The Principles of International/Global Distributive Justice ngela Spagnoli Rodrguez

The principles of international distributive justice

ngela Spagnoli Rodrguez (20110890) Aarhus University International Jurisprudence. Department of Law Abstract: the purpose of this essay is to describe the most important aspects of Rawl's Principles of Distributive Justice as well as analyze the flaws some critics have pointed out in Rawlsian principles of justice. The "difference principle", which expresses the idea that certain social inequalities are unjust when they mean an improvement in the situation of the most disadvantaged, plays a central role in the theory of justice of Rawls. However, when considering the field of international relations (mainly in The Law of Peoples), this principle is completely forgotten to be replaced by a more modest "duty of assistance." Thus, Rawls's commitment to egalitarian ideals does not apply when it comes to considering the economic inequities in the international order. Among other philosophers, Thomas Pogge, has been trying to extend Rawls's domestic justice to the global level to develop global justice. Keywords: Rawls, Distributive Justice, A Theory of Justice, Difference Principle, Law of Peoples, Pogge, Beitz..

The Principles of International/Global Distributive Justice ngela Spagnoli Rodrguez

1 INTRODUCTION Contemporary theories of global justice argue that situations of extreme poverty and misery in the countries of the underdeveloped world is a problem of global economic justice. According to global poverty estimates on which this estatements are based, about 2,800 million people live below the poverty line. Among about 6150 million human beings, 815 million lack adequate nutrition, 1100 million lack access to safe water, and 2400 million lack basic 815 million lack adequate nutrition, 1,100 million lack access to safe drinking water and 2400 million lack basic sanitation, more than 880 million lack access to basic health services, approximately 1000 million have no adequate shelter.Roughly one-third of all human deaths, some 50000 daily, are due to poverty-related causes.1 The crudeness of these data and the implication of global economic order in increasing poverty allows them to show that the serious deficiencies that today millions of people are living today in the world can be characterized as unfair, and that situations of poverty and inequality exist, particularly in the developing world, are a problem of global economic justice. That is the reason why the advocates of global justice ask themselves: what can be done in the global economy to reduce extreme poverty? The statements of the advocates of global justice are contested by important theorists of liberal tradition and political realism.The existence of deep inequalities among members of the world's poorest countries and citizens of the richest countries is not in itself an injustice. The fact that such large inequalities exist and that there are situations of extreme poverty and misery in the poorest countries in the world does not necessarily mean that these are unfair and need to restructure the international order in terms of global or cosmopolitan dimension of the idea of distributive justice. The ethical response to the extreme poverty of the poorest countries in the world should be, for these philosophers, a humanitarian response that has nothing to do with a restructuring of the international order, according to the requirements of justice. This position has been defended, among others, by Rawls.

2 RAWL'S THEORY OF JUSTICE In A Theory of Justice, Rawls attempts to solve the problem of distributive justice by utilising a variant of the familiar device of the social contract. The resultant theory is
1 Matthew Clayton, Andrew Williams. Social Justice.

The Principles of International/Global Distributive Justice ngela Spagnoli Rodrguez

known as "Justice as Fairness", from which Rawls derives his two principles of justice: the liberty principle and the difference principle. He called his theory justice as: fairness, supported in the idea that only from impartial conditions can obtain unbiased results. The fairness of the contractual situation which he calls the original position is ensured by a veil of ignorance that prevents participants to the agreement to observe and have all particular knowledge, including those related to their own identity and society to which they belong. Broadly speaking, the theory of Rawls believes that the principles of justice that are subject to of an agreement between rational, free and equal in a contractual situation fair may have a universal and unconditional validity. Rawls argues that the principles of justice which would establish the basis of an ideal society are principles which would be chosen by every individual if every individual were in an 'original position' of equality with regard to rights and duties and if all individuals were acting rationally in a mutually disinterested manner. This 'original position' is a hypothetical situation in which every individual is acting behind a 'veil of ignorance' as to his or her own social position, class status, individual assets, and personal aptitudes or abilities.

2.1

Original Position

In Rawls, the original position is a hypothetical situation where the parties can deliberate with each other equally and reach principles of justice with no knowledge about their specific interests and social position. 2 The idea of the original position is used to arrive at domestic and global principles of justice in A Theory of Justice and The Law of Peoples respectively. An important difference is that Rawls specifies the parties to the domestic original position as representatives of persons, whereas he specifies the parties to the global original position as representatives of states in The Law of Peoples.

2.2

Veil Of Ignorance

2 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p.11

The Principles of International/Global Distributive Justice ngela Spagnoli Rodrguez

The veil of ignorance3 is a concept used by Rawls to reach the two principles of justice. It consists in when people choose the principles of justice do not know which will be their specific circumstances. The principles that do not emerged from the veil of ignorance would not be acceptable. Principles that would be proposed if the future circumstances of a person are known, are to be excluded. For example, you dont know whether you are rich or poor, so would have no motivation to propose principles that favor rich or poor. In justice as fairness the original position of equality corresponds to the state of nature in the traditional theory of the social contrat. This original position is not, of course, thought of as an actual historical state of affairs, much less as a primitive condition of culture. It is understood as a purely hypothetical situation characterized so as to lead to a certain conception of justice. Among the essential features of this situation is that no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does any one know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like. I shall even assume that the parties do not know their conceptions of the good or their special psychological propensities.4

2.3

Rawls's Two Principles of Justice

These two principles are based on the original position according to which the individuals behind a veil of ignorance would choose the principles of justice. Rawls proposes the following principles5: 1. Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme for all; and in this scheme the equal basic liberties, and only those liberties, are to be guaranteed their fair value. 2. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society
3 This concept was not created by Rawls, but his theory allowed a large diffusion of this concept. 4 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p.11 5 Rawls, A theory of Justice 1971

The Principles of International/Global Distributive Justice ngela Spagnoli Rodrguez

The first principle is known as The Liberty Principle. The second principle is The Equality Principle and is divided in two parts: the former, Fair Equality of Opportunity and the latter is The Difference Principle. The first principle has priority over the second. Rawls explains that the logical priority of the first principle of justice over the second principle implies that violations of basic rights cannot be justified by the fact that such violations may produce economic or social advantages. Furthermore, the logical priority of the first part of the second principle over the second part implies that violations upon fair equality of opportunity can not be justified by arguing that such violations may produce economic or social advantages. The Liberty Principle entails that each person should have the right to political liberty, such as the right to vote or stand for election, liberty of conscience and freedom of thought, the right to hold personal property, freedom of speech and assembly, and freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure. Rawl wishes to see all these freedoms distributed equally, as he asserts that this is the basis of a just society. Regard to the Difference Principle the goal point of Rawls can be stated in either of two distinctive ways: as minimizing the difference (measured in terms of income or wealth) between the topmost and bottom-most group, consistent with the realization of everyones continual betterment, or as achieving the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, that is, the greatest benefit for the least well-off group. The second principle gives also priority to justice over effectiveness, although is compatible with it. The principle of efficiency or Pareto criterion says that the welfare of a group is at its best point when it is impossible for any of its members to improve without at least one is harmed. This principle of efficiency allows large inequalities and therefore unfair distributions. The difference principle would prevent these inequalities by making those inequalities to work in favor of the most disadvantaged. Equal opportunities, in turn, guarantee the fairness of this distribution.

3 THE LAW OF PEOPLES

The Principles of International/Global Distributive Justice ngela Spagnoli Rodrguez

In A Theory of Justice, Rawls failed to discuss the issue of injustice between different societies.6 The "difference principle", previously explained, plays an important role in the theory of justice of Rawls. However, when considering the field of international relations (mainly in The Law of Peoples), this principle is completely forgotten to be replaced by a more modest "duty of assistance." Thus, Rawls's commitment to egalitarian ideals does not apply when it comes to considering the economic inequalities in the international order. The famous Rawlsian principles of basic justice (equal liberty, equality of opportunity and the difference principle) do not apply at a global level.

3.1

Equality among peoples

Rawls explains that there are two perspectives on equality between peoples: one that argues that equality is fair and is a good in itself which is necessary to aspire, the other the law of peoples, which states that inequalities are not always unfair and, when they are, is because the consequences they generate are unfavorable for those who are inequitably considered. Rawls offers three reasons why is needed to worry about reducing inequalities between rich and poor, even though this does not mean completely eliminating the economic gap between them. a. One reason to reduce inequality is to relieve the suffering and hardships of the poor. This idea does not mean that all people should be equally rich. No matter how big the gap between rich and poor, as long as the criterion of reciprocity work equally and thus the least advantaged have the means to use the freedoms we enjoy and live with it rationally and reasonably. When this is achieved is not necessary to completely eliminate the gap between rich and poor7. b. A second reason for narrowing the gap between rich and poor is the gap that often leads to stigmatization and discrimination of some citizens. Given the gap between rich and poor, it is possible stigmatization and discrimination of some citizens from other less advantaged by its location, which is recognized as unfair. This idea is applicable to the society of peoples, in which people are more advantaged than others. The duty of assistance between peoples makes that feelings of inferiority do not have justification. That is because every people is organized according their needs and
6 Rawls considers in his A Theory of Justice the question of justice in international relations only in one paragraph concerned with a matter of conscientious refusal 7 Rawls, The Law of Peoples, p. 114.

The Principles of International/Global Distributive Justice ngela Spagnoli Rodrguez

wealth, and they should not feel inferior because they have the ability to act fairly, to save, to make agreements with other peoples of the society to which they belong, if they want to grow economically.8. c. A third reason to consider the inequalities between peoples concerning the important role of equity in the political processes of the basic structure of the society of peoples. Equality between citizens is expressed in equal opportunities when advantaged social positions opt for, given the talents and efforts of the same citizen. Ensuring an equitable education for all, eliminating discrimination between them. Here, the idea of equity is taken from the second original position in which each people, invested with a veil of ignorance, enables the establishment of the principles of justice that govern their relationships9. Rawls does not share the idea that it is necessary to redistribute wealth among the people in order to consider the organization of a Law of Peoples fair. The reason is that the fate and welfare of a country does not depend on the wealth possessed, but on its political culture. The function of the duty of assistance10 between people is to help disadvantaged societies so that they can become members of the society of peoples and thus political order. The difference between the principle of duty of assistance proposed by the Law of Peoples and a principle of distributive justice is that it is undisputed that when you attend a society, there comes a time when such assistance is no longer necessary, because the people have achieved became autonomous. To end, several principles have been proposed to regulate inequalities among peoples. Two of these are discussed by Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge through the global egalitarian principle. Although Rawls accept Beitzs and Pogges goals of attaining liberal and decent institutions, securing human rights and meeting basic needs, there is a main difference between the their global egalitarian principle and the duty of assistance of the Law of Peoples. While in the society of the Law of Peoples the duty of assistance
8 Rawls, The Law of Peoples, p 114.

9 Rawls, The Law of Peoples, p 114 and p. 115. 10 Rawls propuso un deber de asistencia como alternativa al principio de justicia distributivo internacional, que tendra, segn l, muchas ventajas con respecto a este ltimo. Una de ellas es que tendra un punto de corte; es decir, un momento en el cual, una vez que se satiscieron ciertas metas mnimas deseables en la sociedad ms desaventajada, entonces ya no ser necesario continuar con la transferencia de recursos por parte de la sociedad ms aventajada

The Principles of International/Global Distributive Justice ngela Spagnoli Rodrguez

holds until all societies have achieved just liberal and or decent basic institutions, the global egalitarian principle has not a definite target and cutoff point. 3.2 Beitz's Two Principles.

As I said, several principles have been proposed to regulate inequalities among peoples and prevent their becoming excessive. Two of these are discussed by Charles Beitz.11 He distinguishes between what he calls the resource redistribution principle and a global distribution principle. We can state the distinction between them as follows: suppose first, that the production of goods and services in all countries is autarkic, that is, each country relies entirely on its own labor and resources, and societies in such areas can be expected to make the best use of their natural riches and prosper. Other societies are no so fortunate, and despite their best efforts, may attain only a meager level of well being because of resource scarcities. Beitz views the resource redistribution principle as giving each society a fair chance to establish just political institutions and an economy that can fulfill its members' basic needs. Affirming this principle provides assurance to persons in resource-poor societies that their adverse fate will not prevent them from realizing economic conditions sufficient to support just social institutions and to protect human rights. He doesn't explain how the countries with sufficient resource are to redistribute them to resourcepoor countries. The global distribution principle that Beitz discusses concerns a situation where production is no longer autarkic and there are flows of trade and services between countries. He believes that in this case a global system of cooperation already exist. In this instance Beitz proposes that a global difference principle applies (like the principle used by Rawls in A Theory of Justice), giving a principle of distributive justice between societies. Since he believes that the wealthier countries are so because of the greater resources available to them, presumably the global principle redistribute the benefits of greater resources to resource-poor peoples. Rawls argues that an international difference principle should not exist because it would impose a constant load (unfair) for rich countries. In particular, he argues that:
11 Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations.

The Principles of International/Global Distributive Justice ngela Spagnoli Rodrguez

(i) an international distributive justice principle would impose constant unfair burdens to wealthy countries to benefit others who are at a disadvantage situation as a result of bad and irresponsible decisions made in the past (for example, if a country choose an industrial culture and another choose a more pastoral and leisurely society) and, (ii) as the crucial element of the development of a country is not based on its position in the international arena, but in its political culture, the civic virtues and policies of its members (making a parallel with domestic justice, are not relevant the initial arbitrary circumstances, but the "decisions" that a society takes) a principle of international distributive justice would be rendered superfluous. Indeed, if the arbitrariness in the distribution of initial conditions is a factor that must be taken into account when analyzing the causes of poverty or economic wealth of a country, then it will not be necessary to transfer resources from one country another to improve their situation.

3.3

Pogge on International Distributive Justice.

Thomas Pogge has been advocating extending Rawlss theory of domestic justice to the global level to develop a theory of global justice. According to him, Rawlsian global justice should be committed to Rawlss two theoretical commitments of his two principles of justice: treating each individual as free and equal and preserving background justice. From Pogges point of view, Rawlss own suggestions of global justice in A Theory of Justice are not consistent with these two commitments. The main points for Pogge are: a) that the fundamental principles of justice must have a global reach, b) there must be sought some international institutions to implement it, and c) the specific rules applied to nation-states must be consistent with such principles and institutions. Another central element in Pogge's perspective is that human rights must be seen as the primary focus in theory and practice of global justice.

The Principles of International/Global Distributive Justice ngela Spagnoli Rodrguez

Pogges cosmopolitan point of view is expressed clearly in his proposal of global justice: to address global justice in a one-step procedure without the separate decisions of domestic and global conceptions of justice and in a global original position in which parties are representatives of peoples. For Pogge, states, peoples or any other groups do not have an independent value unless they can take care of the interests of individuals. Rawls, however, does not hold a cosmopolitan view and this can be seen from the fact that the Law of People s does not incorporate a global difference principle and it tolerates decent nonliberal societies. Pogge presents reasons for extending Rawlss conception of the domestic case to the global case that can be supported by the two commitments of Rawlss theory: one is that to treat all human beings as free and equal and the other is the recognition of the importance of background justice of the basic structure. In keeping with these two commitments of a Rawlsian conception of justice, Pogge suggests we develop a conception of global justice from a single global original position. Pogge claims that there is an inconsistency between theories of justice of Rawls. Both Rawl's text (ATJ and LOP) are thought experiments involving a fictional deliverative forum, the original position, composed of rational parties. In the domestic case the parties represents individual persons. In the international case we can find four divergencies: (i) the rational deliberators are conceived as representing peoples rather than persons, and the international original position is said to model the freedom and equality of people; (ii) representation is granted only yo peoples who are well-ordered by having a liberal or a decent domestic institutional order, while the others are not accepted as equals and are denied from equal respect and tolerance; (iii) The veil of ignorance is thin enough to allow the parties to know if people are representing a liberal or a decent peoples; (iv) And the task assigned to the parties to the international original position differs considerably from the domestic, its function is not to reach agreement on public criteria for the assessment, design and reform of the global institutional order, but agree a set of standards of good behavior that people must obey in cooperation. Developing his domestic theory, Rawls writes, at some level there must exist a closed background system, and it is this subject for which we want a theory. And so he assumes throughout, if only for purposes of a first approximation, that the society whose institutional order he discusses is self-contained , more or less self sufficient,

The Principles of International/Global Distributive Justice ngela Spagnoli Rodrguez

and a closed system isolated from other societies. The citizens of such a society ought to structure it, he concludes, according to his public criterion of justice (the two principles with the two priority rules). At this point Pogge states that the world at large is self contained, more or less self-sufficient, and a closed system isolated from others societies so it seems to fit Rawl's requirements. So...what if it is structured according to the public criterion of social justice that Rawls suggests in his domestic theory? Rawls do not only denies that we should do it, but even insists that we should not. Even if a fair world government was unfeasible, this does not invalidate the application of public criteria of social justice worldwide: this criterion does not prescribe a specific institutional design, but governs the comparative assessment of alternative feasible institutional designs. Applied globally, it would instruct us to design global political institutions that would secure the basic liberties of human beings as design the global economic possible and to order so that fair equality of opportunity is realized

worldwide as far as possible and so that it engenders socioeconomic inequalities among persons only insofar as this raises the socioeconomic floor. Rawls could say that it would be wrong to impose a global order designed according to a liberal criterion of social justice upon decent peoples who may reject the normative individualism of this criterion as well as its emphasis on basic liberties. His international theory is needed, then, to accommodate decent peoples whom liberalsare to tolerate and welcome as equal members in good standing of the Society of Peoples.12 In this respect, Pogge formulates 3 questions: Why the theory that should be appropriate for the accommodation between supporters and those who reject normative individualism, is the one that rejects it? Second, why should the opponents of normative individualism be accommodated opponents of normative individualism in the design of international global order but not in the design of the domestic institutional order of a liberal society? Why does Rawls, by not envisioning more liberal global arrangements, assume that the accommodation of decent hierarchical societies is needed forever? Is this a stipulation based on principle or an empirical prediction? Pogge also criticizes the fact that Rawls puts so much moral weight on the notion of a people but the notion remains vague in two senses. First, he sais that it is unclear what groups are to count as peoples, and how each of the recognized people is delimited.
12 Rawls, Law of Peoples, p. 59

The Principles of International/Global Distributive Justice ngela Spagnoli Rodrguez

All these questions have considerable importance in any attempt to make the "Society of Peoples" Rawls imagines as his "realistic utopia." In short, Pogge has challenged Rawls's project in general. He said one of the central problems of Rawls's theory is that advocates a double standard. While on the one hand, relies on a strong equality commitment in his theory of justice, on the other hand, he did not find troublesome the fact that there are great inequalities between countries.

4 CONCLUSION Rawls's work is an essential reference for intellectual and political debate about the goals and priorities that should characterize the projects of political and economic reform of complex democratic societies. The question of global justice gained great concern with such a significant contribution to the debate of the works written by Charles Beitz, Brian Barry, Thomas Pogge to name only the most important ones. The central question of the current liberal debate over global justice is how the requirements of justice are to be transformed from a domestic to global scope. And since Rawlsian justice as fairness is still the main inspiration for all discussions on justice, many philosophers concentrated their research on the question, whether to globalize or not to globalize Rawls. Such cosmopolitans as Pogge or Beitz argue for globalizing Rawls, for example, extending Rawlsian justice as fairness to the world at large. They derive all the consequences from A Theory of Justice, applied to the global realm and argue for the global difference principle and protection of universal human rights. But, as I said, John Rawls himself rejects the cosmopolitan idea and formulates his own conception of international justice in The Law of Peoples. Although I consider useful the theories exposed by Rawls in A theory of justice ", from my point of view the reasons given by Rawls to reject a global difference principle are not sufficiently convincing. The contradiction, in my opinion, we find in the theoretical formulation of justice proposed by Rawls resides in wanting to reach collective values based on individual values. It is clear that any theory of justice can ignore individuality.

The Principles of International/Global Distributive Justice ngela Spagnoli Rodrguez

I will propose some questiones as a reflection: do the situations of poverty and radical inequality that exist in developing countries, constitute a problem of global economic justice? In what situations can be said that radical inequality and poverty are unjust? Does the existence of huge disparities between members of the world's poorest countries and citizens of the richest countries express an injustice? Some philosophers who have addressed this issue suggest that can not be characterized as unfair the deep deprivations that millions of people in the world are suffering, nor that the situations of poverty and radical inequality in the developing world are a problem global economic justice. The fact that there are such large disparities does not necessarily mean that they are unfair. The ethical response to radical inequality and poverty is, for these philosophers, a humanitarian response that has nothing to do with justice. This is expressed in there can be no principles of justice than those established by each community to regulate internally their political life, meaning that there are no principles of global justice.

The Principles of International/Global Distributive Justice ngela Spagnoli Rodrguez

Bibliography:
J. Rawls, Law of Peoples, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1999. J. Rawls, A theory of Justice, OXFORD University Press, Cambridge,1971. Rex Martin and David A. Reidy, Rawls's Law of Peoples: A Realistic Utopia?, Blackwell, 2006. T. Pogge, Realizing Rawls, Cornell University Press 1989.