. Shackleton Team Commander

234

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 235 Chapter Twelve Logistics I. General Logistical support of the VDP differs widely from conventional type operations but it remains a decisive ingredient for successful operations. The timely provision of adequate logistical support throughout the system is imperative. For VD, this includes the functions of supply, transportation, maintenance, and construction. Difficulties in communications and transportation, the varying composition and size of forces, the special operational tactics and techniques employed for VD, and the climate and terrain of the operational area, requires that a flexible system be employed. A. The principles governing the establishment and operation of the logistics system are: 1. Maximum use of local supplies and facilities. 2. Maximum use of local labor. 3. Minimum supply installations. 4. Maximum control and security. 5. Maximum economy of resources. As previously discussed, the selected site for the OB is highly considerate of these supply principles to include road nets and airfields for the transport of supplies.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 236 B. The team commander is responsible to the JUWTF for the conduct of the VDP. He is also completely dependent upon the JUWTF for logistical support. The VDP is conducted by the local people in remote, isolated areas. They depend upon the team commander for direction and support. C. The OB provides JUWTF with logistical estimates. These estimates provide considerable leadtime because of the many nonstandard, obsolete and special type items of equipment required for the VDP. Estimates become more complex because of distance, the uncertainties of guerrilla warfare, and the politics involved. II. Logistic Responsibilities A. Receive supplies. B. Store, maintain and inventory supplies. C. Maintain complete supply records and files. D. Requisition and procure supplies. E. Issue supplies. F. Construct required military facilities G. Establish, inspect and maintain the OB defensive structures. H. Maintain and operate the OB power supply (generators). I. Maintain and control the dispatch of transportation.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 237 Communications and medical supplies and equipment remain the responsibility of the commo chief and the medical specialist, respectively. III. Organization The numerous and demanding logistic functions require full time supervision and direction of a U.S. representative. I assigned my demolition specialist this duty. Organized as part of the administrative branch, he is assisted by a number of tribesmen, whom he trains to carry on all aspects of this facility, Assigned were three supply personnel who are trained and utilized to receive, store, maintain and issue supplies; an armorer who is trained and responsible for the maintenance and repair of weapons; a skilled laborer (carpenter) who is used to supervise and oversee all construction; a mechanic who maintains generators and performs first echelon maintenance and minor repairs on all vehicles; and one driver per vehicle of which we had a total of 14. In addition, the drivers are graduates of the SF training program and have knowledge of military skills and techniques. The labor force is controlled by the area specialist who provides labor to the various facilities as required. IV. Logistic Facilities The required facilities to support the logistic functions are discussed in Chapter Seven (The OB).

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 238 V. Supply Supplies are all items necessary for the equipping, maintenance and operation of the VDP including weapons, ammunition, clothing, food, medicines, materials, vehicles and communications. A. The organization for supply includes: 1. Determining supply requirements. 2. Requisitioning, procuring, storing, securing, distributing, and documenting supplies. 3. Allocating equipment. 4. Obtaining personnel to perform supply functions. B. The minimum information required by JUWTF to perform their supply responsibilities are: 1. Present needs of the VDP. 2. Equipment on hand. 3. Estimated future needs of the VDP. 4. Priorities. This and other information is submitted weekly by the OB to the JUWTF. Emergency requests are submitted anytime. Levels of supply may be imposed as a control measure but I don't feel this is either practical or feasible for this type of operation.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 239 VI. Receipt Air delivery is the only practical method available to the JUWTF for providing logistical support to the VDP. All types of cargo aircraft are utilized with the bulk of supplies transported by civilian contracted C-46 and C-52 aircraft. The C-47 of the air commando unit assisted delivery on occasion (Figure 82). Radio is used to alert and inform the OB of impending deliveries. Messages include the tonnage, type(s) of equipment, number of passengers, etc. As a back-up to communications, we found it wise to have the aircraft circle the OB prior to landing, to insure we were available for the delivery. The uncertainties of weather, aircraft availability, other priority considerations, and the lag in communications made this practice necessary for the efficient receipt of supplies. Helicopters and army aircraft can land adjacent to the OB where we had prepared an airstrip; and air dropped supplies could be dropped and easily retrieved on the DZ's (fields) contiguous to the OB if required (Figure 83). Once the VDP became established, we averaged nearly one aircraft a day of air landed supplies at the Ban Methout airport (10 kilometers from Buon Enao (OB)). Supplies are unloaded from the aircraft directly onto trucks for transport to the OB. Laborers, a security force, and a representative from the logistics section, accompany all supply movements.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON FIG 47. (BELOW) LIGHT AIRCRAFT LZ UNDER CONSTRUCTION

240

FIG 82. (ABOVE) C-46 AIRCRAFT DELIVERING SUPPLIES TO OPERATIONAL AREA

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 241 As a general rule, supplies are not unpacked or uncrated until they are ready to be issued. This reduces storage and maintenance requirements. It is rare, however, when equipment is retained for more than several days without being issued, for we requisitioned based on the principle of immediate needs. VII. Issue Supplies are issued based upon the priorities established by the operations section. Basic items of clothing and equipment are issued as outlined in Chapter Eight (The Strike Force). Supplies are receipted for by the recipients and serial numbered items are recorded and retained on file (Figure 84). VIII. Accountability Formal accountability for supplies is dropped once it is issued. Receipts and records are maintained primarily to determine where and to whom issues have been made. This is extremely important with respect to weapons. Weapons captured from the VC were sometimes those which they had previously captured from us. The records would indicate where the weapon was captured and this furthered our intelligence effort. Equipment repair is not often considered feasible because of the expense involved. Most of this equipment is obsolete, therefore spare parts are next to impossible to obtain; very often spare parts cost more than the line item itself. On the other hand, vehicle spare parts are vital if

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 242 the vehicles are to be kept operational. To assist, we cannibalized those items that could not be repaired, and established a small spare-parts supply. IX. Requisitioning The process of determining supply requirements is strictly guesswork at the outset of the program. Thereafter, it is determined almost completely by experience factors. Pre-determined 'days of supply' for either individuals or operational units, cannot be anticipated. Ammunition and weapons are the supplies of primary concern as nearly all other supplies are locally procured. This is not to convey that all initial requisitions are met, and that the VDP operates without shortages throughout the operation, because of local procurement. Weapons and ammunition are two items which the VDP is completely dependent upon the JUWTF to supply; and without this support the VDP halts. Whatever requisition system is installed, it should be simple in procedure and rapid in fulfillment. The submission of long written justifications through channels only adds to the logistical burden. The JUWTF provided our program with the best and most responsive logistic support I have ever witnessed. No, the system didn't conform to army regulations. We simply asked for what we needed and it was provided without question. Followup paperwork with the justification and accountability therein, was all that was required. This method did not detract from our supply economy or our accountability system, but enhanced it.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON

243

FIG 84. ISSUING SUPPLIES FROM THE LOGISTICAL COMPOUND

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 244 X. Procurement Local procurement is accomplished whenever practical. This is an effective method for reducing transportation burdens and supply transactions. Funds need to be provided the team and of course where funds are involved, trust and integrity must exist. If trust doesn't exist to the extent of unhesitatingly providing funds, then the program is defeated from the start. I found that most members of the CT contributed their personal funds to support the VDP on a voluntary basis. A. The following is a partial list of supplies which are procured locally. 1. Food (rice is the largest item). 2. Fuels (gasoline, kerosene, oil, coal and wood). 3. Construction materials (lumber, bamboo, straw, tin and cement). 4. Tools (shovels, picks, hammers, axes, etc.). 5. Furniture (beds, tables, desks, etc.). 6. Office supplies. 7. Miscellaneous (rope, clocks, materials, lamps, etc.). B. There are certain guidelines which are followed when procuring supplies locally. These are: 1. Prices are consistent with the local economy. 2. Payment is prompt.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 245 3. Supplies in short demand are not procured in large quantities, thus alienating the people. C. The bulk of military equipment is received from the JUWTF. The following listing indicates the magnitude a VDP can reach; and the logistical burdens that accompany this program. Supplies received Jan-Jul 1962 Item Quantity Item Quantity Carbine 1060 Swedish K SMG 800 Schmeisser SMG 250 Madsen SMG 1040 Sten SMG 62 Springfield '03 1950 Luger, pistol 25 P-38 pistol 15 Browning pistol 25 LMG 12 BAR 48 Mortar, 60mm 8 Shotguns 12 PRC-10 radio 18 PRC-6 radio 8 RT-20 radio 12 Wire, WD1 16 rolls Batteries, radio 8 cases Batteries, flashlight 6 cases Telephones, EE-8 8 Telephones, sound power 12 Batteries, 6 volt 30 Camera, Polaroid 2 Camera, 35mm 6

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON Film 250 rolls Radio, Sony Binoculars 10 Soap, bar Knives, sheath 30 Parachute canopy (salv) Wire, chicken 150 rolls Truck, ton Truck, carry-all 2 Rice Ammunition 308 cases 9mm 30 cal '03 35 cases 30 cal link Carbine 35 cases Mortar, HE Mortar, WP 72 cases Grenades Crimp cartridge 62 cases Flares Pyrotechnics 275 pounds Demolitions Shotgun shells 500 Poncho Canteen 25 Compasses Water cans 30 Gas cans Spouts, gas 48 cases Medical supplies Cleaning material 14 cases Clothing Tennis shoes 640 Pistol belts Refrigerator 2 Generator, gas Vegetable seeds 75 Pistol holsters

246 95 1 ton 20 3 10 tons 522 cases 201 cases 18 cases 11 cases 76 cases 12 cases 750 65 14 16 cases 2200 pairs 2 15 cases 10

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 247 Parachutes 75 rolls Wire, barbed 5 Truck, 2 ton 2 Truck, civilian 2 Truck, psyop-sound 3 ton Miscellaneous It is necessary that fast moving combat essentials, such as ammunition, batteries, and medical supplies, come from an established logistics base. Expenditures during operations are replenished as quickly as possible using the simplest form of request. XI. Stockage The stockage of supplies depends on facilities, security, the tactical situation, and the speed with which the OB is resupplied. Because of the excellent means in which we were resupplied, we established a 3 day stockage objective with the exception of ammunition which was 7 days. Pre-packaging and cache sites are not considered to be appropriate for the VDP. We prepositioned a limited amount of ammunition at selected villages, and sub-OB's maintained limited amounts of selected supplies over and above their immediate needs. XII. Accompanying Supplies For the VDP this term denotes supplies which accompany the CT into the operational area. The items selected are at the discretion of the Team Commander, based upon his knowledge of his forthcoming mission. The items listed are those which we found necessary. individual weapon boots watches tennis shoes crystals compasses

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 248 maps personal hygiene items rucksacks survival kits team medicines one time pads AN-GRC-109 (2) civilian clothing uniforms demolition kit carpentry kit (2) medical kit (2) dental kit (2) In our particular operation, we operated in civilian clothing and therefore did not require fatigues or other military uniforms. The specifics of the type dress for American personnel is discussed fully in Chapter Twenty-one (U.S. Personnel). XIII. Transportation Transportation support requires the movement of personnel and supplies by all modes of transport. The primary means available are air and motor. Coolies, animals and carts are secondary means. Movement of troops within the operating area is the responsibility of the operations section. Movement of personnel outside the operations area is the responsibility of the admin section or the medical section (evacuation). The remainder of this chapter is devoted to transport for the movement of supplies, which is the responsibility of the logistic section. The logistic section maintains and controls the dispatch of all motor vehicles assigned to the VDP. Operations have top priority for this transportation with close coordination between the logistic and operating sections required. This will economize and achieve the maximum support from the transportation available. The following procedures were generally established.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 249 A. The logistic section is assigned one 2 ton truck, for which it has priority. The Team Commander is assigned one jeep with a radio. All other transport is pooled with requests made to the logistic section as far in advance as possible. Emergency actions take priority over all requests. B. Daily tasks which require transportation are: 1. Coordination with other agencies. 2. Movement of refugees. 3. Transport of mobile inspection teams (FIT). 4. Transport of supplies. 5. Movement of the strike force. 6. Administrative details. 7. Return trainees to villages. 8. For use in conjunction with the labor force. 9. Psychological operations. C. Unexpected and unpredicted events will usually occur to upset the planned use of transportation, and contingency plans must be prepared and implemented to accomplish routine tasks.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 250 XIV. Air-resupply The ideal manner of delivering most supplies to outlying areas, patrols, or sub-OB's is by helicopter. Emergency air-resupply includes the use of fixed wing aircraft for supply drops; either free-fall or parachuted. We found the low-level free-fall drops or poncho drops the most successful for drops into villages. Parachute deliveries often landed outside the confines of the designated DZ's, which were naturally small. A technique we employed to reduce damage was to attempt to have free-fall drops land on the roofs of the longhouses. Made of bamboo and straw, they are springy and they cushioned the fall of the equipment. I witnessed cases of C rations, ammo, and grenades bounce from these roofs to the ground with no damage to either the supplies or the longhouses. Another important aspect of air-resupply is the proper marking of the designated village or DZ. The terrain and vegetation and similarity of all villages makes navigation very difficult. The aircraft is usually directly overhead before the DZ can be spotted. X. Conclusion Without effective logistical support and logistics management, the Team Commander cannot conduct a successful VDP. The operating level of supplies must be maintained to sustain required operations and functions of the VDP. Local procurement is integrated into the supply system to make it responsive and quick reacting to all situations. The peculiarities of this type

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 251 program are offset and countered through the maximum and efficient utilization of all supplies and equipment. This includes the rigid establishment of priorities and controls of critical items. Sophisticated supplies and equipment are not required for VD. Individual maintenance of weapons, control of ammunition, etc., as well as supply conservation make the available equipment more than adequate. Supplies must be issued if they are available for issue. To retain them for future expectations when shortages exist at the village level, will reduce the capabilities and effectiveness of the VDP.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 252 Chapter Thirteen Communications I. General The VDP communications system is simple in structure but demanding in its operation. The system must provide a reliable means for communicating with the command headquarters, JUWTF, and support the command and control functions of the OB. The general requirements are that communications equipment be reliable, durable, simple to install and operate, easy to maintain, and speedy in employment, as local tribesmen are the primary operators of the equipment. II. Factors in Planning A. Assigned frequencies cannot be selected at random, They must be tested to insure that they are suitable for the area and free of interference from other communications in the region. It is wise to adopt alternate frequencies to insure a more reliable system. B. Cutting-tapping wires are VC countermeasures easily accomplished in insecure areas. This, however, is not considered a shortcoming of the VDP, as wire communications is not a primary means. VC monitoring and jamming of radio transmissions is usually remote in this situation. However, these factors should be considered in the planning stages. C. Radio communications is the primary and most secure means of communications for the VDP.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 253 D. Wire can be effective when used in secure (white) areas to include the OB. E. Mobile communications (vehicle mounted) are required to add flexibility to the system. Sufficient radios are not available for installation at all desired locations (villages). Mobile radios are dispatched quickly to areas of interest and communications are instantaneously established for as long as required. F. The SF is equipped with a means of communications (radio) when on tactical operations. G. Terrain restrictions are an important consideration. H. There is a strong requirement to train communicators. I. Maintenance. III. Limiting Factors A. Atmospheric conditions. B. Vegetation. C. Amount and type of equipment available. D. Number of trained personnel. E. Timeliness of radio traffic. F. Distance between radio sites. IV. Systems A. Command System

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 254 The command net establishes communications from the JUWTF (Saigon), to the various operational areas. Buon Enao was one of these stations and was located 250 kilometers north of Saigon. The JUWTF has a complete inventory of communications equipment which can net with the AN-GRC-109 located at the OB. Messages are transmitted in morse code (keying) and are encrypted for security reasons (one time pad). Radio contacts are made on a scheduled basis. The SOI programs at least one contact daily. We found it quite necessary to increase this to three contacts daily (0800-1500-2000) as the VDP developed. Critical and emergency information is transmitted any time. The command Net Control Station (NCS) maintains a continuous radio watch for this purpose. During critical periods it is also SOP for the OB to maintain a continuous watch until the crisis is over. A supplement to the command system is provided by MAAG. They agreed to receive and transmit VDP traffic through their secure teletype and single side band communications equipment. The messenger system is used between MAAG headquarters and the OB. This assistance speeds our communications effort which contributes heavily to the over-all program. B. Control System Communications emanate from the OB for control, direction, and coordination of the VDP. The control net consists of a series of voice radios (RT-20) located at selected villages, sub-OB's and other interested agencies (Figure 85). Whenever possible alternate-supplementary electrical

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 255 means of communications are established. The sub-OB's have the AN-GRC-109 installed; the provincial headquarters have the telephone. Mobile communications is an integral part of the system. Jeep mounted radios (RT-20) are dispatched with speed to areas of concern and thus increase the capability to communicate throughout the entire area. It acts as a forward CP or a relay station and is employed to fill-in void areas. The voice radios are manned on a24 hour basis by trained Montagnards. The NCS (OB) initiates communications checks on an unscheduled basis. Other members of the net initiate calls only when their traffic is urgent. (Each radio in the net can communicate with the other as well as monitor all traffic within range limitations). This provides speed and ease for relaying information to and from distant stations as the VDP expands (Figure 85). C. Operations System It is desirable to equip all patrols with light-weight radios which can net with the village radio (RT-20). Several small nets, which are capable of communicating 2-3 kilometers with the RT-20, were available for testing purposes. However, the VDP could never obtain sufficient radios to employ this system effectively. We were compelled to utilize the PRC-6 and PRC-10 radios for this purpose, which proved to be completely unsatisfactory.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON FIG 85. COMMUNICATIONS COMMAND & CONTROL DIAGRAM

256

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 257 D. Security System Security communications, primarily wire, is established within the OB and sub-OB' s. Communications wire is strung between guard posts, guard house, and CP. Either the EE-8 or sound powered telephones are used to transmit and receive. Wire is often used when listening posts are established outside the confines of the OB, as are the PRC-6 and PRC-10 radio. V. Types of Equipment In addition to the AN-GRC-109, communications equipment organic to the infantry company is usually available for the VDP. This includes the PRC-6, PRC-10, and the AN-GRC-9 radios. A. We found the PRC-6 to be completely ineffective for jungle operations. It could be employed for internal security of the OB, a patrol base, or an ambush site, providing there was a minimum of distance and vegetation between radios. B. The PRC-10 is effective at times but it is completely unreliable for jungle operations. It was successfully employed, however, from a stationary site utilizing the jungle antenna. Even then, the effective range varied from 1 kilometer to the south, to 10 kilometers to the north of Buon Enao. Both the PRC-6 and the PRC-10 proved to be a logistical burden because of the short life of the batteries.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 258 C. The AN-GRC-109 proved to be highly reliable and effective. Atmospheric conditions presented some problems during the period 2300-0600 hours but none which were considered insurmountable. Power to operate the transmitter is provided either by the hand cranked generator (a component) or the gas driven generator, which is utilized for electrical power. The latter is much more efficient and is employed fully. It is advisable that necessary spare parts and spare components be on hand to reduce the loss of contact with the command headquarters due to unserviceable equipment. D. The RT-20 is a USOM appropriated voice radio, which operates on a set frequency. Its electrical source is a 6 volt wet cell battery. Batteries need to be recharged on a scheduled basis, which through keeping statistics, was [determined to be] every 5 days for the OB and every 17 days for the villages. The amount of transmission governs this schedule. This is one of the reasons for limiting the villagers to emergency transmissions. A number of spare batteries are retained at the OB and a direct exchange transpires when replacement becomes due. The dead batteries are returned to the OB and recharged from the gas driven generator. Recharging is accomplished during the normal operating hours of the generator, to reduce the amount of operational wear placed on this vital piece of equipment. A wind generator was installed with hopes it might assist us in this effort, but we couldn't harness enough wind to generate an appreciable amount of power.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 259 The radio itself has an effective range of 25-40 kilometers with a fixed outdoor antenna. It has a simple push to talk button on the transmitter, and the receiver has a loudspeaker with adjustable volume controls. The set also has a self-destruction button which is pushed in the event capture is imminent. (I was told that pushing the button short circuits the system which causes the internal parts to disintegrate). The entire net is operated by trained Rhade with stations located in strategically, well defended villages. A shortage of these radios exists and adjustments in their location is required as the VDP expands. VI. Antenna System The standard aerial for the infantry radio sets is not sufficient to radiate waves for any appreciable distance. It is therefore necessary to construct antennas to increase the communications capability. Ground waves are often screened by vegetation and it is therefore required to radiate sky waves and/or to locate antennas at such heights, so that waves are emitted over the jungle canopies. The OB communications complex has a series of varied antennas. In addition to the 20 foot staff antenna, which is a component of the RT-20, and the jungle antenna, utilized for the infantry sets, the antenna farm had a 52 foot long-wire (PF 8858), a 71 foot vertical slant, and a 50 foot dipole antenna, to be used in conjunction with the AN-GRC-109.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 260 The selection of proper antennas is essential for maximum communications. Of equal importance, is the sites selected to include the clearance of vegetation, trees and other obstructions. Clumps of bamboo should be avoided. VII. Communications Personnel Seldom are there sufficient qualified communicators for any program. This is also true for the VDP, despite the fact that the two U.S. communicators were well trained and proficient in their duties. Had not the operations sergeant, demolition specialist and weapons specialist been cross-trained and proficient in sending and receiving (a minimum of 12 words per minute), we would have been subjected to many problems. All members of the CT were capable of encrypting and deciphering messages, and were used in this effort. It is strongly urged that priority of training be given to this aspect in preparation for commitment. In addition to being well qualified radiomen, the communications specialists must be proficient at erecting antennas and need a knowledge of basic electricity. A. Indigenous personnel must be trained as communicators if the communications program is to succeed. Instruction on the infantry radios is presented to selected SF personnel; while operating instructions, maintenance (care and cleaning), transmission procedures and security of the RT-20 are presented to the village communicators. B. Operation of the AN-GRC-109 is the responsibility of the U.S. personnel who are well qualified in its operation.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 261 C. The RT-20 is the workhorse of the VDP control system. Normally located at villages on or near the periphery of secured territory, it is quite vulnerable and subject to VC capture. It is important that stress be placed upon the security of this equipment. The Rhade, who become excellent communicators, know the value of protecting and caring for their equipment. They also know the importance of providing information (Figure 86). When a village is selected to receive a radio, this is considered a high honor. Several of the villagers are brought to the OB to receive about eight hours training. They are then accompanied by a U.S. communicator to their village, where the radio is installed. The village chief is given a lecture on the importance of safeguarding this equipment and they all participate in a small ceremony to add emphasis to the occasion. The following account better describes the attitude of these villagers. Attack on Buon Tong Sing At 222330 June 1962 the OB was informed by Buon Tong Sing that they were under a VC attack. They related that automatic weapons fire was pouring into the village from three sides. About 45 minutes later, at 230017 hours, radio contact with Buon Tong Sing was lost. Immediately, another station located at Buon Drong Buk, reported they could still hear gun fire in the direction of Buon Tong Sing. At 230246 hours Buon Tong Sing again entered the net and informed the OB that the VC attack had been repelled.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON

262

FIG 86. RHADE COMMUNICATOR

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON FIG. 87. BUON TANG SING SKETCH MAP

263

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 264 Investigation revealed that at approximately 222330 June, 30-40 VC approached Buon Tong Sing from the south and saturated the village with automatic fire from three sides (points 1, 2 and 3). Then at 230005 the VC attacked the village from the south forcing the Village Defenders to withdraw from their primary positions (Line A) to a line farther back (Line B). It was then that the radio operator, fearing his radio would be captured, withdrew to Point Z, which he felt was a more secure location and also one from which he could handily disappear into the jungle with his equipment if the VC succeeded in overrunning the village. Thus the lull in communications. The VC never did penetrate past the second line of resistance and at 230230 hours the radio operator returned to his location, hooked up his radio, and again entered the net (Figure 87). The fact that the village had defeated the VC and inflicted quite a few casualties on them, was rewarding. However, the actions of the radio operator was felt to be a more significant measure of the prospects for the VDP to succeed. VIII. Other Means of Communications A. Air Delivered Fixed wing, helicopters and commercial air are utilized for the delivery of messages. Commercial air is an excellent means between Saigon and Ban Methout while fixed wing and helicopters are used to air drop or air land messages into the operational areas. Air is an ideal method when messages are lengthy, radio contact has been lost, or messages have a low priority

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 265 of urgency. B. Visual Signals 1. Air-ground. Panel sets, colored cloths, log and rock formations, etc., are excellent means by which information can be passed to in-flight aircraft. Smoke, flares, and other pyrotechnics are also good signaling devices when there is no radio contact. Since most of VD combat air support is predicated upon hitting the VC from the time he attacks a village to the time he withdraws, the following technique is employed quite extensively. A frame, in the shape of an arrow, is constructed of logs and mounted on a rotating pinnacle. The frame is filled with logs, straw, brush and other flammable materials. After the VC complete their attack and withdraw (forcedly or on their own accord), the villagers point the arrow in the direction of the VC retreat. Air support is then able to more readily follow the VC route and hopefully detect them. If this occurs during the hours of darkness the arrow is lit so that it can easily be seen from the air. Small fires are lit at each corner of the village perimeter to assist the flare-ships and armed aircraft in identifying the village in need Of assistance. During darkness C-47 flare-ships can be summoned to the village to drop 1,000,000 candle power flares to light up the battlefield. This exposes the VC and subjects them to air attacks as well as ground fires. 2. Ground

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 266 In addition to the normal pyrotechnic devices there are other visual methods which are successfully employed. A water buffalo tied to a fence post might indicate the village is in trouble; a woman in ceremonial dress might indicate the VC are close by; or other prearranged signals. 3. Audible signals. Whistles, drums, gongs, bird calls and other noises are easily incorporated into the signaling system. 4. Messenger. Messenger is the primary means of communications between villages. Pre-selected routes are concealed and provide speed for relaying and reporting information. Dead letter drops, live drops, etc., are incorporated into the messenger system. 5. Homing devices. Electrical devices, such as the URC-4 or URC-11, are utilized to direct aircraft into obscured or restrictive areas. IX. Conclusion The VDP makes maximum utilization of all means of communications due to the limitations the terrain imposes on radio traffic. Communications personnel are well trained and made to realize the importance of communications equipment. Principles of communications must be equally applied to VD as for any other tactical operation.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 267 Chapter Fourteen Intelligence I. General The VC penetrate and spread themselves throughout the Montagnard villages, particularly those conveniently located, to obtain support. From within, they clandestinely collect intelligence, gather support, assist VC operations and even control village activities. It is because of their success in this endeavor, that the most important consideration for developing the VDP intelligence effort, is that of detecting who the VC and their supporters are. Once the VC organization is penetrated with agents and compromised by informers, they lose much of their effectiveness. This, however, requires a large number of determined and resourceful people to be organized and trained for employment. In addition, the SF is pressed to continuously patrol and maintain surveillance over suspected persons and places, to assist in eliminating the threat of VC build-ups. Detailed information of the VC strength, location(s), arms and equipment also depresses VC successes. Although timely, accurate intelligence is strived for, this is difficult to obtain. The VDP relies on local combat intelligence of the lowest order, but even this is effective through proper training and constant emphasis on its worth and value. Rewards and other types of incentives help put this idea across, but by no means are the people led to believe that they must or will be rewarded for reporting intelligence. Intelligence must be voluntarily contributed by the masses to be effective.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 268 II. Intelligence Personnel It is extremely essential that the entire populace practice intelligence collection including the armed defender, the children in the villages, the women in the market places, and the farmers in the fields. These are the far flung eyes and ears of the VDP intelligence effort and they are encouraged to report all that they see or hear. It is equally important that specialists be trained in all fields of intelligence work to carry on the more refined aspects of intelligence. As you recall, the intelligence section is a part of the SF organization. It is designed to carry out tasks related to intelligence and counter-intelligence activities. These personnel, for the most part, are based at the OB (Figure 88). A. The principal duties of specialist personnel are: 1. Security. As discussed in Chapter Seven, (The OB), this group is responsible for the security of the OB to include manning the guard and sentry posts. The combination of physical security plus an effective pass system, is the means by which the OB reduces its vulnerability to VC access and attacks. The primary task of this security force is to provide adequate warning by detecting the VC and sounding the alarm in sufficient time to permit the SF to occupy their defensive positions. Armed personnel are required to sleep with their weapons, and key installations are manned 24 hours a day. Therefore, defensive positions are taken up almost immediately. The se-

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 269 curity force becomes part of the defense and operates under the command of the SF commander when he assumes the defense. 2. Interrogation Group Interrogators are selected from the most intelligent, best trained, and dedicated Rhade. Their principal duty is to interrogate prisoners of war (POW's), VC suspects, agents and informers. They do not become involved with interrogations associated with combat activities i.e., patrol debriefings, captured VC documents, VC dead, etc. This is accomplished by the debriefing group and is explained later. The interrogation section functions best when it is commanded by a Rhade who can communicate fluently with the Team Commander (U.S.), which is usually in English. This enables the interrogation group to pass on important information to the Team Commander quickly and accurately so that it may be acted upon without delay. The chief of the debriefing group also speaks English. This permits these three people to meet daily and sum up all aspects of the intelligence effort in a conversant manner, thus expediting the flow of information. Interrogators are taught the importance of extracting information from POW's quickly so that it will be current intelligence. Indigenous personnel are often more successful in obtaining information from prisoners than foreign advisors, as they have a better understanding of the culture and what type of interrogation techniques will elicit a rapid and accurate response (Figure 89).

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON FIG 88. INTELLIGENCE SECTION ORGANIZATION

270

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON FIG 90. (BELOW) CAPTURED VC EQUIPMENT

271

FIG 89. (ABOVE) INTERROGATING VC CAPTIVE

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 272 3. Debriefing Group Debriefers work with friendly sources of information i.e., patrols, escaped prisoners, informers and others. Patrols are probably the most lucrative source of information if the debriefer is well enough trained to recognize intelligence and is capable of extracting this information from those who think it to be insignificant. He must be able to analyze this information and maintain the necessary journals and situation maps to keep the intelligence effort updated. Captured documents and equipment are also analyzed by the debriefing group except when they are obtained from a captured VC; then they accompany the POW to the interrogation group. 4. POW Group These personnel are trained to perform the required functions of guarding prisoners, working them, reindoctrinating them through classes and lectures, and caring for their survival (rations and quarters). 5. Refugee Group Refugees are excellent sources of information. Usually they have only recently had contact with the VC and have left behind many relatives and friends who were forced to join the VC. It is through these people that appeals to the VC can be made via propaganda. Personnel assigned to work with refugees must know how to care for their needs, how to conduct psychological operations with these dejected and desperate people, and how to gain intelligence from them.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 273 III. Sources Intelligence sources are no different than those available for any type of operation. Patrols, captured documents, and others have already been mentioned (Figure 90). In addition, the following sources must be considered. A. Indigenous Armed Forces (ARVN) The PSO maintains close liaison with ARVN forces for the exchange of intelligence information. The Team Commander accomplishes the same coordination and liaison with MAAG. It is necessary to have the VDP included on the distribution list of Intelligence Summaries (ISUMS) and other such reports. Although this information is usually provided too late to be effectively acted upon, the information is useful for determining VC trends and locations. B. Local Police The police force of a foreign country usually have far more reaching military intelligence functions than do the police forces of the United States; therefore, they are excellent intelligence sources. Through surveillance and the act of performing their normal duties they can easily detect unusual activities taking place in a community. They assist the VDP by maintaining close watch over those establishments which have goods such as medicines, tinned foods, delicate tools, explosives and gunpowder, etc., which the VC need badly and can't acquire through other means and sources. Excessive purchase of these items is of due concern to the VDP. I recall one instance in which we apprehended a VC supplier with 30,000 piasters on his person. He was ne-

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 274 gotiating the purchase of a large number of bicycles for the VC. We attempted to spring a trap by having the agent continue with his plan, but he was more fearful of what the VC would do to his family, than what we would do to him, so that he wouldn't cooperate with us. C. Visual Air Reconnaissance-Aerial Photography This source is indeed a valuable contribution to any intelligence collection effort. In the VDP, however, it loses much of its real value until the VC have been forced to mass; or they have been reported to be conducting an attack. Otherwise aerial photos and observation present difficulties in detecting the VC from friendly villagers who are dressed and appear identical to the VC. I recall one instance, while on patrol, that we detected friendly T-28 aircraft and continued with our movement. The aircraft flew overhead and sighted our forces of irregulars, who were dressed similar to the VC, and proceeded to go into their attack pattern. It was fortunate that the pilots detected a couple of white-skinned Americans, particularly one with red hair, and called off their strike before their ordnance was dropped. We made it standard practice thereafter to take cover whenever any aircraft flew overhead unless they were in direct support of our mission and knew of our presence. IV. Counterintelligence The one aspect of counterintelligence I wish to mention is the detection of VC informers. It wasn't our policy to apprehend all VC informers as soon as they became known or identified. There were those whom we thought would be of more value if they were misled into reporting

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 275 false information. Such a situation existed when a Lambretta taxi driver and a roadside merchant established themselves as being friendly to the VDP. With our permission, they stationed themselves along the road that led into the OB. Their position was such that they could observe movement to and from the OB along this road. Also, many of the villagers did business with the merchant or rode the Lambretta into town. We stationed a trained agent (who was rotated frequently) at the stand to observe and listen for the exchange of information as well as to contribute false information or negligible truths in answer to many of their questions and feelers for information. In addition, we dispatched false convoys of troops, vehicles and supplies along this road while the operational commitments were dispatched through rear exits. I know this information reached the VC and probably misled him, for the taxi driver was passing the information he observed to a photographer whom we were also employing as an agent (he turned out to be a double agent). When the usefulness of this set-up became outlived we gave the Sret, who was in on the operation, the word to break up the system without revealing that the VDP had any knowledge or association with the apprehension. V. Conclusion At the operating level the willingness of the local population to cooperate with the VDP is relied upon for the obtainment of timely intelligence information. Intelligence is readily available from other sources such as tactical reconnaissance and interrogation of POW's but this is not as timely as that which is obtained from the villager. All information must be checked and investi-

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 276 gated regardless how insignificant it may seem. Operations must be planned and conducted to take advantage of reported intelligence or the effort is a waste.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 277 Chapter Fifteen The Medical Program I. General The medical program is initiated by the Special Forces detachment at the outset of the VDP. This is the inroad which informs the people that they are to receive assistance. It is the most effective and gratifying of all civic action programs. Psychologically, it has no equal unless it be the defeat of the VC and the restoration of peace. The United States Operational Mission (USOM) was not operational in the VDP at the time the medical program for the Montagnards was established. For this reason, USOM, which is now supporting and directing the medical programs in Vietnam (rural health medical program), by which Special Forces medical programs are governed, is not considered in this report. It is recognized that this medical program is devoted to the people of remote and inaccessible areas, and where medical practice is limited to witchdoctors, sorcerers, the spirits, and household first-aid. Missionaries and French landowners did provide a degree of qualified medical services, but the percentage of Montagnards who received this treatment is too minute to be significant. The medical program is developed based upon the needs of the people. The needs of the people is determined by their socio-economic habits. This is the starting point in introducing a medical program to an underdeveloped area.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 278 II. Contributing Factors A. Housing The longhouses of the Montagnards are not built close together, nor in a crowded environment, as are most of the Vietnamese dwellings. However, their custom of clannish living and the fact that many families live under one roof has a definite bearing on the spreading of disease. The longhouses are built of straw and bamboo, and provide excellent harboring for mice, rats, bats, mites, other insects and rodents. These houses are built on stilts approximately four feet off the ground which keeps dampness, crawling insects and creatures from the dwellings. By placing metal strips (tin cans) around the stilts, rats and mice are prevented from crawling up the stilts into the dwellings. A disadvantage of houses on stilts and off the ground is that pigs, goats, cattle and other livestock conveniently pen themselves under the houses to sleep at night or to get away from the hot sun during the day. The dung and other characteristics of the animals provide an excellent breeding place for germs and create unhealthy and unsanitary conditions. B. Agriculture and Diet Rice is the most important commodity and the basic food for these people. Corn, sugar cane, hot peppers, pork, chicken, dried fish and tropical fruit comprise the remainder of their diet. This is supplemented with wildlife and jungle vegetation. C. Transportation

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 279 Most travel is accomplished by foot although a few of the Montagnards do own bicycles. Animal drawn carts are seldom available and it is extremely rare for a village to possess some type of motor transport. Buses and pedicabs travel only on the main roads and then at infrequent intervals. This creates a delay in reporting sickness or summoning help. D. Animals Tigers, bears, leopards, and boars constitute a hazard but the number of Montagnards attacked or injured by animals is negligible, and does not affect the medical program to any significant degree. E. Snakes The abundance of poisonous snakes in the area might cause a problem. There are many species, of which the cobra and viper are the most dangerous. Boa constrictors and pythons are also found in the area, but most snakes will not attack unless provoked or frightened. F. Leeches Leeches are abundant with the land leech and the aquatic leech the most common. The land leech is prevalent throughout the high plateau while the aquatic leech is found near all streams, ponds and lakes. G. Mosquitoes There are many varieties of mosquitoes located in the area. The malaria carriers are the ones which create the more serious medical problems.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 280 H. Flies House-flies, deer-flies and horseflies are year-round pests, but are more noticeable and abundant during the dry summer season than the monsoon season. I. Other Sand-flies, lice, fleas, ticks, mites, spiders, scorpions, ants, termites, bedbugs and cockroaches are also in abundance throughout the area and may be medically significant if not properly contained or controlled. J. Water The primary, and usually only source of water, is the fast running mountain streams. They normally contain sufficient water the year-round and are located rather conveniently to the village, since a water source is a deciding factor in the establishment of a village. During the monsoon season, however, the heavy rains make the streams muddy and murky and generally unsuitable for drinking. During this period, the villagers catch the rainwater in bamboo troughs which run-off into barrels. Wells are not commonly found in Montagnard villages, and providing one is an excellent civic action program to undertake. K. Sanitation Latrines are practically non-existent while garbage disposal simply consists of the waste being devoured by the animals and livestock. Sanitation measures provide a good opportunity for useful and necessary civic action programs to be initiated.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 281 III. Montagnard Sicknesses Nearly all of the common illnesses and diseases found in this area are contracted by the Montagnards. The common cold, malaria, and skin diseases seem to be the most predominant while venereal disease is surprisingly rare. The following medical report for the month of April 1962 best illustrates this comparison. A. Medical Report 1. Total number of outpatients treated at Buon Enao. 1382 2. Total number of bed patients treated at Buon Enao. 51 3. Total number of patients treated by village medics. 980 4. Total number of patients treated by roving medic. 175 5. Types of diseases treated. (A) Respiratory (1) Common cold 335 (7) Meningitis 1 (2) Cough 89 (8) Pneumonia 4 (3) Throat infection 37 (9) TB 5 (4) Influenza 16 (10) Allergies 3 (5) Tonsillitis 2 (11) Sinusitis 1 (6) Bronchitis 8 (12) Pleurisy 1 (B) Eye, ear and nose

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON (1) Minor eye irritation and infection 35 (2) Minor ear irritation and infection 6 (3) Otitic media, external 4 (4) Ear injury 1 (5) Minor nose infection 1 (C) Gastro intestinal (1) Diarrhea, plain 137 (5) Stomach ulcers (2) Constipation 3 (6) Abdominal distension (3) Dysenteries 32 (7) Appendicitis (4) Stomach disorders 5 (D) Conite urinary (1) Urethritis 1 (2) Female disorders 5 (3) Undetermined 8 (E) Venereal disease Syphillis, secondary 1 (F) Dermatologic conditions (1) Rashes 21 (5) Collulitis (2) Boils 17 (6) Allergies

282

1 18 1

1 5

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON (3) Fungi 10 (7) Pistula 1 (4) Itch 9 (8) Undetermined 11 (G) Injuries (1) Minor cuts and bruises 55 (2) Secondary wound infections 29 (3) Sprains 6 (7) Lacerations, severe 5 (4) Fractures 5 (8) Hernia 1 (5) Strains 3 (9) Snake bite 1 (6) Burns 1 (10) Concussion 1 (H) Surgery and special treatment (1) Minor surgery 10 (5) Removal of cobareous cyst 1 (2) Major surgery (bullet wounds) 4 (3) Casting 1 (6) Debridement 3 (4) Urethral catheterization 2 (7) Secondary wound closure 1 (I) Dental (1) Toothaches and infections12 (2) Abcess 1 (3) Tooth extractions 22 (J) Other infectious diseases

283

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 284 (1) Malaria 81 (4) Leprosy 3 (2) Measles 35 (5) Tetanus 1 (3) Chicken pox 13 (6) Hepatitis 1 (K) Metabolic deficiencies (1) Vitamin deficiencies,unspecified 23 (2) Pellagra 1 (3) Beri-beri 8 (L) Worm infections (1) Tape 11 (2) Unspecified 20 (M) Pediatric 1 (N) Deliveries 3 (O) Miscellaneous (1) Arthritis 16 (6) Psychiatric 2 (2) Common aches and pains47 (3) Fever, undetermined 14 (7) Liver abcess 1 (4) Diseases, undetermined 20 (8) Tumor 1 (5) Hemorrhoids 1 (9) Anemia 5 B. The above report, as compiled by the Special Forces medic and/or qualified doctors, was submitted as part of our monthly report to higher headquarters. This provided assistance in de-

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 285 termining the type of medicines and the quantities required to conduct the VDP medical program. IV. Special Forces Medic If the term 'overworked' is to be applied to the VDP it would most certainly have to be connoted with the medic. He is an extensively well-trained individual who is called upon to perform the feats of an intern, a general practitioner, surgeon, and sanitary engineer. However, he is not a doctor and this fact is a guiding factor as to the extent of his practice under normal conditions. The degree of medical support and services rendered to the people is also controlled by Vietnamese laws, but the medic is morally obligated to assist and do whatever he feels is necessary for ailing people. This is particularly true for the SF and other armed fighters regardless of imposed restrictions, which were designed for peacetime operations (Figure 91). A. Duties The Special Forces medic advises the Team Commander on all medical and sanitation aspects of the VDP. The Team Commander makes the decisions and takes the responsibility for the actions of the medic. The primary duties of this individual are: 1. Provide medical support for the Special Forces detachment and other American personnel. 2. Provide medical support for indigenous paramilitary units. 3. Provide medical support for the indigenous population.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 286 4. Train Montagnards to perform medical duties. 5. Direct and supervise sanitation programs. 6. Provide other medical support as directed by the Team Commander. V. Medical Program This program is established to improve existing conditions. It is not established with the intent of duplicating American standards or practices. For this reason, the following limited categories of medical support are rendered to the VDP. A. Immunizations A wholesale immunization program is not feasible nor is the vaccine available. However, as contagious diseases are contracted, most certainly those of the epidemic type are combated by mass immunization. As medicines become available, immunizations begin with the administrative and SF sections and work down to the remainder of the population. B. Personal Hygiene Care of the body is simple enough to be taught and practiced by all the people. More diseases are contracted because of poor personal hygiene, than from any other single factor. Issuing soap definitely encourages personal hygiene. C. Preventive Medicine Health education is the most effective way of combating illness. The village medics are required, as part of their duties, to continually educate the villagers on preventive procedures.

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287

FIG 91. REMOVING BULLET FROM THIGH OF SF SOLDIER

FIG 92. RHADE VILLAGER ON SICK CALL

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 288 D. First Aid It is essential that every man who partakes in combat operations be familiar with the basic application of first aid. First aid eases pain, saves lives, and reduces severe casualties. The common sense methods of first aid (stop the bleeding, prevent shock, keep the patient comfortable) are taught all combatants, while specialized instruction is presented to medical personnel. E. Sanitation The villages are the prime areas of interest for improved sanitation. The construction and location of latrines, use of animal pens, stream separation (whereby drinking water is obtained upstream and bathing, washing clothes, and watering animals is carried on downstream), and garbage disposal are stressed. VI. Hospital Procedures Whether the medical facility is established in a well constructed building, under a tree, or any other place, specific procedures are established to efficiently conduct medical treatment. Sickcall is conducted at specified hours, which for the Montagnards is dawn until everyone has been seen by the medic. Emergencies are treated at any time. Once village medics are trained, then only cases referred by them are honored at the hospital (OB). A medical record is prepared for all patients who receive treatment. This is retained at the hospital for future reference. Patients who are admitted to the hospital are fed and cared for free of charge.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 289 The sick usually assemble outside the hospital where benches and an overhead cover is provided. When their turn comes they enter the waiting room where an attendant records their temperature and other necessary information on a standard form. From here the patient sees either the Special Forces medic or one of the indigenous medics, depending on the ailment. The Special Forces medic treats and diagnoses all cases which are beyond the capability of the indigenous medics. Minor cuts and bruises, burns, abrasions, redressings, etc., are the type of cases which are referred to the indigenous medics. This leaves the Special Forces medic free to carry on diagnosis and the more complicated treatment. Once the medical program is established it is not unusual to have 250 or more Montagnards for sick-call each day (Figure 92). VII. Village Medics The personnel selected to be village medics must be intelligent and industrious. The most suitable age is 16-20 years. Most of the males within this age group prefer to be fighters, therefore, the greatest number of medics are females. It is a full time job to perform the duties required of a village medic. They are, therefore, paid or compensated for their work. The VDP medical program is recognized by the Ministry of Health and village medics qualify as rural health workers for which they are eligible to receive wages from the GVN. However, this was not accomplished with the Montagnards during my tenure, and the VDP bore the responsibility of paying the medics 900 piasters per month.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 290 Village medics are visited at least monthly by medical advisory personnel from the OB. During this visit, their medical facility is inspected, medical records checked, and supplies distributed. Medical supplies are restricted to basic items which are prescribed by higher headquarters. These items are mainly for the suppression of aches and pains, control of skin diseases, infections, worms, and similar ailments. These medicines are usually the type which require no prescription and dosages are standardized. Any ailment which requires diagnosis is referred to the hospital. The village medic is also required to initiate a sanitation program for the village. The Village Chief has vowed to render his full support in this endeavor in return for being permitted to enter the VDP. Another requirement for training village medics is that they and their medicines be protected from the VC by the armed villagers. For this reason, village medics are usually trained in consonance with Village Defenders, to the extent feasible, and returned to their village with the defenders. It is also policy for a village medic to attend to the needs of neighboring villages who are in support of the VDP but don't as yet have a trained medic. VIII. Medical Training Program A. General The formal training program is a three weeks course of instruction which is usually conducted at the OB. Selected trainees receive additional training through OJT at the hospital, and

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 291 may be retained as permanent staff when required. The program of instruction is initially presented by the Special Forces medic, but like other training programs, a small cadre is trained to conduct subsequent courses. B. Course 1. Processing 4 hours 2. Anatomy and physiology 14 hours (A). Introduction 3 hours (B). The skeletal system 2 hours (C). The muscular system 1 hour (D). The circulatory system 1 hour (E). The respiratory system 1 hour (F). The genitor-urinary system 1 hour (G). Review 2 hours 3. Emergency Medical Treatment 11 hours (A). Three life saver steps 3 hours (B). Special injuries and their treatment 4 hours (C). Common emergencies 2 hours (D). Review 2 hours 4. Temperatures, pulse, respiration 7 hours

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON (A). Explanation (B). Demonstration (C). Practical work 5. Injuries and treatment (A). Fractures, sprains, strains and dislocations (B). Wounds (C). Splinting (D). Bandaging 6. Village medical administration, sick-call, sick-book, transfer of patients to the hospital, etc. 7. Sanitation and personal hygiene (A). Personal hygiene (B). Village sanitation (C): Malaria and rodent control (D). Latrines and waste disposal (E). Inspection tour of hospital 8. Communicable diseases (A). Respiratory diseases (B). Intestinal diseases

292 2 hours 1 hour 4 hours 18 hours 2 hours 2 hours 7 hours 7 hours 2 hours 14 hours 2 hours 4 hours 4 hours 2 hours 2 hours 14 hours 5 hours 4 hours

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 293 (C). Infectious diseases 3 hours (D). Review 2 hours 9. Medicines and their usage 8 hours 10. Unconsciousness 2 hours 11. Effects of heat 2 hours 12. Study period 8 hours 13. Review 7 hours 14. Examination and critique 12 hours Total course 132 hours IX. Training Facilities Required A. Housing areas are established for the medical trainees. Once again, security measures, as mentioned in previous chapters are considered. B. A small classroom, suitable for 15-20 trainees, is made available. C. Necessary training aids (charts, models, splints, etc.) are obtained or constructed to simplify the instruction. D. Books and manuals, printed in the Rhade language, are produced and made available to the students as a permanent issue.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 294 X. Instruction Like all training, most training time is devoted to practical work. A demonstration is an excellent manner of teaching, for these people are very adept at quickly and efficiently grasping what they observe. When a student successfully completes the course, he is issued a certificate stating that he has met the standards of the rural health program and is a qualified medic. The provincial health administrator is also notified of the name and the place of practice of each individual and are requested to place them on the GVN payroll. XI. Expansion The medical program expands with the VDP. Hence the requirement for additional medical facilities. As a sub-OB is established, aid stations are also established at these sites. These aid stations are operated similarly to the hospital, but are by no means as extensive or as permanent. Serious cases are still referred to the hospital by the sub-base Special Forces medic, where better facilities are available. As the VDP expands, the volume of hospital patients decreases in proportion to the number of patients treated at the AID stations. However, inspections, supervision and coordination by the Special Forces medic, becomes an increasing responsibility which occupies much of his time.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 295 XII. Conclusion The establishment of the medical program is mandatory for any VDP. It is a program for which the Montagnards can see and feel the assistance being offered them. It signifies to the armed defenders that they will be cared for and treated should they become a casualty. It is a living symbol of the VDP and should be promoted with authority and competency. The Special Forces medic is the individual, through a demanding schedule of tireless and devoted duty, who succeeds in making this facility a success; but it is the VDP that will fail should he not succeed. It is the Team Commander's responsibility to support the medic and the medical program by obtaining the necessary medicines, drugs, and equipment to assist him with his duties. Even then, the medic is handicapped because of poor lighting conditions, make-shift operating rooms, shortages of drugs and medicines, the time lapse in administering aid, and other conditions too numerous to mention. However, a smile on the face of a mother whose son has been healed; or the gratitude of a wife whose husband has been saved, are the rewards of this program. The medic will have hundreds of such memories from his association with the VDP if he is successful in accomplishing his objectives.

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296

FIG 93. VILLAGE AID STATION

FIG 94. MACHINE GUN TRAINING

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 297 Chapter Sixteen Operations I. General The aim of offensive operations is to destroy the enemy. VD combat operations are designed to achieve training objectives, tactical objectives, and psychological advantages. Destruction of the VC is not necessarily accomplished by killing or capturing him, but more so by denying him and isolating him from his means of support. Therefore, operations are designed to keep the VC on the move, disrupt his daily pattern, disrupt his security, place him on the defensive, and physically wear him down. To achieve this success, operations require good intelligence, proper planning, strict security, speed of execution, mobility, deception, and concealed movement. Support of the population contributes greatly to this endeavor. II. Types of Operations Operations are classified as training, tactical, or psychological. A. Training Operations These are planned and conducted to provide trainees with live, realistic, practical experience. These operations are usually conducted in "white" and "pink" areas and are assumed to be free of large VC units; while small VC bands and patrols may possibly be encountered (Figure 94).

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 298 B. Tactical Operations These are conducted by the SF and include patrols, ambushes, reinforcing operations, and raids. These are planned to accomplish military objectives which contribute to the VDP. C. Psychological Operations These are designed to establish a show of force, invoke prestige, reduce tension, and build morale. They are conducted only when there is a high assurance they will succeed. It is from these concepts that criteria for planning and executing offensive operations is derived. III. Tactical Concept VD tactics is a combination of mobile and static defenses. The armed villages provide the static or stationary defenses, while the SF executes mobile defensive operations through offensive actions. It is with this latter force that the remainder of this chapter is devoted. A. It is essential that operations be based upon sound principles. The following are those which we generally accepted as standard policy although adjustments are required for each specific operation. 1. Initiate operations from a firm or established base. This may be the OB, a secure village, or a jungle base. 2. Conduct operations in close proximity to the secure base (within a one hour reinforcing capability).

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 299 3. Tie-in offensive operations with the village defensive systems and include their support in the planning phase. 4. Don't give chase to the VC beyond the limits or perimeters established in the OPLAN no matter how enticing the situation may seem. 5. Movement is tactical. 6. Operations are characterized by small unit actions. 7. Don't rely on heavy supporting fires (artillery, mortars or air). 8. Avoid moving on roads in all but "white areas". 9. Think, operate and move as the VC does. 10. Equip forces to travel rapidly for long durations and to be self sufficient for extended periods. 11. Maintain mobility and never remain in one location for more than 12 hours. 12. Never relax security. 13. Employ varied and unusual tactics. Don't become stereotyped. 14. Retain a reserve for quick reaction to meet the uncertainties and rapidly changing situations of guerrilla warfare. B. Just as operations are conducted based upon sound principles, they are first planned with the following factors in mind: 1. Intelligence.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 300 2. Established VC patterns. 3. In conjunction-coordination with ARVN operations. 4. Hunches. 5. Requirements. IV. Patrolling The aim of patrolling is to gain information (reconnaissance patrol) and to place the VC on the defensive through small-scale offensive operations (combat patrols). A. Patrol planning is detailed and complete. Planning is usually accomplished by the combined team but plans are not made known to the SF until their preparation phase must begin. This is done for security reasons. Patrols are introduced into the operational area in a manner which precludes compromise. Patrol missions are clearly stated and defined and offer as much flexibility as possible particularly in timing. B. Patrol routes are selected with care, are indirect, and are usually through difficult terrain. Once in the patrol area, movement is made during daylight hours with each member of the patrol observing for tell-tale signs left by the VC. A patrol never returns by its outward route except under unusual conditions. C. The size of the patrol is dictated by the mission. In VD, a section (33 men) is considered to be the ideal size. The patrol is deployed to produce maximum fire-power immediately upon contact; fight-at close quarters; and reduce vulnerability to ambush. The type of terrain deter-

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 301 mines the rate of movement. Montagnards are naturally adept at jungle navigation and are also familiar with the area of operations. Thus, the requirement for a compass and map is not usually necessary, even for long-range patrols. They can move swiftly through the most restrictive vegetation and over the most difficult terrain; seldom bunch-up or close-in on one another; and they know the value of silence. Possessing great endurance, they march for long periods and at a rapid pace without becoming exhausted. D. In addition to their natural abilities, the Rhade are trained and drilled to observe the following patrol techniques. 1. Don't litter the patrol route. 2. When approaching obstacles or danger points (areas), send the point across first to investigate while the remainder of the patrol covers them with fire. Continue with caution. 3. Obliterate tracks whenever feasible. 4. Maintain a rear guard. 5. Observe in all directions, with emphasis on the primarily assigned direction. Observe with all the senses. 6. Establish security whenever at the halt. Halt at locations which offer good cover, concealment and observation.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 302 7. Always carry the weapon at the ready position (safety off) and point it in the direction of observation. E. The patrol leader must place himself where he can best influence and control the patrol. This is usually close to the front. The American advisor remains further to the rear and refrains from pestering the patrol leader. He directs and advises the patrol leader only as necessary and is advised of the situation by the patrol leader through an interpreter who always accompanies an American on combat operations. F. When halting for the night, insure that there is sufficient light remaining to establish a secure base, to prepare positions, and to post the guard. The patrol is awakened and fully alerted one hour before first light. The reason for this is that if detected, the VC find first light the most advantageous time to attack or strike a base-camp. G. Patrols have a tendency to relax on the return route. This is especially true if they have already had an engagement. It is a favorite VC trick to overtake a patrol, particularly after contact has been made, and ambush them. The patrol is made to remain alert until they have secured at the base area. When a patrol is ambushed, they employ immediate action. This is described in Chapter Ten (Training Program).

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 303 V. Ambushes In VD the greatest number of casualties inflicted on the VC is when he attacks a fortified village. The second greatest number is when he is ambushed. Ambushes are laid based on intelligence, likely VC movements, VC patterns, and chance. Ambush sites, for the most part, are located at likely cache and rest sites, along routes to fringe villages, and along known or suspected VC infiltration routes. I venture to guess that at best, only one in every 10 of 15 ambushes conducted results in VC contact. If troops are permitted to become discouraged or complacent they will become victims of the VC. Good shooting positions, security, concealment, noise and light discipline, simple prearranged signals, covering all routes, and establishing a killing zone are ambush techniques we are all familiar with. The ambush is laid by siting a series of small groups of men (6-10) along likely ambush sites, with each group having good observation of the killing zone. The ambush site is enhanced if there is an obstacle to which the VC can be pinned. In jungle terrain it is necessary to place men close to the killing zone. Therefore, depth must be added to the position and care must be exercised in the use of grenades, mines and demolitions. The VC travel primarily during the hours of darkness. As a result, most of our ambushes were conducted at night. The principles are the same as those discussed above. The primary exception is that detection is more difficult and shooting less accurate. Firing low and the use of il-

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 304 luminating devices helps overcome these shortcomings. When illumination is used care is taken to insure that the glow does not blind or affect the ambushing force. Shotguns are an excellent weapon for night ambushes. Grenades and booby traps work well when they are placed along suspected routes of retreat or to fill gaps in the killing zone. The ambushing force is disciplined to fire and to cease fire on signal. During the initial stages of the VDP we had difficulty in achieving a spontaneous and high volume of fire when springing an ambush. As a result they were unsuccessful. The Rhade were reluctant to fire for fear that the targets were not VC but friendly villagers. We had previously established a curfew and made it known that anyone outside his village during the hours of darkness would be considered a VC. After we assured and convinced the SF that all villagers were aware of this policy they began to conduct the ambushes properly and achieved good results. On several occasions the ambush force was detected moving into position, and on another occasion an elephant entered the ambush site, which caused a disturbance. In these instances the VC altered their route of movement and by-passed the ambush. Premature firing was the greatest shortcoming of our ambush techniques. VI. Movement by Road To be of assistance to a village under attack, SF units must be dispatched by the fastest means possible. As a result, the SF uses roads and trails to increase their rate of movement. This

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 305 subjects them to VC ambushes. Therefore, they must observe security enroute or they will find themselves fighting their own battle before ever reaching their destination. The VC are renowned for establishing effective ambushes on reinforcing or supporting troops, who have a tendency to relax their security for haste in reaching the scene of action. Immediate action drills are the minimum precautions to be exercised. In addition, varying degrees of movement techniques are employed as determined by the situation. 1. In "white areas", travel by road is considered to be safe and movement is based upon speed. When movement is by foot, secure formations are sacrificed for those which offer greater speed. Movement by truck is considered safe and appropriate. The occupants of the vehicles, however, maintain their counter-ambush posture. 2. In "pink areas", travel by road is restricted. Foot movement is accomplished by tactical formations which offer both speed and security. Security is exercised at danger points along the route, i.e. stream crossings, dangerous terrain, villages, etc. Populated areas are avoided and bypassed whenever possible. Truck movement is considered feasible but with more caution and discretion than exercised in the "white areas". Troops dismount at danger points and move tactically by foot only to entruck after the area has been passed through. 3. In the "red areas", vehicular travel is forbidden unless they are accompanied by dismounted patrols. Foot movement is tactical, roads and trails are avoided as much as is practical.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 306 The following account best illustrates these principles. Attack on Buon Ea Khit At 161100 May 1962, the village of Buon Ea Khit came under VC attack by a force who were harboured in the mountains to the east of the village. The village was considered to be located in a "pink area". However, once a village comes under attack, it and the area surrounding it (two kilometers), is reclassified "red" for operational purposes. The village was approximately 15 kilometers, by road, from Buon Enao, the OB. The SF was loaded into trucks and quickly dispatched to assist the village. They moved to a predesignated point where they detrucked and covered the remaining three kilometers by foot. Moving tactically, they arrived at Buon Ea Khit in sufficient time to repel the VC before they penetrated the village defenses. The trucks continued with a small guard to the trained village of Buon Hra Ea Hning which was only a short distance away. This made them readily available to evacuate the wounded, dead, prisoners, and others, should the need arise. After the VC withdrew, patrols were dispatched and found that the VC had established an ambush site along the road about 11/2 kilometers from Buon Ea Khit. By dismounting the trucks and moving through the jungle on foot, the SF by-passed the ambush and was able to reach the village in the fashion it did (Figure 95).

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON FIG 95. SKETCH OF BUON EA KHIT ENGAGEMENT

307

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 308 VII. Loading Trucks The VDP has no armor assigned to support motor convoys, nor does it possess sufficient vehicles to properly load a sizeable force (10 to 15 men per 2 ton truck). As a result, troop loading procedures is an important consideration. Seldom were more than two trucks employed in convoy. Each truck is usually loaded with one section (33 men) which appears to be excessive. However, because of their small physical stature and the fact that we had them stand in the bed of the truck, it compensated for an otherwise crowded condition. To insure that observation is not obstructed, that weapons can be fired, grenades thrown, and detrucking can take place rapidly, all canvas and overhead bows are removed and the tail gate is fixed in the down position. Automatic weapons (BAR or LMG) are positioned over the cab of the truck to cover the front and front oblique while two BAR men assume the prone position and protect the rear of the vehicle. Each side of the vehicle is lined with riflemen and sub-machine gunners, while selected personnel have grenade launchers affixed to their weapons. As previously mentioned, they are in the standing position and facing their respective side of the road with their weapons pointing in the direction of observation. The commander of the vehicle usually positions himself in the cab with the driver. When ambushed, the driver first attempts to drive through the killing zone as speedily as possible while the occupants either return the fire, assume the prone position, or a combination thereof, depending upon the circumstances of the ambush, i.e. volume of fire, direction of fire,

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 309 VC strength, and conditions of visibility. Once out of the killing zone the troops dismount and assume normal counter-ambush techniques. If it isn't possible to drive the truck past the killing zone, because of a disabled vehicle caused by mines or other firearms, or the driver is killed, a road block encountered, etc., then the truck is immediately brought to a halt while those facing the ambush immediately return the fire at a fast rate while others detruck and move into position to either assault or to pick-up the rate of fire while the remaining force detrucks. This is determined by the commander as he sees the situation. On one occasion we had a truck, with a section of men, ambushed while enroute to render assistance. About five kilometers from the planned detrucking point an electrical mine was detonated (it was exploded about two seconds prematurely and the full force of the blast caught only the front fenders) forcing the vehicle to come to a halt. The explosion was accompanied by automatic fire from a position on the left side of the road. A base of fire was immediately established from within the vehicle while others dismounted and took-up firing positions on the left shoulder of the road. This permitted the remainder of the troops to dismount. The force then went into the assault and ripped the VC LMG position to shreds with a heavy volume of smallarms fire and grenades, killing all four occupants and capturing the LMG and three sub-machine guns without losing a single man. No other VC were found. I must mention in all honesty that I considered the selected ambush site to be extremely poor. I felt it was established to ambush vehicles coming from the other direction. As shown by the diagram (figure 96) the VC

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON Figure 96. SKETCH OF VC AMBUSH

310

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 311 could neither observe nor fire unobstructed into the killing zone from their position. This may have been the reason for the premature firing of the mine. Nevertheless, in my opinion the SF reacted quickly and admirably. Trucks can also be fitted with certain items to reduce their vulnerability to an ambush. One such truck was fitted and used for dangerous missions. Shatter-proof glass is installed in the windshield, steel plating is placed under the floor boards and the sides of the truck and truck-bed are sandbagged. This reduces the troop carrying capacity by about one half. VIII. Movement by Helicopters Helicopter support is often very difficult to obtain in support of VDP operations. They provide an excellent means for moving troops rapidly and securely. We employed two methods for the movement of troops. The first method and the one which was favored, was to discharge troops at the closest location to the VC position while remaining out of range of their fires. The terrain plays an important role when utilizing this method, for the LZ selected should not be more than one kilometer from the objective if the speed of helicopter transportation is to be advantageous. From the LZ, the troops move tactically to engage the VC or to support a village, whatever the case may be. A variation of this method, is to discharge the troops in a concealed location and fake a discharge at a location where the VC can observe the helicopters lowering themselves below the tree line. This may lead them to believe that this is the troop discharge point and misorients them as to the true location of the SF. The second, and least used method,

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 312 was the discharge of troops immediately on or within the objective area. This method exposed both the helicopters and the troops to the highest volume and most accurate VC fires. This method was considered when we were assured of surprise and the number of lifts into the objective area were few (figure 97). IX. Conclusion Operations conducted for VD are not predicated upon large scale offensive actions which are aimed at killing the VC. Rather, they are small unit actions designed to psychologically and physically disrupt the VC organization. When the VC presents a massed force I seriously doubt that any but a few of the more strongly fortified and manned villages could survive the attack without reinforcements from the OB. When the VC mass, ARVN units are called upon to militarily defeat the VC by destruction.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON

313

FIG 97. LOADING HELICOPTER FOR AIRMOBILE ASSAULT

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 314 Chapter Seventeen Air Support I. General This chapter portrays the requirements and availability of air-support operations for the VDP. At best, aircraft is scarce and tightly controlled, unless the U.S. is committed in force. When VDP's are undertaken there will usually be only the U.S. Military Aid Program (MAP), Military Assistance Program (MAAG), and economic development programs (USOM) (AID), in operation. The VDP has no organic air capability, nor does it possess the authority to officially request air-support means of those agencies who are immediately accessible and responsive to the needs of the VDP, i.e. MAAG, Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF), or other U.S. sources. The JUWTF has organic air transports for administering and logistically supporting the VDP's. Tactical air-support is requested and coordinated through the Joint Operations Center (JOC). Low priorities, delay in staffing requests, and the time-distance factor makes this an unsatisfactory arrangement for VD. The following command chart is, in my mind, a suitable and yet austere organization for the VDP, once the third phase (counteraction) is initiated (Figure 98). Prior to phase three, the air commando detachment supports the VDP, as required, under the control of the JUWTF.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON FIG 98. AIR SUPPORT ORGANIZATION

315

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 316 Contract Chinese Nationalists, Turks, and other foreign national pilots and crews, perform the air logistical missions for the JUWTF. Air-delivery of supplies is their primary function and the long, strenuous and continuous flying requirements tax them beyond the safety requirements imposed upon U.S. pilots and aircraft. MAAG possesses a limited number of helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft, which are capable of providing limited troop-lift and resupply functions. Air commando detachments provide the ultimate in VD tactical air-support when properly deployed and employed. These air force personnel are highly and skillfully trained to support special warfare operations. They adapt themselves well to the hardships of living under primitive conditions and are well oriented to all aspects of unconventional warfare. To be employed effectively, air commando units are based where they can immediately respond to the needs of the VDP. Therefore, personnel are quartered at the OB and their aircraft is secured and maintained at a nearby military or commercial airfield. Aircraft ordnance storage is the responsibility of the VDP logistic section. VNAF has propeller driven fighters, bombers, and transports. However, because of their austerity program and their complex procedures for requesting air-support, they are of little value for VD operations. II. Types of Air-support A. Tactical

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 317 1. Close air-support. 2. Interdiction. 3. Harassing. 4. Reconnaissance. B. Transport 1. Air-supply (air-dropped-air-landed). 2. Paratroop. 3. Troop-lift (air-landed). 4. Evacuation. C. Miscellaneous 1. Psychological activities. 2. Communications. III. Air-support Objectives A. Combat air 1. Tactical air-support operations provide assistance to the VDP for the accomplishment of military objectives. The aim is to: (A). Disrupt the VC. (B). Induce the VC to keep on the move and thereby reduce his effectiveness to mass and select targets.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 318 (C). Inflict casualties upon the VC. (D). Lower VC morale and increase his desertion rate. 2. Close air-support is the application of air fire-power within the immediate operations area of the VDP. It consists of engaging VC targets actively engaged in interfering with VDP objectives. It is not usually feasible to employ close air-support to assist tactical offensive operations. The difficulty of detecting the VC and distinguishing them from friendly forces, and the close-in-fighting which characterizes jungle warfare, reduces the accuracy of bombing and strafing to a degree where the risk to friendly troops is often too great to undertake. Close air-support is used extensively and effectively when the VC attack a village. The confines of the village provide the marking for friendly troops, while the area surrounding the village is considered enemy territory. Close air-support is summoned only when the added fire-power is required to obtain decisive results. Air is too often called upon when organic means remain available to repel the VC. 3. Interdiction includes air attacks against known VC camps, bases or concentrations. VC locations are seldom visible from the air and they must be marked or pin-pointed by map coordinates, smoke, bearing and distance runs, etc. Strikes are followed-up by ground support operations to substantiate pilot reports whenever possible.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 319 4. Harassing strikes are made against suspected VC locations and activities. They are intended to disrupt VC daily routines and procedures, aimed at denying him selected areas or havens, maintaining pressure on him, keeping him on the move, and lowering his morale. 5. Reconnaissance missions are limited in scope due to the shortage of aircraft. Their effectiveness in this role is reduced when constant air-surveillance cannot be maintained to detect visible signs of VC movement throughout a vast area of operations. Visual reconnaissance missions must therefore be scrutinized and carried out as a result of existing intelligence. They are often selected for the purpose of providing the team commander with aerial observation of the operating area. B. Transport 1. Air-transport operations provide logistical, psychological, and reinforcement capabilities to the VDP. The priority of use is determined by operational necessity. However, planning remains essential. 2. Transport aircraft is employed to primarily provide long-range logistical support to the OB's. They are further utilized to evacuate and transport personnel in and out of the operations area. 3. Light aircraft is principally employed within the VDP area and between the OB and sub-OB's. The priorities are as follows: (A). Air-transport supplies to specific locations.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 320 (B). Casualty evacuation (C). Reconnaissance. (D). Route observation. (E). Village surveillance. (F). Communications relay stations. (G). Team commanders utilization. 4. Helicopters provide a more versatile means of accomplishing all of the missions in paragraph three above. In addition, helicopters are primarily used for moving troops for the following purposes: (A). Tactical employment. (B). Reinforcements. (C). Movement of key personnel as required (medics, guides, interpreters, commanders, etc.). IV. Planning Air-transport Operations Air-transport is also in short supply and is utilized with discretion. Air missions are combined or integrated whenever possible. The following factors are considered when planning airtransport operations. A. Provide the supporting aviation or air force unit with as much advance notice and information as possible.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 321 B. Consider weather and terrain conditions. C. Consider VC locations. D. Provide for pilot briefings, and include providing the pilot with a flight guide whenever required. E. Avoid tactical routing unless deemed imperative. F. Seek and accept pilot advice. G. Provide for emergency rescue of personnel; and destruction of the aircraft if necessary. H. Provide ground markings, Forward Air Controllers (FAC) etc. whenever practical I. Prepare, light, and secure LZ's/DZ's as required. V. Supply by Air There are two methods of suppying by air; air-drop (parachute or free-drops) and air-landed. The greatest portion of air-supply operations is conducted by the air-landed method. Heavy transport aircraft ferry large tonnages of supply from the logistical base to the OB, while helicopters and light aircraft are used exclusively for supply deliveries within the area of operations. Once again the air-landed method is predominantly used with the exception of emergency operations or in conjunction with tactical operations. When supplies are air-dropped it is preferable to either free-drop them from low altitudes or use improvised parachutes (made from ponchos) for the best results. When supplies are parachuted into an area, the higher altitude required for "chute" deployment reduces the probability of the supplies landing on the desired DZ. DZ's are

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 322 usually small clearings or villages, and supplies which don't land on their mark, could be within easy reach of the VC. Considerations for the conduct of air-supply operations are listed. A. LZ requirements to receive the aircraft. 1. Size 2. Clearing 3. Lighting 4. Obstacles B. DZ requirements to receive airdrops. 1. Security 2. Markings-signals 3. Obstructions 4. Identification C. Reception parties to rapidly receive and transport supplies from the DZ/LZ. VI. Paratroop Operations Paratroop operations are not a consideration for the VDP. VII. Troop-lift Operations For the purpose of the VDP, troop-lift is helicopter landed forces for tactical operations. Helicopters are employed in pairs and are accompanied by armed (escort) helicopters -when

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 323 available. They fly at tree-top level and use the terrain to conceal their flight route and landing area. Upon arrival at the destination (LZ) troops are discharged and the "choppers" are immediately flown out. LZ's are selected based on the mission, security, and surprise. For these reasons we employed helicopters in either of the following ways: A. Vertical envelopment on the objective. B. Troop discharge close to the objective. Vertical envelopment on the objective is the most risky and requires the greatest amount of coordination and support. The landings are preceded by tactical air, artillery fires, or suppressing fires from the armed helicopters. Troop discharge close to the objective is the more appropriate method for VD. Deceptive landings and discharges are employed in conjunction with the assault. These methods are discussed fully in Chapter Sixteen (Operations). Troops marshal at the designated area(s) (LZ's are contiguous to the OB) under the control of an American. An American controls the airmobile operation until the troops are discharged at the objective. Then the normal procedures for tactical operations is employed with indigenous personnel in command. This permits coordination with pilots and in-flight control of the SF to be more manageable and acceptable.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 324 VIII. Evacuation Evacuation from operation areas is performed by helicopter to the OB; and by transport aircraft from the OB to outside areas. Air-evacuation is usually restricted to casualties or the emergency evacuation of personnel. The following factors are considered prior to requesting aircraft for evacuation: A. Casualty's requirement for urgent medical attention. B. The availability of other means to include length of time to accomplish the evacuation. C. The effects of various means of transportation on the patient. D. LZ availability. When an American becomes a casualty, the closest American doctor (MAAG) is notified and requested to either accompany the evacuation flight, or to be available at the OB when the patient arrives. Regardless of what the doctor agrees to, the Special Forces medic accompanies the flight. If an indigenous soldier becomes a casualty, either the Special Forces medic or an indigenous medic accompanies the flight. IX. Conclusion Air-support provides the commander with greater flexibility in accomplishing his mission. It increases the mobility and striking power of the VDP through rapid responses to critical situations. Helicopters reduce reaction time and eliminate the obstacles encountered in road and foot

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 325 movement. Re-supply missions are significantly enhanced and provide the VDP with a formidable method of reaching isolated villages and patrols. Limited aircraft availability require air operations and the utilization of air-support to be carefully planned and implemented for proper utilization. However, complete reliance cannot be placed on air-support unless aircraft are organic to the VDP, and then it also has its limitations. Alternate plans must be incorporated into aircraft utilization.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 326 Chapter Eighteen Civic Action I. General A definition of military civic action is "the use of preponderantly indigenous forces on projects useful to the local population, which contribute to economic and social development, and which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population." For the VDP, civic action is best described as a "tangible psychological operation applied to gain the support of the Montagnards." It is directed at the "grass roots" level, and as the military definition states, conducted by the people themselves to improve their economic and social status. Project supervision and material assistance is provided from the OB. Emphasis is placed on those programs required to fulfill the basic needs of the people. These are short range programs, simple and attainable, in the fields of health, sanitation, agriculture, security, public works, and the like. These programs are, not intended to replace or conflict with USOM, AID, or GVN civic action programs but to supplement and complement them. Initially, large civic action programs are not attainable until the area becomes secure ("white"). However, local self generated programs can immediately be undertaken. When an area becomes secure the GVN exploits civic action programs to further their relations with the Montagnards.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 327 The techniques, employed to enlist popular support and acceptance for VD, are simple. Display consideration for the customs and traditions of the people; provide security; and conduct programs which will improve existing conditions without "westernization". To succeed, the VDP requires population support, not population control. Antagonistic attitudes by either side does little to enhance this program. The paramilitary soldier, who is a brother of the people, must demonstrate integrity and character while providing them protection. The employment of military forces always considers the interests of the people, or population support and population control will be lost. II. Projects The numerous and diversified civic action projects that are generated from within the OB, fall into three basic categories. Those that require labor and materials; and those that require skill and materials. Other combinations or considerations do not affect civic action functions at this level. A. Labor is not usually a consideration, as projects are designed to be accomplished by the people themselves. However, there are times when a massive project or a "fight against time" requires additional manpower to be obtained. B. Skills for the various undertakings are readily available from the indigenous people as well as the Americans. The qualifications of "team members" are not limited to their military skills or specialties. Combined, they often possess knowledge of a wide variety of civilian trades.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 328 They very often conduct civic action in their every-day activities without fully realizing it as such. C. The materials to be provided are mostly locally procured. Others require funding and must be either locally purchased or provided from military or civilian sources. D. As previously stated, the types of projects undertaken are limited only by imagination. The following projects which were accomplished at the Buon Enao complex best illustrates this statement. 1. Health and Medical Chapter Fifteen (Medical), explains in great detail the psychological impact medical treatment receives. The deeds performed are tangible, visible signs of social improvement, which reach the masses. The relief of pain and suffering is a formidable approach in getting the people to convey their support for the VDP. 2. Agricultural Assistance (A). General To keep the people fed is an extremely important consideration for any program. It is desired that the people be able to support themselves and provide for their own needs lest the VDP will find itself burdened with a costly and complex program of survival. To achieve our aims, the following projects were initiated: (1). Protection.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 329 It is not unusual for the VC to confiscate rice for their own survival. During the harvest season the SF is compelled to actively patrol the harvest area, while the Village Defenders are more actively engaged in reaping the harvest. A system is devised to insure that all fields are not harvested simultaneously. This reduces the vulnerability of the SF which would otherwise be thinly spread over a vast area. It also permits villagers to coordinate their harvest and assist each other, thus reducing the net amount of time for the harvest. (2). Fertilizer The productive capacity of mineral drained fields can be nearly doubled when fertilized. By introducing commercial fertilizer, we increased the productivity of the fields and helped alleviate the shortage of food which results from VC activities. The Rhade, however, are accustomed to producing only that which is actually required for their needs. When the fertilizer was introduced and they were told that it would double their crop, they then planned to farm only half of the original plot and cut their workload in half. We soon discouraged this philosophy. Rice produced, which is in excess of their needs, is purchased by the VDP (less the cost of fertilizer) and utilized within the program for feeding refugees, prisoners, etc. (3). Equipment It is often well into the planting season before some villages enter the VDP. As a result, field preparation is delayed because of VC interference and/or the training program that many of the villagers are undergoing. To assist in the preparation of fields, so that crops may be

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 330 produced, we secured a tractor and a plow from the local International Volunteer Service (IVS) organization, with whom we had worked on several occasions and thus had good relations, to accomplish this task. We trained an indigenous operator and in less than two weeks we prepared the necessary fields. We also included a section to be farmed by the refugees to keep them occupied and productive until they were returned to their villages. (4). Seeds We requested and received a variety of vegetable seeds to supplement the crops which are grown by the Montagnards. Of those we introduced, we found that peppers, cucumbers, watermelons, and beans were the most productive and popular with the Rhade. 3. Water Source. Water is a necessary and important commodity and the Montagnards use a large amount for daily living. Women and children spend considerable time transporting water from the stream to the village in small containers made from gourds. A water-well established in close proximity to or within the village is an ideal civic action project. A drilling bit, inch rope and pulley is all that must be furnished. The Montagnards provide the labor as well as the timbers and bamboo to construct the drilling rig. When rock formations are encountered, demolitions are provided to blast through the rock. After water has been struck, the well is faced with galvanized tin or revetted with bamboo to retain the mud and dirt.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 331 If not feasible or practical to dig a well, water can be trucked in five-gallon water cans to the village; or the truck can be fitted with a 500 gallon water tank and be used as a mobile water point. When fitted for this purpose it operates only in secure areas. An abundant water source and a pump is required to make this an efficient operation. 4. Clothing. Several systems are devised for providing bedding, clothing, tools and other equipment to those who lose their belongings to the VC. Clothing drives were conducted on Okinawa (our home station) by the dependents of military personnel and the goods were sent to Vietnam on mission aircraft. Distribution was then made to the Montagnards. Captured VC blankets, clothing and other non-military equipment is also distributed to the needy. 5. Improving the Economy. (A). Sale of Goods The Rhade women are very proficient and productive in the art of weaving. They manufacture very beautiful and colorful blankets and ceremonial items for their own use. These items attract the attention of visitors who desire to purchase them for souvenirs. As more and more Americans began to visit our program, we learned that many desired crossbows, skins, and other artifacts that depicted Rhade culture. As a result we established a trading post. The Rhade would bring their goods to the trading post where they would be displayed for sale. Before long we were receiving written orders from Saigon and Okinawa, from Americans who had seen

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 332 some of the products, for shawls, card table covers and other special-order items. Soon the demand became greater than the supply, and increased prices boosted the Rhade economy. (B). Country Store The Rhade normally produce all that they require for their survival (food, clothing and shelter). At the OB and sub-OB's however, where the tribal lives are interrupted because most of the villagers are employed by the VDP, this is no longer true. Military duties prevent most of these people from hunting, raising crops and obtaining their needs in the manner in which they are accustomed. This requires that a source be established from which they can readily obtain supplies. We established a store for this purpose. A storekeeper was hired and it operated as a non-profit establishment. Transportation was furnished to transport goods from the market place to the store. Goods were purchased in bulk and therefore obtained at a cheaper price with the savings passed on to the Rhade. A credit system was also established with the credit subtracted from the monthly wages. It wasn't long thereafter that a few enterprising Rhade established their own stores (a cafe and two sundry stores) which provided short order meals, tobacco, beer, soft drinks and other related items. 6. Vocational Training (A). Language Classes

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 333 A majority of the Rhade speak only their own language while some also speak Vietnamese and/or French. If they were to be taught a second language it would seem appropriate to teach them Vietnamese. However, the mission of the VDP as well as their motivation to learn English compelled us to teach them our language. .Classes were initially organized and conducted for key personnel who were employed in the VDP. Later classes enrolled other adults who were interested in being schooled. The classes were taught by an interpreter and consisted of twenty two lessons, each an hour long. These classes, along with their daily contact with their American counterparts, produced good English speaking Rhade in a relatively short period of time. (B). Elementary School I am not personally aware of any formal schooling provided to the Rhade prior to 1962. I was informed that they could attend Vietnamese schools if they so desired. This was a little difficult to accomplish since the Rhade spoke only their own tongue, and the distances between the remote Montagnard villages and the population centers where the schools were located, made attendance difficult. To initiate schooling, we built a classroom and hired a Rhade to teach 5-10 year olds how to read, write and count. This initial school was located near the OB and was directed at the children whose parents were employed by the VDP. (C). Home Economics Classes

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 334 Cooking classes, sewing classes, child-care and other instruction is offered to the young females and is conducted by the missionaries in the area. The intent of these classes is to teach new methods and procedures for accomplishing those tasks which a Rhade girl learns from the day she is able to walk. The introduction of manufactured sewing needles (steel), manufactured dyes, and other implements was accomplished to replace the outdated and time consuming methods they were accustomed to. III. Conclusion Civic action is not limited to the undertaking of projects as depicted in this chapter. All inclusive is the day-by-day attitude of those who are associated with the VDP. A smile, a well earned pat on the back, concern for the people and their problems, a sincere effort of friendship, association with the people, and other non-material gestures are an integral part of the civic action program. To build a school and then show little or no concern for it thereafter, is not civic action. Civic action projects cannot be programmed on a commercial basis of values. The construction of ten schools doesn't achieve ten times the amount of good will one school achieves. It is the manner and sincerity by which the civic action program is conducted that makes it successful or unsuccessful at the "grass roots" level.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 335 Chapter Nineteen Psychological Operations I. General Psychological operations (psyops) can be defined as "the planned use of propaganda and other psychological actions to support a program (VDP) by influencing the opinions, emotions, attitudes and behavior of the enemy, neutral and friendly populations, to think and act in a manner which is to our advantage". In considering the application of psyops for VD it is important, at the outset, to realize that psyops must first be directed at the local population to eliminate their support for the VC, and to gain their acceptance and cooperation for the VDP. Psyops directed towards the VC is difficult to attain because his locations are seldom known. If he can be located, then it is difficult to reach him with the media available to the VDP. However, the VC are affected by the propaganda directed towards the populace when it is timely and properly administered. Proper treatment of surrenderees and captives does much to create defection among the ranks of the VC and is exploited to the fullest extent possible. The following account provides an enlightening example of such a program. It was policy at Buon Enao to attempt to re-educate captured and defected VC who showed promise towards this attainment. Many of the VC who were captured were armed supporters, agents, and collectors for the VC because at one time they had no other choice. These captives

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 336 were organized into groups and were utilized as laborers during the morning hours. The remainder of the day was devoted to attending classes where they were lectured and shown the evils of the VC and their communist inspired cause; and the good the GVN was doing for their people. It was not difficult to convince them of this since they were treated well and could witness the accomplishments and standards of living the Rhade had achieved at Buon Enao. After from four to six weeks of this re-education program it was determined that the final stages of the program had something lacking. A means of determining that these people had realized their mistakes and were interested in being free and joining in the cause of their own people was needed. It was decided to establish a special village. Land was acquired from the Province Chief and the initial input of 44 defectors began to build homes and clear fields. They were provided with tools, seeds, food, 100 piasters, some clothing, bedding and cooking utensils which were captured from the VC. They were completely on their honor and were not placed under guard. However, there were certain controls and restrictions imposed upon them. They were not permitted to leave the immediate area without first receiving permission from the OB; outsiders were not permitted in the village unless they were accompanied by control personnel from Buon Enao; they were required to remain at the village for a minimum period of six months at which time they were given the option of remaining or returning to their former village if acceptable to the village chief. After they built adequate housing we permitted them to send for their families. They were also provided with limited food until they raised a crop. They elected a village leader

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 337 who was responsible for the actions of the villagers and the implementation of VDP policies. The security section made periodic inspections and took roll call to determine the progress of the project. In a matter of weeks, these converts constructed a bamboo fence around their village (a symbol that denounces the VC) and in two months over 200 of them were living in this village. There were no attempts to escape and they captured five VC agents who were attempting to lure them back into the VC fold. Primarily, as a result of this program, the entire Rhade tribe denounced the VC which resulted in the VC no longer trusting them. It wasn't long before VC units operating in the area were completely Vietnamese with the exception of the Rhade guides and interpreters they managed to retain. This rehabilitation program greatly contributed to the defeat of the VC as it denied him his most important source of food, intelligence, and man-power. Furthermore, psychological operations under these conditions and circumstances are particularly touchy to political questions. It cannot be overemphasized that political implications must be avoided, and if this isn't possible, then the program must conform to the policies of the GVN. II. Propaganda If PSYOPS are to succeed, propaganda must be integrated into the operational and tactical concept of the VDP; and it must be adapted to conform to the traditions, education and thoughts of the Montagnards. Furthermore, propaganda must be based on truth (white) so as to

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 338 establish credibility, which is essential to winning the hearts and minds of these people. A. Written Word The written word (to include pictures) is transmitted by leaflets, posters and pamphlets. Whatever method is chosen, it is presented in the tribal language and pictures are animated or depicted to the tribal way of life. Propaganda themes which delve into their basic needs and superstitions are the most effective; with the simple, animated picture or cartoon strip achieving the best results. The VC are very often animated as a tiger (an evil sign by Rhade tradition) preying upon the sacred ground of the Montagnards; or devouring their crops, etc.; to produce the desired impression of the message. In addition, a crude or hand manufactured leaflet or poster made of materials native to the area, achieves the best results. Professionally prepared propaganda, highlighted in color, on shiny paper, and artistically animated doesn't have the same impact as that which is from the hands of their own people. Rhade are more apt to accept the professional materials as entertaining literature rather than the carrier of a theme or message. Manufactured printed matter very often contains errors in judgment. As an example, I saw literature aimed at the Montagnards which depicted nothing but light skinned Vietnamese throughout. I would classify this as a major error, particularly in a case where there is animosity between the two races. B. Spoken Word

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 339 Oral propaganda is presented through the media of radio, films, discussion groups, rallies and personal contacts. 1. There is no substitute for personal contact and this is the major effort in the PSYOPS program for VD. Villages are visited frequently by American personnel, Vietnamese officials, and tribal leaders to convey messages to the people or to merely display interest and concern for them. 2. Rallies are good for emitting propaganda, particularly at the training camps and the OB's. They are particularly effective in generating motivation and loyalty for the VDP as well as a "fighting spirit". 3. Radio broadcasts are an excellent means of reaching population masses with propaganda as well as keeping them informed of the situation. This is particularly true in the remote areas. However, a radio is usually a luxury and a difficult item for the Montagnards to come by. To assist our psychological effort, we established a precedent of presenting the village chief a transistor radio when his village completed their training cycle. He accepted this as a token of friendship while to us it provided a means for reaching him and his people with "voice of America" and GVN radio broadcasts, which are transmitting information and propaganda favorable to our cause. 4. Another excellent media is that of films. We obtained two mobile sound-film trucks through supply channels, to transmit this medium of communications. Rhade personnel are

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 340 trained to operate the equipment as well as trained in the dissemination of propaganda. These vehicles operate in secure areas (white), during the evening hours, on an unscheduled and rotational basis. They show films with propaganda themes; those informative in nature (health and hygiene, raising hogs, rotating crops, etc.); and entertaining (American movies). A security section from the SF accompanies each truck on its missions. C. Actions Actions, as we know, often speak louder than words. Some of these actions are discussed in other chapters, i.e., actions of the individual soldier, planning and conduct of military operations, etc. There are instances when circumstances dictate a more pronounced plan of action or even a deviation from what is policy. An example of this is: when we learned that some villagers of Buon Hra Ea Hning were observed associating with the VC and perhaps supporting them, we secretly surrounded the village and conducted a search and seizure operation within. The inhabitants were assembled and they were reminded of their oath to support the VDP. We made no accusation or mention of their association with the VC since our search revealed nothing. However, we felt it was quite evident they knew what we suspected. The rally was concluded with a demonstration of the destructive power of a white phosphorous (wp) grenade when thrown into a bamboo and straw house. As we began to leave, the village chief, who was also the military commander, assured me that his village was loyal to the VDP. He handed me his fire-plan for the defense of the village. It was the most complete fire-plan I have ever seen at this echelon of

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 341 command. It included final protective fires, sectors of fire, and dead spaces. Questioning revealed that he had formerly served with the French. I took a grenade from my belt and presented it to him saying, "Your loyalty can best be judged on how well you use this grenade against the VC. By presenting it to you I have demonstrated my faith in your village". Since Village Defenders are not issued grenades this act, I feel, regained any loyalty which had been lost. Three days later the village of Buon Hra Ea Hning was attacked by the VC. I surmise that those who made acquaintances with the VC broke the association which displeased the VC and they retaliated with this attack. The following account of the action that took place also revealed to me that our psychological operation, three days earlier, was a success. Attack On Buon Hra Ea Hning The VC surrounded the village of Buon Hra Ea Hning during darkness on 10 July 1962. At 2400 hours they opened up with automatic rifle fire from three sides. Following this initial burst of fire several VC breeched the perimeter fence (point 1) and occupied some of the prepared village positions. Other VC followed and entered some of the village long-houses with most of the fighting being done at close range. As the VC increased their penetration, the Village Defenders tightened their perimeter until they were assembled in a small area in the center of the village in the vicinity of the guard house (point 2). As the VC pressed the attack the villagers opened up with what was their last volume of fire killing and wounding many of the attackers. As a last resort the village chief tossed his lone grenade (the one that I had presented to him) into the at-

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 342 tackers and the VC retreated carrying all but two of their dead from the village. The grenade killed the leader of this VC force which triggered their retreat. Several VC weapons were captured and it was estimated that 25-30 VC were killed. Friendly losses were two villagers killed and three wounded; one Village Defender killed, eight wounded and two missing; two weapons lost; and one cow and one pig killed (Figure 99). On the 11th one of the villagers (Y'-Mak) who was captured escaped. He related that he saw 5 dead VC, many being carried on stretchers and many walking wounded. A patrol that was dispatched at dawn on the 11th reported that the VC headed south and much blood marked their trail. They located a spot where many small trees had been cut and found five swagger sticks which are usually carried by VC cadre. At last report the VC were headed for the village of Buon Chue (we had not achieved control of this village at this time nor was it programmed for the VDP in the very near future because of its location). Y'-Seng one of the dead VC left in the village, was from Buon Chue. He had a sister who worked for the government in Ban Methout and a brother who was also a VC. His sister was placed under surveillance by the Vietnamese. On another occasion we had no alternative but to burn and destroy two villages which had collaborated with the VC. The following account will describe this incident.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON FIG 99. SKETCH OF BUON HRA EA HNING

343

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 344 At 201100 May 1962, runners from the villages of Buon Cu Bong and Buon Tong Dok brought a message to Buon Enao that their villages were attacked by the VC at 192100 and that all the Village Defenders and their weapons were captured by the VC (13 weapons at Buon Tong Dok and 21 weapons at Buon Cu Bong). Questioning revealed that identical situations existed at both villages. The VC entered the village and captured the villagers without opposition. Further investigation pointed towards collaboration and on 22 May a formal investigation was conducted. This investigation revealed that the two villages collaborated with the VC. The defensive weaknesses were pointed out to the VC and collaborators were on watch during the attack and thus there was no fighting. The Village Defenders are still missing but other villagers, who were forced to go with the VC, were released and they returned to their village. It was evident that not all villagers were aware of this collaboration but most of the village leaders were. However, not a single shot was fired nor did they resist the VC by fighting. The size of the VC force was estimated to be 50 at each of the villages. To lose a village is one of the most serious disgraces to the Rhade. The people were moved to other villages and the villages were burned. We let this be a warning of what was in store for any others who had intentions of supporting the VC. There were no further incidents of this nature for the remainder of the VDP (Figure 100).

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 345 After an encounter with the VC, Village Defenders, as well as villagers themselves, need to be reassured of their position, whether or not they are successful or unsuccessful in fighting off the VC. It was standard policy to always have a team, consisting of an American, a Vietnamese, and a SF unit, immediately at the scene of action. The SF is used to help in the restoration of the defenses and to remain at the village for a period of time until certain the Village Defenders are once again capable of defending. The American critiques the villagers on their actions, and regardless of how they fared in battle, is always reassuring in his appraisal of the situation. He inspects the damage and redistributes ammunition and supplies where necessary. Upon the Vietnamese falls the chore of reimbursement of livestock or other goods lost in the battle as well as retribution for the next of kin of those who are killed in the battle. This concern is a leading factor which incites the Village Defenders to fight the VC. III. Psychological Warfare Section Psychological operations are most effective when they are conducted by the indigenous people themselves. To accomplish this a psychological section is organized and trained. This unit is an organic unit of the SF. Trained in the basic fundamentals of delivering propaganda i.e., gaining attention of the target audience, being understood, arousing needs, and suggesting solutions to their troubles. This force is a valuable asset to the VDP. They develop their own approach and methods of delivering their message. When they completed their training, I was invited to attend their dress rehearsal prior to commitment. What I saw was a proficient and capable unit.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 346 They achieved results beyond my highest expectations. They devised a program of entertainment with propaganda themes throughout. Their first act was a group of singers who sang Rhade songs and encouraged the audience to sing along with them to stimulate their interests. A skit followed where in the first scene the VC are supported by villagers. The SF, on patrol, questions the villagers who indicate they don't know where the VC are. The second scene depicts the VC demanding more support from the villagers. When this is denied, the villagers are manhandled and forced to provide additional food. After the VC depart a villager is seen leaving the village. The third scene again shows the VC taking food from the villagers only to be surrounded and killed by the SF who were informed by one of the villagers. The cheer of the audience was deafening, and one I will always remember. The third act was the delivery of a message on the care and protection of weapons. An instrumental number followed. Then a political message called for the support of all Rhade to unite behind the VDP and to denounce the VC. The benefits the VDP brought these people are cited. A fire-power demonstration was next on the program which concluded with a pep rally. The Psychological Warfare Section operates within the confines of the trained villages. Only rarely does it operate otherwise. Along with the entertainment program are other forms of assistance. Medical treatment, weapons repair, distribution of soap and food, etc., are all methods employed to gain full support of the people.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 347 IV. Refugee Program Until now most of the discussion has been centered around procedures and methods to gain the support of the local population which is the primary aim. However, we must take advantage of any method which will assist in creating dissension and defection from the ranks of the VC. The finest program to achieve this is the refugee program. There are many VC who aren't hard core nor are they believers in what they are fighting for. Due to the circumstances they find themselves in the VC fold and are then afraid to defect for fear of being killed because of their association with them. It wasn't long after the VDP was placed into operation that signs of progress were observed. As a result, the VC began to implement their terrorist tactics throughout the non-defended villages, to attempt to prevent the local people from supporting the VDP. As a result, hundreds of villagers, who were determined to support the VDP, were left homeless and feared for their lives. This drives them to seek refuge and protection at the OB. These people, to a man, did not want to be resettled (nor did we have plans of resettling them since this would not accomplish our aims) but only protected until they could return to their homes and the protection of their own defenders. A refugee camp was established near the OB. Refugees were separated into groups, by village, and were assigned a living area. A leader for each group was appointed and they immediately set out to construct shelters of bamboo, grass, cardboard, wooden crates, canvas, para-

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 348 chute canopies and whatever other materials could be found. The majority of them managed to bring their blankets and cooking pots with them and could survive if provided with food (Figure 101). At the peak period there were several thousand refugees on location. They were organized into village groups and provided an excellent labor force at a time when many of the VDP projects were being undertaken. After two months, the number of refugees returned to "secure" villages exceeded the input to the camp. This act provided these destitute people with a sense of comfort, hope and faith. I firmly believe that these people will never turn against the VDP because we acknowledged their plight and provided a solution. On the other hand, I am just as certain that were we not able to care for these people, they would have had no alternative but to support the VC, and therefore impair the accomplishment of our mission.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON

349

FIG 100. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

FIG 101. DISTRIBUTING FOOD TO REFUGEES

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 350 V. Conclusion There is no substitute for face-to-face persuasion or acts of humanity in accomplishing psychological tasks. Special Forces personnel are trained to associate with indigenous people, to share in hardships, and to understand the value of the peasant. To forego privileges of comfort and abundance is not a prerequisite to success in all situations. To share so all may have a little and to endure the same hardships, is all a part of psychological operations. While on operations Americans eat, sleep and march as do the Montagnards. When operating in outlying villages, they eat and sleep with the villagers and always pay for their keep. There is no special training required for psychological operations for the VDP; only common sense and the ability to recognize a situation which needs improving and the logistical support required to implement a project as required. When a program is developed beyond the stage of "grass roots psychological warfare", then it has reached Phase IV and augmentation by specialists in this field is required. It is best if they operate under control of the Province Chief or the senior MAAG commander in coordination with the OB. Their technical equipment and methods will have to be adjusted to the needs of the people but they have a better capability to conduct PSYOPS on a full-time basis while the responsibility to operate on the fringes of the secure area remains with the OB.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 351 Chapter Twenty Pre-deployment Training (US)* I. General It is generally recognized that programs such as described herein will befall Special Forces personnel. Therefore, this chapter discusses that training required for Special Forces detachments prior to commitment to the VDP. The 12 man "A" detachment is used for the basis of illustration. Fm 31-21 explains Special Forces organization and operations (Figure 102). The "A" detachment, whose members are fully MOS (military occupational specialty) qualified, is capable of conducting unconventional warfare (UW) or counterinsurgency (CI) operations. Individual and basic skills of this unit enable them to conduct operations and training, intelligence, communications, medical and sanitation, destructive engineer techniques, and weapons and marksmanship programs. Additional selected training prepares them for all aspects of the VDP. There is no argument that experience is the best remedy for the many situations which encounter the VDP, training is the other. A high standard of individual skills and teamwork is achieved only by constant training. Special Forces training programs must incorporate the "cold

Based on 1963 conditions.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON

352

war" attributes and skills. When it is apparent that a unit is to be committed to a particular type program, then training emphasis is shifted in that

FIG 102. SPECIAL FORCES A DET ORGANIZATION

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 353 II. Statement of the Problem Due to the expansion of Special Forces and their heavy commitment into operational areas, personnel and detachments do not possess the much desired experience and team integrity conducive to Special Forces operations. It is evident that emphasis is first placed on qualifying Special Forces personnel in their MOS. Only then is cross-training and specialized training of real value. MOS qualification is the responsibility of the Special Forces training center (Fort Bragg, N.C.), or at the very least, the Special Forces Group Headquarters. Non-qualified personnel are not assigned to operational detachments who are preparing for commitment. Cross-training and proficiency in the basic skills remains the responsibility of the detachment commander. Detachment commanders are provided sufficient training time to achieve this end result. Training exercises in foreign countries and the use of isolated training areas is invaluable for VDP preparation. In addition, detachment experience, compatibility, equipment checks, strengths and weaknesses is determined. Specialized training is scheduled by the Special Forces Group Headquarters. It is based upon the experience and lessons learned of other VDP's. This scheduled training is mandatory for every member of the detachment, and administrative details such as dental appointments, parades and inspections do not interfere with it.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 354 III. Training Objectives Because of the multitude of variances in one detachment over another, as to skills, capabilities and proficiency, a training program cannot be established to satisfy the requirements of everyone. The training program is established based upon the general needs and the training time available. A standard of training, upon which to base a training program, is difficult to assume when there is a great influx of inexperienced or unqualified Special Forces personnel. As a result, it is the detachment commander's responsibility to initiate and conduct training to remedy his detachment's weaknesses as well as to satisfy his own peculiarities. To accomplish this, the Special Forces Group must field him a fully MOS qualified team, present a sound training program, and provide him sufficient training time. IV. Training Recommendations A. Pre-deployment training is based on the needs and the time available. A ten week training program is found to be adequate to meet the needs of the detachment commander. B. Whenever possible, and prior to a detachment entering pre-deployment training, the detachment commander should be provided the opportunity to make a liaison visit in-country, talk with representatives of the JUWTF, and talk with others who have been exposed to VDP's. C. Individuals have passports, security clearances, driver licenses, medical examination and other administrative requirements satisfied prior to entering pre-deployment training. D. Instruction is presented by those qualified in VDP's whenever possible.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 355 E. Included, as a minimum, are two short field training exercises (FTX) for newly formed detachments. F. Once into pre-deployment training, the detachment is operationally controlled and guided by the training schedule. Administrative control remains with the Special Forces company but Commanding Officers (CO's) use caution when placing personnel on duties or details which affect their training. For this same reason, Special Forces Group commitments preclude placing the company commander in a situation where he has no alternative but to assign these people secondary tasks. G. Training is limited in scope to what the detachment is capable of performing. For instance; major civic action, psywar, and intelligence activities are left to other members of the Special Action Force (SAF) who are specifically organized and trained for the more refined approach to these functions. H. Specialized training is geared to specific individuals (detachment specialists), who have primary interest in the subject. To expose an entire detachment to such training i.e., bulldozer operations, fingerprinting, preparing leaflets, etc., detracts from the productivity of the training program. There are, however, many subjects in which all personnel are instructed regardless of the specialty. I. On the job training (OJT) at hospitals, engineer units, ordnance units, signal units, etc., is secured for specialists.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 356 J. Specialized training, OJT and MOS training is scheduled concurrently (each specialist trains in his particular area at the same time) to preclude unnecessary separation during detachment training. K. Language training is conducted in the language most suitable for the mission. There is no reason why a detachment cannot be split to learn different languages when appropriate (French and Vietnamese for instance) to the country. An individual's previous schooling, desire and interest have a bearing on which language he is most suited for. If qualified in one language, instruction in another is more appropriate. This, plus splitting a detachment, produces a multilanguage capability. For a language to be grasped by the average individual, home study is a necessity. Whenever possible, language training is the sole instructional requirement placed upon a detachment throughout the language training program. Because of available time, stress is placed on conversation and survival rather than on fluency. L. Intelligence is probably one of the most important and probably the most neglected aspect of a detachment's training. The VDP requires detachments to move into doubtful areas of operation where reliance is placed upon "strangers". Security is a risk and all intelligence functions are often cumbersome and vulnerable during the early stages of the program. The degree of chance that is accepted, compounds the intelligence effort. As a result, the intelligence sergeant must be well trained in his field; and all other personnel completely competent in combat intelligence as-

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 357 pects. As previously stated, the intelligence sergeant must be MOS qualified. When he enters pre-deployment training he receives specific intelligence training required for the VDP and/or peculiar to the area of operations. This training is best presented by intelligence specialists. The remainder of the detachment receives intelligence training from the intelligence sergeant. When conducting this training, it is remembered that intelligence is best obtained by the indigenous personnel. These are the people that must be further trained to interrogate, evaluate, obtain, and interpret intelligence to include the operation of nets and informer systems. However, detachments always continue to carry on a degree of their own intelligence for internal security and welfare. When operational areas become more complex due to the expansion of the VDP, the request for augmentation of intelligence experts from SAF, is made. A detachment cannot function beyond its capabilities. Of equal consideration is assistance from the Vietnamese intelligence specialists and police forces. Intelligence is everyone business. Training is conducted to make each individual of the des tachment, proficient within their capabilities and responsibilities. M. Until a short time ago engineer training for Special Forces detachments was primarily destructive techniques (demolitions). For CI roles and for VD, constructive engineer tasks take on great importance. Engineer specialists are completely MOS qualified in all aspects of their spe-

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 358 cialty, not only demolitions and fortification, for constructive civic action projects require a great deal of his effort. Initially, fortifications, shelters, minefields, bridging and other defensive and tactical considerations are of primary importance. As the VDP expands so do the civic action functions. The labor is performed by the indigenous people under the supervision of the engineer specialists and later (major projects) under the supervision of civil affairs experts who augments the program. Heavy equipment, to include operators, is secured from Vietnamese sources to foster relationships. In most instances, the people have more talent and knowledge of agriculture, carpentry, masonry, and working with native materials, than do civic action specialists. The training of engineer specialists is concentrated on recognizing better ways of accomplishing tasks and procuring or devising the means to accomplish them. Civic action projects are based upon the customs, environment, and social adaptability of the people. A house made of brick, constructed in the finest fashion, isn't civic action for people who dwell in houses made of bamboo and straw. Civic action does not mean "westernizing"; it means improving social standards, environment and health. N. Psychological operations is merely recognizing a problem and eliminating it in a manner favorable to the local population. Therefore, the training is simple and in the form of orientation or refresher training.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 359 Psychological operations are most effective when presented by the indigenous people. A better reaction and understanding is achieved by the people when they hear one of their own present a message. Propaganda in the form of printed matter is best understood when the message is simple and in cartoon fashion. The use of native materials, with the characters and sketches depicting objects and things recognizable to the people, is imperative. Propaganda in the form of oral presentations is best understood when the message is simple and brief and the traditions and customs of the people is played upon. The greatest reaction and effect of psychological operations is derived from the promised action or deed being performed. Promises which are not fulfilled have an adverse effect. O. Weapons training places emphasis on firing, repairing, and maintaining the numerous foreign weapons that are associated with the VDP. P. Area studies are conducted with precision, accuracy of materials and by those familiar with the area of operations. Voluminous materials are screened and only pertinent information is formally presented. Political structures of the country, the organization of MAAG and other agencies, and legal aspects is included in the instruction. V. Training Program The training program depicted is one which was implemented within the 1st Special Forces Group (ABN), Okinawa, in April 1963. A. Master Training Program

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 360 Language Training 100 hours FTX's 288 hours Area Study 22 hours Psychological Operations 12 hours Intelligence 40 hours Civic Action 8 hours Engineer 40 hours Medical 40 hours Cross-training 24 hours Detachment commanders time 100 hours B. Master Training Plan (10 weeks) 1. 1st week A six day FTX with emphasis placed upon survival, compatibility, endurance, and individual qualities of detachment personnel. 2. 2d week (specialist training). Subject Hours Responsibility Intelligence 20 441st Intel Det Engineer 20 539th Eng Det Communications 20 Signal Plat, 1st SFG

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 361 Civic actions 8 97th Civil Affairs Grp Medical 20 156th Medical Det Det cmdrs time 24 (A) This training, less civic action, runs concurrently. The specialists of each field attend that training which pertains to them. The detachment commander prescribes which of this training other members of the detachment attend. (B) The entire detachment attends civic action training. 3. 3d week (specialist training). Subject Hours Responsibility Intelligence 20 441st Intel Det Engineer 20 539th Eng Det Communications 20 Signal Plat, 1st SFG Medical 20 156th Med Det Psychological 12 14th Psywar Bn operations Det cmdrs time 12 (A) This training, less psychological operations, runs concurrently. The specialists of each field attend that training which pertains to them. The detachment commander prescribes which of this training other members of the detachment attend. (B) The entire detachment attends psychological operations training.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 362 4. 4th week (cross-training). Subject Hours Responsibility Intelligence 6 Intel Sgt Medical 4 Med Specialist Communications 6 Commo Sgt Engineer 4 Engr Specialist Weapons 4 Weapons Sgt Det cmdrs time 20 (A) This training is increased or supplemented utilizing detachment commanders time and-or off-duty time. 5. 5th thru 8th weeks (language training) Subject Hours Responsibility Language classes 15 Education center Language study 10 Detachment cmdr Det cmdrs time 14 6. 9th week A six day FTX with emphasis on those aspects of the VDP which the detachment will be exposed to when committed.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 363 7. 10th week (area study). Subject Hours Responsibility Area study 24 S2, 1st SFG Det cmdrs time 20 VI. Training Scope A. 1st FTX As prescribed by the detachment commander. B. 2d FTX A controlled exercise which incorporates the preparation for employment, deployment, establishing a base (OB) of operations, recruiting indigenous personnel, and performing the various functions of the VDP i.e., security, intelligence, training, civic action, psychological operations, communications, logistics procedures, medical, etc. C. Language training Emphasis is placed on conversation and survival proficiency rather than fluency. D. Area study Conducted in five phases, this training encompasses political briefings by qualified personnel; detachment study of reports and documents; area briefings by experienced personnel; individual study by members of the detachment on their specialties; and briefbacks by each member of the detachment.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON E. Psychological operations Introduction to psychological operations Key communicators Face to face persuasion Radio broadcasting and loudspeakers Printed media Psychological actions Role of the individual F. Intelligence Introduction to intelligence in Southeast Asia Observation and description Principles of identification Introduction to fingerprinting Practical work in fingerprinting Introduction to photography Use of photographic equipment Field photography and identification Warning net operations Introduction

364 1 hour 1 hour 2 hours 1 hour 3 hours 2 hours 2 hours 1 hour 2 hours 1 hour 1 hour 1 hour 2 hours 4 hours 1 hour

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON Operational planning Spotting Selection Recruiting Vetting Control measures Informer meetings Interview techniques Informant reports Informer payments Disposal Communications methods and techniques Casings Cut-out operations Combat intelligence Counterinsurgency intelligence practical exercise G. Civic action Introduction to civic actions Engineer assistance in civic actions

365 2 hours 1 hour 1 hour 1 hour 1 hour 1 hour 1 hour 1 hour 1 hour 1 hour 1 hour 1 hour 1 hour 4 hours 4 hours 5 hours 2 hours 2 hours

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON Medical assistance in civic action Economic development in civic action Coordination in civic action H. Engineer Introduction Heavy equipment Generators and lighting Mines and minefields Rigging and field fortifications Expedient bridging I. Medical Sanitation Public health Introduction Epidemology Control of communicable diseases Source of water supplies Waste disposal and field disposal methods Insect and rodent control

366 1 hour 2 hours 1 hour 1 hour 19 hours 5 hours 5 hours 5 hours 5 hours 20 hours 1 hour 1 hour 1 hour 1 hour 4 hours 3 hours 10 hours

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 367 J. Detachment commanders time 1. OJT for specialists at hospitals, engineer units, ordnance units, communications facilities, etc. 2. Physical training, marches, etc. 3. Maintenance of equipment. 4. Administrative requirements i.e., dental treatment, passports, drivers licenses, parachute jumps, etc. 5. Additional cross-training, language training, other training, as necessary. VII. Conclusion Like all training programs, priorities are established based upon the available time, available instructors, experience and state of training of the detachment. It is further styled to conform to the mission, intelligence of the area of operations, the indigenous forces state of training, and the type equipment available for training the indigenous force. Common obstacles which threaten the pre-deployment training program are: administrative impositions, lack of individual motivation, and unqualified instructors. Although all training has some merit, specific training of VDP subjects has a far more reaching effect if undertaken prior to assuming this type of mission.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 368 Chapter Twenty One Affairs of U. S. Personnel I. General The number of control personnel required to operationally conduct a VDP cannot be standardized or pre-determined. The VDP described herein was initiated by a Special Forces "A" detachment (-) of one officer and six enlisted men. Within eight months a "B" detachment (six officers and 17 enlisted men) and four "A" detachments (two officers and 10 enlisted men per detachment) were committed to expanding the program. Circumstances and conditions change and seldom can tasks be accomplished in a like manner from the first phase (preparation) through ensuing phases of the VDP. Expansion creates numerous problems, and adjustments are required to meet the conditions of each development phase. This chapter presents a personal outlook on how U.S. personnel prepare and conduct themselves to meet all contingencies associated with VD. II. Prior to Commitment A. Training When notified of commitment, the detachment prepares itself by undergoing predeployment training (Chapter Twenty). It is wise for replacement detachments to have a one week overlap in-country prior to conducting the relief. It is also profitable to have the detachment commander or his representative visit the area of operations prior to the detachment enter-

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 369 ing pre-deployment training if at all possible. Much can be gained that would otherwise be unforeseen concerning the program and the area of operations. B. Personal Affairs The Special Forces group admin section arranges and provides personnel support. The marital status and family obligations of each individual will determine what arrangements he must make with respect to the following considerations. 1. Will. It is advisable that all personnel prepare a legal will or update an existing one. 2. Power of Attorney. This is an extremely important document particularly when property owned by one individual is left in the care of another. This is a powerful instrument which should be prepared to confine the bearer to take only those actions specifically desired by the owner. 3. Allotments. Arrangements are made to insure that dependents receive sufficient money to sustain themselves; and that creditors receive timely payments. Pay checks which are sent to the committed soldier may be delayed for a month or longer for a number of reasons. 4. Legal Advice The legal responsibilities of an individual are discussed by the Staff Judge Advocate (pamphlets might be prepared). This discussion is followed by a personal interview for those

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 370 who require specific advice. The legal aspects of counterinsurgency operations as well as the status of forces agreements are also presented at this time. 5. Miscellaneous. The storage of automobiles, clothing and personal effects, movement of dependents, etc. are accomplished in conjunction with clearing station activities. C. Administrative Actions. Procedures for accomplishing personal matters and administrative actions, are largely governed by the status of the committed detachment - temporary duty (TDY) versus a permanent change of station (PCS). Regulations and SOP's will dictate what is to be accomplished prior to departure; and that which will be accomplished at the arriving station. The following are for consideration. 1. Updating Personnel Records. 2. Updating Financial Records. 3. Processing Passports. 4. Medical and Dental Examinations 5. Security Clearances 6. Supply Actions 7. Military Drivers License 8. Identification Tags, Identification Cards, etc.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 371 9. Immunizations. D. Clothing, Equipment, and Personal Effects The terrain, climate, mission, and supply procedures influence what types of supplies are required. Another factor is whether the detachment is committed as military or civilian personnel. We were committed in civilian clothes and this is reflected in the discussion which follows. Otherwise, uniform regulations and policies will provide the appropriate dress requirements. 1. Clothing. (A). General. Dark clothing is more suitable for all aspects of the VDP. Both dress and field clothing is required with wash-and-wear the more appropriate. Local social functions (Province Chief, MAAG, Vietnamese military commanders, etc.) official visits to Saigon, and R&R require various forms of attire. (B). Items. Fatigues, jungle uniforms, and commercially manufactured hunting suits ("tiger suits") are ideally suited for field work. Other durable trousers (Levi's, dungarees, denims, cords, etc.) and shirts (sweatshirts, jungle sweaters, sport shirts, etc.) are suitable for wear at the OB and other secure areas. Undershirts and underwear are seldom worn on operations because of the binding effect and the restriction imposed to air reaching the skin. This, however, is a personal preference.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 372 Jungle boots, combat boots and tennis shoes are required foot-wear. Tennis shoes are ideally suited for wear at the OB particularly in wet, muddy weather. Combat boots repel the elements more readily when oiled rather than shined. This reduces the life of the boot but adds comfort and reduces foot diseases. Socks, handkerchiefs, a cap and other clothing is determined by personal preference. The area of operations may require that field jackets, rainwear, and other specific items be brought to the area. (C). Most of the above listed clothing can be obtained in-country either on the economy or through military channels (depending on the situation). However, procurement may be delayed for a number of reasons, and therefore a minimum amount of clothing (required items) must accompany the person. 2. Individual Equipment. (A). General Once again, that equipment which is most suitable for accomplishing the mission is selected. Normal field equipment or substitute items are suitable for the VDP. (B). Items. Each individual carries a shoulder weapon of his own choice. Those characteristic of being light, able to produce a heavy volume of accurate fire, easy to maintain, and easy to supply with ammunition, were preferred by most. Other equipment such as canteens, field pack

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 373 (rucksack), compass, knife, watch, appropriate sleeping gear (air mattress, hammock, sleeping bag, etc.), individual survival kit, etc., are also required. 3. Personal Effects. Shaving items, hygienic items, towels, shower shoes, transistor radio, letter writing materials, etc., are also items for consideration. 4. Detachment Equipment. This requirement is discussed in Chapter Twelve (Logistics). III. Commitment. A. General Once a detachment has entered the operational area there are many factors and implications which influence the habits of individual team members. These factors can generally be categorized as follows: 1. Behavior. 2. Appearance. 3. Actions. 4. Activities. 5. Relations. 6. Welfare of the individual.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 374 The discussion which follows cannot accurately portray all that is required for adaptation to a specific VDP. It can, however, prepare individuals to anticipate and plan prior to commitment. Adjustments can then be easily implemented depending upon the situation after commitment. B. Behavior Most service personnel are continually made aware of individual conduct in overseas (foreign) areas. In this type program, where so few Americans represent the American image, it is extremely important that they conduct themselves in a manner acceptable to the indigenous population (Montagnard and Vietnamese) and conform to the standards placed upon Americans by the in-country authority. The Special Forces Detachment, because of its independent and intriguing mission, may well be belittled by the Vietnamese (who dislike the Montagnards and have misgivings towards any program designed to assist them); envied by other American personnel (MAAG, MAC-V, etc.) because of professional jealousies; or hated by third party nationals (French businessmen, plantation owners, etc.) because of their disconcern for the Americans and the pressures brought upon them by the VC because of U.S. activity. This subjects the detachment to criticism even when at their best. Animosity, drunkenness, disrespect, loss of temper, ridicule, and so on, by any one individual detracts from the VDP. Each member must always be alert and aware of the effect of his actions; and under control of his senses at all times. Any relaxation of this self-discipline subjects the individual to emotional outbursts under the

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 375 tense and constant pressures of the operation. The "tongue-in-cheek" attitude is very often the best solution to most situations. C. Appearance An isolated commitment in a combat situation invites a relaxation of personal appearance standards, but in my mind doesn't condone or endorse them. This is not to reject adjustments and easing of standards but to emphasize that proper personal hygiene is mandatory for maximum efficiency. Personnel are required to wash and shave regularly. Cleanliness reduces infections and combats disease and irritations. Shaving on a daily basis is not a requirement but a personal preference based upon the situation and the activities which transpire. Daily shaves irritate the skin and small nicks and scrapes invite infection which lead to more serious problems. Growing a mustache appears to be an American custom when on isolated or combat duty. To me this is quite acceptable for it doesn't deter from an individual's bearing while it does offer a personal responsibility and inducement towards achieving a desired goal. A beard is another matter. I am personally against growing a beard primarily for health reasons. However, there may be occasions when it is desirable for the accomplishment of a task. Many of the Montagnards associate a goatee with a Samaritan due to the habitual beard of the French missionaries. Therefore, medical personnel may do well to grow a beard so as to be easily recognized and accepted by the remote villagers.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 376 Hair is kept trimmed and clothing is worn to meet the situation. When Americans go on operations they dress similar to the SF; when departing the operational area (R&R, render reports to Saigon, coordinate, etc.) they wear appropriate civilian clothes; when at the OB, clean, presentable, and comfortable clothing (uniforms) is required; and when permitted to visit the local city (Ban Methout) either for pleasure or business with MAAG, Provincial Headquarters, ARVN Headquarters, etc., the dress is impeccable. Arms are never carried on the person outside the operational area; nor are exposed arms carried into the city except when on military operations (.38 cal pistols are concealed and carried on the person for self-defense). D. Actions The control team directs all facets of the VDP and are not considered to be advisors (except perhaps in the eyes of outsiders). Decisions are gradually relinquished to the indigenous commanders (as outlined in Chapter Eight) but the control team never relinquishes its authority to influence the situation. When the indigenous force attempts to disregard this authority, all support is immediately withdrawn (pay, equipment, supplies, etc.) and, if need be, the program disbanded. American personnel must set the example and use every opportunity to impress the Montagnards with their military skills and talents without being egotistical. On one occasion my commo chief, who was a crack shot and ardent hunter, picked off a tree squirrel with one shot from his carbine. Several of the Rhade had first tried vainly to down the squirrel and when the American bagged it they flocked around him seeking advice and assistance. Thereafter, they

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 377 deeply respected his decisions. Another member of the team was a fair shot with the long-bow. In competition with the Rhade, who use the cross-bow, he excelled and was thereafter more eagerly approached by the Rhade for guidance. When a village is visited, the chief is always called upon first and greeted with respect. The children, who always flock around, are presented candy or toys. On one occasion, my operations sergeant (informed that the village was in need of a clock for posting their sentries), presented a clock to the military commander. Shortly thereafter, the OB was besieged with other village leaders who wanted to know "Where is my clock?" The Rhade share almost all that they have on a community basis and they couldn't conceive why one village was given a clock while the others were not. After solving this problem, I made certain the team used greater restraint in providing gifts to villagers. When on operations, Americans accept the same standards of discipline they expect of the Montagnards; share the same food or lack of it; and endure the same comforts and hardships as other members of the force. It will be noted that while on operations the Rhade assign two or three men to each American as bodyguards. It is their duty to protect the American and keep him out of danger. Thus, they attempt to place him well to the rear of the column; or if in ambush, well away from the killing zone. They feel that losing an American in combat will disgrace their tribe and they take every precaution to prevent this.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 378 After a village has been seized and searched, the villagers are assembled and the SF commander and the American apologize to the people for the inconvenience. Through the use of propaganda the VC is placed at fault. It is only after a village has been trained and armed that complete loyalty can be expected. Untrained/unarmed villages don't have the means to oppose the VC and must sometimes support them to remain alive. It is acts such as these which gain the allegiance and support of the people. However, not all acts can be wholesome and pleasant. There are times when repressive measures are required to convince those who know only the rule of the "Iron Fist" what is expected from them with regards to supporting the VDP. It is important that effective psychological operations be conducted in conjunction with physical retributions. E. Activities An important aspect of the VDP is the requirement to provide adequate avocations whenever the situation and time permits. Idle moments must be occupied with constructive undertakings which are beneficial to the individual. As previously mentioned, contests, games of skill, movies, card playing, reading, music, etc. are all a part of the daily routine at the OB. The accumulation of pets, particularly monkeys, provided hours of amusement and entertainment. Once the villagers were aware of our interest in animals they provided us with monkeys, deer, civet cats, myna birds, parrots, turtles, great horn billed birds and others for our menagerie (Figures 103 and 104).

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON

379

FIG 103. PETS (MOUSE DEER)

FIG 104. PETS (WEEK-OLD GIBBONS)

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 380 Security is the deciding factor as to what length activities may be pursued. Never is the safety of the individual left in doubt when permitting him to partake in these activities. Hunting is a sport enjoyed by most military personnel. The Rhade hunted primarily for food while the Americans hunted for the sport of it. I permitted my personnel to hunt in pairs and in specified "white areas" when the situation allowed. On several occasions they participated in tiger hunts with the Montagnards who used elephants to flush out the prey. Hunting while on operations, firing at birds and monkeys in the vicinity of the OB perimeter, and firing at game from within any village is prohibited. This is for safety as well as tactical considerations (Figure 105). Personnel are permitted to go to the village or town on a selected basis. A curfew is imposed and the routes and scheduling of these visits is not stereotyped. Overnight visits were not authorized in this situation while the vehicle used to transport personnel was never left unattended. For this purpose we used the MAAG compound for parking the vehicle. The Sret, with whom we had an excellent relationship, maintained, at my request, a secure watch and surveillance over the Americans and their activities. They also pointed us to those establishments which they knew to be pro-American and where we would not be subjected to danger. It was not my intention to spy on my people or to restrict their activities, but to keep them out of trouble, and alive. I am certain that when I went to town I was also kept under surveillance and to be truthful, I felt more secure for it. Upon my departure from this mission the chief of the Sret of

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 381 Ban Methout took great pleasure in destroying a listing of Americans and their activities and associations during the six month period we were in the area. I took great pleasure in departing the area with all my men in one piece. R&R to Saigon was incorporated with other tasks needed to be accomplished on a regular basis. On the average, personnel were sent to Saigon (in pairs) once every six to eight weeks for three days. They functioned as couriers, to purchase supplies at the commissary and PX, render reports to the command element in Saigon, and to conduct other duties as required. I felt this opportunity for relaxation was required to maintain the proficiency and effectiveness of the individuals who receive little peace of mind when continuously subjected to VC actions while in the operations area. Because of cross-training, the overlap in duties and assignments, and the acceptance of the Montagnards into key positions with delegated authority, it was possible to permit individuals to be away from the OB for short periods without detracting from the functioning of the VDP. No one individual was considered indispensable and the team performed as well during the absence of any individual, including the Team Commander, as it did otherwise (although it was always a welcome relief for me to have the personnel return). This instilled a greater confidence that the VDP could and would continue to operate without the services of any member who became a casualty.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON

382

FIG 105. (ABOVE) A SUCCESSFUL HUNTING TRIP FIG 106. (RIGHT) ASSOCIATION WITH SF COMMANDER

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 383 F. Relations Relationships with the Montagnards are cordial, friendly, and intimate. I did, however, forbid the Americans to fondle or have an affair with any Rhade women. I felt very strongly about this point, as I believed serious implications could develop. In this situation, where American personnel were provided frequent visits to town and were permitted R&R to Saigon, I felt that sexual desires could be fulfilled during these visits. In a different type environment, where Americans are confined to a remote region for extended durations, then perhaps some controlled system for sexual outlets may be necessary. In this situation, however, Rhade women were "off limits" even when offered. Association with the SF and villagers, off-duty as well as on-duty, is encouraged. At no time, however, is the military relationship downgraded for intimacy or friendship. This position was respected by the Rhade who appeared to be overly cautious in ever permitting themselves to take advantage of the Americans (Figure 106). We participated in those ceremonies which were directly related to the program; and respected Rhade customs. When the dead were buried (as a result of military action) the team commander or his representative made an appearance; Americans donated needed blood for Rhade sick; and we took a special interest in the children.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 384 The privacy and modesty of the women who bathed, combed their hair, etc., in the nude or scantily clad, was respected and nothing was done to embarrass them or cause them to change this practice. G. Welfare of the Individual In an isolated situation, particularly when operating thousands of miles from a parent unit, the concern for those on TDY or detached duty may be overlooked by the parent headquarters. Procedures for promotion, pro-pay qualification, emergency leave, replacements, hazardous-duty and incentive-pay requirements, awards and decorations, efficiency reports, and others cannot be overlooked or disregarded simply because qualified personnel are in an environment which precludes them from protecting their interests. Adjustments or leniency in policies may be needed whereby the individual is not penalized or his career jeopardized. The requirement to perform parachute jumps is often a hardship (this was later relaxed in 1965); to be tested for pro-pay is usually impractical; and efficiency reports on officers are often prepared by superiors who seldom, if ever, witnessed the performance of duty of the rated officer. IV. Conclusion American personnel have an obligation to perform their tasks in a manner which best accomplishes the mission. The many hardships, temptations, and frustrations associated with this type of operation can very easily overtake an individual who is not properly trained, motivated,

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 385 and, offered proper leadership. By the same token, the support headquarters and parent unit have an obligation to perform their functions in a manner which is considerate of the committed detachment.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 386 Conclusion The VDP described in this report is not a remedy for all insurgencies. It is simply a program, one of many programs, which may have a place in a country-plan under certain situations and degrees of insurgent activity. It is a program which can be modified and adjusted to complement large-scale involvement by U.S. combat forces (such as Vietnam); supplement national programs where there are no U.S. combat forces engaged in military operations (such as Vietnam prior to 1964 or Thailand today); or to be employed as a civil affairs program in remote areas of the world (such as Africa and South America). The success of this type program is not determined by casualty figures or battle decisions, nor by the number of troops committed or decorations awarded. It can only be determined successful or unsuccessful by the progress and inroads made by the population to improve their social-economic standards while they increase their determination to combat man, nature, sickness and disease to retain new found hope. To succeed, this type of program requires the complete faith and support of the local government as well as the resources to operate the program. In comparison with other endeavors of this type I think the cost of the VDP is significantly less and the results considerably more evident. I don't feel we could afford to neglect or withdraw support from the Montagnards of Southeast Asia. I make this statement as an unqualified layman of foreign policy and military planning

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 387 objectives. I am not fully aware of what is being accomplished by the U.S. and the GVN in respect to the Montagnards and though I feel I know the Montagnards well, I further realize that I don't know the Vietnamese. However, today (1963) the Montagnards are pro-American and are willing to support the GVN in return for more liberal freedoms. They have displayed their courage, loyalty, and willingness to fight for a cause in which they believe and support. I don't feel the tribesmen will ever willingly take sides with the VC even though only recently they outwardly displayed discontent and dismay with the political situation. But for how long could they afford to be passively neutral? The VC and North Vietnamese realize better than we do that population support is extremely necessary to achieve goals in South Vietnam today. I sincerely hope that the Rhade have not forgotten the VDP and the progress that was made. Only one year after the program was initiated they had achieved most of the objectives required for a successful operation. In 1963 the program was gradually replaced by the Civilian Irregular Defense Group program. I am thankful for the untiring efforts of the Rhade and for having had the opportunity to work with them. I know this is also the feeling of the other Americans who participated in Village Defense.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 388 AN OVERVIEW (Colonel Ronald A. Shackleton 1974) The past twenty years in Vietnam plainly offers a case history of revolutionary warfare of all dimensions. It originates with a successful revolution against an external colonial power only to immediately confront itself with internal civil strike and the splitting of the nation into two republics--North and South. From the beginning, this situation fomented the North to plan and organize for insurgency in the South through the various phases of insurgency until it reached the proportions it did in the sixties. It is the fifties, however, which offer glaring examples of how neglect of the peasant tribes and the remote but strategic highlands they occupied caused unnecessary poor judgments by the South Vietnamese government in their strategic planning for counter-revolutionary policies and programs. Conversely, the sixties showed emphasis on harnessing this potential force by the Government of South Vietnam (GVN) and the significant contribution the Montagnards* made to the counterinsurgency effort. Just as their Cham predecessors had done, the Vietnamese consolidated their hold on the more appealing lowlands. This narrow belt of land, which extends from the Demilitarized Zone south along the China Sea coast into the rich Delta regions, was literally teeming with Vietnamese while the plateau and mountain areas to the west were sparsely settled. The remote and in*

Indigenous tribal groups who occupy the highlands from the 17th Parallel south to the Saigon Plain. They are racially and linguistically distinct from the lowland Vietnamese.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 389 hospitable forests, desolate plains, and primitive tribes presented this area as unattractive to the non-venturesome Vietnamese. It was more than they wished to face. Even the GVN failed to take interest in this area where fewer than five percent of the Vietnamese lived and then in only a few choice government sponsored settlements. This short-sightedness ultimately played havoc with the security programs established for the lowlands. There was no depth from which security forces could operate.1 In the highlands the Montagnards tolerated the Vietnamese overlordship with little grace and passion. Once the tribal chiefs made their formal submission and paid a symbolic tribute of ivory, precious woods, and spices, the tribes were generally left to themselves and their traditional leaders. This relationship lasted until 1955. The failure to integrate the tribal minorities into the Vietnamese national community sooner, created serious problems. In September 1951, probing stabs into the highlands by the Viet Minh found the French positions there to be weak, isolated, strewn in dribbles over roadless expanses, at the end of precarious supply lines, and distant from French logistical bases and airfields. It didn't require a genius to decide this was where the battles should be fought next. These vulnerable outposts were attacked and the highlands became the Viet Minh's major military target rather than the thickly populated and heavily garrisoned lowlands which, because of the rich prizes they contained, proved to be too costly against French mobility, air, and firepower. This same French superiority, however, in the form of tanks, artillery, air bombings, and naval gunfire, was more than

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 390 matched in the dense mountain areas by the cross-country mobility of the enemy foot soldier. Ultimately, sizable French units were destroyed by these concentrated attacks in the highlands-and the Mekong Delta and the coastal lowlands became, not the major theaters of operation, but the major prizes. By 1952 Viet Minh control had slowly spread to the larger Rhade and Jarai tribes. The Viet Minh eventually hollowed out French-Vietnamese enclaves which virtually made the French and Vietnamese prisoners to a few narrow beachheads around Hue, Danang, and Nha Trang. At the time of the Geneva Agreement in 1954, the highlands had the status of Crown Domain and they came directly under the control of Emperor Bao Dai. Subsequently, when the Republic of South Vietnam was formed and the government of Ngo Dinh Diem assumed control of the highlands, the Vietnamese for the first time became responsible for administering the area. There was little to prepare them for the task. The Vietnamese were unfamiliar with the Montagnard and his ways. Their common designation for the dark skinned people, who spoke a strange language, who were sparsely dressed in loin cloths or sarongs, and who did such bizarre things as make animal sacrifices to their Gods, was "savage". The Diem government planned to assimilate the Montagnard into the Vietnamese cultural sphere. From the government's point of view this was to be a civilizing process; but to the Montagnards it was an attempt to destroy their cultural identity and their traditional way of life.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 391 More important was the problem created by the Viet Minh "irregulars" who were left in the South after the exchange of regular troops and prisoners. More than 6000 Rhade and perhaps as many as 4000 warlike Jarai, Bahnar, and Sedang tribesmen had gone North with the Viet Minh in 1954. They reappeared later with a deceptively simple program that afforded "their people", downtrodden under a harsh lowland Vietnamese administration, the prospect of an autonomous area similar to what they had achieved in the North.2 This Communist network began to be noticed in 1956 as they became more and more troublesome. It infiltrated the village systems and made the remote areas the bases for guerrilla operations. Where the Montagnard was concerned, the Saigon regime had much to apologize for. Diem did a great deal to develop the country between 1955 and 1960. But two things must be remembered. First, most of the development was for the Vietnamese refugees who were resettled in the highlands. Little was done for the Montagnards. Second, he offered economic development and political integration at the expense of favoring particular groups. But most of all, he forced a community to grow in the highlands which simply had no future in his society. A community of outcasts with ready made connections to the insurgent apparatus. The Vietnamese government was warned of the negative effects their development plans were having on the Montagnards. The tribesmen were not given even the semblance of local self-government. They were deprived of their ancestral lands, denied adequate schooling, and divested of medical care. By 1960 Diem's government was faced with a determined Communist enemy in the highlands. Their policies and operations were such that they

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 392 had achieved the conditions where they could operate freely in the highlands abetted by the lack of a coherent political structure to oppose them.3 The Montagnards stood alone in their loyalties with no close ties to the national structure. Under such circumstances, they might defend themselves against attack but more often they would seek peace with all armed men. They judged strengths from local incidents and therefore needed little encouragement to determine that the Viet Cong was ever present, always at hand, while government forces were seldom seen. That Diem and others were aware of this is true; that Diem failed to deal adequately with this genuine threat to security is also true. The fault was not in the lack of recognition of the problem. The fault lay in not prescribing and executing the adequate counters to the threat. However, on January 4, 1962 both Saigon and Washington published the terms for a new socioeconomic program of which the eighth point of an eleven point program stated that a special effort would be made to have the Montagnards share in the progress of their lowland compatriots.4 This decree triggered an authorization by Diem for the United States to enjoin him in developing a socio-economic program for the Montagnards to include the security necessary for the program to succeed.5 This was to be the beginning of a "peasant army". The Montagnards were not, at first, willing to accept the terms and conditions offered. After many hours and days of deliberations, however, they agreed to the terms. They were to receive

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 393 economic, political, and social reforms in return for their loyalty to the GVN to include military action against the Viet Cong for the security of the program. "The main reason why the Viet Cong could thrive in the highlands was not so much because the Montagnards were against the government or for the Communists, but they were vulnerable . . . . The villagers were not seeking a revolution. They wanted their old way of life with the cruelties removed. They wanted security, and their loyalty went to the side that gave it to them, along with some simple progress towards a better life and some assurances that the government cared about them and their future."6 It is common knowledge that to be effective an insurgent must have the support of the local populace. This support includes food, recruits, intelligence, laborers and supplies. A guerrilla force, the military arm of the insurgent, also possesses natural advantages for their type of operations. These include knowledge of the terrain, ability to speak the local language, and wisdom in the customs and characteristics of the inhabitants of the area in which they operate. These are conditions which provoked Che Guevera to state, "The guerrilla fighter needs full help from the people in the area. This is an indispensable condition . . . the guerrilla fighter needs to have knowledge of the surrounding countryside, the paths of entry and escape, the possibilities of speedy maneuver, good hiding places; naturally, also, he must count on the support of the people."7

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 394 Just as civilian support is the essential element for successful guerrilla operations, it is also a vital prerequisite for counter-guerrilla operations. Strategically, therefore, the Montagnards should have been recognized as an essential element for victory in the war in Vietnam. 'For he who knows the people, the trails, the place to obtain food can control the region.' The Montagnards alone had this knowledge of the Central Highlands. Therefore, he who won the allegiance of the Montagnards would control this region. The United States faced a similar problem during the period of the Philippine Constabulary. "The army tried to fight guerrillas, but with little success. The enemy faded into the jungle, and the unwieldy regular units were too burdened with equipment, too slow to follow . . . . But, finally, the United States found the solution to the guerrilla problem in the Philippines. We recruited native Filipinos--men wise to jungle ways, men who knew the trails and the mountains as their own back yard."8 The Montagnards were a primitive people who were naturally at home in the jungles and mountains of Central Vietnam. They were hunters and trackers, adept at living off the land, and their physical stamina made them ideally suited for counter-guerrilla warfare. The Vietnamese had at their disposal the greatest civilian force for fighting jungle war in all Southeast Asia. Approximately 700,000 Montagnards occupied more than half the land of the Republic of Vietnam though they made up only five percent of the total population.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 395 "The Communists were defeated in Malaya because eventually enough of the people in the villages were willing to help find the guerrillas and kill them. Why did the villagers do this? Because they trusted the Malayan government? Because they believed this was better than anything the Communists could offer them? Because it offered tangible and increasing prosperity at village level ? Because they were sick of living in the midst of guerrilla warfare? All of these yes; but above all because they became increasingly confident that they would be protected if they took the risk of giving information."9 The Montagnards were discontent, tired and averse to living in the midst of guerrilla warfare. They were being harassed and exploited by both the Vietnamese government and the insurgent, i.e., taxed and levied upon, which offered little peace and security and no future. All they really wanted was to be left alone. They were capable of self-protection if given the means. These were the conditions that suggested the need for the Montagnards to be armed, taught to shot, and trained so that they would have the capability to defend their own villages. In conjunction with these physical security measures would be government civic action programs promoting the economic and social status of the Montagnards. This denial operation would have some military significance but the aim was to form a closer link between the GVN and the Montagnards. The psychological impact it would have on the Viet Cong would greatly outweigh the military contribution. The Viet Cong's access to the Montagnards would be denied. This program was developed along the lines of training interested tribesmen in the use of

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 396 weapons and defensive tactics for the protection of their homes, families, land, and possessions from the terrorisms of the Viet Cong. The object was not to resettle the villagers into strong, centrally located villages. Rather, it was intended to provide the villagers a means to protect what was theirs while they continued to support themselves in the area which was most familiar to them. Village defenders, who received no pay, had to extract their livelihood from the defended area which was the bulwark of this denial operation. No longer would a handful of Viet Cong, armed with one or two weapons, be able to force their wishes upon defended villagers. The Viet Cong now had to mass into large units to obtain food and other necessary support. Once the Viet Cong massed, he created a vulnerable target for the regular military forces or the Montagnard strike force. This strike force was a well armed, highly trained reaction force. It had the mobility to assist villages which came under attack. The strike force was employed on a fulltime basis and received pay equivalent to that of the Vietnamese Civil Guards. Additionally, they conducted offensive operations to keep the Viet Cong off-balance as well as to deter his capability to attack. As more and more villages were trained and armed, the Viet Cong lost more and more support. The accessibility and freedom of movement they once enjoyed no longer went unnoticed nor unreported. The Viet Cong were now forced to revert to repressive measures: seizing rice, conscripting men, and taking hostages in their desperation to survive. "Where voluntary community support . . . cannot be sustained at the desired level, the guerrilla movement almost inevi-

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 397 10 tably will resort to terrorism to compel such support." But even with terror, the guerrilla's most potent weapon and a standard part of his strategy, they lost popular support. They were soon without communal sanctuaries for regrouping after military defeats. The Viet Cong now had to devote a majority of his effort merely to survive. Therefore, his military efforts were reduced considerably. Of equal importance, this program released Vietnamese regular army units to conduct offensive operations in force against the Viet Cong. Otherwise, these forces would find themselves confined to garrison cities, entirely encircled by a hostile countryside. Regular units were no longer depleted for security, patrolling, or population control measures in the remote, isolated rural areas. The protection of the Montagnards was no longer a military responsibility. The village defenders were responsible for their own protection and security. The Vietnamese continually used regular military forces for counterinsurgency operations in the Central Highlands; operations for which they were neither trained nor psychologically suited. " . . . a guerrilla war must be fought primarily by those on the spot. This is so for quite a particular reason. A guerrilla war is an intimate affair, fought not merely with weapons but fought in the minds of men who live in the villages and the hills; fought by the spirit and policy of those who run local government. An outsider cannot, by himself, win a guerrilla war; he can help create conditions in which it can be won; and he can directly assist those prepared to fight for their independence."11

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 398 In the remote Montagnard villages the villagers were isolated from the Vietnamese people and the Vietnamese government. The villagers had turned inward and identified themselves not with Vietnam, but with their family, clan, or village. Efforts of the government had to be directed towards assisting the Montagnards to eliminate this alien feeling that prevailed. "Regular military forces are essential for regular military tasks. But guerrilla warfare is something special . . . . In my judgment, it is nonsense to think that regular forces trained for conventional war can handle guerrillas adequately."12 It would also be fanciful to think that regular forces could effectively employ paramilitary forces without considerable training. In adapting to counter-guerrilla warfare, these forces adopt the same tactics as the Viet Cong: operating in small bands, lightly equipped and mobile, ambushing and surprising the Viet Cong before he can launch at attack on any of their villages. The Vietnamese and the United States employed Special Forces detachments to this program. They were suitably trained and organized to work with peasant forces in remote areas and in an unconventional manner. Tactical operations were designed to protect the villagers but they were also aimed . . . to support the national counterguerrilla programs, to provide protection for indigenous peoples from insurgent exploitation and terrorism, and to gain popular support for the host Vietnamese government."13 The operational concept was as follows: A secure base (village) was established from which the program was supported and controlled. The area was marked-off and the "ink blot" approach14 for arming and training villages began. The villagers were taught the rudiments of self-

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 399 defense. This included village defensive preparations as well as individual training. Fences were constructed around the village and fortifications and shelters were prepared. Systems for patrolling, early warning, communications, collecting and reporting intelligence, village security, population control, and mutual support and coordination with neighboring villages was stressed. As an area became secure, the "ink blot" was enlarged and new villages were brought into the program. "On the military side it will provide a hedge hog of defended villages, i.e. zones of defended villages which will act as a meat grinder when the Communist guerrillas venture into them. Each of the villages will have its own self-defense corps to resist attack. In the empty space between the villages, civil guard strike force units will patrol and lay ambush."15 The guerrilla could no longer rely on surprise nor choose his time and place of attack. Soon he needed food and supplies. Therefore, he was forced to attack a defended village or do without. If he got by the patrols and ambushes, he still must fight his way into the village. The guerrilla became the object of fighting on the terms of his enemy. To fight or engage in battle on other than his own terms is considered too great a risk by a guerrilla force. Thus, the Viet Cong was forced to obtain his support elsewhere. The program was officially considered a resounding success by both the Vietnamese and the United States.16 By August of 1962, only eight months after its inception, over 200 Montagnard villages and nearly 4,000 square kilometers of land (an area nearly the size of the state of Connecticut) was considered secure. Over half of the estimated 120,000 Montagnards living in Dar-

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 400 lac Province (the area of operation for this program) were living in relative freedom and under the protection of thousands of village defenders and a 1,500 man strike force. These people had accepted the training and the mission enthusiastically. They were strongly motivated to oppose the Viet Cong against whom they fought well. It was largely because of the presence of this "peasant army" that the GVN declared Darlac Province secure at the end of 1962. Plans were formulated to revert the program to the control of the Province Chief as well as to expand the "peasant army" concept throughout the country under the now more familiar term of the Civilian Irregular Defense Croup (CIDG).17 This expansion and build-up soon resulted in a significant number of changes to take place in the entire concept of the "peasant army". In February 1962 there was one half of a Special Forces A detachment (one officer and five enlisted men) committed to the Buon Enao project. As the program expanded additional A detachments were dispatched to Vietnam; and by December, 1962 there was the equivalent of 29 Special Forces A detachments spread throughout South Vietnam. It was during this period that responsibility for both logistical and operational aspects of the program was transferred from the U.S. Mission, Vietnam to the recently established United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (USMAC-V). The expansion of the program during the first six months of 1963 was so rapid that much of the criteria established earlier to insure success was either overlooked or ignored. Instead, the emphasis was on speed. Psychological operations were sorely lacking. "It

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 401 18 was no wonder that these projects were not as successful as the Buon Enao experiment." In addition, emphasis was now placed on border surveillance missions. Thus, villagers were resettled--not in the usual manner, i.e., to more secure areas, but to the more remote areas along the Laotian and Cambodian borders--in order that CIDG soldiers could have their families with them. This wasn't quite the same as living, working, fighting for one's own property. This was a primary factor when 18 CIDG border camps were forced to close before they became operational. This displacement was also a paramount factor for the Montagnard uprising (FULRO movement) that took place in Ban Methout on 19 September 1964 when "more than 3,000 heavily armed tribesmen . . . were killing 29 Vietnamese, capturing a hundred more, and seizing 20 Americans U. S. Special Forces advisors as hostages."19 By March of 1964 the conventionalizing of CIDG forces had begun. The importance of the Village Defense concept continued to fall off. The Montagnards were being organized as paid mercenaries. Emphasis was placed on offensive operations. The build-up continued and on 1 October 1964 the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), with an authorized strength of almost 1,300 "green berets" was established at Nha Trang, South Vietnam and co-located with the Vietnamese Special Forces High Command. The latter was to soon take command of the CIDG effort and thus reduce the U. S. role to that of an advisory capacity. In addition, operational control of all CIDG forces was transferred to the Vietnamese Corp commander in whose area they were stationed. Each of the four Corps Tactical Zones would have a U. S. Special Forces C

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 402 detachment and a comparable Vietnamese Special Forces detachment to conduct the CIDG mission. Although the CIDG mission had gone offensive in principle, there was still much of the original area development concepts and objectives undertaken--but as a lesser priority. It was not difficult to understand the changing war in South Vietnam. The introduction of large numbers of U. S. conventional forces into the war zone in 1965 and the presence of North Vietnamese army (NVA) units changed the entire character of the war. It went from a guerrilla insurgency to a conventional war where the enemy relied heavily upon guerrilla tactics. In addition to the offensive shift in the CIDG mission, the expanded U. S. presence had other effects on the CIDG forces. These paramilitary forces were often misused by commanders who knew little or nothing of their capabilities and limitations. The CIDG mission was constantly being altered or revised to satisfy the whims of conventional commanders; or to fill voids in both the U. S. and ARVN capabilities and capacities to fight the war: from clear and hold to search and seize, border surveillance to destruction of VC forces, intelligence gathering to destruction of the VC infrastructure, and from reconnaissance to pacification. An ever changing mission and always in support, coordination, or conjunction with conventional forces. The CIDG forces became "gypsies of the battlefield". The concept of Vietnamization, which became the focal point for all U. S. strategy in Vietnam in 1969, might well have been conceived from the CIDG program. From the outset, the CIDG program was designed to help the Vietnamese win their war. With even the increase in the CIDG effort of from six U. S. Special Forces soldiers in 1962 to

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 403 nearly 2700 at the peak of the CIDG effort in 1969, no one could interpret this as an escalation on the part of the U.S.20 This simply portrayed the growth and significance of the "peasant army" concept as it reached a total force of over 70,000 active, armed peasants. Additionally, there have been many thousands who were trained under the CIDG program, who later joined or converted into Regional Forces (RF) or Popular Forces (PF). In January 1970, 44 CIDG strike force battalions completed conversion, in place, to ARVN Ranger battalions. The cycle was completed and the "peasant army" was assimilated into the government's armed force structure. It must be mentioned that the initial cost of equipping a peasant soldier was less than $10; and in terms of sustaining him in the field, about $1 per day. This changed dramatically in 1965 when the CIDG mission was changed to that of the offensive. The latest weapons and equipment were issued to the peasant and thus the cost rose to almost $200 per man for equipment ($145 for the M16 rifle alone) and to nearly $6 per day to keep him in the field. This was still cheap when compared to the nearly $400 per man it took to equip the ARVN and U.S. soldier; and the $12 and $30 respectively it cost to sustain them in the field. Equally important, is that less than 400 Americans died as a result of combat action during the eight years the CIDG program was in being.21 By body count, the ratio of indigenous CIDG battlefield losses to that of the enemy was about 1:15. The reputation of the CIDG forces as combat skilled rests on the lips of every U.S. and Vietnamese unit who have conducted operations with them. They strongly attest to the battlefield skills and valor of the CIDG forces.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 404 Another of the most significant aspects of the CIDG program is the civic action accomplishments that were dedicated and contributed to the well being of the rural peasant. In round numbers, the following are some of the major efforts: hospitals established (125), dispensaries established (425), educational activities (35,000), instances of economic aid (50,000), welfare activities (36,000), refugees supported (500,000), medical programs (11,000), wells dug (6,500), churches established (130), classrooms built (1,000), markets established (280), bridges built (680), and kilometers of road laid (2,000). Even in war people tire of words and promises. They end up valuing only individual acts. "In the chaos of values, human attachment may come to be a substitute for values, and people may take great risks for the man who inoculates a baby or helps an old woman."22 Those areas of internal war that, despite their military implications, are essentially social, economic, and political are perhaps better managed by the involved people themselves. In an insurgency, such as has been described herein, the government cannot hope to handle but apart of the war with conventional regular forces. Now that the concept of a "peasant army" has been tested and explored the results cannot be put aside as history. They must be evaluated as "experience".

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 405 FOOTNOTES 1 Fall, The Two Vietnams, op. cit., pp. 119-121. 2 Ibid, Appendix I, p. 399. Contains an official translation of the text of the North Vietnamese Constitution of 1960. 3 Accommodation with the Viet Cong in the relatively unprotected villages became a way of insuring life. Defenseless, village survival rested on unwilling cooperation with the superior and resident Viet Cong power. 4 This program focused on new joint efforts to broaden and accelerate assistance to the countryside; and to support a comprehensive and coordinated program utilizing paramilitary forces. 5 U. S. agencies undertook this mission rather than the Vietnamese for a number of reasons. First, the Saigon government neither had the troops nor the expertise to conduct such a program. Second, the peasants were more receptive to have the U. S. work with them than a heretofore unresponsive and "unfriendly" government. Third, the U. S. would finance the program under these arrangements. Fourth, the Vietnamese, and many senior U. S. military officers for that matter, did not have much hope for the program succeeding. Therefore, they did not want to be associated with what could be a political failure. 6 Roger Hilsman, "Plea for 'Realism' In Southeast Asia", New York Times Magazine, 23 August 1964, p. 26.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 406 7 Ernesto Guevera, La Guerra de Las Guerrillas, (Havana: n.p., 1960), p. 17. 8 Roger Hilsman, "Internal War: The New Communist Tactic", Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. XXVIII, No. 23 (15 September 1061); p. 711. 9 Richard L. Clutterbuck, "Communist Defeat in Malaya", Military Review, Vol. XLIII, No. 9 (September 1963), p. 63. 10 Virgil Ney, Guerrilla Warfare Principles and Practices, (Washington, D. C., Command Publications, 1961), p. 14. 11 Walt W. Rostow, "Countering Guerrilla Attack", Army Magazine, Vol. XII, No. 2, (September 1962), p. 56. 12 Hilsman, Vital Speeches of the Day, op. cit., p. 711. 13 U. S. Department of the Army, FM 31-21: Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations w/C1, (Washington: September 1961), p. 7. 14 The term used for expanding the pacification effort from the center outward; much in the same way a blot of ink on a blotter expands. 15 Roger Hilsman, "A Report On South Vietnam", The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLVII, No. 1215 (8 October 1962), p. 526. 16 A matter of official record which can be substantiated in official U. S. military and other agency documents.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 407 17 Francis Kelly, U. S. Army Special Forces in the Republic of Vietnam, (unpublished monograph, 1971), p. 33. 18 Kelly, op. cit., p. 44. 19 Howard Sochurek, "American Special Forces in Action in Vietnam", National Geographic, January 1965, p. 38. 20 There were nearly 600 Special Forces soldiers in Vietnam who were committed to programs other than the CIDG program. 21 There were over 800 U. S. Special Forces soldiers killed or listed as missing in action. Of this number, about half were attributable to other than the CIDG program and/or non-combat losses. 22 Raymond D. Gastil, Can We Win in Vietnam? (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), pp. 90-91.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 408 Epilogue (The following material was extracted from Vietnam Studies: U.S. Army Special Forces, 1961-1971, published by the Department of the Army) THE TURNOVER OF BUON ENAO The problems encountered in turning over the Buon Enao project to the Vietnamese proved to be the same problems which arose every time turnover was attempted in the CIDG program. A discussion of the Buon Enao experience, therefore, is illustrative of the broader turnover experience. The so-called turnover of a CIDG camp consisted of nothing more than "turning over complete authority and responsibility for the camp" to the Vietnamese Special Forces. The CIDG forces present in the camp maintained their CIDG status. The opposite was true in a so-called conversion; civilian irregulars were converted into regular Vietnamese soldiers, Regional or Popular Forces or Vietnamese Army, and lost their CIDG status. Conversion was not very popular among the CIDG. The concept of the CIDG program provided that when an area could be considered secure or became accessible to Vietnam Army units and government agencies, it would be turned over to provincial control. By the end of Operational Switchback, July 1963, the expanded CIDG program was still in the developmental stage only the villages in the Buon Enao complex were considered secure and ready for turnover. Nevertheless, the turnover of Buon Enao was a fail-

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 409 ure. A 5th Special Forces Group synopsis of the CIDG program concluded: "By the end of 1963, the Buon Enao complex was disorganized and most of its effectiveness had been lost." The turnover at Buon Enao gave the first indication of two major problems that would arise later in the transfer of men trained by Special Forces to the government of Vietnam. The first of these was the lack of preparation on the part of the government for taking over and continuing area development projects. The second was the reluctance of strike force troops to be integrated into conventional Vietnamese units. During Operation Switchback some camps were closed out before the assigned mission was accomplished because of the lack of CIDG potential in the area, change of mission, or greater need elsewhere for the strike force personnel. In September 1962 the Darlac Province chief agreed to accept thirty-two of the 214 villages in the Buon Enao complex. These villages were considered secure. It was planned to turn over an additional 107 villages at the end of March 1963 and the remaining villages by the end of June 1963. The government arranged a very rigid schedule for the Buon Enao turnover. The province chief and the Vietnamese Special Forces were given orders to carry out the schedule to the letter. The U.S. Special Forces teams on the sites were therefore unable to alter the schedule, although there is evidence of their considerable apprehension over the possible consequences of an unprepared turnover apprehension that apparently was not shared by the government. Despite the formal co-ordination that took place, actual on-the-scene planning and execution of turnover

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 410 was handled unilaterally by the Vietnamese. The commanding officer of U.S. Special Forces (Provisional), Vietnam, was not shown the turnover plan in advance. By the end of 1962 the chief of Darlac Province had accepted the thirty-two villages, but since he was unable to support them financially or logistically the villages were turned over on paper only. The Special Forces had to continue to support the villages and pay the strike force and other costs. On 20 March 1963 the second lot of 107 villages was turned over with province support of the original thirty-two still not forthcoming. The last 139 villages were to be assimilated into the strategic hamlet program, but because these hamlets had not yet been approved for support by regular U.S.-Vietnamese funds, U.S. Mission funds continued to support all 214 villages in the complex for the next few months. In April 1963, 604 of the 900-man Buon Enao Strike Force were turned over to the province chief to be used for the CIDG program and border surveillance, and one company was sent to open a new camp at Bu Prang in Quang Duc Province. The day after the turnover, the province chief moved the 604 CIDG troops from Buon Enao to Ban Me Thuot for indoctrination, thus leaving the complex without a strike force during the hours of darkness. These actions were taken unilaterally by the Vietnamese and apparently without any indoctrination or psychological preparation of the strike force. Although the province chief had assumed responsibility for the pay of strike force troops on 30 April 1963, they were still unpaid by 26 July and seemed ready to desert, despite the prospect of higher pay scales at the Vietnam Army rate. Neither had the

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 411 village health workers trained at Buon Enao been paid. A serious situation was narrowly averted when the Special Forces provided back pay to strike force troops and village health workers from CIDG funds. Once the strike force troopers left Buon Enao for indoctrination, they did not return but were transferred to other parts of the province, and in the process their unit integrity was destroyed. The dependents of the strike force also started to leave; and there were other disturbing developments that added to the bewilderment and discontent of the Rhade, who had come to view Buon Enao as the source and symbol of the entire program. For example, the dispensary facilities at Buon Enao, which had played a major role in the initiation of the project, were dismantled and moved to Lac Tien and Buon Ho. Concern in Saigon about the large number of weapons distributed to the Rhade resulted, in December 1962, in a government order to reduce the number of weapons by 4,000. Difficulty was encountered in collecting the weapons because the tribesmen had received no instructions to turn them in. The order to do so appeared to them to be inconsistent with what they had been told, namely, that the weapons given them were for the defense of their villages and families. At the time of the turnover, there were still 2,000 more weapons in the province than Saigon regulations permitted, and there were further collections. The Special Forces did not participate in the collection of weapons. Disillusionment following the turnover of Buon Enao may have contributed to the Montagnard uprising which took place in late September 1964.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 412 The reasons for the failure of the Buon Enao turnover can be summarized as follows: mutual suspicion and hostility between the Rhade and Vietnamese province and district officials; overly generous distribution by U.S. agencies of weapons and ammunition to tribesmen whose reaction to government of enforced repossession of some of the weapons was understandably hostile; apparent disregard on the part of the Vietnam government for the interests, desires, and sensitivities of the Montagnards; inadequate Vietnamese government administrative and logistical support; and, finally, failure of U.S. authorities to anticipate these difficulties and avoid them.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 413 Glossary AIR COMMANDO UNIT - A specified grouping of U.S. Air Force personnel and aircraft especially trained and organized to support special warfare ground operations by providing close air support, logistic support, illumination, and psychological operations in isolated and restricted areas. AN-GRC-109 - A military ground radio consisting of a transmitter, receiver and a hand cranked generator for transmitting power. It is capable of providing CW communications up to a range of approximately 2500 miles. AREA CLASSIFICATION - A designation indicating which of the opposing forces has control of an area. RED - One in which the VC operate freely and openly control the civilian population. PINK - One in which the VC and VDP are in a struggle for control. The VC usually dominate during darkness; the VDP during daylight. WHITE - One in which the VDP exercises complete control. AREA SPECIALIST - An individual (asset) who possesses knowledge of the terrain, language, customs, and political-physical make-up of the area of operations. B-RATION - A prepackaged field ration designed to feed a group of men and which normally requires cooking.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 414 C-RATION - A prepackaged emergency ration which requires no cooking and is designed to sustain an individual for one day. CENTRALIZED TRAINING - Trainees are brought to an established training center and instruction is conducted by a training committee. CIVIC ACTION - Those actions performed by the indigenous population of the VDP to improve their economic and social status. Assistance, skills and advice is provided by the SF and the Control Team. CIVIL GUARD - A paramilitary force or militia developed, organized, equipped, and trained to provide protection to the civil populace; or to conduct operations against the VC on a local basis i.e., village or district. COMBAT PATROL - A tactical unit of the SF which is sent out from the base camp (OB) to engage in independent actions against the VC. COMBINED TEAM - The designation given the control element of each VDP. Its members include the Vietnamese representative (PSO), the Area Specialist, and the Special Forces detachment. COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS COMMAND - A communication network which connects the JUWTF with the VDP for the purpose of command control. CONTROL - A communications network which is established within the area of opera-

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 415 tions for the purpose of controlling the VDP. All radios are on a common channel and transmission is permitted only when granted by the Net Control Station or as prescribed in the SOI. OPERATIONS - A communications network which connects an operational unit with the base camp for the purpose of reporting information and/or requesting assistance. SECURITY - A communications network established within the base camp (OB) for the purpose of internal security. COUNTERINSURGENCY - Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by the VDP to defeat subversive insurgency. DECENTRALIZED TRAINING - That training which is brought to the trainees. It is conducted by group (village) with a limited number of instructors. DROP ZONE - A specified area upon which airborne troops, equipment, and supplies are dropped by parachute, or on which supplies and equipment may be delivered by free fall. FIELD INSPECTION TEAM - A group of particularly trained people who are selected to visit trained villages on a periodic basis for the purpose of conducting military assistance, medical assistance, weapons repair, inspecting facilities and defenses, gathering intelligence, and conducting civic action-psychological operations. FIELD TRAINING EXERCISES - A simulated combat exercise conducted in the field and un-

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 416 der conditions where the enemy is either imaginary or in outline. FIRING RANGES KNOWN DISTANCE - An area is cleared of all vegetation and obstructions and firing lines are placed at specific distances from the targets. Firing is from conventional positions and is for the purpose of teaching basic marksmanship and familiarization firing. JUNGLE LANE - Restricted terrain is used to emplace a path or trail and vegetation remains undisturbed. Targets are placed to either side of the trail and at varying distances (limited to visibility). Firers are expected to detect and engage targets by rapidly firing from the shoulder or the hip. MALAYAN RANGE - This range requires that vegetation be discriminately removed to emplace concealed moving and pop-up targets. The firer remains at a fixed position (firing line) and is required to engage targets to his front which instantaneously show themselves. In three seconds the targets are returned to the down position. The purpose of this range is to teach the firer to detect and engage targets rapidly. SHOOTING GALLERY - A clearing is made in the jungle and various types of targets are strung at varying distances (up to 50 meters). The targets are easily distinguishable (painted different colors and common items) i.e., light bulbs, balloons,

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 417 ammo cans, etc. The instructor identifies the target and the firer must search the area and hit the specified target. The purpose of this range is to develop quick reaction firing. GUERRILLA - A combat participant (VC) in guerrilla warfare. He may or may not be a member of a military force. GUERRILLA WARFARE OPERATIONAL AREA - A geographical area in which the organization, development, conduct and supervision of guerrilla warfare and associated activities by Special Forces detachments assists the accomplishment of the theater mission. IMMEDIATE ACTION - Applies to the unhesitating and decisive actions taken by a combat force which is unsuspectingly confronted by the VC. INK BLOT - The term which identifies the method by which the VDP expands by spreading itself from the OB outward in all directions (360 degrees). JOINT OPERATIONS CENTER - A headquarters of special officers of all services who coordinate ground, air and sea operations and the support thereof. JOINT UNCONVENTIONAL TASK FORCE - An organization composed of elements of two or more services which is constituted and designated by the commander of a unified or specified command to plan and direct unconventional warfare. LANDING ZONE - A specified zone within an objective area used for the landing of aircraft. METHODS OF INSTRUCTION - Those basic fundamentals which attribute toward good

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 418 teaching methods and enhance the attention and desire of the student to learn. MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP - A joint service group normally under the military command of a commander of a unified or specified command; primarily administers the U.S. military assistance and planning program in Vietnam. MONTAGNARD - The name designating the mountain people or tribesmen in Vietnam. A group ethnically different from the Vietnamese and equally different in appearance. MILITARY OCCUPATION SPECIALTY - A term used to identify the duty and functions for which an individual soldier is trained and qualified. NET CONTROL STATION - A station designated to control traffic and enforce circuit discipline within a given net. ON-THE-JOB-TRAINING - A training process whereby trainees acquire knowledge and skills through actual performance of duties under competent supervision, in accordance with an approved, planned program. OPERATIONAL BASE - The locality from which VDP operations are projected and supported. The base contains installations which provide logistic, administrative, medical, intelligence, and operations support. Lines of communications stretch out connecting sub-OB's and other various elements of the VDP. OPERATIONAL COMMAND - Those functions of command over assigned forces involving the composition of subordinate forces, the assignment of tasks, the designation of objec-

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 419 tives, the overall control of assigned resources, and the full authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. OPERATION CONTROL - Those functions of command involving the composition of subordinate forces, the assignment of tasks, the designation of objectives and the authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control should be exercised through the chain-of-command. It does not include such matters as administration, discipline, internal organization, etc. OPERATIONS TRAINING - Military action carried out for the purpose of training. TACTICAL - Military action conducted for the purpose of accomplishing objectives. PSYCHOLOGICAL - Military action conducted for the purpose of winning the indigenous support for the VDP, PANJI OR PUNJI STAKE - A sharpened bamboo stick which is emplaced in the ground or in pit-falls for the purpose of supplementing a defense or for inflicting casualties on moving foot patrols. PHASES OF VILLAGE DEFENSE PREPARATORY (PHASE I) - That phase where development of the OB and the security of such is undertaken. It includes actions required to win the support of the indigenous population as well as recruiting key personnel.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 420 INITIATION (PHASE H) - That phase where priority is placed on training the SF and village defenders. COUNTERACTION (PHASE III) - That phase where an all-out effort is made to clear the VC from the area through military actions. REALIGNMENT PHASE (PHASE IV) - That phase where the VDP is expanded to include the establishment of sub-OB's. DEMOBILIZATION (PHASE V) - That phase which completes the mission of the VDP. The GVN is presented the VD force for implementation into its paramilitary force program. PIASTER - The term used for Vietnamese currency. The international rate of exchange is about 32 piasters to the American dollar; the local (Vietnam) rate of exchange is about 72 to one; the blackmarket rate of exchange is about 100 to one. (1962 rates). PRELIMINARY MARKSMANSHIP INSTRUCTION - The training in basic fundamentals of firing a weapon which takes place before men are permitted to fire on the range. PREDEPLOYMENT TRAINING - Training accomplished by the Special Forces detachment which is designed specifically for the mission and area of operations. PRESIDENTIAL SURVEY OFFICER - An agency of the Vietnamese government which has the responsibility for the conduct of special operations. PROPAGANDA - Any information, ideas, doctrines, or special appeals in support of VDP ob-

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 421 jectives, designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes or behavior of the Montagnards in order to benefit the GVN, either directly or indirectly. BLACK - Propaganda which purports to emanate from a source other than the true one. GREY - Propaganda which does not specifically identify any source. WHITE - Propaganda disseminated and acknowledged by the sponsor or an accredited agency thereof. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS - The term includes psychological warfare, and addition encompasses those political, economic, sociological, and ideological actions planned and conducted to create in neutral or friendly foreign groups the emotions, attitudes, or behavior favorable to the achievement of national objectives. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE - The planned use of propaganda and other psychological actions having the primary purpose of influencing the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of hostile foreign groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national objectives. RADIO COMMUNICATIONS PRC-6 - A military hand held radio which operates on a set frequency (crystal) and has a rated range of about one mile. PRC-10 - A military man transported radio which can operate on a number of tuned frequencies and has a rated range of about 8 miles.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 422 RT-20 - A commercial fixed radio which operates on a set frequency and has a rated range of about 25 miles. RECONNAISSANCE PATROL - A small patrol used to gain information of the VC, preferably without his knowledge. REST AND RECUPERATION - The term which defines those periods where men are taken from a combat zone and sent to safe areas for relaxation for a short period of time. The purpose is to reduce combat fatigue. RHADE - One of the numerous Montagnard tribes which dwells in the Vietnamese Highlands. RURAL HEALTH PROGRAM - A Vietnamese sponsored program aimed at providing medical care and treatment in the remote areas by training local people as medics and placing them on the government payroll. SPECIAL FORCES - Military personnel with cross training in basic and specialized military skills, organized into small, multiple purpose detachments with the mission to train, organize, supply, direct, and control indigenous forces in guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency operations. SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONAL BASE -The location of the Special Forces Group during operations to provide command, administration, training, operational supervision, logistical support and intelligence for committed Special Forces detachments. STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES - A set of instructions covering those features of

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 423 operations which lend themselves to a definite or standardized procedure without loss of effectiveness. STRATEGIC HAMLET - A program established by the GVN in which a village is defended by the actions and-or presence of the regular military forces. In many instances villages are relocated into a strong, fortified hamlet for protection and security of the people. STRIKE FORCE - The military arm of the VDP. This paramilitary force is organized and trained to conduct offensive actions against the VD as required. GROUP - A 10-12 man organization similar to an infantry squad. SECTION - A 30-35 man unit similar in organization to an infantry platoon. COMPANY - A 100-120 man unit similar in organization to an infantry company. BATTALION - A 500-700 man unit similar in organization to an infantry battalion. SUB-OPERATIONAL BASE - A complex which carries on many of the tasks of the OB during the expansion phase of the VDP. There may be one or more of these sub-bases established which are under the operational control of the OB. SRET - A Vietnamese, plainclothes police force which conducts many types of police activities in and around the Provinces. TABLE OF DISTRIBUTION - A table which prescribes the organizational structure and personnel of a military unit to perform a specific mission for which there is no appropriate table of organization and equipment.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 424 TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT - A table which prescribes the normal mission, organizational structure, and personnel and equipment authorization for a military unit. TACTICAL AIR - That air support which provides close air support, interdiction, harassment, and reconnaissance in support of ground operations. TACTICAL OPERATIONS CENTER - A physical groupment of those elements of the general and special staff concerned with the current tactical operations and the tactical support thereof. TEAM COMMANDER - The individual (commander) placed in charge of a VDP who issues appropriate orders to forces and personnel placed at his disposal for the accomplishment of the mission. VIET CONG - The name applied to the Vietnamese insurgent (guerrilla). HARD CORE - The well trained, dedicated and completely indoctrinated VC who is employed on a full time basis. REGULAR - The VC who is recruited or forced to join the VC band and is not completely dedicated to their cause. He may or may not be assigned to an active unit. IRREGULAR - The VC who is the village soldier. He operates from the confines of his village providing intelligence, collecting taxes, etc. for the VC units.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON 425 VIET CONG POW CLASSIFICATION CLASS I - The VC who will not subject to interrogation nor will they attempt to be reindoctrinated. CLASS II - The VC who can be persuaded to submit to interrogation and who is undecided as to what course to follow. CLASS III - The VC who easily submits to interrogation and who is willingly in favor of being reindoctrinated. VILLAGE DEFENDER - The villager who is armed and trained to oppose the VC from the confines of his village. He receives no pay and continues to support himself from his civil occupation. VILLAGE DEFENSE - The act of making a village capable of providing its own security and defense through the use of local paramilitary forces. Villages are not relocated but each village becomes a mesh of defenses opposing the VC. VILLAGE DEFENSE PROGRAM - A counterinsurgency resistance movement gained by organizing the civilian population of a given area to resist the VC. This is accomplished through military actions by a paramilitary force, civic action programs, psychological operations, and security for the indigenous people.

VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON ABBREVIATIONS ADMIN - Administrative AID - Agency for International Development AMMO - Ammunition AR Automatic Rifle ARVN - Army Republic of Vietnam BAR - Browning Automatic Rifle CG - Civil Guard CI - Counterinsurgency COMMO - Communications CP - Command Post CT - Combined Team CW - Continuous Wave (keying) DZ - Drop Zone FAC - Forward Air Controller FIT - Field Inspection Team FOI - Field Operations Intelligence FTX - Field Training Exercise GVN - Government of Vietnam

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VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON GWOA - Guerrilla Warfare Operations Area HQ - Headquarters ID - Identification INTEL - Intelligence INTPR - Interpreter ISUMS - Intelligence Summaries IVS International Volunteer Service JOC - Joint Operations Center JUWTF - Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force KD - Known Distance KP - Kitchen Police LMG - Light Machine Gun LZ - Landing Zone MAAG - Military Assistance Advisory Group MAP - Military Assistance Program MAS-49 - French Automatic Rifle MATS-36 - French Rifle MG - Machine Gun MOI - Method of Instruction

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VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON NCS - Net Control Station OB - Operational Base OJT - On The Job Training OPLAN - Operations Plan PCS - Permanent Change of Station PMI - Preliminary Marksmanship Instruction POL - Petroleum, Oils & Lubricants POW - Prisoner of War PRC - Portable Radio Communications PSO - Presidential Survey Office PSYOPS - Psychological Operations PSYWAR - Psychological Warfare RR - Recoilless Rifle R&R - Rest & Relaxation RVN - Republic of Vietnam SAF - Special Action Force SEC - Section SDF - Self Defense Force SF - Strike Force

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VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON SFOB - Special Forces Operational Base SITREP - Situation Report SMG - Submachine Gun SOI - Signal Operating Instructions SOP - Standing Operating Procedures SVN - South Vietnam TACAIR - Tactical Aircraft TD - Table of Distribution TDY - Temporary Duty TOC - Tactical Operations Center TO&E - Table of Organization & Equipment UDT - Underwater Demolition Team USIS - United States Information Service USOM - United States Operations Mission UW - Unconventional Warfare VC - Viet Cong VD - Village Defense VDP - Village Defense Program VIP - Very Important Person

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VILLAGE DEFENSE by COL. RONALD A SHACKLETON VNAF - Vietnamese Air Force

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